

Chapter 16: From Global to National Views: Examining Intelligence Gathering as an Intelligence-curbing Policy: A Review Essay

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Abstract

It is pertinent to note that insurgency has been a menace to the development of human capital and natural resources on a global scale. No doubt, every state is proffering solutions to curb the threat of insurgent and terrorist groups. This paper will focus on insurgency from the global, regional and national perspectives, adopting three selected countries such as Great Britain, Sri Lanka and France (globe), Kenya (Regional) and Nigeria (National). In addition, timely and accurate intelligence has been used by governments and security agencies to submerge the activities of the insurgent group, yet the war against them still persists. Entrancing intuitions from the prevailing literature, the paper views that the root causes of insurgency need to be addressed timely in order to curtail it. More so, some of the security agencies lacks the modern tools in gathering intelligence such as measurement and signature intelligence (SIGMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and so on. It concludes that insurgents group operate differently base on ideology, religion, political motivation, uneven distribution of resources, secession and so on. Nevertheless, with accurate, timely and prompt intelligence sharing the govern-ments and security agencies will able to combat and win the war against terrorists cum insurgents' group.

Keywords: Counterinsurgency, Ideology, Intelligence gathering, Insurgent's group, Security forces.

Introduction

Insurgency has been a massive hindrance to Nigeria's peaceful coexistence. Terrorism cum insurgency are two sides of the same coin; insurgents utilize terror attacks to perpetrate their nefarious activities such as bombing, killing, kidnapping, robbery and so on (Adegoke 2017). The Nigerian Government has been battling terrorism and insurgency threats for over a decade and has been unable to win the battle due to the lack of strategic and coordinated intelligence (Agbibo 2018). However, several factors have contributed to the failure to combat and defeat the terrorist group. These, among others, include a lack of timely and reliable intelligence concerning the terrorists, inadequate Intelligence sharing amongst the security agencies, a lack of political will on the part of the government, and failure to address the root causes (Onuoha 2018). Pertinent to note is the point that insurgency poses primary threats to national security and must be treated with vigour by the government (Agbibo 2017).

The British Approach in Curbing Insurgency

It is crucial to note the British approach in the war against insurgency. The British experience in Northern Ireland, especially the combat against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) that started in year 1969 and they used timely and accurate intelligence to curb the menace of insurgency. Another insurgent group surfaced, and they were active in the Northern Ireland at that period, but PIRA's remained the major threat. The PIRA has been qualified as highly developed in terms of intelligence-led terrorist group because of its functional and capacity precision (Isyaku 2017).

Related to different countries engaging insurgent warfare, the United Kingdom came to the animosity in Northern Ireland with important experience in counter insurgency (COIN) and its current appendage, counterterrorism (Umejesi 2016). Some of the United Kingdom's former insurgent warfare has been held up as examples of efficiency in such wars. Inadequate and inaccurate intelligence gathering were a key origin of the problems. It was reported by historian Chris Ryder that, 'the principal weakness, according to the Chief of

the General Staff who visited the Northern Ireland in 1971 was an inadequate intelligence gathering' (Isyaku 2017).

In the bid to curtail insurgency, intelligence must deliver the critical insight needed to understand what actions will be useful and what levels of dedication are required, the tactical insight to attack the insurgent group when military action is used, this operation need to be discreet and properly planned to achieved huge success (Sumner 2004). Different agencies were involved in the intelligence combat against PIRA. From the onset the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which was expected to lead the intelligence collection to avert insurgency, was not availed to do the needful at the right time (Lowenthal 2002). This made the British Army to interfere in Northern Ireland and impetus it (and other intelligence agencies) to take the lead in intelligence gathering (Casey 2007). As the uprising became more acute, many different intelligence units from the law enforcement, military and intelligence agents were established. More so, national agencies like MI5, MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service and Security Service respectively birthed to gathered political and economy intelligence (Lowenthal 2002).

It is important to note the insurgency in Sri Lanka and how their government won the insurgents war through accurate and timely intelligence. Sri Lanka experiences the deadliest, threat to its sovereignty and stability to the nation since her independence in 1948 from the British government (Wannesburg 2005). The insurgent's war started from late 1970s between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan government. There are two major tribes in Sri Lanka they are Sinhalese and Tamils. The Sinhalese are the majority, consisting of 85% of the population while the Tamils are just 15% (Casey 2007).

According to Tarlebba (2010) the Tamils tribe later formed an insurgency group called Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which later metamorphosed to Liberation Tigers of Tamils Eelam (LTTE) in 1976, headed by Velupillai Prabhakaran. They engaged in insurgency activities with the Sri Lankan government from 1983 to 2009 in the last stage of the warfare. The LTTE ideology is not religious unlike other insurgents' groups like Boko Haram, ISWAP, ISIS, and so on but separation, secession (Establishment of Tamil Nationalism) and revolutionary socialism. The LTTE insurgent group was one of the deadliest and long insurgencies wars against government. It lasted for about 26 years before the Sri Lanka government were able to crush them through timely intelligence and addressing the root causes. Ethnic rivalry is the major causes of the conflict. The Sri Lankan Tamils consider that they are been marginalized by the government in power, they are victims of economic

and political discrimination in their own nation. The Tamils claim that, since the late 1950s the Sinhalese have dominated the government and have denied them to free access to Sri Lanka's universities and other higher institutions, they equally stopped funding to develop the Tamils areas, they banned the use of Tamil language and declared Sinhalese as the country's official language. All these are the root causes of the insurgency in Sri Lanka (Sumner 2004).

The Sri Lanka government was able to win the war against the deadliest insurgent's group after 26 years. The administration of Lt. Col. Nandasena Gotabaya RAJAPAKSA failed woefully to end the insurgency in the country because he neglected timely intelligence and grand strategy. He focused mainly on military hard power to conquer the insurgents war. Contrary to this, his successor Mahinda RAJAPAKSA the President between 2005 and 2015, adopted grand strategy and intelligence gathering to curtail the LTTE nefarious activities. He used strategic objective that matched the LTTE's principal weaknesses. The grand strategy includes peace sought, economics, military actions, information operations strategy to guide lower-level activities and timely intelligence (Wannesburg 2005).

It is imperative to consider the insurgency cum terrorism in France because they have long time experience and their government was able to curtail it after a long battle through adequate and timely intelligence gathering (Bodunde *et al.* 2019). According to the 2018 Global Terrorism Index, France was ranked 30th in the year 2018 as against 23rd position in year 2017 Global Terrorism Index (Institute for Economics and Peace 2018). Insurgency cum terrorism in France was traced back to the French Revolution (1789-1799) which was referred to as state sponsored terrorism (Akinola and Tella 2013). Also, from the mid-1970s, France and other European nations have witnessed various threats of insurgency and terrorism attacks. In 1985, General Rene Audran of the French Ministry of Defence was assassinated by Guerrilla group action (Thomson 2012).

Terrorist violence in France reduced after state-sponsored terrorist groups from the Middle East beset French interests in the setting of East-West tensions caused by the Cold war. Various insurgents' groups like the Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Lebanese Hizballah, the Jackal were the most active from 1982 to 1987 (Olofinbiyi & Steyn 2018). In 1988, the ANO executed four French nationals on a Greek tourist boat in the city of Porous Hizballah led a campaign of 13 terrorist attacks starting in year 1985 that capped with an attack against the store 'Tati' at Rue de Rennes in Paris, killing seven people and about 66 wounded (Oghi 2014).

Akinola (2017) opined that the causes of insurgency and terrorism attacks in France were caused by ideology and regional identity, violence caused by resistance by former French colonies against their persistent domination by France and the current trends of terrorism which is global and inclined to Islam. However, the French government was able to curtail the insurgency menace through intelligence gathering and new counter-terrorism measures like house arrest replaced by surveillance of individuals, establishing cordons around key and vulnerable areas, patrolling and stations of military personnel around places of worship, police raids et cetera. The French government also strengthens the intelligence agencies and provided them with necessary supports to combat the terrorist's activities (Phenson *et al.* 2016). More importantly, the intelligence agencies in France, have assisted the government to combat the nefarious activities of different terrorist group in the French soil. They are Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE), General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI), Directorate of Military Intelligence (DRM), Intelligence Processing and Action Against Clandestine Financial Circuits (TRACFIN), Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Brigade (BRGE), National Commission for the Control of Security Interceptions (CNCTR) among others (Sumner 2004).

The French presidency under the leadership of Emmanuel MACRON adopted some strategies to counter terrorism attacks in the country. The French intelligence agents are assigned to keep a close watch and infiltrate the terrorist groups. Intelligence being a major aspect of these approaches. Multilateralism and training counter-terror operatives were adopted to curb the menace of the insurgency (Mosandi 2019). More so, the use of legal framework empowers the government to deport foreigners that pose a serious threat to public order. The French government has recorded huge success in counter-terrorism efforts using both soft and hard power approaches (United States Department of State 2018).

According to Achumba *et al.* (2016) France has really scored high points in terms of combating terrorism in its shore and fighting terrorism outside its borders. As a global power and the worth the nation places on its citizens explicate the wide gap that occur between its determinations considering this and those of Sub-Saharan countries without such gigantic strides to curb the insurgency vices. In France, the government also introduced Civic Education as parts of school curriculum and school attendance is compulsory up till age of 16. The subject aids the youngsters to understand the implication of insurgency and to deter them from being part of the criminal group as contrary to the Nigerian state where youngsters are brainwashed daily to take part in the Boko

Haram menace. The French government also engaged the Muslims clerics who are anti-jihadist, to support the anti-terrorism efforts and counter foreign radical jihadist propaganda (Mosandi 2019).

Insurgency from the regional perspectives observe painstakingly how government respond to nefarious activities of the terrorists and the counter measures adopted. It is pertinent to note that the insurgency and terrorism menace in Kenya is a reference point to this study. According to Global Terrorism Index, Kenya was ranked 22nd in the year 2017 but ranked 19th position in the year 2018 (Institute of Economics and Peace 2018). This implies that insurgency cum terrorism activities in the state has worsened and need to be curtailed. There are numerous root causes of terrorism in Kenya, where few will be explained. The state of Kenya suffers more than its shares in terms of counter terrorism approach (Mosandi 2019). Bodunde *et al.* (2019) posits that the porous borders have contributed immensely to the menace of terrorism in Kenya. The country borders with 5 countries which are Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Kenya's eastern and northern neighbours' are Ethiopia and Somalia. These borders in the axis are too porous which give room for the Al Shabaab Terrorist group from Somalia to invade and target Kenya without being apprehended by security forces. More so, the slow response of the government in countering insurgency makes the state more vulnerable. Local tensions are another germane root causes of terrorism in the Kenyan state, the Northeast along the coast are mainly inhabited by the Muslims, which make up of a tenth of the Kenya's population. The region is not developed, due to lack of both public and private investments. It leads to tension and some locals in the region are disgruntled and feel cheated and marginalised by the Kenyan government (Agbiboa 2019).

Despite the intelligence agencies and countermeasures adopted by the Kenyan government to curtail the long war against insurgency cum terrorism, the state has failed woefully in combating the menace. The Kenyan state has three intelligence agencies; these are the Special Branch (SB), Directorate of Security Intelligence (DSI) and National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS). The SB and DSI are saddled with the procurement of domestic intelligence on both civil and military affairs while the NSIS is responsible for both gathering of domestic and foreign intelligence. The Kenyan government has responded in both hard and soft approaches to combat the menace of insurgency. The hard approach includes the establishment of an Anti-Terrorism Police unit in 1998 in which some of the troops are deployed to Somalia and Ethiopia borders. The soft approach measures include institutional building policy, bilateral/

multilateral cooperation with the United Kingdom and United States, legislative reform (Faluyi *et al.* 2019).

The Kenyan government has failed to win the battle against the terrorist's group because the intelligence agencies lack gathering of timely and actionable intelligence and they are not financially motivated. Also, the government and the security forces did not gain the full supports of its citizens especially the natives of Mombasa community in the eastern region of the country (Phenson *et al.* 2018).

Observing insurgency menace from the view of National perspective, adopting the Nigerian state as a reference point. The Nigerian state attained her nationhood in 1914 but got her independence 1960 from the Great Britain. The nation has experienced various social vices such as religious sect, political violence, communal clashes, land disputes, kidnapping, arson, and so on (Mosandi 2019). The history of terrorism and insurgency could be traced to religious intolerance and violence during those early eras was now ill-famed Maitasine sect. The group was established by Muhammed Marwa, a radical Islamists in the Northern region of the country. The Maitasine sect had an ideology that contradicted to the social norms and the real teachings of Islamic religion. Their members were mostly illiterate, jobless youths, unwary and low self-esteemed. They are sponsored by Saudi Arabia Wahabi/Salafi sect of Islam, both financially and in teachings (Olofinbiyi & Steyn 2019).

The Wahabi/Salafi sect of Islam has been adopted by the Maitasine group. They were intolerant and extremist in the course of practising their religion. They were disposed to violence at the slightest incitements. The aggressive and intolerance led to the riot in Kano between them and the Kano Government in 1980. The riot was regarded as the worst religious conflict in Nigeria until the emergence of Boko Haram Group (BHG) in 2009. Although, the Boko Haram group was founded in 2002 has a non-militant group. During the Kano riot by the religion sect, over 40,000 people were killed, 10,000 innocent civilians were internally displaced and property worth of billions of naira (Nigeria currency) were destroyed (Achumba *et al.* 2016).

The leader and creator of the radical sect, Muhammed Marwa was later killed by the Nigerian security Forces and the group was crushed. The Nigerian security forces thought that had won the battle against the deadly religious radical sect in the history of the country and they had crushed the ideology of religious intolerance and extremists. Thereafter, the deadliest insurgent group known as Boko Haram Group surfaced. This insurgent group has been engaging the Nigeria security forces in a guerrilla warfare since 2009 and remains active

11 years later. They have killed more than 32,000 people since 2009 till 2019. Over 3 million people have been displaced internally and outside the shores of the country (Mosandi 2019).

According to the Global Terrorism Index, Nigeria was ranked 3rd position since 2016 till 2020 and the deadliest country in term of terrorism and insurgency attacks in Africa (Institute for Economics and Peace 2020). It is germane to note the root causes of terrorism and insurgency and various factors that led to the emergence of it in the Nigerian state. According to Thomson (2012) the insurgent's group was driven by perceived oppression, religious extremism, poverty, ignorance, ideological orientation, lack of political will and ethnic thoughts. More so, Ukpong-Umo (2016) posits that insurgency occurred in Nigeria due to failure of governance, lack of strong culture that enables citizens to make real demands from their leaders and weak security architecture. He stressed further that the environment in which Nigerians domicile and the involvements of governance are the possible causal factors of the emergency of insurgency.

Sani (2011) cited in Mu'azu (2011: 18-19) maintains that the Boko Haram Group was instigated by various factors which are repressive attack against the religious group leader (Muhammed Yusuf) who was killed by the government security forces all in the name that he wanted to escape from a lawful custody in 2009. The Boko Haram group were excluded in all the activities of mainstream of Islamic groups, failure in governance in all the North East region states, they felt cheated that federal government policy favour is against their ideology. In addition, the proliferation of arms and ammunitions, aftermath of Chadian war which led to illegal migration, no connection between both elected and appointed leaders and the people, lack of data base and intelligence about individuals and organisations that have connections with foreign allies, there is no rehabilitation center for religious fundamentalists, all these are the root causes of terrorism and insurgency which required holistic approach, accurate and timely intelligence to curtail.

The Boko Haram group has inflicted different terrors on the security forces, innocents' civilians and Nigerian government. It is pertinent to discuss these major terrorism and insurgency that occurred between 2009 till date. The first ever bombing in Nigeria shores was carried out by BHG member, Mohammed Manga (35 years) young man, on 16th June 2011 that was the first suicide bomber in Nigeria (Mosandi 2019). This man left his home and drove to Abuja on a deadly mission to bomb himself and the Nigeria Police Headquarters. He was a businessman and financially he was stable to some

extent but because of his ideology he volunteered himself to go on the deadly mission as a suicide bomber, all in the name of religion and going to paradise after the terror mission (Akinola & Tella 2017).

Research Methodology

The use of desktop publishing in research methodology allows for the effective organization, analysis, and presentation of data. By adopting advanced publishing tools, this study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how intelligence gathering can function as an intelligence-curbing policy, from a global to a national perspective. To reiterate, this paper is desktop research, which was conducted using the purposive sampling method to select articles from different research engines such as Google Scholar, Science Direct, and EBSCO. These articles were selected based on three criteria, which are, (i) appearing in the first 10 search results; (ii) space - intelligence context; and (iii) most relevant to the purpose of this paper.

How Intelligence Gathering can Assist in Curbing Terrorism, Insurgency and Other Vices

The intelligence agencies are saddled with the high level of procurement of timely, accurate and adequate information which will be collated, evaluated, analysed and interpreted before becoming intelligence that will be useful for the government in policy and decision making or the security agencies that required it for the safety and wellbeing of the masses (Onuoha 2017).

According to Bodunde *et al.* (2019) opined that intelligence gathering is a procurement of information of value, about a person of security interest, building or structures, activities of hostile intelligence services (HIS) that can be processed through three closely items collection, evaluation and interpretation to form intelligence. The aim of intelligence gathering is to curtail the menace of the enemies of state before perpetrating the evil acts. The Nigerian government is still battling with terrorism cum insurgency of the BHG because the security agencies have not gotten the real intelligence about their sponsors, collaborators, strength, and weakness and so on.

Ashaolu (2017) posits that there are various challenges that inhibit the accurate information that can be processed to timely and useable intelligence. These challenges are lack of intelligence sharing amongst the security agencies.

The security agencies in Nigeria promote lack of cooperation, ego boosting, overbearing and favouritisms. These factors have tremendously affecting the intelligence gathering. More so, sometime the government when they are provided with intelligence, they politicised and make a mockery of intelligence sharing amongst the security agents.

According to Bodunde *et al.* (2019) the Nigerian security are not information sensitive and the consciousness of the security operatives must be improved in terms of training and memory training. Hence, this lapse has affected them in terms of intelligence gathering in a battle against terrorist, insurgent and a mapping strategy to defeat them.

The intelligence community (DSS, DIA and NIA) in their collective ability, remains the eye of protecting various essential blind spots in our society as they relate to the wellbeing and safety of the citizen. To some level, security agencies failed to forestall security lapses in Nigeria, the duty of intelligence agencies is to procure timely and accurate intelligence which must be proactive in nature but not reactive as we witness today in the Nigerian state (Isyaku 2017).

Faluyi *et al.* (2019) posits that effective counterinsurgency, prevention, protection, preparedness, response and revitalization efforts depend on accurate, timely and achievable information about the targets, where and how they operate, their cohorts, and the possible vulnerable entity which the enemies may attacks. Presently, the Nigerian state is confronted with various degree of insecurity such as insurgency, terrorism, bombing, kidnapping, armed banditry, cattle rustling, proliferation of arms and ammunitions, influx of illegal migrants, porous borders, corruption, weak and corrupt judiciary, marginalization, poverty, and so on. The security agencies have a significant role in curtail each of these threats.

Despite the challenges of intelligence gathering and interagency synergy remain the greatest and apt in counter measure against insurgency and other security breaches (Ashaolu 2017). The main challenge in intelligence gathering is intelligence sharing. Most of the intelligence gathered are not shared amongst the security agencies in the state. Intelligence sharing is meant to enable the use of activities, from protecting people from violent threats, locating and apprehending suspects (Onuoha 2017).

Intelligence sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence information data or knowledge amongst federal, state, local and provide sector unit. The intelligence from experts is to be shared and used timely among the security agencies. It is necessary for the entire Nigerian citizen to render useful informa-

tion to the security agents, which will be processed to intelligence and shared by the security agencies (Umejesi 2016).

It is imperative to focus and briefly discuss the levels of intelligence sharing amongst security agents. It is conducted and shared at various levels namely strategic level, tactical level, operational level and counterinsurgency level. Strategy Level Intelligence is the largest among the level of intelligence sharing because it involves national and international agencies. It concerns extensive issues about political, military capabilities, economic, scientific, technology, non-state actors and so on. It entails the issues of international and national that concern security (Ashaolu 2017).

Tactical Level Intelligence assist the intelligence agencies and government in planning and combat readiness. It involves briefing, deployment and current threats on flash and black spots to the patrol team. The patrol team will be examined to elicit valuable information for processing and communicating through appropriate channels. The Operational Level Intelligence is intensive on support, focuses on collecting and analysing information that identifies and locates the real threats. The Counterintelligence Level is the process of sharing timely and processed information to protect, safeguarding and preserve the secret of a state's intelligence by averting espionage activities from infiltrating the nation's government such as intelligence community, military strength, economic and so on (Bodunde *et al.* 2019).

Conclusion and Recommendations

Basically, terrorism and insurgency are threats to National security in which almost every state are affected directly or indirectly. Critical review of journals and some materials reveals that the aims of insurgent's group are different from one and another. For instant, the Tamils Eelam insurgent's group in Sri Lanka are fighting for secession and uneven distribution of resources, while the Boko Haram Group in Nigeria are ideology, political motivated, bad governance, marginalization. More so, the study identifies the major causes of insurgency in the globe such as nepotism, favouritism ethnocentrism, cultural identity, bad leadership, unemployment, high rate of illiteracy, religious fundamentalism, and so on. If the governments could focus on the grey areas stated above the rate of terrorism cum insurgency will be reduced drastically.

The study also recommends that accurate, timely and sharing of intelligence will be apt to curtail the menace of insurgency in the globe, regional and national. The security agencies especially the intelligence community

should be trained more on intelligence gathering and sharing. It is incumbent on them to be trained on how to use the modern gadgets of intelligence gathering to counter any forms of criminality in the state. The issue of egocentrism amongst the security agencies should be condemned by the government, this will foster security liaison and strengthen their relationships. Accurate, timely and sharing of intelligence will assist the governments and the state to conquest any form of menace against the contemporary threats.

The study identifies that insurgency are experienced in a different way by different insurgent's group. The way to tackle it are diverse but the method is still the same which is 'accurate and timely intelligence gathering'. There are various forms of intelligence gathering ranging from human intelligence, signal intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open source intelligence and geospatial intelligence. When all these various forms of intelligence are used properly no doubt, the government will win the war against terrorism and insurgency. The security agencies should be well trained on both covert and overt operations, highly motivated both monetary and incentives, this will enhance their loyalty and professionalism in discharging their statutory mandate.

The study recommends the implementation of a community policing method as another realistic paradigm shift towards counter insurgency cum terrorism strategy. This paper submits that the Nigerian government should embrace this method as an alternative way of curtailing the menace of the Boko Haram group should the negotiation approach flop. No doubt, the community policing will play a critical and substantial role in eradicating and curbing the activities of insurgents in terms of gathering accurate and reliable information about them, which will be processed to intelligence. It is factual that, intelligence gathering is key in combating asymmetric or non-asymmetric warfare.

Lastly, this paper recommends that the government and the security agencies should engage the masses in community sensitisation programmes about terrorism cum insurgency and the adverse magnitudes of such events and circulating the information amongst the communities are key, particularly in remote populations prone to attacks. The phase of awareness of the consequence of insurgency should be strengthened amongst the residents. The federal government of Nigeria, through the various ministries and agencies such as Ministry of Information and Culture, National Orientation Agency, National Broadcasting Commission, Voice of Nigeria et cetera, should be used effectually to educate the masses on the havoc and consequences of associating

or connecting with the insurgent group via radio, television, banners, sign posts. This will deter the masses and the effervescent youths from being involved in dread acts.

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