Chapter 6: Brazil, South - South International Security Governance and Peace Operations (2003 - 2016)[1]

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Abstract

This paper explores Brazil's recent contributions to South – South governance and a rethinking of cooperation between global Southern states, as they relate to issues related to international security. Humanitarian intervention – the use of military force to protect individual rights and uphold the principles underpinning the international system – stands as proxy in this instance for the country's participation in collective security measures and the provision of peace and stability at the global level. Brazil's contribution to a notion of security governance anchored in the Global South will be assessed through a focus on both material aspects – participation in United Nations-led peace operations (and non-participation in Western-led initiatives) and ideational aspects such as debates on the norms governing intervention practice and those regulating the practice of security governance in multilateral bodies. Here, the country's engagement with the 'responsibility to protect' is one example.

Keywords: Brazil, peace operations, BRICS, responsibility to protect, Global South

This article explores Brazil's agency in South – South governance and within the BRICS, as they relate to issues related to international security, and highlights several ways in which Brazil has participated therein. It begins with an overview of Brazil's historical and current foreign policy positions with

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regard to global governance on the whole, covering both global-level organizations and the search for 'alternative geometries' emphasizing cooperation among states in the Global South. Global governance aspects are an important component of the country's quest for recognition as an emerging global player. Security issues – the focus of the subsequent section – have played a crucial part in this project, which was initiated by the Lula da Silva Workers' Party government in 2003 and has experienced a slowdown since the controversial impeachment of his successor in 2016.

Security issues have presented Southern emerging powers with a dilemma, in that changes in Western-led security practice have distanced traditional avenues of middle-power participation such as humanitarian intervention from postcolonial states' traditional normative commitments. Brazil's contribution to security governance will be assessed through the lens of Global South cooperation, through a focus on both material aspects – participation in United Nations-led peace operations (and non-participation in Western-led initiatives) – and ideational aspects such as debates on the norms governing intervention practice and those regulating the practice of security governance in multilateral bodies.

Brazil and Global South Cooperation: Material & Ideational Aspects

Brazil and Global Security Governance

Brazil's approach to security governance is influenced both by its overall engagement with global governance, and by historical specificities related to security, war and peace. Under the Workers' Party (PT) governments of Lula da Silva (2003 - 2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011 - 2016), the country has expanded its foreign policy horizon on a global level, taking on a clear role as an emerging power, primarily through the BRICS grouping. Particularly the country's engagement with the institutional architecture of global governance – and its liberal normative content – have been portrayed in recent scholarship through use of the emerging power moniker. Definitions of what constitutes 'emergent' or 'rising' status abound in the literature, many focused on the interaction of these states with mechanisms of global governance. Here, the focus will be on two concurrent elements that bind these definitions together and relate specifically to Brazil's recent position on global governance: the existence of a clear hierarchy within the international system, and the concept of international responsibility in maintaining that hierarchy.

Taken together, these two elements lie at the root of oft-posed questions on the relationship of emerging powers such as the BRICS countries to the existing global order. Will these powers seek to ascend while still submitting to the extant conditions governing their rise, or will they seek, as they emerge, to reshape the rules of the system and of their own rise? In other words, are these powers revisionist or revolutionary (Lipton 2017)? Will they balance or bandwagon in relation to the established powers (Hurrell 2006)?

Hierarchy

One distinction regarding hierarchy is of particular relevance to the BRICS and rising powers from the Global South. This is the divergence between essential acceptance of the normative content of what is fundamentally a liberal world order (Nel 2010: Mitzen 2011: 22), and their rejection of the formal and normative hierarchy behind it. This tension mirrors the distinction between the normative content of the liberal order in the economic realm – where emerging powers' preferred area of action lies (Kahler 2013: 714) and whose tenets they have challenged rhetorically (Laïdi 2012) if not consistently in content – and in the security arena, where postcolonial experiences have pushed normative preferences in a fundamentally different direction.

The rift between normative acceptance and the rejection of hierarchy runs through the contributions to Oliver Stuenkel and Matthew Taylor's recent volume *Brazil on the Global Stage* and is summarizes succinctly in their introduction (Stuenkel & Taylor 2015: 6 – 7). Both these authors and Merle Lipton (2017: 43) return to John Ikenberry's axiom that the Western-led liberal order is 'easy to join … and hard to overturn' (Ikenberry 2011: 56ff). Hierarchy is the fundamental characteristic uniting these two aspects. For emerging powers, this can result in the application of a double standard. Put succinctly, the international system is constructed in such a way that action in pursuance of national interests and preferences by established major powers is taken to be consistent and rational, whereas the same type of action, when performed by emerging countries such as the BRICS, is deemed 'ambiguous' (Stuenkel & Taylor 2015: 8), 'incoherent' (Lopes *et al.* 2013), 'irresponsible' (Patrick 2010) or 'reluctant' (Destradi 2017). In fact, however, emerging powers are increasingly recognized to be no less consistent and considered, or more exceptionalist, in their actions than their more powerful counterparts (Kahler 2013: 712,716: Lipton 2017: 6: Mares and Trinkunas 2016: 12: Burges 2013: 578).

Responsibility

In the context of global governance, particularly of security issues, this hierarchy manifests in how one of the key subjacent concepts of that order – responsibility – is defined and attributed. Both the normative content of collective security and the acceptable manner of its implementation remain the province of established powers. Similarly to the liberal order itself, as the R2P debate shows, this has generated broad agreement on normative content and extensive contestation of how the concept is to be implemented. While few dispute that with increased power comes increased pressure to contribute actively to solving crises – strong divergence remains over how this is to be achieved.

Amrita Narlikar has given this correlation familiar theoretical terms by equating responsibility with the provision of a global public good (Narlikar 2011: 1608). While great power expectations have centered on dividing the labor of implementing global governance, emerging powers have asserted their claim to participation in defining the nature of the inherent responsibility, while to taking pains not to be seen as 'free riders' particularly in the security sphere (Abdenur 2017: 86: Culp 2016: 1529).

As noted with respect to the liberal order itself, one primary dilemma for postcolonial rising powers is the divergence between how the North sees fit to implement, for example, collective security decisions – through the use of force – and their historically grounded aversion to doing so in this manner. These powers' relative weakness in terms of hard military power, coupled with political preferences that privilege other areas of policy – has placed them at a disadvantage where hierarchy equates Northern preferences with global collective preferences (Kenkel & Martins 2016: Bukovansky *et al.* 2012: 27 – 32). Indeed, this perceived conflation of Northern with global collective interests has been a driving force of emerging powers' quest for alternative geometries of global governance (Hurrell 2010a: 62: Hirst 2015: 364) highlighting the Global South, or what Narlikar terms 'club goods' (Narlikar 2011: 1609).

Norm Diffusion

The privileging of security issues and military force has dislocated emerging powers' challenge to soft power issues and to the normative arena (Mares & Trinkunas 2016: 14 - 15: 86 - 88), where effective contestation of the definition of key rules and concepts can take place. Several analysts have noted the

corollary that emerging powers are effectively precluded from taking a direct approach to pursuing their own interests, 'aware that efforts to forcefully impose [their] power would actually undermine [their] position both regionally and globally' (Hoffmann *et al.* 2016: 843: Flemes & Vaz 2011). Asserting themselves in this complex environment in a manner reflective of their newfound status has placed emerging powers before what some analysts have termed a 'graduation dilemma' (Milani *et el.* 2017) which highlights the increasing complexity both of the international environment, and of these states' internal political frameworks as they consolidate internally and take on a larger international presence (Kenkel & Harig 2017).

Greater complexity in the normative practice of global governance has been accompanied by increased sophistication in the academic analysis of how norms and ideas diffuse, and participation in their definition managed. Norms scholarship is fundamental to understanding Brazil's vision of its contribution to global governance. Norms theory in constructivist International Relations is often described as having moved through at least three 'waves'. The first, embodied by the 'life cycle' model developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), was a decisive challenge to material and state-based accounts of behavior, but did not move beyond a unidirectional conception allowing merely for either acceptance or rejection by 'receiving' states (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 2013). The second 'wave' focused on internal processes of institutionalization in those receiving states (Cortell & Davis 2000; Checkel 1997). The third focused on normative content itself and allowed for diffusion to be viewed as a bidirectional process (Acharya 2009: Solingen 2012: Pu 2012. Only with this third wave was it possible to address the agency of emerging powers in the process, beyond simple recipients of content of Northern origin (Acharya 2014; Mitzen 2011: 57). Recently norm diffusion has come to be understood not only as a multidirectional, but as a non-linear and complex, process (Hunt 2016), and studies have moved beyond formal institutionalization to focus on the meaning attributed to a norm once it is placed in practice (Wiener 2009) or implementation (Betts & Orchard 2014).

Antje Wiener's approach is eminently relevant to emerging powers' role in the diffusion of global norms. It claims that formal institutionalization is less crucial to the validity of a norm than its legitimacy as viewed by its users during the process of its definition and contestation. This legitimacy is derived from the regular access of all stakeholders to the contestation process (Wiener 2014: 3). Where structural approaches equate validity with an uncontested fixedness of content, Wiener concludes the inverse (Wiener 2014: 22). The

radical inclusiveness of this approach is especially attractive to emerging powers, and is a crucial component – not grasped by the main currents of scholarship in the Global North – of explaining their conduct, particularly in the security sphere where they often lack hard power.

Brazil and Security Governance

International security is perhaps the area where the factors outlined above come most clearly to the fore: it is both the area of international diplomacy where formal decision-making is at its most hierarchical and exclusive, and that where (ultimately Western-based) notions of responsibility as a prerequisite for participation are most entrenched. This is not to imply that other areas of policy have not arisen where emerging powers have been involved in discussions of responsibility and load – sharing; prominent other topics include free trade (Hopewell 2014); climate change mitigation (Hochstetler & Milkoreit 2015); and nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (Narlikar 2011: 1608). Nevertheless, the security agenda continues to occupy a privileged position in international decision-making.

This section will present how Brazilian policymakers have positioned the country in this area of policy and highlight several areas where the country has been particularly active in maintaining a security policy presence, and where a concerted effort has been made to act in concert with the BRICS and the Global South. Finally, this section will investigate whether the Brazil's preferred alternative to global multilateral bodies, the BRICS grouping, has been able to consolidate into an effective actor on issues of collective security.

Brazilian Normative Priors on Security

Brazil's approach to international security governance is a mixture of South American security culture, classic emerging power behaviour, and the legacy of colonial history. From regional security culture Brazil takes first and foremost two elements: a penchant for multilateralism and a strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention. Multilateralism is seen above all as a double guarantee. On the one hand, a rules-based order rooted in the normativization and legalization of international relations limits the effects of disparities in hard power capacities, protecting against potential interference from major powers (Adebajo 2016: 1188). On the other, multilateral forums provide an ambit in which these inequalities are further reduced by the principle of equal

representation. Emerging powers tend to share this similarly predilection for multilateralism, as it provides them a stage upon which to potentially 'punch above their weight' and attain greater policy effects relative to their investment of diplomatic or material capital (Kenkel 2010; 2013c).

South American states share the second with other postcolonial states: a strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention. Whereas in South America this is coupled with commitment to the pacific resolution of disputes, this is not true of all areas of the Global South. What remains as a commonality is the *de facto* equation of the principle of state sovereignty with non-intervention, non-interference and the inviolability of borders.

Many consider this externally-oriented interpretation of sovereignty to have contributed to 150 years of interstate peace in the region. Changes in the West, driven by genocides and mass atrocities such as those in Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia and Bosnia, have not generated the same shift to an internal, contractual notion of sovereignty inclusive of the protection of individual rights (Kenkel 2012). In South America, emphasis on human rights and democratic governance tends to be external and collective (emanating from the state itself), rather than internal and couched in terms of individual rights.

Further elements of regional security culture include a penchant for legal normativism and a clear aversion to the use of military force as a means of conflict resolution. Indeed, most regional military establishments are not equipped to project force at a sustained meaningful level. Arie Kacowicz lists the further common tenets of the purported South American 'region of peace' [2] as the recognition of colonial borders, including through *uti possidetis*, popular self-determination; convivencia (peaceful coexistence); concertación (decision by consensus); confidence-building measures, especially regarding disarmament and nonproliferation; and democracy and human rights (Kacowicz 2005).

Recent Western-led changes within global multilateral institutions, as well as emerging powers' – and Brazil's – relative ascension in the international hierarchy, have cast into doubt a number of these precepts. Alongside non-intervention and the non-use of force, the main notion affected here is the legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council – once a fixed element at the

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[2] One effect of this notion of sovereignty is that is has created a disjunction between external peace and internal violence: while the region has seen no major conflict in 160 years, it cannot in good faith be referred to as a 'zone of peace': violence rates are among the highest in the world – Brazil alone loses over 60,000 citizens a year to gun violence alone.

core of Brazilian foreign policy (Cervo 2010: 11) as a decision-making body without Southern representation (Binder & Heupel 2015). Andrew Hurrell has, however, described these efforts as still 'very much within the system' (Hurrell 2010b: 136).

One further Brazilian strategy of note, highlighted by Monica Hirst (2015: 362 - 363) has been to seek to integrate development and security issues. Given Brazil's success, under the PT governments, with both internal development and foreign technical cooperation (largely on a South - South basis) (Dauvergne & Farias 2012), coupled with its aversion to (and lack of sustained capacity to project) military force, there is strong incentive to unite these two issues. Peacebuilding, as will be shown below, provides the opportunity to make a virtue of necessity by attaining a security impact by doing development.

Brazil in its Region

The literature on Brazil's interaction with its region is understandably vast, and the purpose of this section is to highlight selected aspects of it that relate to the country's participation in security governance from a South - South perspective. Two aspects are most relevant here. *First*, changes in the norms underpinning security governance at the global level – mainly the shift towards protection of individual rights, driven by the genocides of the 1990s – have created a tension between a regional security culture largely unaffected by these shifts, and a divergent set of expectations governing the responsibility of putative global-level players (Kenkel 2012: Kenkel & De Rosa 2015: Kenkel & Stefan 2016). This tension is at the core of the analyses of peace operations and R2P that follow. *Second*, Brazil's aspirations to global player status do not have the regional support necessary to translate cleanly into a representative role at the global level (Kahler 2013: 724). The result is a disconnect between Brazil's approach to it regions and its regional aspirations. Additionally, since 2016 Brazil and the region itself have experienced political polarization and realignment.

Andrés Malamud points out that regional leadership has not been the springboard to a global role to which Brazilian policymakers had aspired, due both to clashing aspirations in the region and difficulties and shortcomings in institution-building (2011). As the country's policy horizon has shifted to the world, regional policy has turned towards a coalition-building function between the West and the Global South (Burges 2013). Whereas some authors have been quite critical of Brazil's selective investment in firming up institutions in its

immediate environs (Burges & Daudelin 2007), others have placed it within a framework of a resource allocation dilemma for emerging powers. Hofmann *et al* 2016) point out that ideological disparity within a region raises the incentive to invest diplomatic resources at the global level (2016) and to 'forum shop' regionally. Paradoxically Brazil's ability to exercise regional leadership is also hampered by its very preponderance in the region. As a result, the country has pursued a strategy of leadership which effectively replaces coercion with soft power, which Sean Burges has termed 'consensual hegemony' (2008). Consensual hegemony also involves the discursive projection of new common geopolitical spaces in which actors such as Brazil can exercise a leadership function. Recently, one such space for Brazil has been the South Atlantic, in part as a gateway to greater economic and geostrategic presence on the African continent.

Brazil, the South Atlantic and Africa

The past decade has seen renewed Brazilian interest in the South Atlantic region. Though it is largely spurred by the discovery of extensive oil reserves in the pre-salt regions on the continental shelf, this focus possesses important synergies with the country's emerging power project, especially as it relates to potential connections to Africa. Under the guise of the 'Blue Amazon' – a term alluding to the economic and strategic importance of the country's vast rain forest – Brazil has been engaged in the discursive creation of a regional security complex, or at least a shared security consciousness, in the South Atlantic region (Mattos *et al.* 2017; Abdenur & Marcondes 2014a; 2014b). This has led to a recrudescence of efforts to systematize the country's overall approach to maritime security (Duarte & Barros forthcoming). This initiative serves both to protect Brazilian economic interests in the region, and to exclude 'extraterritorial powers' – read great powers – from the region. Efforts have been made to revive the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), and several studies have highlighted the importance of this region to both the BRICS and IBSA (Abdenur *et al.* 2014: Vaz 2015).

The African continent was a declared foreign policy priority of the Lula da Silva government (2003 - 2011). So many new embassies were opened on the continent that Brazil's representation there surpassed that of major powers such as the USA, France and the UK (Kenkel 2013b: 274). The vast majority of interaction between Brazil and Africa has been focused on South - South technical cooperation and aid, within an optic of exporting the successes of Brazil's

own domestic fight against underdevelopment and particularly inequality (Kenkel 2013b: Abdenur 2015: 215: Mello e Souza 2015: Stolte 2015).

However, Brazilian cooperation on defense and security matters with African partners has remained within discreet proportions, and has occurred as a result of direct contact between military establishments, such as in the cases of Namibia (Seabra 2016), São Tomé and Gambia. The exception is Guinea-Bissau, where the country has invested extensively in both bilateral and multilateral peacebuilding initiatives (Abdenur & Marcondes 2014c; Neves 2010). Peacebuilding – and the development of a putative Brazilian approach – is a major part of the country's drive to demonstrate its capacity to contribute to collective security measures through global-level multilateral mechanisms. While the United Nations remains the country's chosen avenue for action on security – though not other – governance measures, it has sought to act through the BRICS mechanism as well, though in this arena the grouping has had at best mixed success.

BRICS and Security

Whereas the BRICS arrangement has made significant strides in offering alternatives to the liberal, Western-led global economic order – as in the case of the New Development Bank – divergences in both regime type and foreign policy preferences – including established power status – have hampered its ability to produce results as a contributor to collective security. In the naval arena, the IBSA group, without the presence of the two UNSC permanent members, has held joint maritime exercises and sought to provide comparative insights between the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean contexts (Vaz 2015).

As an emerging power grouping, the BRICS have sought to provide alternatives to conflict resolution beyond the UN Security Council, though these have repeatedly been dashed on the rocks of Russian and Chinese intransigence with regard to the major conflicts of the day. The two UNSC permanent members have effectively controlled the BRICS security agenda, a domination which became very clear during the group's attempts to address the Crimean and Syrian conflicts. As a loose transregional coalition of states with highly divergent security interests, the BRICS' ability to engage in agenda-setting and to identify areas of effective cooperation in alternative approaches to conflict resolution has been quite limited (Abdenur 2017: 79 - 84). Discursively, one of the group's main contributions has been to cement claims that the global

security context is now clearly multipolar, involving the necessity to accommodate the growing weight of the Global South[3].

In terms of concrete practice, however, particularly as regards efforts to employ hard power jointly, in the security realm the BRICS have failed to provide a serious alternative for countries like Brazil to work outside the global liberal institutions: the Syrian war provides a striking example. The BRICS' position on the Syrian conflict has from its inception been heavily influence by the aftermath of the NATO intervention in Libya (see the section on R2P below), during which all five members occupied seats on the UNSC and were nonetheless unable effectively to influence the outcome of the conflict. Their skepticism translated into hesitance to condemn the gross human violations of the Assad government despite, for example, Brazil's long-term rhetorical commitment to human rights protection (Abdenur 2016a). As the conflict progressed and Russia's proactive role in supporting the Assad regime became incontrovertible, Moscow dominated the group's agenda-setting with regard to the conflict, leading to its reframing as a matter predominantly of terrorism (Abdenur 2016a). A similar dynamic shaped the group's one-sided response to the invasion of Crimea by Russia. In this sense, following the logic laid out by Hofmann *et al.* 2016) for regional contexts, divergences between the members have meant that global-level forums have remained – in the security realm – the more effective alternative for Brazil to contribute to global governance. It has done so over the course of the past 15 years by means of significant participation in peace operations and in the normative conversation regarding intervention in the name of atrocity prevention (R2P).

Brazil and Peace Operations

Brazil has participated in collective security measures since its tenure in the League of Nations. With regard to UN peace operations, the country was, until 2004, with a few notable exceptions, a provider mostly of 'token' (Coleman 2013), mostly individual, contributions (Fontoura 2009; Cardoso 1998; Aguilar 2005; Uziel 2016). From 1957 to 1999, Brazil contributed over 11 000 troops, and more than 300 policemen, the vast majority of which served within the UN Emergency Force (1956 - 1967) in Suez. The further notable contributions were

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[3] Amitav Acharya has dubbed this a 'multiplex world' (2017), whereas resistance to a de facto departure from unipolarity has come from Ikenberry (2008) and colonial apologist Bruce Gilley (2016.

an 800-man battalion to the UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM 1995 - 1997): civilian police in East Timor (UNTAET – 1999-2002) and a smaller force to Mozambique (UNOMOZ 1993 - 1994). This sparse presence in peace operations was due both to military operational limitations and to the translation of the country's foreign policy traditions into a strict distinction between participation in Chapter VI missions, and avoidance of Chapter VII missions, which involve authorization of the robust use of force (Kenkel 2012).

Profound change occurred in 2004 with the creation of UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The Global South emerging power project pursued by the Lula government identified in this mission the opportunity to present Brazil as a responsible power and as a provider of collective goods in the security arena (Kenkel 2013c: 96). One of the explicit goals of this project was to reform the hierarchy of global governance in Brazil's favor – including through diplomatic cooperation with the BRICS – and eventually to enshrine the country as a permanent member of the UNSC. Until its closing in 2017, Brazil provided MINUSTAH's largest contingent, its military commander, and led policy coordination efforts between the Latin American states who made up more than half of its troops (Kenkel 2010: 2013c).

In quantitative terms,

> Prior to the January 2010 earthquake, Brazil had deployed approximately 1,300 troops, whose area of responsibility in the capital of Port-au-Prince encompassed approximately 1.5 million people, about one-sixth of Haiti's population. These troops consisted of a full Army battalion, a Marine Corps battle group and an Army engineering company. Immediately following the earthquake this was increased by a second Army battalion of about 900, tasked exclusively with humanitarian relief. … In acquitting themselves successfully of tasks typical of peace enforcement, in tactical terms Brazilian troops acted little differently from other contingents involved in other robust Chapter VII missions (Kenkel 2013c: 101.

MINUSTAH provided proof that the aspiring South American power was willing to go beyond discourse in its contribution to international security: its total expenditure over the mission's period of deployment reached 2.5 billion reais (1 billion USD): expenditures on direct participation in MINUSTAH were only partially reimbursed (Stochero 2017). The nature of this expenditure is significant in that a proportion of it took place outside of MINUSTAH proper.

Brazil initiated, within the Haitian context, a concerted effort to create its own paradigm of development aid and technical assistance. Designed to constitute an alternative to the Northern-led liberal peace paradigm (Richmond 2006), this approach was based on the idea of exporting the successes experienced by PT-led social programs at the domestic level.

The Brazilian peacebuilding approach is innovative in that it combines elements from across the range of government programs, from classic security and development actors to agricultural innovation, basic health services and conflict resolution NGOs. It is based on accompanying efficient military contingents with support for local ownership: political emphasis on institution-building, and economic focus on sustainability: and on close contact with population and on historical, cultural affinities. This latter characteristic has been shown to limit the exportability of the approach in the African context (Kenkel 2013b; Abdenur & Call 2017). Additionally, the approach was hampered by the same difficulties that permeate the Brazilian domestic context: financial constraints, myopic policy planning, and inconsistent delivery. Nevertheless, there is significant innovation in the approach's content, which alongside its utility as a key component of an emerging-power strategy has generated a strong sense of exceptionalism about the country's role as a source of alternatives to the liberal peace (Hirst 2015: 368). This has given rise to a certain gap between the discourse and the reality of the country's role in peacebuilding, although Brazil has been instrumental in bringing to the fore the connection between security and development in successful peacebuilding (Kenkel 2013b; Abdenur & Call 2017: 31: 22).

Brazil's strict adherence to the limitations of Chapter VI of the UN Charter as authorization for missions' mandates limits the utility of UN peace operations as a conduit for influence. The vast majority of missions are now authorized under Chapter VII and are involved in robust missions for the protection of civilians. This stands in direct contrast to Brazil's preferred approach to assistance under the guise of BRICS-based South - South technical cooperation. This normative tension is at the core of the country's successful involvement in the ongoing evolution of humanitarian intervention norms at the UN and elsewhere. Indeed, Brazil's acquiescence to participating prominently in a Chapter VII mission, and later expanding its contribution to other contexts – the country has a major maritime contingent in UNIFIL in Lebanon – has both shored up its position as an important contributor to global security governance and generated growing critique of this 'subaltern' role from sceptics with a postcolonial viewpoint within the country (Moreno *et al.* 2012: Blanco 2017).

Brazil and Intervention Norms: R2P and RwP

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a political norm designed to reconcile state sovereignty with the protection of civilians against mass atrocities and genocide (Bellamy 2011: Thakur 2011). Developed by an international commission convened by Canada in 2000 (ICISS 2001), the purpose of its creation was, *inter alia*, to create firm guidelines for UN Security Council decisions involving the use of force. Though its primary focus was not initially on military force, this aspect has generated almost all of the diplomatic and analytical debate on R2P. The concept has since been extensively institutionalized at the UN and elsewhere (United Nations 2005: paras 138 - 139: 2009). Very broadly writ, the initial reactions to R2P and its inherent potential for justifying the use of military force were positive in NATO member states and negative – despite buy-in to the overall notion of the event-driven necessity to prevent genocide – in the Global South.

As R2P came increasingly to shape the normative underpinnings of UN and NATO intervention practice, emerging powers who had elected these institutions as the channels of their contribution to global security (Job 2016) were faced with a growing gap between their own policy priors and UN practice (Kenkel & De Rosa 2015; Kenkel & Stefan 2016; Garwood-Gowers 2013; Stuenkel 2016). A crucial moment arrived with the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. Its supporting Resolution, the UN Security Council explicitly grounded the intervention in R2P: however, the text was passed under circumstances that led to significant resentment from emerging powers. All five BRICS were members of the Council at the time: they were not involved in Resolution 1973's drafting and later claimed they had been misled as to the ultimate aims and means of the action mandated (Job 2016; Bloomfield 2015; Singh 2016; Garwood-Gowers 2013; Hunt 2016; Ralph & Gifkins 2017). Consequently, many emerging contributors to the global security commons turned even further away from R2P, and a conceptual rift ensued between its content – upon which almost all states of the world agree – and the preferred means of its implementation.

Brazilian diplomats, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota, seized this opportunity for the country's first serious foray as a norm entrepreneur. Six months after the vote on Resolution 1973, Brazil circulated the concept of the 'responsibility while protecting' at the UN: it was designed to bridge the conceptual differences between Western and Southern powers on R2P, primarily through strict controls on Council practice and further limita-

tions on the use of military force. The concept's authors took as their point of departure the notion that 'one casualty is too many' as a result of interveners' actions (Gaskarth 2017: 304). This was roundly rejected by Western powers, who had internalized the counterfactual argument that many more lives might be saved through the loss of a few. Additionally, Brazil was not seen in the West as possessing the means to mount effective alternatives in favor of atrocity prevention if R2P were to be limited in this way, leading to accusations of a 'do as I say, not as I do' posture (Kelly 2013).

However, it soon became evident that the P-3's precipitated use of R2P to justify the Libya intervention had done serious damage to the concept's overall acceptance. This was particularly true in the case of Syria: in the words of ICISS member Ramesh Thakur, 'Syrians have paid the price of NATO excesses in Libya' (Thakur 2013: 70). The Syrian stalemate has been particularly trying for powers seeking to articulate alternatives to the Security Council, as the Russian government has assisted its Syrian allies in not only blocking action there but in the BRICS arrangement as well.

Despite the tarnished image of the R2P norm itself in the face of crimes in Syria and other ongoing conflicts, the debate over the concept has become an important locus for emerging powers to exercise soft power, to participate in the normative shaping of the key rules of the international order, and to participate in the provision of collective security goods at the discursive, behavior-structuring level. This participation has in particular been taken as a fruitful stage for the study of norm contestation (Wiener 2009: 2014) and, in particular the notion that in an increasingly multipolar order, norms no longer flow unidirectionally from one preordained set of states to another (Pu 2012; Stefan 2016; Shesterinina 2016; Acharya 2016). In this manner, Brazil's ongoing participation in these fora constitutes a key element in its quest to project, through both hard and soft power means, its intention to act as a provider of global goods in the security realm, and to partake of the greater level of participation in collective decisions that accrues to powers viewed as having proven their international responsibility through this channel.

Future Prospects

Unfortunately for BRICS cooperation in the peacekeeping ambit, political changes in Brazil have totally revamped the country's attitudes to security governance over the past two years. The election of extreme right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro to the Brazilian Presidency from January 2019 has

brought a complete wind change to the country's foreign policy and ultimately international stature. Bolsonaro has abandoned traditional foreign policy principles and diplomatic praxis, and aligned the country with extreme-right wing leaders around the world. His foreign minister, Ernesto Araujo, has repeatedly endorsed conspiracy theories directed against multilateral institutions and both liberal and progressive values, as well as even coronavirus containment policies. Brazil's foreign policy was – until the electoral ouster of Donald Trump in November 2020 – aligned with Trump's personal political agenda and with Washington's interests, often to the detriment of Brazil's own societal needs.

The BRICS configuration and relations with the Global South have been relegated to ancillary status. Indeed the new leader's Vice President described African countries during the campaign as *mulambada*—a term originally applied to slaves of Angolan origin, which refers to poor, uneducated Blacks.[4] The result has been a precipitous decline in Brazil's global diplomatic stature at the UN: coupled with the government's unwillingness to confront, or even denounce, raging wildfires in the Amazon in 2019 and 2020, the country is on the cusp of international pariahdom.

Beyond the sidelining of relations with the Global South, two factors have further driven a withdrawal of Brazil from prominent or even relevant status as a peacekeeping troop contributor. First, as Brazilian foreign policy realigned, the abovementioned project for global influence and decisionmaking power – associated with the Workers' Party governments Bolsonaro won election by demonizing – was comprehensively abandoned. Cooperation with the African continent, and the BRICS as a whole (as a result of an ideologically-driven combative stance towards Beijing in particular), was decimated: it remains to be seen whether extensive military influence in the new government will allow peace operations to retain pride of place. However, the association of this project with the PT government, and its oftentimes anti-Western leanings, have reduced Brazil's search for protagonism through these avenues and placed them on an entirely different normative footing. Second, the move within UN peace operations from liberal peacebuilding – with local populations' well-being at its centre – to counterinsurgency-and counterterrorism-based stabilization missions both runs against Brazil's capacities and propensities as a troop contributor, and presents a significant risk to the quality of its now-threatened civilian control over the armed forces.

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[4] https://www.significados.com.br/mulambo

Due to its current ideologically oriented foreign policy, Brazil has suffered a significant blow to its global relevance and the soft power bonus it enjoyed before the impeachment of Rousseff in 2016. Coupled with the economic hardships that began even before the coronavirus pandemic, it is likely to take Brazil a significant time to recover its role as a prominent peacekeeper and security interlocutor in the Global South. When it does do so, it is likely to be only once the current derailment of the country's traditional role, values and identity has been rectified by the return of non-extremist politics to power.

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