

A Socio-cultural Analysis of African Immigration to South Africa

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Abstract

Since the advent of a democratic South Africa in 1994, it has become a new destination for African immigrants, thus adding to the increasing trend of South-South migration globally. African immigration to South Africa has increased not only through the regular immigration of skilled professionals and other economic migrants, but also through refugees fleeing from conflict areas in the continent.

This article utilizes the ideology of *Makwerekwere* as a theoretical framework for explaining *non-belonging* in South Africa within which African immigrants are imagined and treated as despicable ‘others’. It also gains useful insights from a survey of 92 South Africans and African immigrants in KwaZulu-Natal. Some of its findings show that African immigrants in South Africa have stimulated interest and fostered knowledge of other African cultures amongst South Africans and Africans living in South Africa.

Keywords: African immigrants, Makwerekwere, African Cultures, South Africa, Africa

Introduction

Migration is a global phenomenon which is as old as human existence on earth. For instance, early men and women moved from region to region in search of better livelihoods and some times for the pleasure of discovery. Since then, human movement from areas of social and economic distress to those with better prospects for survival and self-actualization have continued

unabated. Logically, in contemporary global geo-political parlance, this has meant high South-North flows of people seeking greener pastures and self-actualization in the more developed regions of the world. Tellingly, amongst the world's regions, Europe, North America and Western Asia have the highest migrant populations of 64 million, 45 million and 22 million respectively (UN 2006a; 2006b). However on the flip side, there has been an equally and increasingly dynamic movement of people across borders in the global south; a phenomenon known as South-South migration (Ratha & Shaw 2007). According to them,

while the policy debate and research on migration has focused on South-North flows, South-South migration is almost as prevalent; nearly half the migrants from the South may be living in other developing countries (Ratha & Shaw 2007: vii).

They contend further that there are approximately 14.5 million migrants who originate from sub-Saharan Africa out of which 10 million have migrated to other sub-Saharan African countries (Ratha & Shaw 2007: 6). South Africa is notable in this regard.

Since the end of apartheid and the advent of a democratic South Africa in 1994, it has become a new destination for African immigrants thus adding to the increasing trend of South-South migration globally. African immigration to South Africa has increased not only through the regular immigration of skilled professionals and other economic migrants from distressed economies, but also, through refugees fleeing conflicts areas such as Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. While it is also a sending country, post-1994 South Africa has become a major receiving country of African migrants including those from outside the Southern African region. For example, Ngwenya (2010) contends that while migration within contiguous borders remain dominant in the case of migration to South Africa, a significant percentage of African migration originate from outside the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. In alphabetic order, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan are notable examples of countries outside SADC that have significant migrant stocks in South Africa. According to Ngwenya, the attraction to South Africa

‘may be attributed to South Africa’s economic strength on the continent’ (Ngwenya 2010: 11). Similarly, Ambassador Mathema, cited in Nwonwu (2010: 152), contend that

while there may be many destination options for Zimbabwean emigrants, South Africa attracted the majority of them because of the country’s peculiar attraction to all sorts of professionals, technicians, skilled and semi-skilled people and workers.

And according to Khan (2007: 3), ‘at a time when European asylum policies are becoming more and more restrictive, South Africa is viewed almost as the only answer’ especially given its sound legal and democratic structures (Willand 2005). On the other hand, it has been argued that South Africa is an attractive transit country for Africans wishing to emigrate to Europe and the United States. However, beyond *push and pull factor* explanations of why Africans are increasingly migrating to South Africa, what potential does the country hold as a possible replacement for African immigration to Europe, the Americas and Asia? How do South Africans view African immigrants in South Africa? What are some of the socio-cultural implications of African immigration for promoting cultural understanding and unity in Africa? More specifically, in the virtual sense of mobility, how has the Nigerian movie industry facilitated transnational ties between Nigeria and South Africa, as well as between Nigerians and other African migrant communities in South Africa? And lastly, what is the role of the state in all this?

In grappling with these research questions, this article utilizes the ideology of *Makwerekwere* as a theoretical framework for explaining *being*, *belonging* and *non-belonging* in South Africa within which African immigrants are imagined and treated as despicable ‘others’. Indeed, migration raises all kinds of socio-cultural issues. For instance, it can lead to cultural advancement for host country given the diversity of cultures it hosts. And on the other hand, it can also lead to cultural confusion and persecution depending on how cultural issues emanating from migration are managed. In South Africa for example, there are two kinds of foreigners based on psychological differentiation; European foreigners are perceived and accepted as ‘tourists’ and ‘investors’ who have everything positive to offer South Africa, while African foreigners are perceived and rejected as

‘Makwerekweres’ and ‘throw-aways’ who have nothing good to offer South Africa (Gqola 2008; Matsinhe 2011). The ‘smelly’, ‘hungry’, ‘poor’, ‘illiterate’ and ‘uncultured’ Makwerekwere from ‘poor’ Africa is judged as guilty for ‘crime, taking our jobs and our women’ (Gqola 2008), and as such should be resisted. The question which we seek to answer in our explanatory framework is: why do South Africans engage in this selective ordering? We contend that answers can be found in a historical psychosocial process of self-loath, self-colonization and inverted racism against those who resemble the self, and which must be deconstructed.

The article also gains useful insights from a survey of South Africans and African immigrants living in urban areas in KwaZulu-Natal. These include Empangeni, Durban and Pietermaritzburg as well as a peri-urban area; Ngwelezana. In attempting a socio-cultural analysis of African immigration to South Africa, the article through questionnaire surveys and 2 focus group discussions in Durban and Empangeni¹ specifically explores how Nigerian movies has fostered international friendship and cultural understanding between Nigeria and South Africa on the one hand, and between Nigeria and other African countries on the other hand. Concisely, these instruments provided informed insights on some socio-cultural implications of African immigration in terms of building towards a united states of Africa. Based on the analysis of its theoretical framework and empirical findings, the article in the end, makes some policy suggestions that could be useful in arresting the present trend of *afrophobia* (Africa’s fear and hatred of itself) in South Africa, and possibly xenophobia and *ethno-phobia*² in the future.

¹ The focus group in Durban consisted of 20 African immigrants including medical practitioners, teachers, students and small business owners from Cameroun, DRC, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. The Empangeni group consisted of 16 with similar occupation profiles as those of Durban but were from the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, Swaziland and Zambia.

² We conceptualize this as the fear and hatred of one ethnic group by another. Following the literature on the dynamics of colonial group relations in Africa (see Fanon 1967; Elias 1994), and in the context of apartheid in South Africa (Hopper 2001; Matsinhe 2011), *ethno-phobia* is a grim possibility in post-apartheid South Africa.

Matsinhe's Ideology of *Makwerekwere* as an Explanatory Model of *Non-belonging* in South Africa

In his seminal book which reconsiders the role of theory in African politics, arguing instead for political thought to be driven by the need to address the immediacy of everyday life/death in the continent, Chabal (2009) contends that the *politics of belonging* has had a very strong influence on African political realities since independence. According to him, a defining characteristic of this *politics of belonging* is that it logically raises the question of the *politics of non-belonging*; the issue of who is a 'native' and who is a 'stranger', who is a 'citizen' and who is a 'foreigner' in any context of place in Africa. For Chabal this is a very important question in neo-colonial African socio-political existence because it is at the centre of the struggle for power at both local and national levels of statehood (Chabal 2009). And in the context of this paper, it is at the centre of the struggle for *being* (modern state citizenship), survival and integration at the continental level in Africa. For example, Chabal argues that questions of identity in Africa are directly linked to the colonial-era politicization of ethnicity and its subsequent impact on socio-economic and political existence in the continent today.

It is in this context that Matsinhe (2011) develops and deploys the ideology of *Makwerekwere* to explain the phenomenon of *Afrophobia* famously expressed in 'blacks against blacks' violence in May 2008 in South Africa. According to Matsinhe, the ideology of *Makwerekwere* in South Africa is a fantasy of the foreign body which has its origin in the socio-emotional dynamics of colonial group relations in South Africa³, and which today informs the relations between South Africans and African foreign nationals in South Africa (Matsinhe 2011: 302). In his words:

In South Africa's imagination, the word 'foreigner' is an emotionally charged signifier for African foreign national or *Makwerekwere*, whereby African bodies become 'literal texts on which some of the most graphic and scrutable messages of aversion are written'. Bodily

³ According to Mr. N. Shandu, the deliberate under-education of black South Africans under apartheid system which effectively delinked South Africans from the rest of the continent was part of this dynamics (Personal communication, 13/07/11).

looks, movements, sounds and smells are legible as evidence of imagined citizenship and foreignness (Matsinhe 2011: 302-303).

In this way, deviation from bodily ideals of citizenship or conformity to fantasies of strangeness warrant strip search, arrest, detention, deportation, humiliation, torture, rape, mugging and killing of the so-called African foreigner in South Africa. Matsinhe explains how looks (body size and configuration)⁴, performances (language, accent and sound patterns such as clicks) and body smells⁵ are used as signifiers of non-South African nativity or citizenship. According to him, these signifiers are used as markers of group as well as individual identity, mediating the 'we-they' differentiation between citizens and non-citizen (Matsinhe 2011: 306). Quite rightly, for Matsinhe, this is a manifestation of the narcissism of minor differences⁶ caused by the colonial/apartheid creation of the South African social unconscious and of the social habitus that goes along with it (Matsinhe 2011). And this is what underlies the anti-African orientation of South Africans which is now been expressed through mistreatment, violent attacks

⁴ South Africans imagine that African foreigners are different from them because they have big noses, big lips and round heads they are 'too dark' or 'too black'; they dress funny, walk in certain different ways and have inoculation marks (Matshine 2011: 303). This much was confirmed in a class discussion on the subject conducted by one of the authors with 300 political science students at the University of Zululand on 05 October 2011. The new additions from the students were 'big bodies', 'huge shoulders', and 'smell different'.

⁵ African foreigners are imagined as primitives who emit foul body odours. For example, it is documented that the South African Police Service use sniffing methods to identify their suspects and victims (usually illegal African foreigners) because they believe these foreigners smell terribly (see Harris 2002; Matsinhe 2011).

⁶ This is a Freudian term that is used to describe individual or group sensitivity to small differences between them and others like them. According to Hazell (2009: 97) such differences are highlighted to achieve a superficial sense of one's own uniqueness, a sense of otherness which is only a mask for an underlying uniformity and sameness.

and killing of Africans. He explains that the dynamics of colonial group relations create power asymmetries between the ‘established groups’ (whites) and the ‘outsider groups’ (blacks) who often are culturally persecuted and economically deprived to a point of self-dehumanization. With time, such asymmetries produce in the weaker outsider group an inferiority syndrome ‘wherein members of the former measure their personal and collective self-worth according to the social standards of the latter’ (Matsinhe 2011: 299). A consequence of this is that members of the weaker group develop self-contempt that often manifests itself in self-destructive behaviour, including contempt and destruction of those who resemble them the most (Matsinhe 2011: 299).

In the context of South Africa and *Afrophobia*, the dynamics of colonial and apartheid group relations altered the social consciousness and unconsciousness⁷ of blacks, creating in them a colonized self as in their ‘social unconscious, ‘South African’ and whiteness became synonyms, whereas blackness symbolized ‘evil’, ‘sin’, ‘wretchedness’, ‘death’, ‘war’, ‘famine’ (Fanon in Matsinhe 2011: 301). In his words,

Such social unconscious enabled the colonized to idealize themselves in the image of the coloniser – a fantasy that finds expression in the ideology of South African exceptionalism, out of which is born the bizarre idea, among others, that South Africans have lighter skin complexions than Africans from the greater continent (Matsinhe 2011: 301).

In this way, the ideals of the oppressor white became the aspiration of the oppressed black, wherein the oppressed black became a cultural clone of the oppressor white. Therefore, Matsinhe hypothesizes that to a greater or lesser extent, the ex-oppressed in South Africa have taken on the character of their ex-oppressor as they now oppress the ‘African Other’ (*Makwerekwere*) who are imagined as different from and inferior to the ‘South African us’. Thus in

⁷ Matsinhe summarizes the social unconscious as ‘the sum of prejudices, myths and collective attitudes of a given group; the stock of common sense knowledge and mundane methods of reasoning which structure people’s lives without necessarily being reflected upon’ (see Matsinhe 2011: 300).

reality, African foreign nationals are feared, hated and distrusted not because they are really different but because they resemble the former victims of apartheid which typifies narcissism of minor difference (Matsinhe 2011: 302). The fear and anxiety of African foreigners is worse in cases where they look and sound like South African citizens such as those from the Southern African region whose cultures and language are same as those in South Africa⁸. According to Matsinhe ‘this cultural and linguistic similarity renders the outsiders (*aMakwerekwere*) invisible and stimulates anxiety in the South African imagination’ as ‘it signifies the enemy who looks like us, the enemy who is us’ (Matsinhe 2011: 309). Matsinhe therefore concludes that in the context of South African history of colonialism and apartheid, the violent aversion towards African foreign nationals in post-apartheid South Africa can best be described as *Afrophobia*. This is aided by an invented concept and ideology of *Makwerekwere* which is used to make visible the invisible object of fear in order to eliminate it. Its use to render Africans from outside the colonial-invented borders of South Africa orderable as the nation’s bogey man is a process that will ultimately lead to self-annihilation (Matsinhe 2011).

This is the crux of our deploying Matsinhe’s ideology of *Makwerekwere* as an explanatory framework in this paper. Going by widely reported outbreaks of afrophobia in South Africa since 1994 as chronicled by the International Organization for Migration, it appears that most so-called black⁹ South Africans see themselves as different from and better than other Africans from the continent. They have become the ‘established groups’ in Africa who must necessarily stigmatize, deal with and if possible annihilate the ‘outsider groups’ who they have framed as *aMakwerekwere*. In their imagination, the *Makwerekwere* from underdeveloped Africa is

⁸ Ndebele, Shangaan, Sotho, Swazi and Tswana are South African languages and cultures which are spoken and practiced widely in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana respectively.

⁹ We say so-called because in reality, no human being is black in the same tone as the colour black just as none is white in the same tone as the colour white. It therefore begs; who decided that some will be called black and others white?

different¹⁰ and does not belong in an exceptional (developed) South Africa. This ideology is so strongly ingrained that even when the *Makwerekwere* eventually meets all the legal requirements for citizenship and is bestowed such, he/she is still counted as ‘foreigner’ and never fully accepted and treated as a South African¹¹. This is an imagery that must change not only at the people level, but also at the top level of governance¹² in order to prevent our collective self-annihilation as a race. This is more so as the differentiation between South Africans and other African nationals is not based on any real difference between them. Rather it is an imagined difference which is a result of long years of systematic psychosocial dehumanization that ‘blacks’ suffered under the apartheid era. In many ways, this is supported by findings from our survey of South Africans in our study areas who agree that from watching Nigerian movies and other African movies, they can see that Africa’s numerous cultures are more similar than they are different. For instance, 74% of our sample affirmed this (see table 4) with a cumulative 90% highlighting areas of similarity in dressing, family values, marriage, ancestral belief and worship (see table 7).

¹⁰ One of the authors has on numerous occasions personally experienced this misconception of difference on account of her skin colour. She is very light-skinned and has as such been assumed to be Zulu or ‘Coloured’ based on the imagination that a Nigerian cannot be so light skinned.

¹¹ In May 2010, one of the authors requested a list of all academic staff from the Human Capital Management (HCM) department of the University of Zululand with a view to determine the percentage of African foreigners. In helping to identify the African foreign nationals on the list, the HCM staff also ticked those who were appointed as citizens and others who had become citizens over time as ‘foreigners’.

¹² Contrary to popular opinion that afrophobia exist mainly in the lower echelons of society, it is happening at the top as well. It is being expressed daily by educated and affluent South Africans at top-level state institutions such as the department of Home Affairs, the South African Police Service and the media (Neocosmos, 2006; Gordon, 2010). Ironically, universities that ought to be citadels of knowledge are not spared as, for instance, eminently qualified African foreigners are routinely denied positions because they are not South Africans.

Trends of African Immigration to South Africa since 1994

Historically, South Africa has always attracted immigrants from different parts of Africa. During the dark apartheid years, the Aliens Control Act of 1963 was largely the legislative and policy instrument used to regulate immigration into South Africa, and as the name suggests, it was effectively used to control the entry of foreigners, especially Africans, into the country. According to Crush, the act was a blatant and unashamed instrument of white racial domination or supremacy¹³. For example, Section 4 (1) of the Aliens Control Act stated that a person could only immigrate to South Africa if that person's habits of life are suited to the requirements of South Africa. As Khan contends, 'the official definition of an immigrant was therefore that he or she had to be able to be assimilated into the white population', impliedly, 'Africans were not considered for immigration' (Khan 2007: 2). However, African mine and farm workers from neighbouring states such as Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were given special exception and allowed to enter South Africa solely as undocumented migrant labourers and with severe human rights restrictions which made them no worse than indentured slaves (see Adepoju 1988; Kenneth 1997; Zlotnik 2003; Khan 2007).

Since the advent of popular democracy in 1994, immigration policy and trend has changed from one of selective restriction that was racialised to one of guided accommodation that is non-racialised. This is so because although post-1994 immigration policy and practice is open to and accommodative of anyone who can contribute to developing the new South Africa, it is a guided accommodation as it only encourages skilled workers, capital-owning entrepreneurs and wealthy retirees to emigrate from their countries to South Africa. For example one of the stated intentions of the extant Immigration Act No 13 of 2002 is 'to permit an easy flow of highly skilled foreigners and investors into South Africa'. In this light, the act is intended to promote economic growth by:

- (a) Ensuring that businesses in the Republic may employ foreigners who are needed;

¹³ Jonathan Crush: South Africa: New Nation, New Migration Policy? <http://www.queensu.ca/samp> Accessed 10/05/11.

- (b) Facilitating foreign investments, tourism and industries in the Republic which are reliant on international exchanges of people and personnel;
- (c) Enabling exceptionally skilled or qualified people to sojourn in the Republic;
- (d) Increasing skilled human resources in the Republic;
- (e) Facilitating the movement of students and academic staff within the Southern African Development Community for study, teaching and research; and
- (f) Tourism promotion (Immigration Act No 13, 2002: 14)

According to Khan (2007:4),

Generally, immigrants who are in a position to contribute to the broadening of South Africa's economic base are welcomed to apply for residence. Similarly applications by skilled workers in occupations for which there is a shortage in the country are encouraged but particularly applications by industrialist and other entrepreneurs who wish to relocate their existing businesses or establish new concerns in South Africa. Anybody who intends to retire in South Africa may do so if they can show a Nett worth of an amount to be determined by the Minister of Home Affairs.

And although unlike the apartheid control act, the immigration act of 2002 does not preclude temporary visitors of varying categories, in many ways, it excludes some class of people. It excludes unskilled workers, petty traders with little or no start-up capital and even refugees fleeing from economic deprivations and or conflict in their home countries in spite of the rights that refugees have by reason of the Refugees Act No 130 of 1998. In spite of this, the trend of African migration to South Africa since 1994 has remained an economic survival strategy used by members of poor households in Southern African countries (see Adepoju 2006). For example, largely because of its political instability and economic malaise, Zimbabwe since 2000 has now overtaken Mozambique as the country with the highest number of migrant stocks from the SADC region in South Africa as table 1 shows.

Table 1: Migrant stock of top sending African countries to South Africa, 2007

Country	Migrant stock
Ghana***	208, 226
Ivory Coast**	24, 849
Malawi	10, 662
Mozambique*	269, 918
Swaziland	80, 593
Zimbabwe*	5, 109, 084

Source: Ngwenya (2010: 15).

* Represents countries with the highest number of migrant stock

** Represents countries that fall outside the SADC region

*** Represents countries both with the highest number of migrant stock that fall outside of SADC.

Ghana and Ivory Coast from outside SADC show a relatively strong presence in post-1994 African migration flows to South Africa. Others in this category that are not listed in this table include Cameroun, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritius, Nigeria and Tanzania. Together, they form a new pattern of African immigration characterized by a

large scale and diversity of origins of present-day immigrants, bringing their skills, enterprise and drive, and eager to explore prospects in Africa's most buoyant economy (Adepoju 2006: 40).

Clearly then, South Africa because of its economic position in Africa tends to attract a lot of African immigrants fleeing economic decadence in their countries. However, beyond economic push and pull factors, are there other factors that make South Africa an attractive migration destination for other African nationals? As aforementioned, apart from South Africa's stable political environment, strong rights-based constitution, and sound legal

framework for protecting and enforcing these rights, it emerged from our FGD that its low potential for natural disasters and Africanism are important factors. For all 16 participants in our FGD in Empangeni, all the non-economic factors enumerated were also significant pull factors in their decision to migrate to South Africa. For example, of the 16, 5 said, given the high propensity of countries of the north to natural disasters, South Africa was a better choice. For them, while the decision to migrate had to do with push factors (unemployment and lack of self-actualization prospects) in their home countries, they also did not want to lose their lives to natural disasters which plague the developed north more in the search for greener pastures (FGD 01/05/11). On Africanism, 6 of the participants who first came to South Africa as students, have finished their studies and have been working for over 5 years now felt very strongly about studying within Africa and giving back to Africa rather than to the rich north. For them, in spite of afrophobia, living amongst a predominantly African population was more comforting than living as conspicuous racial minorities in a predominantly European population. A similar sentiment was expressed in the FGD in Durban. The group agreed that African cultural similarity which made for easier assimilation was a driving factor in their choice of South Africa as a migration destination (FGD 09/07/11).

However, much as the impetus for migration is largely economic, what remain unappreciated are the cultural implications of African immigration for promoting transnational friendship and peace in the continent through cultural appreciation. As Africans increasingly travel within the continent, they get to know their continent and appreciate the fact that the things that divide them are largely artificial if not imaginary. This has implications for both regional and intercontinental integration especially at the people-level. For example, in the context of this paper, Nigerians living in South Africa have increasingly stimulated ordinary South Africans and other Africans living in the country through their clothing, food and music cultures to take more than a passing interest in what Nigeria is about. One avenue through which this interest is consummated is watching Nigerian movies on the Africa Magic channel (114) on Multi Choice digital satellite television (DSTV), Top TV and DVDs. From our survey findings, it appears that beyond their entertainment value, Nigerian movies are engaging in cultural enlightenment on Nigerian peoples and cultures. Indeed, they and

other such African movies are fostering friendship, transnational ties and unity between Nigerians and South Africans as well as other African nationals in South Africa. This certainly has positive implications for regional integration, peace and development in Africa if the ordinary people of the continent are to buy into the idea and fruition of a United States of Africa.

Case Study Analysis of Nigerian Movies in Promoting Cultural Unity in Africa

Method of Data Collection and Presentation of Findings

A total of 92 persons, 40 males and 52 females across Empangeni, Ngwelezane and Pietermaritzburg were randomly sampled for this study. They included 3 Batswana, 6 Congolese, 8 Cameroonians, 5 Mozambicans, 55 South Africans, 7 Zambians and 8 Zimbabweans. The respondents were sampled at the entrance of shopping malls in Empangeni (Sanlam centre), Ngwelezane (China store) and Pietermaritzburg (Scottsville).

As table 2 shows, 52% of the respondents felt that the presence of Nigerians in South Africa stimulated their interest in watching Nigerian movies which has further improved their knowledge of Nigeria, its peoples and cultures.

Table 2: Nigerian presence in South Africa stimulated interest in movies Interest

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	48	52.2	52.2	80.4
	No	26	28.3	28.3	28.3
	Do not know	18	19.6	19.6	100.0
	Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Approximately 83% of the respondents felt this way as shown in table 3. This is a positive socio-cultural outcome of African immigration within the continent if the vision of a united Africa or United States of Africa is to be realised.

Table 3: Increased understanding of Nigerian peoples and cultures
Understanding Nigerians and their culture

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	76	82.6	82.6	82.6
No	11	12.0	12.0	94.6
Do not know	5	5.4	5.4	100.0
Total	92	100.0	100.0	

As aforementioned, 74% of the respondents are now more convinced after watching Nigerian and other African movies that most African cultures are similar. A further subsection of this descriptive statistics to quantitative analysis reveals a significance difference of $P < 0.05$ in the perceptions on similarity between African cultures in the continent.

Table 4: Convinced most African cultures are similar
Similar

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid .00	1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Yes	68	73.9	73.9	75.0
No	13	14.1	14.1	89.1
Do not know	8	8.7	8.7	97.8
5.00	2	2.2	2.2	100.0
Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Table 5: One-sample statistics
One-Sample Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Similar	92	1.3913	.83806	.08737

Table 6: One-sample test
One-Sample Test

	Test Value = 0					
	T	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
Similar	15.924	91	.000	1.39130	1.2177	1.5649

As table 7 shows, the perceived areas of similarities in African cultures for the respondents include dressing, marriage, family values and ancestral worship. In terms of the frequency distribution of multiple responses, 58% of the total number of respondents ticked either ‘dressing’, ‘marriage’, ‘family values’ or ‘ancestral worship’ while 31% ticked ‘all of the above’. The other frequencies are shown in the table.

Table 7: Perceived areas of similarities in African cultures

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Dressing	13	14.1	14.1	14.1
	Marriage	13	14.1	14.1	28.3
	Family values	15	16.3	16.3	44.6
	Ancestral worship	13	14.1	14.1	58.7
	All of the above	29	31.5	31.5	90.2
	Dressing and marriage	1	1.1	1.1	91.3
	Marriage, family values and ancestral worship	3	3.3	3.3	94.6
	Family values and ancestral worship	2	2.2	2.2	96.7
	Marriage and family values	2	2.2	2.2	98.9
	Dressing, marriage and family values	1	1.1	1.1	100.0
	Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Synthesis and Discussion

As aforementioned, South Africans view and treat African immigrants in the country as aMakwerekwere based on an imagination of difference between them and other Africans aptly described by Matsinhe (2011) as the narcissism of minor difference.

Whether real or imagined, the so-called differences between South Africans and other Africans, especially those from outside the Southern region are frequently highlighted to achieve a superficial sense of South African uniqueness. And as Hazell (2009) contends, it is a sense of otherness which is only a mask for an underlying uniformity and sameness. This much is reflected in our study where respondents including South Africans themselves agree that African cultures are more similar than they are different. While similarity in culture does not necessarily imply or confirm similarity in physical traits, it does point to an underlying sameness or similarity in origin especially considering that blacks known today as South Africans migrated¹⁴ from west and central Africa some 2, 000 years ago in what is known as the largest human migration in global history¹⁵. More over, the minor variations in physical traits can be found all over the continent and should therefore not be treated differently from the way we would treat physical variations amongst all peoples such as 'short', 'tall', 'slim', 'fat'. Concisely, in the context of this study, the notion of difference between South Africans and other Africans which fuels the invented ideology of Makwerekwere is false.

Second, it has been argued that regional integration and pan-African governance is the key to sustainable development and unity that can bring about lasting peace and stability in Africa (Miyanda 2001; Uzodike 2010). In the same vein, the literature on the barriers to its realization is well documented (Miyanda 2001; Ndi-Zambo 2001). However, we contend that if regional and continental integration is to be a reality in Africa, the African masses who would become instruments of such integration must first buy

¹⁴ South Africa is indeed a country of migrants as historically both the Caucasian and Indian populations are products of migration hundreds of years ago.

¹⁵ See <http://www.ezakwantu.com/Tribes%20-%20Southern%20African%20Tribal%20Migrations.htm>. (Accessed 17/08/11.)

into it. One way to facilitate this buy-in is through immigration within the continent which has the potential to foster common cultural understanding, acceptance and unity of Africans. That way, their buy-in will easily eliminate some of the social barriers to regional integration which is a result of intolerance based on ignorance (Miyanda 2001). Our study shows that African immigration can have a positive effect on the process of regional and continental integration. This is especially so in South Africa which was previously delinked from the rest of Africa and whose peoples as a result have very little knowledge of the peoples of the rest of Africa. For example, 48 (87%) of the 55 South Africans who took part in our survey say that from watching Nigerian movies, they now view Nigerians in more positive light because of the similarities in cultures/worldviews, and the fact that they now know more about Nigeria beyond the popular stereotypes and narrow views about Nigeria and Nigerians¹⁶. Similarly, 83% of all respondents expressed this sentiment. This is connected to Nigerian immigration to South Africa as 52% of all respondents said the presence of Nigerians in South Africa stimulated their interest in watching Nigerian movie (see table 2).

Concluding Remarks and Policy Suggestions

We have tried to show that xenophobia, and in the context of this study, afrophobia is a socio-cultural outcome of African immigration to South Africa which impacts negatively on the unity of Africa and Africans. We have also argued that this afrophobia is based on an invented ideology of Makwerekwere which itself is a cumulative result of the dynamics of psychosocial group relations during the apartheid years. If not properly managed, this dynamics has the potential to snowball into new forms of discrimination and violence that would engulf South Africa with negative

¹⁶ Nigerians in South Africa are generally stereotyped by both government officials and the masses as criminals and drug dealers (see Harris, 2001: 74). However, in reality, the number of Nigerians involved in criminal activities in South Africa pale into insignificance compared to the number of Nigerian doctors, professors, engineers, architects, mathematics and science teachers and entrepreneurs working legally all over South Africa and contributing significantly to its economic growth and development.

implications for the region given that crisis is exportable (see Ayoob 1995). The question we now turn to is: what is the role of the post-apartheid South African state in all this? This is where the concept and practice of citizenship; being and belonging in South Africa as constructed by the post-apartheid state come in.

The notion of citizenship in Africa based on indigeneity of modern states remains problematic. This is because the state in Africa is an artificial creation of colonialism that has very little if anything to do with the cultural and lived realities of the African peoples. It therefore becomes a narrow conception and practice of citizenship which not only excludes but also facilitates afrophobia. This is the case in South Africa where the post-apartheid state constructed and implemented a narrow definition of citizenship based on the traditional state-nation-territory discourse (Gordon 2010). According to him, South Africa's nationalist discourse of immigration policy depicts (African) foreigners as a threat to the social and economic rights of citizens, and as such should be restricted (Gordon 2010: 52-58). This is what Neocosmos (2006) described as state hegemonic conception of citizenship to which 'all in the public domain, from the Left to the Right of the political spectrum, have been in agreement that the benefits of South African citizenship should be restricted to those who could prove some form of indigenous link with the country, and that the others should be kept firmly out' (Neocosmos 2006: 125). In this way, xenophobia, according to Neocosmos is a structural feature of state discourse and practice, not an accidental occurrence as claimed by the state and its ruling party; the African National Congress (ANC).

This post-apartheid state exclusivist conception and practice of citizenship, evident in immigration legislation and a selective regime of state benefits that is reminiscent of apartheid oppression, has enabled the masses' conception and use of the *Makwerekwere* ideology to engage and ostracize African foreigners. The point is if the post-apartheid state had conceived a pan-Africanist notion of citizenship (progressive, egalitarian and as such more inclusive) and put the required structures in place to implement it, the ideology of *Makwerekwere* would have been contained early on and the stigma and development costs of afrophobia and xenophobia avoided. As things stand, the cultural richness which South Africa stands to benefit from African immigration has not been fully harnessed because of the state's

exclusivist politics of nationalism and the afrophobia it brews¹⁷. At the level of continental integration, Tadjó (2008) puts the issue into perspective thus:

We Africans are not talking to one another. The difficulty of travelling inside the African continent, unworkable currency exchanges, linguistic barriers and the age-old divide between Francophones, Anglophones and Lusophones are all factors that have turned us into strangers living side by side (Tadjó 2008: 238).

Apart from South Africa's pan-Africanist responsibilities in the continent as espoused in its African Renaissance project, the state's inability or unwillingness to proactively engage with the question of pan-African citizenship in South Africa will not end at the afrophobic divide between South African 'natives' and African 'strangers'. As Tadjó contends, 'the discourse of 'othering' can always be displaced into other modes of expression' (Tadjó 2008: 235) as was the case in the Ivory Coast where the notion of 'foreigner' became dual. According to her,

the 'Other' is not just the one who does not belong to the national territory. The 'Other' has also become the one who is not from the local territory (Tadjó 2008: 236).

The lesson for South Africa is that today it is African foreigners; tomorrow it would be South Africans turning on themselves in ways that could precipitate a civil war between the different ethnicities (ethno-phobia) in this beautiful rainbow nation-state. The state and its ruling class must therefore act proactively. In this light, and based on our analysis and findings, the following suggestions suffice:

- The South African government should change its political discourse on citizenship by encouraging debate around constructing a new notion of citizenship that is more pan-Africanist, inclusive and tied

¹⁷ Xenophobia or afrophobia blights South Africa's human rights profile in the world, a phenomenon that may not bode well for foreign direct investment in the country.

to an overall vision of South African development. This does not imply opening up the borders for the continent to flood South Africa. Rather, it is an inclusive conceptualization of citizenship that makes special provision for skilled Africans to earn South African citizenship periodically. Such recognition of Africans by the state will effectively discourage South Africans from caricaturing Africans as the problem of South Africa.

- Based on this, Government should formulate and implement a clear immigration policy that encourages brain gain for South Africa in critical areas of need without aiding brain drain for the rest of the continent. In this light, the state should collaborate with African states to effectively manage the drain effects on their economies. Similarly, the state should support democratic consolidation and good governance in Africa to forestall opportunistic immigration to South Africa.
- Government in collaboration with civil society, especially the media must make conscious efforts to educate the South African public about Africa, its history and connections rather than reproducing stereotypes and clichés. In this vein, African history should be introduced in secondary schools. Also, universities should be given incentives to have functional African Studies centres that would teach ‘Introduction to Africa’ which all undergraduate students will be required to take for credit points at first year. These centres can also incorporate optional courses on major African languages as part of their teaching brief.
- As part of the African enlightenment campaign, Government should encourage the SABC 1, 2 AND 3 to show films from Africa which showcase and educate on African cultures and ways instead of focusing on only South African soaps such as Generations, Muvhango and Isindingo. Our study show that South Africans are very interested in watching African films as all 92 respondents said they watched Nigerian movies and other African movies frequently (54% answered ‘frequent’ while 46% answered ‘Very frequent’).

The challenge for them is that African movies are only shown on satellite television which most people cannot afford.

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