4. Liberalism and Empire

> The chief obstacle to the attainment of our end is the fact that our intentions are generally misunderstood.
>
> —Alfred Milner, *England in Egypt*

This chapter concerns the rationale for imperial and colonial, and subsequently, global power. The conceptual and rhetorical building blocks of global political economy include financial management, historical precedent, economic theory, and pedagogical culture. Proponents of the first modern wave of globalisation (1870-1914) identified finance (debt and corruption), technology (expertise), and the development of human rights (civilisation) as major issues. The end point was clear to anyone concerned with the good of humanity.

Alfred Milner's *England in Egypt* (1892) reflects on the veiled protectorate of Egypt. Egypt was *de jure* part of the Ottoman Empire but after 1882 under *de facto* British rule—neither a colony nor a dominion. Milner served as undersecretary of finance in Egypt from 1890-92. 'What has brought Egypt from ruin to solvency, from solvency to financial ease' (1892: viii), according to Milner, has enabled bondholders to see the value of their investments doubled. Determined 'to stamp out corruption' (xxiv), the English are pursuing their business and not their philanthropic interests: 'business of a perfectly straightforward and honourable kind, and possessing the characteristic of all good business, namely, that both the parties concerned are benefited' (xxiv). Sustainable business equals good governance and good order when confronted with **'**the labyrinth of jarring interests, conflicting authorities, and hopelessly disintegrated sovereignty' (1892: 4).

The even-handed British approach is contrasted with the predatory approach of competing powers, specifically France: 'complicated international fetters' (ix) are the 'Gordian knot' (x) that must be cut. The 'stubborn opposition' (xiv) of Egyptian rulers 'that gives the appearance of a genuine national movement' (xv) distinguishes the very people who have the most to gain from the proposed reforms. Lamenting 'the revival of fanatical prejudice consequent of the recent political troubles' (xi), he notes the 'time immemorial' (3) embodied in Egypt, for what we see now extends back millennia: '[t]he

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.29086/978-0-6397-0950-5/2022/AASBS10
Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.29086/978-0-6397-0950-5/2022/AASBS10/chapter4

fascination of its primeval monuments remains' (2). Present 'social and economic conditions' (4) must be remedied by modernisation. Egypt's 'monstrous' political system—'the anomalies, the intricacies, and the shams with which the Political System of Egypt, in its latest development, positively bristles' (3)—must be reformed. We must not allow the substitution of 'the wolf for the sheep dog as the guardian of the flock' (433).

According to Milner's diagnosis Egypt, a place where '[p]aradox seems rooted in the soil' (2), faced two possible courses: either 'acceptance of the helping hand … and their co-operation with us in that work of constructive reform,' or 'persistence in the recent policy of hostility and obstruction—a policy which renders the success of our work under present conditions impossible, and must therefore end in some radical change' (xxi). That change, Milner explains, will certainly not accord with the ideal of national independence and will result in more, and less benign, foreign control. Politicians must not 'misinterpret the situation' (xxii) for the British are committed to Egyptian independence and are working to prepare the Egyptians for independence, a process that can only meet its completion gradually: 'the ingrained evils of some fifteen centuries cannot be eradicated in a decade' (440). Financial swindling may have induced British intervention, but the interest of the bond-holders 'has never been the inspiring motive of our policy. The inspiring, the predominant, motive of that policy, is the welfare of the Egyptian people' (444). Egypt is a place of many contradictions and the Egyptian people must be saved from themselves.[1]

Milner is fulsome in his praise of Sir Evelyn Baring, scion of the Baring banking dynasty and former British Controller-General and Consul-General of Egypt (1883-1907) (*England in Egypt*: 438-440). In 1913 Baring, now the Earl of Cromer, reciprocated, seeing Milner as 'the founder of South African prosperity … whose statesmanlike foresight is now beginning to produce a rich and abundant harvest' ("South Africa," 1913: 255).[2] Baring, as economist and financier, is credited with having restored stability after a revolution and securing 'Egypt's finances, and given her prosperity' (Marsot 1968: 127).

Let us take up the thread of what Evelyn Baring, former Consul-General of Egypt, termed 'the true motives which guide the actions of those who take the leading part' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 1915: 7).

England in Egypt

> And remembering that the return of prosperity to the peoples of the Near East began with your [Baring's] administration in Egypt.
>
> —Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*

Baring's philosophical consideration of imperial power reflects on the paradoxes noted by Milner. It would be difficult to find a more telling distillation of the liberal, developmental imperial project, and its voice can only be heard through a lengthy quotation:

> Lastly, how does the matter stand as regards ourselves? We have endeavoured to be as elastic as the somewhat cast-iron dogmas of Western civilization admit. Speaking from my own experience, I should say that the absence of that social adaptability, in which the French excel, is to some extent compensated in the case of the English by a relatively high degree of administrative and political elasticity. Save in dealing with some exceptionally barbarous practice, such as Sati, we have followed the example of Rome in respecting local customs. Indeed, it may be doubted whether we have not gone too far in this direction, for we have often stereotyped bad customs, and allowed them to assume the force of law. We have not interfered seriously with the practice of infant marriages. Save in respect to slavery, we have left intact the personal law both of Hindoos and Mohammedans—albeit that in both cases the codes were drawn up centuries ago to suit the conditions of primitive societies. But in spite of these, and other illustrations of a like nature which might be cited, do not let us for one moment imagine that we have not been innovators, and, in the eyes of the ordinary conservative Eastern, rash innovators. Freedom of contract, the principle of *caveat emptor*, rigid fixity of fiscal demands, the expropriation of land for non-payment of rent, even the commonplace Western idea that a man must be proved to be guilty of an offence before he can be punished, are almost as great innovations as the principle of representation accompanied by all the electoral paraphernalia of Europe. These divergent habits of thought on economic, juridical, and administrative questions have served to enhance the strength of the very formidable and elemental forces, such as differences of religion, of colour, and of social habits, which are ever tending to sunder the governing race from that which is governed. There has been no thorough fusion, no real assimilation between the British and their alien subjects, and, so far as we can now predict, the future will in this respect be but a repetition of the past. *Fata obstant* [the fates oppose, or, destinies do withstand—Virgil]. The foundations on which the barrier wall of separation is built may be, and, without doubt, to a certain extent are, the result of prejudice rather than of reason; but however little we may like to recognize the

> fact, they are of so solid a character, they appeal so strongly to instincts and sentiments which lie deep down in the hearts of men and women, that for generations to come they will probably defy whatever puny, albeit well-intentioned, efforts may be made to undermine them. (Baring *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 1910: 85-88)

The realisation of individual freedom dovetails with western economic, juridical and administrative forms, and resistance is a matter of prejudice rather than reason. National, and imperial, advantage are enablers and by-products of progress.

Progress can intensify elemental forces. The intensification of these prejudices is a result of the progress made, and an attempt to hinder development.[3] Primordial 'instincts and sentiments which lie deep down in the heart of men and women' will form a barrier that will ensure that the future is 'but a repetition of the past.' The economic, juridical and administrative forms of 'primitive societies' are no longer suited to prospering in the modern world. The new global situation demands radical reform.

Impatience with the tissue of condescension and self-serving prejudice of such formulations regarding 'primitive races' (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism* 75) ought not to distract from what Edward Said in *Orientalism* called 'the intellectual power' (1978: 41) at work. Situating Baring within 'the long-developing core of essential knowledge, knowledge both academic and practical … knowledge about knowledge of Orientals, their race, culture, history, traditions, society and possibilities' (38), Said warns that to see only the rationalisation of colonial domination is to 'underestimate the reservoir of accredited knowledge' (39). The images, figures, and narratives that cannot be relegated to the authoritarian casuistry of some bygone primitive era of grasping imperialism and colonialism. These powerful discursive elements are, Said suggested, at work today; reason enough to revisit the spokesmen of imperialism.[4]

Shorn of overt racial supremacism, the idea of progress is inseparable not only from a historical narrative—from primitive to modern—which is more complicated and tenacious than is often supposed. The historical sense includes consideration of race and the mechanics of domination which, as Said suggests, must not be simply dismissed as prejudice dressed up as reason for then the central integument is left undisturbed. One must attend to distinctions and variegations to identify the infrastructure.[5]

Scepticism directed at claims for 'the dignity of British principles' (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 79) fortuitously coinciding with 'the interests of civilisation' (39)—'the general interest of Europe and civilisation' (40) and 'the civilising work which Great Britain has undertaken in Egypt' (84)—should not distract from analysis of *how* their own interest coincided with civilisation, or as we would now say with the very survival of humanity. This is no mere rhetorical sleight of hand but rather a powerful and persistent means not only of claiming the moral high ground but also of pre-empting and marginalising opponents and sceptics. The 'so very presentable face of good conscience' (Derrida 1992: 81) is part of a mechanism designed to undermine the capacity to resist.

Reaction to the thesis that 'the broad lines which those reforms must take are traced out by the commonplace requirements of European civilisation' (*Modern Egypt* I, 5) ought not to obscure the basis on which such claims were, and are, made. Consider the claim that slavery and race antipathy were not an integral part of Roman Imperialism:

> My own conjecture—and it is nothing more than a conjecture—is that antipathy based on differences of colour is a plant of comparatively recent growth. It seems probable that it received a great stimulus from the world-discoveries of the fifteenth century. One of the results of those discoveries was to convince the white Christian that he might, not only with profit, but with strict propriety, enslave the black heathen. Towards the middle of the fifteenth century, slaves were regularly imported from Senegambia and the Guinea ... It is true that negro slavery never took root in Europe, but it lasted until within recent times on the further side of the Atlantic, and the fact that the institution of slavery was closely identified in the eyes of all the world with difference of colour must have helped to bring into prominence the idea of white superiority, and thus to foster a race antipathy which, by a very comprehensible association of ideas, was not altogether confined to those coloured races who were enslaved, but was also in some degree extended to those who, as in the case of the Arabs, far from being themselves subject to enslavement, eventually became the most active agents in the enslavement of others.
>
> Under the influence of a benevolent and, in this instance, very laudable humanitarianism, there has been a great reaction during the last century; but I cannot help thinking that even now antipathy based on colour is a much more prominent feature in the government and social relations of the world than was the case in ancient times. There would certainly at first sight appear to be some connection between this circumstance and the recrudescence of slavery, which dates from the fifteenth century. (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 142-143)[6]

The idea of race superiority is not primordial but rather a product of history—a social construction, as we would now say. It seems that the subjection of subject races rests more on economic and techno-cultural superiority understood as adaptability to the demands of the present historical context. This is why Milner could disparage 'the primitive and untutored instinct of aversion from alien races' ("The Two Empires," 1908: 297). For the time being the burden of guiding others along the path of history, and so empowering them, rests with the white race. This is not a natural but an historical contingency. The remedy for certain problems must not be confused with speculation on its causes.

It seems that the idea of progress, and the necessary stages of development that are its building blocks, can detach from the idea of biological race differentiation.[7] Marketing the empire is not dependent on the claim to racial, biological superiority. Writing about what Baring calls 'paramount races' (*Modern Egypt* I, 5) is of less moment than what is said about development. The thematic centre of regressive racism, conscious or unconscious, can vitiate the need to analyse, leading to what Rey Chow labels 'facilely dismissive judgements' (1998: 12).

Consider the argument of *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* against corruption and for good governance. Referring to 'an administrative system which is honeycombed with corrupt practices' (60) and veiled behind 'vapid moral sentiments' (61), Baring draws a lesson from ancient Rome's sanctioned 'venality' (62):

> But I venture to think that a more reasonable, more correct, and more philosophic view to take is to surmise that the *Pax Romana* was a necessary phase through which the world had to pass before those moralizing influences, which we owe mainly to the Jew and the Teuton, could be brought to bear on the destinies of mankind, and thus usher in a period when the arrested culture and humanity of the Hellene could exert their legitimate influence. (62)[8]

Quoting with approval Sir George Cornewall Lewis on the corruption of the East India Company—"'no civilized government ever existed on the face of this earth which was more corrupt, more perfidious, and more capricious than the East India Company was from 1758 to 1784, when it was placed under Parliamentary control'" (68)—Baring points to Turkey, Egypt and the Congo as other examples of the corruption of the principle of sound government. Economic management rather than race is the foundation of discrimination.

The root of the problem is allowing those who profit and those who rule to become one: 'That principle is that administration and commercial exploitation should not be entrusted to the same hands' (69). State officials may err but if they are well-paid can have no excuse for bad government and must be punished if they lapse. Commercial agents, however, care nothing for the common good of future well-being and 'must almost of necessity at times neglect the welfare of the subject race in the real or presumed pecuniary interests of their employers' (70).

Singling out the Congo, Baring indicts what we would now call corporatism: 'the system is radically defective and vicious; all the more so because public opinion may not improbably be largely influenced by those who are in the perpetuation of the abuses' (70, note). Although '[a]n Imperial Power naturally expects to derive some benefits for itself from its Imperialism' (41), unbridled venality does not serve that power's long-term interest. Imperial Power and stewardship must not fuse administrative and commercial spheres.

Baring lists 'economic, juridical, and administrative questions' (87) but does not discuss the juridical. This is surprising given that his source for thinking on dependencies is Lewis's *Of the Government of Dependencies* (1841).[9] Lewis's preliminary remarks clarify the distinction between sovereign and executive power in which executive power is divided into two classes, juridical and administrative (1841: 11). A judge executes the law, but administers nothing.

One can speculate that Baring passes over the question of juridical power because the reality is that, in the dependency, the juridical sphere is an extension of the administrative power. The metropolitan norm is not exportable to the empire, at least not immediately. Sovereignty, of course, is not an issue because it rests with the dominant, home country and is tacitly assumed by Baring and articulated by Lewis with extensive ancient and modern examples. According to Lewis: 'The powers of a subordinate legislature are expressly or tacitly delegated to it by the supreme government' (1841: 249).[10]

Although drawing extensively on Lewis for information, Baring omits to mention Lewis's emphatic scepticism regarding the actual separation of powers achieved by functioning governments. The definitive separation of legislative and executive powers 'is not consistent with the practice of any government which has hitherto existed' (41). Could not the same be said of administrative and commercial powers, particularly in dependent and

subordinate polities? Put bluntly: How can commercial interests be challenged by a judiciary and a constrained executive that follows laws made elsewhere?

Baring's representation of the separation of administrative and commercial powers runs up against the symbiosis between regulation and revenue; between administrators' salaries and revenue (usually in the form of tax) dependent upon commercial activity. Where this extraction is not voluntary it must be enforced.[11] Highlighting that 'lurking in the background was a British garrison—the ultimate military sanction' (Vatikiotis 1991: 175) makes the English appear more like Lewis's depiction of the Romans commanding through force and extracting through monopoly:

> It was the general policy of the Romans not to make more changes in a conquered territory than were necessary for the purpose of reducing it to complete subjection. Hence, when they had firmly established its dependence on Rome, by garrisoning all its strong places with Roman legions, and collecting all its public revenues by Roman officers, they were content to allow the ancient law of the country, its religion, and other peculiar institutions of a like nature, to remain untouched. The Romans appear to have adopted this course partly upon reflection and from a conviction of its expediency, and partly from a certain haughty indifference which led them to turn away with contempt from questions about matters not affecting the maintenance of their own authority. (Lewis 1841: 119)

There is of course a considerable difference between 1841, the original date of publication of Lewis's *Of the Government of Dependencies*, and the early twentieth century when Baring was writing. One major difference has little directly to do with questions of racial superiority and inferiority, and it takes us to the heart of the lesson to be learnt from the first modern age of globalisation. One major battle has been fought and won and we live in its wake.

Free Trade

> … because … every other consideration has to give way to this supreme law, the 'categorical imperative' of the Free Trader, that we must not do anything which could by any possibility in the remotest degree benefit the British producer in his competition with the foreigner in our home market. It is from the obsession of this doctrine that the Tariff Reformer wishes to liberate our fiscal policy.
>
> —Alfred Milner, "Tariff Reform"

Lewis's target in *Of the Government of Dependencies* is Adam Smith's argument that the possession of over-seas dependencies increases the chance of war between nations as their commercial interests clash (see Lewis: 243-245). For Baring, writing some sixty years later in "The Government of Subject Races," Adam Smith's influence in England has rapidly declined 'after the great battle of Free Trade had been fought and won' (16).[12]

On the other side of the Free Trade debate—associated with the names of John Bright, Richard Cobden, and William Gladstone—the role of small government was accepted:

> But whatever may have been the faults of that school, and however little its philosophy is capable of affording an answer to many of the complex questions which modern government and society present, it laid fast hold of one unquestionably sound principle. It entertained a deep mistrust of Government interference in the social and economic relations of life. Moreover, it saw, long before the fact became apparent to the rest of the world, that, in spite not only of some outward dissimilarities of methods but even of an instinctive mutual repulsion, despotic bureaucracy was the natural ally of those communistic principles which the economists deemed it their main business in life to combat and condemn. Many regard with some disquietude the frequent concessions which have of late years been made in England to demands for State interference. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the main principle advocated by the economists still holds the field, that individualism is not being crushed out of existence, and that the majority of our countrymen still believe that State interference being an evil, although sometimes admittedly a necessary evil-should be jealously watched and restricted to the minimum amount absolutely necessary in each special case. ("The Government of Subject Races," 16-17)

The role of the State intervening in the market must not interfere with individual (social and economic) freedom. That is why colonialism and imperialism are, initially, best left in the hands of individual companies:

> Our habits: of thought, our past history, and our national character all, therefore, point in the direction of allowing individualism as wide a scope as possible in the work of national expansion. Hence the career of the East India Company and the tendency displayed more recently in Africa to govern through the agency of private companies. On the other hand, it is greatly to be doubted whether the principles, which a wise policy would dictate in the treatment of subject races, will receive their application to so full an extent at the hands of private individuals as would be the case at the hands of the State … More than this, State officials, having no interests to serve but those of good government, are more likely to pay regard to the welfare of the subject race than commercial agents, who must

> necessarily be hampered in their action by the pecuniary interests of their employers. (17-19)[13]

As individual economic actors, companies pursue their own interests (that of their shareholders). The role of the (metropolitan) State is to ensure broader stakeholder interests are heard and to reconcile individual interest and public good. The pecuniary interests of private companies are useful up to a point but must be tempered by the metropolitan State's interest in good government.[14] Free Trade and State oversight are compatible as far as subject races are concerned: 'Indeed, the whole fiscal policy adopted in Egypt since the British occupation in 1888 has been based on distinctly Free Trade principles' ("The International Aspect of Free Trade," 1910: 140; and see "Disraeli," 1912).[15]

Within the imperialist camp the debate regarding Free Trade cut across liberal and conservative wings, and divided liberal imperialists. Milner traced his Free Trade credentials to Bloemfontein, 1903 (see "Unionists and the Empire," 1907: 244) but stressed the need to transcend dogmatism:

> In our complex modern society there is room, no doubt all the room and the need in the world, for individual enterprise and initiative. But there is no room for a policy of *laissez-faire*, of 'go-as-you-please and the devil take the hindmost,' unless you are prepared to have such a mass of 'hindmosts,' such a number of failures as will drag down the whole community to a lower level. In the keen rivalry of nations, in the constant competition between them, from which none can escape (I am not thinking of war; wars might for ever cease, but there would still be competition in peace), one of the things which is going to count most is waste, waste of human power through bad social and industrial arrangements. There is a great silent force always working on the side of those nations which waste least in that respect. ("Imperialism and Social Reform," 1908: 353)

Milner was in favour of protectionist tariffs to privilege products from the empire and to encourage production and employment in the motherland. Unbridled Free Trade could undermine the economy of the home country and unravel the mutual benefits that could weave the empire together.[16]

On the other hand, Baring, an admirer of Louis Mallet,[17] was sceptical of the economic case for protectionism and the lofty ideals of social reform at home and abroad that accompanied it:

> Nevertheless, in spite of the outward contempt with which this Cinderella amongst the sciences is at times treated, political economy has an awkward way of vindicating its own majesty. A sure reward awaits those who, in spite of occasional obloquy and misrepresentation, conform to its leading precepts. A

> slow but certain Nemesis, as Socialists and Protectionists if, *quod Dis non placeat*, they should ever have their way in this country will eventually learn, dogs the steps of those who violate its leading principles. ("Indian Progress and Taxation," 1913: 195-196; see also "The Fiscal Position in India," 1913)

Free Trade and acceptance of the economic laws of the free market will assert their immutability. Political economy as the interpretation of probability becomes the iron law of necessity.

Free Trade and imperialism are not antithetical: economic self-interest and imperial responsibility converge.[18] This delicate balance cannot be left in amateur hands but demands the attention of experts (see Mitchell 2002). The skills required are necessarily found in the personnel who currently manage aspects of the current system. But the rule of experts does not overcome all pitfalls:

> Unfortunately political or administrative errors cannot be condoned by reason of good intentions …The intentions of the British, as compared with the Roman Government are, however, noteworthy from one point of view, inasmuch as from a correct appreciation of those intentions it is possible to evolve a principle perhaps in some degree calculated to avert the consequences which befell Rome, partly by reason of fiscal errors …The point of departure of the British Government is altogether different. Its intentions are admirable. ("The Government of Subject Races," 37-38)

Resistance to progressive reform comes in part from 'fail[ure] to appreciate the intentions' (45) motivating actions and policy.

The twin pillars of empire are commerce and military power, but the developmental empire must constrain destructive capitalism:

> The Empire depends in a great degree on the strength and efficiency of its army. It thrives on its commerce. But if the soldier and the trader are not kept under some degree of statesmanlike control, they are capable of becoming the most formidable, though unconscious, enemies of the British Empire. ("The Government of Subject Races," 51)

All flowed from the fundamental principle of the liberal imperialist creed: good government is better than self-government (see Marsot 1968: 75). A principle that opened the way to collaboration and the hollowing out of national sovereignty in the name of development.

Was collaboration merely the acknowledgement of the incompetence and/or powerlessness of national government to control the economy for the greater good? Better let the dominant global power manage things. Speaking for those wielding power, Baring counselled against overt displays of

dominance, 'showing a preference for a Protectorate as opposed to the assumption of complete sovereignty' (*Abbas II*, xviii). The history of primitive times provides some valuable lessons.

While the Romans were undone by what "The Government of Subject Races" terms 'Barbarous Finance' (36), particularly land tax, it is the failure to communicate intention, or its wilful misinterpretation, that lies at the root of the modern crisis of imperialism.[19] The analogy between Roman and British imperialism is striking:

> The first points of analogy which must strike anyone who endeavours to institute a comparison between Roman and modern—notably British—Imperial policy are that in proceeding from conquest to conquest each step in advance was in ancient, as it has been in modern, times accompanied by misgivings, and was often taken with a reluctance which was by no means feigned; that Rome, equally with the modern expansive Powers, more especially Great Britain and Russia, was impelled onwards by the imperious and irresistible necessity of acquiring defensible frontiers; that the public opinion of the world scoffed 2,000 years ago, as it does now, at the alleged necessity; and that each onward move was attributed to an insatiable lust for an extended dominion. (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 19-20)[20]

Despite such misunderstanding of the causes of expansion, fortunately our intentions are still recognised by potential subjects: 'Is it not clear that they are coming because the Empire means something to them much more than mere government or power? It speaks to them of justice, of righteousness, of mercy, and of truth' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 6).

In his Introduction to Stephen Paget's *For and Against Experiments on Animals* (1912),[21] Baring responds to the charge of 'callous indifference to suffering which were frequently levelled against the experimentalists' ("Experiments on Living Animals," 1912: 238). The imperative of 'progress in medical science' for the good of humanity entails that 'the Vivisectionists, and not their opponents, were the true humanitarians; that they were, under circumstances which rendered them peculiarly liable to misrepresentation, fighting a cause in which not only the whole human race, but also the brute creation, were deeply interested (241, 239). Because 'the pursuit of knowledge in every direction is strewn with the records of false scents' (244) the anti-vivisectionists have been misleading the public, 'led away by a very natural but, I firmly believe in this case, a misplaced sentiment' (252).[22]

Although some animals may suffer during the trials of experimental vaccinations the overall benefit outweighs the risks. Responsibility to humanity

imposes a duty, and hence an ethics and a politics. The idea that the predominance of the strong over the weak is the law of life is

> misapplied Darwinism. The validity of the theory can only be admitted if human beings are in all respects to be assimilated to the brute creation. It involves a complete confusion between a law of Nature and a "law of life." Animals, birds, and insects devour each other because they are obliged to do so in order to live, and because they are not restrained from doing so by any moral or intellectual scruples' ("The German Historians," 1915: 99)

It seems that the 'stern and ruthless logic' ("Subject Races," 43) of the West is intertwined with strategies and rhetoric, feeling, and the principle of reason.

Reiteration of intention and inherent meaning (of actions and words) aims to fix context and meaning not only of action, but also to reframe contexts. The primacy of animating intention is maintained with controlled insistence: 'The fallacy that every Imperialist agent is possessed with an insane desire to enlarge the area of territories painted red on the map of the world is far from being extinct' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 4). Intention as the presence of the origin and imprimatur of identity is tied up with the question of character (*ethos*), and so part of another (auto)biographical narrative chain, what we call personal history, from which we think we can read off inclinations or traits.[23] The rhetorical organisation of attestation of intentional meaning amounts to more than a dramaturgy of sincerity.

The attempt to install a determined regime of interpretation, to cauterise fatal interpretive effractions, pivots on the claim that extenuating circumstances are nothing other than original circumstances. Expository recapitulation clarifies the origin. The real, actual meaning should be obvious to anyone interpreting in good faith. Unfortunately the exegetical exercise of excluding the validity of certain interpretations, the re-framing of events to shore up an essential meaning before the vicissitude and contingency of interpretation, is necessary.

The reiteration, retransmission of original primitive meaning is also teleological in a double sense: this is what we aimed at, and you, addressee (public, posterity), are the arbiter of meaning (again). Injunction: You must be conscious of our intention. A teleological and ethical determination dominates this ethics of reading. Putting aside the absurd and all too common spectacle of those benefitting from a system claiming credit for reforming it, the claim to sanity raises the fundamental question of the division between reason and

madness. At stake in the imperial project is reason itself versus the interminable misfortune of the mad.[24]

Not only is there the 'power of the authority that sustains the representation' (Caygill 1989: 27) of the duly appointed official speaking and writing on behalf of the government (who in turn represents the people). The role of institutional legitimation is key.[25] The creation of the official humanised persona—'a complex alignment of freedom, production, and judgement' (14)—anchors all mechanisms of persuasion and forensic argumentation and is the transcendental guarantee of credibility. Transcendental because this origin, with its roots in freedom and responsibility, is the pre-requisite of the discourse of justification and morality.

The question of the authorisation of legitimate meaning bolsters and parasitizes an essential humanism that is integral to the imperial and colonial imagination, at least for its proponents. Men, not animals, are the authors of speech acts (see Derrida 1988: 134). There can be no assertion of good conscience without this reserve and destination; no testamentary unity or stake without the origin of action aiming at intended result. Unfortunately, interpretation must navigate 'the vulgar and unworthy views sometimes attributed to British Imperialists' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism." 11).

Hermeneutic problems arise not merely from faulty policy but also from misunderstanding the collective, over-arching intention of the imperial official as 'the prose writer, and still more of the orator, [which] should be to state his facts or to prove his case' ("Translation and Paraphrase," 1913: 56).[26] This is a linguistic problem of 'the fidelity of the translation' ("Lord Curzon's War Poems," 1915: 18), whereby 'the ideas or sentiments which it had been intended to convey have been disfigured' ("Translation and Paraphrase," 55).

This is why Baring's texts on literary aesthetics are not merely subsidiary or peripheral to the mechanics of empire. Not only are meaning and intention touchstones of efficient communication. They, in addition to commerce and military power, are integral to the authority without which administration is ineffective. At once semantic and performative, efficiency—the reason of empire—is the moral justification for developmental domination and the means to civilisation.[27] Erecting protective barriers against irrational madness, the danger menacing reason, is an index of a more general problematic.

Pedagogy of Culture

> The material interests of the mother-country, important though they be, must be waived aside if they conflict with the interests and aspirations of the dependency. A higher standpoint than any material advantage must be adopted.
>
> —Evelyn Baring, "Lord Curzon's Imperialism"

The financial and military aspects of imperial rule are supplemented by the cultural and the pedagogical. The 'sane imperialism' of the British involves tutelage of backward peoples, and is the better alternative to 'the Prussian dream of world dictatorship' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 3, 12).

Yet the mission of 'rational Imperialists' (5) cannot be achieved without the maintenance of culture and civilisation at home. Central to this ongoing enlightenment is literary education in western literature which must, however, be handled carefully:

> For more than half a century we have, perhaps unavoidably, been teaching English through the medium of English literature, and that literature, in so far as it is historical, may easily be perverted from a disquisition on the advantages of steady progress achieved by a law-abiding nation into one which eulogizes disrespect for authority, and urges on the governed the sacred duty of throwing off the yoke of unpalatable Governors. Neither, of a surety, if we—or the French in Algeria or Tunis—turn to the history of the other great Western nation, is any corrective to be found. Can we be surprised if we reap the harvest which we have ourselves sown? (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 106)

Referring to the Greek and Roman classics and protesting against those who would jettison the classics in favour of more relevant, useful, fields of study, Baring includes himself among those who

> lift up their hands in supplication to scientists, educational experts, and parliamentarians—yea, even to the soulless wire-pullers who would perhaps willingly cast Homer and Sophocles to the dogs in order to win a contested election—and with one voice cry: we are no enemies to science; but in the midst of your utilitarian ideas, we implore you, in the name of both learning and common sense, to devise some scheme which will enable the humanities to act as some check on the growing materialism of the age … in taking any new departure let us, therefore, very carefully and deliberately consider how we can best preserve all that is good in our existing system. ("The Future of the Classics," 1913: 310)

Classical literature is the repository of ethico-political value. Aesthetics informs judgement as well as sustaining a sense of historical continuity and identity.[28]

It is what saves us, and those who become our responsibility, from 'the humanistic wreck' (309).

The ideal of the imperial mission spreading British principles of freedom, order and justice, and the analogy with Roman imperialism, calls to mind Marlow's meditation from *Heart of Darkness*:[29] The Roman analogy serves to demarcate the modern, English imperial ideal. Motivated by what Baring terms 'a sincere and wholly disinterested desire' ("England and Islam," 1913: 413), the record must be set right. The fate of the British Empire lies in this tangle of intentions and results. Baring concludes his preface to *Modern Egypt* with a quotation from Kipling's wistful "Mandalay" (1890), a gesture to this affective and ideal dimension of globalising imperialism.

Good intentions are not enough—that is the lesson from experience.[30] And yet, as with Milner, *our* good intentions ought to be, if not enough, then at least taken into account when evaluating our actions. Actions that can misfire but not through any malice or selfishness on our part. There is a problem of interpretation which is a problem of context as much as of wilful misinterpretation of proper meaning.[31] If the transparency of our good intentions ought not to be taken at face value, then at least the 'special administrative experience' (*Modern Egypt* I, 4) ought to be taken into account. While to be 'well-intentioned, but certainly misdirected' (22) is not the monopoly of our opponents, our expertise in 'fiscal administration' (14) means that we representatives of 'the logical West' (7) are the lesser of many evils.[32] The core of this competence is familiarity with the logic of finance so as to remedy the suffering caused by 'persistent neglect of economic laws and by reckless administration of the finances of the State' (4). If 'the worry is that 'Egypt would once again degenerate into being the happy hunting-ground of the political and financial adventurer' (*Abbas II*, 84), who is the hunter and who is the hunted?[33]

The 'logical, and very Western' ("Subject Races," 42) project fuses moral sense and fiscal expertise; at once subjective and objective, a matter of feeling and form. The expertise of colonial legislators is not dependent on colonial knowledge, but on familiarity with the global, external financial system and its web of consequences and possibilities. Wisdom promotes the general good amidst private (parochial, national) interests.[34] Disinterested government, putting utility before self-interest, transforms altruistic desire into moral insight. Trans-political politics resolves refractory factionalism into a higher human level by way of the clearer eye of the outsider who is an insider of the

global system. Witness the superior judgement of the governing classes who can see the bigger picture and the governed classes immersed in refractory passions and private interests.[35]

Exactly how this alchemy spanning moral philosophy, politics, and psychology is achieved remains enigmatic. Where does desire end and disinterestedness start? Who decides, and according to what criteria, between responsibility and practicality, sincerity and strategy, private interest and national interest; and between these and humanity, modernity and tradition, finance and people, form and content? Aporia and contradiction remain unresolved. But it was not, and is not, only the judgement of posterity that was at stake for liberal imperialists.

Doubtless Baring, like Milner, was reacting to attacks on his record as colonial administrator.[36] In this theatre of intentions, behind the question of trust, lies the realm of economic laws and its 'somewhat cast-iron dogmas' that dictate the broad lines which reforms must take. European norms are the benchmark by which progress is measured. Recalcitrance, ignorance, and short-sightedness stand in the way. While Baring did not share Milner's visionary enthusiasm for a world-wide state of free citizens emerging from the chrysalis of the British empire,[37] he did share contempt for those who sought to distort the intentions of sane imperialists:

> Still less reliance can be placed on the action of the British Press, which falls a ready victim to the specious arguments advanced by some strategical pseudo Imperialist in high position, or by some fervent acolyte who has learnt at the feet of his master the fatal and facile lesson of how an Empire, built up by statesmen, may be wrecked by the well-intentioned but mistaken measures recommended by specialists to ensure Imperial salvation. ("The Government of Subject Races," 49)

Since a primary medium of communication is the press, the mainstream media can seriously distort and derail any chance of reaching a fair and accurate understanding of problems and their solutions.[38] Both Milner (former assistant editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*) and Baring were involved in shaping public opinion. Journals and newspapers provided a platform from which to influence politicians and policy, and the reasoning thus disseminated was designed to inform and sway (see Potter 2017; and Shannon 2017).

The South African War of 1899-1902—what Milner called 'a supreme crisis in the history of the Empire' ("Imperial Unity—External Advantages," 1908: 309)—brought the tensions within liberal imperialism to a head.

South Africa

> The storm which has blackened the skies of the world was heralded by a cloud no bigger than a man's hand in South Africa.
>
> —Lionel Curtis, *Civitas Dei*

According to Milner, misunderstanding and distortion led to the Anglo-Boer War. Efficiency, industrial efficiency, was the watchword for South African reconstruction and British social reform. At home and abroad national self-interest and insularity must encompass the bigger, global picture. In a globalising, interconnected world national insularity was not an option. The problem was national preoccupation with 'internal development' such that 'owing to a narrow outlook and false political philosophy' they have 'failed to rise to the conception of what is involved in citizenship of a world-wide state' (Milner, "The Two Empires," 1908, 295). Milner envisioned the British Empire as stepping-stone to 'this world-wide state' ("Conditions of Closer Union," 1908: 361).[39]

The intra-liberal imperial critique of Milner and the Boer War offers lessons regarding the nature and effectiveness of attempts to challenge this version of progress. The arguments and 'the feelings of the Liberal minority during the Boer War' (Murray 1921: 8) shed light on the pitfalls of the liberal anti-imperial position.

Critics of the Second Boer War did not have to embrace the cause of the anti-imperial peasant colonisers-cum-colonised. Confronted with a campaign to demonise critics and mobilise belligerent public opinion, one option was to attack the disinterestedness of those laying claim to it. Francis W. Hirst:

> In our war with the two republics no detail is wanting to complete this picture. We see a fight for gold-fields introduced by gambling. Kaffirs as well as consols fluctuate with every change in its fortunes. Bears and bulls let loose their alternate rumours; and every fresh outpouring of blood is foreshadowed and recorded in a rise or fall of Stock Exchange securities. You have quotations before and after a skirmish, failures and fortunes after a defeat, failures and fortunes after a victory. (1900: 44)

Hirst argues that 'to set the South African conflict in its financial environment' involves appreciating the 'sordid motives' (45) that are not simply expatriated to the colonies but which return home by way of 'an application to metropolitan society of the same methods which had been found effectual in Cape Town' (49).

The colonies are the workshop of tools and strategies of fraud and authoritarianism that come home to roost in the motherland. Indeed 'the trail of the financial serpent' (55) can run smoothly so long as 'the people upon whose will a Government depends runs on blinkers':

> How is a democracy to know or even to suspect that its Ministers are a row of puppets, and that a board of international financiers sitting in Paris or Berlin or London pulls the wires, especially if that same board controls a great part of the press? The acquisition of the Charter, the Matabele War, and the Raid are three extraordinary proofs of the powers wielded by this unsuspected ring and of the modes in which these powers have been exercised. Another is furnished by the rehabilitation of Mr. Rhodes after the Raid. (59)

In the case of the Boer War, strictures regarding the disciplining of private commercial interests were not heeded: 'Vainly had Adam Smith warned British statesmen that exclusive companies are bad for commerce but worse for empires, and vainly had his warnings been written out in the chapter and verse of bitter experience' (49).

Events in South Africa reveal the rot in the system as a whole:

> We all know how insidious are the ways of corruption, how unconsciously motives of private gain may work upon virtuous resolves. One danger can hardly be escaped. The Stock Exchange, acting upon the Company Laws, has placed the ownership of industry and the means of distribution and production upon a basis that is very largely speculative, with results that are often disastrous to the public interest … Take the still blacker case of South African Companies, in which the governing classes of this country had invested so largely. The consciences of these investors are far too easy. Messrs. Rhodes, Beit, Albu, Goerz, and the rest stand between them and their victims. The opulence of Park Lane is squeezed from the compound. The geese that lay golden eggs for London society are of a migratory habit, and possess a power Hans Andersen might have envied of changing their plumage and their form. For these ingenuous auriferous geese that waddle through the vulgarized drawing-rooms of London and Parisian seasons are vultures when they flap their wings and sharpen their talons over Kimberley, Johannesburg, and Rhodesia. (115-116)[40]

Those proposing to administer the remedy for corruption are themselves corrupt. Key to advancing their private interests is control of the news media:

> It is not possible to exaggerate the dangers which menace us from these sources … when we find the Empire put in motion by foreigners for foreigners, it is time to counterwork the busy, though unseen, agencies of international finance. By the quiet purchase of half a dozen honest papers with a large circulation, and by a gentle, gradual reversal of their policy, something that looks remarkably like

> public opinion can be fabricated. When that is done, a free people cannot be said to enjoy freedom of the press. If news is carefully subedited, and then a glowing leader written upon doctored facts, a popular indignation is aroused by atrocities which never took place, and wrong impressions are formed which it is very difficult to erase. (63-64)[41]

The threat comes from "'Financial Imperialism'" and 'the busy, though unseen, agencies of international finance' (63). Public opinion is manipulated by outright lying, half-truths and omission, and the hounding of critics.

Not only is ownership of the media a problem, the compliance of journalists and other public intellectuals means there is no debate and counter-weight. Anyone who wants clarification or an open debate is accused of being pro-Boer.[42] Hirst argues that while the agents of financial imperialism feed shareholders 'by the reduction of black and white wages, by facilitating the importation of niggers, and by introducing some form of compulsory labour' (56), the tentacles of dependency strangle national freedom at home and abroad: 'Long Tom's discharges reverberate in every synagogue of Europe and America' (44).[43]

Gilbert Murray also warned against fake news and the manipulation of the virtues that define the mass of the people at their best. While philanthropy is based on 'primeval instincts,' and while excess of sympathy less destructive than lack of sympathy, the hatred of oppression can lead one 'to believe a tale of wrong without much sifting of evidence:'

> This is dangerous, but it might not do much harm except for one circumstance. Who is it who have the power of telling these tales of wrong and so stirring up the country? Obviously the newspapers—the newspapers which support opposite political parties or are the property of rival capitalists. ("National Ideals; Conscious and Unconscious," 1900: 175, 178)

Decrying 'the deplorable tendency of the great newspaper to organize crusades—and very sinister and rash crusades—instead of publishing facts,' Murray diagnosed a failure of liberal values before the juggernaut of crude imperialism:

> What can be the feelings of so able and influential a Liberal as the Editor of the *Daily News* when he sees most English newspapers, and his own among them, filled day after day with statements, no doubt more or less well tested, intended to discredit, by hook or by crook, the whole race of South African Dutch, from reports of individual cruelties to natives, and explanations from adventurous financiers that their deficits are entirely due to bribes paid to the Volksraad, down to third-hand repetitions of what somebody told somebody that Mr. Reitz's

> brother had said eighteen years ago in a smoking-room? ("Preface," *Liberalism and the Empire,* 1900: xi, vii)[44]

Murray was only too aware that liberal critics of the Boer War were a minority, and that speaking truth to power usually proves powerless.[45]

Criticism of vested interests and conspiratorial elites, manipulation of the news media, and appeals to the morality of national consciousness proved ineffective not merely because of the riposte of paranoia, xenophobia or impractical idealism that deflected criticism. More important was the essential agreement regarding the value of imperialism as civilising mission with dispute centring on the lapse from this ideal. Once again it is the Romans who serve as comparative resource:

> But, when all deductions were made, the Roman Empire meant peace throughout the known world; it meant decent and fairly disinterested government; it protected honest men from thieves and robbers; it punished wrongdoers; it gave effective help to towns wrecked by blizzards or earthquakes, or to provinces where the crops had failed. It spread education and civilized habits; it put down the worst practices of savage superstition. (Murray, "Satanism and World Order," 1919)

Among fellow 'humanists' (309) Baring includes Murray and quotes with approval from *The Rise of the Greek Epic* (1907):

> that Greek literature, in Professor Gilbert Murray's words is 'an embodiment of the progressive spirit, an expression of the struggle of the human soul towards freedom and ennoblement'; and that our young men and women will be, both morally and intellectually, the poorer if they listen to the insidious and deceptive voice of an exaggerated materialism which whispers that amidst the hum of modern machinery and the heated wrangles incident to the perplexing problems which arise as the world grows older, the knowledge of a language and a literature which have survived two thousand eight hundred storm-tossed years is 'of no practical use.' (Baring, "The Future of the Classics," 312)

The liberal critics of imperialism shared a commitment to the progressive spirit: human rights, democracy, economic efficiency, and technology (scientific and bureaucratic).[46] But not democracy unreservedly. For Murray these hopes focused on the League of Nations: 'not Democracy but Internationalism' beyond the self-interest of 'sovereign states' (Murray 1918: 28, 27).[47]

The core belief was that, at its best, imperial tutelage could ameliorate the pangs of nation building experienced by western nations. The short-cut to development was to be facilitated and administered by those qualified to have

oversight. The accusation of universal self-interest and prognostications of disaster merely confirm the need for experts able to seize the moment. Murray provides an illustration:

> Mere straight-forward self-interest, then, takes us a very long way in the explanation of politics. But obviously not the whole way. There are other instinctive elements … Consider the fowls of the air. A very pretty small bird, the great Tit, when hungry, will lift up its beak, split open its brother's head and proceed to eat his brains. It might then be satisfied, think you? Not at all! It has a moral nature, you must please to remember, which demands to be satisfied as well as the physical. When it has finished its brother's brains, it first gets very angry and pecks the dead body; then it flies off to a tree and exults. What is it angry with and why does it exult? It is angry with the profound wickedness of that brother, in consequence of which it was obliged to kill him: it exults in the thought of its own courage, firmness, justice, moderation, generosity and domestic sweetness. That song is its equivalent—poor innocent thing—of a patriotic leading article in the *Kreuz Zeitung* or the *Daily Telegraph* or the *Petit Journal.* (Murray, "National Ideals; Conscious and Unconscious," 163)

None of this departs in its essentials from the principles laid down by Baring and the need for statesmanlike control of soldier and trader.

In the final analysis, financial profiteering, corruption, mismanagement, etc., were irrelevant compared to the strategic economic and military need to control the Cape of Good Hope and Southern Africa's gold. The trail of bungling and lack of probity did not change the objective context of the emerging world order

Conclusion

> Satanism; the spirit which hates the World Order wherever it exists and seeks to vent its hate without further plan. That is wrong. But this spirit would not have got abroad; it would not have broken loose and grown like seed and spread like pestilence, had not the World Order itself betrayed itself and been false to its principles, and acted towards enemies and subjects in ways which seem to them what the ways of Nero or Domitian seemed to St. John on Patmos.
>
> —Gilbert Murray, "Satanism and World Order"

Writing after the horror of the World War I, Murray criticised those who embrace the sacred cause of hatred and allow loathing of their rulers to blot

out reason and self-interest. They must be saved from themselves by the very rulers they demonise. Echoing Baring's diagnosis of 'instincts and sentiments which lie deep down in the hearts of men and women,' Murray argued that the 'spirit of unmixed hatred towards the existing World Order' (215) cannot be allowed to sink the human race.[48] Imperialism and globalisation cannot be wished away, and, whatever its origins and current lapses, there is a responsibility to make the best of it; for our sake and for the sake of those affected by our decisions.

The critics of imperialism lost the argument because a greater threat loomed over them, one that threated their very existence. Those best able to resolve/exploit/enlighten perceptions of the current situation by controlling public debate and discrediting opponents won the day. Such is the crucial factor, irrespective of how the crisis was reached, who is to blame, what could have been different, and so on. Inaction invites catastrophe. Unable to prevent the Great War, the discourse of globalisation re-emerged after World War II in the form of the United Nations and the World Health Organisation (see Hankins 2019).

Looking back at his life, Bertrand Russell passed the following judgment on his friend Murray and their liberal generation:

> We had ventured forth in a frail skiff on calm and sunny seas, but wild tempests were threatening to sink our little bark, and hope grew gradually more difficult and remote. (1960: 209)[49]

Notes

[1] 'This is the latest of Egyptian paradoxes, that those who are most keenly desirous to see us go away, are always doing the very things which are guaranteed to postpone our going till the greek Kalends.' (Milner, *England in Egypt*, xxv)

[2] See Baring's gentle chiding of Milner's impractical idealism in "Lord Milner and Party" (1913).

[3] Baring also saw Egypt as 'the "Land of Paradox"' ("The Capitulations in Egypt," 1913: 170); and see *Modern Egypt* II, 1908: 127, 291-292. Those who resisted his reforms (in Egypt) were representative of 'conservatism' (*Modern Egypt* II, 161). As regards sanitary reform: 'the conservative instincts of the people, and their indifference to sanitation, constitute and almost insuperable barrier to rapid progress' (512). Yet the primitive is not always a hindrance: 'Moreover, increased contact has often only resulted in the decay of some primitive but highly laudable Eastern virtues, and the assimilation of some very reprehensible Western vices' ("Japan," 1916: 278-279).

[4] 'One obvious reason stems directly from the times we live in and the many resemblances between our present wave of globalization and the previous one in which Lord Cromer was a major participant in the forty years or so before the First World War.' (Owen 2004: vii)

[5] 'This diversity reflected the fact that the British empire had not been assembled according to a centralised, planned programme, but had developed in fits and starts over many years, through the gradual, opportunistic and localised accretion of territory around far-flung bridgeheads.' (Potter 2007: 54-55). See Hannah Arendt on 'Lord Cromer, who in Egypt changed from and ordinary British chargé d'affaires into an imperialist bureaucrat' (1951: 243).

[6] However, 'it is to be observed that pride of race, which usually accompanies the conception of an Imperial policy, was in no degree wanting amongst the Greeks' (Baring, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 9 note).

[7] Roger Owen sees Baring emphasising 'race as a biological category' (2004: 355).

[8] '"The Imperialism which Lord Curzon favours is not that of nation-devouring Rome, whose heavy hand, albeit its weight was to some extent tempered by the humanizing influence of Hellas, numbed the intellect and chilled the nascent aspirations of the subject races which fell under her sway. Rather is it a vivifying force on which the populations incorporated into the British Empire may readily graft and develop all that is best in their own national characteristics.' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 10)

[9] On George Cornewall Lewis, son of Sir George Amyand, a Director of the East India Company and owner of a sugar plantation in Grenada, see Seymour et al (1998).

[10] But this is not an automatic transmission between the head and the subordinate. See Lewis on *Third report of the Commissioner of Inquiry into the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice in the West Indies: Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Christopher, and the Virgin Islands* (1827) and the "'considerable obscurity'" surrounding the relation between the laws of the mother country and their application in the colonies: "'The answer generally received in the case of free persons, was, '1st. We acknowledge the common law of England;' but always qualified by 'so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of the colony'" (quoted in Lewis 1841: 199-200).

[11] Baring in 1915: 'The presence of British garrisons in Cairo, Alexandria, and Khartoum unquestionably counts for much in explanation of these very singular political phenomena' (*Abbas II*, xx-xxi). 'If there is one point more than another, which an official and political training of the special kind which I have undergone impresses upon the mind … [it is the importance] of military discipline.' (52) With Britain at war with Turkey, and Egypt being part of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt became a Protectorate in 1915. See Baring (1968: 122, 20) on the demoralising effect of the First Boer War and the dangers arising from the indecision of a weak government.

[12] See Louis Mallet (1891: 113) on Cobden and the ongoing need to fight to entrench Free Trade principles. Mallet warned against making 'our selves the missionaries of blood and plunder in the heart of Africa … Is England to lead the way in transplanting to another continent the miserable traditions and discredited maxims of the past, to bring Africa into the scale to trim a new balance of power, and there to seek new battle-fields for the nations of Europe to add to the bloody record of their own?' (1891: 117). Southern Africa must not join the trinity 'Ireland, Egypt, and India' (213), the unholy quagmire from which Britain is unable to extricate itself. Niall Ferguson (2003: 283) recounts the detail of Gladstone's (and Disraeli's) interest in Suez Canal shares. For others, Gladstone's liberal policy toward the Boers that

resulted in the Pretoria Convention of 1881 which granted limited independence to the Transvaal was in hindsight a mistake. Harry Johnston's *The Gay-Dombeys*: 'They spoke of the Kaffir Market, as it were beginning to be called. Transvaal Gold-fields were making many liberals regret Mr. Gladstone's policy in 1881' (1919: 11). H.G. Wells wrote the preface to Johnston's satire.

[13] Baring's essay "The International Aspects of Free Trade" (1910) refers to J. Shield Nicholson's 'brilliant work' (136), *A Project of Empire: A Critical Study of the Economics of imperialism, with Special Reference to Ideas of Adam Smith* (1909). Baring notes that the advantages of Free Trade are dependent upon Britain's 'marked commercial supremacy' (129). See Marsot (1968: 138).

[14] For Milner while the actions of the South Africa Company are 'impossible to regard with approval,' the extension of Empire by way of private companies is 'a valuable stop-gap' on the way to determining 'the best permanent arrangement' ("Geography and Statecraft," 1907: 233).

[15] According to Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot it was Baring's fiscal success in Egypt that sowed the seeds of rebellion: 'With affluence, the Egyptians acquired assurance, and England's financial policy came to be regarded with hostility' (1968: 139). As one official wrote to Millner: "'we have created a huge Frankenstein and now we must do our best to stifle the monster'" (quoted in Marsot 118).

[16] Milner wrote the approving introduction to *The Elements of Reconstruction* where H.G. Wells argued against 'a merely protective tariff' that would make farmers lazily fat and send up the landowners' rents in a time when it is the bounden duty of everyone to be lean and active' (1916: 51-52). See Milner's statement on 'a nobler Socialism, which so far from springing from "envy, hatred, and all uncharitableness," is born of genuine sympathy … From this point of view the attempt to raise the well-being and efficiency of the more backward of our people—for this is what it all comes to—is not philanthropy: it is business' ("A Political Ishmaelite," 1906: 160-161). And also his criticism of political economy ("The Two nations," 1912: 500). George Bernard Shaw argued that Milner was no Socialist and, like his Boer opponents, was dominated by the morality of private property 'and so had to argue in the manner of the wolf with the lamb' (1900: 24). See Dutton (1981: 183) on Milner's argument for the importance of private property for social order.

[17] 'He [Sir Louis Mallet] was the best type of the English civil servant; a keen politician but not a political partisan, a trained official without a trace of the bureaucratic element in him, and a man of really liberal aspirations without being carried away by the catchwords which sometimes attach themselves to what, from a party point of view, is called liberal policy in England … Lord Goschen consulted Sir Louis Mallet as to whom he should nominate as Commissioner of the Debt in Egypt. Sir Louis Mallet recommended me.' (Baring, *Modern Egypt* I, 15)

[18] 'He [Baring] could not support Chamberlain's tariff reform program because of his life-long faith in free trade. Nor would he underwrite Lord Milner's plea for the creation of a party of "national efficiency" to combat the harmful influences of the established parties in foreign affairs.' (Tignor 1963: 157; and see Mowat 1973) Gilbert Murray traced the origin of the Peloponnesian War to the 'cruel tariff-war' waged by Athens against Megara ("Aristophanes and the War Party," 1918: 43).

[19] 'The actions and opinions of Lord Curzon, in common with those of all other politicians, are, of course, a very legitimate subject for criticism, but he has a fair right to claim that the motives which dictated those actions and the process of reasoning which led to the formation of those opinions should be taken from his own lips rather than that they should be judged by the light of the interpretation often erroneously placed upon them by hostile or ill-informed critics.' (Baring, "Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 7)

[20] 'The British Empire, like the Roman, was built up by dull men. It may be we shall be ruined by clever ones.' (Wells 1897: 65).

[21] South Africa and Africa feature prominently in Paget's accounts of developing remedies for infectious diseases and parasites. It would seem that the Boer War, and European colonialism in Africa, benefitted medical research, which in turn is a benefit to humanity.

[22] 'Sympathy must, as Lord Curzon very rightly points out, be accompanied by strength, courage, and, above all, by accurate knowledge.' (Baring, "Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 4)

[23] Milner in valedictory mood: 'What I should prefer to be remembered by is the tremendous effort subsequent to the war, not only to repair its ravages, but to restart these colonies on a higher plane of civilisation than they had ever previously attained … And in that connection I should like to say one final word to those—perhaps they are not very many—who are good enough to place confidence in me; I do not mean merely confidence in my good intentions, or in the main drift of my policy, but in the general soundness of my judgment. To them I would say: "If you believe in me, defend my works when I am gone. Defend, more especially, those which are more especially mine. I care for that much more than I do for eulogy, or, indeed, for any personal reward"' ("Johannesburg," 1905: 85).

[24] 'The unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur of the order of reason, that which makes it not just one actual order or structure (a determined historical structure, one structure among other possible ones), is that one cannot speak out against it except by being for it, that one can protest it only from within it; and within its domain. Reason leaves us only the recourse to stratagems and strategies.' (Derrida 1963: 36)

[25] '"Mind," he began again, lifting one arm from the elbow, the palm of the hand outwards, so that, with his legs folded before him, he had the pose of a Buddha preaching in European clothes and without a lotus-flower—"Mind, none of us would feel exactly like this. What saves us is efficiency—the devotion to efficiency. But these chaps [i.e., the Romans] were not much account, really. They were no colonists; their administration was merely a squeeze, and nothing more, I suspect. They were conquerors, and for that you want only brute force—nothing to boast of, when you have it, since your strength is just an accident arising from the weakness of others. They grabbed what they could get for the sake of what was to be got. It was just robbery with violence, aggravated murder on great scale, and men going at it blind—as is very proper for those who tackle a darkness. The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to ..."' (Conrad 1902: 10)

[26] 'In the long course of our history many mistakes have been made in dealing with subject races, and the line of conduct pursued at various times has often been very erratic.

Nevertheless, it would be true to say that, broadly speaking, British policy has been persistently directed towards an endeavour to strengthen political bonds through the medium of attention to material interests. The recent history of Egypt is a case in point.' (Baring, "The French in Algeria," 1913: 253) See Kwame Nkrumah (1965: 212-218).

[27] 'Egypt, it would appear, was to be civilised on a European model.' (Baring, *Modern Egypt* I, 59; and II, 432) However, 'the supreme necessity of efficiency' must be tempered by recognition 'that it is politically wiser to put up with an imperfect reform carried with native consent, rather than to insist on some more perfect measure executed in the teeth of strong- albeit often unreasonable native opposition" (Baring, "The French in Algeria," 261). Baring described himself as a 'mid-Victorian' liberal: 'a school of politicians whose ideas have now been swept into the limbo of forgotten things, the only surviving principles of that age being apparently those associated with a faint and somewhat fantastic cult of the primrose' ("Sir Alfred Lyall," 78). Tory Disraeli's favourite flower was the primrose, and the primrose wreath at Disraeli's funeral was rumoured to be from Queen Victoria. In "Lord Curzon's Imperialism" Lloyd George is patted as 'an impulsive but warm-hearted and courageous demagogue' (2).

[28] Baring argues against imposing the language of the dominant power on its subjects and expecting it to 'serve as a solvent' (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 4) binding a national community and its foreign rulers. Those most eager to learn the language of the rulers are motivated by 'self-interest,' and quickly intensify their resentment and complain 'in shrill tones, and, in some cases, not without a certain amount of reason, that the opportunities accorded to him for rising are insufficient' (104).

[29] Conrad's manuscript has after "'They grabbed what they could get for the sake of what was to be got'" the following excised elaboration: "'That's all. The best of them is that they didn't get up pretty fictions about it. Was there, I wonder, an association on a philanthropic basis to develop Britain, with some third rate king for a president and solemn old senators discoursing about it approvingly and philosophers with uncombed beards praising it, and men in the market places crying it up. Not much! And that's what I like!'" (1902: 10, footnote).

[30] Baring on the policy of England in the Near East specifically Turkey and the Ottoman Empire: 'All has been in vain. History does not relate a more striking instance of the truth of the old Latin saying that self-deception is the first step on the road to ruin' ("England and Islam," 413). See also "The Ottoman Empire" (1913): 'The blindness displayed by Turkish statesmen to the lessons taught by history, their complete sterility in the domain of political thought, and their inability to adapt themselves and the institutions of their country to the growing requirements of the age, might almost lead an historical student to suppose that they were bent on committing political suicide' (265).

[31] 'Different men are animated by different ideals. All that can be expected of any of us is to remain true to his own. And for my own part I can imagine no higher ideal which can animate the citizens of my country at the present time than that of a great and continuous national life, shared by us with our kinsmen, who have built up new communities in distant parts of the earth, enabling them and us together to uphold our traditional principles of freedom, order and justice, and to discharge with ever increasing efficiency our duty as guardians of the more backward races who have come under our sway.' (Milner, "Introduction," *The Nation and the*

Empire, 1913, xlviii) According to Rebecca West, Milner 'had no tie with the efficient of the earth except that he could mimic the way they might behave' (1982: 476).

[32] Consider the 'best type of English civil servant; a keen politician but not a political partisan, a trained official without a trace of the bureaucratic element in him, and a man of really liberal aspirations without being carried away by the catchwords which sometimes attach themselves to what, from the party point of view, is called liberal policy in England' (*Modern Egypt* I, 15).

[33] Lord Rosebery to Cromer, March 9, 1894: "'We have gone through many stormy times together, and I have long come to the conclusion that you are a good man to go tiger-hunting with'" (quoted in *Abbas II*, 64). Lord Rosebery is identified with what Baring approvingly terms 'the school of Liberal Imperialism' (30). Marsot describes Roseberry as 'a confirmed imperialist' (1968, 103).

[34] 'It is not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty's Government which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at all. It is the unprogressiveness, I will not say retrogressiveness, of the Government of the Transvaal, and its deep suspicion of the intentions of Great Britain, which causes it to devote its whole attention to imaginary external dangers, when every impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers which threaten it are internal.' (Milner, "Graaff Reinet," 1898: 10) The Boer leaders are deceiving their people into a 'hopeless resistance' ("Cape Town," 1900: 30).

[35] 'I could give numerous instances, which are within my own experience, to show how readily young men fresh from the English schools or universities adapt themselves to new surroundings and speedily identify themselves with the interests of the people over whom they are called to rule.' (Baring, "Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 12-13) See Gilmour (1994: 27-28) on the Oxford Balliol men (including Milner and Baring) and the influence of Benjamin Jowett. Aldrich (2020) tracks Baring's son in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising.

[36] 'The average annual value of British exports to Egypt, which was £3,000,000 in 1880-84, had risen by painfully slow degrees to £3,500,000 in 1890-94. It is calculated that the British taxpayer has spent about £40,000,000 on Egypt and the Soudan. Never have desert lands been more thoroughly manured by more competent hands.' (Hirst, 1900: 73).

[37] Milner's narrative moves from 'Imperial federation' ("The Two Empires,"1908, 293) in which members of the British Empire are 'the citizens of a world-wide state' ("Imperial Unity—Internal Benefits," 1908: 314) to 'the free peoples of a world-wide state' ("Imperialism and Social Reform," 1908, 354): 'I mean a real Empire State with its necessary concomitant, an Empire citizenship.' ("Empire Citizenship," 1912: 487)

[38] 'The pubic often seize on some incident which strikes the popular imagination, or idealise the character of some individual whose action excites sympathy of admiration … A series of myths cluster round the original idea or statement … All that happens is that an incorrect fact or a faulty conclusion is graven into the tablets from which future historians must draw their sources of information.' (Baring, *Modern Egypt* I, 3)

[39] 'The epoch of expansion is pretty nearly past, but there remains before us a great work of development and consolidation' (Milner, "Unionists and the Empire," 1907: 238). Baring, more sanguine than the messianic Milner, ends his introduction to the first collection of his political and literary essays with a quotation from Dryden's *Aurengzebe* (1675), a play set in India: "'Trust on, and think to-morrow will repay,/To-morrow's falser than the former day'" ("Translation and Paraphrase," 73).

[40] 'When Sir Alfred Milner overruled the wishes of the responsible Governments of Cape Colony and Natal, he deserted the traditions of Liberalism, and he involved South Africa in the worst of all wars—a war of races. It must be the task of Liberals to see that the talk about drawing the Empire more closely together is not to be made a pretext for suffocating the autonomy of our colonies.' (Hammond 1900: 209) George Bernard Shaw: 'Theoretically, they [Boers] should be internationalized, not British-Imperialized; but until the Federation of the World becomes an accomplished fact, we must accept the most responsible Imperial federations available as a substitute for it' (1900: 24).

[41] 'The press and the politicians who forced the pace with Outlander grievances, suzerainty, or the Dutch conspiracy, have kept it up with a native policy, securing thus that firm co-operation of business and philanthropy which is the distinctive note of British Imperialism. The two motives are commonly fused in some vague phrase about the necessity of securing to black races "the dignity of labour" or of "protecting them from the vices of civilization".' (Hobson, 1901: 133) See Cain (2002).

[42] See Hobson (1901: 11, 127) on Olive Schreiner being blocked by certain magazines, and the 'coarse brutality' meted out to Cronwright Schreiner by the press. 'More important still, they saw these men buying not for commercial but for propagandist purposes, the most important organs of the press in the colony, and establishing at great expense new organs of revolutionary agitation in Johannesburg; they saw public opinion throughout South Africa poisoned by the mendacity of this unscrupulous press, visibly operated in collusion so as to arouse public passion and to drive the British imperial policy towards a catastrophe.' (Hobson, 1900: 26)

[43] Noting the 'anti-Jewish comments which disfigured the radical literature' (182), Donal Lowry remarks that, '[f]ollowing in Hobson's footsteps, Hirst's analysis took a frankly anti-semitic turn' (2002: 180).

[44] Silas Modiri Molema (1920: 262) quotes with approval Murray's address delivered at the opening meeting of the Conference on Nationalities and Subject Races, Westminster, June 23, 1910, appealing for a more self-critical approach to empire. Murray's liberal credentials can be seen in his Introduction to Norman Leys, *Kenya* (1924). See also the Preface to John Hobbis Harris, *Slavery or "Sacred Trust"* (1926), and his comments on Liebknecht and warm appreciation of Ghandi's work in South Africa ("The Soul as It Is and How to Deal with It," 1918: 148). Murray was friend and ally of Jan Smuts. See Jean Smith (1960), an advisor for H.G. Wells's *Outline of History*, on Murray.

[45] See Professor Murray's disapproval of Milner's sloppy knowledge of one aspect of the Greek classics ("The Exploitation of inferior Races in Ancient and Modern Times: An Imperial Labour Question with a Historical Parallel," 1900: 123). Murray's translation of *The Trojan Women* (1905) was designed to draw a parallel between the suffering of the Boers and the Trojans. Simon Perris notes that 'Murray and his wife donated £100—a not insignificant sum in 1901—to the Boer Women and Children's Clothing Fund' (2010/2011: 429). See Caedel, (2007). Murray wrote the Preface to William Archer's *The Great Analysis*, a book that 'came to me like a spring in the desert' (in Archer 1912: vi).

[46] See Murray's defence of the classics in "Religio Grammatici: The Religion of a 'Man of Letters'" (1918). Is this text the model for T.S. Eliot's better known "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919)?

[47] See De Madariaga (1960). Murray contributed to H.G. Wells's *The Idea of the League of Nations* (1919). See also Lenin on "'*the dream of idealistic politicians, the United States of the civilized world*,'" the early twentieth century revolt of the Hereros in South West Germany, and the uprising of the Hottentots (1968: 684, 682).

[48] H.G. Wells also made the case for the end of the War as an opportunity to institute 'the proper plan for national efficiency' (1916: 105) and 'Imperial reorganization' (88). This involved political and economic reorganization on the national and the global level.

[49] George Orwell was more damning: 'Where this age differs from those immediately preceding it is that a liberal intelligentsia is lacking … like all liberals he [Russell] is better at pointing out what is desirable than at explaining how to achieve it … Underlying this is the idea that common sense always wins in the end. And yet the peculiar horror of the present moment is that we cannot be sure that this is so. It is quite possible that we are descending into an age in which two and two will make five when the Leader says so' (1939: np.).

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Capitalism and Colonialism

This image is from Rudyard Kipling's 1909 *A Song of the English*. The original 1893 publication of Kipling's poems in the *English Illustrated Magazine* was not accompanied by this illustration.

It is this picture that opens Klas Rönnbäck and Oscar Broberg's 2019 book, *Capitalism and Colonialism: The Return on British Investments in Africa 1869-1969*. A few pages later the following epigraph adorns chapter one:

Snatched and bartered oft from hand to hand,
I dream my dream, by rock and heath and pine,
Of Empire to the northward. Ay, one land
From Lion's Head to Line!
"The Song of the Cities: Cape Town,"

from *A Song of the English* (1893)

Rönnbäck and Broberg comment:

> Looking at the picture alone, we are unable to determine who the victims might have been, but Kipling's poem clearly laments the English who died for the sake of the British Empire. Kipling, in contrast, shed few tears for all the others who suffered and died as a consequence of British imperialism. (2019: 4)[1]

Readers of *Capitalism and Colonialism* are not informed that the lion illustration by W. Heath Robinson is from "The Song of the Dead" in the 1909 edition of *A Song of the English*, and not from the 1893 *English Illustrated Magazine* which has only the poetry.

Kipling's words 'On the sand-drift—on the veld-side—in the fern-scrub we lay' in the original 1893 version of "The Song of the Dead" might refer to the attrition of colonisation. Given the date, they might specifically refer to the First Boer War of 1880-1881. By 1909 these lines and the image of the lions could be used to refer to the Second Boer War of 1899-1902. At this time lamenting the English who died for the sake of the British Empire could also involve promoting a climate of reconciliation between Boer and Briton preceding the Union of South Africa in 1910. Kipling's poems "General Joubert," "South Africa," and even "The Lesson" collected in *The Five Nations* (1903), attempt to address the white wounds left by the war.[2]

Capitalism and Colonialism tracks the importance of South Africa for investors on the London stock market. There was a substantial difference between the 1893 and 1909 for investors in South African companies listed on the London exchange. During the global mining boom of 1886-1899 the annual return for the total South African portfolio listed in London was 12.2 per cent, and the mining sector delivered an 'extraordinary' (43) average of 16.0 per cent per year.[3] In contrast, the first two decades of the twentieth century saw the average return of -0.9 per cent for the mining sector, with an average of -2.8 per year for gold mining. The exception was Premier Diamond Mine (30 per cent per year). By 1909 the mining boom was over.

May 1893, the date on which "A Song of the English" appeared in *The English Illustrated Magazine*, was when financial panic hit the United States. By this time the run on gold caused by the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Argentina had already wiped out Kipling's savings. Kipling's bank, The New Oriental Banking Company, had made bad investments. Hearing about the unfolding crisis in Tokyo, Kipling wrote that he felt 'like a rabbit in a stoppered warren' (1892: 62).

What is known as The Baring Crisis of the early 1890s was a result of the collapse of the boom in Argentine securities which began in 1887. An observer reported: 'During this period British investments became interested to large amounts in South African gold mining enterprises and in large undertakings for the construction and development of public works in the Argentine Republic and in Australia' (Stevens 1894: 120). The South African mining boom masked the unfolding crisis in which Argentina's financial agent in Europe, Baring Brothers & Co., faced insolvency. Small investors like Kipling paid the price.[4] "A Song of the English" may have originally reflected this crisis of imperial finance and the first great modern bailout.

As for South Africa in the opening decades of the twentieth century, the international Gold Standard put a ceiling on the gold price and inflation reduced South African mining profits. Still, between 1884 and 1911 Britain's investments in South Africa jumped from £34 million to £351 million (see Hart and Padayachee 2013: 64). 1919 saw a temporary dramatic boost in the gold price and the struggle to reduce production costs by replacing 5000 skilled white workers with lower-paid black workers lowered the total wage bill of the gold companies to 20 per cent. This also produced the Rand Revolt of 1921. The victory of the mine owners ensured that the return on investment in the major South African gold companies 'skyrocketed' (Rönnbäck and Broberg, 260).

The fall of the Gold Standard in the early 1930s resulted in long-term upward movement of the gold price: 'With the gold companies as locomotives, the interwar years developed into an industrial take-off for South Africa' (262). While the gold companies yielded an average of 11 per cent to their investors between 1920 and 1939, the diamond companies yielded only 0.6 per cent. Rönnbäck and Broberg conclude: 'There is nonetheless no easily discernible relationship between the discrimination of the black population and the return on investment in South Africa' (271).

It seems that other factors such as market volatility, monopoly and monoposy practices, war, pandemic, currency fluctuations), institutional changes, and external shocks all influenced the return on investment in South Africa. Despite the Native Land Act of 1913, and the coercive labour relations in the settler colonies, *Capitalism and Colonialism* concludes 'there is no pattern of higher return on investment in settler colonies compared to non-settler colonies' (327). The return on investment in settler and non-settler colonies was similar (12-14 per cent per year) in the final decades of the nineteenth

century, and in the first decade of the twentieth century settler colonies decreased to 3 per cent compared to 5 per cent of non-settler colonies.

Egypt is key to the convergence of rate of return in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Although classed as a non-settler colony, Egypt's profitability for investors on the British stock exchange raised the average rate of return for settler colonies. The Suez Canal Company made a major contribution to the aggregated financial return of the settler colonies. The return to profitability of Egypt followed from imperial intervention. Worries over the security of British investments in a potentially bankrupt Egypt led to the British government purchasing shares in the Suez Canal Company and the imposition of Dual Control (1876). Britain's intervention could now be presented as protecting (its own) property rather than interfering with the property of others. Private British interests coincided with imperial national interest. The military occupation of Egypt in 1882 was accompanied by a renewed rally in stock prices that stabilised by 1884 and boosted returns on investment in the country (311-317).

The financial stabilisation of Egypt by Alfred Milner and Evelyn Baring secured British strategic and trade interests as well as the rights of investors on the London stock market. The same outcome was envisaged by those anticipating the outcome of the Boer War of 1899-1902, another 'leading example of finance-driven imperialism' (Rönnbäck and Broberg 2019: 341). The Boer War was a massive transfer of wealth from public coffers to private investors:

> When peace was finally declared on 31 May 1902, investors in South African gold companies [listed on the London Stock Exchange] had earned a nominal accumulated return on investment of 64 per cent relative to September 1899, that is, prior to the outbreak of the war. Investors in South African financial companies (heavily involved directly and indirectly in the mining business) made even larger gains, earning a nominal return on their investments of 100 per cent relative to the pre-war level of September 1899. Given the low rate of inflation in these years, the average real annual rate of return translated into 8 per cent per year for South African gold-mining companies and 17 per cent per year for investments in South African finance companies. These private gains came at an enormous cost to the British Treasury, which had to foot the £217 million bill for the massive military intervention as well as to more than 20,000 dead British soldiers. (Rönnbäck and Broberg 2019: 320)

Capitalism and Colonialism reports that by the 1930s 'investments in the settler colonies developed strongly, with an average rate of return of 9 per cent per

year' while the non-settler colonies deteriorated to 'a real rate of return of 1 per cent per year on average during the 1930s and decreasing to -2 per cent per year on average during the 1940s' (334).

Decisively from the 1940s onwards, the accumulated return on investment for settler and non-settler colonies started to diverge: 'It does not seem far-fetched to conclude that this divergence, at least partially, was associated with the more widespread and intensified coercion of the labour force developing in both South Africa and Rhodesia during that period' (327).'

The story that emerges when the unit of investigation is the return on British investments in South Africa is that the racial compact of 1910 eventually paid off. Martin Legassick and David Hemson complete the picture:

> In the 1960s, the input of foreign capital into South Africa amounted to a flood: from £1,500 million in 1959, the total trebled in a decade': In the post-Sharpeville era of fascism in South Africa, foreign capital reaped the rewards of massive increases in output and high profit rates. Balthazer Vorster, appointed Minister of Justice in 1961, was the coordinator of the campaign of repression, torture, incarceration and murder. When he became Prime Minister, in 1966, he was greeted by the Rand Club, the social gathering place of big capital in South Africa, with a warmth never offered to any other Prime Minister since 1948. ("Foreign Investment and the Reproduction of Racial Capitalism in South Africa," 8)

Notes

[1] See H.G. Wells on Kipling's endorsement of the self-righteous bullying of "'the gang in possession" (1920: 959). See also Kipling on *Uncle Remus*: 'a new book about rabbits and foxes and turtles and niggers' published 'when Cetshwayo lived in the Melbury Road, Arab Pasha in Egypt' (1924: 143). In 1882, following his defeat at Ulundi, Cetshwayo travelled to London. The Egyptian uprising led by Urabi Pasha was defeated by Garnet Wolsey, vanquisher of the Bapedi paramount Sekhukhune.

[2] According to T.S. Eliot, Kipling was not unaware of the faults of British rule, 'its commercialism, exploitation and neglect:' 'it is simply that he believed the British Empire to be a good thing, that he wished to set before his readers an ideal of what it should be, but he was acutely aware of the difficulty of even approximating to this ideal, and of the perpetual danger of falling away from even such a standard as might be attained' (1941: 29). Eliot saw something 'alien about Kipling, like a visitor from another planet' (28) and 'his reflections on the Boer War are more admonitory than laudatory' (29). See Melissa Free (2016).

[3] "'I hate that kind of thing. The gold grubbers and diamond bagmen! But it's part of the march onward. We must have money, you know.'" (Gissing 1897: 14) See also Davenport-Hines and Van Helten (1986).

[4] 'A period of very cheap money followed upon the "Baring Crisis" of 1890, during which the output of gold in the Transvaal and the silver panic in America caused money to pour into London for investment … Trade was not active; money was shy of industrial investment both in England and abroad; and it was a profitable transaction to buy Consols [Bonds] yielding 2¾ per cent. with money borrowed from the bankers at ½ to ¾ per cent.' (Mallet 1913: 213) Baring Brothers was reborn as Baring Brothers & Co., Ltd. In 1995 Barings Bank collapsed as a result of speculation by a futures dealer, Nick Leeson (see Banerjee 2016).

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