The 2010 FIFA World Cup – Service Delivery, ‘Afrophobia’ and Brand Imperialism: Through the Eyes of Frantz Fanon

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Abstract
Soccer is the most popular sport in the world. This game which has deep historical roots in working class communities of the big 19th century English industrial cities of Manchester, Liverpool and Sheffield, has captured the imagination of people all around the world. The game is considered a great unifier of humanity. The 2010 World Cup was the first such event on African soil, and South Africa was billing the event as Africa’s World Cup.

Since being awarded the 2010 World Cup, South Africa has experienced outbreaks not of xenophobia, but of ‘Afrophobia’ as one informal sector informant coined the term; this implies attacks by poor black South Africans on foreign black Africans. This violence did not occur in places where the foreign Africans are majorities but in areas where they are minorities. Significant state resources were redirected to the infrastructure development associated with the World Cup; resources that could possibly have gone to service delivery in poor areas. Thus the outbreaks of ‘Afrophobia’ often occurred as part of service delivery protests. One could possibly refer to this as the first line of deprivation that has resulted from the awarding of the World Cup to South Africa.

The second line of deprivation is associated with the impact of brand imposition as a result of FIFA’s insistence that its sponsors be given monopoly preference in the economic opportunities associated with the
event. FIFA is completely intolerant of any competition to its brand sponsors. In this sense, FIFA’s impact is similar to the impact of shopping malls on small businesses on main-street, the informal sector and farm dairies and bakeries on the urban fringe.

This article will seek to scientifically investigate above-mentioned issues and voice the perceptions of the population of Berea, Bertrams, Ellis Park, Melville and Yeoville concerning the unfolding clash between FIFA and its brand sponsors and the formal and informal trades that form the basis of the survival strategies of communities surrounding the central part of Johannesburg. The views of Frantz Fanon on nationalism and unity were used as conceptual framework for the unfolding of the article.

**Keywords:** Xenophobia, afrophobia, nationalism, national unity, national consciousness, post-colonial, national middle class, crass materialism, neo-liberalism, brand imposition, patriotism, service delivery, state resources, nationalisation, informal sector, Apartheid.

### 1. Introduction

Soccer is the most popular sport in the world. This game which has deep historical roots in working class communities of the big 19th century English industrial cities of Manchester, Liverpool and Sheffield, has captured the imagination of people all around the world. The game is considered a great unifier of humanity. The 2010 World Cup was the first such event on African soil, and South Africa billed the event as Africa’s World Cup. The slogan for the World Cup, chosen by the Local Organising Committee (LOC), was ‘Celebrate Africa’s Humanity’; in the cities the bill boards were shouting: ‘World class stadiums, world class host cities’ and ‘United we shall stand’.

One of the most prominent latent functions of this world class event was expected to be the unification of the continent as well as to enhance the feeling of nationalism in South Africa. With that, of course, also came the hope to revive a faltering economy and crippling poverty in the country. However, since being awarded the 2010 World Cup, South Africa has experienced serious outbreaks of xenophobia; one informal sector informant referred to these attacks as ‘Afrophobia’ - this implies attacks by poor black
South Africans on foreign black Africans. This violence did not occur in places where the foreign Africans are majorities but in areas where they are minorities. Significant state resources were redirected to the infrastructure development associated with the World Cup; resources that could possibly have gone to service delivery in poor areas. Thus the outbreaks of ‘Afrophobia’ often occurred as part of service delivery protests. One could possibly refer to this (‘Afrophobia’ and service delivery protests) as the first line of deprivation that has resulted from the awarding of the World Cup to South Africa.

The second line of deprivation was associated with the impact of brand imposition as a result of FIFA’s insistence that its sponsors be given monopoly preference in the economic opportunities associated with the event. In this sense, FIFA’s impact is similar to the impact of shopping malls on small businesses on main-street, the informal sector and farm dairies and bakeries on the urban fringe. Taking into account these two lines of deprivation, it seems that FIFA – contrary to the initial expectation – is a major stumbling block in the way of nationalism and unity. The philosopher and psychiatrist Frantz Omar Fanon from Martinique (1925 – 1961), warned about the limitations of this consciousness of nationalism and unity, which eventually just becomes ‘hollow and empty’. Some applicable facets of Fanon’s work will be used as conceptual and theoretical pointers for the unfolding of this article.

2. Objectives
The objectives of the paper are seven fold:

- To introduce the work of Frantz Fanon as conceptual reference point regarding national consciousness and unity
- To give a brief historical contextualisation of nationalism in South Africa
- To scrutinise the relationship between the 2010 World Cup, strikes and service delivery protests
- To investigate ‘Afrophobia’ in South Africa as a result of the 2010 World Cup
3. **Methodology**

Two basic research procedures were used for the research, namely a literature study and the survey procedure.

The historical procedure (literature study) was used to conceptualise and contextualise all facets of the research. Reference in this regard can especially be made to literature on nationalism in the country, views of nationalism and unity of Frantz Fanon as well as supporting literature on FIFA’s activities. Books, scientific journal articles, popular articles, newspapers, reports, conference proceedings, databases, official FIFA documents as well as the Internet were used as sources for applying the historical procedure.

To gather the empirical information, the survey procedure was used. The empirical part of the study tried to ‘pick up the voices’ and perceptions of the population of Berea, Bertrams, Ellis Park, Melville and Yeoville concerning the unfolding clash between FIFA and its brand sponsors and the formal and informal trades that form the basis of the survival strategies of communities surrounding the central part of Johannesburg.

When working with the ‘more informal sector’ and in poor and ‘marginalised’ communities, especially in Africa, a qualitative approach is the better choice for the subject matter in that it enables the respondents to expand on their points of view without being limited by the questions. Data collection methods included focus groups, interviews and researcher observations. As the elements of focus groups and interviews were not fixed beforehand, they were semi-structured on the basis of a list of topics related to the project objectives (see Objectives Point 2). A degree of flexibility was allowed to assist the interviewer(s) to probe deeper where more relevant information could be obtained through further questioning. Questions and topics were not necessarily asked in the same order each time as this
depended on the way the focus group discussion/interview developed. This allowed the person being interviewed a degree of freedom to voice concerns and to participate in directing the flow of the conversation. These focus group discussions and in-depth interviews assisted in clarifying what themes and topics were considered to be important and what the major concerns of individuals, communities, informal sector traders and restaurant and bar owners were regarding the impact of the FIFA 2010 World Cup.

Focus groups (8 to 12 people) and interviewees were selected purposely to take account of gender, race, migrant or local status, age and specific interest groups, e.g. street vendors and bar owners. To enhance the scientific nature of the study, at least two researchers (interviewers) facilitated each focus group and each personal interview. Different individuals in different areas were also used as key informants; ‘Piet’ (not the real name) for example, owns a sport bar in one of the central parts of Johannesburg for more than thirty years. Patton (2002:321) describes key informants as

… people who are particularly knowledgeable about the inquiry setting and articulate about their knowledge – people whose insights can prove particularly useful in helping an observer understand what is happening and why.

The interviews with the respondents were documented. The content of the data was then analysed by means of conceptual (thematic) analysis. According to Palmquist et al. (2005), the process of conceptual analysis comprises eight steps, namely:

- deciding on the level of analysis
- deciding on how many concepts to code for
- deciding whether to code for the existence or frequency of a concept
- deciding how to distinguish among the concepts
- developing rules for the coding of texts
- deciding what to do with irrelevant information
- coding texts
- analysing results
A more theoretical (contrary to a practical) approach - that is the interpretation of written sources (literature control; also see historical procedure) - was used as the basic point of departure for the analysis and interpretation of the results.

According to Guba (in Krefting 1991), there are four important elements for increasing trustworthiness in qualitative research:

- Truth value (confidence in the truth of the findings and the context in which the study was undertaken);
- Applicability (the degree to which the findings can be applied to other contexts and settings or with other groups);
- Consistency (whether the findings would be consistent if the inquiry were replicated with the same subjects or in a similar context); and
- Neutrality (the degree to which the findings are a function solely of the informants and conditions of the research and not other biases).

The researchers tried their utmost to guide their research according to these elements during the study.

4. **Frantz Fanon: National Consciousness and Unity**

Fanon was exceptionally critical of national liberation movements led by the urbanised intellectual elite. He did not believe that these movements were capable of transforming underdeveloped countries into states that could take their place on the world stage. He rejected the formation of a national middle class as much as he rejected the ideology of nationalism itself. Thus he believed that the national bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries

… should not be opposed because it threatens to slow down the total, harmonious development of the nation. It should simply be stoutly opposed because, literally, it is good for nothing (Wallerstein 2009).

Fanon (2001:164) then denounces the ideology itself:
Nationalism is not a political doctrine, nor a programme. If you really wish your country to avoid regression, or at best halts and uncertainties, a rapid step must be taken from national consciousness to political and social consciousness .... A bourgeoisie that provides nationalism alone as food for the masses fails in its mission and gets caught up in a whole series of mishaps.

According to Fanon, national consciousness in the post colonial period, ‘... instead of being the all-embracing crystallisation of the innermost hopes …’ of the nation, ‘the whole people’, ‘... instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilisation of the people’, turns out to be ‘... an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been’. This is because of the ‘... incapacity of the national middle class to rationalise popular action, that is to say their incapacity to see into the reasons for that action’ (Fanon 2001:119).

This traditional weakness, which is common to the national consciousness of under-developed countries, is not only because of the legacy of colonialism, or in the case of South Africa, Apartheid. It is also, according to Fanon (2001:119) ‘... the result of the intellectual laziness of the national middle class, of its spiritual bankruptcy …’, and of the profoundly cosmopolitan and neo-liberal mould that its mind is set in.

Fanon would typify the national middle class which took over power at the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa as an under-developed middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case it is in no way commensurate with the global bourgeoisie and is no better than the Afrikaner ‘administrative bourgeoisie’ which it is in the process of replacing through affirmative action and black economic empowerment (BEE).

The national bourgeoisie of under-developed countries is not engaged in production, nor in invention, nor building, nor labour; it is completely canalised into activities of the intermediary type. The psychology of the national bourgeoisie is that of the businessman, not that of a captain of industry; and it is only too true that the greed of the settlers and the system of embargoes set up by colonialism has hardly left them any other choice (Fanon 2001:120).
The national middle class in power in many post-colonial African countries quickly deteriorated into situations where,

[t]he ruling party … is puffed up in a most dangerous way. In the presence of a member of the party, the people are silent, behave like a flock of sheep and publish panegyrics in praise of the government of the leader. But in the streets when evening comes, away from the village, in the cafés or by the river, the bitter disappointment of the people, their despair but also their unceasing anger makes itself heard (Fanon 2001:147).

The middle class who is in power vainly seek to recapture the popular imagination with fanfare, with national prestige projects, global events and conferences, through the blowing of trumpets, the dishing out of balloons, t-shirts and slogans – through an increasing number of carnivalesque processions; thus the middle class elite reverts to the global capitalist class for assistance and is

… greatly assisted on its way towards decadence by the Western bourgeoisies, who come to it as tourists avid for the exotic, for big-game hunting and for casinos. The national bourgeoisie organises centres of rest and relaxation and pleasure resorts to meet the wishes of the Western bourgeoisie. Such activity is given the name of tourism, and for the occasion will be built up as a national industry (Fanon 2001:123).

According to Fanon (2001:136), the masses are not fooled, they

… have no illusions …. They are hungry; and the police officers, though now they are Africans, do not serve to reassure them particularly. The masses begin to sulk; they turn away from this nation in which they have been given no place and begin to lose interest in it.

The current escalation of strikes, threats of strikes and service delivery protests before, during and after the 2010 World Cup, would suggest that South Africa has reached a similar stage.
5. Historical Contextualisation of Nationalism in South Africa

During the struggle against *Apartheid* there emerged a more nationalist consciousness – one which saw the need for a broad front type of struggle against the system. This broad front was achieved through an alliance between workers organised in the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the country and the African National Congress (ANC) in exile. A new consciousness began to emerge uniting the working class, educated elite, small business and rural peasants across tribal lines and gave hope that a new national consciousness would arise towards a common struggle for liberation.

The combined armed struggle of the 1970s and 1980s (*Mkhonto we Sizwe*) with the ‘united front’ struggle represented by the struggles of the UDF and the labour struggles led by COSATU during the same period, gave hope that South Africa would escape the post-independence pitfalls encountered by its neighbours in Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The neo-colonial disappointments suffered in the ‘frontline’ states were blamed on the brutal reaction of the *Apartheid* state in its own defence against the liberation struggle, and objective global conditions, particularly those associated with the Cold War.

However, when South Africa began making the same neo-colonial mistakes soon after 1994, it became clear that it was not only the actions of the *Apartheid* state, or the Cold War (both of which are now assigned to the scrapheap of history) that led frontline countries into mistaken policies. Furthermore, it is puzzling that South Africa seems to be walking down the same path as what its neighbours walked before it. Some argue that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and state communism in Eastern Europe, the objective global conditions favour neo-liberalism and therefore that the objective conditions are forcing South Africa down the same treacherous road. Yet others argue that ‘historic compromises’ such as the *Risorgimento* in 19th Century Italy, Bismarck’s *Kultur Kampf*, Mugabe’s Lancaster House, or Mandela’s Kempton Park, invariably leads into historical *cul-de-sacs*, because such compromises paper over national and class fault lines and invariably just postpone the inevitable settling of historical scores. According to Fanon (2001:119), such historic compromises are incapable of moving a
formerly colonised country from a mere national consciousness to one with an effective political and social consciousness; a country that is capable of effectively dealing with the key challenges that confront it.

South Africa in the 1980s experienced a struggle that should have welded together national consciousness, and created conditions for the development of a deeper political and social consciousness given that it combined an armed struggle, international sanctions, a united front struggle at home and a labour/class struggle. The African National Congress seemingly attempted to build on these favourable conditions by proclaiming itself a broad non-racial church with the objective of constructing a unifying national identity in the place of the fractured, dehumanising divisions sponsored by more than forty years of Apartheid. Yet, Frantz Fanon (also see Point 4) reaches from the grave to sum up the current reality in South Africa when he writes:

National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystallisation of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilisation of the people, will be in any case an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been (Fanon 2001:119).

Fanon correctly lays the blame for this ridiculous repeat of history at the door of the national middle class, the leaders of the liberation movements no less. According to Fanon it is the inability of this class, which now seeks to promote itself as a national policy of the ANC government to rationalise popular action. The middle class did not understand clearly why it mobilised the masses of the people against colonialism and Apartheid, and it can therefore not understand why people are now mobilising in service delivery protests, strikes and deviance against it. South Africa is lacking of a national consciousness; it is clear that a large part of the population, particularly the growing middle class, is suffering from a crass material consciousness, and they believe naturally that the ruling ideas of the current epoch should be the ideas of the current ruling class – crass materialism.

The spokespersons of this class lambasted the trade unions for unleashing a wave of strikes in the run up to the 2010 World Cup, called ‘unpatriotic’ any criticism of the event and demanded that the population
kneel as one before the altar of FIFA. Fanon’s (2001:147) prescience in this is also remarkable:

The [ruling] party, instead of welcoming the expression of discontentment, instead of taking for its fundamental purpose the free flow of ideas from the people up to the government, forms a screen, and forbids such ideas.

And despite the middle class flying national flags from car windows, the working class and the poor seemed to be singularly unimpressed. President Jacob Zuma could not understand why the people in townships heckled him, thus in Siyathemba Township near Balfour (in 2010) the president ‘…was so upset by the crowd’s reaction that at one stage he threatened to abandon the meeting’ (Ncana 2010:4).

The deputy minister of sport reported to parliament on 10 November 2009 that

[a]s one of the most critical elements in the hosting of a successful World Cup, transport is a key focus area from government’s point of view. With a total expenditure of R 170 billion over the past five years (the fiscal years 2005 to 2010), the South African government is certainly taking this very seriously - and demonstrating it. South Africa’s rail system, road infrastructure and public transport will not be the same once 2010 rolls around. It will, in fact, be of world-class (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2009).

No wonder there has been no improvement of services in the townships and rural areas, and while the already over-developed infrastructure of the major urban centres were developed even further, the areas in which the poorest of the poor reside must have been under-developed even more – hence the escalation of service delivery protests and strikes. Instead of welding a national consciousness, the 2010 World Cup deepened the fault lines of the neo-colonial reality South Africa currently finds itself in.

This demonstrates a material and an intellectual bankruptcy on the part of this class which rode to power on the backs of the working class, the urban and rural poor and the peasantry. Black economic empowerment
(BEE) in reality simply translates into the taking over of government and business offices and mining and agricultural interests, and of course, homes in the formerly racially segregated suburbs formerly occupied by the *Apartheid* middle class.

The new black middle class consciously separates itself by dress, behaviour and consumption patterns from those it struggled with in a united front against *Apartheid*. The new middle class literally stepped into the shoes of the former *Apartheid* rulers, as BEE partners with those rulers. Now, instead of white national servicemen and policemen we see black policemen policing the working class on behalf of global capital. The black South African middle class has discovered its neo-colonial historic mission: that of administrator, manager and intermediary on behalf of global capital. It has now taken upon itself the task of creating conditions favourable to investment, it has set up NEDLAC for the purpose of minimising strikes and mediating the class struggle and finally to politically demobilise the masses of the people to ‘take them back from the verge’ of the unfathomable, namely a revolution.

The South African government has demonstrated time and again that it sees itself not only as the conveyor belt between the nation and global capitalism, but also as the transmission belt between Washington, London, Paris and Tokyo and the rest of Africa; now also the conveyor belt between the nation and FIFA.

In the run up to the World Cup 2010, the nation was ‘mobilised’ in preparation and expectation; after the month long event the nation will be expected to survive on fond memories of the event. The conspicuous world class stadiums now stand like monuments; pyramids to the organisational capacity of the black middle class. It argues that it has successfully replaced the white Afrikaner middle class, that it has arrived – the Afrikaner have been relieved of his responsibility as policeman, administrator and manager of the economy and government for global capital. The organisers intended for the event to demonstrate that the new middle class has so successfully stepped into the role of intermediary of global capital that it has successfully managing a global prestige project – that South Africa is truly the gateway through which global capital can penetrate Africa. The impact of the diversion of resources from service delivery, health, education, and economic development needs, for the time being, forgotten. Instead of being an event
that brings African unity in the continental sense, it could possibly already have been the underlying cause of serious social disorder in the country.

Eager to demonstrate its ability to organise and administer events of ‘global significance’, this middle class constantly fishes for every and all global events, including global conferences on racism and the environment, the Olympics, rugby and cricket World Cups and of course, the big one that did not get away, the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

In the sections to follow, the mentioned impact of the World Cup (see Introduction and Objectives) namely strikes and service delivery protests, ‘Afrophobia’ and brand imposition, will be dealt with in greater detail.

6. 2010 World Cup, Strikes and Service Delivery Protests

John Kane-Berman (2010) writing about service delivery protests notes that ‘… revolt in the country, though not necessarily articulated as such, is against the ANC’s top-down model of government’. On the other hand, the concern is about how much damage the recent service delivery protests had caused to South Africa’s brand image, especially during the World Cup, as was reflected from the interview with International Marketing Council (IMC) chair, Anitha Soni, at the end of May by Jeremy Maggs (Eberl 2010). Allegations were made that the South African Police Service (SAPS) issued a directive to several municipalities not to allow marches for the duration of the World Cup (Mawande 2010). These allegations were confirmed by Prof. Jane Duncan, chairman of the Media and Information Society at the Rhodes University-based Highway Africa. Municipalities that had allegedly been issued with such a police directive included: Nelson Mandela Bay, Rustenburg, Mbombela, Cape Town and Ethekwini. The Gauteng Local Government and Housing MEC, Kgaogelo Lekgoro, believed strongly that violent service delivery protests will derail the progress made in staging a successful 2010 FIFA World Cup (Essop 2010). This was definitely not a far-fetched ‘fear’ from Lekgoro; according to Dave Zirin (2010) South Africa has more protests per capita than any nation on earth, in a normal month. He also warned that the World Cup crackdown could result in a national explosion:
Over 70 000 workers had taken part in strikes connected to World Cup projects since the preparations have begun, with 26 strikes since 2007. On March 4th 2010, more than 250 people, in a press conference featuring representatives from four provinces, threatened to protest the opening game of the Cup unless their various demands were met (Zirin 2010).

In the international ‘eye’ and with the event already underway, striking World Cup stadium security guards joined the service delivery march attended by thousands of people in Durban on the morning of June 14. Security workers demanded their wages and complained about the lack of service delivery and high electricity prices; they demanded a ‘World Cup for all’, saying the country should put people before profit (Anon. 2010a). Two days after this event, as the country marked the 34th anniversary of the Soweto uprising against Apartheid rule, about 3 000 people marched in Durban to denounce FIFA and the government for their spending priorities while millions live in poverty. Walkouts by stewards elsewhere were triggered and police had to take control at the World Cup stadiums in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban and Johannesburg. Allan Murphy, organiser of the protest, stated that ‘[i]f we have money for stadiums, we should not have any homeless people or people having to live in shacks’ (Veith 2010).

During the dragged-out civil service strike in August and September 2010, COSATU’s spokesperson, Patrick Craven, said that the trade union refuses to accept that there is no money for increasing salaries, whilst the same government spent millions on World Cup tickets (Steenkamp 2010a:2). Furthermore, the government paid an astonishing R 10,2 million for functions and receptions during the World Cup (Smith 2010:2).

Although major strikes (luckily) didn’t derail the global event, service delivery strikes continued on a daily basis across the country. Many of these strikes were in Nelson Mandela Bay, where residents in areas like Despatch, Kleinskool and Kwazakhele took to the streets almost daily (Mawande 2010). An indirect link can be drawn between these strikes and the World Cup; in most of these areas there is a lack of houses and a lack of proper basic services. The Gauteng provincial government has promised through the premier to intensify its work with municipalities in order to attend to issues raised during ongoing service delivery protests. Protesters in
Gauteng echoed the same concerns of unemployment, poor housing delivery, lack of clean water, electricity and the need for clinics and extra police resources. She (the premier) said it is understandable that communities threatened to intensify their protests during the World Cup (Anon. 2010b).

A research report to Parliament in 2009 found that the main provinces affected by protests were:

- Mpumalanga – e.g. Piet Retief and Balfour townships
- Gauteng – e.g. Thokoza and Diepsloot
- North West – e.g. Zeerust and Rustenburg
- Western Cape – e.g. Du Noon and Phillippi
- Free State – e.g. Jagersfontein and Kgotsong
- KwaZulu Natal – e.g. Durban and KwaMachibisa
- Eastern Cape – e.g. Duncan Village and Komga

The reasons put forward for the protests have included the following:

- Lack of / Poor service delivery (water, sanitation, electricity, refuse removal)
- Lack of / Inadequate housing
- Evictions
- High levels of unemployment
- Lack of communication with communities
- Lack of leadership in the municipality
- Corruption
- Nepotism
- Mal-administration
- Financial mismanagement

The same research report indicates that the possible reasons for violence can be attributed to:

- Aggression fuelled by intense prolonged frustration
- A sudden downturn in the economy triggering frustration and discontent, often leading to social unrest
The reinforcement of violence as being ‘acceptable’ in families and communities often leads to a vicious cycle of violence in those families and communities.

Xenophobia, coupled with fierce competition for jobs and resources by poor South Africans, have often made foreigners targets of violence.

Vindictiveness, anger, arguments and provocation can lead to physical violence.

Group dynamics and power dynamics often play out in submission being enforced upon anyone perceived to be resistant, defiant or obstructive to a cause.

Lack of confidence, due to the legacy of apartheid; perceived racism and/or discrimination as well as a sense of ‘threatened masculinity’ in gender relations.

Availability of, and easy access to, firearms and other kinds of weapons.

Alcohol or substance abuse can lead to increased aggression.

The existence of gang or criminal activities can result in the exploitation of protests by criminal elements (The Research Unit: Parliament of South Africa 2009).

It is clear from the information above that there were competing and different perspectives about the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, and that those falling into Fanon’s category of ‘the wretched of the earth’ did not share the patriotic passion of the ruling middle class elite, especially when they do not have a house or proper basic services.

7. ‘Afrophobia’ in South Africa

When looking at the holistic picture (also see Point 6), it is clear that most South Africans saw little direct or sustained economic benefit coming from the event (see Webb 2010). The global games offered opportunities and incentives to both local and foreign business elites and very little to the frustrated ordinary citizens on the ground; even the price of a ticket was out of reach for most South Africans (the cheapest ticket cost 55 Euros – R 570; the cheapest ticket for the final cost 275 Euros – R 2 842). On the one hand, the event opened foreign opportunities for marketing, sponsorships,
investment and tourism; on the other hand, local business elites benefited from a vibrant global image. It was claimed that the World Cup would give relief to the country in terms of the recession – it was estimated by planners that the event would contribute approximately 5 billion USD to the economy and create 415,000 jobs (also see Point 9); these figures however, are ephemeral and un-measurable (Webb 2010).

As indicated in the Introduction, significant state resources were redirected to the infrastructure development associated with the World Cup; resources that could possibly have gone to service delivery in poor areas (also see Point 6). For the 50% of South Africans living below the poverty line, the World Cup did not bring better housing, healthcare or employment. In fact the country lost more than a million jobs during 2010. This situation can fuel the monster coined ‘Afrophobia’ and give momentum to the competition between South Africans and their ‘brothers and sisters’ from elsewhere in Africa for ‘scarce goods’. The philosophy echoed by research subjects being interviewed on grass root level is simple: If billions can be founded for stadiums, why can’t it be found for houses, water and electricity in shack dwellings…?

Webb (2010) points out that the World Cup had become the ‘playing field’ for many of the current burning debates in South Africa, and the World Cup was supposed to ‘blank out’ these debates: nationalisation of mines and resource industries, land distribution, divisions between the African National Congress (ANC) and its trade union and communist allies, illegal immigrants, xenophobia, etc. The distressing images of suffering in neighbouring Zimbabwe as well as the complex immigration problem and resulting cases of xenophobia in the country were apparently threatening the branding campaign of the World Cup. Spin-doctors then rolled out an image that these issues can be separated from the ‘highly successful’ country; Mahmood Mamdani rightly says South Africans have always seen themselves as unique from the rest of Africa… Unfortunately, all these issues are in an intricate way interwoven into the economics and politics of our country (see Webb 2010).

Safety was of course one of the biggest concerns for FIFA and for the hosting country. The reality is that safety measures were (to a great extent) in place for players and tourists, but not for poor and disenfranchised South Africans who face violent crime while living in poverty. According to
a Creamer Media reporter (Polity 2010), South Africa was prior to the tournament confident that the 2010 World Cup would be safe and secure, and to a great extent it was. More than 46 000 police officers were deployed to secure the hosting of the 2010 World Cup, Interpol set up an office in South Africa to assist authorities to secure the tournament and a special task team from the UK was also co-opted.

When informal sector operators were banned from the proverbial ‘playing field’ and poor people were literally removed to the outskirts (see next paragraph), a recipe for conflict, xenophobia and ‘Afrophobia’ was created which might have had bloody consequences. The charged up armed forces of the country didn’t parade in these settlements to fight xenophobic attacks and restore order in criminal havens; tragically, not far away, the extravagant event commenced in glamour and peace. Ironically, despite all the safety measures as well as South Africa’s international strategic position, the country as World Cup host was not completely immune against terrorist attacks. The government of Iraq arrested a senior member of Al-Qaida who apparently planned a terror attack against World Cup 2010 a month prior to the tournament. Terror attacks were planned (and luckily countered!) in all three tournaments since 1998 (France, Japan and Germany). Although extremist terror attacks can be politically complicated, these attacks might simply have to do with these kinds of mega-events (World Cup) and the potential for media exposure, and South Africa was and is no exception. When looking at a future mega-event in the country (e.g. the Olympic Games), poor border control and xenophobia can increase the vulnerability of South Africa in this regard (also see Gibson 2010:8).

Interestingly and alarmingly, crime and violence increased after the tournament ended; an investigation by the newspaper Beeld in this regard revealed that crime and violence has risen sharply in the first week after the tournament, especially in terms of farm attacks, house breaking and murder. The scope of the investigation included Johannesburg, the East and West Rand, the Vaal Triangle, Pretoria, Limpopo, North West, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. Unfortunately, the statistics couldn’t be compared with that of the police (the SAPS statistics for this period will only be released later in 2011), but it is in line with the statistics for Johannesburg and Pretoria of the security company ADT (Edwards 2010:1).
As implied above, FIFA and the Government also had plans in place to remove some of the poor from the streets and inner city in order to present neat and world class cities to the world. Prominent in the world’s eye was Blikkiesdorp, an informal settlement just north of Cape Town. Inhabitants, contrary to claims by the city, were of the opinion that they had been moved to this ‘concentration camp’ to showcase a clean city during the World Cup. Some inhabitants described the conditions as ‘worse than Apartheid’. Blikkiesdorp, established in 2008 (initially to house illegal occupants of homes in Delft which formed part of the controversial N2 Gateway housing project), are now also accommodating people evicted from unsafe houses, vagrants and victims from xenophobic violence. Earlier in 2010, a special reporter on adequate housing for the UN presented a report to the UN Human Rights Commission on the negative effect of these mega-events on people’s right to proper housing. The reporter specifically mentioned the case of 20 000 people that were removed from the Joe Slovo informal settlement to make way for the N2 Gateway housing project (Davids 2010; Smith 2010).

According to Webb (2010), police also relocated 600 people who had been camping alongside a city railway line in Cape Town to a transit zone outside of the city. It seems as if this (evictions) is standard practice when mega-events are around; it is estimated that 700 000 people were evicted in 1988 at the Seoul Olympics and at the Beijing Olympics (2008), 1,5 million people were displaced (Webb 2010). Research subjects in Johannesburg told the research team that FIFA and the city made sure that all ‘second economies’ close to Ellispark were ‘cleaned up’ before the start of the Games.

According to a recently released report from Doctors Without Borders (Le Roux 2010:13), there are 30 000 ‘survival immigrants’ living in only 40 of the more than a 1 000 deserted buildings in the city centre of Johannesburg. This figure represents a fraction of the immigrants flowing into the country on a daily basis; most of them Mozambicans, Tanzanians and Zimbabweans. According to the report, there exists a strong feeling amongst most immigrants that the xenophobic temperature in the country is rising (also see Point 9). A situation like this, together with FIFA’s ‘cleaning up’ policies, had serious explosive potential during the tournament. Fear was also expressed by the so-called Elders (an influential grouping of amongst others, former state presidents) that xenophobic violence will flame up again
after the World Cup, when the work in the construction industry will be finished (Van Wyk 2010:2).

It was estimated that the 2010 World Cup would bring 450 000 visitors to South Africa – the country with the highest number of people with HIV/AIDS in the world. Furthermore, it is a fact that a number of tourists combined soccer and tourist attractions with paid sex (Richter et al., 2010). According to South Africa’s Drug Central Authority (Skoch 2010), it was estimated that 40 000 sex workers trickled in for the event from as far as the Congo, Nigeria and Russia to cater to the wide-taste-spectrum of mostly male visitors and their soccer needs.

Despite the fact, as suggested, that sexual entertainment goes hand in hand with mega-events (it is estimated that about 40 000 women and children were moved into Germany for the World Cup in 2006), major plans from city fathers were made to ensure that there will be no prostitutes on the menu during the World Cup event in South Africa. According to Cape Town’s safety and security mayoral committee member, the city had a comprehensive policing strategy in place which included cleaning the streets and closing all illegal brothels (Barnes 2010). An article by the Institute for Security Studies (Gould 2010) formed part of a ‘massive’ awareness campaign in Gauteng to counter human trafficking, especially during the FIFA World Cup. There were three legs of the campaign: public awareness raising, improving co-ordination in the fight against human trafficking and the identification of new measures to combat trafficking. The focus of the City of Johannesburg was particularly on Soweto and Alexandra. These areas were chosen because they were largely affected by xenophobia in 2008 and have a high density of informal settlements. The fact of the matter is that most of the prostitutes on the streets of Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg are immigrants; the abrupt closing down of these ‘industries’ will generate serious forms of conflict, especially during an event of this kind. A brothel owner (a Nigerian) in an area in Johannesburg told the researchers that ‘99%’ of his ladies and more than 50% of his clientele are from elsewhere in Africa and that he is looking forward to a ‘roaring trade’ during the World Cup. Lastly, although more research needs to be done now that the tournament is over, there might be a strong link between human trafficking and xenophobic attacks.
8. Impact of FIFA’s Brand Imposition

The FIFA World Cup is the world’s largest single-sport event and, as such, attracts the interest from both sport fans and business people. It is still privately funded and the FIFA Rights Holders are guaranteed exclusive use of the Official Trademarks/Brands. Any unauthorised use of the Official Trademarks/brands – FIFA Logo, trademarks and slogans - by another party was not allowed and was seen as undermining of the integrity of the FIFA World Cup and its marketing programme and puts the interest of the worldwide football community at stake (FIFA 2010:3).

FIFA runs the Rights Protections Programme in order to ensure that its official trademarks and other intellectual property rights are properly protected and enforced. They tackled organised ambush marketers, counterfeiters and unauthorised traders – all of whom sought to profit from an event to which they have not contributed.

Some of the official sponsors of the Event in South Africa were: Adidas, Budweiser, Coca-Cola, Castrol Oil, Continental Tyres, Emirates, Hyundai, McDonalds, Visa, YingLi Solar and the Indian IT super-giant Mahindra Satyam. In addition, there were five national sponsors, which include First National Bank (FNB), British Petroleum (BP), Neo Africa, Telkom and Prasa.


The battle between FIFA, the sponsors, merchandising partners and teams of IP lawyers against those who attempted to ‘cash in illegally’ was a formidable one. Internationally known brands including Adidas, Emirates and Budweiser paid up to $50 million each to supply products and associate their brands with the event (Burgess 2010). It is therefore obvious that the organisation did not spare any person who illegally used its logo and trademarks for commercial purposes. The rules for using the FIFA logo, the trademarks and various slogans before and during the 2010 World Cup were thus obviously very strict.
‘Brand police’ patrolled the 2010 Soccer World Cup stadiums and hosting cities to ensure that the FIFA brand was not hijacked. In this regard, FIFA rights protection manager, Mpumi Mazibuko, said: ‘We plan to have teams in each of the cities looking out … for brand hijackers’. Only FIFA brands were allowed in the commercial restriction zones in and around stadiums countrywide. According to FIFA marketing director, Thierry Weil, FIFA needed to protect its commercial affiliates. He emphasised:

When you buy a car, you buy it completely…you don’t let everybody drive the car and it is the same for our partners – they bought the car, they want the key and they want to be insured they are the only ones driving the car (Fin24 2010).

The main problems, amongst others, security officials had to face during the tournament, include the following:

- counterfeit
- sub-standard and unauthorised merchandise
- illegal and black market tickets
- improper use of logos and trademarks
- ambush marketing

FIFA (2010) claimed that the 2010 FIFA World Cup offered a wide range of opportunities for small and medium enterprises (SME’s). Yet all those small and medium enterprises interviewed in Yeoville, Ellispark, Betrams and even Mellville complained that FIFA’s strict protection of its own interests hampered their own chances of making the most from the event. Thousands of internationals poured into the country over the period of the tournament, creating opportunities in accommodation, health services, travel services, arts, crafts, entertainment, etc. Yet all these service providers had to go through a strict vetting process and pay FIFA for the rights to provide such services. FIFA, the Organising Committee and the Host Cities worked jointly to integrate the informal sector. Informal traders were accommodated around operational areas including the Fan Miles and Fan Fests; all located outside the FIFA exclusion zones around stadiums. Regarding this ‘promise’ of
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FIFA, the fieldworkers for this research found a huge gap on the ground between policy and practice. The contrary situation was indeed confirmed by research being sponsored by the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA). The research revealed that despite the fact that 92% of small and medium enterprises indicated that the tournament as a whole was successful, only 14% indicated that the tournament contributed in a significant way to their individual success (Lamprecht 2010:3). Participants overwhelmingly blamed FIFA’s policy (on branding, etc.) for the fact that they (SME’s) didn’t benefit more out of the tournament. More than 2 000 small and medium enterprises were involved in the research.

As mentioned above, FIFA imposed its branding on the whole of the country in an absolute monopolistic way. According to Georgina Guedes (2010), it is understandable that they need to protect their sponsors who gave them a lot of money, but to try to claim ownership of the year ‘2010’ whenever it’s used in a sporting context is ludicrous. She (Guedes) lists the following examples from the tournament:

- According to FIFA guidelines, you couldn’t sell a t-shirt that says ‘2010’ on it if there is any kind of link to the football, because FIFA owns all football rights in 2010.
- The use of an emblem, word, slogan or an event title or other reference to the ‘Event’ on a merchandising item creates an infringement of FIFA’s rights.
- If you own a bar, and you would want to show football games on your big screen, you couldn’t put up a chalk board outside your bar saying ‘watch 2010 games here’ or ‘come in for a cool beer while you enjoy the World Cup on our big screen TV’. You could, however, say ‘watch the football’ or ‘today’s game’.

A few other examples of the monopolistic branding included:

- People wearing branded t-shirts would be allowed into stadiums if they do not move together wearing the same t-shirts in big groups.
- Vuvuzelas with small brands would be allowed into stadiums, but not vuvuzelas bearing ‘huge words’.
Freek Cronjé, David van Wyk and Doret Botha

- In stadiums, only Budweiser beer was sold. Restaurants and bars in the area should be closed an hour before the game, during the game and can open only an hour after the game. Interestingly, it seems as if South African Breweries (SAB) took on the fight; in certain places, for example Yeoville, they painted some sport bars out with striking colours and provided big screens. Also, participants in the research are seemingly not too keen on Budweiser. A bar owner in the vicinity of Ellispark stated clearly: ‘Budweiser? Man, it is like a cup of piss…’.

- Initially FIFA also wanted restaurant and bar owners to pay R 50 000 if they were to show the soccer on television. Luckily for hundreds of restaurant and bar owners this suggestion fell through. One manager of a family restaurant informed the research team of a ‘threat’ letter from FIFA that he received regarding this issue.

- Accommodation was handled for FIFA by its hospitality and logistics agent, Match. In this regard, there were problems as well. Initially Match reserved 1,9 million bed nights, just to later release 1,3 million again into the market. This was very negatively experienced by the accommodation sector; some received two months before the start of the tournament all their ‘stock’ back (Slabbert 2010:9). A hotel owner in one of the smaller cities being interviewed told the researchers that FIFA/Match went ‘over his head’ and without consultation built new facilities for accommodation during the tournament. Despite all the pre-planning and the monopolistic management of accommodation, FIFA had to give an extra injection of R 750 million at the end of the day in order to ensure the satisfaction of visiting teams (Grobbelaar 2010a:3).

- Ticket sales, also orchestrated by Match, were also accompanied by frustration and problems. FIFA released 90 000 more tickets on May, 28, but at more than one ticket centre (for example in Sandton and in the Brooklyn Mall) there were complete chaos due to ‘failed computer systems’ (Grobbelaar 2010b:3).

- As indicated already under Point 7, some informal traders and vendors were removed from areas close to stadiums. Many of these informal sector traders in central Johannesburg (and other cities) are
foreign Africans, so are sex-workers, retailers, restaurant and bar and shebeen owners and guest house owners. Many visitors to South Africa during the World Cup from Africa naturally gravitated to those suburbs where their country men are staying and making use of the very affordable hospitality services provided in these suburbs, many of which were close to 2010 match venues. The only ironic problem is that FIFA is completely intolerant of any competition to its brand sponsors.

The monopolistic branding by FIFA also got some serious resistance in places. In Durban for example, Match had been stopped from erecting a tent town on the south side of the Moses Mabhida stadium because altered plans had not been submitted to the city. Furthermore, two new adjacent practice fields had been destroyed by heavy trucks when delivering the marquee tents and FIFA had to carry the costs of those repairs. The city was adamant that FIFA is not above the law (see Dardagan 2010). Another example is two pharmaceutical companies who are supplying chronic medicine from Pretoria. FIFA denied them access to and usage of their offices at Loftus Versfeld during the duration of the World Cup. The companies took FIFA, the Blue Bulls company (BBM) as well as the national police chief to court; the case had been settled out of court (Versluis 2010:5).

9. 2010 FIFA World Cup: The Aftermath

Despite all the above-mentioned ‘negatives’, one must admit that South Africa hosted one of the most magnificent soccer World Cups in the history of the game. FIFA made R 29 billion out of the tournament, which, makes it the most successful tournament in the history of FIFA (Sake24 2010:3). Worral (2010) called it an ‘unquestionable smashing success’ and further states that, according to some experts, the South African World Cup has set new standards for this major international event. Over 500 000 visitors came to South Africa and according to South African Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, these visitors added some USD 6 billion to South Africa’s economy during 2010 (about the same amount spent to host the tournament – but with longer-term benefits in the form of new airports, roads and transport
systems and stadiums). The minister of tourism, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, claims that tourists spent R 3.64 billion during the months of June and July; this amount does not include air fares and match tickets (Keogh 2010:7). Gordhan also reiterates that, despite the cost of the tournament (between R 36 billion and R 38 billion) and the economic benefits, a special social and psychological legacy was established that will last for very long (Grobbelaar 2010c:3; also see Landman’s positive analysis of the tournament (Tempelhoff 2010:3)). The World Cup helped unite South Africans and changed Africa’s relationship to the world and, by doing so, dispelled the ‘deepest, darkest Africa’ myths regarding the continent. It increased Africa’s future tourism potential and put to bed the ‘Afro-pessimism’ which exists in the minds of people all over the world. A study by the Reputation Institute of South Africa has shown that as far as the reputation of countries goes, South Africa had moved into a better position post World Cup 2010. According to the Institute, South Africa since the hosting of the World Cup moved from a grouping of countries with serious reputational issues, such as Iran and the Ukraine, to a grouping where South Africa was statistically comparable to countries such as the US and India. This ‘move’ will obviously enhance a better investment climate in the country (Prinsloo 2010b).

The tournament also put the continent as a whole on the ‘economic map’. Emerging markets in huge parts of Africa are already in a growth cycle, and according to the World Bank, a 5% economic growth in 2011 can be achieved. With other economies that are achieving economic levels of activity, e.g. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia, Africa can no longer be dismissed as insignificant in global terms (Worrall 2010). Frank Blackmore, a senior economist, reiterates the above-mentioned and claims that South Africa, through the World Cup, created a favourable climate for direct foreign investment (DFI) and tourism growth (Prinsloo 2010a).

As mentioned above, great achievements have indeed been obtained, but these – as indicated throughout the article - also gave birth to great expectations. The expectation is that South Africa will be a different country after the World Cup, with amongst others, improvements regarding:

- Race relations
- Service delivery Housing
• Schools
• Hospitals
• Education system
• Power generation
• Water purification

It is, however, important to remember that ‘running a country’ is different from ‘organising an international sporting event’. The ‘time and effort’ that it takes to organise and host the World Cup are completely different than the ‘time and effort’ required dealing with the developmental needs of a country. Matshiqi (2010) emphasised that ‘… delivering on the promise of a better life for all South Africans is not an event’.

The lead up to the World Cup was characterised by a ‘time of hope’: jobs were available in the construction phase of the stadiums and the country had a common goal. In the Post-World Cup era, these jobs dried up, there is no longer a common purpose and South Africans are unhappy with services and limited opportunities (Witherden 2010). Sinwell (2010:47f) wrote an interesting article, arguing that the ‘left’ failed in its efforts to confront and challenge the neo-liberalism of the government and FIFA during the World Cup regarding profiteering of the rich, lack of services, etc. ‘[N]eo-liberalism can never be critiqued to death, but can only be destroyed through the strategic mobilisation and action of the masses’. Sinwell basically delivers a plea for having a real strategy (with action plans) in place before the next mega-event, opposed to only banners and slogans, and to conscientise people.

Several outbreaks of xenophobia have indeed been reported since the end of the World Cup. According to the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) (Witherden 2010), there has been little change in the environment that gave rise to xenophobic violence in 2008 (in a wave of xenophobic attacks during 2008 sixty-two people died and 150 000 were displaced). Poverty, unemployment and income indicators have not shifted significantly since 2008, while high levels of crime and violence are an everyday reality in many poor communities in South Africa. According to Witherden (2010), referring to a report which cited three non-governmental organisations (NGOs) - the Social Justice Coalition, Equal Education and the Treatment Action Campaign – there were at least 15 incidents of
‘xenophobic criminal activity’ in Khayelitsha alone since the 11th of July 2010. These activities entailed looting of Somali-owned shops by gangs ranging from ten to thirty individuals. Foreign-owned shops were also looted and burned in the Western Cape. These renewed threats against foreigners coupled with the memory of the 2008 riots were enough to send thousands of people – Mozambicans, Somalis, Zimbabweans and other Africans – fleeing across the border. These reports of xenophobic violence had a damaging effect on the progress made towards ‘unity’ and the ‘positive image’ that South Africa experienced while hosting the World Cup.

On a practical and logistical note, the question can be asked what will happen to all the new stadiums. Indications are that few of them will be utilised in full and some of the others (e.g. in Mbombela, Polokwane and the Royal Bafokeng stadium) might become ‘white elephants’. Cricket South Africa investigated the possibility to play a ‘premier’ league (similar than the IPL tournament in India) at some of the stadiums. It became clear that none of the ten new stadiums is suitable for cricket due to a too small playing surface (Steenkamp 2010b:1). The economic commentator, J.P. Landman, is of the opinion that the ‘white elephants’ must be demolished if necessary; according to him these stadiums have fulfilled their purpose (Tempelhoff 2010:3).

As seen in the above discussion, conflict and controversy will continue to be part of the South African condition since conflict and controversy is part of the human condition. Conflict must however be seen as an opportunity to learn constructive lessons about how to become a better and stronger nation. Matshiqi (2010) states in this regard:

The challenge is to harness and channel the spirit of unity that blanketed the country during the World Cup into other areas of national life. This will, however, not work unless it becomes an ever-present, conscious and continuous effort on the part of a significant majority of South Africans.

10. Conclusion and Recommendations
The article addresses mainly the critical issues of service delivery, ‘Afrophobia’ and brand imposition during the FIFA 2010 World Cup in
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South Africa. It is argued that the general expectations from this global event were to unify and further strengthen the rainbow nation. Hence, a brief contextualisation of nationalism in South Africa was sketched (Point 5). The thoughts of Frantz Fanon on nationalism and unity were used as conceptual framework for the paper (Point 4). However, it became clear that the World Cup 2010 didn’t necessary unite the ‘average’ South African and that hopes of unity and nationalism will probably remain an empty promise, in the words of Fanon.

Regarding service delivery and ‘Afrophobia’ (Points 6 & 7), it is clear that most South Africans have seen little direct or sustained economic benefit coming from the event. Despite all the safety measures taken by South Africa as well as uniting promises, xenophobia, ‘Afrophobia’ and violence are still ‘burning issues’ that must be taken into account. Furthermore, the research revealed that the over-regulated brand imposition of FIFA has on the surface more negative than positive effects. On the one hand FIFA, the sponsors, merchandising partners and teams of IP lawyers aim to protect their ‘brands’ at all cost and on the other hand there are those who will seek to cash in illegally on the 19th FIFA World Cup.

The main line of recommendation will be to seriously question and oppose the monopoly of FIFA - and the associated government - in future, especially when the event will be hosted by a developing country (see the argument of Sinwell under Point 9). It will be very interesting to follow the developments of and the build-up to the two following tournaments in Russia and Qatar. It is however a tragedy that the event – first time on African soil – seemed to a great extent just a ‘billion dollar business monopoly’. Such an event can also - despite all the football related issues - very effectively be utilised as developmental vehicle and an injection for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the host country (researchers acknowledge some efforts by FIFA, for example the 20 Foot-ball for Hope sport centres being promised by FIFA to be build in Africa before 2012). FIFA can prescribe ethical and creative CSR programmes to the main sponsors in the organising of the event. In rolling out these programmes, meaningful and sustainable development can take place in critical areas regarding economical, environmental and social issues that go hand in hand with mega-events. In their research, Smith and Westerbeek (2007) underline the important role of sport as a vehicle for CSR. Amongst others, they highlight the following
areas towards which sport can contribute (in very few of these areas FIFA really will leave a lasting foot print):

- Rules of fair play: equality, access and diversity
- Safety of participants and spectators
- Independence of playing outcomes
- Transparency of governance
- Pathways for playing, e.g. junior and senior sport programmes
- Community relations policies
- Health and activity foundation
- Principles of environmental protection and sustainability
- Developmental focus of participants
- Qualified and/or accredited coaching
- Social interaction, cultural understanding and integration

However, global conferences and sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup will always be very important for the national middle class (see Fanon Point 4) in that:

- They hope to reignite patriotic fervour behind the ruling party and the middle class;
- They hope to demonstrate to the global community their capacity organising a descent carnival in the sense of post-modern politics;
- They hope to demonstrate their capacity to maintain law and order; and
- They hope to benefit from the ‘crumbs’ that drop from FIFA’s table; how much the ‘crumbs’ and the effect thereof will be for South Africa, must still be seen.

To conclude, Fanon’s remarkable prescience which reflects on the alliance between the South African government and FIFA, will serve as a striking concluding thought:

The local party leaders are given administrative posts, the party becomes an administration, and the militants disappear into the
crowd and take the empty title of citizen. Now that they have fulfilled their historical mission of leading the bourgeoisie to power, they are firmly invited to retire so that the bourgeoisie may carry out its mission in peace and quiet. But we have seen that the national bourgeoisie of under-developed countries is incapable of carrying out any mission whatever (Fanon 2001:137).

Leaders

... now make it clear by their attitude that they gave their support with no other end in view than to secure their slices of the cake of independence [and wealth!]. The party is becoming a means of private advancement (Fanon 2001:138).

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