When 'Trek', 'Gulf' and 'Guilt' Goes

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I
The topic of this conference¹, 'Towards a Transcultural Future: Literature and Society in a “Post”-Colonial World' diagnosed the future objective of a present and existing articulation of literature and society. This interpretation derives from the assumption that, a's critics problematising the literature-society interface, we should discursively contribute to the realising or facilitate an entry into a transcultural era or epoch. This does not only mean that there is an implicit assumption of the significance of literature, i.e. with regard to its capacity to prefigure such a reality, but that critics themselves have a significant role to play in this event. Significant with regard to the notion of the transcendence objectified in such a 'future', is too, that it would transcend the 'racism' inherent in theoretical versions of 'multiculturalism'. Another assumption could be that such a discourse is already present in literature—i.e. in how particular literary works articulate 'society' in 'transcultural' terms. Of these, there may be a whole range of literatures, including minority literatures, contact zone literatures, hybrid literatures, autobiography or literatures articulating 'experience', literary representations of struggles of the colonised or literatures addressing the problematic that even though the colonial era may have passed, it is not past—the mail of this era has only been reaching its destination during the last two decades. The complexities this topic therefore raises are numerous, multi-faceted and territorially and contingently determined. For this reason, I have limited my paper to three limit-experiences as they have found expression in a sample of South African critical, popular political literature.

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As my title indicates, the limit experiences are condensed in three conceptual metaphors—'trek', 'gulf' and 'guilt'. At three particular junctures in South African history, each of these metaphors constituted a form for which a certain disparate contents were to be organised. 'Trek' refers to the myth of Afrikaner unity which apartheid ideologues created under influence of nineteenth century racial discourse but especially German National Socialism. In the early 1950s, 'gulf' came to indicate the distances which this myth created—distances which were articulated in territorial, political, economic and social terms. With the world reconfiguring potential local South African but also global events of the 1990s unleashed, 'guilt' stands for the often suspended metaphor in 'post'-discourses as they struggle to exit from a colonial past determination. The assumption in the case of each of these metaphors is that 'post' discourse requires their dissolution. For this reason, their tenor indicates their abolition—which includes the negation of the negations their own iconic limits signified: 'When ... Goes'.

My argument is then that the dawn of a transcultural future depends on the realising of the protasis captured in my title. As such, it does not deal with an entry into a new epoch or reality but the problematics of an exit or

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2 In principle, the conceptual metaphors deal with the idea of 'movement', i.e. movement is change. If something moves away from the self, it signals a value of 'bad' versus 'good', which in turn, signals a value of goodness. Examples are: A leader comes to power; a person comes to his or her senses; you come into money; you come to understand something. Over and against this, we have: something goes bad or stale; you go off your mind; you go to pieces; you go crazy. Contextually, this, however changes, because as more specific cultural metaphors, they may acquire alternative values, e.g. to 'trek' within the context of Afrikaner history, refers to a movement away from the 'bad' towards independence and a different centre of identity and selfhood. Similarly, the term 'gulf', in the context of the ideology of apartheid served as a metaphor of separation, capturing a system developed for purposes of the retention of self identity and selfhood. With 'guilt' the question is a bit more difficult and complex because it is what we may term a 'metonymic metaphor'. Here the concept 'guilt' serves as an abbreviation or concentrated set of psychological, ideological and systemic experiences or feelings that obtain meaning within the South African post-apartheid economic sphere.
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_Ausgang_. Since this is the focus, the paper attempts to bring to the outside a sample of those internal forms and their dynamics which acquired iconic status in the colony of which apartheid was only one symptom amongst others.

II

The three authors that provide the sample are Arthur Keppel-Jones, Jan Toekoms and Lester Venter who respectively wrote _When Smuts Goes_ (1947), _When Malan Goes_ (1953) and _When Mandela Goes_ (1997). Each of these texts were to be interventionist in the present. This question of the present juncture or cross-roads, asked for _how_ to represent the present’s past determination but also its reality effects on a possible if not probable future social formation dynamics.

Keppel-Jones’ book was a futurist popular political dystopic history blending a narrative spanning from 1952 to 2010 and recounted from an even later fictional point of reference, 2015. This revelatory history derived from then prevalent assumptions underlying political beliefs in white superiority, the nationalist drive towards the establishing of a republic, if not fascist hopes3 of how to construct the political future of South Africa as determined by racial segregation.

Assuming that General Jan Smuts’ towering international stature and national influence would prevail, Keppel-Jones mistakenly presupposed that South Africa’s National Party would only come to power at the elections of 1952. This is why his narrative only started after the 1952 elections.

When Jan Toekoms wrote his book in 1953, therefore, the apartheid regime was just elected for its second term, showing its true colours much sooner than Keppel-Jones predicted. This fact, however, also allowed him to not write a dystopic fiction, but to deal with ‘real facts’. The genre is therefore different. It is a descriptive progressive programme dealing with the thematisations the racist regime problematised. Since his hermeneutics of progress was still that of white hegemony and not that of ‘revolution’ as Kant would have it, it could not but falter. By remaining within a racially-inspired socio-political segregationist frame, it still compromised his proposals for a ‘democratic republic’.

Venter’s book is characterised by a socio-political symptomatology

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3 This issue is not treated in this article but see Sachs (1961; 1965).
arising from more than three hundred and fifty years of alien rule in South Africa. If the first two eras ended with the 'tentative exploration' by the Portuguese and Dutch, and the end of colonial and apartheid hegemony respectively, the third starts with the end of the domination of settler descendants and 'opened as South Africans, for the first time in their history, prepared to be governed ... by themselves' (Venter 1997:15).

At this present juncture, Venter's analyses of the new democratic South Africa focuses on two sets of problematics which have to be faced squarely by all South Africans: that of a rising anger among the 'un-people' in the face of the realities of global paradoxes intersecting within the boundaries of one country; and that of the present 'silent dynamics of change' inevitably steering South Africa towards the abyss of 'revolution'. Factors generating 'anger', are:

widespread poverty, getting worse in relation to the forward leaps being made by the rich; population growth outstripping economic growth, and the slumming of the cities as unstemmable waves of migrants arrive there; the rise in crime and the development of an illicit sub-economy feeding off its formal partner; the promise of dramatic political instability and the wielding of chaos power; and the deterioration of the environment and its resources (Venter 1997:49).

The second set derives from the complex realities and the changes these factors actuate in South African society as we live. As these realities are catapulting South Africa towards a social revolution the magnitude we do not consciously comprehend as yet, the dilemma is that no-one is dealing with them constructively:

... these realities are not a prominent part of the public debate in South Africa. They get limited coverage in the media, and they are certainly not the main stuff of parliamentary debates. That's why, in this book, they are called the silent dynamics (Venter 1997:16).

Since they 'sweep us along', 'processes of change', Venter argued, are not 'readily perceptible to us'. For this reason, Venter wanted South Africans to
get some handle on the changes taking place in the present, and to evade the change trap .... [by addressing] each of the primary elements that make up our lives in South African society, identify within them their main characteristics, seek to understand those and the change they are undergoing, and then project those processes into the future (Venter 1977:18; see also p.19).

Similar to Keppel-Jones, then, Venter’s (1977:21) main assumption is that, because of their uncomfortable complexity but also the unwillingness of South Africans to address them, it is these realities which will determine South Africa’s next twenty years or so. ‘Before long, they will dictate virtually the entire political agenda of the society and government itself’ (Venter 1977:22).

Keppel-Jones, Toekoms and Venter, each at a particular historical cross-roads, asked the populace’s attention for some ‘objective’ or ‘intellectual’ attention to ‘realities’. They mainly problematised the racially-inspired reactionary myth which, through its ‘emotion’, demonised alternative political possibilities. Since correctly assumed, however, that their calls would not be heeded, Toekoms developed a ‘progressive programme’ in which ‘each section [of the population] accept[s] limitations of its aspirations ... [in order] to give justice to all’. Keppel-Jones and Venter articulated their views through the medium of dystopic narrative, especially as it points to the ‘un-people’’s coming revolution.

III
The question now arises as to the ontology of the present, what we are in the present and especially, the nature of that from which an exit is sought. My focus on the three conceptual metaphors, ‘trek’, ‘gulf’ and ‘guilt’ may provide one avenue for such an analysis.

‘Trek’
The ‘trek’ metaphor indicates the dynamics through which a minority’s sub-narrative became a masternarrative within a racial conceptual schema. Gerard Moerdyk’s contribution in the Official programme of the Opening of
the Voortrekker Monument (13 - 16 December 1949)\textsuperscript{4} may provide a window on this reality.

In a comparison with Phoenicians, Portuguese and even Jan van Riebeeck, who did not succeed in ‘subduing’ Africa, it is said that ‘The Voortrekker, with his wife and family, however, became the founder of a white nation in southern Afrika’ (a.t.). In these comparisons, the blending of Phoenicians, Portuguese and Jan van Riebeeck with the ‘voortrekker with his wife and family’ shows the latter to have succeeded where the former failed, and in the blending of to ‘subdue’ Africa with the founding of a white nation, this act of founding acquired a racial charge. This racialism is further foregrounded in the comparison with Cortez who subdued Mexico, immediately following.

It is this maintenance of the white race which was such a great act, especially when it is compared with, for example, the conquest of Mexico by Cortez, which is a remarkable achievement, but which resulted in the intermingling of the white race with the natives (Moerdyk 1949:44; a.t.).

The phrase, the ‘maintenance of the white race which was such a great act’, is not only positively charged, it also calls up images of past, present and future in which it is assumed that this is what happened in the past and what it also calls the white Afrikaner to continue practising. Comparatively, if the voortrekker’s as well as Cortez’s act of conquest of a native population could be similar, then the main difference, is that the voortrekker succeeded in the maintenance of his white race, and that of Cortez, which, while negatively charged, resulted in the ‘intermingling of the white race with the natives’.

A second perspective comes from the description of the character of the voortrekkers as it was ideologically perceived to be and as it was represented within the image schemas in the Voortrekker monument. Moerdyk (1949:44) says:

\textsuperscript{4} Keppel Jones’ notion that it also came about due to a rigid and conscious creation of its conditions of possibility through calculated legislation is dealt with elsewhere.
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The design derives from the desire to have the monument interpret the character of the Voortrekkers and do homage to the act of destiny that they fulfilled, through which the rise and continued existence of the Afrikaans people became possible (a.t.).

The interlacing of 'character', 'act of destiny that they fulfilled', and 'rise and continued existence of the Afrikaans people', not only charged this statement with divine sanction and obedience but also with the coercive pull to exhibit the same 'character'. As this schema is related to both 'rise' and 'continued existence', it also carried their opposites, namely that if the current generation is being coerced to continue in the same 'character' then the possibility exists that they would not do so, that they would be atypical of the voortrekkers, and ultimately, disobedient to God. In chronososophical perspective, this also meant that the current generation would not enfabulate themselves within the same divinely sanctioned predetermined history.

The interpretation of some of the symbolism in the artworks at the monument provides a third perspective. Referring to the triangular ledge at the top of the monument, Moerdyk (1949:47) interprets it as to mean 'fruitfulness' or 'fertility' (vrugbaarheid), and links it with the statement to Abraham—which is in fact the standard creation, Noahic, Abrahamic and Israelite covenant statement or promise—'Be fruitful and multiply'. The blending is evident in: 'from which the idea follows, to make and keep South Africa a white man's land' ('n witmansland) (Moerdyk 1949:47). The linking of the concepts, to 'make' and 'keep' South Africa 'a white man's land' posed the challenge that it is not a white man's land as such, but still to be made so, as well as that it would require concerted effort, and, that once achieved, to keep it so. At basic level, this racial conceptual schema obviously has nothing to do with the command to Abraham, nor to the idea of fruitfulness or fertility, or that the triangular ledge in itself carries sexual and racial meaning. Within the racialistic sub-narrative the conceptual images all, however, function within the white—black racist binary and were as such, now elevated into a masternarrative.

A fourth perspective lends further depth to the 'trek' metaphor. With reference to the death of Piet Retief, Moerdyk (1949:52,54) interprets: 'Piet Retief stands bounded but straight and proud. There, he represents white South Africa and civilization' (... blanke Suid Afrika en die beskawing); and

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to ‘Blooddriver’, that it is a symbol of ‘a battle between order and barbarism’ (‘n slag tussen orde en die barbarisme). Not only the image in the artwork but also the interpretation are part of the subordinate narrative in which the image schema of ‘white South Africa’ blending with ‘civilization’, was created. The suspended backgrounded information is that of ‘black South Africa’ which stands for civilization’s opposite, namely ‘barbarism’. This binary was foregrounded in the opposition of ‘order’ and ‘barbarism’ in the second reference.

In this narrative, the blended elements which constitute the myth are: the voortrekker, his wife and family—white nation—subduing of Africa—voortrekker character—act of destiny—fertility and the white man’s land—white South Africa—civilisation—order. The discourses which were interlaced to constitute the receptor myth—its form—for the enfabulating act of the unity of an Afrikaner people were those drawn from the South African historical contingencies of the ‘trek’, and the already developed discourses of racial supremacy, (western) civilisation, and covenant theology. On all four counts, contingency, historicity and particularity within Afrikaner experience have been transcended for the ideal of one unifying and inclusionary masternarrative. As such, it had its own coercive force. If the Afrikaner did not in essence find itself already part of the trek narrative, white racial purity, (western) civilisation and divine promises, then this complex remained a task still to be accomplished. For this, the apartheid apparatuses and related image schemas were to be fabricated—not only to create this white nation but also to instil and perpetuate a cognitive environment which would ensure mastery or baasskap.

In Keppel-Jones’ narrative, the explicit references to the masternarrative spun around the ‘trek’ metaphor are not that numerous. Even so, the metaphor itself is pervasive, since his main point of attack is the elevation—to the order of masternarrative—of white racist republican ideals deriving from the ‘trek’ narrative. It manifests especially in his cynical reference to where ‘their national ox-wagon took the wrong road though another road was available’, as well as the chapters on ‘The Ox-wagon Republic’ and ‘The Second Great Trek’ (Keppel-Jones 1947:229; 62-84; 85-102).

In diagnosing the centrality of the ‘trek’ metaphor in the emerging white republican masternarrative, Keppel-Jones (1947:88) aptly stated that it
was characterised by ‘trek as response to unwelcome governance’\(^5\). This aptly captures the ontology of Afrikaner mythology as illustrated from Moerdyk’s myth-making exercise. As conceptual metaphor, ‘trek’ therefore functioned as a certain transcendence—constituting an ‘outside’ or limit-experience from within South African contingencies—separated off not only from the realities on the African continent but also international community. For Keppel-Jones, the intoxicating delirium of the transcendent experience of ‘race fear’ and ‘race-hatred’ as it condensed in ‘trek’, would dystopically transform into that of black revolt, pulling South Africa into the abyss of revolution.

‘Gulf’

In his hermeneutics of the present, Calpin (1941) assumed that there is an ungappable ‘gulf’ not only between Afrikaans and English speaking South Africans but also between white and black. Compared to other countries, he lamented, there is no integrated South African people. This clue inspired Jan Burger (1960) to title his book, *The Gulf Between*. Since it was only the whites who enjoyed constitutional equality, the ‘gulf’ addressed hermeneutically in this book—after twelve years of Afrikaner hegemony—therefore, was that between English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites. This calls for two observations.

Since this ‘gulf’ mainly had its accidence in the Anglo-Boer war—historically, it was the rationale for ‘trek’ which here came to a head—it was the ‘bitterness’ of this event and how it was cultivated by Afrikaner myth-makers, which would continue to determine South African politicised

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\(^5\) Patterson’s (1957:294) explication is similar. She said: ‘The first reaction of many Nationalist Afrikaners to [international criticism] is one of avoidance, tempered with counter-aggressiveness for home consumption. The Afrikaners cannot as in the old days trek away physically from hateful circumstances, but their political leaders can make such “snook-cocking” gestures as walking out of [the] UNO. In general, they can close their minds and pretend that the offending situation does not exist, or at least have any significance’ (e.a.).
culture, white cognition and attitudes for another century. This reality's complement is that the white popular political literature of the time mainly attempted to bridge this gulf first, and only in a secondary sense, to address the divides between white and black, or white and Indian or white and Coloured.

Within the confines of the legislated racist framework, this literature—if it hoped to have some liberalising or 'progressive' influence—nevertheless remained the often (un)willing victim of racialistic thinking cathexing any constructive proposals to the contrary. The 'progressive programme' Toekoms (1953) therefore proposed, only constituted a pushing of racist thinking to its greatest possible liberalisation. Race as limit experience therefore continued to prejudice the conceptual metaphor of 'gulf' as well as the progressive strategies which were aimed at eradicating the other kinds of 'cleavage', 'division', 'dongas', 'barriers', 'unbridled prejudice' and 'discontent'. By default, this kind of complicity is inherent to any discourse claiming to evolve progressively—it must of necessity not only start out from but also remain captive to the main determining assumption(s) of its conceptual metaphors struggling to map different routes of 'progress'.

Toekoms' (1953:6) objective, then, was to 'close the breach between the two White races' first. Even though qualified, his strategy to persuade the South African English to let the Afrikaners have their republic, makes this evident:

This proposal should not be understood to imply that only Afrikaner ideals are to be respected in the republic of tomorrow. On the contrary, the Progressive Programme aims at the building up of

---6 Toekoms (1953:2) captured this perspective when he said: 'The Boer War was the culmination of a century of clashes between wilful, independence-loving Trekboers and English officials. Britain, with her imperial mission and non-conformist conscience has had a strangely meddlesome and wayward career in South Africa'.

7 I.e. in the senses of Besetzung—to be 'occupied' as by troops, 'charged' as by electrical current as well as to be compromised as in 'interest'—but also that of the group daimon.
South Africanism on a basis of inter-racial co-operation. Patriotism must not be a synonym for Afrikanerism. Group loyalty must be something apart from and lesser than patriotism. Once a republic has been established the Afrikaners will have reached their foremost political goal and can then be expected to appreciate the legitimate aspirations of other groups (Toekoms 1953:6f).

Further qualifications came from his generalisation of this view, his notion of a ‘democratic’ republic and call for a ‘rigid constitution’. The first is present in,

[o]ur population does not comprise a nation, but a plural society. The people who inhabit our country are not homogeneous. They belong to different ethnic groups, they speak different languages, they observe different customs and they cherish different traditions. [South Africa’s] history has so far been stormy, precisely because the South African peoples have given their allegiance primarily to their own groups and have ignored the interests of the country as a whole .... [it is] a state distracted and crippled by racial animosities and no real progress is possible until these difficulties have been overcome. The real problems are not racial at all .... none of [the real problems] can be solved or even attended to while racial hatreds divide the land (Toekoms 1953:1).

Toekoms’ notion of democracy was tailored to counter proponents of republicanism who derived their ‘streams of thought ... from the sewers of fascism’. Further, since South Africa is a plural and not homogeneous population, he advocated a rigid written constitution. Such a constitution, he argued, would prevent ‘any section of the population’ which would rise to power to succumb to the ‘temptation to perpetuate its advantage by tampering’ with it as well as allay fears that such a ‘party will use the temporary favour of the electorate to perpetrate injustice’ (Toekoms 1953:7f,132).

The ‘gulf’ between white and black, however, constituted the main focus of his book. This gulf, he argued, is the result of 1) the perpetuation of master—servant relations which ‘deny the humanity of the Blacks’; 2) the
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rising of a ‘serious discontent’ due to both this inhumanity and the white exploitation of surplus labour; 3) white fears of miscegenation; 4) the 1926 industrial legislation which does not allow the indigenous population to ‘lay bricks, drive locomotives, or hold blasting certificates’—i.e. job reservation for whites at especially artisan levels; 5) the pass laws; 6) conditions in the ‘locations’ and the fact that the government of the day did not accept urbanised African people as an irreversible fact on the South African landscape; 7) the closely related view that Indians can be repatriated back to India; 8) the absence of political participation in local and central government; 9) police brutality arising from the miseducation of police or that they come from the lowest social strata in white society (Toekoms 1953:15,17,22ff,35,55,57,69,87ff,109ff).

On these present causes of the ‘gulf’, Toekoms (1953:53-66,17,20,44ff,50,48,114ff,69ff,99ff,109ff) advocated a radical economic equality; human attitudes and interaction based on the acceptance of the humanity of people and a common citizenship; the countering of crime and discontent through a progressive redress on various levels of the economic and political domains in society—not least through skills development; the displacing of the pass laws; the development of especially an urban middle class which would permanently do away with ‘locations’; the acceptance of Indians as an integrated part of the South African population; the gradual introduction of all population groups into the political system; and the upgrading of the quality of people in the police service—thereby pre-empting cross-racial police brutality.

Hermeneutically, Toekoms remained a victim of the racialist atmosphere of his time—he retained social apartheid. The ‘gulf’ then persisted. Even so, he perceived that South Africa will at some stage move over into a majority democratic system including all its people. He also aired views which transcended the prejudices in which his progressive programme of necessity remained stuck: that parliament should not be divided racially and, given the ill will in the country, ‘only a prolonged period of fair play on the part of the Whites will dissipate it’ (Toekoms 1953:42).

Starting from the racial thematisations of his present, Toekoms’ progressive programme then sought to interventionistically chart a political development which would culminate in total economic equality at the turn of the century. In his give-and-take approach, he also attempted to convince the
public of a realism which would open up the continentally and internationally unhinged limit-experience of race seclusion. Even though dealing with the same ontology, his strategy was an inversion of the 'dystopic'.

'Guilt'
If the limit experiences in the present above were those of a movement away from 'unwelcome governance' and the racist delirium of institutionalised control, the limit experience in 'guilt' is the 'confusion' arising from the realisation that life is worsening while it was expected to have been better after South Africa's independence.

Venter's (1997:73, 97, 99-108, 136) principle hypothesis of the 'unpeople's' rise to power under the leadership of a populist socialist party—tapping into popular discontent—was that this event will be prefigured by three 'catalysts' (Venter 1997:65, 91): Mandela's departure; the leadership task for Mbeki; and the dissolution of the ANC. He argued that Mandela, was an 'icon', and represented 'an aura, an era, and a set of national priorities that made South Africa's transition possible'. With his 'leadership by symbolism' he argued that Mandela—with his 'old fashion values' of 'honour and loyalty'—

... brought to South Africa, in its most precarious moment, the prospect of a society beyond division and beyond retribution. He made reconciliation the theme of his presidency. He became the medium through which South Africans glimpsed a future that worked. It was the future in which the qualities of citizens transcended their race, and in which life had a new dignity (Venter 1997:67-70, 68).

'When Mandela goes' Venter argued, the 'transition' characterised by an 'active' 'racial reconciliation' he engineered would end. On the one hand, the reconciliation 'not undertaken will remain undone' (Venter 1997:69). On the other, Mandela's successor would emphasise the 'marrying' of 'transformation' with 'transition' and 'reconciliation'. Apart from the societal and economic paradoxes—present in the silent dynamics of 'population growth, urbanisation, joblessness, crime and the knowledge gap'
(which will manifest during this phase of ‘transformation’) Venter (1997:108; chapters 4 & 5) raised the spectre of ‘guilt’.

Pointing to the fact that things will ‘get better’ on some fronts—e.g. due to the dismantling of apartheid’s legal form and the fostering of reconciliatory attitudes, while the symptoms of the ‘silent dynamics of change’ will show that things would be ‘getting worse’—this paradox, he argued, would ‘make us feel guilty’ (Venter 1997:168; e.a.). The confusion mixed within this ‘guilt’ he then unpacked with regard to the interlinking of ‘thought’, ‘attitude’ and ‘behaviour’ and proposed a diagnosis of ‘the reciprocal effects between a country’s social order and the mind-set of its people’ ‘reveal[ing] trends and collective attitudes’ (Venter 1997:167,169). More than the other two authors, Venter, then attempted the existential engagement of the limit-experience of our present.

This he did by relating ‘guilt’ to the dynamics of three forces or causes: significant delivery and progress on social transformation away from the disparities of South Africa’s apartheid past; the rising ‘anger’, ‘discontent’ and ‘growing impatience of swelling multitudes of the unpeople’; and the ‘unforgiving emergent global economy’ (cf. Venter 1997:180). Inverted, ‘guilt’ arises because of the failure of ‘significant delivery and progress on social transformation’; the inability to constructively deal with the people’s ‘anger’ and ‘discontent’; and ultimately, the guilt before the court of the ‘unforgiving’ ‘global economy’. Especially the latter view was also aired by Wallerstein. Referring to the exploitationary history of colonialism and its current ‘ideological justifications’, he ironically pointed to the ‘guilt’ of the post-colonial states deriving from the challenges faced by the ‘national liberation movements’ within the world system:

... liberals and European social-democrats alike ... plac[e] the burden of guilt on the Third World for its inability to match the West’s economic living standards unless they are ready to assimilate assiduously Western culture (Wallerstein 1995:49; e.a.).

In the world system, this is the Third World’s or the South’s ‘guilt’. This conceptual image of ‘guilt’ is one which drives the South to play the ‘catch-up’ game with the North, to ignore the complex realities of ‘underde-
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devlopment' and to turn a blind eye to the atrocious realities of the first world's 'developmental' incentives at the expense of black life (especially as it concerns education⁸). 'Development', then, creates 'intellectually and politically ... false expectations' (Wallerstein 1995:2)—another delirium. For this reason, it is precisely this 'guilt' which captures the 'post'-colony's 'conditions' of impossibility. It is as displaced conceptual image, that this 'guilt' characterises the North's attitude, its behaviour (practices) and its inhuman cognitive conceptualisations of the South. And, it is this 'guilt' which, like apartheid, surely has its own delirium, limit-experiences and conceptual metaphors. This perspective on 'guilt' shows that it is not something that can be dealt with merely in local socio-legal, nor in national context. Rather, it appears as if it already forms part of an international intellectual process dealing with realities—not least in literature.

IV

So, when 'trek', 'gulf' and 'guilt' 'goes', what, does 'come' then? For Keppel-Jones, the 'revolution' is inevitable. Given apartheid's fascist cycle, South Africa has missed out on opportunities within the world system. Only a second dissociative cycle—this time involving the majority of South Africans—will have the populace collectively realise that it is not 'the way to go'. Since Toekoms had the same premonition, he attempted to interventionistically develop a 'progressive programme' which would not only pre-empt 'the revolution' but also show the way in which all South Africans could be on the same economic level of existence by the end of the century—preventing the coming 'class-war'. This road was not followed and that is why Venter still saw the second revolution looming large on the horizon, with us all, already within the spiral towards its eruption. Since he did not foresee us constructively dealing with the revolution's occult essence, its 'silent dynamics' or 'guilt', for him, as for Keppel-Jones, the probable apocalypse of our common dystopia, is our common pact with destiny.

⁸ Venter (1997:238) refers to the fact that South Africa has to catch up with itself in the field of education. 'For not only does South Africa significantly lag behind world norms in education, the gross disparities within South African education are the origin of the biggest division of its people'—the colonial legacy of 'underdevelopment'.
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This analysis shows that there would come a time that ‘trek’ as well as ‘gulf’ will go—if not in social relations, then at least as they were institutionalised. The resolution of ‘guilt’, however, is still a future probability. Moreover, the ‘guilt’ of the ‘First’ and that of the ‘Third’ worlds may mean that this ‘revolution’ may not only be that of South Africa or that of the radical overthrow of the ‘Third’ world’s internationally collaborating governments, but an event which may impact in ‘First’ world territory too—either directly or by default. A dystopic narrative for this probability, I believe, ‘can be fairly easily predicted’ as Keppel-Jones said. So, the question still remains: What is the scenario for ‘when “guilt” goes’ or, for that matter, does not go in the immediate present? I only make two comments—one on the ‘agon’ and the other on ‘care’.

If, in history, ‘revolution’ represented the engaging of the limit-experience of radical change for many, for others, it stood for chaos and destruction—not only of property and lives but also of values and morals. As our authors implied in their concept of the ‘cross-roads’, the problematic here is not that of the binary but that of the social if not personal ‘agon’. Like ‘guilt’, it represents the struggle or contest between conformity or common culture and the embracing of ‘transcendence’, ‘Nothingness’, the ‘unthought’, the ‘outside’ or ‘counter-culture’. For one thinker, it was the continuous battle between Apollo and Dionysus; for another, that between the norming, forming and ordering powers of ‘reason’ and ‘unreason’. As such, the ‘First’ world in itself—where individuals have internalised power/knowledge—would in principle only know the ‘agon’ as an internal and personal struggle. The threat of ‘Third’ world violence would be conjured up in the media as institutional lever working on the personal unconscious to socially repress any of its possible outward manifestations. In the ‘Third’ world, this is not the case. The sources of discontent as well as the growing anger are not hidden but present in all its violence and institutional but also person-on-person cruelty. Collectively, we live the agon historically, socially and personally as next to an abyss. Only ‘hope’ on the mostly not forthcoming ‘delivery’ deriving from national but also international ‘guilt’, still keeps us from igniting the powderkeg.

Our other possibility is that of ‘care’—how to, as academics, or literary scholars engaging the problematics of literature and society, facilitate the ethics of not only a care of the self but also the care of society,
and that, globally. This possibility has potential in a certain transcendence, an Ausgang which has to address that which we are—both nationally and internationally. Whether we have to go through our revolution or not, it seems to me that this possibility has to be engaged responsively.

In a private conversation with Wole Soyinka on his visit to South Africa two years ago, He said that ‘the greatest discovery’ of the twentieth century was that of Human Rights. Charles Taylor points to the fact that if the ‘civic humanism or analogous movements’ in Western history is not accounted for, ‘Western history and societies become incomprehensible’. Maybe, the same is inevitable not only in South Africa but in the world system—a responsive civic, but also a responsible, and uncompromising universal humanism.

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