Introduction

Johannes A. Smit

Taking Moodley’s (2001) *The Conceptual Basis of Ethnic Stereotyping among Secondary School Learners in the Durban Metropolitan Area* as point of departure, Moodley and Klopper document instances of ethnic stereotyping among Grade 8 learners in the Durban region. They show that ethnic stereotyping is closely related to how individuals categorise one another in terms of group attributes at the conceptual level. They also show that, in terms of Wellman’s (1992) model of common sense belief-desire psychology, the categorisation that underpins stereotyping involves values and beliefs as particular cognitive subcategories; and that, stereotyping is related to Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, beginning with physical needs for safety and sustenance, and ending with the psychological need for self-actualisation. They develop this link in the light of Boon’s (1998) insight that ‘ethnicity is high when people feel threatened, or when their physiological and safety needs have not been met, and low when people can proceed to actualising their inherent potentials’. The study also shows that ‘learners from all ethnic groups tend[,] to positively stereotype their own groups, while at the same time negatively stereotyping other groups with regard to particular attributes’. It also ‘relate[s] stereotyping to the mental models that people construct of their environments, outline how the particular mental models of four respondents reflect instances of stereotyping, after which, [they] by way of example, discuss the generic mental models of White and Black respondents in terms of how they modelled their own group and one another’s group’.

Buthelezi points to the significant events related to the equalising of gender imaging in recent history. This relates to principles, goals, targets and guidelines in the proclamations of Education For All (EFA) contained in both the World Declaration on Education for All and The Dakar Framework for
Action (Department of Education—DoE 1999), as well as ‘Curriculum 2005’, the OBE-approach adopted for schooling, and the Revised National Curriculum Statements (RNCS) Grades R-9 (DoE 2002) which adopts an inclusive approach to the curriculum. She sets out to analyse the extent to which six OBE-oriented books for the intermediate phase meet or do not meet the requirements that were set out in these policy guidelines. These are: Making Sense by Liz Stewart, UVulindlela by Z. Ndlela and T. Mkhize, Daybreak by D. Clohessy, E. O’Riordan, L. Beake and C. Kühne, IsiZulu Sempela by Z.A. Ziqubu, Nuwe Afrikaans Sonder Grense by Mari Lätti and Sonia Gouws and Dynamic English by Gus de Villiers, Helene Strauss and Sylvia van Straaten. She does this by also first discussing ‘language, gender and the OBE-curriculum’, ‘gender stereotypical images’ in primary schoolbooks, and the theoretical framework and methodology followed. Her study takes into consideration the Revised National Curriculum Statements (RNCS) Grades R-9 (DoE 2002) which adopts an inclusive approach to the curriculum, and takes cognisance of human rights issues such as inequality, gender, disability and HIV/AIDS that influence the degree and way in which learners can participate in schooling. The study ‘seeks to determine how far [the books] cover these language learning area requirements, and [whether] they reinforce / challenge stereotypical images of girls and women in typically female activities and occupations that omit the diverse realities of women’.

Solarsh and Alant focus their study on the very important issue of the possibility of developing ‘useful programmatic interventions ... to improve academic progress for rural children’. In order to do so, they reason that ‘baseline measures of skill are necessary to provide a sound scientific point of departure’ and that the research project was an attempt to precisely provide such a measure. Central to their study is the application of the Test of Ability to Explain for Rural Zulu-speaking Children, (TATE-ZC) (Solarsh 2001). Solarsh developed this test to ‘analyse how rural African children think, solve problems and verbally express this process within the context of a western education system’. Her main aim was ‘to analyse the verbal solutions of rural Zulu-speaking children to everyday problems, elicited through the use of [TATE-ZC], as a measure of the development of abstract thinking skills’. This main goal was achieved through chunking it into secondary aims, viz. 1) the administration of the TATE-ZC to six groups of rural Zulu-speaking children
Introduction

(N = 292), aged 7-12 years, to obtain a comprehensive sample of ‘ability to explain’ presented by these children in six years of the primary school phase; 2) the analysis of data obtained on the above test, according to the following procedures: i) the identification of ‘age levels at which statistically significant development had taken place, and the presentation of a tentative set of ages for criterion-based evaluation for the development of thinking skills in rural primary school children’; ii) the assessment of whether ‘one thinking skill in particular correlated better with the total score, i.e. represented overall ability to explain’; iii) an analysis of ‘the mean scores of the sub-tests at each age level to attempt to identify a developmental process in the emergence of thinking skills viz. which thinking skill emerged first and which was most challenging’; iv) a comparison of ‘the extent to which school performance correlated with results obtained on the TATE-ZC’; and v) an analysis of ‘whether gender differences existed in the development of thinking skills, in the sample as a whole and at each age group’. They achieved these goals through a ‘quantitative analytical survey design’. Subjects were selected on the basis of ‘a stratified purposive sample’. Six schools in the Valley of a Thousand Hills participated—4 primary schools (Grade 0-7), one junior primary schools (Grade 0-4) and one senior primary school (Grade5-7). As for results, Solarsh and Alant say, ‘the test results of rural Zulu-speaking children when tested on the TATE-ZC, have been shown to lack the necessary cognitive and academic language proficiency (CALP) that would enable them to reach their full potential as learners. The cause of this has been noted to be due to a multiplicity of recognized factors, but lack of exposure to stories and books, which are essentially language-based activities do play a significant role. Using the five thinking skills identified in the TATE-ZC in combination with an intensive campaign to up-grade levels of literacy in the community as a whole could offer a programmatic option for improving the academic future of children in Africa’.

Brown examines ‘the role of cognitive instrumental processes, social influence processes, and perceived behavioural control in the acceptance of the Internet as a learning tool’. Based on a survey of 294 university students, he found that ‘the cognitive instrumental processes perceived compatibility with values/learning style, perceived usefulness, perceived enjoyment, and perceived long-term consequences of use significantly influenced the acceptance of the
Johannes A. Smit

Internet as a learning tool’. He also found that the social influence process perceived voluntariness, to have ‘a significant negative influence, whilst none of the perceived behavioural control factors (self-efficacy and facilitating conditions) had any effect on acceptance’. In all, he found that ‘5 influential factors accounted for 45.8% in the variance of intentions to use the Internet for learning’. He consecutively provides a conceptual background to the study, an overview of the research framework and hypotheses, the research method, the data analysis and its results, a discussion and the implications of the research, and the limitations and future research possibilities. In order to promote the use of the Internet as a learning tool, therefore, educators and trainers should make it a requirement for students to use the Internet in their courses he reasons.

Edwards, Henwood and Kannan start their article by pointing to the male or masculine ideology pervading science and also give the reader a brief history of cognitive science. This relates to the notion of men ‘conquering and exerting mastery over the natural world’ in and through science, and explanations based on ‘mechanism’ or mechanics. However, there is a counter-perspective in which the ‘former stark, strictly physical, value-empty, and mindless cosmos previously upheld by science’ has become perforated and ‘infused … with cognitive and subjective qualities, values and rich emergent macrophenomena’ of a more feminine kind. Rather than mechanics, and domination, it is characterised by holistic and systemic perspectives as well as co-operation and inter-dependence. Here, different from objectivist approaches, ‘human experience is given a central place in our understanding and not dismissed as a mere by-product of brain processes’. This latter perspective then, provides the context in which Cognitive Therapy has been developed. It is ‘an approach to relieving human distress which is founded on this kind of holistic approach’. Against this background, the first aim of their study is ‘to show that the current clinical models on which cognitive therapy treatments are based are, on the one hand complex and detailed, but on the other … situated and human, in that they address the individual’s problems pragmatically within real everyday contexts’. To illustrate the application of one of the available models ‘in action’, they present a case study. In it they show ‘how case based research provides a basis for testing and refining both the underlying theory and the treatment model’. The second aim of their paper
is 'to sound some warnings about the contemporary enthusiasm for cognitive science'. This relates to the mainly masculine approaches and attitudes which normally accompany notions of 'science'. The cognitive therapy case study they present, however, provides a different perspective on it. They then describe the programme and its participants in terms of treatment developed by Clark and Wells (1995) and some follow-up studies. Participants were drawn from students who responded to posters placed around campus. The research methodology was a multiple case study design (Barker, Pistrang & Elliott 1994; Edwards 1996). It allowed for the investigation of 'the experience of participants in some depth and to examine objectively their response to the programme'. It sought to 'see whether the process of the therapy would unfold in the way that Clark and others had claimed that it would and how much participants were able to overcome their anxieties and phobic behaviour'. The case study illustrates how the cognitive model of social phobia works in practice when applied to one person's life situation. Case studies of the other participants are in the process of being written.

Departing with the view that 'privacy is a cognitive construct' Nicola Jones introduces her article by referring to a number of problematic issues in this complex. Pointing to the information age—and what many people do not consciously realise as they peruse the media—is that 'moral judgements characterise the content of the mass media'. Even though journalists have been very aware of the fact that there are many ethical decisions involved in their work, attempts to precisely identify 'what standards of conduct and moral judgement constitute ethical behaviour' have not been easy. The main nexus where this problematic is encountered, is the debate 'on privacy versus the people's need to know'. In the context of the ability of governments, journalists and businesses to invade the lives of people through a wide variety of technologies, and access the people's most personal information on the World Wide Web—from health to banking accounts—the question of what counts as a right to 'private' and what as 'the public's right to know', becomes ever more pressing. Jones also adds the issue of governance transparency—which came with South Africa’s new democratic dispensation. This is then also the context of the analyses of reporting on Glyn Taylor's death. Central is, 'How much of a public person's private life do people need to know?', and 'what constitutes "the public's right to know"?' Jones deals with these matters
by engaging issues such as whether the Taylor story was an invasion of privacy, provides definitions of the ‘invasion of privacy’, items related arguments in favour of and counter to the ‘private lives versus public interest’ debate, the points at which the privacy issue arise in journalistic work, and the social significance of seeing journalism as ‘gossip in print’.

Basson and Whitehead focus their research on ‘the nature of mental imagery and its use in sport settings’. They address this by drawing on cognitive neuroscience, theories of consciousness, and what self and emotions add to our understanding of the nature of and processes involved in mental imagery. The study of imagery in mainstream and sport psychology provides the historical context for their arguments. To illustrate how the study of consciousness, self and emotions may shed light on the complexity of the phenomenon, they also deal with issues of definition and the nature and function of mental imagery. We also have here a brief discussion of current theories that explain how mental imagery impacts on sport performance. This is then expanded by discussion of current cognitive and neurobiological theories of mental imagery. The article concludes with a few pointers to the issues one needs to consider when researching developments in the use of mental imagery in sport and other performance settings, e.g. guidelines for re-conceptualising mental imagery for both research and intervention.

Maree et al. replicate the Rensink et al. (1997) experiment but also increase the sample size and investigate the role of attention accuracy and response capability in mediating change detection. It introduces the focus by overviewing the issue at stake and how, methodologically, it has been investigated. The study then states that, firstly, ‘the brain does not build up or internalise a reasonably full and rich visual representation of the environment’; and secondly, that change blindness, ‘indicates that this representation is unstable and very sketchy and that one possibly relies on the external environment as a form of a memory extension’. A major finding of the experiment relates to ‘the possibility that both attention and reactive capability could be feature specific’. This means that ‘the detection of colour, location and presence/ absence changes might involve specific processes in the brain’. As such, it is not merely ‘attention’ that is responsible for mediating change detection, because ‘very specific attentional and cognitive processes
are involved in detecting very specific changes. Attending to colour is probably qualitatively different to attending to location’. The upshot is that this impacts on how tests for attention and reactive capabilities are done. By making for instance, ‘focal attention’ responsible for detecting kinds of change, one may ‘gloss over very real differences on a micro or featural level’. There is for instance evidence for distinct brain regions corresponding to specific sub-processes of visual attention’. Even though attention is important for change detection, it only functions up to a point. Alternative avenues for further research are thus opened up. Maree et al. suggest that the ‘distinction between interest types needs to be reconceptualised using larger samples and more specific criteria to make allowance for issues such as semantic versus visual informativeness’. The study explains change blindness, the role of attention, the articulation of response time and the detection of change, the method followed, the results of the experiment, and a discussion and a conclusion with recommendations.

Matthew Jukes addresses an issue about which still much controversy exists—‘whether parasitic worm infections affect cognitive performance’. Despite more than fifty studies on the topic, Jukes says that it is still difficult to draw unequivocal conclusions. A recent review of treatment trials argued that ‘there is insufficient evidence as to whether [deworming treatment] improves cognitive performance’ (Dickson, Awasthi, Williamson, Demellweek & Garner 2000). ‘The ambiguity of the evidence does not imply, of course, that parasitic worm infections do not affect cognitive function, or that treatment of children with infections cannot improve cognitive function’ he argues. ‘The ambiguity is more likely to result from the difficulty in producing clear results in a field where conducting well designed studies is expensive, time consuming and often unethical’. The paper considers the key difficulties in interpreting results in this field and describes a recent study that attempted to avoid such problems. Finally, Jukes reviews a selection of studies and draw conclusions ‘as to the likely effect of parasitic worm infection on cognitive function’.

Cowley starts his study by pointing to two views of cognitive science, *viz.* the cognitive internalist that views cognition in terms of an input-output model, and the model that sees cognition as distributed, where ‘affect, perception and
action—and also history—form part of the shaping of cognitive processes. He then asks the question of whether the same is true of babies, and more particularly, if and how one could study this phenomenon in babies of three months old. The project report has ‘an overall goal of designing culturally appropriate measures of dyadic interaction’. It focuses on description and theoretical issues. It stresses that, at three months, babies from KwaZulu-Natal manifest linguistic, ethnic and socioeconomic diversity. Even though this kind of observation may be uncomfortable for the politically sensitive, it is ‘more dangerous’, Cowley argues, ‘to ignore the social and cognitive implications of diversity’. The report then deals with procedures for the study of the impact of culture on babies at three months, the method followed, the question of ‘qualitative complexity’, how one can analyse local cultural styles, identify typical features of different groups, how cognition is distributed by voice, and the theoretical and applied consequences of the study. It is an important study pointing to how significant cultural differences are, even when studied at three months. The study involved three groups of children in Briardene, Phoenix, and Durban, and finds, for instance, that even at 14 weeks, socio-cognitive development is permeated by culture. Cowley further says: ‘as behaviour, values and beliefs affect infants before they are learned, we urge caution in promoting Western-style child rearing’. This is relevant to ‘those who believe that there is much of value in indigenous knowledge as well as African values and languages’. Persons, brains and communities are shaped by local cognitive processes. In distributed cognition perspective, ‘initiatives to improve community life must rely on careful use of material resources, research and, above all, local views of how the world ought to be’.

In their study, Mersham and Louw explore international public perceptions about Australia. It analyses changes to such perceptions (if any) over time and whether the 2000 Olympic Games have had any impact on such perceptions. For focusing on the inter-group character of respondents’ images of Australia they deployed a modified version of Walter Lippmann’s notion of stereotypes (Jandt 1995:54) to ‘describe negative or positive judgements made about others on the basis of their membership of another group—in this case the other group is “Australians”’. The study addresses topics and issues such as: the Olympics, the media, and images of others; the three-year study and the issue of ‘looking in from the outside’; a pre-Sydney games survey; Australia

---
as place; the Australian personality; Australia as a destination; Australian sports; culture and history; economy and politics; race and culture; mediated Australia; and whether the 2000 Olympics should be seen as media opportunity or media stereotyping.

Initially delivered as a paper at the 2001 ASNEL conference with the title, ‘Towards a Transcultural Future: Literature and Society in a “Post”-Colonial World’, Smit interpreted the conference topic as invitation towards indicating how literature could discursively contribute to the realising or facilitation of an entry into a ‘transcultural’ era or epoch. Amongst others, another assumption is, in some interpretations, that such a discourse is already present in literature—i.e. in how particular literary works articulate ‘society’ in ‘transcultural’ terms. Since the complexities in the topic are vast, Smit delimited the scope of his paper to only focus on three ‘limit-experiences’ as they have found expression in a sample of publications that is part of South African critical, popular political literature. These are condensed into three conceptual metaphors—‘trek’, ‘gulf’ and ‘guilt’. At three particular junctures in South African history, each of these metaphors constituted a form for which a certain disparate contents were organised. ‘Trek’ refers to the myth of Afrikaner unity which apartheid ideologues created under influence of nineteenth century racial discourse but also under influence of German National Socialism. In the early 1950s, ‘gulf’ came to indicate the distances which this myth created—distances which were articulated in territorial, political, economic and social terms. With the world reconfiguring potential local South African but also global events of the 1990s unleashed, ‘guilt’ stands for the often suspended metaphor in ‘post’-discourses as they struggle to exit from a colonial past determination. (In this case, it has an economic connotation.). The assumption in the case of each of these metaphors is that ‘post’ discourse requires their dissolution. For this reason, their tenor indicates their abolition—which includes the negation of the negations their own iconic limits signified: ‘When ... Goes’. Smit’s study then, analyses these conceptual metaphors as represented in a sample of southern African popular political literature of the twentieth century, as it represents these historical junctures.

In his contribution, Klopper analyses the metaphor cluster, yesterday is another country... no one has a passport back there. He uses the theoretical framework, conceptual blending, developed in Fauconnier (1985; 2001)
Fauconnier & Turner (1994; 1996); Turner & Fauconnier (1995; 1998; 1999; 2000); Turner (1991; 1996; 1999 and 2000); and particularly Fauconnier & Turner (2002), The way we Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities. According to Fauconnier & Turner, conceptual blending forms the basis for a variety of forms of every-day thinking, and should therefore not be seen as a form of cognition that is limited to specialised forms of reasoning like analogical thinking, mathematical calculation and metaphor construction. In particular, he looks at the role of image schema theory in Fauconnier & Turner’s theory, and how image schemas are said to simplify extremely complex real world events to human scale thinking by compressing some elements of meaning into other elements of meaning in the process of conceptual blending. In the first part of the article, he outlines Fauconnier & Turner’s theory, and analyses the vital relations that are compressed during blending to achieve human-scale cognition. In the second part, he looks at how blending compressions operate in counterfactual blends, humour and metaphor, and the metaphor, yesterday is another country... no one has a passport back there.