

THE DIASPOREAN II: PERSPECTIVES FROM BEYOND SOUTHERN AFRICA

EDITOR:
Stephen Mutula



Alternation African Scholarship Book Series, Volume #16



The *Diasporean I* and *Diasporean II* research project, and two published book volumes, are dedicated to the memory of Katie Mutula (1991 - 2021).

Alternation African Scholarship Book Series (AASBS)

General Editors

Nhlanhla Mkhize; Relebohile Moletsane; Nobuhle Ndimande-Hlongwa;
Sarah Mosoetsa; Stephen Mutula; Labby Ramrathan; Johannes A. Smit

Lead-Editors

Nyna Amin *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Vivienne Bozalek *Cape Peninsula University of Technology*; Denzil Chetty *University of South Africa*; Rubby Dhunpath *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Bekithemba Dube *University of the Free State*; Mari Haugaa Engh, *Norwegian University of Science and Technology*; Maserole Kgari-Masondo *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Rembrandt Klopper *University of Zululand*; Simangaliso Kumalo *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Sam Lubbe *Mangosuthu University of Technology*; Sadhana Manik *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Cheryl Mohamed Sayeed *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Herbert Moyo *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Priya Narismulu *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Maheshvari Naidu *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Beatrice Okyere-Manu *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Kunle Oparinde *Durban University of Technology*; Michael Samuel *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Federico Settler *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Upasana Gitanjali Singh *University of KwaZulu-Natal*; Lilian Siwila *University of KwaZulu-Natal*.

Alternation research groups have made decisive and far-sighted knowledge production contributions in the interdisciplinary Arts and Humanities arena for more than twenty-five years. From 2020, it adds the *Alternation African Scholarship Book Series (AASBS)* to its research outputs system. Via its incisive thematically-focused inter-, multi-, and trans-disciplinary, as well as digitally-informed, research approaches, the AASBS not only advances the frontiers of knowledge in Africa's institutions of Higher Learning in designated focus areas, but also critically generates scholarship of, by and with the people(s) of our continent. Historically the research draws on the rich traditions of interactive African intellectualisations, from its earliest civilisations, through struggles for liberation and freedom, to independence and growth. It opens up future epistemic opportunities through intellectual initiative and resourcefulness, while critically contributing to the international advancement of knowledge on all relevant levels. Contributing to research-led constructive, transformative and substantial discourse development in our programmes and disciplines, it also aims at impacting the wellbeing of our people foundationally and all-inclusively in the present. All forms of scientific and social challenge which Africa's societies and communities face, need to be problematised and researched in the Arts and Humanities, in the interest of cooperative and conscientious responsible knowledge generation and foundational conceptual and methodological research impacts. We serve the hopes and aspirations of the people of Africa.

AASBS is committed to the highest levels of inclusive, factually correct and critical, socially-responsive and socially-accountable evidence-based research analyses and outputs. Each chapter is reviewed by at least two independent peer reviewers. Through its editing and peer-review system, each volume also builds research leadership, research expertise, and interactive research acumen, capacity and capabilities.

A list of published and upcoming titles follows overleaf

Alternation African Scholarship Book Series (AASBS)

- Ramrathan, L., N. Ndimande-Hlongwa, N. Mkhize & J.A. Smit (eds.). 2020. *Re-thinking the Humanities Curriculum in the Time of COVID-19. Volume #01.*
- Ndimande-Hlongwa, N., L. Ramrathan, N. Mkhize & J.A. Smit (eds.). 2020. *Technology-based Teaching and Learning in Higher Education during the Time of COVID-19. Volume #02.*
- Mkhize, N., N. Ndimande-Hlongwa, L. Ramrathan & J.A. Smit (eds.). 2020. *Teaching and Learning in Higher Education in the Time of COVID-19. Volume #03.*
- Smit, J.A., N. Mkhize, N. Ndimande-Hlongwa & L. Ramrathan (eds.). 2020. *Learner and Subject at the Dawn of Digital Research-Led Teaching and Learning in the Time of COVID-19. Volume #04.*
- Manik, S. (ed.). 2020. *From High-risk Sports to Sports as High Risk: Crisis, Capitulation and Creativity during COVID-19. Volume #05.*
- Kumalo, S.R., C. Lynch, A.B. Bangirana & C. Kemedjio (eds.). 2021. *Critical Perspectives on Governance, Religion and Humanitarian Aid in Africa. Volume #06.*
- Singh, U.G., P.S. Reddy, M.W. Phiri & P. Appavoo (eds.). 2021. *Global Trends in Management, IT and Governance in an E-World. (E-MIG 2019 International.) Volume #07.*
- Amin, N. & R. Dhunpath (eds.). 2021. *(Re)Learning to Teach in Contexts of Crises. Volume #08.*
- Bob, U. (ed.). 2022. *The COVID-19 Pandemic: Impacts of the Corona Virus on Sport and Society. Volume #09.*
- Moran, S. 2022. *Primitive Times. Volume #10.*
- Singh, S.B. (ed.). 2022. *Indians in South Africa: Perspectives from 1860 to the 21st Century. Volume #11.*
- Ramrathan, L., R. Hoskins & V.S. Singaram (eds.). 2022. *Assessment through Digital Platforms within Higher Education Studies. Volume #12.*
- Jain, P., N. Mnjama & O. Oladokun (eds.). 2023. *Information and Knowledge Management for Social, Economic and Political Development. Volume #13.*
- Samuel, M.A. & H. Mariaye 2023. *Transforming Postgraduate Education in Africa. Volume #14.*
- Mutula, S.M. (ed.). 2024. *The Diasporean I: The Southern African Perspectives. Volume #15.*
- Mutula, S.M. (ed.). 2024. *The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa. Volume #16.*
- Mkhize, N. & S. Ehiane (eds.) 2024. *Aspects of African Scholarship in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Volume #17.*

*The Diasporean II:
Perspectives from
Beyond Southern Africa*

Editor
Stephen M. Mutula

2024

CSSALL
Durban

Published in 2024 in South Africa

CSSALL Publishers (Pty) Ltd
c/o POSTNET SUITE 158
Private Bag X9118
Pietermaritzburg
KwaZulu-Natal
3200

Email: cssall123@gmail.com
Editor-in-Chief: Prof J.A. Smit
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Email: smitj@ukzn.ac.za

Alternation African Scholarship Book Series Volume #16
© CSSALL Publishers (Pty) Ltd

Title: *The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa*
Editor: Stephen M. Mutula

ISBN: 978-0-9869937-6-3
DOI number: <https://doi.org/10.29086/978-0-9869937-6-3/2024/AASBS16>
BOOK URL: <http://alternation.ukzn.ac.za/books/series/The-Diasporean-II-Perspectives-from-Beyond.aspx>

Cover design by Imvelo Siphamandla Zimu, ZimuI@ukzn.ac.za
Graphic Designer, Corporate Relations
University of KwaZulu-Natal

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright holder and publisher.

CSSALL has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this volume, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Printed and bound by Print Connection, Tel (031) 202-7766

Preface

World-historical events such as the fall of the Berlin wall, and the fall of ideologies such as apartheid, opened borders for world travel and the global movements of people, like seldom before. Often driven to move away from drought and disaster-prone geographical areas, some people also move to new countries in search for better education, working, or health opportunities. For whichever decisions people move, and especially when they move with their immediate family, such movements themselves are often perilous, in addition to which one then has to set up a home, and become a member of the population of the new country of adoption.

Conceptualised by the late Katie Mutula, these two volumes of *The Diasporean*, are together, simultaneously, a prime sample of research excellence and, the power of inter-, and multidisciplinary research, focused on such a fluid social and historical phenomenon as human movement, migration, as well as challenges that accompany our diaspora communities of the world. *The Diasporean I: The Southern African Perspectives*, covers five main sections, all together presenting 11 exceptional chapters. The main topics covered are,

- financial integration, that covers issues related to financial development dynamics in both home and host countries, and access to credit;
- xenophobia and Afriphobia in the contexts of increasing forms of local nativisms and populist xenophobia on social media; and family language policies of home country languages;
- feminisation and gendered roles in migration, within transnational relations; how it impacts family life, and how diasporean experiences are also in themselves gendered, in the transnational space; and
- the significance of technology and skills transfer for developing sustainable livelihoods, and also the significance of education, in this context, especially postgraduate education.
- The final chapter in *The Diasporean I*, covers food security challenges that migrants experience in South Africa.

The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa, likewise cover five main thematic focuses. These are,

- The study of existing diaspora policy in Africa, including how these determine challenges concerning ‘capital structure’ and the growth of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Africa, as well as philanthropy in rural areas;
- Foreign remittances bring data and related arguments to the fore, on the impact of COVID-19 on remittances, the nature, size and scale of foreign remittances from elite migrants, and how remittances also impact rural development in home countries.
- Section three develops topics on immigration policy, analyzing how diasporians’ human dignity is harmed in how they are portrayed and framed in the press, how it impacts family structures and careers, and how repatriation or deportation are portrayed by the online press in South Africa and in Britain.
- This is followed by a section on the notion of the ‘brain drain’ and skills transfer related to possibilities for multi-sectoral collaboration in the medical field, and challenges of skills transfer in diaspora contexts.
- The final section on the digital economy, addresses the acceleration of the digital economies world-wide during the COVID-19 pandemic, and investment opportunities that accompany the diaspora movements of peoples.

Each in its own way, but also as a two-volume collaborative research project, *The Diasporian I* and *The Diasporian II*, are comprehensive and are the result of incisive scholarship in a critical field of study both in South Africa and Africa more further afield.

We are thankful, that Prof. Stephen Mutula and the team who was working with the late Katie Mutula, saw the project through to its conclusion. The project itself as well as the quality of the research for the two volumes, stand as a testimony to Katie’s character and a monument in her name on behalf of all those mentioned or not mentioned, who formed part of the project, and too, those who have passed on due to migratory experiences, and the nameless ones, who got lost at sea or in sandy deserts or forests or strange countries.

Prof Johannes A. Smit
Chair: College of Humanities Institute
University of KwaZulu-Natal

Contents

<i>Johannes A. Smit</i> Preface	v
Contents	vii
Contributors	ix

Stephen M. Mutula

Chapter 1: Editorial

The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa	1
---	---

SECTION I: DIASPORA POLICY DESIGN, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Hardlife Zvoushe

Chapter 2: Towards Effective Diaspora Engagement Policies in Africa:

Lessons in Policy Design	7
--------------------------------	---

Katie Mutula (posthumous) & Vanessa Tang

Chapter 3: Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure on
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Africa

36

Lewis Edwin Chigova & Costa Hofisi

Chapter 4: Diaspora Philanthropy for Rural Infrastructural
Developmental Projects in Zimbabwe: Trends, Challenges, and
Opportunities

60

SECTION II: FOREIGN REMITTANCES

Awa Zihindula

Chapter 5: Impact of COVID-19 on International Migration and
Remittances

83

Gyaviira Kisitu & Robert Stalone Buwule

Chapter 6: Perspectives on Foreign Remittances from Elite
Ugandans in the Diaspora

112

Joburg Mahuyu & Albert Makochehanwa

Chapter 7: Diaspora Remittance Challenges and Opportunities for
Rural Development: A Case of Zimbabwe

137

SECTION III: IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND PRESS FRAMING

Samuel Fikiri Cinini & Sazelo Michael Mkhize

Chapter 8: The Immigration Policies as an Exclusion Practice:
A Serious Threat to Human Dignity among the Diasporas 167

Faith Kimathi

Chapter 9: Intra-African Migration Impact on Family Structure and
Career: A Self-study Inquiry from a Female Migrant in
Southern Africa 189

*Moipone Mamahlomola Nkhatho, Tigere Paidamoyo Muringa &
Gilbert Zvaita*

Chapter 10: Framing the Deportation of Zimbabwean Immigrants:
A Comparative Analysis of South African and British Online Press 214

SECTION IV: BRAIN DRAIN AND SKILLS TRANSFER

Haseena Majid & Ganzamungu Zihindula

Chapter 11: Multi-sectoral Collaboration: A Proposed Means of
Mitigating Medical Brain Drain in South Africa 249

Jerald Hondonga & Tawanda Chinengundu

Chapter 12: Challenges of Skills Transfer for Zimbabwean Migrant
Workers in the Diaspora: A Systematic Review 277

SECTION V: DIGITAL ECONOMY

Everlyn M. Anduvare

Chapter 13: The Surge of Africa’s Digital Economy during COVID-19:
Impact on the Diaspora Communities 303

Adelekan Saidi Adedeji

Chapter 14: Diaspora Investment: Enhancing Opportunities,
Growth, and Sustainability in Sub-Saharan African Economies 318

Acknowledgments 343



✧ Contributors ✧

Dr Adelekan Saidi Adedeji is a lecturer in the Department of Business Administration at Lagos State University, Nigeria. He was a senior lecturer and Head of the Department of Management Studies at the Dominican University Ibadan, Nigeria. He was also the Acting Director of the Centre for Apprenticeship and Community Relations at Mountain Top University, Nigeria. Dr. Adedeji obtained his PhD in Management and Entrepreneurship at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. He has published 52 academic journal articles and seven chapters in local and international journals. His research interests are in social entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship education, entrepreneurship and innovation, SMEs, female microenterprises, strategic management, organisation behaviour, and FDI. elevateddeji2@gmail.com; saidi.adelekan@lasu.edu.ng; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7747-6125>

Dr. Everlyn Anduvare is the Deputy University Librarian and an Adjunct Lecturer of Information Literacy Skills at Karatina University in Kenya. She holds a PhD in Library Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa; a Master of Information Technology from the University of Pretoria; a Master of Information Science (Knowledge Management); a BA Hons and a BTech in Information Science from the University of South Africa. Her research interests include Information and Knowledge Management, Information Ethics, Information and Digital Literacy, and Research Data Management. varelynn@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5613-0213>

Dr. Robert Stalone Buwule is a Senior Librarian at Kyambogo University. He previously headed the ICT section and the Faculty of Special Needs and Rehabilitation Library at Kyambogo University. He has worked as a consultant on user friendly libraries, ease of information access, knowledge management, and research and development projects. He has presented conference papers and published peer reviewed journal articles and book chapters. His interests and research work relates to ICT4D, information and information institutions management, culture and society, Easing Information Access, Disability Information Services, Research and Innovation Information Services, SMEs, and Entrepreneurship. burosta@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1233-1053>

Contributors

Dr. Lewis Edwin Chigova is a post-doctoral fellow at North-West University's School of Government Studies in Afrocentric Governance of Public Affairs. Lewis's research interests include public sector innovation, civic crowdfunding, co-production, digital local governance, and diaspora philanthropy. He holds a PhD in Public Management and Governance from the North-West University and a Hons. and an MPA from the University of Zimbabwe. lewisec47@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7357-2091>

Dr. Tawanda Chinengundu is a lecturer at the University of Pretoria and holds a PhD in Curriculum Studies (TVET) from the University of South Africa and an MEd in Technical and Vocational Education, specialising in Engineering Graphics and Design from the University of Zimbabwe. He has over 25 years of teaching experience at Technical High Schools and tertiary institutions in Zimbabwe and South Africa. He has several publications in peer-reviewed journals on TVET-related topics. His research interests are Trends in Engineering Graphics and Design Pedagogy, Integration of Technology in Teaching and Learning, TVET Teacher Education, and Blended Learning. tchinex2@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9114-6368>

Dr. Samuel Fikiri Cinini holds a PhD in Criminology and Forensic Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, and is a research fellow of Criminology and Criminal Justice in the School of Applied Human Sciences at the same university. He has been a lecturer of Criminology, Criminal Justice, and Criminalistics: crime scene investigation and other criminology-related modules. He is also a lecturer of Intelligence and Security Analysis, Arms Control and Disarmament, and Human Security in Post-Conflict Interventions at Accord University in Somalia. His research areas are Crime and Policing, Public Safety and Security, Criminal Justice, Xenophobia, Victim Rights, and migrants. samuelfikiri@gmail.com; cininiS@ukzn.ac.za; <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4889-6398>

Prof. Costa Hofisi is a Professor of Public Administration at North-West University, South Africa. He is one of the founders and the current director of the Afrocentric Governance and Public Affairs research entity at North-West University. His research interests centre on public sector innovation issues, such as digital transformation and 4IR. costa.hofisi@nwu.ac.za; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2571-6991>

Dr. Jerald Hondonga is a TVET practitioner with experience spanning over 25 years as a high school teacher and lecturer. He has research interests in TVET Education, Curriculum Studies, Skills Development and Employment, Migration, and Labour. He has presented at conferences and published book chapters and articles in peer-reviewed journals in his areas of interest. He specialised in Civil Technology and Curriculum Studies. Jerald is a PhD graduate from Tshwane University of Technology in the Technology and Vocational Education department. He is currently the Head of the School of Construction at New Era College in Gaborone, Botswana, and Acting Coordinator for Research Management and Innovation.
jhondonga@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7608-0818>

Dr. Faith Kimathi holds a PhD in Education specialising in teacher development studies, from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. She also holds a Master of Curriculum Studies from Kenyatta University, Kenya. She is a qualified geography teacher, lecturer, mentor, and qualitative researcher with a distinctive ability to adapt to new instructional skills and contexts quickly. Her research interests include educational issues, social-economic development, migration, and diaspora studies. She previously worked as a part-time lecturer and post-doctoral fellow at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and the University of Witwatersrand School of Education. fkkananu@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8885-7994>

Dr. Gyaviira Kisitu is a lecturer at Kyambogo University in Uganda, Department of Religious Studies and Philosophy. His main areas of research include African Theology, Christian Theology in Africa, and Pastoral Theology. He has published peer-reviewed articles and book chapters focusing on gender, sexuality, reproductive health, and human rights interfacing leadership, governance, and human development in Africa. Previously he worked as a researcher at the Institute for Religion, Governance, and Environment in Southern Africa and as a post-doctoral scholar in the School of Religion, Philosophy, and Classics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. kisitudavis@yahoo.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1084-7638>.

Mr. Joburg Mahuyu is pursuing his doctorate in Development Studies at the College of Human Sciences, Department of Development Studies, University of South Africa, Tshwane, South Africa. Mr Mahuyu is a former lecturer at

Contributors

Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University, Zimbabwe. He is a researcher and consultant on developmental and educational issues in Zimbabwe and holds an MSc in Development Studies from Women's University, Zimbabwe. His research interests are peace, conflict and development, poverty and inequality, vulnerability, and livelihood development. jmahuyu@gmail.com;
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6304-4487>

Ms. Haseena Majid is a Global Atlantic Fellow for health equity and social justice, with undergraduate training in Primary Eye Health Care and post-graduate training in Public Health Management, Public Administration and Governance. She has experience nurturing and developing leadership, teaching, training, management, and operations skills. Ms Majid has 14 years of experience in health service delivery, followed by advocacy, governance and research, which have allowed her to connect her skills and training to contribute to governance and civil society programs. Through fundraising opportunities and training within the Global Atlantic Fellowship, she co-founded a civil society organisation USAWA for Learning and Healing, where she is an executive director leading a team toward overseeing the operations and facilitating access to funding and collaboration opportunities. She has received an award for public - private strategies to alleviate a cataract surgery backlog in uMgungundlovu District. The World Council of Optometry nominated her for the Optometry Advocacy and Leadership program. Her research focus and practice are in intersectional public health spaces, primary health access for needy communities, and strategies to advance public service delivery sustainably through interventions that include Public Administration, Procurement, Risk Management, Community Engagement, and Research. Others include integrated people-centred healthcare approaches in disease prevention, health access, migration and health, cataract surgery and interventions to alleviate avoidable blindness.

h.majid@atlanticfellows.org; <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1618-9699>

Dr. Albert Makochehanwa is an economist with over 15 years of experience in economics and social science. He has worked extensively in Africa, specifically Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, and Ethiopia. Dr Makochehanwa has published several papers and contributed to several studies on economic issues in Southern Africa. He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Pretoria, South Africa, an MSc in Economics and an Hons. in Economics from the University of Zimbabwe. Over the years, Dr

Makochekanwa has been a consultant to the following organisations with which he has produced technical and policy documents: World Bank Institute, Washington DC, USA; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Virtual Institute, Geneva, Switzerland; Trade and Industrial Strategies and AusAID; Center for Global Development, Washington DC, USA; United Nations Children's Fund, Harare, Zimbabwe; African Economic Research Consortium, Kenya; Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada; Namibia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Namibia; Underhill Capital Solutions, South Africa; University of Mauritius, Mauritius; and Trade and Development Studies Centre, Zimbabwe. almac772002@yahoo.co.uk; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4608-0320>

Dr. Sazelo Michael Mkhize is a senior Criminology and Forensic Studies lecturer in the College of Humanities at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Sazelo holds a PhD, Master's, Hons. and BA in the discipline of Criminology and Forensic Studies. The School of Applied Human Sciences awarded him as the best emerging scholar. He has published articles in high-impact and accredited national and international journals and presented papers at reputable conferences. His research areas are Police Culture, Victimisation and Victim, Crime Prevention, Community Violence, and School Violence. Mkhizes1@ukzn.ac.za; <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7950-1948>

Dr. Tigere Muringa is a media, communication, and journalism lecturer and researcher focusing on research, teaching, knowledge management, supervision, and consultancy. Thematically, his research interests revolve around Media and Cultural Studies, Corporate Communication, Government Communication, Public Relations, and New and Digital Mass Communication. He is a Post-doctoral Fellow at the University of Free State, South Africa and a Director of Research at M&G Research Consultants. Previously, he worked at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (2019 - 2021) and Durban University of Technology (2021 - 2023), where he taught media and journalism modules. He taught Public Relations at Boston Media House, Durban Campus. tigerem589@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3773-4959>

Ms. Katie Mutula (1990 – 2021, posthumous). 'The Diasporean', was the brainchild of Katie Mutula. It provides an exposé of her experiences studying, working, and living for 21 years, in the Diaspora. She passed on in March 2021 at the age of 31. At the time of her passing, she was completing her

Contributors

doctoral degree in economics at the School of Accounting, Economics and Finance at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg campus. Her research focused on international trade under the tutelage of Dr. Vanessa Tang. At the time of her passing, Katie was a part-time lecturer in the BCom foundation program at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. She held the following qualifications: a BA in Accounting and Economics from the University of Botswana and a Hons. and an MCom in Economics from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Her research interests were international trade and development economics. She planned to acquire practical skills in data science, e-commerce, and photography. Tributes from her colleagues and students in the BCom foundation program eulogised her as radiant, patient, loving, inspirational, influential, bright, friendly, persistent, a wonderful soul, gentle and caring, full of grace and integrity, calm, warm-hearted, humble, honest, respectable, and creative with a contagious smile. This book is written in her honour.

Prof. Stephen M. Mutula is the Dean and Head of the School of Management, IT and Governance at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He also served as the Dean and Head of the School of Social Sciences and interim Deputy Vice-Chancellor for the College of Humanities at the same University. He has published widely. Mutulas@ukzn.ac.za; <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3776-8104>

Ms. Moipone Nkhatho-Muringa is a clinical psychologist at Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital in Durban, South Africa. She completed her Master of Clinical Psychology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and her Hons. and BSc at the University of Free State. Moipone's research interest is focused on clinical psychologists' experiences of cross-cultural counselling, psychiatry, neuropsychology, mental health challenges and multicultural counselling practices in South Africa. Moipone is dedicated to improving mental health outcomes and supporting those in need. moiponepsych@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0009-0007-9189-0430>

Dr. Vanessa Tang is a lecturer in International Economics and a Policy Development consultant at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. She holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, and has consulted for various organisations, including the African Development Bank, African Union, and African Capacity Building Foundation. She has written

several publications for books, journals, and government reports on international trade, welfare, tourism, special economic zones and regional economic integration issues. Her most recent co-edited book is titled *Development and Sustainable Growth of Mauritius* (2019). She holds the following academic and professional qualifications: B.Com (Hons.) from the University of Port Elizabeth, M. Phil from Stellenbosch University, a PhD from the University of Johannesburg, and a Post Graduate Certificate in Education from UNISA. Her research interests are International Trade, Development Economics, and Regional Economic Integration. TangV@ukzn.ac.za; <https://orcid.org/0009-0003-9109-9316>

Ms. Awa Zihindula is currently a postgraduate student and a researcher at Witwatersrand University. Sponsored by the National eScience Postgraduate Teaching and Training Platform, she is pursuing a second Master's in science. She holds a BSc. in Applied Mathematics and Statistics and an MSc. in Population Studies and Demography from the University of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa. Her recent research focuses on barriers to healthcare services for the elderly in rural South Africa. She is bilingual and provides mentorship and coaching to junior students. awazihindulaonline@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9116-7046>

Ganzamungu Zihindula, College of Health Sciences, School of Public Health Medicine, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. g.zihindula@atlanticfellows.org; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9865-4672>

Mr. Gilbert T. Zvaita, currently working at the Durban University of Technology, is an experienced peacebuilding researcher with extensive qualitative and action research skills honed through eight years of work in tertiary environments and four years of freelance consulting with non-profit organisations. His research spans diverse peacebuilding facets, including youth peacebuilding, social entrepreneurship and peace, gender and peace, and African elections. Gilbert holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences, an Hons. and a Master of Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His current research employs a participatory approach, focusing on empowering and mobilising youth to create sustainable peacebuilding solutions through social entrepreneurship practices in post-conflict urban communities in Zimbabwe. gilbert.ramah@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0381-9973>

Contributors

Dr. Hardlife Zvoushe is a lecturer in the Department of Governance and Public Management, at the University of Zimbabwe. He holds a PhD in Public Management and Governance from the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, an MSc in Public Administration, a BSc and Honours in Public Administration and a general BA from the University of Zululand. His research interests cover public policy, African public affairs, transformative public governance, public sector reforms, and public service delivery. He was part of a team that trained officials from the Zimbabwe Gender Commission and Ministry of Women Affairs on gender, peace, and security in 2020. He is a co-author of a training manual on gender, peace, and security, which was part of the UN Women's Project on Gender and Macroeconomics (2019 - 2021). zvousheh@sociol.uz.ac.zw; <https://orcid.org/000-0002-3500-2466>



CHAPTER 1

Editorial:

The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa

Stephen M. Mutula

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3776-8104>

Introduction

This volume of *The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa*, broadly covers the themes of Diaspora Policy Design, Capital Structure and Infrastructure Development, Foreign Remittances into or within the Southern African Region, Immigration Policies and Press Framing in the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe, Brain Drain and Skills Transfer; and the Impact of the Digital Economy on Diaspora Communities during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

The ‘United Nations International Organization for Migration’ regularly reports global statistics of migration trends and finance outflows from the global north to the global south, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. These financial inflows significantly contribute to the recipient countries’ GDP, surpassing the official development assistance provided to them. Migrants who have moved to the host countries due to factors such as persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations, disasters, education, job opportunities, and natural disasters, amongst others, contribute this money. International migration is a complex global phenomenon that brings great challenges and generates opportunities for the migrants’ home and host countries. The complexity and multidimensional nature of international migration call for robust policy and practical interventions to manage the Diaspora phenomenon responsibly in both home and host countries for the greater public good. There is also a need to develop pragmatic strategies to attract and retain productive human capital in different professional and technical fields.

The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa, like *The Diapsorean I*, is conceived and written from an inter-, multi-, trans and cross-disciplinary perspective. This approach recognises the complex problems of international mobility and migration that are not amenable to a single disciplinary perspective. This volume presents theoretical and empirical chapters, each peer-reviewed by at least two experts in the relevant fields. The list of reviewers and their affiliations are provided separately in this volume.

The intellectual scope of the content for *The Diasporean II*, was conceived by the late Katie Musungu Mutula, who was a doctoral student and part-time lecturer in the School of Accounting, Economics, and Finance at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. *The Diapsorean II*, has therefore been completed in her honour in recognition of her intellectual thought and input before passing on in March 2021. May her soul rest in eternal peace and her legacy endure.

Diasporean II will appeal to students, scholars, the academe, international organisations, business, civil society, government, industry, and non-professionals who wish to understand or reference their personal experiences in the Diaspora.



This volume of the book *The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa* is divided into five sections containing 13 chapters. Section I contains three chapters covering Diaspora Policy Design, and Capital Structure and Infrastructure Development. The first chapter is titled ‘Towards Effective Diaspora Engagement Policies in Africa: Lessons in Policy Design’, authored by Dr. Hardlife Zvoushe. The second chapter in this section is titled ‘Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Africa’. It is co-authored by Ms Katie Mutula (posthumous) and Dr. Vanessa Tang. The third chapter is titled ‘Diaspora Philanthropy for Rural Infrastructural Developmental Projects in Zimbabwe: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities’. Its co-authored by Dr. Lewis Edwin Chigova and Prof Costa Hofisi.

Section II contains three chapters focusing on Foreign Remittances, with the first chapter authored by Mr. Awa Zihindula titled ‘The Impact of Covid-19 on International Migration and Remittances’. This section’s second chapter is ‘Perspectives on Foreign Remittances from Elite Ugandans in the

Diaspora’, co-authored by Dr. Gyaviira Kisitu and Dr. Robert Stalone Buwule. The third chapter is ‘Diaspora Remittance Challenges and Opportunities for Rural Development: A Case of Zimbabwe’. It is co-authored by Mr. Joburg Mahuyu and Dr. Albert Makoche Kanwa.

Section III covers Immigration Policies and Press Framing in three chapters, of which the first is titled ‘The Immigration Policies as an Exclusion Practice: A Serious Threat to Human Dignity among the Diasporas’. Dr. Samuel Fikiri Cinini and Dr. Sazelo Michael Mkhize are the co-authors. The second chapter, ‘Intra-African Migration Impact on Family Structure and Career: A Self-study Inquiry from a Female Migrant in Southern Africa’, is authored by Dr. Faith Kimathi. The title of the third chapter in this section is titled ‘Framing the Deportation of Zimbabwean Immigrants: A Comparative Analysis of South African and British Online Press’ and is co-authored by Ms. Moipone Mamahlomola Nkhatho, Dr. Tigere Paidamoyo Muringa, and Mr. Gilbert Zvaita.

Section IV presents two chapters on the broad subject of Brain Drain and Skills Transfer. The first chapter is titled ‘Multi-sectoral Collaboration: A Proposed Means of Mitigating Medical Brain Drain in South Africa’. It is co-authored by Ms Haseena Majid, and Dr. Ganzamungu Zihindula. The second chapter is ‘Challenges of Skills Transfer for Zimbabwean Migrant Workers in the Diaspora: A Systematic Review’, co-authored by Mr. Jerald Hondonga and Dr. Tawanda Chinengundu.

Section V on Digital Economy presents two chapters. The first is titled ‘The Surge of Africa’s Digital Economy during COVID-19: Impact on the Diaspora Communities’, which Dr. Evelyn Anduvare authored. The second, authored by Dr. Adelekan Saidi Adedeji, is titled ‘Diaspora Investment: Enhancing Opportunities, Growth, and Sustainability in Sub-Saharan African Economies’.

Professor Stephen Mutula
Dean and Head: School of Management, IT and Governance
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Durban
South Africa
Mutulas@ukzn.ac.za

SECTION I

DIASPORA POLICY DESIGN, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 2

Towards Effective Diaspora Engagement Policies in Africa: Lessons in Policy Design

Hardlife Zvoushe

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/000-0002-3500-2466>

Abstract

Sub-Saharan African countries are at various stages of developing Diaspora engagement policies. There are very few – if any – cases of success stories with the engagement of the Diaspora. A review of African experiences with Diaspora engagement shows a persisting trend of constraints ranging from lacking Diaspora databases, unfavourable investment climates characterised by political and economic risks, and limited investment in e-government development for virtual interactions with Diaspora communities. This chapter takes a qualitative approach underpinned by extensive literature reviews on African experiences with Diaspora engagement in selected country cases from Asia and Latin America. These countries not only had Diaspora policies for longer periods but have also recorded notable successes with Diaspora engagement. Experiences of the reviewed international cases indicate that foundational efforts in Diaspora engagement have encompassed determining the Diaspora's size, capturing citizens' comprehensive personal details abroad, and building advanced virtual interactive platforms for information exchange. Results show that the policy architecture of Diaspora engagement initiatives of the selected international cases is anchored in four broad dimensions: political, economic, socio-cultural and administrative, and some of the definitive policy initiatives under these dimensions include adjustment of immigration laws and foreign policies, granting dual citizenship to Diaspora communities, creating Diaspora administrative institutions, building Diaspora networks, and creating socio-cultural events promotive of home-Diaspora 'reunions'.

Keywords: Diaspora, engagement, policies, Africa, Latin America, Asia

1 Introduction

The Diaspora phenomenon has gained significance in the past four decades following the increasing migration of people within and across continents. There are both pull and push factors driving the migration trends across the world today. Some regions and countries suffer conflicts and economic turmoil, while others enjoy peace amidst economic gains. Migration flows have further benefitted from the enabling effect of globalisation and the liberalisation of people and goods across borders (Wiarda 2004). It has resulted in the ‘de-territorialisation of personnel’, enhanced inter-state trade, deepened regional integration, and strengthened bilateral and multilateral exchanges at political and economic levels (Sengupta 2001). Initially, in the migration matrix, sending states appeared like outright losers when their best brains left for bigger economies of the Global North. It raised questions on how sending countries would benefit from the emigration of their citizens. While it was natural for citizens to support families left behind financially, it was not obvious how savings by citizens abroad would translate to economic gains for the homeland. This trend marked the birth of the migration-development discourse, centring around the conversion of the supposed ‘loss of personnel’ that migration seemed to project into economic development gains for the sending states. Countries took specific actions to engage their citizens in foreign countries to tap into economic benefits from citizens abroad (Edeh *et al.* 2021). This need for engagement saw the formulation of Diaspora policies, the creation of administrative structures for Diaspora affairs, the reform of migration laws, and the designing of Diaspora-focused economic programmes, among other numerous efforts (Sendhardt 2021). The migration-development discourse also drew attention at the global level, resulting in the creation of the United Nations Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) in 2003. Following an almost unanimous recognition of the importance of the migration-development linkage, it was resolved that the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) be created as a consultative platform for governmental exchanges on international migration and its trade-offs with development. Generally, global experiences show that countries worldwide have different histories with Diaspora engagement. Use of the term ‘Diaspora’ was originally associated with the Jewish, Armenian, and Greek historical dispersion.

Comparative analysis and available statistical data on the impact of Diaspora engagement initiatives worldwide reveal trends where Latin American, Asian, and European countries are recording good economic returns

from their state-Diaspora relations (World Bank 2019; Palop-García & Petroza 2021). The ever-rising levels of remittances are one indicator of the results of those relations. Credit is given to the deliberate efforts to create laws, policies, and institutional structures for pursuing the Diaspora engagement agenda. Of course, one cannot ignore the effect of the size of the Diaspora when it comes to the number of investments coming from abroad. In this chapter, the author is interested in the architecture of Diaspora engagement policies and how international best practices may inform sub-Saharan African Diaspora engagement initiatives. To date, countries in sub-Saharan Africa are at various stages of developing Diaspora engagement policies, and a tiny fraction may count as ‘success stories’ in the stricter sense of it. Analysis of Diaspora engagement efforts in Africa reveals challenges ranging from a lack of inclusivity in policy formulation and limited investment in the engagement efforts to significant stocks of political and economic risks that serve as deterrents to external investments. The author first describes concepts such as the ‘African Diaspora’ and ‘Diaspora engagement policies’ in this chapter. He then describes the migration-development nexus in the African context and reviews the engagement efforts made so far at continental and national levels. Focus on engagement efforts in Africa ends in examining the challenges faced by countries pursuing Diaspora engagement. After that, international experiences are analysed, highlighting the major definitive initiatives underpinning the Diaspora policies of selected country cases. That is followed by describing the findings and conclusion on the constitutive elements of effective Diaspora engagement policies guided by tried and tested international practices.

2 A Methodological Note

This chapter takes a qualitative approach to gathering and analysing data. It relies on reviewing secondary material in journal articles, books, book chapters, and online databases on migration and development.

2.1 Conceptual Definitions

2.1.1 African Diaspora

The concept of ‘diaspora’ has generated contestation among scholars of Diaspora and cultural studies. An ontological debate arose, pitting those who look at Diaspora as ‘discreet entities or groups’ and those who take a constructivist

perspective of viewing the Diaspora as a ‘social construction’ (Grossman 2019:1264-5). The term ‘diaspora’ originates in Greek, where it originally meant ‘scattering of seeds’ (Anthias 1998). In its earliest usage, the term referred to Jewish, Greek, and Armenian dispersion, but that exclusive understanding has since been subjected to dilution, broadening and stretching to include the emigration, dispersion, or scattering of wider racial and ethnic groups across the globe. Some scholarly opinions have indicated that stretching the meaning of Diaspora has been done ‘to accommodate the various intellectual, cultural and political agendas’ (Brubaker 2005) in various geopolitical spaces. Diaspora’s meaning has manifested in three dimensions: semantic stretch, conceptual dispersion, and disciplinary dispersion (Brubaker 2005). As a result, the term has taken multiple yet loosely related meanings often carried in such terms as ‘transnationalism’, ‘dispersal or immigration’, ‘community’, ‘exile’, ‘displacement’, ‘group identity’, ‘homeland orientation’, ‘boundary maintenance’. These terms are currently used across different fields and sub-fields in humanities and social sciences, from history, sociology, anthropology, and education to religion and philosophy (Tölölyan 1996).

In making sense of the concept of Diaspora, the author of this chapter relies on the definition by the African Union Technical Workshop on the relationship with the Diaspora, which defined the African Diaspora as the geographic ‘dispersal of peoples whose ancestors, within historical memory, originally came from Africa, but who are currently domiciled, or claim residence or citizenship, outside the continent of Africa’ (cited in Adisa 2017:43-44). Salient features from this definition characterise the African Diaspora as ‘Africans living outside Africa’ whose roots can be traced to the continent. Practical meanings of ‘Diaspora’ often relate to transnationalism, homeland orientation, and, sometimes, retention of group identity by extraterritorial populations (Grossman 2019).

Some ascribe the creation of the ‘original African Diaspora’ to historical developments involving the slave trade between the 16th and 19th centuries (Bolaji 2015). In post-independent Africa, the African Diaspora has further been maintained and strengthened by voluntary migration necessitated by the pull of educational and job opportunities in the developed economies of the Global North (Kamei 2011). In some instances, however, it has been a clear case of forced displacements induced by political instability and civil wars in the home countries, often resulting in the creation of groups of refugees seeking political asylum in countries within and outside the continent (Mohamoud &

Osman 2008). Africa – specifically south of the Sahara – has seen migration taking place in three forms determined by destination: internal, intra-regional and international (Beyene 2015).

2.1.2 Diaspora Engagement Policies

After appreciating the African Diaspora concept, it is necessary to unpack how their home governments officially engage the group or groups described as ‘African Diaspora’. This understanding concerns specific state policies and concrete actions to engage citizens outside a particular country’s borders meaningfully. The combined efforts of a government to reach out to citizens beyond its borders, constitute what are described as ‘Diaspora engagement policies’ (Sendhardt 2021), and according to Gamlen (2008b:3), these are defined as ‘state institutions and practices that apply to members of that state’s society who reside outside its borders’. In this chapter, we define Diaspora engagement as the collection of legal, institutional, and administrative efforts by the home country to communicate, involve, and consider its citizens and descendants living abroad, with the idea of opening up space for their participation in national activities and programmes to foster socio-economic and political development of a country. There are multiple motivations behind a state’s engagement with its Diaspora.

On the one hand, the state has private and national interests to pursue; on the other, it has obligations to fulfil for its citizens at home and abroad (Gamlen 2006; 2008a). From Diaspora engagement, there is immense potential for states to gain economic and political support as well as enhanced social capital at two levels: first, among compatriots abroad, and second, between states and their citizens (Qstergaard-Nielsen 2003). However, before states invest in engaging their Diasporas, they normally have a few considerations to make, for example, the size of the Diaspora community and the level of skill and professional knowledge from which a state may benefit through knowledge transfer, brain gain or brain circulation (Tiwari 2013).

In practice, Diaspora engagement policies have included several strategies, such as the legal provisions for dual citizenship, which aim to grant non-resident citizens a nationality status and allow them to return, vote, invest, own property or pass citizenship to posterity. A cursory review of available legal provisions for dual citizenship shows that they are never uniform across countries, although the effects may be similar in many respects (Nilsson 2011).

Diaspora engagement may also provide administrative machinery in foreign countries by creating Diaspora offices or using diplomatic missions to assist the Diaspora (Gamlen 2008a). Some countries have given full political rights to citizens abroad by allowing them to vote and participate in their home countries' political activities and affairs. Governments have also played facilitatory roles – albeit indirectly in some cases – in encouraging money transfers or remittances from abroad (Kassegn 2021). Assistance has come in the form of favourable laws, reduced cost of sending money, reduced charges on recipients of remittances and allowing unfettered operating space to money transfer agents.

Diaspora engagement has also been pursued through investment programmes that target the Diaspora community. These include selling Diaspora bonds to mobilise external private finance for local development programmes, especially under limited capital financing from local sources (Ketkar & Rath 2011). Sending states have also partnered with the Diaspora to implement community development projects. A few countries have brokered fair pension portability for their Diaspora, increasing their citizens' chances of return (Nilsen 2011). Pension portability comes against the backdrop of a lack of social security benefits for some members of the Diaspora communities. Diaspora engagement has also been pursued in the form of the promotion of homeland cultural practices in foreign countries. One good example is India's *Know India Programme* run under the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, which seeks to engage second-generation Indians born abroad to know their country of origin and cultural practices. Countries such as the USA have also collected expatriate taxes on their citizens based outside the US. Other countries may not necessarily have that kind of tax but put charges on Diasporans' remittances.

3 The Diaspora in African Development

The 'migration-development nexus' (Sørensen *et al.* 2002) or generally the 'migration for development' discourse has been gaining traction over the last four decades, with a shared recognition of the role of migration in driving the development agenda of homelands (Fargues & Rango 2020; Lavenex & Kunz 2008). The migration-development nexus has presented an additional development paradigm that recognises migration's agency in the development discourse (Sinatti & Horst 2015; Faist & Fauser 2011). In the wake of the continuing brain drain trend, Africa appears to have recognised the intellectual capital, technical capacity and financial potential that now lies beyond its shores (Edeh *et al.*

2021). The Diaspora is now being seriously considered as an avenue to be leveraged in spurring the economic development of homelands through remittances, capital market investments, philanthropy and humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and various other economic initiatives (Gnimassoun & Anyanwu 2019). International experiences of countries such as China, India and Israel validate the positive correlation between Diaspora and development. As Muzondidya (2011:124) explains:

In these countries, Diaspora communities have gone beyond the traditional support for home countries via private transfers of funds, goods and equipment. Diaspora investors and entrepreneurs have played a critical role in attracting FDI, setting up joint ventures and promoting export of domestic companies. Both Chinese Diaspora returnees and overseas Chinese diasporians have played an active role in technology transfer, trade and investment in China.

The growing importance of the Diaspora in Africa can be read from the recognition the AU has accorded them in its programmes, declarations and statutes. There are explicit references to the connection between Diaspora and development. For a start, one of the AU's definitions of the African Diaspora unambiguously emphasises that connection thus: 'The African Diaspora consists of peoples of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and *who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent* and the building of the African Union' (AU 2005:7, emphasis mine). While most available definitions of the Diaspora generally do not emphasise the link between Diaspora and development in home countries, the AU's position deliberately foregrounds and makes the intention to leverage African Diaspora for economic transformation loud enough.

Additional efforts were made at the policy level by the AU. In 2006, for example, an Experts' Meeting on Migration and Development led to adopting the Draft African Common Position on Migration and Development. This step covered many thematic policy areas such as migration and development, human resources and brain drain, labour migration, remittances, African Diaspora, migration and human rights, and migration and gender, among others (AU 2006). The initiative would work in a complementary, if not mutually reinforcing fashion with the 'Migration Policy Framework for and Plan of Action 2018-2030', which seeks to promote the free movement of

people, inter-regional cooperation, and facilitation of the participation of the African Diaspora in the development of their home countries.

The drive to give special recognition to the African Diaspora may have been motivated by the recognition of the continuously increasing numbers of African migrants in other regions. The World Migration Report (2020:54) notes that more than 21 million Africans live in other African countries. Africans living outside the continent grew from around 17 million in 2015 to 19 million in 2019, with Europe accounting for at least 10.6 million African-born migrants, Asia with 4.6 million, and North America with 3.2 million. These numbers become even more relevant after recognising that remittances have become one of Africa's major sources of external financial flows. At the start of 2009, remittances constituted more than 5% of GDP in at least 15 African countries (Kas-segn 2021). In the same year, 2009, the IMF recognised that the African Diaspora had become the greatest contributor to foreign investment inflows in Africa (Okpewho & Nzegwu 2009). It is not an isolated development if international experiences are considered. For example, about a decade ago, 60% of China's FDI was estimated to come from 55% of its Diaspora (Muzondidya 2011).

4 Diaspora Engagement in Africa

Efforts to engage the Diaspora in Africa can be seen at the AU level first, then at individual member states' level. The section below describes the efforts made so far at these two levels.

4.1 Engagement Efforts and Initiatives at Continental Level

Several initiatives aiming at advancing the Diaspora engagement agenda at the continental level started with the AU's adoption of the African Diaspora as the continent's sixth region. This effort has gone together with calls for promoting 'global Pan-Africanism' across continents (Bolaji 2015). Mangala (2017) notes that when the proposal to integrate the sixth region within AU structures was introduced, it resulted in a heated debate concerning its implications. It was a challenge because the 'African Union, more often than not, operates on the basis of consensus politics' (Mangala 2017:41). Further problems emanated from the uniqueness of the sixth region, whose nature sharply contrasts with the other five regions. Besides its global spread, it is characteristically diverse and heterogeneous because it comprises citizens drawn from different countries

across the continent. This diversity made integrating the sixth region within the continental structures problematic (Bolaji 2015).

Following the developments at the UN level, marked by the creation of the GCIM and GFMD, the AU instituted initiatives to engage key actors of the Global North, specifically the European Union (EU) and its member states. The EU-Africa dialogue on migration and development resulted in the establishment of the Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (PMME), which was adopted in Portugal in 2007 at the second EU-Africa Summit (Mangala 2017:4). In December 2002, the AU-Western Hemisphere Diaspora Forum was launched in Washington D.C. with full representation of African Diasporas in the regions of Latin America, the Caribbean, the USA, Canada, and Central America. The main agenda was establishing win-win relationships for the African Diaspora, the AU, and African countries. The AU has further produced policy documents such as the Declaration of the Global African Diaspora Summit, adopted in 2012 in South Africa. The objectives of the amended AU Constitutive Act have also covered the participation of the African Diaspora in building the AU. Article 3(q) states that one of the objectives of the AU is to: ‘invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part of our Continent, in the building of the African Union’ (AU 2003).

The other key development at the continental level has been the creation of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), whose responsibility is to facilitate the engagement between the AU, African governments, and their people within and outside the continent. ECOSOCC mobilises African people to participate in the continent’s transformation, policymaking and development agenda. Article IV(1a) of the ECOSOCC statutes enables these roles, which provide that out of the 150 seats in the ECOSOCC General Assembly, 20 should be reserved for the African Diaspora. Unfortunately, the ECOSOCC Diaspora participation initiative has not taken off in practical terms. Ikome (2009) notes that between 2005 and 2008, there was no Diaspora representation in the Interim ECOSOCC Assembly.

Moreover, there was no involvement of the Diaspora in the consultative and electoral processes of the ECOSOCC. It appears these challenges have been compounded by the fact that in addition to the lack of unambiguous criteria for filling the 20 Diaspora seats, stakeholders have no consensus on how the issue should be resolved (Ikome 2009). Different meetings of stakeholders such as Diaspora networks, consultants and others have produced almost irreconcilable proposals. Fair and inclusive criteria is needed to ensure equitable seat distri-

bution among representatives of the heterogenous African Diaspora.

Through the Citizens and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO), whose work is intricately connected to that of the ECOSOCC, the AU came up with the Diaspora Engagement Project, which sought to assist AU member states with building their capacity to design and implement Diaspora engagement initiatives at a national level. One notable development in CIDO's operations is the development of the Diaspora engagement self-assessment tool (DESAT), which member states can use for self-evaluation to ascertain their level of Diaspora engagement and take corrective measures where necessary. The DESAT is made up of six pillars which have specific weighted indicators under them. The pillars are:

- (a) the political will to engage the Diaspora;
- (b) a Diaspora friendly environment;
- (c) a national Diaspora strategy;
- (d) Diaspora consultation mechanisms;
- (e) a mobilising outreach strategy; and
- (f) Diaspora-oriented programmes.

As of 2019, CIDO applied the DESAT on a sample of 11 African member states, and the aggregate scores revealed that only Rwanda showed consistency across the six pillars, recording an average score of 3.3 which, according to DESAT score descriptions, reflects 'a good level of implementation' of Diaspora engagement programmes. Scores for the other ten members ranged from an aggregate of 1.0 which reflects the mere existence of plans towards Diaspora engagement, to 2.4, which reflects little effort to implement Diaspora engagement programmes (AU 2019). However, it is instructive to note that the DESAT as a tool only provides a generic template to all African member states without necessarily capturing country-specific nuances that should normally be considered in Diaspora engagement processes. In addition, it is also not quite easy to positively ascertain the appetite to seriously embrace and apply the DESAT among member states since it is not necessarily mandatory for African countries to adopt it.

4.2 Engagement Initiatives at National Level

At a national level, several African countries have made efforts and put in place

a variety of initiatives that seek to create avenues to foster a development-focused relationship between the home country and its Diaspora. One of the developments has been creating Diaspora focal persons and dedicated Diaspora offices in government ministries in at least 45 African countries. In 2016, CIDO held its first continental workshop, bringing together the Diaspora focal points of the AU member states. Morocco established the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad in 1990 and, later, the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad (Hanafi & Hites 2017). Rwanda also created the Department for the Diaspora within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ethiopia established the Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Kenya, the government has ensured that every Kenyan embassy has a dedicated Diaspora portal.

All AU member states have formulated Diaspora policies, which have operated with migration policies. A study of Diaspora and development policies in ECOWAS's 15-member states conducted by Schöffberger (2020) found that each of the 15 states had either a policy or strategy on migration, Diaspora and development. Each of them had certain provisions for the Diaspora. The study also noted that Diaspora policies have generally received less attention over time than immigration policies. In addition, the scarcity of data on Diasporians was a major hindrance to effective policymaking on Diaspora engagement.

African countries have also instituted several Diaspora mobilisation programmes to foster mutually beneficial engagement with the Diaspora. In 2019, the Government of Nigeria established the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM) to facilitate and promote mutually beneficial developmental relations between the Diaspora and their homeland. Before this development, the government had already set aside the Nigerian Diaspora Day on the 25th of July every year as part of the broader effort of mobilising and actively promoting the participation of the Diaspora in national development activities and programmes (Kamei 2011). There have been knowledge transfer programmes in sectors such as education and health. For example, Ghana has had the Migration for Development in Africa programme (MIDA) in the health sector, which was created through joint efforts of the Ministry of Health and the International Organisation for Migration to promote knowledge transfer and to address the adverse effects of brain drain (Teye, Alhassan & Setrana 2017). In the Nigerian education sector, efforts were made to promote knowledge transfer between Nigerian experts and academics abroad and local Nigerian universities.

Experiences also show that in actualising the benefits of Diaspora engagement efforts, African countries have designed development programmes

and opened avenues for the participation of the Diaspora in the economic development of their homelands. In 2013, the Nigerian government launched the Diaspora National Development Strategy to encourage Diaspora investment in local long-term development projects (Ogen 2017). The government sold a USD 100 million Diaspora bond to mobilise financial resources to finance infrastructure development as part of that strategy. Between 2008 and 2017, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria issued Diaspora bonds to raise finances for infrastructure development in the energy, water and irrigation, and transport sectors (Rastomjee 2018).

Nigeria has had other initiatives meant to engage and harness the developmental potential of its Diaspora. Of course, other efforts did not necessarily originate with the government. Rather, it was purely an initiative of the Diaspora to mobilise compatriots and participate in national development back home. An example is the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organisation (NIDO) and the subsequent creation of the Nigeria Diaspora Investment Fund (NDIF) by the European Chapter of NIDO.

5 Critical Issues and Challenges in Diaspora Engagement

As with most development programmes, obtaining a comprehensive picture of Diaspora engagement policies' effectiveness, performance, or impact is extremely difficult (Vezzoli & Lacroix 2010). There are data availability constraints owing to the lack of commissioned research at the country level that gives a full picture of the situation in African countries. To an extent, it may be too soon to talk about or expect noteworthy results from African Diaspora engagement policies because many of them are relatively young to have generated any notable impact yet. The study by Schöfberger (2020) of the 15 West African states' policies on Diaspora showed that out of the 15 policies and strategies found in those countries, 13 were formulated between 2013 and 2020, with 10 of these coming between 2016 and 2020. The time factor becomes critical if one considers that engagement initiatives such as tapping into Diaspora savings for homeland investment are long-term, multi-year processes that further depend on political, economic and technical factors in a particular context (Rastomjee 2018).

The indicative successes of Diaspora engagement policies are quite limited despite significant figures of annual remittances to Africa over the years. Generally, the value of global remittances to sub-Saharan Africa has increased significantly in the past two decades, recording USD 4.8 billion in 2000, USD

20 billion in 2005, USD 32 billion in 2010, USD 42 billion in 2015, USD 48 billion in 2019, then dropping to USD 37 billion in 2020 due to Covid-19 pandemic-related drawbacks (Tittel-Mosser 2021; World Bank 2019). Research further shows that remittances to sub-Saharan Africa are still consumptive and meant to primarily support Diasporians' kith and kin back home (Kamau & Kimenyi 2013), yet internationally, remittances to other developing countries outside Africa are making significant contributions to economic development thanks to pragmatic development frameworks designed by the governments of those countries (Edeh *et al.* 2021). In addition, the objectives of some of the African Diaspora policies sometimes lack clarity on the intended form of development (Vezzoli & Lacroix 2010), which effectively complicates the channeling of received remittances towards programmatic activities for economic development.

The political environment has not helped matters concerning Diaspora engagement and its benefits. Political instability has marred prospects of Diaspora-driven local investments by raising the level of risk and, in the process, killing potential Diaspora participation in economic development initiatives. Manifestations of instability have ranged from civil wars and coups in West and Central Africa to troubled political spaces of the Horn of Africa (Mills & Norton 2002; Plaut 2013). Literature on African politics classifies some states as 'chronically unstable', 'failed', and 'ungovernable' (Wiarda 2004). Some African states have been described as 'parasitical, patrimonial, predatory, cronyist, prebendal, and anti-developmental' (Agbese & Kieh 2007). For obvious reasons, these descriptors are not consistent with the agenda of attracting foreign direct investment.

Tittel-Moser (2021) argues that challenges affecting Diaspora engagement policies also manifest in a lack of trust between Diaspora communities and their home governments, resulting in a lack of drive to positively respond to calls for investment in the homeland. Negative political perceptions of the political leadership of home governments normally work against investment inflows. Several African countries still have bureaucratic pathologies that often come married to corrupt practices, raising the cost of investing in such countries. Following the creation of multiple structures tasked with the Diaspora engagement agenda, there have been policy implementation problems emanating from difficulties associated with inter-agency cooperation where multiple ministries and other structures are involved in implementing Diaspora engagement policies. Joint implementation of policy is normally pro-

blematic because of coordination challenges (O'Toole 2003).

In most cases, African governments do not have adequate data about their Diasporas (Tittel-Mosser 2021), yet when Diaspora instruments and strategies are crafted, amounts of information are required about 'the size, locations, and economic and demographic characteristics of the migrated Diaspora, including migrant age, gender, skills level, intended destination, level of retained savings, financial assets and liability' (Rustomjee 2018:4). Lack of this information normally fails to adapt government programmes to Diaspora needs and circumstances (Tittel-Mosser 2021).

Diaspora engagement policies have also been affected by challenges related to developing e-government in Africa. Besides a few cases where significant investments were made in developing websites serving Diaspora communities, African countries have Diaspora webpages that are less accessible, less informative, and not advanced enough to enable smooth virtual interactions with Diasporeans. The 2020 United Nations E-Government Development Index shows that no African country reached the top 75. Of the bottom 25 countries with the lowest rankings on the global index, 21 were African.

6 Selected Cases of Diaspora Engagement in Asia and Latin America

Three case studies – China, India, and Mexico – have been selected in this chapter to serve as international success cases with Diaspora engagement policies. These three countries are among those that have leveraged their huge Diaspora populations in national economic development. The combined totals of Diaspora populations for the three countries triple that of the whole of Africa. Their success stories with Diaspora engagement in economic development are a direct result of huge Diaspora populations and astute policymaking underpinned by strategic management of Diaspora engagement processes (Dubey 2008). Recent data shows that China, India and Mexico were the top three countries in Diaspora remittances, with USD 79 billion, USD 67 billion and USD 36 billion, respectively (World Bank 2019). A study of the degree of adoption of emigrant policies in 14 Latin American and Caribbean countries showed Mexico recorded the highest score on the Emigrant Policy Index in 2017 (Palop-García & Petroza 2021). Available evidence on the three selected case studies further tells the story of countries that have capitalised on and are reaping the benefits of the migration-development trade-off. For instance,

India's sectoral approach to harnessing Diaspora investments has seen its IT industry grow from nothing in the 1970s to a USD 100 billion industry, thanks to the active participation of its Diaspora (Pande 2014). The three cases of China, India and Mexico are used in this chapter for analytical and demonstrative purposes as we attempt to deduce the constitutive elements of the countries' Diaspora engagement efforts. The tangible results of their Diaspora engagement efforts, as demonstrated by the value of their remittances, and the successes with various other socio-economic programmes further justify their selection in this study.

The Chinese Diaspora was created by the voluntary migration of citizens searching for jobs and economic opportunities and forced migration during tyrannical warlords in rural China (Venkateswaran 2007). Globally, China has the biggest Diaspora population, estimated to be around 60 million in 2014 (Liu & van Dongen 2016). China's long history of engaging its Diaspora goes back to the years of Yuan Shikai when laws, regulations and administrative machinery were established concerning Chinese overseas affairs (Guotu 2012). The urge to pursue engagement with citizens overseas may have been further spurred by the reported economic success of Chinese nationals overseas. The combined economic output of the Chinese overseas was estimated to be USD 400 billion in 1991 and rose to USD 600 billion by 1996 (Guotu 2012).

In India, the Diaspora evolved cumulatively through four historical phases of migration, beginning with the indentured labour migration of the colonial era, followed by the reconstruction period of the post-Second World War and the post-independence period. The third phase came during the oil boom period in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. Lastly, Indian migration has continued with the movement of knowledge workers (Kahali 2017). There are at least 25 million Indians who are resident in 110 countries. There was a realisation of the economic development potential of the Indian communities abroad, and the government prepared a collection of directives and initiatives meant to guide Diaspora engagement (Sahai 2013). Diaspora engagement efforts have a long history dating back to the early 1980s when practical engagement between the Indian government and Indian citizens outside the country started. The Emigration Act was enacted in 1983, resulting in the establishment of the Protector General of Indians. During the Indira Gandhi regime, foreign exchange shortages led to the formulation of a 'remittance-centric policy' and increased dependence on Diaspora remittances (Sharma 2009).

In the Mexican context, poverty is one major factor that fueled the mi-

gration of citizens into at least 30 countries in the world, but into the United States, where more than 30 million are currently domiciled. With that population, the United States automatically accounts for at least 97% of Mexican emigrants globally (Israel & Batalova 2020). It has prompted the Mexican government to place special focus on immigrants in the USA, resulting in the development of close ties between Mexico and the USA through special bilateral arrangements, agreements, joint operations, and even adjustments to foreign policy and immigration laws by Mexico. Mexico is regarded as one of the countries particularly active in building relationships with its Diaspora communities. However, that comes with a particular bias towards the US-based Diaspora (Bravo & de Moya 2018; Palop-García & Petroza 2021).

6.1 Dimensions of Diaspora Engagement in China, India, and Mexico

6.1.1 Political Dimension

Political actions involve governmental initiatives in the form of policies, regulations, and laws in areas such as citizenship, Diaspora, investment, trade, migration, and foreign relations. China established a policy on Chinese overseas affairs as far back as 1927. Numerous laws and regulations were also passed to cover areas such as migration, investment, Chinese labour, education, and Chinese voluntary organisations. The government also removed restrictions on the emigration of Chinese nationals. India also launched the Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) in 1999 to cater for descendants of Indian migrants. The card came with the benefit of a 20-year visa for a small fee, and holders could access economic, educational, and financial facilities using it (Tiwari 2013). India liberalised money transfers back in 2000 to facilitate global remittances, removing obstacles and creating smooth channels for transmitting money into the country. Another significant political development has been granting dual citizenship to Diaspora communities in India and Mexico. India granted dual citizenship to the Indian Diaspora in the category of Overseas Citizens of India (OCI). Mexico also granted its Diaspora communities electoral rights, allowing them to vote while in foreign countries. Mexico further made arrangements and put in place mechanisms to defend the rights of its citizens in the US.

Multiple strategies and tactics involving state and non-state actors in building relationships with the Diaspora community have been used (Bravo & de Moya 2018). The Mexican government demonstrated strategic sensitivity to,

and astuteness in portraying its Diaspora as a hardworking group of Mexicans abroad which had attained the position of ‘strategic partners’ of the state, ‘business partners’, ‘agents of development’, and ‘agents of change’ (Bravo & de Moya 2018). Pakistan a similar approach and portrayed the identity of its diasporic population as ‘a prized instrument’, ‘strategic asset’, and ‘agent of development’ (Qaisrani 2020). Mexico further applies traditional and digital public diplomacy in engaging its Diaspora. The latter involves interaction with citizens abroad using social media and other digital interactive platforms.

Following the emergence of the United States as the most popular destination for emigrating Mexicans, the Mexican government adjusted its foreign policy towards the US. It instituted mechanisms to improve bilateral relations and deepen cooperation (Délano 2011). This step has seen the creation of binational commissions such as the Working Group Regarding Migration and Consular Affairs and the signing of Safe and Orderly Repatriation Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding with the United States.

6.1.2 Economic Dimension

Cases of China, India and Mexico also drive their Diaspora engagement through economic initiatives, mostly meant to boost remittances, increase foreign direct investment and spur economic development. China realised the potential to leverage the huge financial capacity of the Chinese Diaspora and went on to establish four special economic zones in the traditional emigration areas. 39.1% of USD 5.22 billion invested in special economic zones between 1979 and 1987, came from Chinese nationals abroad (Guotu 2012). China prepared special rules and offered preferential treatment to foreign direct investment from Chinese nationals overseas –the preferential treatment applied to the taxation of investments and land rentals. There were also sector-specific special benefits. India also took a sectoral approach, as it sought to develop the area of science and technology. It leveraged the talent of Indian scientists in the Diaspora in developing local IT technologies with tremendous success (Pande 2014).

A critical development in Diaspora engagement is the effort to establish the size of the Diaspora and data banks containing citizens’ information in the Diaspora. Mexico and India developed databases with information on their experts, professionals, and state and non-state organisations operating in the Diaspora. Mexico created the Mexican Researchers Abroad Catalogue. India appointed a high-level committee on Indian affairs in 2001, tasked with map-

ping the Indian Diaspora and noting their expectations and prospective areas of engagement (Sahai 2013). Its role extended to establishing the Diaspora's preferred policy options mutually beneficial to them and their home government. Database development in India led to a knowledge network involving resident citizens and highly skilled professionals in the Diaspora. Those in the knowledge network formed sectoral clusters based on areas of specialisation and expertise (Sharma 2009). In addition to creating Diaspora databases, the Mexican government communicates and shares information with its Diaspora communities. It effectively uses all available channels to provide information to the Mexican Diaspora community regarding government policies and programmes supporting Diaspora communities. It also provides information on how citizens abroad can vote, how to send remittances home, and how diasporians can invest in Mexico (Bravo & de Moya 2018).

6.1.3 Socio-Cultural Dimension

Countries like China and India have capitalised on their homogeneous religious and cultural traditions as rallying points for mobilising citizens abroad. China indigenised international broadcasting to help publicise Chinese culture – creating and promoting a global Chinese identity (Ding 2015). India created symbolic cultural activities and Diaspora awards given at special cultural events. The government further designated certain days for cultural commemorations. Nevertheless, besides the cultural focus of the commemorations, the events are equally meant to bring together business people, entrepreneurs, and the generality of Indians to an interactive forum where economic development issues can be shared. In addition, cultural programmes such as *Tracing the Roots* and *Know Your India* are created under the Ministry of Indian Overseas Affairs to enhance socio-cultural links between the country and its diasporic population.

6.1.4 Administrative Dimension

Diaspora engagement also benefits immensely from state and non-state institutions implementing Diaspora policies by creating networks of citizens abroad and providing critical information on homelands. China created several administrative structures for handling Diaspora affairs. Examples include the Chinese central and local governments established the Overseas Affairs Chinese Bureau, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, State Council for Overseas Chinese Affairs,

Overseas Affairs Chinese Committee, All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, China Overseas Exchange Association (Liu & van Dongen 2016). The government of Mexico created the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, not just as a link with the Diaspora but also as a structure to help diasporians organise themselves (Délano 2011). Other important structures have included the National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad under the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and the Beta Groups for the Protection of Migrants created by the Mexican National Migration Institute.

India created the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs as an administrative structure to oversee the protection of the Indian Diaspora, promote Diaspora engagement and enhance the development impact of the Indian Diaspora. The Indian government also relies on a series of organisations created to assist the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs with Diaspora engagement. These include the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre, Indian Development Foundation of Overseas Indians, Indian Council of Overseas Employment, Global Indian Network of Knowledge, Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council, and Overseas Indian Centres (Vezzoli & Lacroix 2010).

Table 1: Summary of Key Policy Initiatives in the Selected Country Cases

Dimensions of Diaspora engagement initiatives	Specific policy actions		
	China	India	Mexico
<i>Political Dimension</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diaspora policy • Public diplomacy • Reformation of immigration laws 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comprehensive Diaspora policy/ Emigration Act • Dual citizenship • PIO card scheme • Voting rights • Return migration policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suffrage • Protection of Diaspora rights • Traditional and digital public diplomacy • Review of foreign policy towards <u>USA</u> • Strategic framing of Diaspora identities • Emigration support • Return migration policies

Economic Dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Remittance attraction programmes</u>• Special economic zones• <u>Knowledge transfer programmes</u>• <u>Diaspora tax incentives</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Remittance attraction programmes</u>• <u>Liberalisation of money transfer</u>• <u>Diaspora tax incentives</u>• <u>Issuance of Diaspora bonds</u>• <u>Strategic databases of diasporians, programmes, investment opportunities</u>• <u>Knowledge transfer programmes</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Remittance attraction programmes</u>• <u>Investment programmes</u>• <u>Strategic databases of diasporians, programmes, and investment opportunities</u>• <u>Multiple communication platforms and information sharing</u>
Socio-Cultural Dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Programmes promoting global Chinese identity</u>• <u>Diaspora networks & partnerships</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Cultural commemorations and Diaspora awards</u>• <u>Cultural programmes</u>• <u>Diaspora networks & partnerships</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Diaspora networks & partnerships</u>• <u>Social services for emigrants</u>• <u>Cultural events</u>• <u>Transnational sports tournaments</u>
Administrative Dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Dedicated state institutions for Diaspora affairs</u>• <u>Municipal offices for Diaspora affairs</u>• <u>Networks of Chinese Diaspora organisations</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Dedicated ministry of overseas affairs</u>• <u>Consulate Diaspora offices</u>• <u>Committee on overseas affairs</u>• <u>Networks of non-state organisational structures</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Consulate Diaspora offices</u>• <u>Sub-ministry level Diaspora offices</u>• <u>State-level offices for expatriate affairs</u>• <u>Quasi-government Diaspora institutions</u>• <u>Networks of non-state Diaspora organisations</u>

Source: Author’s compilation

7 Description of Findings and Conclusion

Informed by the review of selected country cases, the chapter concludes that at the heart of the Diaspora engagement agenda in sub-Saharan Africa is the question of policy capacity, which broadly encompasses the government's ability to scan the environment, set strategic directions, make intelligent choices, assess implications of policy options, and properly use knowledge to design effective policies (Wu, Ramesh & Howlett 2015). Policy capacity is further underpinned by competencies (analytical, operational and political skills) and capabilities (resources critical in supporting policy implementation). Of these two, Africa is glaringly found wanting on the latter, where countries are not only falling short in designing effective Diaspora policies but are also failing to adequately provide resource support for the effective implementation of the same policies. Efforts made so far show progress in creating state administrative structures, which have been complemented by Diaspora-based non-state organisations and networks of citizens abroad in driving the Diaspora engagement agenda.

Africa is not necessarily short of Diaspora policies, programmes and engagement initiatives. What is worrying, however, is the performance and impact these are having on the target population. Efforts have been let down by limited investments in developing ICT and e-government infrastructure to enable virtual engagement with Diaspora through website interactions, social media, and other avenues. Also, policy initiatives are unilateral and non-inclusive. However, international practice indicates the need for mobilising Diasporas and meeting them to exchange ideas and learn their preferences regarding investments and possible socio-economic programmes. Some countries have yet to address trust issues fully, and in some cases, even government legitimacy issues. The enduring trust and legitimacy issues explain Diaspora's unresponsiveness to calls for investment in the homeland. Normally, trust and legitimacy issues carry perceptions of political risk and weigh down investment prospects badly.

From the reviewed international cases, Diaspora engagement is approached from multiple angles, with well-coordinated actions pursued within a clearly defined framework of objectives, goals and national developmental programmes. In all the cases and several others from the same regions, there is a specific emphasis on the 'migration for development' agenda. Engagement efforts are strategically taken from the policy level to investment programmes targeting the Diaspora communities. However, the available literature shows

that few countries have a comprehensive, dedicated Diaspora policy despite clear, demonstrable efforts to practically engage citizens overseas. In cases where a comprehensive policy is not there, what is normally found is an array of initiatives that inform and guide state action in pursuing Diaspora engagement.

Diaspora engagement efforts in the cases of China, India and Mexico effortlessly demonstrate that numbers matter. With a combined population of over 100 million Diasporeans, the potential financial and economic returns are hard to resist for these countries. The size of the Diaspora determines how far a country may go in committing to the Diaspora agenda. Establishing the size has normally been followed by collecting personal details of members of the Diaspora community, resulting in the eventual creation of Diaspora databases, mostly for the highly skilled professionals who ordinarily do not only have the potential to invest back home but can also participate in the processes of skills transfer, technology transfer, and brain circulation. It is one aspect that many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are yet to fully implement, mostly owing to resource challenges. Documenting individual details of all experts and skilled professionals abroad enables sending states to determine what can be estimated or expected from a particular group of diasporas regarding remittances and investments. The Mexican digital atlas of highly skilled Mexicans abroad is evidence of the advancement that can be reached in creating Diaspora databases.

Progress in engagement efforts also hinges on the nature of state-Diaspora relations and interactions. The thriving of the state-Diaspora relationship is dependent on many factors. For a start, the Diaspora perception of political leadership in the homeland and issues of trust and legitimacy are critical in securing citizens' goodwill and political support abroad. As China seriously considered enlisting its Diaspora population in national development, it had to institute legal and political reforms to project an accommodative stance towards the Diaspora, who were once sidelined at the political level. Reforms under Jinping have helped create bridges between the government and Diaspora and, in the process, opened the platform for reaching out to citizens overseas to establish their expectations and potential participation in building the Chinese economy. Once a platform for exchange is created, governments strategise and decide on the best medium for reaching out and the content of messages sent to diasporeans. At this point, the Mexican strategic framing of Diaspora identities served to project a positive government perception of its

citizens abroad. It works hand in hand with packaging messages from the government to the Diaspora. Content that appeals to ideals of patriotism, belonging and ‘attachment to the homeland’ drives the engagement narrative. Reviewed cases and others in Asia show that many countries have exploited religious and cultural attachments to revive oneness and unity with Diaspora communities. Global experiences further reveal that creating a favourable political and socio-economic environment for the Diaspora communities is one of the most important tasks for governments, and it touches on reducing or eliminating political and other risks to inspire faith in the security of investments in the home environment.

References

- Adisa, J. 2017. The African Union Perspective on the Diaspora. In Mangala, J. (ed.): *Africa and its Global Diaspora: The Policy and Politics of Global Emigration*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50053-9_2
- African Union 2003. *Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union*. Addis Ababa: African Union. Available at:
<https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-constitutive-act-african-union> (Accessed on 18 June 2023).
- African Union 2005. *Report of the Meeting of Experts from Member States on the Definition of the African Diaspora*, 11 - 12 April, Addis Ababa. Available at: <https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/4391?locale-attribute=en> (Accessed on 18 June 2023).
- African Union 2006. *African Common Position on Migration and Development*. Addis Ababa: African Union. Available at:
<https://www.unhcr.org/4d5257e09.pdf> (Accessed on 18 June 2023).
- African Union 2019. *Diaspora Engagement Self-Assessment*. African Union: Addis Ababa. Available at:
<https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/2019%20Diaspora%20Engagement%20Self%20Assessment%20Report%20ENG.pdf> (Accessed on 18 June 2023).
- Agbese, P.O. & G.K. Kieh Jr. (eds.). 2007. *Reconstituting the State in Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230606944>
- Anthias, F. 1998. Evaluating ‘Diaspora’: Beyond Ethnicity? *Sociology* 32, 3:557 - 580. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0038038598000091>

- Beyene, H.G. 2015. Are African Diasporas Development Partners, Peace-Makers or Spoilers? The Case of Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria. *Diaspora Studies* 8, 2:145 – 161.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09739572.2015.1029714>
- Bolaji, M.H.A. 2015. The African Union's Call for Global Pan-Africanism and the Ghana-Diaspora Relations in the 21st Century. *Journal of Black Studies* 46, 1:62 - 101. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021934714557329>
- Bravo, V. & M. de Moya 2018. Mexico's Public Diplomacy Efforts to Engage Its Diaspora Across the Border: Case Study of the Programs, Messages and Strategies Employed by the Mexican Embassy in The United States. *Rising Powers Quarterly* 3, 3:173 - 193.
- Brubaker, R. 2005. The 'Diaspora' Diaspora. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, 1:1 - 19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000289997>
- Délano, A. 2011. *Mexico and Its Diaspora in the United States: Policies of Emigration since 1848*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511894848>
- Ding, S. 2015. Engaging Diaspora Via Charm Offensive and Indigenized Communication: An Analysis of China's Diaspora Engagement Policies in the Xi Era. *Politics* 35, 3-4:230 - 244.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12087>
- Dubey, M. 2008. Changing Salience of the Relationship between the Indian Diaspora and India. *Diaspora Studies* 1, 2: 73 - 84.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09739572.2008.10597323>
- Edeh, E.C., A. Osidipe, M. Mitchell, O. Ehizuelen & C.C. Zhao 2021. Bolstering African Strategy for Sustainable Development and Its Diaspora's Influence on African Development Renaissance. *Migration and Development*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2020.1855737>
- Faist, T. & M. Fauser 2011. The Migration – Development Nexus: Toward a Transnational Perspective. In Faist, T., M. Fauser & P. Kivisto (eds.). *The Migration – Development Nexus: A Transnational Perspective*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230305694>
PMCID:PMC3250941
- Fargues, P. & M. Rango (eds.). 2020. *Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean*. Geneva: IOM.
- Gnimassoun, B. & J.C. Anyanwu 2019. *The Diaspora and Economic Development in Africa*. Working Paper Series, No. 308. Abidjan: African Development Bank.

- Gamlen, A. 2006. *Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are They, and What Kind of States Use Them?* COMPAS Working Paper No. 32. Available at: https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2006/wp-2006-032-gamlen_diaspora_engagement_policies/ (Accessed on 18 June 2023).
- Gamlen, A. 2008a. The Emigration State and the Modern Geographical Imagination. *Political Geography* 27:840 – 856. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.10.004>
- Gamlen, A. 2008b. *Why Engage Diasporas?* WP-08-63, COMPAS Working Paper Series. Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford. https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP-2008-063-Gamlen_Why_Engage_Diasporas.pdf
- Grossman, J. 2019. Toward a Definition of Diaspora. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 42, 8:1263 – 1282. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2018.1550261>
- Guotu, Z. 2012. China's Policies on Chinese Overseas: Past and Present. In Chee-Beng, T. (ed.): *Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora*. London: Routledge.
- Hanafi, L. & D. Hites 2017. Morocco and Diaspora Engagement: A Contemporary Portrait. In Mangala, J. (ed.): *Africa and its Global Diaspora: The Policy and Politics of Global Emigration*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50053-9_3
- Ikome, F.N. 2009. *The Challenges of Diaspora Representation in The African Union's ECOSOC Assembly*. Policy Brief 55. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies.
- Israel, E. & J. Batalova 2020. Mexican Immigrants in the United States. Available at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-immigrants-united-states-2019>. (Accessed on 28 December 2021).
- Kahali, A. 2017. Diaspora Engagement: Need for a Paradigm Shift – Indian Perspective. *Diaspora Studies* 10, 1:1 - 24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09739572.2016.1239432>
- Kamau, A.W. & M.S. Kimenyi 2013. More than Just Sending Money Home: Engaging the Diaspora as a Priority for Africa's Development. Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2013. *The Brookings Institution/ Africa Growth Initiative*. Available at: www.brookings.edu/foresight-africa (Accessed on 21 December 2021).
- Kamei, S. 2011. Diaspora as the Sixth Region of Africa: An Assessment of the African Union Initiative, 2002 - 2010. *Diaspora Studies* 4, 1: 59 - 76. <https://doi.org/10.1163/09763457-00401004>

- Kassegn, A. 2021. COVID-19: The Impacts of the Global Crises on African Remittances and Countries' Response to This: An Extreme Crisis. *Cogent Economics & Finance* 9,1.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1948665>
- Ketkar, S.L. & D. Rathar 2011. Diaspora Bonds: Tapping the Diaspora during Difficult Times. In Plaza, S. & D. Ratha (eds.). *Diaspora for Development in Africa*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
<https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793993310000147>
- Lavenex, S. & R. Kunz 2008. The Migration – Development Nexus in EU External Relations. *European Integration* 30, 3:439 - 457.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330802142152>
- Liu, H. & E. van Dongen 2016. China's Diaspora Policies as a New Mode of Transnational Governance. *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, 102:805 – 821. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1184894>
- Mangala, J. 2017. Engaging Diasporas in Development: Contours and Outcomes of International Policymaking. In Mangala, J. (ed.): *Africa and its Global Diaspora: The Policy and Politics of Global Emigration*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50053-9_1
- Mills, K. & R.J. Norton 2002. Refugees and Security in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. *Civil Wars* 5, 1: 1 - 26.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240208402493>
- Mohamoud, A. & S. Osman 2008. The African Diaspora as Agents of Peace on the Continent. Available at: <https://library.au.int/african-diaspora-agents-peace-continent-3> (Accessed on 21 December 2021).
- Muzondidya, J. 2011. The Zimbabwean Diaspora: Opportunities and Challenges for Engagement in Zimbabwe's Political Development and Economic Transformation. In Murithi, T. & A. Mawadza (eds.). *Zimbabwe in Transition: A View from Within*. Johannesburg: Jacana.
- Nilsson, K. 2011. *Ties that Bind: A Study of Diaspora Engagement Policies in Ghana*. Unpublished MA dissertation. Lund University.
- Ogen, O. 2017. Nigeria: Diaspora Engagement Policies in National Context. In Mangala, J. (ed.): *Africa and its Global Diaspora: The Policy and Politics of Global Emigration*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50053-9_5
- Okpewho, I. & N. Nzegwu 2009. *The New African Diaspora*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

- O'Toole, L.J. 2003. Interorganisational Relations in Implementation. In Peters, B.G. & J. Pierre (eds.): *Handbook of Public Administration*. London: Sage.
- Palop-García, P. & L. Petroza 2021. Do Diaspora Engagement Policies Endure? An Update of the Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) to 2017. *Global Policy* 12, 3:361 - 371. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12937>
- Pande, A. 2014. The Role of Indian Diaspora in the Development of the Indian IT Industry. *Diaspora Studies* 7, 2: 121 - 129. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09739572.2014.911446>
- Plaut, M. 2013. Briefing: How Unstable is the Horn of Africa? *Review of African Political Economy* 40,136: 321 - 330. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2013.797760>
- Qaisrani, A.A. 2020. Reaching Out, Inviting In: Pakistan's Approach to Diaspora Engagement. *Migration and Development* 11,3: 501 - 520. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2020.1797457>
- Qstergaards-Nielsen, E. 2003. *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230512429_10
- Rastomjee, C. 2018. *Issues and Challenges in Mobilising African Diaspora Investment*. Policy Brief No. 130. Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation.
- Schöffberger, I. 2020. Diaspora and Development Policies in the Economic Community of West African States. In Fargues, P. & M. Rango (eds.): *Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean*. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.
- Sendhardt, B. 2021. The Paradoxical Nature of Diaspora Engagement Policies: A World Polity Perspective on The Karta Polaka. *Ethnopolitics* 20, 1:25 – 38. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2020.1808322>
- Sengupta, C. 2001. Conceptualising Globalisation: Issues and Implications. *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, 33:18 - 24.
- Sharma, J.C. 2009. Diaspora Policy of NDA (National Democratic Alliance) Government of India. *Diaspora Policy* 2, 2:171 - 185. <https://doi.org/10.1163/09763457-00202004>
- Sinatti, G. & C. Horst 2015. Migrants as Agents of Development: Diaspora Engagement Discourse and Practice in Europe. *Ethnicities* 15, 1:134 - 152. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796814530120>

- Sørensen, N.N., N. van Hear & P. Engberg Pedersen 2002. The Migration – Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options. *International Migration* 40, 5:49 - 71. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00211>
- Teye, J.K., O. Alhassan & M.B. Setrana 2017. Evolution and Nature of Diaspora Engagement Policies in Ghana. In Mangala, J. (ed.): *Africa and its Global Diaspora: The Policy and Politics of Global Emigration*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50053-9_6
- Tittel-Moser, F. 2021. Diaspora Engagement: Africa. *Regional Series. EUDiF*. Available at: https://www.icmpd.org/content/download/52572/file/EUDiF_Regional%20Overview_Africa%20%28v.3%29.pdf (Accessed on 18 June 2023).
- Tiwari, S. 2013. Diaspora Engagement Policy in South Asia. In Yong, T.T. & M.M. Rahman (eds.): *Diaspora Engagement and Development in South Asia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137334459_12
- Tölölyan, K. 1996. Rethinking *Diaspora(s)*: Stateless Power in The Transnational Moment. *Diaspora* 5, 1:3-36. <https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1996.0000>
<https://doi.org/10.3138/diaspora.5.1.3>
<https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1991.0008>
- Venkateswaran, A.P. 2007. The Diaspora of India and China: An Indian Perspective. *Diaspora Studies* 1, 1:77 - 88. <https://doi.org/10.1163/09763457-00101005>
- Vezzoli, S. & T. Lacroix 2010. *Building Bonds for Migration and Development: Diaspora Engagement Policies of Ghana, India and Serbia*. International Migration Institute, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).
- Wiarda, H.J. 2004. *Political Development in Emerging Nations: Is there Still a Third World*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- World Bank 2019. Record High Remittances Sent Globally in 2018. Washington Press Release. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/08/record-high-remittances-sent-globally-in-2018> (Accessed on 10 December 2021).
- World Migration Report 2020. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration. Available at: https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr_2020.pdf (Accessed on 14 December 2021).

Wu, X., M. Howlett & M. Ramesh 2015. Policy Capacity: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Policy Competences and Capabilities. *Policy and Society* 34: 165 - 171.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.09.001>

Dr. Hardlife Zvoushe

Lecturer

Department of Governance and Public Management

University of Zimbabwe

zvousheh@sociol.uz.ac.zw

CHAPTER 3

Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Africa

Katie Mutula

(Posthumous)

Vanessa Tang

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0009-0003-9109-9316>

Abstract

This chapter is based on a PhD thesis by Katie Musungu Mutula, who passed on in early March 2021. The research, which Dr Tang was supervising, explores the pecking order theory and the importance of multiple determinants in the capital structure decisions of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Africa, using a panel data analysis of 2126 firms from 2007-2018. The results suggest that SMEs follow a pecking order model. Age, size, profitability, firm growth, access to finance and internal assets all play an important role in determining SME's capital structure. Moreover, evidence suggests that financial variables, particularly profitability and access to finance, are crucial since they have the largest impact on the capital structure of SMEs.

Keywords: pecking order, capital structure, trade-off, SMEs

1 Introduction

Since the seminal papers of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majiluf (1984), capital structure theories have dominated the corporate finance literature. These studies have focussed on how firms make financing decisions

relative to their debt and equity mix. In particular, the pecking order and trade-off theories of capital structure have been the most reviewed. They are seen to be the two competing theories of capital structure within the literature. The premise of the pecking order theory is that firms will follow a hierarchy when deciding how to finance their operations by prioritising internal funding before considering external debt and, lastly, equity.

On the contrary, the trade-off theory postulates that a firm will aim to achieve an optimal debt target, which balances the costs against the benefits of obtaining debt instead of equity, to maximise the firm's value. For the majority of studies (Adair & Adaskou 2015; Shyam-Sunder & Myers 1999; Tong & Green 2005), evaluating the capital structure decisions of firms has involved testing the validity of both pecking order and trade-off theories to establish which one performs best in explaining corporate financing decisions. Mixed results have ensued, with some studies finding evidence of the pecking order theory (Bhama *et al.* 2016) and others finding evidence for the trade-off theory (Abel 2018). Still, other studies have not found conclusive evidence pointing to either of the theories informing the capital structure decisions of firms (Frank & Goyal 2007b; Adair & Adaskou 2015). However, many studies have supported the pecking order theory concerning the capital structure of SMEs (Cassar & Holmes 2003; López-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira 2008; Matias & Serrasqueiro 2017).

In general, decisions that inform the capital structure of firms are arguably the most important to any corporation, as they communicate how a firm is likely to maximise its market value and may also impact its cost of capital. In the case of SMEs, the significance of the decisions on capital structure is heightened due to the challenges that SMEs face relative to large firms that would result in bankruptcy should there be a failure to honour debt obligations (Honjo & Harada 2006).

In addition, because SMEs find it difficult to access finance, their financing strategies would be vital in determining how they maximise their value and performance and minimise their cost of capital due to the debt-to-equity option they choose.

The rationale for studying the capital structure decisions of SMEs has grown exponentially in recent times, especially since access to finance remains a major obstacle in the development of SMEs in general and especially in Africa.

SMEs are engines of economic growth known for their instrumental

role in developing national economies through employment creation, income generation and innovation. On average, SMEs account for 95% of all firms within the business sector in developing and developed countries (WTO 2016). In the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, SMEs account for about 70% of employment, whereas in emerging economies, SMEs contribute about 45% to employment (OECD 2017). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the contribution to employment by SMEs is about 80% (World Economic Forum 2015). Despite the widespread agreement regarding SMEs' contribution to economic development, there is a lack of consensus on how SMEs are defined across various countries and regions. The absence of a universal definition presents a problem in classifying firms irrespective of region or development status. In general, the term SME may refer to companies that do not constitute large corporations or, more specifically, to small and medium-sized ventures. In some instances, the term SME may also include micro-enterprises, which are considered smaller than other SMEs in size, for example, by having less than ten employees (European Commission 2016).

The number of employees, annual sales, total assets and total capital of a firm are different criteria used in determining how SMEs may be defined and tend to vary from country to country (Akinyemi & Adejumo 2017). These criteria indicate firm size and are useful in classifying firms into micro, small or medium enterprises for an operational definition. However, the number of employees is used widely as an indicator of firm size compared to other criteria (Inan & Bititci 2015). The term SME may hold various meanings under different contexts depending on the criteria used and the threshold for each criterion. For example, using the number of employees as an indicator, SMEs in the United States generally comprise firms with less than 500 employees (Rothwell & Zegveld 1982). In OECD countries, firms with 20 to 99 employees are classified as small and those with 100 to 500 employees as medium enterprises (OECD 2017).

On the contrary, in developing countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa, SMEs may be defined as firms comprising one to 100 employees (Muriithi 2017). According to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), small firms consist of five to 19 employees, medium firms consist of 20 to 99 employees, and large-sized firms consist of 100 or more employees (World Bank Enterprise Surveys 2020). For purposes of a working definition, this chapter will follow the WBES criteria in defining an SME. Therefore, an SME will be defined as a firm of five to 99 employees.

From their inception, SMEs experience many entrepreneurial challenges that disadvantage them compared to large firms. Restricted access to finance, inadequate managerial capabilities, lack of absorptive capacity for technology diffusion, limited access to highly skilled labour and the ability to sustain it, difficulty in acquiring government support, stiff competition, high transaction costs due to information asymmetry and a high-risk profile which tends to subject them to bankruptcy during financial distress, are some of the many problems that SMEs face in the various stages of their development (Elseoud *et al.* 2019; Akinyemi & Adejumo 2017; Crick *et al.* 2018; Ardic *et al.* 2012). In addition, SMEs find it cumbersome to access foreign markets, identify international business opportunities and cope with progressively complex and dynamic international business practices and standards (Paul *et al.* 2017; Kuzmisin & Kuzmisinova 2016; Stainbank & Tafuh 2011).

Although SMEs generally experience various issues throughout their growth, the severity, length, and probability of the challenges experienced differ from country to country. SMEs in developing countries are more likely to face poor infrastructure, lack of managerial capabilities, inadequate and unfavourable government support, poor electricity supply, increased competition, high interest rates, high inflation rates, corruption and low patronage compared to their counterparts in developed nations and emerging markets (Ocloo *et al.* 2014; Cant & Wiid 2013; Muriithi 2017; Wang 2016). On the contrary, SMEs in developed and emerging countries may tend to experience problems relating particularly to their exports, for example, limited knowledge of foreign markets, barriers in language and culture, tariffs and non-tariff measures and limited funding for their exports (Matlay *et al.* 2006; Mah 2018). However, a universal problem experienced by SMEs and more likely so in African countries, is inadequate access to finance. Based on the underlying assumptions of both pecking order and trade-off theories, SMEs are largely challenged by access to finance due to information asymmetries and high agency costs that accrue mainly to small firms. According to López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008), the constraint of accessing finance renders SMEs more likely to depend on internal funds and less on debt when making their financing decisions. It raises the possibility that SMEs' behaviour in capital structure decisions may be attributed to their limitations in acquiring finance.

SMEs are essential to the growth and development of economies. In this chapter, the authors explore the possible link between finance and SME development by examining the behaviour of SMEs in capital structure

decisions. Thus, the main objective of this chapter is to test the pecking order theory in the field of SMEs, considering the importance of multiple determinants in the capital structure decisions of SMEs in Africa using a panel data analysis of 2126 firms from 2007 to 2018.

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the pecking order theory and reviews the empirical evidence. Section 3 sets out the conceptual framework of this chapter. The model to be tested and the methodology are presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes the empirical results. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6.

2 The Pecking Order Theory: Theoretical Base and Empirical Evidence

2.1 Theoretical Base

The pecking order theory of capital structure suggests that corporate managers will follow a hierarchy when choosing an optimal funding source for financing their projects, where they will opt for the cheapest alternative before considering other alternatives in cases where it is necessary. In this case, firm managers will first opt for retained earnings with the lowest level of risk for their financing needs. They will consider issuing debt and hybrid securities before issuing equity, which is considered the highest risk. The seminal work of Myers (1984), followed by Myers and Majluf (1984), which publicised the pecking order hypothesis of capital structure, illustrates the pecking order behaviour of firms concerning capital structure as occurring due to adverse selection problems of asymmetric information between firm managers and investors. Firm managers have more information regarding the firm's value and investment opportunities than investors do and will act to maximise the intrinsic value of the shares of existing shareholders if there is a need to raise funds for a valuable investment opportunity.

Consequently, the information asymmetry between managers and investors will result in a cost to the firm, described as the underinvestment problem by Myers (1984). The underinvestment problem occurs when managers choose to forgo a positive investment opportunity to maximise the share value of existing shareholders rather than issue out undervalued shares, which will benefit new shareholders. The underinvestment problem is therefore avoided if sufficient internally generated funds to fund investment opportunities exist.

The cost associated with the adverse selection lies in the likelihood that the firm manager will choose not to issue shares and, in turn, forgo a beneficial investment opportunity rather than sell shares at a value that is below their true value. Therefore, if a firm can raise and retain sufficient funds internally to cover the investment opportunity costs, the costs associated with the adverse selection can be avoided. Moreover, if securities must be issued to finance an investment opportunity, the advantage of issuing debt over equity is that investors will perceive large levels of debt as an indication of higher quality of firm shares because firms issuing out large levels of debt have lower marginal expected bankruptcy costs than firms that issue large levels of equity (Ross 1977).

In addition to the costs of adverse selection, taxation and transaction costs also influence how firms make decisions concerning their capital structures according to the pecking order hypothesis. According to Baskin (1989), holding the amount of debt and investment constant, increasing equity shares will necessarily give rise to higher dividend pay-outs, resulting in high taxes. In addition to taxes, transaction costs of issuing new equity tend to attract commissions equivalent to up to 50% of the actual funds raised from issuing equity, making costs related to issuing equity much higher than those accrued for debt.

Concerning the capital structure of SMEs, the theoretical considerations of information asymmetries and agency costs are of particular importance (Mateev & Ivanov 2011). Bharath *et al.* (2008) suggest that for the pecking order theory of capital structure to be economically and statistically underpinned, the assumption of adverse selection, which arises from information asymmetry between managers and investors or shareholders and investors, should be made. Moreover, Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) point out that small firms are more likely to follow a pecking order when faced with various financing options, as they borrow per their investment requirements and not so much to achieve an optimal debt-to-equity target as suggested by the opposing trade-off theory. On the contrary, Hogan *et al.* (2017) postulate that a theory - practice gap exists when examining the capital structure of small high-technology firms, where the assumption of information asymmetry that should drive firms to prefer debt over equity fails to hold. In this case, small high-technology firms rely more on external equity than debt as a funding option. Hogan *et al.* (2017) argue that if the owners' perception of information asymmetries widens for this particular set of SMEs, the larger will be the expected use of external equity for the firm.

2.2 Empirical Evidence

Various authors have tested the empirical implications of the pecking order theory with mixed results. In a panel survey of British SMEs, Watson and Wilson (2002) found evidence supporting the pecking order hypothesis. The authors found that the predictions of the pecking order model are quite strong and especially evident amongst SMEs that have shared interests between shareholders and managers. They also found the likelihood of a pecking order within different debt types.

Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) examined how firms finance their flow of funds deficits. The former authors found evidence to support the pecking order theory, and the latter found evidence of a target debt ratio.

On the other hand, Frank and Goyal (2007b) found no evidence to illustrate the strength of either the pecking order theory or the trade-off theory in exclusively accounting for all ‘stylised facts’ depicted in both models. Adair and Adaskou (2015) also review the relationship between capital structure determinants and capital structure decisions of 2370 French SMEs by testing the pecking order and trade-off theories. Their findings, like Frank and Goyal (2007), show inconclusive evidence in support of either theory, especially where the size and age of the firm are concerned. However, regarding profitability and growth opportunities offered to SMEs, evidence was found in support of the pecking order theory.

Cassar and Holmes (2003) and López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira’s (2008) studies also test the pecking order theory. Both found that the pecking order hypothesis can explain the capital structure of SMEs, with size, age, asset structure, profitability and growth opportunities being statistically significant as key factors of capital structure. However, Cassar and Holmes (2003) found the size to have a weak influence over SMEs’ capital structure.

Further López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008), using panel analysis, tested both the trade-off and pecking order theories on a large sample of Spanish SME firms over ten years. They found that both theories help explain the capital structure behaviour of SMEs to an extent. Their results point to firms following a definite pecking order in their financing strategies. However, evidence shows that firms that set a debt ratio target are accorded more trust, even if the period taken to achieve the target may be prolonged. In addition, López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) found that although SMEs do follow a pecking order in determining their level of debt, those that aim to reach an optimal target,

as postulated by the trade-off hypothesis, tend to receive greater trust amongst creditors. On the contrary, other studies found evidence of the dominance of the pecking order hypothesis in explaining capital structure decisions of SMEs (Swinnen *et al.* 2005; Serrasqueiro *et al.* 2011; Degryse *et al.* 2012).

More recent studies, such as Bhama *et al.* (2016), comparing poor firms with well-off firms, also found evidence of the pecking order behaviour for firms considered poor but with limited evidence for well-off firms. In addition, their results show that poor firms tend to borrow to finance their operations but keep their debt ratio in check, which indicates pecking order tendencies. Yulianto *et al.* (2016), on the other hand, test the pecking order and trade-off theories on a sample of 16 Indonesian manufacturing firms by first identifying and separating the variables that influence capital structure according to each theory. Their results also found evidence in support of the pecking order theory.

Similarly, Matias and Serrasqueiro (2017) test the two competing capital structure theories on a sample of Portuguese SMEs and found evidence support-ing pecking order and trade-off theories. In particular, Matias and Serrasqueiro (2017) found that older and more profitable SMEs tend to use less debt, which points toward the pecking order theory, which suggests firms with sufficient internal funds will prefer that option over debt. In addition, they found evidence supporting the relationship between firm size and debt in both pecking order and trade-off theories.

The studies that have concentrated on SMEs in testing capital structure theories have largely found evidence in support of the pecking order hypothesis (Cassar & Holmes 2003; Swinnen *et al.* 2005; López-Gracia & Sogorb-Mir 2008; Degryse *et al.* 2012; Adair & Adaskou 2015; Matias & Serrasqueiro 2017). Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) suggest that SMEs are more likely to exhibit pecking order behaviour because they tend to borrow as needs arise rather than set target debt levels, as the trade-off hypothesis postulates.

Lastly, in a review of the literature concerning the determinants of capital structure, Kumar *et al.* (2017) noted that the pecking order hypothesis tends to perform best theoretically and empirically in explaining the capital structure decisions of firms.

3 Conceptual Framework: Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure on SMEs

As the literature outlines, evidence of the trade-off and pecking order theories

of capital structure exists with mixed results. Moreover, these results are most pertinent to large firms, with few studies focussing on the capital structure decisions of SMEs. In instances where the focus has been on SMEs, evidence has largely been found supporting the pecking order hypothesis (Abor & Biekpe 2009; Kuruppu & Azeez 2016; Matias & Serrasqueiro 2017). Even so, given different SME settings, the pecking order hypothesis may lead to ambiguity in results. It is, therefore, paramount to consider the pecking order hypothesis being tested over and above the inherent problems of SMEs and contexts. Hence this chapter, is testing the pecking order theory of SMEs and, where data permits, the case of African countries involved in the global value chain networks.

Based on preceding works, the pecking order hypothesis is generally tested by regressing firm characteristics hypothesised to influence capital structure decisions of a firm on the firm's short-term and long-term debt ratios. Recently, empirical work has incorporated and shown other factors such as industry characteristics (Degryse *et al.* 2012; Li & Islam 2019); country-level characteristics (De Jong *et al.* 2008; El Bahsh *et al.* 2018); cross-country characteristics (Bancel & Mittoo 2004; Desai *et al.* 2004); managerial attributes (Sheikh & Wang 2011; Hu & Liu 2015); and time (Drobetz *et al.* 2006) to be significant determinants of firm capital structure. Related studies (Kayo & Kimura 2011; Jõeveer 2013) have illustrated the importance of including a combination of various factors in a single model when testing for the determinants of capital structure to evaluate the explanatory power of the various determinants in accounting for large variations in leverage within the model.

Kumar and Rao (2015) propose a conceptual framework for identifying the preferred funding options of SMEs. Firm-specific characteristics, manager attributes, and sources of finance form part of the critical factors affecting the choice of finance of managers, as outlined in Kumar and Rao's proposed conceptual framework. Retained earnings, debt finance (consisting of short-term and long-term debt), equity, and other forms of finance constitute funding options available to SMEs. Firm-specific characteristics commonly affecting the capital structure decisions of SMEs include age, size, profitability, growth, and asset structure. Manager attributes have internal features (aversion to risk; aversion to change; growth strategies) and external characteristics (gender; age; education; experience; ownership). According to Kumar and Rao (2015), because SMEs face numerous obstacles in accessing finance, the sources of finance that focus on the features of the type of finance available to SMEs are

crucial in determining their finance preferences. The types of finance include formal sources (banks; equity; venture capital) and informal sources (love capital from family and friends; social capital acquired through social networks; angel investors who invest in the business due to its potential).

Adapting the conceptual framework suggested by Kumar and Rao (2015), preference for SME funding is influenced by firm-specific characteristics (age, size, profitability, growth, asset structure); managers' external attributes (experience); and sources of finance (formal and informal). In addition, the preference for SME funding, which demonstrates how the firm's capital is structured, gives rise to the firm's debt-to-equity ratio, the model's dependent variable to be estimated. The explanatory variables comprise firm-specific characteristics, the manager's external attributes and sources of finance. The dependent variable, the debt-to-equity ratio, is measured by a firm's total debt divided by its market value of assets. The firm's age is determined by the year a particular firm formally began operations. The firm's size is determined by the number of employees working or by the logarithm of sales. Profitability is determined by the level of retained earnings of the firm; growth is determined by the firm's investment in research and development activities or by the growth in sales, and asset structure is measured by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets or the level of collateral pledged by the firm. Managerial experience is measured by the top manager's years of experience in the industry. Access to finance is determined by the level of difficulty in acquiring funding from formal and informal sources.

4 Model and Methodology

This chapter uses the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) database between 2007 and 2018. SMEs are selected based on the WBES classification. According to this classification, a firm is considered an SME when it meets the criteria of 5-99 full-time employees. Given that there are restrictions in data, especially for African firms that are for a limited number of years, thus, in selecting the SMEs in Africa, this chapter has three-panel data groups: Panel A (2007 – 2013); Panel B (2009 – 2016) and Panel C (2013 – 2018). Kenya, Zambia, and Ghana comprise Panel A; Cameroon, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo comprise Panel B; and Kenya comprises Panel C. The authors surveyed 2126 SMEs in seven African countries in this chapter.

Following the earlier works of Abor and Biekpe (2009), in its general form, the model to be estimated is as follows:

$$Y_{it} = X_{it}\beta + \alpha_i + \mu_{it} \quad (1)$$

Where Y_{it} represents the dependent variable (debt ratio) of each firm i at time period t . X_{it} represents the firm level and managerial factors known to affect capital structure according to the pecking order hypothesis, whilst β represents the coefficient on each independent variable. α_i represents all unobserved time-invariant characteristics of firms and μ_{it} is the error term.

More specifically, the model the study uses is expressed as follows:

$$TDR_{it} = AGE_{it} + SIZE_{it} + PROFIT_{it} + GROWTH_{it} + ASSET_{it} + EXP_{it} + FACCESS_{it} + \alpha_i + \mu_{it} \quad (2)$$

The firm's dependent variable total debt ratio (TDR), measures the riskiness of the capital structure. The TDR is the percentage of retained earnings used to finance working capital.

The independent variables of the model are based on prior studies (Abor & Biekpe 2009; Mateev & Ivanov 2011) and include the number of years the firm has been in operation (AGE); the firm turnover measures the size of the firm (SIZE); the profit return on assets (PROFIT) is the ratio of net income to total assets; the growth (GROWTH) variable is measured as the growth in sales; the asset structure (ASSET) is determined by the ratio of fixed to total assets; managerial experience (EXP) is taken as the top manager's years of experience in the industry; access to finance (FACCESS) is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm has access to formal and informal sources of finance, and 0 otherwise.

The study uses panel data methodology to test the pecking order theory and the importance of multiple determinants in the capital structure decisions of SMEs. The preferred method used in this study is the fixed effect (FE) estimation technique based on the results of the Hausman test, not rejecting the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level.

5 Empirical Results

The regression results are presented in Table 1 below. Firstly, the estimated results indicate that the firm's age is a significant determinant of capital

structure for firms in six out of seven countries. Also, the results show a negative and significant association between firms' age and capital structure. Therefore, this implies that the older firms provide more experience and have more time to accumulate funds (Myers 1984; Abor & Biekpe 2009). Also, according to Serrasqueiro *et al.* (2011), this can contribute to increased creditworthiness and reduced recourse to debt in small and medium-sized enterprises. This behaviour is in line with the pecking order approach.

Regarding the size variable, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the firm's size and capital structure in five countries: Kenya, Zambia, Benin, Cameroon, and Cote d'Ivoire (at a 10% significance level). Such findings support prior studies (Mira 2005; Nguyen & Ramachandran 2006; Mateer & Ivanov 2011) and align with the pecking order hypothesis. According to the pecking order hypothesis, there is a clear hierarchical means of funding operations, and given SMEs' smaller size and associated higher risk levels, credit is difficult. Thus, smaller-sized firms can use internal funding before considering debt or equity.

Next, this study finds that the firm's growth is negatively associated with the capital structure of the firm. According to Myers (1977), firms with higher growth opportunities tend to have less debt, given that the amount desired to finance growth opportunities cannot be collateralised. In addition, the agency costs between shareholders and debtholders tend to be heightened for firms with higher growth opportunities (Titman & Wessels 1988). This negative relationship between growth and capital structure is also significant for SMEs in Kenya, Togo, Cameroon, and Cote d'Ivoire. Therefore, this means that higher growth is associated with lesser debt. However, it is interesting to note evidence of a positive and statistically significant relation regarding SMEs in Zambia at a 5% significance level. Thus, this implies that larger debt is associated with higher growth in Zambia, which is inconsistent with the pecking order approach.

Regarding the profit return on assets, a negative and significant correlation was found between profitability and capital structure for Ghana, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo firms. Profitable firms funded their operations with internal funding and less debt. Therefore, this aligns with the pecking order hypothesis, which suggests that firms with sufficient funds will not aim to reach an optimal debt target. Instead, they will follow a hierarchy where they will utilise retained earnings and rely less on external funding. These findings also adhere to prior studies (Allen 1993; Sheikh & Wang 2011; Oboh

et al. 2013; Kadongo *et al.* 2015).

As to the asset structure variable, which includes categories such as land and buildings, equipment, personal assets and other assets, the results indicate that in panel A in all three countries (Ghana, Kenya, Zambia), land and buildings were mostly used as collateral for debt, followed by other assets and equipment. Firms in panel B namely Benin and Cote d'Ivoire, seem to favour equipment as the collateral for debt, followed by personal assets, other assets, and finally, land and buildings. In panel C, firms in Kenya used land and buildings, personal assets, and other assets as collateral towards their debt. Generally, it seems that firms in all three panels that used land and buildings, equipment, personal assets, and other assets instead of accounts receivable as collateral for debt were less likely to fund their operations with retained earnings and more likely to issue debt. This positive relationship between asset structure and capital structure has previously been found by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Chen (2004) and Serrasqueiro and Rogão (2009). According to Scott (1976), firms that want to optimise their debt targets will issue as much secured debt as possible to avoid agency costs arising from conflicts between shareholders and debtholders. However, firms in Kenya (panel A) that used equipment compared to accounts receivable as debt security and SMEs in Cameroon (panel B) that used land and buildings compared to accounts receivable as debt security were more likely to fund their working capital with retained earnings and less likely to issue debt. This negative relationship between asset structure and capital structure may arise when firms prefer to hold a large share of tangible assets and retain a substantial portion of their earnings as funding.

Regarding access to finance, the estimated results indicate a statistically significant and positive link between finance access and firms' capital structure in all countries except for Benin. The expectation is that firms with easy access to finance will be encouraged to use the facility, potentially leading them to rely more extensively on debt financing. Consequently, firms may use much less retained earnings to finance their investments. Such behaviour, however, does not align with the pecking order theory.

Lastly, evidence regarding managerial experience on capital structure reveals insignificant diverse findings in the top managers' experience that can be positively or negatively related to capital structure. If the results are positive, this implies that as top managers' experience increases, the debt ratios may increase and vice versa on negative findings.

The Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure

Table 1: Pecking Order Theory - Determinants of Capital Structure (SMEs 2007-2018)

Dependent variable : Capital Structure (TDR)								
	Panel A: SME s (2007-2013)			Panel B:SME s (2009-2016)				Panel C:SME s (2013-2018)
Independent								
Variables	Ghana	Kenya	Zambia	Benin	Cameroon	Cote d'Ivoire	Togo	Kenya
AGE	0.213 (0.436)	0.010*** (0.001)	-0.304 (0.218)	-1.019*** (0.374)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.242)	0.018*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)
SIZE	0.012 (0.129)	-0.817*** (0.025)	-1.344*** (0.479)	-6.359*** (1.886)	-1.672*** (0.502)	-2.555* (1.387)	-0.509 (2.789)	-1.065 (0.681)
GROWTH	0.348 (0.722)	1.143* (0.651)	-1.389** (0.543)	-1.277 (1.429)	2.071*** (0.504)	1.931*** (0.540)	6.148*** (1.577)	1.372* (0.801)
PROFIT	19.127*** (4.374)	20.069*** (17.302)	32.441* (18.604)	1.764 (15.359)	40.473*** (4.619)	27.685*** (3.309)	25.613*** (12.292)	27.075*** (9.753)
LAND ASSET	-10.042*** (3.334)	-10.767*** (1.906)	-27.780*** (0.101)	-8.570 (20.390)	12.896*** (1.676)	24.894 (16.807)	-3.431 (17.691)	-4.683*** (1.580)
EQUIP ASSET	6.572 (7.210)	22.267*** (2.550)	-6.202 (4.875)	-44.031*** (11.791)	8.331 (16.474)	-9.069*** (0.220)	-13.896 (8.699)	12.797* (7.393)
PERSONAL ASSET	-7.570 (13.481)	-0.116 (1.724)	1.426 (5.256)	11.142 (13.879)	-18.660*** (4.352)	-15.193*** (2.243)	-5.228 (8.541)	-12.771 (11.654)
OTHER ASSETS	-23.664*** (2.395)	-5.911*** (1.530)	-3.728 (2.848)	2.753 (7.490)	6.030 (8.854)	-18.672*** (2.854)	-22.762 (33.369)	-7.951 (5.061)
FACCESS	-16.846*** (0.089)	-21.510*** (4.762)	8.879*** (3.340)	-11.102 (9.093)	-25.769*** (3.163)	-23.856*** (8.208)	-24.185*** (0.593)	-16.092*** (3.889)
EXP	-0.354 (0.283)	-0.151 (0.182)	0.373 (0.424)	-0.004 (0.665)	0.313 (0.519)	0.057 (0.571)	0.004 (0.289)	-0.224 (0.163)
CONS	58.800*** (2.461)	67.165*** (20.893)	77.455*** (3.662)	215.270*** (28.993)	49.069** (22.616)	97.362*** (19.469)	70.110 (63.949)	71.103** (30.040)
R Squared	0.220	0.286	0.240	0.446	0.347	0.283	0.365	0.229
No of Obs	417	454	319	74	212	135	84	431
Standard deviations in parenthesis								
*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance								

Evidence of a positive association between managerial experience and a firm's capital structure has been reported by Frank and Goyal (2007a) and

Borgia and Newman (2012). However, studies that found evidence of a negative relationship between managerial experience and a firm's capital structure include Colombo and Grilli (2007), Coleman and Robb (2012) and Mangafić and Martinović (2015). In this study, none of the estimated results are statistically significant, thus indicating that top managers' experience in African countries is not a major determinant of SMEs' capital structure.

6 Conclusion

Previous studies have extensively reviewed firms' capital structure in general and SMEs in the context of the pecking order hypothesis, with mixed results. However, little is known about the capital structure of SMEs in Africa despite the considerable and rising importance of SMEs in African economies. Therefore, the objective of this study is to test the pecking order hypothesis of capital structure on SMEs in Africa and to explore the importance of several factors in SMEs' capital structure decisions using a panel data analysis of 2126 firms from 2007 - 2018.

The results emanating from this study suggest that the pecking order hypothesis generally explains the capital structure of SMEs in all three panels. Age, size, profitability, firm growth, and asset structure are statistically significant key determinants of capital structure, whilst managerial experience is found to not influence the capital structure of SMEs in general. In addition, although not traditionally considered a key determinant of capital structure within the literature, access to finance is statistically significant in determining capital structure for SMEs. Additionally, the findings of this chapter reveal that profitability and access to finance are very important in determining SMEs' financing policies since they have the greatest impact on the capital structure of SMEs.

References

- Abel, A.B. 2018. Optimal Debt and Profitability in the Trade-Off Theory. *The Journal of Finance* 73: 95 - 143. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12590>
- Abor, J. & N. Biekpe 2009. How do We Explain the Capital Structure of SMEs in Sub-Saharan Africa? *Journal of Economic Studies* 36: 83-97. <https://doi.org/10.1108/01443580910923812>
- Adair, P. & M. Adaskou 2015. Trade-Off-Theory vs. Pecking Order Theory and

- the Determinants of Corporate Leverage: Evidence from a Panel Data Analysis upon French SMEs (2002 – 2010). *Cogent Economics & Finance* 3: 1006477 <https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2015.1006477>
- Arkinyemi, F. & O. Adejumo 2017. Entrepreneurial Motives and Challenges of SMEs Owners in Emerging Economies: Nigeria & South Africa. *Advances in Economics and Business* 5: 11: 624 - 633. <https://doi.org/10.13189/aeb.2017.051105>
- Allen, D.E. 1993. The Pecking Order Hypothesis: Australian Evidence. *Applied Financial Economics* 3: 101-112. <https://doi.org/10.1080/758532828>
- Ardic, O.P., N. Mylenko & V. Saltane 2012. Access to Finance by Small and Medium Enterprises: A Cross-Country Analysis with a New Data Set. *Pacific Economic Review* 17: 491 - 513. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2012.00596.x>
- Bancel, F. & U.R. Mittoo 2004. Cross-Country Determinants of Capital Structure Choice: A Survey of European Firms. *Financial Management* 103 - 132. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.683111>
- Baskin, J. 1989. An Empirical Investigation of the Pecking Order Hypothesis. *Financial Management* 26 - 35. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3665695>
- Bhama, V., P.K. Jain & S.S. Yadav 2016. Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Deficit and Surplus Firms: Indian Evidence. *International Journal of Managerial Finance* 12: 335 – 350 <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMF-06-2014-0095>
- Bharath, S.T., P. Pasquariello & G. Wu 2008. Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions? *The Review of Financial Studies* 22: 3211 – 3243. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn076>
- Borgia, D. & A. Newman 2012. The Influence of Managerial Factors on the Capital Structure of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Emerging Economies. *Journal of Chinese Entrepreneurship* 4, 3: 180 - 205. <https://doi.org/10.1108/17561391211262148>
- Cant, M.C. & J.A. Wiid 2013. Establishing the Challenges Affecting South African SMEs. *International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER)* 12: 707 - 716. <https://doi.org/10.19030/iber.v12i6.7869>
- Carvalho, M. & J. Cerejeira 2019. Level Leverage Decisions and Manager Characteristics. *Working Paper, NIPE - Universidade do Minho*. Available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/232200139.pdf> (Accessed on 18 June 2023).
- Cassar, G. & S. Holmes 2003. Capital Structure and Financing of SMEs:

- Australian Evidence. *Accounting & Finance* 43: 123 - 147.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-629X.t01-1-00085>
- Chandler, G.N. & S.H. Hanks 1998. An Examination of the Substitutability of Founders Human and Financial Capital in Emerging Business Ventures. *Journal of Business Venturing* 13: 353 - 369.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0883-9026\(97\)00034-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0883-9026(97)00034-7)
- Chen, J.J. 2004. Determinants of Capital Structure of Chinese-Listed Companies. *Journal of Business Research* 57: 1341 - 1351.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0148-2963\(03\)00070-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0148-2963(03)00070-5)
- Coleman, S. & A. Robb 2012. Capital Structure Theory and New Technology Firms: Is There a Match? *Management Research Review* 35: 106 - 120.
<https://doi.org/10.1108/01409171211195143>
- Colombo, M.G. & L. Grilli 2007. Funding Gaps? Access to Bank Loans by High-Tech Start-Ups. *Small Business Economics* 29: 25 - 46.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-005-4067-0>
- Crick, F., S.M.S.U. Eskander, S. Fankhauser & M. Diop 2018. How Do African SMEs Respond to Climate Risks? Evidence from Kenya and Senegal. *World Development* 108: 157 - 168.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.03.015>
- Cusolito, A.P., R. Safadi & D. Taglioni 2016. *Inclusive Global Value Chains: Policy Options for Small and Medium Enterprises and Low-Income Countries*. Washington DC: The World Bank. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0842-5>
- Dang, V.A. 2013. Testing Capital Structure Theories Using Error Correction Models: Evidence from the UK, France and Germany. *Applied Economics* 45: 171 - 190. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2011.597724>
- Daskalakis, N. & M. Psillaki 2008. Do Country or Firm Factors Explain Capital Structure? Evidence from SMEs in France and Greece. *Applied Financial Economics* 18: 87 - 97. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09603100601018864>
- De Jong, A., R. Kabir & T.T. Nguyen 2008. Capital Structure around the World: The Roles of Firm- and Country-Specific Determinants. *Journal of Banking & Finance* 32: 1954 - 1969.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.12.034>
- Degryse, H., P. De Goeij & P. Kappert 2012. The Impact of Firm and Industry Characteristics on Small Firms' Capital Structure. *Small Business Economics* 38: 431 - 447. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-010-9281-8>
- Desai, M.A., C.F. Foley & J.R. Hines 2004. A Multinational Perspective on

- Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets. *The Journal of Finance* 59: 2451 - 2487.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00706.x>
- Drobetz, W., P. Pensa & G. Wanzenried 2006. *Firm Characteristics and Dynamic Capital Structure Adjustment*. Available at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952268 (Accessed on 18 June 2023). <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.952268>
- El Bahsh, R., A. Alattar & A.N. Yusuf 2018. Firm, Industry and Country Level Determinants of Capital Structure: Evidence from Jordan. *International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues* 8, 175.
- Elms, D.K. 2013. 6 Views of GVC Operators. In Low, D.K.E.A.P. (ed.): *Global Value Chains in a Changing World*. Geneva, Switzerland: Wprld Trade Organisation. Available at:
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/00_gvc_dev_report_2021_e.pdf (Accessed 11 April 2023). <https://doi.org/10.30875/0b68ab34-en>
- Elseoud, A., M. Sayed, F.M. Kreishan, & M.A.M. Ali 2019. The Reality of SMEs in Arab Nations: Experience of Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain. *Journal of Islamic Financial Studies* 5.
- Fama, E.F. & K.R. French 2002. Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions about Dividends and Debt. *The Review of Financial Studies* 15: 1 – 33. <https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/15.1.1>
- Frank, M.Z. & V.K. Goyal 2003. Testing The Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure. *Journal of Financial Economics* 67: 217 - 248.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X\(02\)00252-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00252-0)
- Frank, M.Z. & V.K. Goyal 2007. Corporate Leverage: How Much Do Managers Really Matter? *Social Science Electronic Publishing*. Available at:
[https://www.scirp.org/\(S\(lz5mqp453ed%20snp55rrgict55\)\)/reference/referencespapers.aspx?referenceid=2375588](https://www.scirp.org/(S(lz5mqp453ed%20snp55rrgict55))/reference/referencespapers.aspx?referenceid=2375588)
(Accessed on 11 April 2023). <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.971082>
- Frank, M.Z. & V.K. Goyal 2007b. Chapter 12: Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt. Espen Eckbo, B. (ed.): *Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance* 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.670543>;
<https://dl.icdst.org/pdfs/files/9b890fbcef7f5b0af5f39934788f6464.pdf>
- Ganiyu, O.Y., I. Adelopo, Y. Rodionova & O. Luqman Samuel 2018. Capital Structure in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Nigeria. *The European Journal of Applied Economics* 15: 74 - 90.

- <https://doi.org/10.5937/EJAE15-17631>
- Harris, M. & A. Raviv 1991. The Theory of Capital Structure. *The Journal Of Finance* 46, 297-355. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03753.x>
- Hogan, T., E. Hutson & P. Drnevich 2017. Drivers of External Equity Funding in Small High-Tech Ventures. *Journal of Small Business Management* 55: 236 - 253. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jsbm.12270>
- Honjo, Y. & N. Harada 2006. SME Policy, Financial Structure and Firm Growth: Evidence from Japan. *Small Business Economics* 27: 289 - 300. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-005-6703-0>
- Hu, C. & Y.J. Liu 2015. Valuing Diversity: CEOs' Career Experiences and Corporate Investment. *Journal of Corporate Finance* 30: 11 - 31. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.08.001>
- Huang, R. & J.R. Ritter 2009. Testing Theories of Capital Structure and Estimating the Speed of Adjustment. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis* 44: 237 - 271. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109009090152>
- Inan, G.G. & U.S. Bititci 2015. Understanding Organisational Capabilities and Dynamic Capabilities in the Context of Micro Enterprises: A Research Agenda. *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences* 210: 310 - 319. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.11.371>
- Jensen, M.C. 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. *The American Economic Review* 76: 323 - 329.
- Jõeveer, K. 2013. What Do We Know about the Capital Structure of Small Firms? *Small Business Economics* 41: 479 - 501. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-012-9440-1>
- Kayo, E.K. & H. Kimura 2011. Hierarchical Determinants of Capital Structure. *Journal of Banking & Finance* 35: 358 - 371. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.08.015>
- Kodongo, O., T. Mokoaleli-Mokoteli & L.N. Maina 2015. Capital Structure, Profitability and Firm Value: Panel Evidence of Listed Firms in Kenya. *African Finance Journal* 17: 1 - 20. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2465422>
- Koleša, S. 2018. Global Value Chains: Government Policies for Enhancing the Role of Small and Medium Enterprises in Global Value Chains – A Case Study of Slovenia. *Management, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper* 13: 49 - 70. <https://doi.org/10.26493/1854-4231.13.49-70>

- Kumar, S., S. Colombage & P. Rao 2017. Research on Capital Structure Determinants: A Review and Future Directions. *International Journal of Managerial Finance* 13: 106 – 132. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMF-09-2014-0135>
- Kumar, S. & P. Rao 2015. A Conceptual Framework for Identifying Financing Preferences of SMEs. *Small Enterprise Research* 22: 99 - 112. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13215906.2015.1036504>
- Kuruppu, G. & A. Azeez 2016. Financing Preferences of Small and Medium Enterprise Owners of Sri Lanka: Does Pecking Order Theory Hold? *Journal of Business and Economic Policy* 3.
- Kuzmisiin, P. & V. Kuzmisiinova 2016. Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Global Value Chains. *Economic Annals-Xxi* 162, 11-12: 22 - 27. <https://doi.org/10.21003/ea.V162-05>
- Li, L. & S.Z. Islam 2019. Firm and Industry Specific Determinants of Capital Structure: Evidence From The Australian Market. *International Review of Economics & Finance* 59: 425 - 437. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2018.10.007>
- López-Gracia, J. & F. Sogorb-Mira 2008. Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories Financing SMEs. *Small Business Economics* 31: 117 - 136. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-007-9088-4>
- Mah, J.S. 2018. Korean Policies for SMEs Development and Internationalization. In Sebastián Herreros, K., I., Nanno Mulder (ed.): *Innovation and SME Internationalization in Korea and Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac): Policy Experiences and Areas for Cooperation*. United Nations: Santiago: Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica Para América Latina Y El Caribe (Cepal).
- Mangafić, J. & D. Martinović 2015. The Firm-Specific Determinants of the Target Capital Structure: Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina Panel Data. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 6: 188 - 188. <https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n2s5p188>
- Mateev, M. & K. Ivanov 2011. How SMEs' Uniqueness Affects Capital Structure: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe Panel Data. *Quarterly Journal of Finance & Accounting* 50,1: 115 - 143.
- Matemilola, B., A. Bany-Ariffin, W. Azman-Saini & A.M. Nassir 2018. Does Top Managers' Experience Affect Firms' Capital Structure? *Research In International Business and Finance* 45: 488 - 498. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.184>

- Matias, F. & Z. Serrasqueiro 2017. Are There Reliable Determinant Factors of Capital Structure Decisions? Empirical Study of SMEs in Different Regions of Portugal. *Research in International Business and Finance* 40: 19 - 33. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.09.014>
- Matlay, H., K.E. Neupert, C.C. Baughn & T.T.L. Dao 2006. SME Exporting Challenges in Transitional and Developed Economies. *Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development* 13: 535 - 545. <https://doi.org/10.1108/14626000610705732>
- Michaelas, N., F. Chittenden & P. Poutziouris 1999. Financial Policy and Capital Structure Choice in UK SMEs: Empirical Evidence from Company Panel Data. *Small Business Economics* 12: 113 - 130. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008010724051>
- Miettinen, M. & M. Virtanen 2013. Capital Structure of Start-Ups: Evidence on Non-Accounting Characteristics. *Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing* 9: 889.
- Muriithi, S. 2017. African Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Contributions, Challenges and Solutions. *European Journal of Research and Reflection in Management Sciences* 5,1: 36 - 48.
- Myers, S.C. 1977. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. *Journal of Financial Economics* 5: 147 - 175. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X\(77\)90015-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(77)90015-0)
- Myers, S.C. 1984. The Capital Structure Puzzle. *The Journal of Finance* 39: 574 - 592. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03646.x>
- Myers, S.C. 2001. Capital Structure. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 15: 81 - 102. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.15.2.81>
- Myers, S.C. & N.S. Majluf 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have Information that Investors do not Have. *Journal of Financial Economics* 13: 187 - 221. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X\(84\)90023-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0)
- Nguyen, T.D.K. & N. Ramachandran 2006. Capital Structure in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: The Case of Vietnam. *Asean Economic Bulletin* 23: 192 - 211. <https://doi.org/10.1355/AE23-2D>
- Oboh, S.C., A.C. Adekoya & R.F. Adeyeye 2013. Profitability and Debt Capital Decision: A Reconsideration of The Pecking Order Model. *International Journal of Business and Management* 8, 13: 24 - 33. <https://doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v8n13p24>

- Ocloo, C.E., S. Akaba & D.K. Worwui-Brown 2014. Globalisation and Competitiveness: Challenges of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Accra, Ghana. *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 5,4: 287 - 296. Available at: <http://Hdl.Handle.Net/123456789/4317> (Accessed 11 April 2023).
- Odit, M. & Y. Gobardhun 2011. The Determinants of Financial Leverage of SMEs in Mauritius. *International Business & Economics Research Journal (Iber)* 10: 113 - 126. <https://doi.org/10.19030/iber.v10i3.4107>
- OECD 2017. Enhancing the Contributions of SMEs in a Global and Digitalised Economy. *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development*. Paris: OECD.
- Paul, J., S. Parthasarathy & P. Gupta 2017. Exporting Challenges of SMEs A Review and Future Research Agenda. *Journal of World Business* 52: 327 - 342. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2017.01.003>
- Rajan, R.G. & L. Zingales 1995. What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence From International Data. *The Journal of Finance* 50: 1421 - 1460. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05184.x>
- Ross, S.A. 1977. The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach. *The Bell Journal of Economics* 8: 23 - 40. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3003485>
- Rothwell, R. & W. Zegveld 1982. *Innovation and the Small and Medium-Sized Firm*. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship.
- Santarelli, E. & H.T. Tran 2020. The Interaction of Institutional Quality and Human Capital in Shaping the Dynamics of Capital Structure. In John, R. & T. Finn (eds.): *Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises in Vietnam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851189.003.0004>
- Scherr, F.C., T.F. Sugrue & J.B. Ward 1993. Financing the Small Firm Start-Up: Determinants of Debt Use. *The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance* 3: 17 - 36. <https://doi.org/10.57229/2373-1761.1141>
- Scott, J.H. 1976. A Theory of Optimal Capital Structure. *The Bell Journal of Economics* 7: 33 - 54. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3003189>
- Serrasqueiro, Z.M.S. & M.C.R. Rogão 2009. Capital Structure of Listed Portuguese Companies. *Review of Accounting and Finance* 8: 54 - 75. <https://doi.org/10.1108/14757700910934238>
- Serrasqueiro, Z.S., M.R. Armada & P.M. Nunes 2011. Pecking Order Theory

- Versus Trade-Off Theory: Are Service SMEs' Capital Structure Decisions Different? *Service Business* 5: 381. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11628-011-0119-5>
- Sheikh, N.A. & Z. Wang 2011. Determinants of Capital Structure. *Managerial Finance* 37: 117 – 133. <https://doi.org/10.1108/03074351111103668>
- Shyam-Sunder, L. & S.C. Myers 1999. Testing Static Trade-off against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure. *Journal of Financial Economics* 51: 219 - 244. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X\(98\)00051-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00051-8)
- Sogorb-Mira, F. 2005. How SME Uniqueness Affects Capital Structure: Evidence from a 1994 – 1998 Spanish Data Panel. *Small Business Economics* 25: 447 - 457. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-004-6486-8>
- Stainbank, L. & M. Tafuh 2011. The Threshold, Burden and Usefulness of Financial Reporting for Small and Medium-Sized Entities in KwaZulu-Natal. *Management, Informatics and Research Design* 69. Available at: <https://www.degruyter.com/database/IABO/entry/iab20122716/html?lang=en> (Accessed on 11 April 2023.)
- Swinnen, S., W. Voordeckers & S. Vandemaele 2005. Capital Structure in SMEs: Pecking Order Versus Static Trade-Off, Bounded Rationality and the Behavioural Principle. *European Financial Management Association* 7: 1 - 40.
- Titman, S. & R. Wessels 1988. The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. *The Journal of Finance* 43: 1 - 19. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02585.x>
- Tong, G. & C.J. Green 2005. Pecking Order or Trade-Off Hypothesis? Evidence on the Capital Structure of Chinese Companies. *Applied Economics* 37: 2179 - 2189. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840500319873>
- Wang, Y. 2016. What Are The Biggest Obstacles to Growth of SMEs in Developing Countries? – Empirical Evidence from an Enterprise Survey. *Borsa Istanbul Review* 16: 167 - 176. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2016.06.001>
- Watson, R. & N. Wilson 2002. Small and Medium Size Enterprise Financing: A Note on Some of the Empirical Implications of a Pecking Order. *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting* 29: 557 - 578. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00443>
- Wignaraja, G. 2013. Can SMEs Participate in Global Production Networks? *Global Value Chains in a Changing World*. Geneva: WTO Library. <https://doi.org/10.30875/d18b619c-en>

- WTO 2016. *The World Trade Report: Levelling the Trading Field for SMEs*. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Yuhua, Z. & A. Bayhaqi 2013. SSME Participation in Global Production Chains. *Issues Paper No 3, APEC Policy Support Unit* 1 - 52.
- Yulianto, A., D.A. Suseno & W. Widiyanto 2016. Testing Pecking Order Theory and Trade-Off Theory Models in Public Companies in Indonesia. *Journal of Economic & Management Perspectives* 10: 21 - 28.

Katie Mutula (posthumous)
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
University of KwaZulu-Natal

Vanessa Tang
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
University of KwaZulu-Natal
TangV@ukzn.ac.za

CHAPTER 4

Diaspora Philanthropy for Rural Infrastructural Developmental Projects in Zimbabwe: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities

Lewis Edwin Chigova

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7357-2091>

Costa Hofisi

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2571-6991>

Abstract

In this chapter, the authors explore the trends, challenges and opportunities presented by Diaspora philanthropy in rural infrastructure development. It is noted that Diaspora contributions through remittances have become a source of development for several countries. Despite research showing that Diaspora philanthropy fosters social change and drives development in countries of origin, the authors point out that few studies have examined the relationship between Diaspora philanthropy and rural infrastructure development (such as in Zimbabwe). The chapter contributes to the growing literature on Diaspora philanthropy using Zimbabwe as a reference country. A purely qualitative approach has been adopted, employing document analysis and literature review as techniques for data collection. The findings highlight the trend in which there has been an increase in infrastructure projects supported by Diaspora philanthropy since 2015. In addition, it was found that Diaspora philanthropy can provide tremendous opportunities for developing rural infrastructure, despite the high cost of remittances, legal and policy gaps and government mistrust. Developing countries such as Zimbabwe, where Diaspora remittances are critical to economic growth, benefit from Diaspora philanthropy supporting

rural infrastructure development. Finally, it is recommended that Zimbabwe accelerates efforts to revise its Diaspora policy, enact legislation that allows citizens abroad to support rural infrastructure projects, and reduce remittance costs.

Keywords: Diaspora philanthropy, remittances, infrastructure development, migration, rural areas, Zimbabwe.

1 Introduction

The practice of migrant communities participating in the development of their home countries is not new. According to (Johnson 2007), human migration, Diaspora giving, and the culture of giving back to countries of origin are centuries-old practices. Several studies have demonstrated how Diaspora communities contribute to the development of their home countries – particularly by building physical capital and productivity and ultimately boosting employment, living standards, and economic growth in their countries of origin (Mitra 2016). For example, Gnimassoun and Anyanwu (2019) found that Africa’s African Diaspora significantly and robustly improves real per capita income. Espinosa (2016) presents Diaspora philanthropy as the new development aid. Because of the consensus on the massive potential Diaspora philanthropy holds, Johnson (2007) observes the emergency of debates among scholars and development economists on the impact of Diaspora philanthropy on poverty, development, and equity in receiving countries. What is recurring in several available studies are answers to Sidel’s inquisitions (Sidel 2021): Is Diaspora giving an agent of social change and development in communities of origin? How has philanthropy by migrants become an emerging driver of development in the communities of origin?

Even though several research case studies by different scholars – providing some answers to the above questions – show the positive effect of Diaspora philanthropy fostering social change and driving development in countries of origin (Akech, Assim, Mutambasere, Ramakhula & Tutlam 2019; Babis, Zychlinski & Kagan 2021; Espinosa 2016; Gnimassoun & Anyanwu 2019; Newland, Terrazas & Munster 2010; Shaul Bar Nissim 2019; Sidel 2021; Singh & Koiri 2018), the relationship between Diaspora philanthropy and rural infrastructure development has hardly been examined (for example, in Zimbab-

we). A study examining the trends, challenges and opportunities Diaspora philanthropy presents would significantly contribute to the existing body of knowledge. Such an inquiry would be necessary for debates attempting to revisit and reflect on the developmental capacity of Diaspora philanthropy, for example, attempts to qualify Diaspora philanthropy as equalling or a new form of development aid (Espinosa 2016), particularly its role in rural infrastructure development. Through this chapter, the authors aim to contribute to the growing literature by exploring the trends, challenges, and opportunities of Diaspora philanthropy in rural infrastructure development. The study focuses on Zimbabwe for three key reasons. Zimbabwe's migrant population has been on a sharp increase between 2016 and 2021 (Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 2022), which has seen both a yearly increase in remittances and, subsequently, a rise in the percentage contribution of remittances to 10.1% GDP (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2022).

Johnson (2007) underscores that the scholarly understanding of the 'Diaspora philanthropy' concept comes with many conceptualisations, such as homeland philanthropy, migrant philanthropy, and transnational giving. Nevertheless, in recent years, Diaspora philanthropy has attracted the attention of scholars and development practitioners associated with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the African Development Bank. Mitra (2016), writing on the IMF blog, delved into the debate on whether migration presents a zero-sum loss for sending countries by examining Diaspora philanthropy. Mitra (2016) argues that Diaspora philanthropy presents a developmental oxymoron of 'addition by subtraction'. An overwhelming focus in the literature has been limited to the Diaspora's contribution to investment and entrepreneurial development, skills transfer and human capital development (Johnson, Johnson, Kingman 2004; Manivannan 2006; Wescott 2006; Wescott and Brinkerhoff 2006). However, more country-specific case studies covering the trends, challenges, and opportunities of Diaspora philanthropy in developing infrastructure are lacking in the literature that must be explored. Sidel (2021) alludes to this scant evidence in the literature to difficulties in calculating total remittance flows and, most importantly, categorising money for charitable and philanthropic purposes. Espinosa (2016) explains that the reason for the limited academic focus on Diaspora philanthropy is conceptual, defining what 'qualifies as philanthropy, the underreporting of these initiatives and the anecdotal nature of philanthropic narratives'.

Against this background, the authors' primary purpose in this chapter is to investigate the trends, challenges and opportunities of Diaspora philanthropy in developing public development projects in Zimbabwe's rural areas. This chapter is structured as follows: the next section conceptualises and contextualises Diaspora philanthropy. It is followed by an outline of the study's methodology. The third part describes the study's findings by looking at an overview of Diaspora philanthropy and rural infrastructure development in Zimbabwe and reflecting on the trends of Diaspora philanthropic activities in Zimbabwe in development. The fourth section examines the findings by expounding on the main challenges and opportunities presented by the issue under analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting recommendations and indicating the implications for practice and future research.

2 Conceptualising and Contextualising Diaspora Philanthropy

Diaspora philanthropy is a concept with different understandings often associated with remittances. Sidel (2021) argues that the difference between remittances and Diaspora philanthropy is an intricate and thin line and a difference conceptualised differently in different countries. Diaspora philanthropy, as defined by Flanigan (2017:494), is 'Money, goods, volunteer labour, knowledge and skills, and other assets donated for the social benefit of a community broader than one's family members in a country or region where there is a population with whom the donor(s) have ancestral ties'.

According to Johnson (2007), Diaspora philanthropy represents the transfer of resources by migrant communities to their country of origin for civic or public purposes. Eisenstadt (2009) acknowledges the central significance of Diaspora communities and networks to Diaspora philanthropy. Espinosa (2016) accounts for the development of Diaspora philanthropy on the decline in official development assistance flows and the need to find alternative sustainable development instruments. Other literature presents Diaspora philanthropy as representing the emergence of new development actors (Newland *et al.* 2010), the continuation of debates that undermine the role of private investment in spearheading development (Johnson 2007) and part of discussions that explain the role of remittances in development. The remittances make Diaspora philanthropy agents of change and development (Muzondidya & Chiroro 2008).

Orozco (2013) sees the growth of interest amongst scholars and prac-

tioners in migrant remittances and development. Espinosa (2016) laments that Diaspora philanthropy is not getting the same scholarly reviews as remittances, although it can significantly contribute to development. According to the World Bank (2019), international migration – the movement of people across international boundaries –considerably impacts economic growth and poverty alleviation. In 2015, migrants from emerging and developing economies sent home USD 430 billion, three times as much as their home countries receive in financial assistance from other countries, representing a substantial portion of their gross domestic product (Mitra 2016). In 2018, an estimated USD 529 billion worth of remittances went to developing countries (Maune & Matanda 2022). The amount rose to USD 559 billion in 2019 (Beck, Janfils & Kpodar 2022). In terms of the overall percentage contribution to GDP, Mitra (2016) noted that Diaspora remittances represent 37% in Tajikistan, 30% in Nepal, around 25% in Tonga, Liberia, and Haiti, and 16% in Lebanon. Eisenstadt (2009) reasons that transnational communities and networks are essential in human development. Hence, despite the citizens living in distant countries, they often express their interest in developing their communities of origin. In this case, as observed by Straubhaar and Vâdean (2006) and Hidayati (2020), remittances play a crucial role as a source of income or capital for developing countries like Zimbabwe, contributing to efforts aimed at equalizing a country's development.

Participants in Diaspora philanthropy include individuals, groups, philanthropic organisations, professional associations, faith-based organisations, migrant ethnic groups and foundations. The Diaspora-based philanthropists invest their resources to finance projects in rural Zimbabwe. Some projects involve building or rehabilitating school blocks and health facilities, sinking or rehabilitating boreholes, providing piped water systems, electrifying facilities, and other developments. According to Madziyire (2015), philanthropic activities sometimes involve alum associations and individual former students assisting schools, either irregularly or for a specific project. The financier can deal directly with authorities or use intermediaries to disburse resources to develop identified projects. Johnson (2007) shares experiences from China where family members act as *de facto* intermediaries for philanthropic activities. In Zimbabwe, there are cases of community-based organisations acting as intermediaries. Some documented organisations that work as intermediaries include Citizen Initiatives (crowdfunding-based philanthropy), Uluntu Community Foundation, Community Foundation, and Delta Philanthropies.

3 Method

In exploring the concept of Diaspora philanthropy in rural infrastructure development in Zimbabwe, this inquiry follows a purely qualitative approach. The qualitative approach allows the study to ‘discover new insights into a new topic about which very little is known’ (Nieuwenhuis & Smit 2012). The approach enabled the researchers to explore Diaspora philanthropy in Zimbabwe and the trend, challenges and opportunities it presents in rural infrastructure development. Document analysis was used to investigate Diaspora philanthropy trends by examining migration, remittances and development statistics. This technique was necessary because documents represent reality’s objective reflection (Silva 2012). Only reliable documents from reputable sources were used, such as the Zimbabwe Treasury fiscal statements, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe monetary policy statements, Zimbabwe government policies, the World Bank, OECD, African Development Bank, and the United Nations reports.

Data was also collected using a literature review method. It was used within the definition of Onwuegbuzie *et al.* (2010). Onwuegbuzie and Frels (2012:29), citing Onwuegbuzie *et al.* (2010), define a literature review as ‘an interpretation of a selection of relevant published and or unpublished information that is available on a specific...that optimally involves summarisation, analysis, evaluation, and synthesis of the information’. By ‘interpretation’ it means the researchers were active and not passive in conducting their reviews (Onwuegbuzie & Frels 2012:29). ‘Selection’ entails that the researchers will not include all available information but an adequate sample to represent the body of knowledge (Onwuegbuzie & Frels 2012: 29). Furthermore, in line with Onwuegbuzie and Frels (2012), ‘relevant’ means the collected information must be linked to the topic under study and ‘summarisation’ involves consciously and accurately describing each source of information. ‘Analysis’ means examining each selected source and determining the essential features, ‘evaluation’ emphasises rigour and trustworthiness of each source of information used in this study, and ‘synthesis’ relates to the merging of all the information that has been summarised, analysed and evaluated into a coherent narrative – into this chapter (Onwuegbuzie & Frels 2012:29).

4 Description of Findings

Kapesa, Mugano, and Fourie (2021) note that Zimbabwe needs USD 2 billion annually until 2032 to finance public infrastructure. Still, it can only afford 20%,

creating an 80% financial gap (Kapesa *et al.* 2021). This financial gap is difficult to cover through public financing of infrastructure development alone (budget allocations and grants) (Mostafavi, Abraham, and Vives 2014). In Zimbabwe, the other challenge is that the country cannot attract private sector financing of infrastructure due to many problems, such as the investment climate and lack of foreign direct investment standing at 1.3% of GDP (United Nations - Zimbabwe 2021). After reaching USD 745 million in 2018, foreign direct investment in Zimbabwe declined significantly to USD 280 million in 2019 and USD 194 million in 2020 (United States of America Department of State 2022). Despite the World Bank statistical evidence showing the general increase in official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa (from USD 44.28 billion in 2016 to USD 66.84 billion in 2020) (World Bank 2022a), Zimbabwe has failed to net significant official development assistance because of a poor relationship with the global north countries. In addressing the resource gap, Diaspora remittances and the oil of Diaspora philanthropy, have shown ‘considerable development impacts’ (Tevera & Chikanda 2008).

Apart from the above, it is imperative to note the disparities between urban and rural infrastructural development in Zimbabwe, where rural areas are most affected. Therefore, Diaspora philanthropy can assist in supporting rural infrastructural development. Rural infrastructure in this study involves economic and social infrastructure with a deliberate bias on health, education, water and sanitation, and power.

There is an increasing acknowledgement that migrant remittances are becoming an important source of international capital flows for developing countries, such as Zimbabwe and have a critical impact on economic development (Beck *et al.* 2022). At a policy level, the authors of this study found that the Zimbabwean government affirms that it is ready to increase the participation of its Diaspora population in national development as enunciated in the *National Development Strategy 1 2021-2025* (Government of Zimbabwe 2020). Such participation needs to be anchored in creating an enabling environment for Diaspora philanthropy to flourish. Thus, Diaspora giving must be enabled and controlled by mechanisms, structures, policies, and rules established by national and subnational authorities (Sidel 2021). Studies and experiences from countries such as China, the Philippines, South Korea, Israel, India and Mexico have exposed the importance of having structures that allow the deployment of remittances to national development (Babis *et al.* 2021; Gnimassoun and Anyanwu 2019; Shaul Bar Nissim 2019; Singh and Koiri 2018). In Nigeria,

Alechenu (2021) stresses that the Central Bank of Nigeria has established a well-functional mechanism and incentives that augment the free flow of remittances to the country. These strategies allow more Diaspora philanthropic contributions to cover rural infrastructure developmental needs in rural areas. Hence, it is imperative to reflect on how the central government in Zimbabwe controls and supervises Diaspora philanthropic activities since certain rural infrastructure facilities, including health and education, are owned by the communities, local authorities, and faith-based organisations. For example, through Diaspora philanthropy, the government can cultivate social change and equitable rural infrastructure development in Zimbabwe's poor rural areas by attracting, incentivising, and regulating actors and activities (Sidel 2021).

5 Trends of Diaspora Philanthropy in Zimbabwe

The study examined remittance trends because of the relationship between remittances and Diaspora philanthropy. Developing countries like Zimbabwe – particularly those seeking economic growth and development – consider foreign remittances a critical component of growth and development (Maune & Matanda 2022). The World Bank (2022c) estimates that Zimbabwe received USD 1.42 billion in 2019 and USD 1.83 billion in 2022 personal remittances, recording a 29% increase. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2022) mid-term monetary policy statement figures for January to June indicate that Diaspora remittances amounted to USD 797 million in 2022, a 23% increase from USD 650 million received during the same period in 2021. According to World Bank data, there was a slight increase in the percentage contribution of remittances to Zimbabwe's GDP from 2018 to 2020 (World Bank 2021b). The data shows Zimbabwe received (percentage contribution of remittances to GDP) 7.3% in 2019 and 10.1% in 2020 (World Bank 2022b). The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2021) and United Nations - Zimbabwe (2021) indicate that 2019 remittances contributed 54% of foreign receipts. The United Nations - Zimbabwe (2021) also states that in 2020 the country received about USD 1 billion in remittances. However, the literature reviewed in this study correctly notes that an unknown portion of these transfers represents social investments for the common good, such as building and funding schools, community centres, or health clinics, which has generated interest, study, and promotion of 'Diaspora philanthropy' (Johnson 2007). In the case of Zimbabwe, the study found that official figures on the exact amounts of the remittances that translate to financing infrastructural

development in rural areas are difficult to come across. Nevertheless, the study came across several infrastructural projects supported by Diaspora philanthropic arrangements in rural Zimbabwe.

The 2022 Population and Housing Census, Preliminary Migration Report showed a sharp increase in Zimbabweans moving to other countries from 2015 to 2021 (Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency 2022). Even though the research does not seek to assume causality, it, however, observes an increase in documented Diaspora philanthropic activities in rural infrastructure during the same period. For example, the study of Ncube and Gómez (2015) on the contribution of remittances to infrastructural development in the Tsholotsho District in Zimbabwe shows successful cases where the Diaspora community in South Africa financed the construction of a local healthcare centre. Through crowdfunding in Zimbabwe, Diaspora philanthropy has constructed a school block at Masibinta Secondary School in Binga district in 2021 (Citizens Initiative 2022). Citizens Initiative – a non-profit organisation – crowdfunded mostly by Diaspora communities to assist seven schools in Bikita, Chimanimani and Chipinge districts affected by Cyclone Idai in 2019. The organisation coordinated the building of classroom blocks at Rimbi Primary School and Mandara Primary School, assisted in the completion of another classroom block at Ndimba Primary School, refurbished a classroom block at Rimbi Primary School, constructed toilets at Ngangu Primary School, finished the construction of toilets at Tafara High School and supplied water pipes to connect to clean water at Ndimba High School. In Mutasa District in Manicaland Province, Madziyire's (2015) doctoral study on philanthropy, examining 29 public high schools, revealed that about two-thirds received infrastructural support. The support was on classroom blocks, library buildings, electrification of school buildings, science laboratories, teacher's quarters, toilets blocks and water supply.

Further, Hidayati (2020) emphasises the favourable influence of remittances on rural development. Although it might seem obvious that the quantum of remittance flows likely depends on two variables, which are alluded to by Straubhaar and Vâdean (2006) as migrants' ability (their income and the savings from income) and their motivation to remit savings back to the home country, there is more to it. In several countries, such as Zimbabwe, for instance, there is a link between the increase in remittances and the availability of official channels of remitting money (Kpodar & Imam 2022). However, the challenge is the presence of 'informal remittances' (Ghosh 2006). In Zimbabwe, a

significant portion of remittances is sent through informal channels and hence are challenging to account for in official statistics (Maune & Matanda 2022). Attempts to account for remittances sent through informal ways are tricky because of contested official migration statistics on Zimbabwe due to illegal migration, particularly between Zimbabwe and neighbouring countries such as South Africa and Botswana.

6 Diaspora Philanthropy in Zimbabwe's Rural Infrastructure Development: The Challenges and Opportunities

The conduct of Diaspora philanthropy in rural infrastructure development comes with several challenges and opportunities. First, in highly politically polarised countries like Zimbabwe, as shown in opinion surveys by Afrobarometer, where there is mistrust between government and citizens (Bratton & Masunungure 2018), Diaspora philanthropy is often susceptible to abuse by individuals with ulterior motives (Johnson 2007). A case is 'philanthropic contributions' aimed at political ends and not necessarily rural infrastructure development. As Johnson (2007) warns, remittances could appear to be and are counted as 'philanthropy' under local law but have much more to do with personal gain than public benefit. Musoro, Madziva, and Magaisa (2010) have argued that Diaspora citizens' engagement transcends combatant political issues and humanitarian and economic development in Zimbabwe. Akech *et al.* (2019) observe a long-existing hostility between the government of Zimbabwe and its Diaspora population, which is a stumbling block to development. For example, the ruling ZANU-PF party in Zimbabwe regards rural areas as its support base and hesitates to allow Diaspora citizens-funded projects (Muzorewa & Nyandoro 2021). These factors challenge Diaspora philanthropic activities in rural areas where developmental interventions are needed to boost infrastructure development.

Second, Diaspora philanthropy in general and Zimbabwe mainly necessitates enquiries on its long-term use as a development alternative for rural infrastructure projects, as shown by the work of Citizens Initiative in Binga, Chipinge, Bikita and Chimanimani. It can support both new projects and the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure. Still, it is unclear whether the support can be ongoing and consistent as financiers are often once-off supporters. Where commitment to support a project is shown, the fact that it is voluntary

means that members of the Diaspora can withdraw support since there will be nothing binding supporters to projects. Further, current anti-immigrant developments in South Africa will likely affect Diaspora philanthropy since the country hosts the largest share of Zimbabwe's Diaspora population. The South African government announced in 2022 that it would not renew the Zimbabwe Exemption Permit (ZEP) beyond June 2023. The ZEP allowed Zimbabweans to work legally and stay in South Africa.

Third, Akech *et al.* (2019) argue that countries of origin must remove the legal impediments that restrict the engagement of the Diasporas. Zimbabwe, for instance, must complement policies such as the National Diaspora Policy Implementation Action Plan of 2017 with supporting legislation. The Government of Zimbabwe acknowledges the criticality of reviewing the 2017 Diaspora Policy and the centrality of enacting complementary legislation to gain meaningful participation of the Diaspora in development (Government of Zimbabwe 2020:176). Currently, the Diaspora policy has no legal backing that can guide the participation of Diaspora citizens in the Diaspora to contribute to developmental activities.

Fourth, despite their importance, the costs of sending remittances are still very high, reducing their flow (Beck *et al.* 2022). Hence, the cost of remitting is a challenge that affects the contribution of Diaspora philanthropy to rural infrastructure development. According to the World Bank (2021b), sending money to sub-Saharan countries (excluding Nigeria) is expensive compared to other regions. Beck *et al.* (2022) state that the median remittance fee stood at 1% in the corridor between Russia and Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova and Ukraine in 2020. Conversely, the World Bank (2021b) explains that in 2020, for example, in sub-Saharan Africa, sending USD 200 costs an average of 8.2% of the money. This cost is above the global average of sending remittances, standing at 6.09% in 2022, up from 6.04% in 2021 (World Bank 2022a). The World Bank (2021b) notes that it was even more expensive at a regional level, where it cost an average of 14% to send money from South Africa to Zimbabwe in 2020. South Africa hosts the lion's share of Zimbabwean migrants, and they contribute a significant portion of Diaspora philanthropy contributions. In 2022, the largest remittances company by volumes, Mukuru, charged 10% of the amount sent from South Africa to Zimbabwe. The high cost of remitting discourages Diaspora communities from participating in Diaspora philanthropy. A recent study by Kpodar and Imam (2022) estimates that reducing transaction costs to the Sustainable Development

Diaspora Philanthropy for Rural Infrastructural Developmental Projects

Goal target of 3% could generate an additional USD 32 billion in remittances, higher than the direct cost savings from lower transaction costs. Hence, such a cost reduction would broaden the share channelled to Diaspora philanthropy activities.

However, Diaspora philanthropy also presents some opportunities for Diaspora communities to contribute to improving infrastructure in their communities of origin. Diaspora philanthropy covers the developmental gap from dwindling official development assistance and foreign direct investment in developing countries. Ncube and Gómez's (2015) study in the Tsholotsho District in Zimbabwe confirmed that Diaspora remittances contribute to local development. Due to Zimbabwe's apparent gaps in rural infrastructure development, Diaspora philanthropy is an effective way to convert private wealth into philanthropic capital, thanks to the current pace and breadth of human mobility (Johnson 2007). Bonga (2020) reiterates the importance of Diaspora remittances to national development. Similarly, Ncube and Gómez's (2015) study in the Tsholotsho District in Zimbabwe shows evidence of migrant remittances improving health and water infrastructure. Hence, the authorities and policymakers in Zimbabwe must begin to appreciate the value the country's migrant population in the Diaspora can bring to rural development through their contributions.

Espinosa (2016) theorises that Diaspora philanthropy is becoming an alternative to development aid. The recent scholarly attention on Diaspora philanthropy is part of inquiries examining the link between migration, remittances, and development. According to Espinosa (2016), discussions focusing on this link pose a new form of development aid and are grounded on three identifiable global trends:

- (a) the decline of official development aid;
- (b) the ballooning of private remittances; and
- (c) the professionalisation of international labour migration.

The World Bank (2021a) exposes that remittance flows to developing countries (excluding China) exceeded foreign direct investment and official development assistance in 2020. According to the World Bank (2021a), remittances stood at USD 540 billion against USD 259 billion in foreign direct investment and USD 179 billion in official development assistance in 2020.

Zimbabwe's government acknowledges the contribution of Zimbab-

we's Diaspora to the country's development. In the *National Development Strategy 1 2021-2025* policy document, the Government of Zimbabwe envisages reviewing the Diaspora policy and enacting enabling legislation. The aim is to 'improve Diaspora participation in national development' (Government of Zimbabwe 2020). As shown earlier, remittances significantly contributed about 10% of GDP to the economy in 2020 (World Bank 2022b). At the same time, the 2022 Preliminary Report on Migration released after 2022 shows an upward trajectory of Zimbabwe professionals integrating into the global labour markets between 2016 and 2021 (Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency 2022). As more professionals join the global workforce, more remittances will likely be channelled towards rural infrastructural development in Zimbabwe. Experiences from India, China, the Philippines, Israel and South Korea have shown expatriates funnelling funds towards infrastructure development (Bonga 2020; Espinosa 2016). The same can happen to Zimbabwe.

7 Recommendations and Areas for Further Research

The study indicates that the government of Zimbabwe acknowledges the importance of improving its Diaspora citizens' participation in development. The authors recommend that the government speed up the proposed 2017 National Diaspora Policy Implementation Action Plan reviewed in this chapter. It is recommended that the new Diaspora policy be guided by rules, regulations and laws that control activities such as using Diaspora philanthropic resources in developmental projects. Similarly, the government must incentivise expatriates who want to contribute to developing the communities of origin. The government must maintain an official database documenting projects supported by Diaspora philanthropists and indicating projects that willing citizens can help. Finally, it is recommended that governments and private remitting companies must work towards reducing remittance costs. As this study has noted, reducing costs will likely attract more migrants to participate and contribute to projects in the communities of origin. Since the economic situation in Zimbabwe is still relatively unstable, more and more citizens are likely to leave the country for better economic opportunities. This growing migrant population must be mobilised to contribute towards development projects in rural areas of origin. Hence, it is recommended that creating a conducive environment that supports Diaspora philanthropy as a catalyst for sustainable infrastructural development in rural communities in Zimbabwe is critical.

In this chapter, the authors note research gaps that need further investigation. First, studies providing a framework for Diaspora philanthropy in rural infrastructure development are difficult to source. Currently, such a framework is challenging to find in available studies. Second, in Zimbabwe, just like Sidel (2021) captures in Asia, there are no significant studies to observe the evolvement of Diaspora philanthropy from *ad hoc* practices into a sustainable, structured and organised approach to Diaspora philanthropic contribution to rural areas' development. Therefore, there is a need for research and strategies that focus on translating *ad hoc* philanthropic activities by migrants living abroad into channelled activities that aid in the developmental infrastructure strategies for rural development.

Despite the evidence on Diaspora philanthropic activities in Zimbabwe, further studies are needed to explore the extent of Diaspora philanthropic activities to improve public infrastructure in rural areas and the primary type of projects attracting Diaspora philanthropist support. For example, this data must be comparable to district or provincial data on the major Diaspora countries where most philanthropists reside and their intermediaries. These studies must be empirical and possibly undertaken in line with quantitative approaches to address the above information gap. For example, such studies can address what Sidel (2021) describes as the challenges of statistically distilling money meant categorically for philanthropic activities from remittances.

8 Conclusion

The primary aim of this chapter was to examine the trends, challenges, and opportunities of Diaspora philanthropy in rural infrastructure development. Following a qualitative approach, the analysis centred on Zimbabwe. Document analysis and literature reviews were used to collect data which exposed that Diaspora philanthropy can support developmental projects in rural areas. The findings showed growth in Diaspora-supported programmes since 2015. The cost of remitting, the absence of a coherent policy framework, and uncertainty in South Africa, where the South African government decided not to renew ZEPs beyond June 2023, are some challenges affecting the conduct and sustainability of Diaspora philanthropy. It was also revealed that from the policy level in Zimbabwe, the government acknowledges the significance of improving the participation of its Diaspora population in development. Identified cases show Diaspora communities using intermediaries such as

Citizens Initiatives to build and rehabilitate rural schools in Chipinge, Chimanimani, and Binga. More so, it is recommended that the government must speed up the process of reviewing the Diaspora policy and work towards reducing remittance costs.

References

- Akech, J.G., U.M. Assim, S.C. Mutambasere, T. Ramakhula & C.K. Tutlam 2019. Africa's Democratic Deficit: The Role of the Diaspora in Bridging the Gap between Citizens and Government. *Global Campus Human Rights Journal* 3,1: 28 - 51.
- Alechenu, B.E. 2021. Economic Impact of Diaspora Remittance on Nigerian Economy. *London Journal of Social Sciences* 1,1: 79 - 87.
<https://doi.org/10.31039/ljss.2021.1.41>
- Babis, D., E. Zychlinski & M. Kagan 2021. Comparing Transnational and Communal Diaspora Philanthropies among Temporary Migrant Workers: The Case of the Filipino Community in Israel. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 32, 2: 372 - 382.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-020-00304-8>
- Beck, T., M. Janfils & K. Kpodar 2022. What Explains Remittance Fees? Panel Evidence. *International Monetary Fund Working Paper*. Available at: <https://www.imf.org//media/Files/Publications/WP/2022/English/wpiea2022063-print-pdf.ashx>
(Accessed on 12 April 2023).
<https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400205439.001>
- Bonga, W.G. 2020. Understanding Diaspora Remittances Levels in Zimbabwe (2009 - 2020) Including Future Forecasts Using the ARIMA Technique (2020 - 2022). *European Journal of Research Development and Sustainability* 1, 2: 10 - 21.
- Bratton, M. & E.V. Masunungure 2018. Heal the Beloved Country: Zimbabwe's Polarized Electorate. *Afrobarometer Policy Paper* No. 49. Available at: https://www.africaportal.org/documents/18766/ab_r7_policypaperno49_heal_the_beloved_country_zimbabwes_polarized_electorate.pdf.
(Accessed on 12 April 2023).
- Citizens Initiative 2022. *Together We Can Make a Difference*. Available at:

<https://www.citizensinitiative.org/>

(Accessed 12 April 2023).

Eisenstadt, S.N. 2009. New Transnational Communities and Networks: Globalization Changes in Civilizational Frameworks. Ben-Rafael, B & Y. Sternberg (eds.): *Transnationalism: Diasporas and the Advent of a New (Dis) Order*. Leiden/ Boston: Brill.

<https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004174702.i-788.6>

Espinosa, S.A. 2016. Diaspora Philanthropy: The Making of a New Development Aid? *Migration and Development* 5,3: 361 - 377.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2015.1053305>

Flanigan, S.T. 2017. Crowdfunding and Diaspora Philanthropy: An Integration of the Literature and Significant Concepts. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 28, 2: 492 - 509.

<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-016-9755-7>

Ghosh, B. 2006. *Migrants' Remittances and Development: Myths, Rhetoric and Realities*. Grand-Saconnex, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Gnimassoun, B. & J.C. Anyanwu 2019. The Diaspora and Economic Development in Africa. *Review of World Economics* 155, 4: 785 - 817.

<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-019-00344-3>

Government of Zimbabwe 2020. *National Development Strategy 1 (2021-2025)*. Harare: Government Printers.

Hidayati, I. 2020. Migration and Rural Development: The Impact of Remittance. Paper Presented at the IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 25th - 26th September 2021, Jakarta, Indonesia.

Johnson, P.D. 2007. *Diaspora Philanthropy: Influences, Initiatives, and Issues*. Boston, MA: Philanthropic Initiative.

Johnson, P.D., S.P. Johnson & A. Kingman 2004. *Promoting Philanthropy: Global Challenges and Approaches*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Available at:

<https://www.cbd.int/financial/charity/g-promotingphilglobal.pdf>.

(Accessed on 12 April 2023.)

Kapesa, T., G. Mugano & H. Fourie 2021. Financing Public Infrastructure in Zimbabwe: Current Trends and Future Alternatives. *Public and Municipal Finance* 10, 1: 82 - 93. [https://doi.org/10.21511/pmf.10\(1\).2021.07](https://doi.org/10.21511/pmf.10(1).2021.07) PMID:35512788

Kpodar, K. & P.A. Imam 2022. *How Do Transaction Costs Influence Remit-*

tances? Available at:

<https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/journals/001/2022/218/001.2022.issue-218-en.pdf> (Accessed on 12 April 2023)

<https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400224270.001>

Madziyire, G.T. 2015. *Evaluating the Impact of Philanthropic Activities in Public High Schools in Mutasa District, Zimbabwe: An Educational Management Perspective*. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Manivannan, J.K. 2006. *Virtual Leadership: The Next Phase of Diaspora Philanthropy*. New York: CUNY Center for the Study of Philanthropy.

Maune, A. & E. Matanda 2022. The Impact of Foreign Remittances on Economic Growth: Evidence from Zimbabwe. *Acta Universitatis Danubius, Conomica* 18, 4. Available at:

<https://dj.univ-anubius.ro/index.php/AUDOE/article/view/1851>

(Accessed on 12 April 2023).

Mitra, P. 2016. Addition by Subtraction: How Diasporas Can Boost Home-Country Growth. Available at:

<https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2016/05/18/addition-by-subtraction-how-diasporas-can-boost-home-country-growth>

(Accessed on 12 April 2023).

Mostafavi, A., D. Abraham & A. Vives 2014. Exploratory Analysis of Public Perceptions of Innovative Financing for Infrastructure Systems in the US. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice* 70: 10 - 23.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2014.10.002>

Musoro, L., C. Madziva & A.T. Magaisa 2010. Building Bridges between Host and Home: The Zimbabwean Diaspora in the UK. Paper presented at the Law, Society & Social Justice Conference, University of Surrey. Available at: <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/45088>

(Accessed on 12 April 2023).

Muzorewa, T.T. & M. Nyandoro 2021. The Rural Electorate in Zimbabwe's Elections 1980 - 2018: Consciousness and Voting Preferences. *Journal of African Elections* 20, 2: 141 - 164.

<https://doi.org/10.20940/JAE/2021/v20i2a8>

Ncube, G. & G. Gómez 2015. Remittances in Rural Zimbabwe: From Consumption to Investment? *International Journal of Development and Sustainability* 4, 2: 181 - 195.

Newland, K., A. Terrazas & R. Munster 2010. *Diaspora Philanthropy: Private Giving and Public Policy*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Diaspora Philanthropy for Rural Infrastructural Developmental Projects

- Nieuwenhuis, J. & B. Smit 2012. Qualitative Research. In Wagner, C., B. Kawulich & M. Garner (eds.): *Doing Social Research: A Global Context*. London: McGraw-Hill.
- Onwuegbuzie, A.J. & R.K. Frels 2012. Writing a Literature Review. In Wagner, C., B. Kawulich & M. Garner (eds.): *Doing Social Research: A Global Context*. London: McGraw-Hill.
- Orozco, M. 2013. *Migrant Remittances and Development in the Global Economy: Diasporas in World Politics*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
<https://doi.org/10.1515/9781626370340>
- Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2021. *Monetary Policy Statement: Staying on Course in Fostering Price and Financial System Stability*. Harare: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.
- Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2022. *Mid-Term Monetary Policy Statement: Restoring Price and Exchange Rate Stability*. Available at: <https://www.rbz.co.zw/documents/mps/2022/Monetary-Policy-Statement-August-2022-.pdf> (Accessed on 12 April 2023.)
- Shaul Bar Nissim, H. 2019. New Diaspora Philanthropy? The Philanthropy of the UJA-Federation of New York toward Israel. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 48, 4: 839 - 858.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764019828048>
- Sidel, M. 2021. A Decade of Research and Practice of Diaspora Philanthropy in the Asia Pacific Region: The State of the Field. *University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper* 1677.
- Silva, A.S.F. 2012. Document Analysis. In Wagner, C., B. Kawulich & M. Garner (ed.): *Doing Social Research: A Global Context*. London: McGraw-Hill.
- Singh, N. & P. Koiri 2018. Migration, Diaspora and Development: Impressions from India. *Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy* 12, 4: 472 - 487.
<https://doi.org/10.1108/JEC-12-2016-0044>
- Straubhaar, T. & F.P. Vâdean 2006. *International Migrant Remittances and their Role in Development*. Paris: OECD.
<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264013896-3-en>
- Tevera, D. & A. Chikanda 2008. *Migrant Remittances and Household Survival in Zimbabwe*. Cape Town: Idasa.
- United Nations - Zimbabwe 2021. *Common Country Analysis Zimbabwe 2021*.

Available at:

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNCT_ZW_CommOnCountryAnalysis_2021Final_0.pdf

(Accessed on 12 April 2023.)

United States of America Department of State 2022. *2022 Investment Climate Statements: Zimbabwe*. Available at:

<https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-investment-climate-statements/zimbabwe/>

(Accessed in 12 April 2023.)

Wescott, C.G. 2006. *Harnessing Knowledge Exchange among Overseas Professionals of Afghanistan, People's Republic of China, and the Philippines*. Paper Presented at the Labour Migration Workshop, New York. Available at:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=893246

(Accessed on 12 April 2023).

Wescott, C.G. & J.M. Brinkerhoff 2006. *Converting Migration Drains into Gains: Harnessing the Resources of Overseas Professionals*. Manila Philippines: Asian Development Bank.

<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.893246>

World Bank 2019. Migration and Remittances. Available at:

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/labormarkets/brief/migration-and-remittances> (Accessed on 12 April 2023.)

World Bank 2021a. *Defying Predictions, Remittance Flows Remain Strong during the COVID-19 Crisis*. Available at:

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/05/12/defying-predictions-remittance-flows-remain-strong-during-covid-19-crisis>.

(Accessed on 12 April 2023).

World Bank 2022a. *Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (Current US\$) - Sub-Saharan Africa*. Available at:

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=ZG>

(Accessed on 12 April 2023.)

World Bank 2021b. *Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) – Zimbabwe*. Available at:

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=ZW> (Accessed on 12 April 2023).

World Bank 2022c. *Personal Remittances, Received (Current US\$) – Zimbabwe*. Available at:

Diaspora Philanthropy for Rural Infrastructural Developmental Projects

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=ZW> (Accessed on 12 April 2023.)

Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency 2022. *2022 Population and Housing Census: Preliminary Report on Migration*. Available at:

https://www.zimstat.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Migration_2022_PHC_Report_Final.pdf.
(Accessed on 12 April 2023).

Lewis Edwin Chigova
Afrocentric Governance of Public Affairs
North-West University
South Africa
lewisec47@gmail.com

Costa Hofisi
Afrocentric Governance of Public Affairs
North-West University
South Africa
costa.hofisi@nwu.ac.za

SECTION II

FOREIGN REMITTANCES

CHAPTER 5

Impact of COVID-19 on International Migration and Remittances

Awa Zihindula

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9116-7046>

Abstract

The working migrants in the Diaspora have long been a source of income for their families and contributors to the economic development of their countries of origin. However, since the Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) outbreak, many migrant workers have lost their jobs as countries experienced economic recession and struggled to open their economies fully. The loss of employment ultimately affected the remittance volume to receiving countries that have long been dependent on the latter as their source of income, potentially leading to financial problems for recipients of these funds. In this chapter, the author sought to determine the impact of COVID-19 on migration and remittances flow before and during the outbreak of the pandemic in European Union (EU) countries. She adopted the developmental pluralistic theoretical framework in addition to existing literature related to the topic. In this fully quantitative study, secondary data was used for European Union and African countries, and most of the selected countries have records of legal migrant workers. Data were accessed from the World Bank and the International Labour Organization databases from 2012 to 2020 and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs from 2005 to 2020. The data was analysed using a multiple regression model through ‘RStudio’ statistical software to verify the association between outward remittances as a dependent variable, unemployment, the number of migrant workers and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as independent variables. The results showed that COVID-19 impacted the rate of sending remittances home and decreased migration. These results contributed to the sparse literature on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on working migrants and remittances. They provided useful recommendations for policy formulation for both the host and recipient countries.

Keywords: migrant workers, diaspora, remittances, COVID-19 pandemic, socio-economic factors, developing countries, EU countries.

1 Introduction

While there are significant studies on international migration and remittances, many of these studies do not share concerns about the impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic on international migration and remittances (Koczan, Peri, Pinat & Rozhkov 2021). COVID-19 was declared a health crisis by the World Health Organisation (WHO), and it is associated with an economic crisis affecting the incomes of both developed and third-world countries (Devermont & Olander 2020). Existing literature provides evidence on how remittances are influenced by many socio-economic factors, including epidemiological factors (Chaudhary 2020; Rajan & Zachariah 2019). The various government responses to the impact of the novel coronavirus on their economies varied significantly across the globe depending on the size and shape of the respective economy. The African Union Commission (2020) acknowledges changes in financial and labour flows, particularly remittances in developing countries. Apart from the healthcare, retail, and agriculture sectors, tourism, construction and manufacturing sectors were hugely affected. These sectors generally employ a significant number of foreign nationals and were affected in different ways by lockdown measures introduced in different countries to avoid the transmission of COVID-19 (Smith-Bingham & Hariharan 2020).

The working migrants in the Diaspora have long been a source of income to their families and contributors to the economic development of their countries of origin (Bodomo 2013; Lindley 2009; Woldemariam & Yiheyis 2017). Remittances and migration are two crucial factors in enhancing the economic conditions of individuals from their country of origin (Inoue 2018; Siddique *et al.* 2016). Most developing countries depend on financial resources in the form of remittances, which assists them in solving financial problems, taking care of their families, and investing money in some business (Azizi 2021; Hossain 2015; Inoue 2018). Thus, inward remittances address socio-economic issues like low incomes, access to medical care, food, and education.

There is sparse research on the impact of COVID-19 on migration and remittances. Recent findings suggest that international migration and remittances positively impact sending and destination regions (Cuong & Linh 2018;

Howell 2017; De Haas 2007). Furthermore, migration affects individuals, families, and sending and receiving countries. Migration, especially from low-income to high-income countries, has enabled migrants and their families to improve their income by bringing in remittances, a key component of GDP because of their higher-paying jobs in the destination country (Adhikari, Clemens, Dempster & Ekeator 2021; Borjas 2003). Host countries also benefit from migration as they welcome skilled migrant workers who participate in the workforce and add to the economic outcome or human capital (Subbotin & Aref 2021). For instance, migrant scientists (mainly mathematicians, physicians and computer scientists) move from Russia to the United Kingdom, Germany, and France (Antoshchuk 2018; Ball & Gerber 2005; Korobkov & Zaionchkovskaia 2012; Ryazantsev 2013). Hence, host countries benefit from cheap labour and scarce skills posts which skilled migrants fill.

Moreover, in Nigeria, the growing, educated, and unemployed youths leave the country for Europe, mostly Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, searching for job opportunities in the shortage skills industries and strengthening the old growing population in the mentioned countries (Adhikari *et al.* 2021). Nigeria is one of the sub-Saharan countries where 36% (in 2014) to 52% (2018) of the youth population desired to leave due to the high unemployment rate (Adhikari *et al.* 2021). When these young skilled people arrive and start working in Europe or America, part of their income is sent home as a remittance.

Remittances subsidised about 15-20% of GDP globally (Luce 2014). In addition, migration enhances globalisation through international trade (Foreign Direct Investments) and technological transfers (Koczan *et al.* 2021). However, the flip side of migration is that it can be detrimental for sending countries, as they lose human capital, primarily through brain drain (Straubhaar 2018). Based on the migration network effect theory, migration can lead to more future migration (Koczan *et al.* 2021). This study acknowledges that remittances sent home to siblings or networks are hard to be traced as they are channelled through informal systems; hence this was not included in this study.

On the other hand, migration affects the receiving countries, especially the repercussions in the labour markets, through competition for jobs with the host country's citizens (Friedberg & Hunt 2018; Ratha, Mohapatra and Scheja 2011). For many years, international migration and remittances have increased (Barne & Pirlea 2019). However, the COVID-19 pandemic has affected international migration and remittance flows, potentially harming the socio-economic status of migrants in both sending and destination countries (Bisong *et al.* 2020).

This chapter is a conceptual and empirical evaluation of the impact of COVID-19 on migration and remittance flows before and during the outbreak of COVID-19 in EU countries. The primary objective is to investigate socio-economic factors that influence the outflow of international migration and remittances, focusing on the COVID-19 pandemic.

2 Problem Statement

The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in developing countries experiencing changing economic landscapes and a shift in inward remittances. Existing literature proves that most developing countries primarily depend on remittances (Escribà-Folch, Meseguer & Wright 2015; Mohapatra, Joseph & Ratha 2012). In addition, remittances are regarded as the source of wealth for most families in developing countries and contribute financially to the household's needs (Cuong & Linh 2018). A thorough evaluation of the pandemic's effects on recipient nations is essential to filling in the literature gaps.

Although migration benefits the destination country through brain gain, the pandemic shifted the global economic landscape. For instance, EU countries imposed several COVID-19 regulations, which impacted the movement of people in and out of their countries. As the recipients of most migrants, the EU countries (Gabriël *et al.* 2015) suffered the most consequences of the pandemic due to travel restrictions. The migration factor works alongside remittances, thereby complementing each other. However, the extent to which COVID-19 affected migration and remittances remains under-researched. Although remittances are driven by migration, COVID-19 and its related regulations, such as travel restrictions, have substantially shifted the migration patterns and the global economic landscape, which calls for further intellectual interrogation.

3 Literature Review

This section gives an overview of the claim that international migration impacted remittances during COVID-19 using arguments propounded by optimistic developmental theorists. The passage describes the current state of international migration and remittance flows by examining annual panel data studies conducted in different countries. Migration and the subsequent remittances lead to expanded wages and diminished destitution, just as improved well-being and schooling develop the country's economy for a sending country

(Chaudhary 2020; Ratha, Mohapatra & Scheja 2011; Siddique, Shehzadi, Manzoor & Majeed 2016; Woldemariam & Yiheyis 2017). In any case, these additions could involve significant social expenses for travellers and their families.

Since many developing nations are likewise significant beneficiaries of global remittances, they face difficulties integrating migrants, rivalry for work among migrants and native specialists (Jaquet, Kohler & Schwilch 2019; Ratha *et al.* 2011), and the expense costs related to providing the arrangement of social administration to migrants. The economic implications of COVID-19 cannot be underestimated, especially for its ability to have caused job losses to general workers and the self-employed, who altogether became unable to gain money to be sent home through remittance.

Scientific evidence further reveals that every pandemic outbreak affects remittances, not just COVID-19. Studies conducted during the Ebola outbreak in some parts of Africa show that incomes were affected negatively in Africa during Ebola (Anderson 2014). Anderson's study shows that many people quit their jobs due to the fear of contracting the disease, thus reducing financial interaction (Anderson 2014). However, during this period, there were rules and regulations, such as a travel ban, to avoid the spread of Ebola (Cohen 2016).

Pandemics such as Cholera and Typhoid fever have had a high incidence in Sub-Saharan countries and other countries such as India, South-East Asia, and the Arabian Peninsula. Individuals from these countries could not travel unless they took the necessary precautions to prevent spreading these diseases (Amicizia *et al.* 2019). These precautions subsequently affected migration and remittances (Bisong *et al.* 2021).

Although there have been significant studies about the impact of a pandemic on migration and remittances separately, the contribution of this chapter is unique in that it looks at the recent pandemic, COVID-19 and its effects on migration and remittances in the EU countries. It compares it to previous studies that considered Africa only and looks at this from a policy perspective.

3.1 Remittances Flow from Europe

A World Bank report shows that remittances to low- and middle-income countries hit a new high in 2019 [USD 554 billion or EUR 503 billion] (World Bank 2019). In 2020, they were expected to reach USD 574 billion (EUR 521 billion). The EU, non-EU and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) countries combined account for 55% of global remittances (European Migration Network 2020). The top sending countries globally are the United States, Switzerland, Germany, France, and Luxembourg. The net sending European countries of personal transfers are predominantly from the western half of the EU. The top five sending nations in the EU are France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Ireland.

As the impact of COVID-19 on the economic growth of EU countries is unclear, the outlook for the value of remittances to the source country remains uncertain. In the past, remittances were countercyclical. Workers sent money to their homes in times of crisis. However, the COVID-19 pandemic affected all countries by creating additional uncertainty and significantly slowed immigration payments to families in developing countries (Soava, Mehedintu, Sterpu & Raduteanu 2020). Another effect of COVID-19 was that the employed population decreased, and investments were the main factors that led to the reduction of the GDP growth rate.

According to Saova *et al.* (2020), lower remittance flows had severe and lasting effects on households that depend on this income to meet their basic needs. COVID-19 was a big shock to the European economy, and the EU Member States took budgetary and political measures to support the sectors particularly hard hit and, implicitly, citizens.

The European Commission created an Investment Initiative in response to COVID-19 to help member states fund their response to the COVID-19 crisis. The initiative combined mobilising immediate financial support from structural funds to meet the most pressing needs and maximum flexibility in using funds (Castellarin 2020). Unfortunately, for the remittances-receiving countries in Africa, the complexity of financial challenges that the continent faced before the pandemic would not allow the governments to create such an investment initiative in response to COVID-19 as did their European counterparts. Ultimately, the economic stability of Europe and its ability to tackle financial challenges are some of the pull factors for migrants.

3.2 Migration in Europe

In Europe, three distinct factors largely influenced worldwide migration patterns in the second part of the 20th and early 21st centuries (Aldcroft & Morewood 2012). The lack of skilled labour in Northern and Western Europe, European decolonisation, and the development and subsequent fall of the Communist bloc

in Central and Eastern Europe have substantially impacted migration patterns (Aldcroft & Morewood 2012). Several northern and western European countries have recovered from the devastation of the Second World War (WWII), unprecedented economic development after 1950, the 1973-1974 economic slumps, or the impact of the global financial crisis (Aldcroft & Morewood 2012). The increased need for labour in these countries was due to post-war recovery and rapid economic growth, which the country's workforce could not meet. In non-communist Europe, three big overlapping migratory waves may have been witnessed due to the Second World War: labour migration, the family movement for reunion, and post-industrial migration (Naydenov 2018). Post-colonial migration movements should be examined in addition to these three migratory waves.

Migration is an essential source of remittances for emerging economies. Remittance flows are a fundamental component of the welfare of citizens in emerging economies, as millions of households exceed self-sufficiency levels and contribute to improving health, education, living conditions and even entrepreneurship (Mehedintu, Soava & Sterpu 2019). The EU's freedom of movement allows migrants to return home frequently and directly bring home their money earned abroad. Hence, the actual remittance flow will likely be significant and higher than the official data flow.

3.3 Current Trends of International Migration and Remittances

Kalantaryan and McMahon (2020:6) highlight that remittances are an integral element 'for economic growth and poverty alleviation by ensuring a flow of financial resources from migrants in Diasporas to households and communities in other countries'. According to the Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbook (BOPSY), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) report provides statistics on remittances derived as the sum of three remittance categories (IMF 1993). The latter comprises 'workers' remittances', which are payments made by migrants who live and work in a different country, and 'workers' remuneration', which includes all costs and other financial benefits accrued by migrant workers. Finally, migrant transfers are financial assets acquired through moving from one country to another (International Monetary Fund 1993).

As Figure 1.1 shows, remittances rapidly increased, especially in developing countries, before the advent of COVID-19. Remittances attained an annual real growth rate of approximately 13% between 1991 and 2008, more

than the actual yearly growth rate of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) at 11% and Official Development Assistance (ODA) at approximately 6% (Yang 2011). Between 2005 and 2012, remittances roughly doubled, according to the World Bank (Larsson & Ångman 2014). Remittance inflows to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were estimated to reach USD 46 billion in 2019 (Bisong *et al.* 2020).

With the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, remittance inflows were expected to decline by approximately 23% in 2020 (Bisong *et al.* 2020; Quinn 2020). However, remittance flows were stable during the COVID-19 crisis despite these predictions. For example, remittances to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) only fell by roughly 2% in 2020, from USD 548 billion in 2019 to USD 540 billion (World Bank 2020). Instead, remittances increased by 6.5% in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2020 (World Bank 2020).




Figure 1.1: The rapid growth of remittances over two decades. Source: World Bank Migration and Development Brief

Regarding the US dollar, India, China, Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt were the top five remittance-receiving economies in 2020. In contrast, Tonga, Lebanon, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and El Salvador topped the recipient countries list regarding GDP share (World Bank 2020).

In 2019, the following countries received remittances that accounted for more than 10% of their GDP: South Sudan 34.4%, Lesotho 21.3%, Gambia 15.5%, Zimbabwe 13.5%, Cabo Verde 11.7%, Comoros 11.5% and Senegal at 10.5% (Kalantaryan & McMahon 2020). However, in 2020, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States of America topped the list of source countries for remittances (World Bank 2020). According to 2012 remittances statistics, East Asia and the Pacific topped the list of receiving more remittances at 31%, followed by South Asia at 22%, Latin America and the Caribbean at 17%, Europe and Central Africa at 11% (World Bank 2019); the Middle East and North Africa at 11%, and SSA at 8% (Ratha *et al.* 2020).

Certain studies argue that outward remittances negatively affect GDP growth (Al Akayleh 2016; Chami, Jahjah & Fullenkamp 2003; Meyer & Shera 2017). Conversely, one study found that GDP positively affected outward remittances (Lambovska, Sardinha & Belas 2021). The literature explored indicated that remittances' effects on GDP growth depend on the beneficiaries' use of the received remittances. For example, a remittance receiver who spends money on clothing contributes to the GDP growth differently from the receiver who buys land, employs workers and starts producing for the community's consumption.

Furthermore, scientifically it is agreed that remittances reduce poverty and enhance economic growth in receiving countries (Adams & Cuenquecha 2013; World Bank 2014). However, other studies showed that remittances have the potential for brain draining (Beine, Docquier & Rapoport 2001; Gibson & McKenzie 2012). According to Larsson and Angman (2014), analysing remittances must not only concentrate on their effect on development.

4 Conceptual Framework

The pluralistic developmental theory, which neoclassical economists embrace, was developed in the late 1980s and 1990s, and it brought out a new argument regarding migration, remittances and development. This theory places migration in both a positive and negative perspective. It argues that migration increases the flow of remittances and knowledge, skills, and awareness that immigrants obtain in a foreign country, which would either improve or derail progress in both the sending and destination states (Taylor 1999). The pluralistic developmental theory further links the motives and impact of migration, highlighting that

migration can positively or negatively impact development and economic growth (De Haas 2007).

Therefore, it is essential to understand the relationship between migration, remittances, and economic growth. As such, the effects of migration and remittances are context-dependent (De Haas 2007). No theory explicitly explores the relationship between migration and remittances on one side, and developmental and economic growth, on the other side. Migration brings about balanced growth because it contributes to the best allocation of production factors, such as labour and income, which benefit all similarly sending and destination countries (De Haas 2007). For instance, migrants would invest in their home countries, thus stimulating economic development (Adenutsi 2010; De Haas 2007). On the other hand, migration can be detrimental to growth, as propounded by the pluralistic developmental theory.

4.1 Developmental Pluralistic Conceptual Framework

The framework works on the notion that the economies of remittances recipient countries (also migrant-sending countries) are stratified into macro- and micro-levels (Larsson & Ångman 2014). The macro-level highlights how and where remittances are spent and issues related to brain drain or brain gain are engaged, at the macro-economic level in the sending country. The micro-level indicates remittance spending in sending country. It highlights that remittances are expended on local and foreign goods, relying on the recipient country's economy (De Haas 2007). For instance, during Zimbabwe's economic meltdown in 2000, remittances could be used to buy goods in neighbouring South Africa because of the country's shortages.

Therefore, the impact on the macro-level is determined by whether remittances are spent on domestic or foreign products. On the same level, brain drain is widely associated with negative impacts on migrant-sending countries. There would be a lower labour supply in many industries as people migrate. The framework provides a basis for the argument that challenges are associated with remittance inflows at macro-levels. They are associated with an increased risk of corruption in the recipient country, thus affecting economic and developmental growth (Berdiev *et al.* 2013; Chami *et al.* 2008)

The association between macro- and micro-levels of migration is shown in Figure 1.2 below. The pluralistic framework further proposed that macro- and micro-levels of migration and remittances highlight positive developmental and

economic growth (Larsson & Ångman 2014). For instance, it has been demonstrated that when remittances are sent to less stable economies, they boost the demand-supply chain, thereby increasing jobs (De Haas 2007).

As the optimistic developmental theory outlines, remittances alleviate poverty, which is also widely embraced by the pluralistic developmental framework. Nevertheless, remittances also negatively impact the meso-level, especially impoverished communities that cannot afford to send their people abroad.




FIGURE 1.2: Developmental pluralistic conceptual framework. Source: (de Haas 2010:27)

5 Hypothesis

The hypothesis testing is that remittances and migration have decreased because of the adverse economic effects of the Coronavirus pandemic. The guidelines and lockdown regulations – especially the ‘stay at home’ call – may have affected migrants’ ability to transfer money to their home countries. The tested hypotheses were:

- Ho: There is no relationship between remittances and migrant workers;
- H1: There is a relationship between remittances and migrant workers;
- Ho: Unemployment does not affect the act of sending money home; and
- H2: Unemployment does affect the act of sending money home.

6 Aim and Objectives

6.1 Aim

The study aims to investigate the impact of COVID-19 on migration and remittances in the European Union Countries.

6.2 Objectives

The following objectives were developed to answer the research question:

- To compare migration and remittance frequencies before and during the COVID-19 pandemic period;
- To understand the potential economic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on remittances; and
- To integrate the analysis of international migration with the study of remittances in the era of COVID-19 epidemiological issues.

7 Research Methodology

The authors of this study evaluated the impact of COVID-19 on international migration and remittances and adopted a quantitative method.

7.1 Research Design

This study used a causal-comparative design, a form of research that attempts to identify and determine the causal relationship between two or more groups. Causal comparative studies are studies in which researchers attempt to resolve the reasons or causes for the differences in individual groups. Apuke (2017) mentioned that the causal comparison includes categorical independent and dependent variables, while related studies only include quantitative variables. Furthermore, comparative causal studies provide better evidence of causality than correlation studies.

The association between remittances and migrant workers is assessed. In addition, the control variable was involved in the study to verify its effect on the dependent variable. Thus, the causal-comparative design fits the data since it aims to establish a relationship between variables.

7.2 Data and Sampling

Simple random sampling was used to collect data. This sampling method is used when every element in the population has an equal probability of being selected

and included in the sample (Apuke 2017). Data can be collected using different instruments in different research. According to Kumar (2018), data can be collected primarily or using the existing secondary data. Primary data is collected using questionnaires, interviews and surveys.

In contrast, secondary data is already collected data that is accessed from desktops, different population organisations, and depending on the research's plan to be answered. In this study, the author used secondary data. This data type was used because it was easily accessible, helped save time, and was less costly. Although the possibility of getting this data was less stressful, permission still had to be requested to access some of this data.

This cross-sectional data was collected from reputable sources such as the World Bank, the Migration Data Portal, the United Nations, and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The dataset used is from these different sources. The reason for using this number of sources is that all the variables were not found in one dataset. Thus, the author merged the various datasets to facilitate the computation. Below are the sources for each of the datasets classified differently depending on the content and timeline:

- Outflow remittances data available from 2012 to 2020 (World Bank);
- Stock migration data available from 2005 to 2020 (United Nations DESA);
- Working-age population data available from the year 2012 to 2020 (International Labour Organisation); and
- The control variables are unemployment from 2012 to 2020 and annual GDP growth per capita (World Bank).

European Union countries were selected as a sample because they are part of the sending countries and were the first to be affected by the pandemic. The data is available and accessible for use from all the selected EU countries, unlike African countries. Most people migrate from developing countries in Africa and Asia to Europe, searching for greener pastures. It is important to note that remittances were measured in outward remittances since they are sent out of these countries to the developing world, especially in SSA countries.

European countries were selected in this study because these are among the best-remittances-sending countries to Africa. They were also the first to be affected by the pandemic. The data is available as many people use formal bank transactions.

7.3 Methods

The study involves numeric data from the World Bank, the ILO and the United States Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). The cross-national data covered 188 countries, while the data used covered 28 EU countries. In the study, the authors investigated the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on migration and remittances. The study hypothesises that migration and remittances were affected by the COVID-19 outbreak. Thus, the nature of the dataset determines the convenient approach for the analysis.

Therefore, the quantitative investigation was adopted for this study and could be a strategy for examining objective hypotheses by testing the relationship among factors that can be measured using instruments (Pandey & Pandey 2015).

Quantitative inquiry is a strategy that depends on surveys where reactions are scored numerically or using auxiliary information. The author performed data extraction and quality assessment and applied statistical methods to summarise data quantitatively.

This study adopted a quantitative approach because the datasets were numerical, and the association between variables were established statistically. The cross-sectional study focused on the value of remittances in the year 2012 to 2020 and migration in the year 2005 to 2020, and the aim was to establish the association between the variables in the pandemic era.

7.3.1 Analysis

The study used a linear regression model to check the relationship between remittances and migration. General Regression models were generated to establish the relationship between remittances (X) and migrant workers (Y) and control variables such as unemployment and GDP growth per capita. Because the dataset for the dependent and independent variables is in ABC format, with more than one independent variable, the multiple linear regression model (MLR) was suitable for the data analysis. The underlying hypothesis and assumptions of the MLR are that there must be a relationship between the outcome variable and the independent variables. Scatterplots can also show a linear or curvilinear relationship between the variables. Multiple regression assumes that the residuals are normally distributed.

An analysis of the causal relationship between outward remittances and migrant workers was performed to determine how these two were affected in

the era of COVID-19. The control variables, such as unemployment and GDP growth per capita, were used to check whether they affected the model imposed by their presence.

Descriptive statistics were performed to determine the mean and standard deviation to describe the sample data.

As this study focuses solely on working migrants sending remittances from Europe to Africa, the following variables were considered:

Variables	Description
MigrantsW	Migrant workers
UnemplR	Unemployment
OutwardRemit	Outward remittances
GDP growth	Gross Domestic Product annual growth

8 Results and Analysis

8.1 Results


The choice of using migrant workers instead of migrants is that the high probability of sending remittances home is associated with the migrant workers. Before running the test, the data's validity and reliability were checked, and a correlation matrix was performed. The outcome in Table 1 performed in RStudio and R Markdown shows a correlation among all the variables, which validates the use of these variables. The scatterplot in Figure 2 also indicates a relationship between the above-selected variables.

Table 1: Correlation Matrix (2012-2020)

	MigrantW	UnemplR	OutwardsRemit	GDP growth
MigrantW	1	0.659	0.599	-0.180
UnemplR	0.659	1	0.161	-0.115
Outwardsremit	0.599	0.161	1	-0.118
GDP growth	-0.180	-0.115	-0.118	1

8.1.1 Scatterplot Matrix for Regression Variables

The Scatterplot matrix (Figure 2) output from RStudio shows other relationships among the variables.



It is seen that Outward remittances and migrants as a measure of migration are associated. None of the independent variables has a high correlation, or else there could not be of any use having them in the equation. The results could have been slightly the same after adding the variables with a high correlation.

Before engaging in any regression analysis, getting an idea of the dataset was essential. It consisted of performing a descriptive dataset statistic to understand what the sample conveys.

	Vars	N	Mean	Sd	Median	Trimme	Mad	Min	Max	Range	Skew	Kurtosis
MigrantW	1	279.00	1240.24	2152.24	293.34	718.79	404.34	0.00	10904.49	10904.49	2.59	6.58
UnemplR	2	279.00	728.63	1137.08	239.65	465.87	251.06	5.33	6041.82	6036.49	2.29	5.03
Outward Remit	3	279.00	4.23	6.47	1.00	2.77	1.18	0.00	28.18	28.18	2.04	3.59
GDP growth	4	279.00	1.67	3.55	2.03	1.90	2.19	-10.84	25.18	36.02	0.23	7.31

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (2012-2020) Source: R studio and R markdown output

Descriptive statistics helped to see the dispersion of the data by the variance. Standard deviation determined how far the observation was from the mean, where skewness and kurtosis determined the data distribution. The variable

GDP growth has a skewness value of 0.23. Thus, the distribution is approximately symmetric. The other variables, namely MigrantW, UnemplR, and OutwardsRemitt, have a skewness value of 2, making them positively skewed. The fact that all the kurtosis values are over 3 implies that most values observed are more significant than the mean.

8.1.2 The Trend of Migration in the European Union Countries

The dataset from UNDESA containing migration stock for both genders was used to observe the trend over time. The dataset did not identify the age group of its population.




Figure 2: Trend of Migration (Source: RStudio and R Markdown output)

The figure above (Figure 3) displays migrants' entry into Europe from 2000 to 2020. The number of total migrants from 2000 to 2020 was about plus or minus

10000 (± 10000) migrants. In late 2009 it peaked at more than 80000 migrants, the highest. Then in 2011, the number of migrants shrunk to about 11000 and below. The number of migrants picked up in 2014, only to shrink again in 2015 and remain low until 2019. Late in 2019, there was an increase up to early 2020, probably around January and February, dropping in late (October-November-December) 2020.

8.1.3 *The Trend of Remittances Before and During COVID-19*

The outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020 has had complex impacts on every sphere of life. Existing data shows a fluctuant movement in remittances compared to before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the following graph, figure 4, suggests an increase in outward remittances from 2012 to 2014. A sudden drop from 2014 to 2016 is observed. Outward remittances started to pick up from late 2017 to 2019.




Figure 4: Trend of remittances - Source: R Studio and R markdown output

For some reason, the remittance decrease from early 2019 to early 2020 is comparable to the drop from 2014 to 2016. There was a slight increase in outward remittances in early 2020, but it dropped again in late 2020. During the COVID-19 era in late 2020, outward remittances decreased to the lowest level compared to the previously observed values. By the start of 2021, a slight pick-

up is observed, which might be attributed to the progressive opening of the economies as EU countries suspended most COVID-19 control regulations and mass-vaccinated their populations. These actions allowed people to return to work and earn their previous average salaries, sending remittances back to their homes.

8.1.4 Remittances and Migrant Workers

A multiple regression model was used to analyse all the variables. Model (1) concerns remittances outwards as the dependent variable and migrant workers as independent variables, and a linear regression model was performed to determine the relationship between the two variables. The result shows that the p.value (0.0001) is extremely small and less than a 5% significance level, which is the benchmark. The migrant workers variable is statistically significant; in other words, the null hypothesis was rejected at a 95% confidence interval. It implies an association between the variables of migrant workers and remittances. Ultimately, migrant workers did have a positive impact on sending money home.

In the second model, the author added the variable ‘unemployment’ to see how it can impact the rate of sending money home. The result shows that the unemployment variable is statistically significant with a small value (0.002). The null hypothesis is rejected at a 5% level of significance. The model is statistically significant; thus, unemployment affects the rate of sending money home. Being unemployed reduces the chance of earning an income. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the effects of COVID-19 were felt differently in the EU and Africa. For example, some EU countries paid their employees their regular monthly salaries regardless of their not being at work. Also, the rate of job losses in Africa was very high compared to Europe. These are critical determinants of the abilities of migrant workers in EU countries to send remittances to Africa.

In Table 3, the variable GDP per capita was added, and the result shows that the model is not statistically significant since the p.value of 0.089 is greater than a 5% significance level. The GDP did not affect the sending of remittances. In general, the estimated low p-value of different models suggested a significant level of accuracy for these models. The overall significant F-statistic proves that the regression models fit the sample data well. A summary of the equations is found in the table below:

Dependent variable:	Outward remittances, 2012-2020		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Migrant workers	0.002*** (0.0001)	0.003*** (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.0001)
Unemployment		-0.002*** (0.0003)	(0.089)
GDP growth annually in:			
Constant	1.994*** (0.359)	2.690*** (0.346)	2.035*** (0.403)
Observations	279	279	279
R2	0.358	0.454	0.358
Adjusted r ²	0.356	0.450	0.354
Residual std. Error	5.194	4.798	5.203
F statistic	154.685***	114.902***	77.102***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: Variable GDP Per Capita Addition

9 Description of the Findings

This chapter focused on the impact of COVID-19 on remittances and international migration. In other words, the intended focus was on the outward remittance and migration variation before and during the pandemic. The results indeed indicate that there has been a change in migration and remittances.

Migration and remittance were not stable in the era of COVID-19. The results of the regulations and rules during the virus outbreak prove that COVID-19 impacted migration and remittances. The number of migrants in the EU was high five years back and decreased from 2015 to 2019. The pandemic emerged when it started to pick up in late 2019 and early 2020, with the number of migrants dropping in late 2020. This decrease is because most countries closed their borders and banned entry to reduce human morbidity. Like other countries around the globe, EU countries closed their borders, including all ports of entry for travellers in general, to impose and comply with COVID-19 regulations. Countries like Malta and Italy closed their internal borders for migrants and citizens to avoid spreading the virus. These two countries closed boat ports, the primary way for migrants to enter the country via the Mediterranean for health and safety purposes.

Outward remittances decreased drastically from 2014 to around 2017.

There is anecdotal evidence that in 2016-2017, almost all the Western Union agencies in Europe were robbed. It was hard for people to send money home until the creation of new money transfer agencies like Mukuru, Hello Paisa, Moneygram and others, which might have been a reason for that trend in outward remittances. One of the other causes of that imbalance was inflation and the oil price. Before this incident, there was also a financial crisis in Europe from 2009 to 2013. All these events occurred before COVID-19, and remittances decreased again during the pandemic era (late 2020). Jobs were lost as many companies shut down, and some employees, especially migrants, could not work from home. As the results show, unemployed people increased and impacted remittances negatively. According to Eurostat, the literature indicates that the unemployment rate in the EU was 6.8%. However, the youth had an unemployment rate of about 4.7% in Czechia to 32.4% in Greece (Lambovska, Sardinha and Belas 2021). Outward remittances were estimated to increase in 2021 as the European countries sent foreign aid as loans for COVID control to assist developing countries, especially African countries.

GDP per capita and inflation are linked. The increase in inflation causes people to spend more money because they believe it will be less valuable in the long run. The rise in inflation causes an increase in GDP, and hence prices increase. Literature is scarce on outward remittances as most studies focus on inward remittances and GDP. The results of this research showed that GDP does not affect outward remittances. Only one study contradicted this finding that GDP affected outward remittances positively (Lambovska, Sardinha & Belas 2021). Factors contributing to such unique findings on GDP concerning remittances are to be explored further to determine the context and timing that could influence this finding. The results showed an association between migrant workers and remittances, and the control variables impact the primary independent variable. The unemployment variable had a negative impact on outward remittances. The number of migrants coming to Europe decreased due to COVID-19 regulations, which later impacted remittances. Other aspects linked to migration must have affected remittances, which are not documented. There is a need for further studies in this field to understand these trends and ultimately help to shape migrant-related policies.

Findings were consistent with assumptions. Remittances and migration were expected to decline due to the pandemic. It appears that lockdown regulations and travel bans, as mentioned in the literature, reduced the number of migrants entering EU countries. Furthermore, outward remittances also fell

due to high unemployment caused by the pandemic (Quinn 2020; World Bank 2020). In this study, unemployment significantly decreased outward remittances.

10 Conclusion

International migration is an often discussed subject, focusing mainly on its economic impact. The aim was to verify if remittances sent home were affected by the presence of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as migration. The study conducted a multiple regression model to show the relationship between dependent and independent variables, and an ordinary linear regression was used. The result showed that COVID-19 impacted outward remittances and international migration. The hypotheses were tested and found to be statistically primarily significant. Thus, the study found that the presence of the pandemic had an impact on migration and remittances. The findings positively confirmed the hypothesis and confirmed the assumption.

11 Recommendations

Organisations such as the UN, the IFM, Statistics South Africa, and other secondary data sources must have updated data at least every three months to make the jobs of students and researchers easier. Finishing on time or having accurate results is problematic because of the data's unavailability. Working on this aspect will be helpful for academia and add to the sparse literature on working migrants and remittances. Therefore, this is a call to conduct a qualitative study with senders of remittances to understand what affects their sending frequency and to conduct the same qualitative study with the receivers of remittances to understand how this halt in the routine affects them.

Moreover, further studies should be conducted to explore the effects of COVID-19 on remittances from internally displaced persons (IDPs) and economic migrants within Africa. The policy should be revised to assist working migrants and their families during crises like pandemics.

Acknowledgement

The support of the DSI-NICIS National e-Science Postgraduate Teaching and Training Platform (NEPTTP) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed, and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NEPTTP.

References

- Adams, Jr., R.H. & A. Cuecuecha 2013. The Impact of Remittances on Investment and Poverty in Ghana. *World Development* 50: 24 - 40. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.04.009>
- Adams, Jr., R.H. & J. Page 2005. Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries? *World Development* 33, 10: 1645 - 1669. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.05.004>
- Adenutsi, D.E. 2010. Do International Remittances Promote Human Development in Poor Countries? Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. *The International Journal of Applied Economics and Finance* 4, 1: 31 - 45. <https://doi.org/10.3923/ijaef.2010.31.45>
- Adhikari, S., M. Clemens, H. Dempster & N.L. Ekeator 2021. *Expanding Legal Migration Pathways from Nigeria to Europe*. Available at: <https://Www.Cgdev.Org/Publication/Expanding-Legal-Migration-Pathways-Nigeria-Europe-Brain-Drain-Brain-Gain>. (Accessed on 21 March 2023). <https://doi.org/10.1596/35996>
- African Union Commission 2020. *Impact of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) on the African Economy*. Available at: <https://Au.Int/Fr/Node/38326>. (Accessed on 21 March 2023).
- Al Akayleh, F. 2016. Do Foreign Workers' Positive Contributions to GDP Outweigh the Negative Effect of their Outward Remittances on GDP? A Case Study of Saudi Arabia. *Advances in Economics and Business* 4, 12: 657 - 666. <https://doi.org/10.13189/aeb.2016.041204>
- Aldcroft, D. & S. Morewood 2012. *The European Economy Since 1914*. Philadelphia: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203094761>
- Amicizia, D., R.T. Micale, B.M. Pennati, F. Zangrillo, M. Iovine, E. Lecini, F. Marchini, P.L. Lai & D. Panatto 2019. The Burden of Typhoid Fever and Cholera: Similarities and Differences. Prevention Strategies for European Travelers to Endemic/ Epidemic Areas. *Journal of Preventive Medicine and Hygiene* 60, 4: E271.
- Anderson, M. 2014. Ebola: Airlines Cancel More Flights to Affected Countries. *The Guardian* 22 August 2014.
- Antoshchuk, I. 2018. Female Computer Scientists from Post-Soviet Space: Migration and Academic Career in the UK. In *23rd International Conference on Science and Technology Indicators* (STI 2018), 12 – 14 September 2018, Leiden, the Netherlands, pp. 414 - 419. Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS).

- Apuke, O.D. 2017. Quantitative Research Methods: A Synopsis Approach. *Journal of Business and Management Review* 33, 5471: 1 - 8. <https://doi.org/10.12816/0040336>
- Azizi, S. 2021. The Impacts of Workers' Remittances on Poverty and Inequality in Developing Countries. *Empirical Economics* 60: 2: 969 - 991. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-019-01764-8>
- Ball, D.Y. & T.P. Gerber 2005. Russian Scientists and Rogue States: Does Western Assistance Reduce the Proliferation Threat? *International Security* 29, 4: 50 - 77. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2005.29.4.50>
- Barne, D. & F. Pirlea 2019. *Money Sent Home by Workers is Now the Largest Source of External Financing in Low- and Middle-Income Countries* (Excluding China). World Bank Blogs, 2. Available at: <https://Blogs.Worldbank.Org/Opendata/Money-Sent-Home-Workers-Now-Largest-Source-External-Financing-Low-and-Middle-Income>. (Accessed on 21 March 2023).
- Beine, M., F. Docquier & H. Rapoport 2001. Brain Drain Drains and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence. *Journal of Development Economics* 64, 1: 275 - 289. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878\(00\)00133-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00133-4)
- Berdiev, A.N., Y. Kim & C.P. Chang 2013. Remittances and Corruption. *Economics Letters* 118, 1: 182 - 185. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.008>
- Bisong, A., P.E. Ahairwe & E. Njoroge 2020. *The Impact of COVID-19 on Remittances for Development in Africa*. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management.
- Bodomo, A. 2013. African Diaspora Remittances are Better than Foreign Aid Funds. *World Economics* 14, 4: 21 - 29.
- Borjas, G.J. 2003. The Labour Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Re-examining the Impact of Immigration on the Labour Market. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118, 4: 1335 - 1374. <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355303322552810>
- Castellarin, E. 2020. The European Union's Financial Contribution to the Response to the COVID-19 Crisis: An Overview of Existing Mechanisms, Proposals Under Discussion and Open Issues. *European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration* 2: 1021 - 1044.
- Chami, M.R., M.S. Jahjah & C. Fullenkamp 2003. *Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?* New York: International Monetary Fund. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.880292>

- Chami, M.R., M.P.J. Montiel, M.Y. Abdih & J. Dagher 2008. *Remittances and Institutions: Are Remittances a Curse?* (No. 2008/029). New York: International Monetary Fund.
- Chaudhary, D. 2020. Influence of Remittances on Socio-Economic Development in Rural Nepal. *Remittances Review* 5, 1: 83 - 96.
<https://doi.org/10.33182/rr.v5i1.820>
- Cohen, N.J. 2016. Travel and Border Health Measures to Prevent the International Spread of Ebola. *MMWR Supplements* 65. Available at:
<https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/su/pdfs/su6503a9.pdf>
(Accessed on 11 April 2023).
- Cuong, N.V. & V.H. Linh 2018. The Impact of Migration and Remittances on Household Welfare: Evidence from Vietnam. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 19, 4: 945 - 963.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0571-3>
- De Haas, H. 2007. *Remittances, Migration, and Social Development: A Conceptual Review of the Literature*. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Available at:
<https://www.Files.Ethz.Ch/Isn/102848/34.Pdf>
(Accessed on 21 March 2023).
- Devermont, J. & E. Olander 2020. *COVID-19 Is an African Political Crisis as Much as a Health and Economic Emergency*. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Available at:
<https://www.Csis.Org/Analysis/COVID-19-African-Political-Crisis-Much-Health-And-Economic-Emergency>
(Accessed On 16 August 2021).
- Escribà-Folch, A., C. Meseguer & J. Wright 2015. Remittances and Democratisation. *International Studies Quarterly* 59, 3: 571 - 586.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12180>
- European Migration Network 2020. *The Impact of COVID-19 on Remittances in EU and OECD Countries*. European Commission, 2020. Available at:
<https://Emn.Ie/Publications/Impact-Of-COVID-19-On-Remittances-In-Eu-And-Oecd-Countries/> (Accessed on 21 March 2023).
- Friedberg, R.M. & J. Hunt 2018. The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth. In Suárez-Orozco, M.M., C. Suárez-Orozco & D. Qin-Hilliard (eds.): *Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the New Immigration*. Philadelphia: Routledge.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315054193-4>

- Gabriël, S., M.V. Johansen, E. Pozio, G.S.A. Smit, B. Devleesschauwer, A. Allepuz & P. Dorny 2015. Human Migration and Pig/ Pork Import in the European Union: What are the Implications for Taenia Solium Infections? *Veterinary Parasitology* 213, 1-2: 38 - 45.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vetpar.2015.03.006> PMid:25837784
- Gibson, J. & D. Mckenzie 2012. The Economic Consequences of ‘Brain Drain’ of the Best and Brightest: Microeconomic Evidence from Five Countries. *The Economic Journal* 122, 560: 339 - 375.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02498.x>
- Hossain, M.I. 2015. An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of Foreign Remittances on Poverty in Developing Countries. *Economy* 2, 2: 44 - 48.
- Howell, A. 2017. Impacts of Migration and Remittances on Ethnic Income Inequality in Rural China. *World Development* 94: 200 - 211.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.01.005>
- Inoue, T. 2018. Financial Development, Remittances, and Poverty Reduction: Empirical Evidence from a Macroeconomic Viewpoint. *Journal of Economics and Business* 96: 59 - 68.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2017.12.001>
- International Monetary Fund 1993. *Balance of Payments Manual, International Money Fund: Washington, DC, 1993*. Available at:
<https://www.Imf.Org/External/Pubs/Ft/Bopman/Bopman.Pdf>
(Accessed on 21 March 2023).
- Jaquet, S., T. Kohler & G. Schwilch 2019. Labour Migration in the Middle Hills of Nepal: Consequences on Land Management Strategies. *Sustainability* 11, 5: 1349.
<https://doi.org/10.3390/su11051349>
- Kalantaryan, S. & S. McMahon 2020. *COVID-19 and Remittances in Africa*. Luxembourg: Office of the European Union.
- Koczan, Z., G. Peri, M. Pinat & D.L. Rozhkov 2021. *The Impact of International Migration on Inclusive Growth: A Review*. IMF Working Papers 2021 (088). Available at: <https://www.IMF.Org/En/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/03/19/The-Impact-Of-International-Migration-On-Inclusive-Growth-A-Review-50169> (Accessed on 21 March 2023). <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513571966.001>
- Korobkov, A. & Z. Zaionchkovskaia 2012. Russian Brain Drain: Myths V. Reality. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45: 327 - 341.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.07.012>

- Kumar, R. 2018. *Research Methodology: A Step-By-Step Guide for Beginners*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Lambovska, M., B. Sardinha & J. Belas 2021. Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on the Youth Unemployment in the European Union. *Ekonomicko-Manazerske Spektrum* 15, 1: 55 - 63.
<https://doi.org/10.26552/ems.2021.1.55-63>
- Larsson, P. & J. Ångman 2014. *Remittances and Development: Empirical Evidence from 99 Developing Countries*. Available at: <http://www.Diva-Portal.Org/Smash/Record.Jsf?Pid=Diva2%3A726509&Dswid=-8259>. (Accessed on 21 March 2023).
- Lindley, A. 2009. The Early Morning Phonecall: Remittances from a Refugee Diaspora Perspective. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35, 8: 1315 - 1334. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830903123112>
- Luce, S. 2014. *Labour Movements: Global Perspectives*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
- Mehedintu, A., G. Soava & M. Sterpu 2019. The Effect of Remittances on Poverty in the Emerging Countries of the European Union. *Sustainability* 11, 12: 3265. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su11123265>
- Meyer, D. & A. Shera 2017. The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth: An Econometric Model. *Economia* 18, 2: 147 - 155.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2016.06.001>
- Mohapatra, S., G. Joseph & D. Ratha 2012. Remittances and Natural Disasters: Ex-Post Response and Contribution to Ex-Ante Preparedness. *Environment, Development and Sustainability* 14, 3: 365 - 387.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-011-9330-8>
- Naydenov, K. 2018. International Migration in Europe in the 21st Century. In 4th *International Scientific Conference Geobalkanica*. Macedonia, 15 – 16 May 2018. <https://www.Cambridgescholars.Com/Resources/Pdfs/978-1-5275-0910-8-Sample.Pdf> (Accessed on 21 March 2023).
- Pandey, P. & M.M. Pandey 2015. *Research Methodology: Tools and Techniques. Obtenido De Research Methodology: Tools and Techniques*. Buzau, Al. Marghiloman, Romania: Bridge Centre. Available at: <http://Euacademic.Org/Bookupload/9.Pdf> (Accessed on 21 March 2023).
- Quinn, A. 2020. *The Money's Not Coming Home: 690 Billion Remittances Risk*. Bloomberg, 08 April 2020. Available at: <http://www.Investing.Com> (Accessed on 27 September 2021).

- Rajan, S.I. & K.C. Zachariah 2019. *Emigration and Remittances: New Evidence from the Kerala Migration Survey 2018* (No. ID: 12989). Working Papers id: 12989, eSocialSciences. Available at: <http://Localhost:8080/Xmlui/Handle/123456789/488>. (Accessed on 21 March 2023).
- Ratha, D., S. Mohapatra & E. Scheja 2011. Impact of Migration on Economic and Social Development: A Review of Evidence and Emerging Issues. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* (5558). Available at: <https://Elibrary.Worldbank.Org/Doi/Abs/10.1596/1813-9450-5558>. (Accessed on 21 March 2023). <https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5558>
- Ratha, D.K., S. De, E.J. Kim, S. Plaza, G.K. Seshan & N.D. Yameogo 2020. COVID-19 Crisis through a Migration Lens. *Migration and Development Brief* 32. Washington, D.C: World Bank Group.
- Rybakovsky, L. & S. Ryazantsev 2005. International Migration in the Russian Federation. In *UN Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development*. New York: United Nations, Population Division.
- Smith-Bingham, R. & K. Hariharan 2020. *This is the Impact of the Corona-virus on Business*. World Economic Forum. Available at: <https://www.Weforum.Org/Agenda/2020/02/Why-Is-Coronavirus-A-Global-Business-Risk/> (Accessed on 23 September 2021.)
- Soava, G., A. Mehedintu, M. Sterpu & M. Raduteanu 2020. Impact of Employed Labour Force, Investment, and Remittances on Economic Growth in EU Countries. *Sustainability* 12, 23: 10141. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su122310141>
- Straubhaar, T. 2018. *The Economics of Migration Policies*. In Marshall, B. (ed.): *The Politics of Migration: A Survey*. Philadelphia: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315728285-2>
- Subbotin, A. & S. Aref 2021. Brain Drain and Brain Gain in Russia: Analysing International Migration of Researchers by Discipline Using Scopus Bibliometric Data 1996 – 2020. *Scientometrics* 126, 9: 7875 - 7900. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-021-04091-x>
- Taylor, E.J. 1999. The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the Migration Process. *International Migration* 37, 1: 63 - 88. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00066> PMID:12322077
- Woldemariam, K. & Z. Yiheyis 2017. Remittances and Economic Development in Africa: A Review of Empirical Evidence. In Wamboye, E., E. Tiruneh (eds.): *Foreign Capital Flows and Economic Development*

Impact of COVID-19 on International Migration and Remittances

in Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53496-5_18

World Bank 2014. World Development Indicators. Available at:

<http://www.Data.Worldbank.Org/Indicator>

(Accessed on 21 March 2023).

World Bank 2020. *World Bank Predicts Sharpest Decline of Remittances in Recent History*. New York: Press Release 2020/175/SPJ. 22 April 2020.

Yang, D. 2011. Migrant Remittances. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25, 3: 129 - 152. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.3.129>

Ms Awa Zihindula

DSI-NICIS National e-Science

Postgraduate Teaching and Training Platform (NEPTTP)

School of Social Sciences

Faculty of Humanities in the field of e-Science

Witwatersrand University

Johannesburg

awazihindulaonline@gmail.com

CHAPTER 6

Perspectives on Foreign Remittances from Elite Ugandans in the Diaspora

Gyaviira Kisitu

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1084-7638>

Robert Stalone Buwule

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1233-1053>

Abstract

Approximately 4.4% of Uganda's population lives in the Diaspora. Ugandan Diaspora significantly contributes to the national development of Uganda through various investment projects such as setting-up schools, hospitals, manufacturing plants and hotels. They also send remittances to their relatives and friends, positively impacting their living conditions. Despite this contribution, it has been noted that remitted funds rarely translate substantially to their initial purpose. The question as to why this is the case prompts an inquiry into the local investment patterns of Ugandan migrants, the relationship between the jobs they do in the host countries and the business portfolios they set up in Uganda, projects supervisory modes, collaborations, and partnerships they forge while setting up projects. The nature of the Ugandan Diaspora investments, the experiences of the Ugandan Diaspora in remitting funds to Uganda and the extent to which remittances contribute positively to their intended purposes are examined. A mixed methods research design was used, and data from 40 key purposively sampled informants were analysed.

Keywords: Uganda, Diaspora, Uganda migrants, remittances, investment

1 Introduction

In this chapter, the authors explore the investment patterns of Ugandans in the Diaspora and how their investments contribute to the national development and economic growth of the country. The focus on the Ugandan Diasporas' contribution to national development is being explored against the backdrop where the urge for economic transformation and development continues to influence the choice of patterns countries take to ensure social and economic prosperity. From a global perspective, paths such as those proposed through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000-2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2015-2030) have been embraced as road maps that could improve the well-being of people. Further, as rightly observed by Ade-nutsi (2010:31), several countries have also attempted to establish developmental models centred on real per capita income growth and distribution, accumulation of capital and other productive resources, including human resource, heavy industrialisation for structural transformation, foreign direct investment and foreign aid. Despite some notable gains from the above, some disturbing yet unanswered questions exist: Why do we still speak of under or low-developed countries, or the 'Third' world countries, always in dire need of economic support? Why are there ever-growing migrants from low-developed countries to other nations, especially in Europe and the United States of America, with some enduring dangerous travelling alternatives? One possible explanation is that none of the above intervention models has succeeded enough to respond to developing countries' social and economic plight. For instance, Sub-Saharan African countries hold most of the poverty-ravaged world population (Nwani & Osuji 2020). With a large population in this region surviving on less than USD 1.90 – the international poverty line indicator – the affected masses can hardly afford decent shelters, a healthy daily meal, health care and other crucial amenities.

Uganda is among such countries, most of whose population is in the informal sector and survive on less than USD 1.90. It is still categorised among the low-developed nations or those described as 'still developing'. Further still, the country has a history of political instability stretching back to the 1960s, negatively impacting the economy up to the mid-1980s. The current regime gained power in 1986 and introduced some normalcy. There were efforts to work with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to reform the economy through structural adjustment programs. These programs introduced many economic changes, such as decentralisation, liberalisation, and private-

sation of the foreign exchange market (Ojede, Lam & Okot 2019). It could partly be why Uganda is among the top 10 African countries with the highest remittance inflows, as these factors tend to motivate Ugandan Diasporas to invest in the local market. The World Bank African Development Indicators of 2009, 2015 and 2016 show that remittance inflows to Uganda superseded the traditional sources of foreign exchange such as exports and foreign aid (Cooper, Esser, Tuyeni & Lal Mohamod 2018).

Although Uganda is one of the high-ranking migrant destination countries in Africa, it is also the origin of many migrants to other countries. In the East African region, the country is identified with a fast-growing number of citizens living in the Diaspora. The Ugandan population in the Diaspora is projected to be about 2 million people, with steady growth in recent years. For instance, in 2009, it was set at 660 000 people; in 2015, it had grown to 730 017; in 2019, the number had increased to 875 000 (Bulwaka 2009; Remitscope Africa 2021). Ugandans in the Diaspora maintain strong sentimental and material links with their home country (Sambajee 2015). Such sentimental links are demonstrated through regular visits back to Uganda. Many Ugandans in the Diaspora demand more participation in the countries' policy and political activities since they remit substantial social and productive investment funds. It is not yet noticeably clear whether these remittances from Ugandans in the Diaspora translate into the social and economic transformation of the economy.

1.1 Problem Statement

Ugandans in the Diaspora send remittances to their relatives and friends, thus, positively impacting the living conditions of the recipients in the country (Cooper *et al.* 2018). However, some of the remittances sent rarely translate into formidable investments (Sambajee 2015). In this chapter, the authors attempt to delve into this phenomenon to establish the factors that influence the nature of Diaspora investment and the extent to which Ugandan migrants' remittances contribute positively to their intended purposes.

1.2 Objectives

The authors of this chapter sought to:

- a) Establish the local investment patterns of Ugandan migrants.

- b) Investigate the relationship between the jobs they do in the host countries and the business portfolios they set up in Uganda.
- c) Examine the supervisory modes they use for their investments in Uganda.
- d) Scrutinise the collaborations and partnerships they forge while setting up projects in Uganda.

2 Literature Review

This chapter focuses on the remittances that the Ugandan Diaspora send back home to their relatives or friends. Remittances are spoken of regarding money migrant workers worldwide send to their countries of origin (Hougaard 2008). Still, remittances can be domestic, whereby funds are sent within the national borders from one person to another with a non-reciprocal transfer character. The World Bank speaks of ‘personal transfers to consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from non-resident households’¹.

In the Ugandan context, remittances are an integral source of household sustenance and a contributor to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Survey reports on the relationship between Ugandan Diaspora remittances and recipient households in Uganda indicate that remittances have, over the years, gained enormous prominence among the beneficiary community. As a source of income or a subsidy, remittances in Uganda are known to contribute to consumption and other basic needs such as education, shelter, and health.

Uganda’s remittance inflows have experienced steady growth, with a small decline in 2020. Data shows that in 2019 remittance inflows to Uganda recorded a high of USD 1.4 billion, while in 2020, the amount declined to about USD 1.054 billion due to the impact of Covid-19. Figure 1 below illustrates the steady increase in remittances.

¹ The World Bank, on ‘How to Define Remittances?’ available from <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114950-how-do-you-define-remittances> (Accessed on 18 November 2021.) *World Bank Staff Estimates Based on IMF Balance of Payments Data*. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=UG> (Accessed on 18 November 2021.)




Figure 1 shows the inflow of remittances in Uganda from 2000 to 2019 (World Bank 2020)

Although Uganda has registered a steady growth in inflow remittances in recent years, when we compare this growth with other African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, we find that remittances by Ugandans in the Diaspora are on the lower side. For example, in 2020, Nigerians in the Diaspora remitted USD 17.2 billion, while Ghanaians remitted USD 4.3 billion. Kenyans remitted USD 3.1 billion to the Diaspora in East Africa, while South Sudanese remitted USD 1.2 billion (World Bank 2020).

However, concerning the available data, Uganda still enjoys the ninth position among the first ten most remittance destination countries in Sub-Saharan Africa despite the Covid-19 pandemic². The steady growth in Uganda's remittance inflow may be attributed mostly to the growing number of Ugandan emigrants, especially in the East African nations and the Middle East, most of whom are involved in casual and homecare jobs. Despite the documented growth in Ugandan remittance inflows, there are claims that not all the remittances received translate substantially into personal and community investments (Bulwaka 2009; Romaniuk & Durner 2018). This challenge, if unacknowledged and unaddressed, would undermine the potential contribution of the Ugandan Diasporans to the national and economic development of Uganda. Local investment opportunities are channels through which the Ugandan Diaspora is called upon to contribute to the economy. To actualise this, the Diaspora community prefers investing in schools, hospitals, manufacturing plants and hotels (Bulwaka 2009). Some of them have also formed partnerships and associations such as 'Uganda North America Association (UNAA), Uganda Business and Professionals Association United Kingdom (UBPA), Bamasaba in Diaspora, Acholi Diaspora and Baganda in Diaspora' to strengthen their investment ambitions further (Bulwaka 2009:16).

3 Research Methodology

Purposeful sampling was employed following a mixed methods research design. The respondents were elite Ugandans in the Diaspora who were sourced ongoing as the research progressed until the researchers reached the point of saturation (Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault 2015). Elite Ugandans were the focus because they were easily accessible and could easily respond to the online questionnaire used during the data collection process. The respondents were consciously selected depending on their expertise, in-depth understanding and perspectives on remittance investment and Ugandans in the Diaspora. According to Daymond and Holloway (2010), qualitative homogeneous sampling consists of small units ranging between 4 and 40 informants. This approach allowed researchers to focus in great depth on a few phenomena rather than more superficially across a wider range, as is common in quantitative studies

² Uganda follows Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Somalia, Democratic Rep of the Congo, Senegal, Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria in the first position respectively (IMF, World Bank World Development Indicators and staff estimates)

(Yoshikawa, Weisner, Kalil & Way 2008). Therefore, semi-structured online questionnaires were used to collect the data. Valuable insights were obtained, which were thematically analysed to develop new insights or expand and refine the existing perspectives for this chapter.

4 Findings

Below are the findings of the research based on the objectives.

4.1 *Demographic Details of the Research*

A total of 84 participants were approached and sent links to the online questionnaire. Only 57 responded, giving the study a response rate of 68%. Most of the respondents (84.2%) were male, as indicated below.




Figure 2: Gender representation of the respondents of the study (Source: Field data)

When the respondents were asked to indicate their age bracket, the biggest percentage was between 41 and 50, as indicated in the pie chart below.




Figure 3: Ages of the respondents of the study (Source: Field data)

The respondents were further asked why they left Uganda for the Diaspora; the bar graph below represents these reasons.




Figure 4: Reasons why Ugandans in Diaspora left (Source: Field data)

Like many other countries, the emigration of Ugandan nationals has increased and can be attributed to voluntary and involuntary factors (Bulwaka 2009). From the above illustration, education is one of the leading voluntary factors pushing Ugandans to go to the Diaspora. This phenomenon started in colonial times when Ugandans who had received elementary education were urged to travel overseas to pursue higher education on scholarship. Due to globalisation, Ugandans have continued to demand higher education abroad to become globally competitive. The involuntary factor worth noting relates to political reasons. Uganda's post-independence period between 1968 and 1985 was marred with massive emigration due to political instability and civil wars. The civil strife was characterised by military domination, abuse of human rights, and flawed government systems, which forced many Ugandans to flee and exile. For example, there has been a raging debate on the violence, abuse of power and human rights in Uganda between 1972-1979. Some historians have indeed remarked on this period as one where Uganda experienced the worst fascist military ethnocracy and totalitarian rule and that an estimated 55 000 Ugandans of Asian origin plus other British and multiple ethnic affiliations were expelled from Uganda, shiftily turning them into stateless refugees or displaced migrants within 90 days (Hundle 2013). In the period following 1985, there has been a semblance of political stability, but other involuntary factors like unemployment and poverty continue to force Ugandans to leave for the Diaspora.

The research sought to establish the recent prevailing host countries of Ugandan emigrants. The figure below shows the countries that attract elite Ugandan emigrants, with the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America being the most prevalent.

It shows that the most elite Ugandans in the Diaspora are in the UK, followed by the United States of America. It could partly be because the UK is a former colonial master of Uganda, and elite migrant Ugandans to that country can easily be integrated into its social fabric. It is also important to note that following British colonialism in Uganda, Ugandans started migrating to the UK during the 20th century, thus the high numbers of Ugandans in the UK. Their skill level also influences the distribution of Ugandan migrants. Currently, the highly skilled ones go to Europe, the USA, Australia and New Zealand, while the semi-skilled and unskilled are more likely to go to the Gulf states (Sambajee 2015).




Figure 5: Countries where Ugandans in Diaspora are (Source: Field data)

4.2 Ugandan Diaspora Community and Investment

The research aimed to establish the kind of work Ugandans do while in their host countries. The results revealed that 57 participants responded, and their responses are as follows: 10 participants (16%) are engaged in medical work and health care; 8 participants (14%) work in the digital, graphics and Information Communication Technology (ICT) industry; 6 participants (9%) do consultancy work; 4 participants (6%) reported being in the education sector; 3 participants (5%) were in business and self-employed; 3 participants (5%) were in engineering; 3 more participants (5%) were engaged in the food chain industry; 2 respondents (4%) reported being in accountancy; 2 participants (4%) were in Administrative, Human Resource and Project management; 2 participants (4%) also reported being engaged in Aeronautics and Freight Logistics industry; 2 participants (4%) reported being engaged in domestic work; 2 participants (4%) in the Hotel and Hospitality Industry; 2 participants (4%) in Insurance; 2 participants (4%) Non-Committal; 2 participants (4%) Transport and Logistics. In the other categories, Architecture, Defence and security work, social work, spiritual and pastoral work, only 1 participant (2%) was engaged.

Most skilled Ugandans in the Diaspora are engaged in medical and

health care, followed by digital, graphics and ICT-related work. The increasing international demand for skilled labour has led to professionals such as teachers, doctors and nurses seeking better opportunities in the Diaspora. Many Ugandan students study nursing courses intending to migrate to the Diaspora and find work there (Nguyen, Ropers, Nderitu, Zuyderduin, Luboga & Hagopian 2008; Mwesigwa 2015). Also, after being trained in Uganda on government sponsorship, many Ugandan medical doctors have left Uganda and plied their trade in the Diaspora, where the pay is better, and they enjoy better working conditions and equipment. Though this may seem good for the Ugandans in the Diaspora, it leaves a brain-drain effect on the Ugandan economy. There are many instances where Ugandans have travelled abroad for better medical care only to find fellow Ugandans in the Diaspora working in those same hospitals. For example, when the Lord Mayor of Kampala, His Worship Erias Lukwago, developed acute anaphylaxis, he was treated by a Ugandan consultant physician and gastroenterologist Professor Godfrey Lule who works at Aga Khan Nairobi Hospital (Wandero 2020). Ugandans are also in other trades like ICT, electrical, mechanical, and civil engineering, even in defence and security.

The respondents were later asked whether they send remittances to Uganda regularly, to which they responded as indicated below.




Figure 6: Composition of the Diaspora who send remittances to Uganda (Source: Field data)

It was also important to establish how often respondents sent remittances to Uganda, as this is critical in determining how often remittances may be expected from the Ugandan Diaspora. This information is indicated below, and it is based on 53 respondents who were able to respond to this task.

Table 1: Frequency of the Diaspora Sending Money to Uganda

S/No.	Frequency of sending remittances	Number of respondents	Percentage
1	Monthly	22	41%
2	Weekly	9	17%
3	As often as necessary	6	11%
4	Quarterly	4	8%
5	Almost every day	3	6%
6	Occasionally	3	6%
7	Twice every month	2	4%
8	Thrice a month	2	4%
9	Half-yearly	1	2%
10	Thrice a year	1	2%
	Total	53	100%

From the table above, the findings show that most Ugandans in the Diaspora prefer sending remittances monthly. Weekly, the number drastically dropped to 17% of the total respondents. It could be due to the costs of sending funds and the rules host countries impose on remittance outflows. This experience agrees with Beck, Janfils, and Kpodar (2022) and Cooper *et al.* (2018), who observed that the cost of transfers is still high and likely to continue affecting the amount and frequency by which funds are remitted. The reasons why Ugandans were committed to sending remittances home were considered significant motiva-

tions for an increased remittance inflow in the country. According to the research findings, the three most important explanations are personal investment, community investment and helping out family and friends. The distribution of respondents’ views about the above reasons varies, as represented in the figure below:




Figure 7: Reasons respondents send remittances (Source: Field data)

The findings show that respondents have multiple reasons for remitting money back home. From the graph above, at least 55 respondents (98%) had ‘humanitarian help of family members and friends’ as the major reason, followed by 42 respondents (75%) who send money back home for personal investment. This finding is not vastly different from Ojede *et al.* (2019), who note altruism as a key reason for remittances. The beneficiaries of these remitted charitable funds boost consumption and investment in the childhood education of relatives.

The respondents were asked whether they had formed or joined collaborations and networks to help them remit and set up investments in Uganda. Below is the pie chart indicating their responses.

Those who answered yes were probed further to explain how those collaborations and partnerships work. Some responses included working with Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations (SACCO) and joining online digital platforms that offer Unit Trusts and saving and credit schemes with strict

rules and regulations. When asked whether the partnerships had helped secure their investments, seven respondents answered in the affirmative.




Figure 8: Formation of collaborative networks for Diaspora investments
(Source: Field data)

In partnership with the Private Sector and Civil Society, the government plays a key role in setting up networking investment opportunities for Ugandans in the Diaspora. The annual Diaspora summits held in Uganda – normally in December when most Ugandans in Diaspora return for the Christmas holiday – have greatly helped them explore diverse investment opportunities and expand business partnerships with home counterparts (Bulwaka 2009).

4.3 Investment Opportunities and Patterns for the Diaspora Community in the Country

The respondents were asked to indicate the type of business portfolios they invested in, in Uganda while in the Diaspora. Below is the line graph indicating the findings. The line graph shows that most Ugandans in the Diaspora invest in real estate, land and property management, agriculture and farming, education, housing and construction.




Figure 9: Investment oortfolios of Ugandans in the Diaspora (Source: Field data)

This is not vastly different from the profitable business portfolios profiled by the Uganda Investment Authority (2020) database, which includes Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Construction, and Education. Interestingly real estate was among the less-profiled business ventures.

The Authority carried out seven outward missions to China, Ireland, Tanzania, Ghana, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kenya, the UK and Ethiopia, which resulted in 219 potential investment contacts made in energy, health care, agri-business, fintech, electronics assembly, training/education, and infrastructure sectors (Uganda Investment Authority 2020).

The respondents were probed further to explain how they managed to supervise their investments in the Diaspora. The results show that 42 participants were able to respond to this task as follows: 24 of them (57%) reported using their family members as supervisors; six participants (14%) reported hiring professional managers, agents and employers; three participants (7%) reported making periodical calls back home as a form of supervision; two participants (6%) reported making use of private business management firms to

do supervision on their behalf; two participants (6%) reported doing supervision simply by trusting people and by God's grace. One participant (2%) reported using one of the following: business partners in Uganda, tracking bank and other financial records, periodic visits, and use of community supervision; one participant (2%), however, shared the conviction that fixed assets do not need supervision and therefore did not engage in any form of supervising the assets at home.

The findings show that most Ugandans in the Diaspora maintain a strong bond with their family members and trusted friends, which could be why they would prefer entrusting them with the supervisory role. A gentleman from Canada stated that 'as far as my investments in Uganda are concerned, I only trust my Mother and Sister because I believe they can never cheat me or waste my resources.' Effective supervision may also involve the direct presence of the investor(s). In this case, the Ugandan Diaspora would need time to travel back to personally monitor their investments' progress. However, although this may be ideal for positive yields, few Ugandan Diasporas can frequently return home for this purpose. According to the study's findings, of the 54 participants who expressed opinions on how often they returned home to make personal supervision, only 20 (37%) returned home once per year.

The researchers wanted to know how often the Ugandans in Diaspora travel to Uganda to supervise their investments. The results show that of the 54 participants who responded, the majority (20), representing 37%, stated they travel to Uganda once yearly to supervise their investments. Next were nine participants (17%) who travelled twice per annum. The rest travelled as follows: five participants (9%) travelled once every two years; five participants (9%) indicated that they travelled regularly but could not provide the exact number of times they travelled per year; four participants (7%) travelled three times per year, while four participants reported their travelling frequency to be three to five times per year. Those who rarely travelled but could not express their travelling frequencies in figures were four (7%), and only one participant (3%) was found to travel only once in four years.

Interestingly, two participants (4%) never desired to travel back home to supervise their investments. It is important to note that the findings indicate that the Ugandan Diaspora does not seem to have an urgent desire to visit Uganda frequently to supervise their investments. This can be seen from the limited numbers of respondents who make more than one visit per year and the fact that the majority prefer to shorten such visits to only once per annum.

However, this experience is not limited to the Ugandan Diaspora alone. A study on the British and Indians in the Diaspora revealed that, on average, they travel between one to six times in three years (Harvey 2008).

The respondents were asked whether they had engaged in any form of technology or skills transfer from the Diaspora to Uganda. This investigation is based on available research, which suggests that migrants living outside their countries of origin can equally participate in nation-building at various levels, including transferring knowledge and skills from their host countries to their countries of origin (Sonia & Ratha 2011; Chikezie 2011). Below is the pie chart with their responses:




Figure 10: Investment in technology transfer by Ugandans in Diaspora (Source: Field data)

Those who responded ‘yes’ were asked to illustrate the technology or skills they have transferred from the Diaspora to contribute to Uganda’s social and economic transformation. It was found that the Diaspora community contribution was spread in several sectors: ICT with 26% of the respondents, followed by Farming, 21%; Education, 16%; Business, 16 %; Medical, 5%; Mobile money transfer, 5%; Quality control, 5% and Communication 5%. It is imperative to note that Ugandan professionals in the Diaspora, especially in the Western world, have been exposed to modern inventions and innovations. If

such exposure is positively utilised in Uganda, it may aid development. Such exposure is critical in motivating Diaspora entrepreneurs to open businesses. A respondent from the UK stated his company's contribution to business entrepreneurs in Uganda, saying: 'We have introduced new payment receiving gadgets on the market, like an electronic till with electronic receipts and training young people on various techniques on creating optimal value in our business through customer care and after sales activities'. Another respondent from South Africa dealing in the importation of agricultural types of machinery to Uganda, expressed that he thinks of engaging the local people in his home village on modern methods, for instance, how to use an irrigation system during the dry season to have food available for supply and water for animals throughout the year. Based on the responses from the study's participants, it appears that most of them believe their investments greatly contribute to Uganda's social and economic transformation. The extent to which the Diaspora community believe in their contribution to Uganda's economy is further illustrated below following the study's findings. Interestingly, most respondents were convinced of having a major and significant contribution.




Figure 11: Contribution of remittances from Ugandans in Diaspora to the national economy (Source: Field data).

In addition to the above illustration, a response from a study participant from Tanzania stood out: ‘If various investment projects such as in business, education, knowledge and skills importation are encouraged with the relevant motivation from the community and government the Diaspora community have a brick to add to economic transformation of Uganda’. A Ugandan entrepreneur in the United States of America agrees with the above saying, ‘Ugandans in the Diaspora are hungry and willing to transfer foreign capital, and modern technology but the current system considers our involvement in the economy a danger to its survival’. Similarly, a lady in Dubai stated that ‘Ugandans in the Diaspora have tried their best to contribute to Uganda’s economy but most have been frustrated due to mistrust and corruption plus the economic environment is very discouraging’. While echoing the same feelings as the above respondents, another gentleman from New Zealand stated, ‘Remittances from the Diaspora community is a huge contributor to the Ugandan economy, and the Diaspora need more protection by the government and should be provided with incentives and accessibility to bank loans to support their investments’.

Other negative factors that appeared to influence the investment patterns of many Ugandan Diasporas included corruption and fraud, the lack of trustworthy business partners, unfriendly banking systems and procedures, unfriendly taxation, high transfer rates, poor supervision, unreliable government systems, unstable forex exchange rates, lazy work ethic, and political interference. Many respondents stressed the aspects of corruption and fraud coupled with untrustworthy business partners as most leading challenges. For example, a middle-aged gentleman from the United States of America stated, ‘There has been this tendency where people cheat Ugandans in Diaspora when they see that they are not in the country. They change the ownership of either the land titles or their other belongings. Such fraud has left the Diasporas with no love of doing business in Uganda anymore as they do not trust anyone’. Another lady from South Africa mentioned that ‘Ugandans should be faithful and trustworthy to their fellow Ugandans in Diaspora when engaging in any business enterprise’. She further stated that ‘there is need for Ugandans in Diaspora to have mutual trust and understanding with the locals’. Lack of trust is also mentioned elsewhere by the *Diaspora Engagement Mapping UGANDA* (2020) as one of the key obstacles the Ugandan Diaspora faces. It further notes other issues, such as the lack of information and infrastructure, adequate human and capital resourcing to maximise their potential, and the high cost of capital to facilitate access to financial assistance for Diaspora investment.

To further understand how the possible challenges would affect the Diaspora's attitudes and decisions to build investment bases in Uganda, research participants were requested to state whether they were satisfied with the investment opportunities in Uganda and their possible advice for improvement. In Figure 12 below, while 67% of the participants indicated they were unsatisfied, only 14.3% stated being satisfied.




Figure 12: Satisfaction of the investment climate in Uganda (Source: Field data)

The challenges Diaspora investors face in Uganda explain the high dissatisfaction rate. On the other hand, those who appear to be satisfied with the current investment opportunities in Uganda highlighted the following to explain their experiences: affordable land, availability of cheap labour and less bureaucratic investment processes. Despite the seemingly different points of view on the investment opportunities by the Uganda Diaspora, there were observations made in the form of suggestions to which the majority of the participants agreed. These included a call to have the political leadership transformed, arguing that in its current form, it appears to provide less attention to reformatory policies in the country. Other suggestions were: Waive taxes on investments for Ugandans in the Diaspora; Promote honesty among Ugandans; Build robust government systems; Train Ugandans in the Diaspora in human capital and investment; Adopt technological advancements, especially in banks;

Build a good work ethic among Ugandans; Stump out corruption and nepotism; Create incentives for Ugandans in the Diaspora to invest in Uganda; Recruit people on merit to work in government institutions; Network with fellow Ugandans in the Diaspora. One respondent shared her view on the need to increase capacity and human resources:

I think the investment opportunities should be placed on technical Institutions where students can learn practical skills like plumbing building, car and motor repairing, and Electric wiring. Once the students are equipped with these skills, it will improve their chance of getting jobs or starting a business on their own.

Another participant intimated on the aspect of corruption:

The government needs to take action and clean up on the side of bureaucracy and corruption, streamline investment processes and procedures and stop legislations that are unfavourable to Ugandans in diaspora such as loss of absolute property ownership for people that obtain a second citizenship.

The United States Department of State (2022) reported that Uganda's investment climate presents opportunities and challenges. It is a market economy with an ideal climate, arable land and a young and productive population; however, it was deeply devastated by Covid-19. This observation is not very different from the World Bank (2019), which noted that Uganda has tried to diversify from primary production into export-oriented manufacturing. However, it is facing serious deficiencies, including the required infrastructure to support, among others, microenterprises and small- and medium-sized enterprises or large enterprises.

5 Conclusion

The remittances of the elite Ugandans in the Diaspora significantly contribute to Uganda's social and economic transformation. This transformation is, however, largely invisible because the structures through which the remittances are received and invested are poor. Due to frustration, there is a need for a concerted effort to streamline these structures so that the elite Ugandans in the Diaspora do not burn out. There is a need to critically evaluate the structures of

handling these remittances such that the policy regulations are strengthened, address the dishonesty between the business partners and improve the productivity of the investment the Ugandans in Diaspora put in place.

6 Recommendations

Based on the study's findings, below are the suggested recommendations to create a more enabling environment for Ugandans in the Diaspora to send more remittances to Uganda for social and economic transformation.

- Reduce the bureaucracy involved in registering investments done by Ugandans in the Diaspora.
- Curb Corruption in the procurement of land and other business properties.
- Promote faithfulness and honesty between business partnerships of Ugandans in the Diaspora and among the locals.
- Involve more Ugandans in the Diaspora in the policy and regulatory frameworks of the Uganda Investment Authority.

References

- Beck, T., M. Janfils & K. Kpodar 2022. What Explains Remittance Fees? Panel Evidence. *International Monetary Fund Working Paper* WP 22, 63. <https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400205439.001>
- Bulwaka, M. 2009. *Diaspora Diplomacy: A Case Study of Uganda*. University of Malta. Available at: https://www.diplomacy.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/23082010102413_Bulwaka_28Library29.pdf (Accessed on 20 May 2022).
- Chikezie, C. 2011. Reinforcing the Contributions of African Diasporas to Development. In Sonia, P. & D. Ratha (eds.): *Diaspora for Development in Africa*. Washington: World Bank.
- Cooper, B., A. Esser, R. Tuyeni & S. Lal Mohamod 2018. Remittances in Uganda. *Exploring Barriers to Remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa Series* 3:1-19.
- Daymon, C. & I. Holloway 2010. *Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications*. New York: Taylor & Francis. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203846544>

- Harvey, W.S. 2008. Brain Circulation? British and Indian Scientists in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. *Asian Population Studies* 4, 3: 293 - 309. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17441730802496516>
- Hougaard, C. 2008. *The Landscape of Remittances in Zambia*. Available at: http://cenfri.org/documents/Remittances/2008/Zambia_remittances_doc_Sep%202008.pdf (Accessed on 18 June 2022).
- Hundle, A.K. 2013. Exceptions to the Expulsion: Violence, Security and Community among Ugandan Asians, 1972 – 1979. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, 1: 164 - 182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2012.755308>
- Mwesigwa, A. 2015. Uganda Crippled by Medical Brain Drain. *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/feb/10/uganda-crippled-medical-brain-drain-doctors> (Accessed on 3 April 2022).
- Nguyen, L., S. Ropers, E. Nderitu, A. Zuyderduin, S. Luboga & A. Hagopian 2008. Intent to Migrate among Nursing Students in Uganda: Measures of the Brain Drain in the Next Generation of Health Professionals. *Human Resources for Health* 6, 1:1-11. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-4491-6-5> PMID:18267034 PMCID:PMC2275294
- Nwani, S.E. & E. Osuji 2020. Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Dynamics of Population, Energy Consumption and Misery Index. *International Journal of Management, Economics and Social Sciences (IJMESS)* 9, 4: 247 - 270. <https://doi.org/10.32327/IJMESS/9.4.2020.13>
- Ojede, A., E. Lam & N. Okot 2019. Identifying Macro-Determinants of Remittance Flows to a Developing Country: The Case of Uganda. *The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development* 28, 4: 429 - 451. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09638199.2018.1546336>
- Remitscope Africa 2021. *Uganda*. Available at: <https://remitscope.org/africa/uganda> (Accessed on 20 May 2022).
- Romaniuk, P. & T. Durner 2018. The Politics of Preventing Violent Extremism: The Case of Uganda. *Conflict, Security & Development* 18, 2: 159 - 179. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2018.1447863>
- Sambajee, P. 2015. Rethinking Non-Traditional Resistance at Work: The Case of the Indian Diaspora in Mauritius. *Culture and Organisation* 21, 5: 386 - 408. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14759551.2015.1060233>
- Sonia, P. & D. Ratha (eds.). 2011. *Diaspora for Development in Africa*. Washington: World Bank.

- Taylor, S.J., R. Bogdan & M. DeVault 2015. *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: A Guidebook and Resource*. ProQuest Ebook Central. Available at: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kyambogou-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4038514> (Accessed on 02 April 2022).
- Uganda Investment Authority 2018. *Report on the 'Home is Best'*. Diaspora Summit 2018 in Jinja, Uganda. Available at: <https://www.ugandainvest.go.ug/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Report-on-the-'Home-is-Best'-Diaspora-Summit-2018-in-Jinja-Uganda-Final-1.pdf> (Accessed on 03 April 2022).
- Uganda Investment Authority 2020. *Annual Report 2019 - 2020*. Available at: <https://www.ugandainvest.go.ug/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/2019-2020-UGANDA-INVESTMENT-ANUAL-REPORT-FINAL.pdf> (Accessed on 13 April 2022).
- Uganda Migration Profile 2017. *Study on Migration Routes in the East and Horn of Africa*. Maastricht: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance.
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2014. *World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs – An Action Plan*. New York: UNCTAD.
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2021. *World Investment Report 2021: Investing in Sustainable Recovery*. Available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2021_en.pdf (Accessed on 11 April 2023).
- US Department of State 2022. 2022 Investment Climate Statements: Uganda. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-investment-climate-statements/uganda/> (Accessed on 25 September 2022.)
- Wandero, A.A. 2020. Invest more in Health – Lukwago. *Daily Monitor*. Available at: <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/invest-more-in-health-lukwago-3222006> (Accessed on 02 February 2022.)
- World Bank 2019. *An Assessment of the Investment Climate in Uganda*. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/12249?locale-attribute=en> (Accessed on 04 May 2022.)
- World Bank 2017. Migration and Remittances. Migration and Development Brief KNOMAD. Available at: <https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-development-brief-36> (Accessed on 18 March 2023).

World Bank 2020. Personal Remittances Received (Current US\$) - Uganda. IBRD-IDA. Available at:

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=UG>. (Accessed on 05 May 2022).

Yoshikawa, H., T.S. Weisner, A. Kalil & N. Way 2008. Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Research in Developmental Science: Uses and Methodological Choices. *Developmental Psychology* 44, 2: 344 - 354.

<https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.44.2.344> PMID:18331127

Gyaviira Kisitu
Department of Religious Studies and Philosophy
Kyambogo University, Uganda
kisitudavis@yahoo.com

Robert Stalone Buwule
Library Department
Kyambogo University, Uganda
burosta@gmail.com

CHAPTER 7

Diaspora Remittance Challenges and Opportunities for Rural Development: A Case of Zimbabwe

Joburg Mahuyu

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6304-4487>

Albert Makochekanwa

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4608-0320>

Abstract

Diasporans are energetic and resourceful migrants who move from their ancestral homelands to new lands to improve their own lives as well as the lives of their families. As a result, they engage in various activities in the Diaspora, such as learning new skills and doing any available jobs despite their qualifications or community services to earn a living. A major challenge faced by Diasporas is sending their hard-earned money to their homeland. The money is supposed to help families with socio-economic development or investments. This literature review-based study highlights how Diaspora remittances stimulate rural development in Zimbabwe and proffers strategies to harness Diaspora funds. The content analysis of selected secondary data revealed that formal remittances to Zimbabwe in 2021 reached USD 1 billion, up from USD 981 million in 2020, contributing 3.2% to the country's GDP. However, most remittances were through informal channels because of regulatory bottlenecks. The literature reviewed also revealed that the lack of reliable, affordable and accessible transfer systems and high taxation and anti-migration policies increased the cost of sending home remittances. Lower transaction costs resulted in high remittance flows that facilitated socio-economic development. The authors offer recommendations to the policymakers that may attract Diaspora remittances for national development in the recipient country.

Keywords: Diasporans, remittances, opportunities, challenges, rural development, Zimbabwe

1 Introduction

This chapter draws from secondary data, focusing on Diaspora remittance challenges and opportunities in sending money to relatives in their home country for rural development. Diaspora remittances are considered one of the key benefits that Diasporans bring to originating countries (homelands). Remittances refer to private resource flows for direct consumption and household support (Ratha 2009). Literature has shown that most developing countries are not tapping into such essential inflow to channel it towards social and economic development (Bonga 2019; Rustomjee 2018; ZimStat 2012). According to an International Organisation for Migration Report by Melde, Milan, Shivakoti, Roy, Martineau, and Laczko (2019), remittance inflows have assisted many developing countries in maintaining a balance of payments stability, ensuring the availability of hard currency, improving countries' credit worthiness for external borrowing and increasing internal aggregated demand. People in the Diaspora send money home for many reasons, including sustaining families left behind and as savings and investments for the future. The need to construct secure livelihoods through gainful employment abroad constitutes an important driver of Zimbabwean emigration.

According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2017), Diaspora remittances are household incomes from foreign economies arising primarily from people's temporary or permanent move to those economies. Diaspora social remittances are taken as ideas, practices, mindsets, world views, values and attitudes, norms of behaviour and social capital that migrants mediate and consciously or unconsciously transfer from host to home communities (Chivundu, Suphian & Kim 2017). Remittances can contribute to national development if harnessed into the national economy (ZimStat 2012). The former Finance Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, acknowledged the importance of remittances in the 2014 Budget Statement by indicating that globally, most countries, including Zimbabwe's regional neighbours, benefited immensely from financial transfers by their nationals in the Diaspora. Remittances that are either invested or saved have a multiplier effect on the economy and have a developmental impact (Bonga 2019).

Apart from formal channels, Diaspora remittances may enter the country through informal channels. No documentation of such remittances passes through formal channels. Estimates of such remittances will misguide policy just as much as not accounting for them. These potential inaccuracies may be caused by irregular migration that exists. A person becomes an irregular migrant when they enter a country without satisfying the immigration laws of that country. There is greater concern that Diaspora remittances continue to be transmitted through informal channels in Zimbabwe, especially with the current global inflation rates. Irregular, illegal immigration is not uncommon in Zimbabwe, as witnessed by detaining and prosecution statistics over the years for contravening immigration laws in neighbouring countries and abroad. The lack of proper travel documentation by many Zimbabwean migrants in many host countries means that a significant flow of remittances enters through informal channels, especially from neighbouring countries like South Africa and Botswana (Zhou, Pindiriri & Tambama 2013).

The movement of people from one nation to another is not a new notion globally. For instance, since the 1950s, Zimbabweans immigrated to South Africa in what used to be called 'Wenera.' It meant working in mining shafts. (Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy 2016). They would send money to families back home via informal channels like friends or relatives for general upkeep and development. In the post-independence era, Zimbabwean migrants continued to send money through informal channels because of the high transaction costs associated with sending money.

Zimbabwe has suffered exceedingly high levels of outward migration, estimated at between 0.4% and 0.2% of its population annually since the turn of the century (Welborn, Cilliers & Kwasi 2019). The Zimbabwean Government recognises that international migration has become an established feature of contemporary social and economic life, with positive and negative manifestations and opportunities (Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy 2016). Income inequalities, human rights abuses and insecurity continue to function as push factors for migration in most developing countries, and Zimbabwe is not spared. Therefore, there is a need for Zimbabwe to put in place mechanisms and policies that favour formal remittances.

The Diaspora phenomenon can be considered a special resource for economic, social, and political development that affects the migrants, the people who stay behind (in their homeland), and the migrants' host countries (IFAD 2017). Therefore, the Diaspora remittances support many people in many

developing countries, including Zimbabwe. Although some Diasporas voluntarily work outside their home countries, in many cases, it is a forced decision, as for Zimbabweans, due to political persecution or increased poverty and inequality caused by the ruling party ZANU PF (Bonga 2019). Therefore, migration is neither a new development phenomenon, failure, nor a substitute for development. The World Bank (2021) has estimated that by 2025, migration could put over USD 140 billion a year into the pockets of people in poor countries. Despite all this, migration remains a controversial and complicated issue generating much debate about the consequences of regular and irregular migration, brain drain, social tensions and family disintegration (Awojobi, Tetteh & Opoku 2017). It is hoped that if governments in developing countries can manage migration by creating a database for Diaspora and lowering taxes on remittances, they can unlock many more benefits for poor people (World Bank 2021).

Diaspora incorporates all kinds of mass population movements:

- Victim Diaspora or Classic Diaspora forced into exile, such as the Jewish, African, and Armenian.
- Labour Diaspora as a result of mass migration in search of work and economic opportunities, such as the Indian and Turkish Diaspora.
- Trade Diaspora, where migrants seek to open trade routes and links such as the Chinese and Lebanese.
- Imperial Diaspora for those keen to serve and maintain empires, such as the British and French Diaspora during the colonial times.
- Cultural Diaspora for people who move through a process of chain migration, such as in the Caribbean (Gazso 2017).

Political tensions in Zimbabwe since 2009 have forced many Zimbabweans to seek political asylum in other countries. The crackdown by the former Zimbabwean President, Mr Robert Gabriel Mugabe's regime on opposition political activists, made some Zimbabweans flee for their lives (Bonga 2020). Gross human rights abuses and poor micro and macro-economic policies compounded by disputed election results have made Zimbabwe's citizens lose confidence in the ruling government. These factors have made some Zimbabweans look for greener pastures outside their country. Constructivism and liberal approaches were adopted. Constructivism sought to account for Diaspora identities, motives, and preferences, while liberalism explained their

actions once the preferences were settled. Apart from emphasising the contribution of constructivism and liberalism to the understanding of Diaspora activities, the research offered ways in which Diaspora activities could enrich both approaches and stimulate rural development. Diasporas were among the most prominent actors that linked international and domestic spheres of politics and development. In this chapter, the authors aim to address challenges affecting Diaspora remittances and the efficacy of such challenges on rural development.

The concept of Diaspora (Diasporas) will be taken to include a collection of people who share a common national, civic, or ethnic identity and who were either forced to leave or voluntarily left their homeland and became residents in another country. The literature review explores the Diaspora remittance challenges and opportunities for rural development, focusing on the Zimbabwean Diaspora from a selected set of literature from 2001 to 2021. The next section presents the problem statement, objectives, the theories underpinning the study, a review of the secondary data, methodology, recommendations, and conclusion.

1.1 Problem Statement

The transfer of funds by Diaspora to their families in their home countries has grown rapidly over the past ten years (World Bank 2021). There are aspects of remitting that have received scant attention in Zimbabwe. Many poor countries are highly dependent on remittances (Poirine & Dropsy 2019), yet Zimbabwe seems unable to attract remittances from its migrants abroad. According to the World Bank (2021), annual African Diaspora savings, at USD 53 billion, exceed annual remittances to the continent and are mostly invested abroad. The major problem faced by Diasporas is sending money back to families and communities in their homeland. The transfer of Diaspora remittances is made costly and difficult by high taxes. Therefore, this means that people in the Diaspora turn to informal channels of sending money back home. Informal transfer systems cannot be regarded as bad but should be used as the last resort when no suitable banking or financial services are available. However, such informal transfer systems have resulted in some individuals defrauding the intended beneficiaries, thus, exacerbating poverty, inequality and derailing rural development. Conducive policies and transparent and accountable ways of transferring money are paramount to prevent financial crimes, money launder-

ing, or the diversion of funds to other unproductive uses. Therefore, preventing these illegal activities is best achieved through regulated formal systems by the government of Zimbabwe. The most challenging factor acting as a stumbling block is the failure of governments to create a set of flexible and inclusive rules to cover informal and formal sector approaches (Orozco & Jewers 2011). It means there must be a policy or initiatives that address the cost of a transfer. Remittances have increasingly become a critical component of national income that warrants investigation (Damiyano & Dorasamy (2019). Against this backdrop, the authors of this chapter embarked on reading secondary data and analysing literature related to the Diaspora remittance challenges and opportunities for rural development.

1.2 Objective

The authors of this chapter evaluate Diaspora remittance challenges and opportunities intended to stimulate rural development in Zimbabwe.

2 Research Methodology

This chapter is a literature review-based study. It used secondary data to gather Diaspora remittance challenges and opportunities for rural development. The secondary data included scholarly articles, books, and reports from various governments and non-governmental organisations. The literature used mainly published articles that adopted a mixed-method approach to the impact of Diaspora remittances that helped to evaluate the impact of Diaspora remittances through getting perceptions and figures related to Diaspora remittances. The chapter used selected secondary data from 2001 to 2021. This period was chosen to evaluate the impact of Diaspora remittances over 20 years because there are changes in information communication technology which positively or negatively impact Diaspora remittances and the government of Zimbabwe.

3 Theories Underpinning the Research

The motive of the Diaspora regarding remittances to their families in their homeland has led to a series of theories that try to explain the link between Diaspora remittances and development. Poornima and Unnikrishnan (2015) describe the word ‘Diaspora’ as having its roots in the Greek word *diaspeirein*,

which means ‘to scatter across, or disperse’. Dispersal is the result of a combination of compulsion and choice. Thus, emigrations are the result of push and pull factors. The authors adopted the following theories to ascertain the impact of Diaspora remittances on rural development. First, the pure altruism theory by Adam Smith (1976) asserts that migrants send money to their families because they care about their family’s well-being, thus, caring for others rather than self-interests. Money sent by Diaspora is used for education, food, health care, investment, and the welfare of migrant families (Awojobi, Tetteh & Opoku 2017). IFAD (2017) indicated that regular remittances lift most families above the poverty line and help them avoid falling back into ‘poverty traps’. According to Fokkema, Cela and Ambrosetti (2013), people remit money because of emotional attachment to their parent’s home country. However, Glytsos (2002) argues that permanent migrants are the only ones that remit for charitable purposes, while temporary migrants remit for investment and future consumption smoothing. The probability of remitting depends on strong family ties between migrants and remaining households. Remittances would decline with an increase in the recipient households’ wealth and the time the migrant stays in the host country (Chinembiri 2017). However, this theory helps to explain the reason(s) for remitting as caring for others and sympathising with those that remained in the home countries, not all Diaspora care and sympathise with their families in the homelands. Despite some Diasporas being employed, some children back home drop out of school due to a lack of finances to pay school fees. At times immediate family members die due to failure to access better health facilities.

The second theory underpinning this literature review is self-interest – exchange motive by Adam Smith (1976). The theory alleges that people always behave in a way that maximises their utility. People in the Diaspora usually remit funds to pay people who look after their investments or other material assets that are likely to be part of their preparation for returning (Fokkema *et al.* 2013). There is an intention by the Diaspora to return to their recipient home country in the future. Anticipation of a return is another factor that explains the self-interest motive for sending remittances (Chinembiri 2017). The migrant wants to demonstrate acceptable behaviour as an investment for the future upon returning home. Diaspora remit because they get positive utility from the consumption of the family (Damiyano & Dorasamy 2019).

Unlike Damiyano and Dorasamy (2019), Diaspora face challenges securing employment in foreign lands; some have little to send home for socio-

economic development or future investments. Subsequently, some Diasporas face hardships in the homelands when they return or get deported because they did not invest at home while in the Diaspora. It is not always the case that some Diaspora will return home, as highlighted (Chinembiri 2017). Some Diaspora will die while in Diaspora, while others will get permanent residence in foreign countries.

4 Review of Secondary Data

This section reviews literature from other scholars on Diaspora remittances from international, regional and Zimbabwean perspectives to gather insights regarding Diaspora remittance. The challenges and opportunities faced by Diaspora as they try to contribute towards rural development in their home countries while residing in foreign countries are significant.

Internationally, there are ongoing debates on the link between Diaspora remittances and development (Awojobi *et al.* 2017). Some authors have alluded that the Diaspora remittances can play an important role in recovering and reconstructing fragile states. Ratha *et al.* (2011) used reports prepared by the World Bank (2010) on Diaspora remittance flows in developed countries to assess the impact of Diaspora remittance on rural development. It was noted in these reports that China, Korea, and India were among the countries showing that Diaspora remittances could significantly help transform rural economies if collected and governed well. The Asian countries promoted partnership agreements, particularly with African countries, at the continental, regional and bilateral levels. They have also taken steps to gradually reduce remittance costs and cooperate with African Diaspora. The IFAD's Financing Facility for Remittances Group has financed projects and policy advocacy plans that promote competition at national and international levels, offering alternative and better financial options for Diaspora to use their hard-earned money. At the national level, some Asian countries have been using a cost-effective 'passing trade system' and collective accounts. The easier and faster passing trade system is like a post office transfer and does not need the sender or the recipient to open an account at the bank concerned.

Remittance flows from migrants have complemented government cash transfer programs to support families suffering economic hardships during the Covid-19 crisis in Zimbabwe. Facilitating the flow of remittances to relieve strained household budgets should be a key component of government policies

to support a global recovery from the pandemic (World Bank 2021).

In 2021, Diaspora remittances registered strong growth in most regions globally. For example, inflows increased by 21.6% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 9.7% in the Middle East and North Africa, 8% in South Asia, 6.2% in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 5.3% in Europe and Central Asia (World Bank 2021). However, in East Asia and the Pacific, remittances fell by 4% - though when excluding China, remittances registered a gain of 1.4% in the region. In Latin America and the Caribbean, growth was exceptionally strong due to economic recovery in the United States, which has positively impacted economic development. According to the World Bank's Remittance Prices Worldwide Database, the cost of sending USD 200 across international borders continued to be too high, averaging 6.4% of the amount transferred in the first quarter of 2021. This figure is more than double the Sustainable Development Goal target of 3% by 2030. It is most expensive to send money to Sub-Saharan Africa (8%) and lower in South Asia (4.6 %). According to the World Bank (2021), costs are higher when remittances are sent through banks than through digital channels or money transmitters offering cash-to-cash services.

Globally, remittance flows from migrants complemented government cash transfer programs to support families suffering economic hardships - as during the Covid-19 crisis. Some governments, especially in developing countries, failed to secure enough cash to support vulnerable citizens during the Covid-19 lockdown. Therefore, Diaspora remittances helped the governments to get money through taxes to give to vulnerable citizens. Facilitating the flow of remittances to relieve strained household budgets should be a key component of government policies supporting the global recovery from the pandemic (World Bank 2021).

According to the World Bank (2021), the outlook for remittances in 2022 is a slower growth of 3.6% due to risks stemming from Covid-19. For instance, the cost of sending USD 200 to the Middle East fell to 6.3% in the first quarter of 2021 from 7% in the previous year. Remittances to South Asia grew 8% to USD 159 billion in 2021. Higher oil prices aided economic recovery and drove the spike in remittances from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which employs over half of South Asia's migrants. Economic recovery and stimulus programs in the United States also contributed to the growth. In India, remittances advanced by an estimated 4.6 % in 2021 to reach USD 87 billion. Pakistan had another year of record remittances, growing at 26% and reaching USD 33 billion in 2021. In addition to the common drivers, the government of

Pakistan supported the transmission of Diaspora remittances through formal channels that attracted large inflows. In addition, Afghanistan's fragile situation emerged as an unexpected cause of the remittance increase in 2021, intended for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and families in Afghanistan. Diaspora remittances were the region's dominant foreign exchange source, with receipts more than twice as large as foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2021. The South Asian region has the lowest average remittance costs globally at 4.6% (World Bank 2021). However, sending money to South Asia through official channels is expensive compared with informal channels, which remain popular because sending money through informal channels attracts zero or little costs. Reducing remittance costs would create a win-win situation welcomed by the Diaspora and governments as remittances would not be heavily charged or taxed, and the Zimbabwean Government would benefit from the volume of remittances. More cash would be channelled for rural development through projects such as water and sanitation, roads and infrastructure development and upgrading the health delivery system because the state collects more taxes from remittances channelled formally.

According to the World Bank (2021), long-term Diaspora investment potential in the homeland and host countries remains untapped in Africa. Since 2000, only five countries, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda, have issued Diaspora bonds. Until recently, in most instances, exclusively targeting the savings of Diaspora populations has failed. At the same time, efforts to attract a broader range of external investors, including the Diaspora, have proved more successful. According to the World Bank (2021), remittances to the developing countries in the North Africa region were projected to have grown by an estimated 9.7% in 2021 to USD 62 billion. There was substantial growth in most countries in the European Union (notably France and Spain). Remittance receipts for the Maghreb region in western and central North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) surged by 15.2%, driven by European growth. On the other hand, flows to several other countries in the region declined in 2021, including Jordan (6.9%), Djibouti (14.8%), and Lebanon (0.3%). For the development of the Middle East region, remittances have long constituted the largest source of external resources for FDI.

In 2021, remittance inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 6.2% to USD 45 billion, while the remittance costs were approximately 8% in the first quarter of 2021, down from 8.9% a year ago (World Bank 2021). Nigeria, the region's largest recipient of remittance inflows from Western countries such

United States of America, Canada and Japan, is experiencing a moderate rebound in remittance flows due to the increasing influence of policies intended to channel inflows through the banking system. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where the value of remittance inflows as a share of GDP is significant include the Gambia (33.8%), Lesotho (23.5%), Cabo Verde (15.6%) and the Comoros (12.3%). In 2022, remittance inflows were projected to grow by 5.5% due to continued economic recovery in Europe and the United States. Although intra-regional migration makes up more than 70% of cross-border migration in this region, costs are high due to the small quantities of formal flows and the utilisation of black-market exchange rates (World Bank 2021).

Diaspora remittance to Zimbabwe remains very informal (Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy 2016). In the past, Zimbabwean authorities have adopted many initiatives like the Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy 2016 aimed at boosting remittances from the Diaspora community, but the efforts were futile. Zimbabwe is yet to realise full economic dividends from its citizens in the Diaspora. The Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Professor Mthuli Ncube, alluded to this view in his 2021 National Budget Statement (*The Zimbabwe Herald* 2020). He noted that the Zimbabwean Diaspora presented a significant opportunity (or potential) for contributing to the economy's development beyond remitting funds for consumptive purposes. In this regard, the minister pointed out that the government was drafting and implementing policies to better harness and use this resource (the potential presented by the Diaspora community), particularly regarding nurturing the Diaspora's entrepreneurial potential.

The impact of remittances on education in Mexico in early 2000 showed that remittances from the Mexicans in the United States positively and significantly assisted in educational attainment among children aged 10 to 15 years, especially among the low levels of schooling households (Hansom & Woodruff 2003). It appeared that remittances relaxed budget constraints that otherwise would have forced children to leave school, especially in households with low levels of adult schooling who do not value the importance of education.

Formal remittances to Zimbabwe were estimated to have reached USD 981 million, contributing 3.2% to the country's GDP (Orozco & Yansura 2019). Remittances have been noted to bring positive benefits to the country when transferred through formal channels and invested in productive economic activities such as improvements in the telecommunications sector in Zimbabwe.

It was worth noting that Zimbabweans abroad supported their families back home in financial and in-kind from 2011 to 2019 (AfDB 2019). However, most transfers were through informal channels because of regulatory bottlenecks. AfDB (2019) posits that migrants' transnational economic engagement has positively impacted rural areas within countries across the structural and rural transformation classification continuum. Orozco (2013a) asserts that remittances have long been a potent force for enabling conditions by which households enjoyed a higher quality of life, increased potential for upward mobility, improved material well-being and greater freedom. A study by Ahmed, Mughal and Klasen (2018) to establish the impact of Diaspora remittances on rural households in Nepal found that remittances bolstered rural households' accumulation of assets and precautionary savings. Remittances facilitated rural households' investment in education, housing and nutrition, positively changing individuals' earning capacity over a lifetime due to continuous remittance inflows (Nguyen, Grote & Nguyen 2017). Because remittance monies are fungible – meaning the monies can easily be exchanged for other things like goods – households can use remittances for various purposes like consumption, savings or productive investment. The fungibility of remittances is particularly important for rural development as most families can interchange for similar or another compatible good.

During the economic meltdown in Zimbabwe between 2007 and 2008, many locals left for Diaspora and had to send money and foodstuffs back home to sustain their families (Ratha 2009). In order to maximise the benefits of remittances, there was a need to strengthen the remittances infrastructure, reducing transaction costs of remittances, addressing 'last-mile' concerns – ensuring recipients in remote or rural areas can receive remittances and at a reasonable cost – and facilitating the use of formal systems, as opposed to informal systems. Leveraging the use of remittances for development through government incentives such as tax breaks, special deposit accounts, matching funds, investment vehicles, and civil society initiatives would stimulate rural development.

According to Bonga (2020), 65% of adults in developing countries live on less than USD 1.90 daily and do not own a bank account in Zimbabwe. These factors bring about many challenges when Diaspora remittances are channelled through banks. Therefore, shifting remittances from informal to formal transfers could decrease the development impact of remittances. This suggestion is proposed not for 'controlling' remittance recipients and senders but because

formalising remittances can bring other developmental benefits. However, the developmental impacts of shifting to a formal system remain disputed as benefits such as socio-economic development highlighted by Orozco (2015) and the World Bank (2021) may not be realised.

Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012) conducted a comprehensive review of informal remittance transfer systems in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific countries, which revealed that these systems offered cheaper, faster, and more versatile services, often surpassing the reliability of formal methods. This is because there were no barriers like government policies and taxes imposed on Diaspora remittances. Furthermore, there is no clear evidence that the development impact of informal transfers is systematically different from that of formal transfers because development is realised in rural areas as more funds are channelled without restriction through informal means.

An attractive and sustainable business environment should be created for Diaspora to commit funds towards investments in Zimbabwe through formal channels. The incentives offered should be enticing enough to make it worthwhile for investors to invest in the Zimbabwean economy. Incentives may be in the form of fiscal and non-fiscal policies that attract the establishment of investments in perpetuity. For example, reduced tax rates for defined trades and projects, import duty exemptions on machinery and other capital equipment imported for investment in specific areas prioritised by the government, reduced corporate income tax for enterprises set up by Diaspora investors, and some tax holidays. In Egypt, Diaspora emitting through banks receive tax breaks for up to ten years. Interest incomes of emigrants from India and Sri Lanka are exempted from income tax. Egypt and Moldova have programmes allowing migrants to buy land at preferential prices. Ethiopia, Kenya and India exempt interest earnings from Diaspora bonds from income taxes (Moreno-Dodson Blanca., Mohapatra, Sanket, Ratha & Dilip 2012).

According to the Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy (2016), the government of Zimbabwe made some efforts to attract Diaspora remittances. In 2005, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) established Homelink to attract foreign currency from Zimbabweans in the Diaspora by providing products and services that meet such people's investment and consumption needs. Homelink was structured into four business units: Proplink –involved in real estate development, housing and land development; Easylink Money Transfer (Pty) Ltd – an agent of Western Union International, responsible for money transfer services; Investlink – responsible for investment needs of the Diaspora by

scanning for investment opportunities in the country and parcelling the opportunities to the Diaspora for possible take up and Masterlink Capital Services (Pty) Ltd – providing short-term financing needs for customers within and outside Zimbabwe. The authors found that despite all the efforts made by the government of Zimbabwe to attract Diaspora remittances, it lacked investor confidence. The lack of confidence resulted from inconsistent money policies. For example, when the Zimbabwean dollar was reintroduced, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor made it clear that it was ZWL 1:1 USD. However, regrettably, within two months, the rate had changed. The conversion of current accounts to nostro accounts and the giving of deadlines to ensure people have used their current account balances tainted the whole Homelink programme. Under normal circumstances, no one can invest in an unstable economic environment. However, a few housing units can be seen in Bindura, Mashonaland Central Province, reserved for those in Diaspora to buy (Chinembiri 2017).

In 2009, the RBZ issued the Diaspora Tobacco and Gold Production Financing Bonds to boost Diaspora remittances. Tobacco bondholders received capital plus interest as a single payment at the end of the tobacco season. The Diaspora Gold Production Financing Bond was also issued to Zimbabweans in the Diaspora to finance gold production by small-scale gold miners in return for interest when the producers sold their gold to the RBZ's gold buying arm, Fidelity Printers and Refiners (Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy 2016)

In 2016, the RBZ launched the Diaspora Remittances Incentive Scheme (DRIS) and further enhanced it in 2017. Under the scheme, in 2016, the RBZ introduced a 3% incentive to receivers of remittances in Zimbabwe who would receive funds sent to them via formal channels, that is, through registered money transfer agents. The incentive was increased to 10% of the funds received in 2017. The DRIS was meant to encourage remittances through formal channels. The scheme benefitted the money transfer agents and the receiver of the funds based on a 2% and 3% split. The scheme witnessed an increase in the flow of remittances by a monthly average of USD 45 million. However, it was discontinued without notice on 27 March 2019 (*Financial Gazette* 8 December 2019; RBZ March 2019; Zhou, Pindiriri and Tambama 2013).

The RBZ also introduced an Investment Desk to cater to Zimbabweans living and working outside the country. The desk, established in 2018, sought to facilitate the participation of Zimbabweans in the country's development by mobilising investments into various economic sectors. Furthermore, the RBZ

authorised commercial banks in Zimbabwe to open Diaspora Investments Accounts for Zimbabweans in the Diaspora (*The Herald* 7 February 2018). The accounts were created in Zimbabwe to specifically enable individuals to save and invest funds designated for investment projects. These accounts would be funded from offshore sources and were eligible for a 7% Diaspora Remittance Incentive provided by the RBZ, in addition to the interest offered by the bank. However, the Diaspora community was hesitant due to uncertainties exhibited in previous monetary and fiscal policies. They feared that when the RBZ had collected enough, it would force clients to convert their balances into a volatile local currency (Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy 2016).

Diaspora remittances are made through formal channels and informal channels. Most Zimbabweans living in Diaspora avoid sending money through formal channels to evade high taxes imposed by the government. The Government of Zimbabwe has stringent policies that do not favour Diaspora remittances, such as a 2% tax on every transaction and high withdrawal charges of USD 5.00 per withdrawal, depending on the amount to be withdrawn by the client. In June 2019, the Minister of Finance and Economic Development outlawed the use of multiple currencies. The move shattered the earlier incentive schemes introduced by the RBZ (RBZ June 2019), such as issuing Diaspora bonds, Diaspora Investments Accounts and Diaspora Remittance Incentive Scheme (Chinembiri 2017).

Even to date, Diaspora remittances remain a lifeline for many Zimbabweans. Diaspora remittances have resulted in rural household development. New houses have been built, boreholes have been sunk that are solar powered, and some communities now have community libraries and clinics.

5 Challenges Affecting Diaspora Remittances in Zimbabwe

This section discusses the challenges faced by Diaspora in sending money to their home country, Zimbabwe, which subsequently affects rural development in the home country.

5.1 Taxing Remittance Policies

Remittances are private monies that can be taxed when spent on public goods. However, taxing remittances was counter-productive because doing so incentivised migrants to send money through informal channels, reduced the

need to send remittances altogether and was regressive in Zimbabwe. A mandatory 2% tax on all financial transactions imposed by the Minister of Finance and Economic Development in Zimbabwe prevented Diaspora from sending money through formal channels. There are high costs for transmitting money through existing formal money transfers. Remittances from the Diaspora have been attracting high service charges (Damiyano & Dorasamy 2019).

5.2 Lack of Investor Confidence

One of the possible reasons why Zimbabweans in the Diaspora are not keen to invest back home is a lack of confidence and trust in the prevailing situation in the country. The lack of confidence and trust flows from the absence of accurate official information on policy positions and opportunities for possible take-up. Zimbabweans in the Diaspora have been assumed to be anti-government. The general perception of Zimbabweans living in the Diaspora is that of an unstable investment environment characterised by overnight changes in laws and agreements. It will require concerted efforts to undo this attitude, inspire confidence, and achieve significant economic stability and growth inflows. Time and again, top government officials, including ministers, publicly issue conflicting investment policy interpretations. Such tendencies breed an unpredictable investment environment in which investors feel insecure. This situation was particularly pronounced regarding the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (*New Zimbabwe* 25 December 2015; *The Standard* 3 April 2016).

5.3 Lack of Engagement and Formal Communication Platforms with Diaspora

According to Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy (2016), Zimbabwe has no formal communication platforms between the government and the Diaspora. As a result, there are no cohesive synergies between the country and the Diaspora. The Zimbabwean Diaspora has relied on the public media as the primary source of information on the situation back home. This lack of engagement was not ideal, considering some media deficiencies bordering over-exaggeration and misrepresenting facts. This situation could be resolved via frequent official engagement between the government and the Diaspora community as a platform to provide accurate information about the situation. For instance, through embassies abroad, the government should frequently engage with the

Diaspora community through various communication platforms by hosting business seminars – online or face-to-face – conferences and cultural festivals. The embassies could listen to the Diaspora community's challenges and aspirations and explain government policy positions on matters of concern. This engagement could go a long way in building the Diaspora's confidence in government dealings. This engagement would stimulate the exchange of knowledge, expertise, and experience between the Diaspora and the mainstream development agencies. Knowledge and sharing expertise are essential as they can stimulate joint development activities in the future.

There are no specific fiscal concessions in Zimbabwe to attract prospective Diaspora investors. The research indicated that in some situations, the Diaspora communities are also left out in programs to empower the local people of the home countries. In the case of Zimbabwe, the investment policies were targeted at attracting FDI, whilst the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act was silent on the role of Diasporas in nation-building and employment creation. The research showed that the general view within the Diaspora community is that the government's investment promotion schemes are meant for foreign investors instead of local investors and the Diaspora community. Furthermore, the environment is also viewed to favour large companies more than start-ups or small- and medium enterprises. A mechanism is needed to assist returning residents concerning relocation, reintegration, and support to start businesses for social and economic development (Chinembiri 2017).

5.4 Few Receiving Points and Poor Internet Connectivity

The study found that recipients of Diaspora funds had to travel long distances to access the money. In Zimbabwe, most recipients get their money from Mukuru and Western Union. These collection points are found in banks, hyper hardware shops or wholesalers in big towns and cities, mostly far away from rural communities. It must be understood that not all in Diaspora are gainfully employed, and some may send as little as USD 20.00. In some cases, travelling long distances would not be prudent as the transport cost may surpass the amount sent. Due to electricity outages, internet connectivity is often interrupted. It was found that some recipients could spend more time, if not days, queuing at the bank or Mukuru collection booths. Some places were inaccessible due to poor road networks. Again, it was found that those from rural communities would take a long time to collect the money sent (Damiyano & Dorasamy 2019).

5.5 Corruption

Diaspora remittances should be put to good use for the benefit of the citizens through improving health facilities, education and infrastructure development and not for individuals or political benefit. Governments in developing countries should be accountable. Confidence and trust between the government and its citizenry are built through the positive actions of the government that include, among others, enacting and implementing policies that benefit citizens, embracing accountability and transparency in public transactions, and fighting corruption in a firm, fair, and just manner. For example, in Zimbabwe, money donated to fight Covid-19 was mismanaged. The then minister of Health and Child Welfare, Dr Obadiah Moyo, was implicated in a USD 60 million fraud and got fired from the post, but no recoveries were recorded. Leaders should pass credibility or competency tests (Damiyano & Dorasamy 2019).

One of the reasons why remittances have not spurred economic growth and rural development in Zimbabwe is that the remittances were not intended to serve as investments but as social insurance to help family members finance the purchase of life's necessities. Remittances lift people from poverty but do not typically turn their recipients into entrepreneurs. Studies have shown that remittances tend to reduce poverty. Adams' (2004) work on remittances and poverty reduction found a statistical relationship between remittance and poverty trends worldwide. His study showed that a 10% increase in international remittances from each individual would lead to a 3.5% decline in the share of impoverished people. Most governments in Africa were not taking remittance flows as investment opportunities. There is a need to develop policies and institutions that can help recipients of remittances make the most of the transfers they receive (Chinembiri 2017).

6 Remittance Policies, Products, and Solutions to Spur Rural Development: Opportunities

This section discusses products and policies that can harness and aid remittance flows to stimulate rural development in Zimbabwe. This section also highlights opportunities that can be created through favourable Diaspora remittance policies in Zimbabwe.

Asset building is a key intersecting component between remittances and development. Significant challenges include poor financial access, especially for recipients in rural areas, regulatory environments restricting participation in

money transfers limiting competition, and problems relating to expensive remittance transfer costs persist. As a result, migrants often invest informally, and such development projects do not have expected impacts.

6.1 Reducing Transaction Costs of Remittances

Reducing transaction costs of remittances enables rural recipients to receive them at a reasonable cost, facilitating the use of formal systems instead of informal systems. On average, remittance costs in all regions were higher than the 5% transfer fees proposed by the IMF (Watkins & Quattri 2020). Fees to Sub-Saharan Africa were the highest, at 12.8%, on average, and fees to South Asian countries were lowest, at around 6.5% on average. These transfer fees were detrimental to development. They represent money that could have been spent on recipient households instead. For instance, Watkins and Quattri (2020) estimated that for Sub-Saharan Africa, remittance fees cost the African continent USD 1.8 billion a year, enough money to pay for the primary school education of 14 million children in the region. Therefore, reducing remittance fees is an important policy priority.

Reducing the transaction costs of remittances is critical to increasing the remittances available to recipient households. Increasing competition can reduce transaction costs, thereby increasing the quality of service. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, remittances were dominated by a duopoly of money transfer organisations (MTOs). It explains why transfer fees were highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (Watkins & Quattri 2020). In developed countries such as the US-Mexico remittances corridor, the costs of remittances have been reduced by more than half. Therefore, competition can be increased through:

- (i) promoting alternative providers such as microfinance institutions and credit cooperatives;
- (ii) including financial services in the services provided by post offices and ensuring they have the required facilities like an Internet connection and management information systems. The Post Office has embraced banking in Zimbabwe, but remittance charges remain high;
- (iii) eliminating exclusive partnerships for money transfers and allowing multiple partnerships;
- (iv) disseminating information about potential channels and costs for remit-

tances – including websites, such as the successful Australia Remittance Cost Database or the World Bank Remittance Costs Database, but should also be published in other formats like pamphlets written in various common languages for migrants that are less literate and without access to the Internet;

- (v) allowing non-bank financial institutions like MTOs direct access to clearing and settlement systems rather than through commercial banks;
- (vi) improving transparency; and
- (vii) implementing technological advances such as pre-paid cards that can be used in stores nationwide.

6.2 Shifting from Informal to Formal Transfer Systems

About 65% of remittances in Zimbabwe were informal in 2015 (Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy Document 2016). Shifting remittances from informal to formal transfers can increase the development impact of remittances. Formalising remittances can bring community developmental benefits such as sinking boreholes, health facilities, education centres or institutions and road rehabilitation. Informal remittances are associated with money laundering or the financing of terrorist activities. Therefore, channelling funds through formal channels would give governments greater oversight (Kharel 2011).

The Universal Postal Union (UPU) was instrumental in implementing the Millennium Development Goals in the United Nations General Assembly resolutions (A/RES/59/220, 2004; A/ RES/60/1, 2005). These resolutions aimed to reduce poverty and the digital divide and reaffirmed the need to adopt policies and take measures to reduce the cost of transferring migrant workers' remittances to developing countries. The costs associated with international money transfers remained high, with charges of up to 20% levied on transactions in some cases (World Bank 2011).

6.3 Financial Product Design

Policymakers must target the financial markets before designing financial services interventions. Identifying the product to be offered involves carefully selecting the partners among financial institutions, government agencies and

civil society to develop access to the target population and collaboration with remittance service providers (Chinembiri 2017).

6.4 Educating Rural Recipients on Budgeting and Saving

Rural remittance recipients should be educated on formalising their savings at trusted financial institutions to improve their living standards. Financial education will improve the usability and openness of financial products among remittance recipients. Low levels of financial literacy reflect many people's struggle to strike the right balance between income and expenditure. It can result in some people getting enough money but failing to make meaningful household or community development (Damiyano & Dorasamy 2019).

7 Recommendations

The following recommendations are proposed:

- The Zimbabwe government needs to study how their recipients currently use remittances. Most evidence on remittance receipt and usage is limited. Therefore, policymakers do not have an adequate understanding of the obstacles that prevent remittances from being used to spur development, particularly in education, business formation and investment in rural areas.
- There is a need to initiate partnerships between registered banks and non-bank financial institutions, including savings and credit cooperatives, micro-finance institutions and post offices, to reduce transaction costs.
- There is a need to fight corruption in managing Diaspora remittances and ensuring transparency and accountability.
- There is a need to promote mobile phone remittance transfers and accessibility. In Zimbabwe, most rural communities have poor road and transmission network systems.

8 Conclusion

This chapter presented evidence of the potential challenges faced by Diasporas

in sending money to their home families for sustainability and development. It reviewed and highlighted major gaps in the literature. It should be considered as a resource document for further study and analysis.

From a macroeconomic perspective, remittances have been considered to boost foreign exchange reserves. Remittances bring the much-needed foreign currency to purchase capital items for socio-economic development. Most rural communities in Zimbabwe lag in development due to a lack of foreign currency.

The authors of this chapter found that there is a need for policies that promote Diaspora remittances. They are an important source of income which can be used to develop rural areas. Policy improvements regarding Diaspora remittances include reducing transaction costs and ensuring recipients in rural areas can receive remittances at a reasonable cost. They are left with more disposable income, which they can use to develop their households and communities. Facilitating the use of formal systems helps to bank the unbanked and could deepen financial systems in low-income countries. Capturing a share of remittances for development purposes, avoidance of corruption, promotion of accountability, and creation of communication platforms between the government and the Diaspora community and providing incentives to remitters helps to increase the inflow of Diaspora remittances.

Although tax incentives may attract Diasporas' remittances, the research in this chapter emphasises that these may also encourage tax evasion of non-migrants. Likewise, matching funds have successfully encouraged group remittances in some countries but could divert resources from other, more important programmes or needy regions and places. Although remittances are private monies, they should be treated like other income sources. Finally, the most productive use of remittances can be achieved through improvements in the overall investment climate of a country. The environment should be politically stable, free from corruption and conflict.

The Universal Postal Union was already collaborating with partners such as the IFAD, the World Bank and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to tackle challenges faced by Diasporas in sending money to their families in their respective home countries. There is a need to create more partnerships to establish reliable postal services by providing financial services that can contribute to socio-economic development in rural areas. Most rural areas in Zimbabwe remain marginalised. Such partnerships need to have the full support of the respective governments and international donors.

References

- Adams, R. 2004. Remittances and Poverty in Guatemala. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3418*. World Bank.
<https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3418>
- Adams, R. & A. Cuecuecha 2010. Remittances, Household Expenditure and Investment in Guatemala. *World Development* 38, 11: 1626 - 1641.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.03.003>
- African Development Bank 2019. *African Economic Outlook 2019*. Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire: AfDB.
- Ahmed, J., M. Mughal & S. Klasen 2018. Great Expectations? Remittances and Asset Accumulation in Pakistan. *Journal of International Development* 30: 507 – 532. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3202>
- Alcaraz, C., D. Chiquiar & A. Salcedo 2012. Remittances, Schooling, and Child Labour in Mexico. *Journal of Development Economics* 97, 1: 156 - 165.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.11.004>
- Awojobi, O.N., J. Tetteh & S. Opoku 2017. Remittance, Migration and Development: Investigating African Diaspora in Germany. *International Journal of Innovative Research & Development* 6, 6: 32 - 38.
<https://doi.org/10.24940/ijird/2017/v6/i6/JUN17009>
- Banyai, M. 2010. Dracula's Image in Tourism: Western Bloggers versus Tour Guides. *European Journal of Tourism Research* 3, 1: 5 - 22.
<https://doi.org/10.54055/ejtr.v3i1.42>
- Bonga, W.G. 2020. Understanding Diaspora Remittances Levels in Zimbabwe (2009 - 2020) Including Future Forecasts Using ARIMA Technique (2020 - 2022). *European Journal of Research Development and Sustainability* 1, 2: 10 - 21.
- Carling, J. 2004. Policy Options for Increasing the Benefits of Remittances. *Centre on Migration, Policy and Society*. Working Paper No. 8. Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Chinembiri, T. 2017. *The Impact of USD - Rand Exchange Rate on Remittance to Zimbabwe (2008 - 2015)*. Bachelor's Dissertation, Department of Economics, Faculty of Commerce, Midlands State University.
- Chivundu, R., R. Suphian & S. Kim 2017. *The Effect of Diaspora Remittances on Economic Growth in Malawi*. Repository, Hanyang University.
<https://repository.hanyang.ac.kr/bitstream/20.500.11754/116445/1/The%20Effect%20of%20Diaspora%20Remittances%20on%20Economic%20Growth%20in%20Malawi.pdf>

- Choi, S.X., Y. Lehto & A.M. Morrison 2007. Destination Image Representation on the Web: Content Analysis of Macau Travel Related Websites. *Tourism Management* 28: 118-29. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2006.03.002>
- Damiyano, D. & N. Dorasamy 2019. The Diaspora Effect on Poverty Alleviation in Zimbabwe. *Restaurant Business* 118, 11: 381 - 416. <https://doi.org/10.26643/rb.v118i11.10703>
- Demirguc-Kunt, A. & L. Klapper 2012. Measuring Financial Inclusion: The Global Findex Database. World Bank. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 6025. <https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6025>
- Fokkema, T., E. Cela & E. Ambrosetti 2013. Giving from the Heart or from the Ego? *Motives behind Remittances of the Second Generation in Europe* 47, 3: 539 – 572. <https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12032>
- Government of Zimbabwe 2016. *Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy*. Harare, Zimbabwe: Government of Zimbabwe.
- Gazsó, D. 2017. Diaspora Policies in Theory and Practice. *Hungarian Journal of Minority Studies* 1: 65-87.
- Glytsos, N.P. 2002. The Role of Migrant Remittances in Development: Evidence from Arab Mediterranean Countries. *International Migration* 40, 1: 65 - 144. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00183>
- GSMA 2012. *Mobile Money in the Philippines – The Market, the Models and Regulation*. Available at: <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Philippines-Case-Study-v-X21-21.pdf> (Accessed 23 March 2023.)
- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 2017. *Sending Money Home: Contributing to the SDGs, One Family at a Time*. Rome: IFAD. Available at: <https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/39135645/Sending+Money+Home+-+Contributing+to+the+SDGs%2C+one+family+at+a+time.pdf/c207b5f1-9fef-4877-9315-75463fccfaa7> (Accessed 11 April 2023.)
- International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 2013. *Diasporas and Development: Bridging Societies and States*. *International Dialogue on Migration* No. 22. Geneva: IOM.
- Kharel, P. 2011. *Remittances as a Development Resource: The Experience of Nepal*. Available at: http://www.sawtee.org/Research_Reports/R2011-02.pdf (Accessed on 23 March 2022)

- Melde, S., A. Milan, R. Shivakoti, S.Y. Roy, D. Martineau & F. Laczko 2019. *Migration Governance Indicators: A Global Perspective*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Moreno-Dodson, B., S. Mohapatra & D. Ratha 2012. Migration, Taxation, and Inequality. *Economic Premise No. 80*. Washington DC: World Bank. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/a10fb322-671f-5a9b-8772-50de4a490ef1> (Accessed 11 April 2023.)
- Nguyen, D., U. Grote & T. Nguyen 2017. Migration and Rural Household Expenditures: A Case Study from Vietnam. *Economic Analysis and Policy* 56: 163 - 175. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2017.09.001>
- Orozco, M. 2013. *Youth, Migration, Remittances and Development: A Needed Policy Approach*. Available at: <https://www.bu.edu/africa/files/2018/11/Youth-and-Remittances-Implications-for-Policy.pdf> (Accessed 11 April 2023.)
- Orozco, M. & J. Yansura 2019. *A Taste of Home: The Nostalgia Trade and Migrant Economic Transnationalism*. In Elo M., I. Minto-Coy (eds.): *Diaspora Networks in International Business: Contributions to Management Science*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91095-6_5
- Orozco, M. & M. Jewers 2011. *Assessment & Lessons Learned from the African Diaspora Marketplace*. Washington, D.C.: USAID.
- Orozco, M., L. Porras & J. Yansura 2015. *Trends in Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2014*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue.
- Pasura, D.M. 2008. *A Fractured Diaspora: Strategies and Identities among Zimbabweans in Britain*. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
- Poirine, B. & V. Dropsy 2019. Diaspora Growth and Aggregate Remittances: An Inverted-U Relationship? *Applied Economics* 51,11 : 1151 - 1165. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2018.1524981>
- Poornima, M.D. & V. Unnikrishnan 2015. Close Look on the Theories of Diaspora Coimbatore, Tamilnadu. *Pune Research: An International Journal* 1,2. Available at: <http://puneresearch.com/media/data/issues/55fae9ed7062f.pdf> (Accessed on 11 April 2023.)
- Ratha, D. 2009. *A Lifeline to Poor Countries: Remittances in Development*.

- Finance and Development* 46,4. Available at:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44837715_Remittances_A_lifeline_for_development
(Accessed on 11 April 2023.)
- Ratha, D.S., C. Özden, S. Plaza, W. Shaw & A. Shimeles 2011. *Leveraging Migration for Africa – Remittances, Skills, and Investments*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
<https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8257-8>
- Rustomjee, C. 2018. *Issues and Challenges in Mobilising African Diaspora Investment*. Policy Brief No. 130 - April 2018. Waterloo, Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation.
- UNDESA 2017. *United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development Population Division: International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision*. Available at:
<https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock> (Accessed on 11 April 2023.)
- United Nations 2013. *Maximising the Development Impact of Remittances*. Available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditctncd2011d8_en.pdf
(Accessed on 11 April 2023.)
- Watkins, K. & M. Quattri 2020. *Lost in Intermediation: How Excessive Charges Undermine the Benefits of Remittances for Africa*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Welborn, L., J. Cilliers & S. Kwasi 2019. *Great Zimbabwe: Alternative Prospects to 2040*. Southern Africa Report 23. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- World Bank 2011. *Remittance Prices Worldwide: Making Markets more Transparent*. Available at: <http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/>
(Accessed on 11 April 2023.)
- World Bank 2014. *Remittances Prices Database*. Available at:
<https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/en> (Accessed on 11 April 2023.)
- World Bank 2021. *The Migration and Development Brief* 35. Available at:
blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove (Accessed on 11 April 2023.)
- Zimbabwe Diaspora Policy 2016. *Ministry of Macro-Economic Planning and Investment Promotion*. Available at:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Economic_Planning_and_Investment_Promotion (Accessed on 11 April 2023.)

- ZimStat 2012. *Migration in Zimbabwe: A Country Profile 2010*. Harare: Zimbabwe National Statistic Agency.
- ZimStat 2021. *Migration in Zimbabwe: A Country Profile 2010*. Harare Zimbabwe National Statistic Agency.
- Zhou, H., C. Pindiriri & J. Tambama 2013. Consumption Response to Diaspora Remittances in Zimbabwe. *BOJE: Botswana Journal of Economics* 11, 15. Available at: <file:///C:/Users/mutulas/Downloads/94196-Article%20Text-241824-1-10-20130913.pdf> (Accessed on 11 April 2023.)

Joburg Mahuyu
College of Human Sciences, Development Studies,
University of South Africa (UNISA)
Pretoria
jmahuyu@gmail.com
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6304-4487>

Albert Makochekanwa
Department of Economics
University of Zimbabwe
Harare
almac772002@yahoo.co.uk

SECTION III

**IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND
PRESS FRAMING**

CHAPTER 8:

The Immigration Policies as an Exclusion Practice: A Serious Threat to Human Dignity among the Diasporas

Samuel Fikiri Cinini

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4889-6398>

Sazelo Michael Mkhize

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7950-1948>

Abstract

The massive scale of 9/11 – the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City in the United States (US) – prompted unprecedented international action to coordinate efforts against terrorism. Equally noteworthy is the fact that numerous national governments enacted specific legislation to bolster their national security and safeguard their societies against the potential menace of future terrorist activities. In that process, the quest by many governments to strengthen their national security has produced charges alleging human rights violations and curtailment of civil liberties of certain groups of people in those states. Since then, various new national laws have been said to impose intrusive restrictions on certain freedoms to thwart activities by potential terrorists. Migration, thus, tends to be viewed as a security threat or challenge. These perceptions about immigrants have had important policy implications in many countries. Numerous policies aimed at reducing immigration, restricting immigration from certain countries, limiting social benefits for immigrants, or increasing penalties for immigration violations have been implemented throughout history in response to these negative perceptions. The authors of this study aim to assess how immigration policies are used to exclude the Diaspora in the socio-economic spheres of the host country. In doing so, they demonstrate that this exclusion practice is the cause of numerous threats to human dignity

among the Diasporas. Through a systematic process, a qualitative secondary data approach was utilised to gather information for this chapter. The Internet was used to access search engines such as Google Scholar, Jstor, and Ebscohot, by using appropriate keywords to collect articles, books and other important documents that provide relevant data that contribute to the completion of this chapter. The objective of this study is to explore how immigration policies play an exclusionary role with serious threats to human dignity and human rights violations among Diasporas. The chapter suggests that real-world public policy on immigrants and migrants should consider the human dignity of the Diasporas as human beings living in the host land.

Keywords: immigration policies, exclusion practice, migrants, human dignity, threat, human security, Diasporas

1 Introduction

Migration is universal. Human beings spread globally from one corner to the other of the world through migration (Ullah & Huque 2020). Transcontinental migration has played an important role in the Americas. The American continent was formed entirely by immigrants from every other continent. Over two-thirds of Latin America's population descends from people who arrived after 1492. In Africa, Asia, and Europe, over 94% of the population trace their origins to people who have been there for thousands of years (Ullah & Huque 2020). Initially, immigration was seen as temporary but eventually became permanent. Therefore, today's claims about the migrants are that they have marked the societies politically, socially and culturally, though they are the minority (Ullah & Huque 2020:33).

Throughout the Atlantic Slave Trade, from approximately 1526 to 1867, some 12.5 million enslaved people were shipped from Africa, and 10.7 million arrived in the Americas (Miller 2018). In addition, Salopek (2019:45) reports the following: 'The United Nations estimates that more than a billion people are voting with their feet, migrating within their countries or across international borders. Millions are fleeing violence: war, persecution, criminality, and political chaos. Many more, suffocated by poverty, are seeking economic relief beyond their horizons' (ibid). Nevertheless, past and present US anti-immigration policies have contributed to human rights violations

among Latin American immigrants and physical and psychological issues in Latin American migrants regardless of their legal status (Somin 2017). While the face of immigration may have changed, immigration has been a part of US history for over 200 years (Pulitano 2013). It is how the territories that became the US were taken from the indigenous peoples. Today's politicians and American citizens who fear immigrants are the grandchildren of European ancestors who sought a wide array of freedoms in a new world (Somin 2017).

Thus, by ignoring the history of immigration in the US through the lens of colonial expansion, society has constructed the concept of the dangerous alien other, resulting in human rights violations, racism, xenophobia, and other social inequalities (Romero 2008). Unfortunately, 19th and 20th-century anti-immigrant sentiment – which often translates into policy – continues to create inequality in American society for non-White migrants (Romero 2008). Present-day voluntary migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers arrive in the US from Latin America due to various factors known as push-pull factors (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012). Push factors are 'described as forces that cause migrants to flee their countries and/or play into the decision-making process to migrate to the United States' (Franco 2018:1). They are dynamics such as war, poverty, and persecution that commence in the migrants' country of origin. In contrast, pull factors are elements that develop in the resettlement country, such as reunification with family, that force Latin Americans to migrate specifically to the US (Franco 2020).

In Africa, environmental degradation, overpopulation, droughts, famines, debt crises, political and social instability, economic marginalisation, ethnic clashes, and religious fanaticism have become powerful elements for ongoing unrest (Ullah 2012). Ullah and Haque (2020) say these circumstances produce potential migrants and refugees. Although Sub-Saharan Africa constitutes only about 10% of the world's population, it accounts for nearly 25% of its refugees (Ullah 2014). A substantial percentage of these were environmental refugees (Ullah 2013). Others have fled civil wars and human rights violations (Ullah 2016). Millions of internally displaced people are not legally recognised under international law as refugees (Ullah & Haqu 2020). Portes (1981) affirms that migration increases with time. Growing economic disparities between developed and developing countries drive this increase through education, training, and technological progress, notably in communications and transportation. The changing internal and external conflicts, political persecution, involvement of mafia syndicates in 'illegal migration' and high demand

for sex tourism have produced huge amounts of forced migrants, refugees, and trafficked humans (Ullah & Haque 2020). One of the laws (migrants travel in general short distances) may seem obsolete in the time of advanced technology.

Some push forces of migration have somewhat been explained by a theory of relative deprivation which creates a desperate desire of the potential migrants to set off for new destinations, often without knowing how and where they will end up (Ullah & Haque 2020). According to research, violence, political unrest, and natural disasters have acted as push factors influencing emigration from various Latin American countries (Franco 2018; Greenman & Hall 2013; Seghetti 2015). Natural disasters in Honduras, like floods and hurricanes, have displaced many of its nationals, qualifying them for Temporary Protected Status in the US (Greenman & Hall 2013). This study aims at assessing how immigration policies are used to exclude the Diaspora in the socio-economic sphere of the host land. It demonstrates that this exclusion practice is a cause of numerous threats to human dignity among the Diasporas. The authors of this study suggest that each country must consider international human rights and humanitarian laws when crafting its immigration policies. They seek to request that robust immigration policy and practical interventions be implemented to manage the Diaspora phenomenon in both human and profitable manners for the common public good.

Therefore, this research adopted a qualitative approach to the study's objective. Normally qualitative researchers examine how people learn about and make sense of themselves and others and how they structure and give meaning to their daily lives. Thus, qualitative research involves collecting and interpreting subjective data often shaped by social, cultural, and political realities evident during data collection (Walters 2009). Nevertheless, the researchers of this study decided to use secondary data following a systematic method. Secondary analysis is an empirical exercise that applies the same basic research principles as studies utilising primary data and has steps to be followed just as any research method (Johnston 2017).

Using large secondary data sets provides an alternative to collecting primary data, often giving the researcher access to more information than would be available in primary data sets (Vartanian 2010). One of the advantages of secondary data is that it can include any data examined to answer a research question other than the question(s) for which the data were initially collected. However, also it includes access to large amounts of information and coverage of a broad range of individuals or other entities like schools and hospitals

(Vartanian 2010:1-3). They tend to be far less costly and take far less time to organise relatively to primary data sets. For this chapter, the authors used secondary data from accredited journals by the institution for which this research was conducted, the University of KwaZulu-Natal. These journals and books were accessed online through web-based resources leading to the institution's online libraries, the South African government website, and online newspapers.

Although secondary data presents many opportunities for researchers, there are still good reasons for using primary data. One of the problems with using secondary data is the lack of control over the framing and wording of survey items (Vartanian 2010). It may mean the data does not include questions important to a study. Trzesniewski, Donnellan, and Lucas (2011:5) point out that 'the primary disadvantage of secondary data is the flip side of the major advantage – the data have already been collected'.

Nevertheless, to access the data, the internet was used in a way that the researchers formulated a search strategy using appropriate keywords through Google Scholar and Jstor.org, but also some official websites were visited, which then allowed for a collection of estimated relevant articles, books and other web-based resources from which secondary data were extracted to respond to the purpose of this study. The ethical procedures were considered by describing articles that protect human subjects in their analysis. Such data were de-identified before the secondary data analysis was conducted.

1.1 The Relevance of this Study

Development and migration association is real. The debate about the impact of migration on development has been ongoing. However, scholars argue that migration contributes robustly to development in origin and destination countries in both negative and positive terms. Pieces of evidence are mounting that, leveraged by appropriate policies, migrant support – whether through cash or in-kind – could be best used in changing society in myriad ways. They could be turned into the best vehicle for enculturation, acculturation, technology transfer, and skills and knowledge circulation.

However, there is compelling evidence indicating that migration has partially alleviated unemployment in labour-surplus countries and simultaneously provided a labour supply solution for resource-rich countries that face a shortage of workers (Ullah & Haque 2020:2). The goal of this chapter is to

demonstrate how immigration laws are being shaped to the detriment of immigrants or people living in the Diaspora affecting their human dignity and human security. Human security has many socio-economic restrictions, such as decent employment and access to decent health care. They cannot eat healthily due to the low income earned and are marginalised within the host lands; consequently, their safety and security are at stake. This situation happens in Western countries as well as in African countries. Hence the need to speak louder as many countries choose to make exclusionary immigration policies that negatively affect the lives of millions of people living in the Diaspora. In this chapter, it is suggested that countries should make immigration policies by considering the human right and human dignity of the people for whom those laws are made.

2 Immigration Policies and Human Dignity

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) both state that all human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person (Vierdag 1978). Dignity is becoming commonplace in the legal texts providing human rights protections in many jurisdictions (McCrudden 2008). The humanists attempted to reconcile classical thought and dogmatic theology by emphasising the idea of humankind as having dignity because ‘Man [human-kind] is made in the image of God’, distinguishing humankind from other species. The Catechism of the Catholic Church incorporates this idea of humans as made in the image of God as central to its conception of human dignity:

Of all visible creatures only, man is ‘able to know and love his creator.’ He is ‘the only creature on earth that God has willed for its own sake,’ and he alone is called to share, by knowledge and love, in God’s own life. It was for this end that he was created, and this is the fundamental reason for his dignity... Being in the image of God the human individual possesses the dignity of a person, who is not just something, but someone. He is capable of self-knowledge, self-possession and of freely giving himself and entering into communion with other persons. And he is called by grace to a covenant with his Creator, to offer him a response of faith and love that no other creature can give in his stead (Chukwujekwu & Maduabuchi 2019:644).

Nevertheless, the migratory process is often complex and dangerous. Migrants are a vulnerable social group, and because of this, there are quite a few statistics on migration, which make analyses difficult. The reasons for fleeing are often related to the denial of human rights, and after they leave, they can be subjected to trafficking or exploitation in transit (Ullah & Haque 2020). In the receiving countries, social groups in an unfavourable position consider newcomers competitors for jobs and public services, cultivating a social and political climate that generates xenophobia and racism. Increased competition between states leads them to reduce their services in areas of social welfare, education and healthcare which influences a segment of the population living on the margins, often in direct competition with migrants for welfare services and are the main breeding ground for xenophobic and racist ideologies. Largely unknown is the magnitude of xenophobia in many countries and the impact on the psychological well-being of migrants (Ullah & Haque 2020).

Ullah and Haque (2020:133), quoting from UNESCO 2008, state, 'xenophobia' is the 'attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity'. Generally, xenophobia is directed towards foreigners as defined by the nation-state. However, it can be directed towards people who speak the same language and even people of the same nationality, which means rural migrants to urban areas may experience xenophobia (Ullah & Haque 2020). Racism refers to hostility based on beliefs about inherited biological differences, while xenophobia refers to hostility based on cultural differences or hostility towards foreigners (Ullah 2014). Xenophobia got prominence partly because it often translated into hostility toward immigrants in many countries. The policies designed to protect refugees and migrants often fail or are inadequate, and many migrants are left without rights or knowledge of how to acquire them. Human rights violations often result from xenophobia or racism and therefore receive unequal treatment. The lack of rights compounds it because the migrants are not citizens and the potential difficulty of navigating the legal system (Ullah, Mohamad, Hassan & Chatteraj 2019).

Immigrants and refugees are often pressured to assimilate and integrate and often have the duties of citizens, like paying taxes, without the rights of citizens. Ullah and Haque (2020:134) claim that 'migrants are often treated as a security threat, have irregular statuses and are subjected to exploitative or forced labour'. However, xenophobia is not caused by migrants but instead

affects them. Xenophobia appears to be the worst in areas with few foreigners, who are often perceived to be associated with criminality, stealing jobs, and using up social services. These assumptions give way to xenophobic policies that protect nationals from immigrants and encourage hostility, violence and exploitation (Misago, Freemantle & Landau 2015; Rzepnikowska 2019). The causes of xenophobia are complex and multifaceted and are interrelated with all the potential theories, but regardless of the causes, they negatively affect migrants and their families. Instead of restoring human rights to migrants, many governmental policies exacerbate their problems by enhancing their vulnerability and playing into the xenophobic misperceptions of the population.

3 Immigration Policies as a Triggering Factor of Xenophobic Sentiments

The influx of refugees into a socially and economically fragile environment poses a threat to the scarce resources of the poorer host nation population, and refugees are therefore targeted. As such, refugees become scapegoats for social problems and are relentlessly victimised by xenophobic measures, human rights violations, and negative images propagated by the media and opinion leaders in society (Palmary 2004). One recent example presented itself in South Africa, where since 2008, waves of xenophobic attacks have been perpetrated throughout the country, mostly toward African refugees and asylum-seekers. Residents often accuse refugees of stealing local jobs and taking part in criminal acts (Hassan 2020).

Unlike many countries, South Africa is seeing many refugees move into urban areas seeking access to basic services, such as housing, sanitation, and water, on an equal footing with South African citizens. This influx places an additional burden on local government and incites the dissemination of negative images of foreign refugees (Hassan 2020). Migration is closely linked to individual, national and global security concerns. It is especially true considering migration often occurs due to conflict and violence. As a result, increasingly harsh policies are formulated, resulting in promoting human trafficking and employers hiring immigrants to avoid complying with government employment regulations (Ullah & Haque 2020:30). As more and more humans cross more and more borders in search of jobs, security and a better future, they need to confront, assimilate or expel strangers, strain political systems and collective identities that were shaped in less fluid times (Ullah & Haque 2020).

Migrants, due to their often illegal or non-citizen status, are vulnerable, which not only makes them an easy target for xenophobic and racist hostility but also makes it difficult for them to seek protection or access to the justice system. They are more likely to be exploited in their jobs and less likely to be able to send their children to school or have access to health care (Ullah & Haque 2020:134). According to UNCHR 2001, the denial of these basic human rights is often largely a result of xenophobic policies. Different countries are making different policies (hard and soft), which would be detrimental, to some extent, to the ones who need asylum. For example, the US is talking about building a wall. At the same time, tens of thousands of lone children flee violence in Latin America across the US-Mexican border. Ullah, Hasan, Mohamad, and Chatteraj (2020) acknowledge that among the top ten factors influencing conflict prevention and political instability within the European Union (EU), the US Council on Foreign Relations (USCFR) has determined that the influx of migrants is a contributing factor.

The pro-immigration mindset thinks countries have a moral duty to accept not just refugees but also people from poverty-stricken lands who seek jobs and a better future. On the contrary, the anti-immigration mindset thinks that with sufficient force, immigration could be and should be stopped. Countries should not be obliged to open their doors. However, in the case of refugees fleeing brutal persecution in a neighbouring country could be an exception. The argument is justified based on the law that it is a basic right of every human to defend themselves against invasion, whether in the form of armies or migrants (Ullah, Hasan, Mohamad & Chatteraj 2020). As Hassner and Wittenberg (2015) point out, countries are likely to restrict immigration policies when they become direct victims of domestic or international terrorist events within their territory.

An example is found in President Donald Trump's security initiatives regarding future terrorist threats. He cited the danger of America's home-grown terrorists, who may descend from first, second, or third-generational immigrants (Choi 2018). In his mind, both domestic and transnational terrorists are likely to exploit US immigration policy.

Scholars and policymakers considered immigration as a resource rather than an issue of national security. However, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, immigration has become an urgent security concern in receiving countries. Many political leaders consistently show uneasiness with ethnically, culturally, and religiously distinct minority populations whom their citizens

fear, among other things; they view these minorities as a potential source of terrorist threats in the wake of 9/11(Choi 2021).

The most alarming news is that populist politicians foster xenophobia by branding immigrant workers as terrorist sleeper cell members, scapegoating them to distract the public from other pressing politico-economic and security problems. Along this line, Phizacklea (2011) maintains that ‘in the face of an increased securitisation-migration nexus ... migrants are cast as a cultural/criminal/terrorist threat’. Her observation highlights the rationale for this political scapegoating, where politicians try to boost their policy platforms and popularity by rhetorically blaming terrorist-related incidents on mass immigration (Choi 2021). When faced with security-economic difficulties, political leaders willingly resort to scapegoating to maximise their chances of election/re-election. In particular, when a country experiences a series of terrorist events, political leaders are motivated to blame immigrant workers as sources of insecurity for their political gains (Choi 2021).

4 Immigration Policies and their Impacts on the Human Security of Immigrants

The first major statement concerning human security appeared in the 1994 Human Development Report, an annual United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) publication. The concept of security, the report argues, ‘has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives’ (Paris 2001:89). According to Adger *et al.* (2014), human security can be defined as a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity. In this assessment, the vital core of human lives includes the universal and culturally specific, material and non-material elements necessary for people to act in their interests. Adger *et al.* (2014) maintain that many phenomena influence human security, including the operation of markets, the state, and civil society. In addition, poverty, discrimination, and extreme natural and technological disasters undermine human security. At its core, human security and insecurity are universal issues. Pietsch and McAllister (2010) posit that ‘in every country, there are individuals and groups who are unsecured’. However, the direct

material aspects of livelihood security include access to food, housing, clean water, employment, and avoiding direct health risks (Adger *et al.* 2014).

For this reason, Liotta and Owen (2006:39) highlight that ‘human security takes a significant leap by shifting the focus from the state, society, or community as the referent object to the individual’. The report also revealed that the UN Commission on Human Security attempted to expand the 1994 UNDP concept to include protection for people suffering from violent conflict due to migration or refugees and those in post-conflict situations, improving conditions of poverty, health, and knowledge. Nevertheless, some human security scholarship also seeks to present explanatory arguments concerning the nature of security, deprivation and conflict by focusing on the individual level. In addition, most scholars and practitioners working on human security emphasise its policy relevance; they believe that the concept of human security can and should result in policy changes that improve the welfare of people (Newman 2016).

Whilst human security has been taken up most actively within international studies, the broader debates around the concept are very much relevant to criminological discussions of security, and these discussions make a valuable contribution to human security debates (Newman 2016). For Newman (2016), the focus on humans is part of a movement in criminology to critically question how security is defined and operationalised in society and in whose interests. Criminologists thus explore the pervasive scope of security in contemporary society and how these conditions the nature of governance, the relationship between the state and individuals (political security), the provision of security by commercial actors rather than as a public good and the tension between individual liberty and public security.

The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report is considered a milestone publication in human security (United Nations Development Program 1994). Lee and Kim (2011) report that the UNDP not only defined the term but also urged that understanding of global security be expanded to include seven security areas: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security (AdisÖNmez 2016). Similarly, the UNDP Report defines human security as people’s ‘safety from chronic threats and protection from hurtful disorders in the patterns of daily life’. However, the treatment received by migrants in different countries opposes the human security concept. It affects their human dignity, as seen in their experiences throughout the immigration process from their country of origin to the hosting country.

5 Deportation as an Immigration Policy

Over the past several decades, the US government has increased its immigration enforcement powers to unprecedented levels. Annual deportations exceeded historic highs in the early 1990s when they climbed above 40 000 per year (Kretsedemas & Brotherton 2018). Immigration laws have not just become tougher; there has been a paradigm shift in the workings of the global migration regime. When coming to grips with this transformation, it is necessary to look beyond the social fact of mass deportations and consider the broader changes that help explain why mass deportations and massive spending on border control can be rendered legible as a reasonable response to the challenges posed by international migration and that highly political construction known as ‘border security’ (Kretsedemas & Brotherton 2018).

By 2008, Bush’s last year in office, this number rose to 140,000 interior removals yearly. Bush initiated an immigration enforcement policy targeting interior removals. The Obama administration continued Bush’s legacy by further enhancing the focus on interior enforcement. Moreover, two years after Obama took office, interior removals peaked in 2011 with 188 000 annual deportations. During Obama’s first term alone, there were nearly 750 000 million interior removals – far more than Bush’s record-setting numbers (Calavita 2010). From 2003 to 2013, there were 1.3 million interior removals. Nearly half of them (47%) had lived in the United States for at least three years; one in six (216,000) had for at least ten years (Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti & Bergeron 2013). The deportation of long-term US residents is often the most harmful to families and communities, as they are the most likely to lead to family separation. The two million deportations during Obama’s first five years of office do not necessarily mean that two million families were separated. Nevertheless, his program of mass deportation over the past decade resulted in at least 2016 000 people who had lived in the country for more than ten years being torn from their homes (Golash-Boza 2018).

6 Obama’s Legacy of Mass Deportation

Mass deportation primarily affects non-white people, is carried out without due process, and separates millions of children from their parents. Under Jim Crow laws, African Americans were denied access to schools, housing, and the ballot box. When long-term residents of the United States are deported for such crimes as marijuana possession or tax evasion, some face a life of exile from the only

country they have ever known. Many of these deportees were deported to countries they barely knew. Kretsedemas and Brotherton (2018) interviewed 150 deportees in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Brazil, who recounted horror stories of police brutality, gang violence, homelessness, poverty and isolation. According to Kretsedemas and Brotherton (2018:48), native American children were taken from their parents in the early 20th century, and the same thing is happening to immigrants today. In 2012, more than 400 000 people were deported. Nearly 100 000 of them were parents of US citizens. Tens of thousands of these children will grow up in the United States knowing the US government took away their right to grow up with one or both parents (Kretsedemas & Brotherton 2018).

On the campaign trail, Trump criticised Obama for not deporting enough criminals – even though 92% of all interior removals in 2016 were of people with criminal convictions. Nevertheless, on 25 January 2017, Trump issued an executive order called Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, which includes a new priority system. Whereas Obama prioritised immigrants who had been convicted of crimes, Trump's order included immigrants who had been charged with a criminal offence or who may have committed a crime but have not been charged – giving immigration enforcement officers broad leeway to deport people like Daniel Ramirez, who has no criminal record (Kretsedemas & Brotherton 2018:52). Now, any immigrant with so much as a traffic ticket must worry that they will make it to the top of the priority list and find Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents knocking at their door.

7 Immigration Policies and their Impacts on the Migrant Populations

Immigration ranks among the most salient issues shaping politics in Western democracies today, engendering substantial negative attitudes towards those perceived as outsiders (Hellwig & Sinno 2017). Researchers have asked whether opposition to immigrants is due primarily to a perceived economic or cultural threat or a combination of the two. Economic arguments test predictions for models of labour market competition and immigrants' use of public services (Hainmueller & Hiscox 2010; Mayda 2006). Dempster and Hargrave (2017) suggest that what drives public attitudes towards refugees and migrants can be highlighted in several key drivers, citing economic, cultural and security issues

as the most important real-world concerns. Similar to Hellwig and Sinno (2017), who have conducted studies highlighting cultural elements that emphasise threats to national identity, religion, values, beliefs, and ethnic differences, Ford (2011) also identifies conservative social attitudes. Other studies highlight the effect of security fears (Lahav & Courtemanche 2012; Wike and Grim 2010) and crime concerns (Fitzgerald, Curtis & Corliss 2012). These accounts speak to the complex and multifaceted nature of sentiments towards immigrants. Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ (2007) argue that ‘natives’ anxieties about new groups’ present in society may be shaped by real threats, affecting their well-being, or only perceived threats. Many politicians and native-born citizens blame immigrants for terrorist attacks on their soil. However, existing studies offer little to no systematic research on whether terrorist attacks result in restrictive immigration policies (Schmid 2016).

Consequently, immigration policies that aim to deport undocumented Latin American migrants have led to racial profiling targeting all Latinx migrants based on appearance and skin colour, despite their immigration status (Somin 2017). It has resulted in unlawful arrests and intense fear in Latinx communities in the US. Hagan, Castro, and Rodriguez (2010:1820) state that the fear of deportation in Latinx communities ‘poses huge emotional and psychological consequences for deportees and their families’. Cavazos-Rehg, Zayas, and Spitznagel (2007:1126) add that constant fears of deportation ‘heighten the risk for emotional distress and impaired quality of life’ in Latin American migrants. Therefore, as immigration policies become increasingly rigid and persecutory, Latinx families have more fear of being torn apart as deportation continues to be a looming threat.

In some cases, Latinx children – who are citizens – live with the excessive fear of losing undocumented parents to deportation, resulting in psychological harm (Franco 2020). At the thought of losing family members to deportation, young migrant children have reported anxiety, fear, distress, poor concentration, and somatic complaints such as stomachaches (Kamenetz 2017). Gumbel (2016) notes, ‘One little boy in North Carolina has been suffering crippling stomachaches in class because he’s afraid he might return home to find his parents gone’. Hagan, Castro, and Rodriguez (2010:1820) add that the deportation of parents and physical separation of Latinx families have ‘long-lasting traumatic effects on children and spouses left behind in the United States’.

In addition to fearing the deportation of family members, anti-immigration policies lead to other social and psychological consequences. Hagan *et*

al. (2010) report that Latinx immigrants' fears of apprehension lead to feelings of exclusion and social isolation. For instance, Latinx immigrants have reported withdrawing from their communities by avoiding visiting public places such as parks and libraries or participating in local events (Hagan *et al.* 2010; Menjívar & Abrego 2012). Some immigrants have isolated themselves in their homes after work hours to avoid law enforcement (Hagan *et al.* 2010). Gumbel (2016) adds that a Latin American woman living with HIV compared the impact of the changes in recent anti-immigration laws to when she was diagnosed with HIV. The woman reportedly felt hopeful about HIV treatment, whereas immigration policies felt 'like a death sentence' to her (Gumbel 2016:12).

8 South Africa and Immigration Policies

South Africa is affected by unemployment and poverty, and many South Africans blame immigrants that migrants worsen the economic situation (Ullah, Hasan, Mohamad & Chatteraj 2020). South Africa is a major receiving country in Africa and hosts over five million migrants (visitors) each year, with a foreign-born population of between 3-5%. The lack of policies to support refugees and migrants reflects and perpetuates xenophobia by exacerbating the situation in their host countries (McConnell 2008). South African policies, though devoted to ensuring the human rights of migrants and refugees, have failed to grasp the bigger picture, focusing only on specific issues and overlooking important linkages between such related areas as the brain drain, increasing inequality among citizens, unemployment and HIV/AIDS (McConnell 2008).

In line with the results of this study, the authors suggest that real-world public policy on immigrants and migrants should consider the human dignity of the Diasporas as human beings living in the host land. Immigrants should not be seen as a threat or issue to the host and, rather, as a workforce to be positively exploited with dignity to enhance the economy of the host land. From this background, policies will be crafted to include the importance of hosting immigrants and how they can benefit from the system.

9 Conclusion

From time immemorial, migration has been a feature of human existence. Many factors drive human mobility: seeking freedom from war and conflict, escaping

hunger and poverty, finding economic opportunities and employment, fleeing from religious intolerance or political repression, or even trading and travelling to other places. Migrations seek a comfort zone, including better income, environment, weather, safety, and health. The founding document of international human rights law, i.e., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), refers in its preamble and article 1 to claims and freedoms that human beings enjoy by their humanity: inherent rights. These rights are based on the principles of dignity, equality and liberty and are underpinned by solidarity notions. While the notion of human rights is arguably of more recent origin, it is part of a broader development that can be traced back to the earlier stages of human history. At the core of human rights lie fundamental questions about the nature of human beings and their relationship with each other as members of societies, including the 'international society'.

In this context, human rights address the relationship of individuals to others, in particular to those in a position of power (especially civil and political rights, equality and non-discrimination) and the relationships of groups and their members to others (minority rights, rights to self-determination and rights of indigenous peoples); the settlement of disputes and administration of justice (fair trial in modern parlance); rights to participate in the polis (particularly freedom of expression and related rights, including the right to vote); and the material (in the broadest sense) conditions for a life of dignity and freedom (social, economic and cultural rights; the right to development). However, human rights belong to all human beings and, therefore, cannot be restricted to a selected group of privileged people. Hence, it is important to understand that even though immigrants are found in foreign lands, it does not mean that they have lost their humanity as human beings or that their human dignity must be threatened. On the contrary, immigrants should be treated with dignity. They should be humanely exploited to contribute to developing the hosting community and the hosting country. Receiving countries must learn how to benefit from immigrants instead and allow them to live peacefully in the host country. Immigrants, once in a foreign land, should be subjected to similar laws of the hosting country with the same treatment as local citizens. It is crucial to recognise the challenges of implementing stringent border measures to curb illegal entry, but equally important is the imperative to treat those who manage to enter with the utmost respect for their inherent dignity as human beings.

References

- Adger, W.N., J.M. Pulhin, J. Barnett, G.D. Dabelko, G.K. Hovelsrud, M. Levy, Ú. Oswald Spring & C.H. Vogel 2014: Human Security. In: *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*. CUP. Available at: <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/> (Accessed on 15 June 2023).
- AdisÖNmez, U.C. 2016. What is the Human Security Approach and How the Phenomenon Contributed to the International Security Agenda: Canadian and Japanese Paradigms. *İnsan Güvenliği Yaklaşımı Nedir ve Uluslararası Güvenlik Ajandasına Nasıl Bir Katkı Sağlamıştır: Kanada ve Japonya Örnekleri* 12, 24: 1 - 28. Available at: <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=120476533&site=ehost-live> (Accessed on 11 April 2023.)
- Calavita, K. 2010. *Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the INS*. New Orleans, Louisiana: Quid Pro Books.
- Cavazos-Rehg, P.A., L.H. Zayas & E.L. Spitznagel 2007. Legal Status, Emotional Well-being and Subjective Health Status of Latino Immigrants. *Journal of the National Medical Association* 99, 10: 1126.
- Choi, S.-W. 2018. *Emerging Security Challenges: American Jihad, Terrorism, Civil War, and Human Rights: ABC - CLIO*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
<https://doi.org/10.5040/9798400645099>
- Choi, S.-W. 2021. Immigration Policy and Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis. *Defence Peace Economics* 32, 3: 271 - 295.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1659577>
- Chukwujekwu, S.C. & R.O. Maduabuchi 2019. Philosophy and Sustenance of Human Dignity in the 21st Century. *Philosophy* 9, 10: 640 - 650.
<https://doi.org/10.17265/2159-5313/2019.10.009>
- Dempster, H. & K. Hargrave 2017. *Understanding Public Attitudes Towards Refugees and Migrants*. London: Overseas Development Institute & Chatham House.
- Fitzgerald, J., K.A. Curtis & C.L. Corliss 2012. Anxious Publics: Worries about Crime and Immigration. *Comparative Political Studies* 45, 4: 477 - 506.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011421768>
- Ford, R. 2011. Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to Immigration in Britain is Affected by Migrants' Region of Origin. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37, 7: 1017 - 1037.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.572423>

- Franco, D. 2018. Trauma without Borders: The Necessity for School-based Interventions in Treating Unaccompanied Refugee Minors. *Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal* 35, 6: 551 - 565.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10560-018-0552-6>
PMid:30416250 PMCID:PMC6208907
- Franco, D. 2020. This Land is Our Land: Exploring the Impact of US Immigration Policies on Social Work Practice. *Journal of Progressive Human Services* 31, 1: 21 - 40.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10428232.2019.1583956>
- Golash-Boza, T. 2018. President Obama's Legacy as 'Deporter in Chief'. In Brotherton, D.C. & P. Kretsedemas (eds.): *Immigration Policy in the Age of Punishment*. Colombia: Columbia University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.7312/brot17936-002>
- Greenman, E. & M. Hall 2013. Legal Status and Educational Transitions for Mexican and Central American Immigrant Youth. *Social Forces* 91, 4: 1475 - 1498. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sot040>
PMid:24511162 PMCID:PMC3816545
- Gumbel, A. 2016. Doctors See a New Condition among Immigrant Children: Fear of Trump. *The Guardian*. Available at:
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/25/donald-trump-immigration-deportation-children-doctors> (Accessed 11 April 2023).
- Hagan, J., B. Castro & N. Rodriguez 2010. The Effects of US Deportation Policies on Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives. *North Carolina Law Review* 88, 5: 1799.
- Hainmueller, J. & M.J. Hiscox 2010. Attitudes Toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from A Survey Experiment. *American Political Science Review* 104, 1: 61 - 84.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990372>
- Hassan, H.A. 2020. Transformations of Forced Migration in Africa: Issues and General Problems. *African Journal of Political Science International Relations* 14, 2: 74 - 83. <https://doi.org/10.5897/AJPSIR2020.1255>
- Hassner, R.E. & J. Wittenberg 2015. Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why? *International Security* 40, 1: 157 - 190.
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00206
- Hellwig, T. & A. Sinno 2017. Different Groups, Different Threats: Public Attitudes Towards Immigrants. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43, 3: 339 - 358. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1202749>

- Johnston, M.P. 2017. Secondary Data Analysis: A Method by which the Time has Come. *Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries* 3, 3: 619 - 626. <https://qqml-journal.net/index.php/qqml/article/view/169/170>
- Kamenetz, A. 2017. *I Have Children Crying in the Classroom: How Learning Happens*. nprEd. Available at: <https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/03/09/518996780/i-have-children-crying-in-the-classroom> (Accessed on 11 April 2023).
- Kretsedemas, P. & D.C. Brotherton 2018. *Immigration Policy in the Age of Punishment: Detention, Deportation, and Border Control*. Colombia: Columbia University Press. <https://doi.org/10.7312/brot17936>
- Lahav, G. & M. Courtemanche 2012. The Ideological Effects of Framing Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties. *Political Behaviour* 34, 3: 477 - 505. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-011-9171-z>
- Liotta, P.H. & T. Owen 2006. Why Human Security? *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations* 7: 37 – 54.
- Mayda, A.M. 2006. Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 88 3: 510 - 530. <https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.88.3.510>
- McConnell, C. 2008. Migration and Xenophobia in South Africa. *Conflict Trends* 2009, 1: 34 - 40.
- McCrudden, C. 2008. Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights. *European Journal of International Law* 19, 4: 655 - 724. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chn043>
- Meissner, D.M., D.M. Kerwin, M. Chishti & C. Bergeron 2013. *Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of Formidable Machinery*. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Menjívar, C. & L. Abrego 2012. Legal Violence: Immigration Law and the Lives of Central American Immigrants. *American Journal of Sociology* 117, 5. <https://doi.org/10.1086/663575>
- Miller, L.H. 2018. *Global Order: Values and Power in International Relations*. New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429495229>
- Misago, J.P., I. Freemantle & L.B. Landau 2015. *Protection from Xenophobia: An Evaluation of UNHCR's Regional Office for Southern Africa's Xenophobia-Related Programmes*. Geneva: UNHCR.

- Newman, E. 2016. Human Security: Reconciling Critical Aspirations with Political Realities. *British Journal of Criminology* 56, 6: 1165 - 1183. <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azw016>
- Orrenius, P.M. & M. Zavodny 2012. The Economic Consequences of Amnesty for Unauthorised Immigrants. *Cato Journal* 32,1: 85. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245015
- Palmay, I. 2004. *Refugees, Safety and Xenophobia in South African Cities: The Role of Local Government*. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
- Paris, R. 2001. Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? *International Security* 26, 2: 87 - 102. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753191141>
- Pettigrew, T.F., U. Wagner & O. Christ 2007. Who Opposes Immigration? Comparing German with North American Findings: Du Bois Review. *Social Science Research on Race* 4, 1: 19 - 39. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X07070038>
- Phizacklea, A. 2011. Concluding Remarks: State Security versus the Security of Migrants: The Unbalanced Contest. In Lazarides, G. (ed.): *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*. Farnham Surrey, UK: Ashgate.
- Pietsch, J. & I. McAllister 2010. Human Security in Australia: Public Interest and Political Consequences. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 64 2: 225 - 244. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710903544361>
- Portes, A. 1981. 13 Modes of Structural Incorporation and Present Theories of Labour Immigration. *International Migration Review* 15, 1: 279 - 297. <https://doi.org/10.1177/019791838101501s15>
- Pulitano, E. 2013. In Liberty's Shadow: The Discourse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Critical Race Theory and Immigration Law/ Politics. *Identities* 20, 2: 172 - 189. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2012.763168>
- Romero, M. 2008. Crossing the Immigration and Race Border: A Critical Race Theory Approach to Immigration Studies. *Contemporary Justice Review* 11, 1: 23 - 37. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10282580701850371>
- Rzepnikowska, A. 2019. Racism and Xenophobia Experienced by Polish Migrants in the UK Before and After the Brexit Vote. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45, 1: 61 - 77. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1451308>
- Salopek, P. 2019. Walking with Migrants. *National Geographic* 236, 2: 40 - 63.

- Schmid, A.P. 2016. Links between Terrorism and Migration. International Centre for Counterterrorism (ICCT) Research Paper. May 2016. *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies* 7, 4.
<https://doi.org/10.19165/2016.1.04>
- Seghetti, L. 2015. *Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues*. United States of America: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Available at:
<https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs10563/>
(Accessed 11 April 2023).
- Somin, I. 2017. Immigration, Freedom, and The Constitution. *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy* 40, 1.
<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2968440>
- Trzesniewski, K.H., M. Donnellan & R.E. Lucas 2011. *Secondary Data Analysis: An Introduction for Psychologists*. Washington DC: American Psychological Association.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/12350-000> PMCID:PMC3263756
- Ullah, A. 2012. Climate Change and Climate Refugees in Egypt: An Overview from Policy Perspectives. *TMC Academic Journal* 7: 56 - 70.
- Ullah, A. 2013. Bridging the Origin and the Destination: Diaspora, Development and Culture. In Pillai, G. (ed.): *The Political Economy of South Asian Diaspora: Patterns of Socio-Economic Influence*. London: Palgrave McMillan.
- Ullah, A. 2014. *Refugee Politics in the Middle East and North Africa: Human Rights, Safety, and Identity*. New York: Springer.
<https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137356536>
- Ullah, A.A. & A.S. Huque 2020. Demoralisation-Led Migration in Bangladesh: A Sense of Insecurity-Based Decision-Making Model. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 5, 4: 351 - 370.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891119867140>
- Ullah, A.A., N.H. Hasan, S.M. Mohamad & D. Chatteraj 2020. Migration and Security: Implications for Minority Migrant Groups. *India Quarterly* 76, 1: 136 - 153.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419901199>
- Ullah, A.K.M.A., S.M. Mohamad, N.H. Hassan & D. Chatteraj 2019. Global Skills Deficiency: Perspectives of Skill Mobility in Southeast Asian Countries. *Asian Education and Development Studies* 8, 4: 416 - 432.
<https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-12-2018-0185>

- Ullah, A. & M.S. Haque 2020. *The Migration Myth in Policy and Practice: Dreams, Development and Despair*. New York: Springer.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1754-9>
- Vartanian, T.P. 2010. *Secondary Data Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388817.001.0001>
- Vierdag, E.W. 1978. The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law* 9: 69 - 105.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0167676800003780>
- Walters, P. 2009. Qualitative Archiving: Engaging with Epistemological Misgivings. *Australian Journal of Social Issues* 44, 3: 309 - 320.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1839-4655.2009.tb00148.x>
- Wike, R. & B.J. Grim 2010. Western Views toward Muslims: Evidence from a 2006 Cross-National Survey. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 22, 1: 4 - 25. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edq002>

Samuel Fikiri Cinini
Department of Criminology and Forensic Science
School of Applied Human Science
University of KwaZulu-Natal
samuelfikiri@gmail.com

Sazelo Michael Mkhize
Department of Criminology and Forensic Studies
School of Applied Human Science
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Mkhizes1@ukzn.ac.za

CHAPTER 9

Intra-African Migration Impact on Family Structure and Career: A Self-Study Inquiry from a Female Migrant in Southern Africa

Faith Kimathi

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8885-7994>

Abstract

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Intra-African mobility doubled, from 13.3 million to 25.4 million between 2008 and 2017. Intra-African mobility, despite its complexities, is often seen as a network linking economically poor Sub-Saharan countries to more developed African states, with the aim of uplifting families economically. This qualitative phenomenological study employs narrative inquiry to reflect upon and analyse the experiences of individuals because of Intra-African migration. The self-study offers insights into the nature of opportunities, assumptions and realities experienced by a female from East Africa within a family space in Botswana and South Africa. The study illuminates how these experiences impact the identity, family structure, and transformation of women migrants. Foregrounded on the narrator's voice, in Kwa-Zulu Natal, South Africa, the reader can envisage an unrehearsed female migrant who struggled with contextual variations in Botswana. The lack of an established support system affected her mental health and agency despite working as a teacher and her spouse having a well-paying job and remittance back home. The social and institutional structures did not favour progression; thus, the family moved to South Africa for career advancement and hospitality. Although she enjoyed excellent tertiary education opportunities in South Africa, finding steady employment in the host country has remained daunting. This chapter contributes to an emergent body of research that explores the feminisation of Intra-African migration.

Keywords: Intra-African migration, female, family structure, career, self-study inquiry, Southern Africa.

1 Introduction

In the 1980s, the international exodus of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) migrants to Europe led to the perception that Africa was the ‘continent on the move’ (Flahaux & de Haas 2016). However, aligned with international trends at continent levels, SSA has the second largest share of intra-regional migration globally. By 2020, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) indicated that 63% of migrants from SSA were living in other parts of Africa (UNDESA 2020:2). This reality contradicts previous data analysis reports or media stereotypes which argue that the rapid movement of Africans to the developed countries is driven by poverty and conflicts. Although we cannot ignore African migration to Europe triggered by violent conflicts, poverty or environmental degradation via the Mediterranean Sea, a wave of young skilled professionals and entrepreneurs dominates the recent Intra-African migration trends (Mlambo & Mpanza 2019). In the 1990s, young professionals moved from other SSA countries to Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia (IOM 2019b). These African elites (including myself) from poorer nations moved to these countries with high expectations of political freedom, economic benefits, better livelihoods and social integration (Mberu & Sidze 2017; Udelsmann & Bjarnesen 2020). Despite the complexity related to the trends and driving forces, this Intra-African movement has created Diasporan communities, which impact the country of origin and host countries in various ways. For instance, the Intra-African remittances from South Africa alone had an outflow of EUR 934 million to their neighbouring countries in 2018 (UNDESA 2019).

International organisations generate most existing quantitative data about Intra-African migration outside the continent to explore global and regional migration patterns within the umbrella of neoliberal policies. It means the African migration phenomenon may lack an accurate theoretical underpinning that looks at migrants from a family perspective (Flahaux & de Haas 2016; Achieng, El Fadil & Righa 2020). In this chapter, the African women migrants’ voice is elevated. It illuminates how personal experiences in the destination countries impact the self-identity, family structure, career and transformation of women migrants. Recent surveys and interview-based studies on Southern African migration show the movement’s complexities, contradicting or exaggerating the previous data (Flahaux & de Haas 2016). For instance, one report argues that female migrants are highest in Eastern Africa (50%), followed by Central and Western Africa (47% each), Southern Africa

(44%) and Northern Africa (43%) (UNCTAD 2018). However, a simple Google Scholar search on African women migration in Southern Africa between 2018 and 2022 generates over 20 small interview-based studies of Zimbabwean female teachers, domestic workers, sex workers, women traders, refugees and children experiences in South Africa (Anganoo & Manik 2019; Dodson 2018; Liu 2020). In these studies, the women's voices are relegated to the periphery. There is limited research focusing on professional women migrants, who are an essential component of labour markets and the globalisation process in the context of South-South migration flows. There is a need for an accumulative scholarship to critically interrogate and validate the existing data regarding professional Intra-African migrant women (Muthuki 2013). Self-studies or in-depth data highlighting how migration impacts gender roles, family structures and career advancement in the host countries are unavailable. Against this backdrop, this chapter explores the assumptions and realities of a female teacher migrant. It describes how the migration impacted her family relationships and career in the host countries. Future robust phenomenological studies or multiple narratives together with practical interventions would illuminate the needs, opportunities and challenges of African women migrants. The scholarship may assist in the transformation of Intra-African migration policies.

In this chapter, the author conceptualises and offers a brief history of Intra-African migration following this introduction section. Literature on Intra-African migration and women's perspective in Southern Africa will then be presented, proceeded by the theoretical framework and methodology sections. Using a narrative inquiry approach, the author generates a sequential vignette and description of the lived experiences in Botswana and South Africa.

1.1 Objectives and Research Questions

The objectives of the chapter are to:

- Examine the expectations and assumptions made by Intra-African women migrants regarding the country of destination.
- Investigate Intra-African migration's impact on the family structure and career opportunities for women in the destination country.

With the incorporation of a gender perspective, in this chapter, the author aims to answer two related questions:

- What are the expectations and assumptions made by Intra-African women migrants regarding the country of destination?
- How does Intra-African migration impact women's family structure and career opportunities in the destination country?

2 Insights into Intra-Africa Migration

The Intra-African migration can be traced over 2000 years ago during the Bantu expansion and northward migration. According to Lucas (2015), pre-colonial Intra-African migration was an essential strategy for livelihoods. The pastoral communities moved seasonally in search of water and pastures (Massai of Kenya and Tanzania or Tuareg of West Africa); barter traders among Timbuktu; transatlantic trade and the ruin of Great Zimbabwe also support this notion. Other communities moved in response to environmental distress or the expansion of stronger tribes. These early movements affected various communities' population density or social structures (Achieng *et al.* 2020). Later, Africans were forced to move within the colonial territorial borders (Udelsmann & Bjarnesen 2020). Most of these political boundaries remain a source of internal and regional conflicts in contemporary Africa. Nevertheless, these conflicts have also created new possibilities - a move towards economic collaboration and integration (Mlambo & Mpanza 2019).

Although Intra-African migration is an old phenomenon, there is no single specific definition of the term. At regional levels, Intra-African migration is often substituted with terms like transnational, international mobility, or intercontinental migration. Adopted from UNDESA (1998) in paragraph 32, a migrant is 'any person who has moved across an international border away from their habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) their legal status; (2) whether their move was voluntary or involuntary; (3) the driving forces; (4) or period of stay in the host country' (IOM 2019a:32). Therefore, this chapter considers Intra-African migration as the movement of any person across national borders within Africa regardless of the driving circumstances, form, or legality. The study also perceives Intra-African sometimes as a 'two-step' migration by skilled workers in search of better socio-economic opportunities. Thus, migration can lead to permanent or temporary settlement in the host country.

Intra-African migration is shaped by three main regional movements: labour migration in the western and central areas, refugees movement in the

eastern and southern areas, together with professional (skilled) migration mostly from West and East Africa to Southern Africa (Mberu & Sidze 2017; Udelsmann & Bjarnesen 2020). The African Union (AU), in conjunction with international organisations, has examined African migration trends and amended policies in the last decade to increase free movement aligned to Agenda 2063, strengthened intra- and interregional cooperation and resolve the Africa-Europe migration crisis (Mlambo & Mpanza 2019). For instance, in conjunction with IOM, the AU revised the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) in 2017 and 2018. It has also developed a 10-year plan to achieve stronger African migration frameworks by 2030. This development resonates with the Economic Development in Africa Report (UNDESA 2020), which stresses the benefits of Intra-African migration to the origin and destination countries, the African alliance, and social-economic transformation. Intra-African migration contributes to gross domestic product, employment, trade, poverty reduction and inclusive growth in Africa. Similarly, it allows highly skilled youth to share their knowledge. According to cited interview with Ais-sata Kane in September 2020, ‘African students were moving to countries with well-developed universities on the continent that could facilitate skill development and job creations for the youths’ (Udelsmann & Bjarnesen 2020: 30).

African states, therefore, need to strengthen the existing policies while creating their national and regional migration policies within the AU policy guiding principles. Nevertheless, Africa seems to have limited resources and capacities to create, implement and monitor migration frameworks at the national or regional level (Achieng *et al.* 2020). Despite these challenges, progress has been made toward easing travel document requirements. In the East African Community (EAC), people freely travel within the region using valid national passports or the new East African passport, which accords a six months multiple-entry validity. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has also linked up with the EAC to examine this free movement’s positive and negative impact. Dr Linda Adhiambo Oucho, in response to an interview on this free movement, noted that ‘increased free movement in Africa is expected to decrease the numbers of irregular immigrants, [but] may open more possibilities for trafficking’ (Udelsmann & Bjarnesen 2020:30). Similarly, in the West African region, ECOWAS migrants are issued with an ordinary passport for travel within the region for up to 90 days without a visa. Although the Southern African Development Community

(SADC) visa exemption protocols and action plans on travel, tourism, and free movement are in place, there is still an entry visa policy in Angola, DRC and Madagascar. The 13 other states must complete the bilateral agreements to restrict illegal migration. There is also ongoing discussion to harmonise and amend current migration policies and introduce a SADC passport. To promote free movement and collective integration, Botswana and Namibia signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding on 20 February 2023 for citizens to use identity cards for travel and abolish passports (Botswana Home Affairs, Press Release 20 February 2023). Similarly, the bilateral agreement between Kenya and South Africa signed in 2022 allows Kenyans to travel visa-free to South Africa from January 2023 for up to 90 days.

Despite these significant strides, the implementation of these progressive policies remains problematic. Resources are insufficient to accommodate the influx of migrants from poor to middle-income countries, and undocumented immigrants can be a risk to South African authority and safety (Mlambo & Mpanza 2019:283). For this reason, in 2022, the South African Department of Home Affairs (DHA) announced the termination of the Zimbabwe Exemption Permits (ZEP) from June 2023. This action aims to drive away over 178,000 ZEP holders who have lived and worked in South Africa for over two decades if they do not apply for regular South African permits. Lesotho migrants with similar permits have been informed by DHA that their services are no longer needed in South Africa. Civil society organisations interpret these actions as violations of human rights. Research also shows that most illegal immigrants in SA sustain the livelihoods of their relatives in their country of origin (Zimbabwe); hence, strict action against them reduces economic benefits to their people (UNDESA 2019).

The drivers of migration within Southern Africa are largely linked to geographical proximity and economic gains of both the host and country of origin. For example, for a long time, the South African industrial, mining industry and agriculture sectors have drawn cheap labour from the neighbouring countries since the 1960s and 1970s (Hlalele & Mashiya 2019; Mberu & Sidze 2017). In contrast, people from South Africa moved to Angola, Namibia, Zambia and other neighbouring countries during civil wars or apartheid tensions (IOM 2019b; Edelman & Bjarnesen 2020). Botswana's diamond discovery and Angola's oil wealth attracted skilled and unskilled labour migrants from the region and elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s (Mlambo & Mpanza 2019). Botswana nationals can travel to South Africa for highly skilled jobs, business,

medical care, family visits, holidays, and shopping (Crush & Peberdy 2018). Recently, Botswana has been elevated to middle-income and migrant-receiving country status drawing skilled professionals across the continent.

At the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994, new job opportunities were created, attracting unskilled workers from poor SADC member countries. Similarly, professionals from Asia, Europe, and the rest of Africa were attracted by better economic growth, the new political climate, and attractive salaries (Flahaux & De Haas 2016; Udelsmann & Bjarnesen 2020). However, the South African authority only recognises migrants considered valuable and forces the majority of others who qualify to apply for asylum status (Moyo, Nshimbi & Gumbo 2018). South Africa has witnessed a growing number of undocumented immigrants from various regions, such as the SADC region, the rest of Africa, Europe, the USA, and Asia (Crush & Peberdy 2018). Consequently, it ranks among the countries with the highest migrant populations, with approximately 6% of its population being migrants, trailing behind Gabon (16%), Libya (12%), Côte-d'Ivoire (10%), and Gambia (10%) (Crush & Peberdy 2018).

3 Intra-African Women Migrants in Southern African

Although the number of male migrants exceeds that of female migrants, there is an emerging pattern of increased female migration in Southern Africa since 2015. Increasingly, feminisation within Africa is linked to personal advancements in education and employment, the elimination of legal restrictions and changing standards in Sub-Saharan Africa (Magidimisha 2018). It is also linked to a decrease in male-dominated families, the emergence of more female-headed households and a global increase in professional (skilled) migration (UNCTAD 2018). However, there are limited cumulative studies on professional or independent women migrants in Southern Africa. A simple search generates several case studies of independent women migrants in South Africa in the last eight years (Hlalele & Mashiya 2019; Masanja 2012; Muthuki 2013). Most studies highlight the challenges and experiences of semi-skilled and unskilled women migrants from Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi and Zimbabwe involved in cross-border trade, contract agricultural or domestic employment in South Africa (Moyo 2017). Most studies on women migrants from Sub-Saharan countries to South Africa relate to refugee issues, asylum seekers and experiences of the Somali, Ethiopian, Congolese, Senegalese and Rwandan

women migrants (Magidimisha 2018; Xulu-Gama 2022).

From the African family perspective, men are the primary economic migrants, and the women either join the spouses later or are left behind (Hlalele & Mashiya 2019). Most women who opt to join their spouses become homemakers or engage in small businesses to supplement their spouses' income in Diaspora (Netshikulwe, Nyamnjoh & Garba 2022). However, women forced by circumstances to remain in their home countries tend to gain more authority and work harder to maintain their homes within the patriarch norms (Magidimisha 2018; Hlalele & Mashiya 2019). For instance, during the Angolan civil war, women had to take on greater family responsibilities like trade, construction, home maintenance, disciplining male children, dealing with legal issues, and fulfilling social obligations, initially perceived as men's tasks (UNCTAD 2018). In matrimonial circles, women's self-sufficiency is discouraged; thus, peers, extended family, and religion will pressure women to join their spouses. According to Hiralal (2017), citing Cohen in 1997, the married women in Southern Africa also migrated, but their narratives were concealed.

Women are supposed to be passive in making family decisions and live a systematic gendered, socially constructed life supporting families, toiling and struggling. Nevertheless, women seek more freedom to work and achieve their full potential. For instance, young married Ethiopian women in South Africa would like to move 'away from the Spaza shop mentality' (Netshikulwe *et al.* 2022:84). Due to these tensions, gender studies have shifted away from women as supporters of men to professional women who autonomously migrate within the labour market narratives - a trend in the feminisation of migration (Muthuki 2013).

There is adequate evidence suggesting that independent Intra-African female migration has become prevalent. Most of these women are active economic contributors as professionals, activists and heads of households (Magidimisha 2018). Responding to social and economic models, many Sub-Saharan women migrants perceived South Africa as a nation with a relatively peaceful and economically stable environment. On arrival, this perception changed as they experienced intimidating situations and xenophobic attacks (Hiralal 2019). For example, Zimbabwean female teachers are the largest group in South Africa. Despite the principles of African integration and their educational qualifications, most are working as unskilled workers for survival (*ibid*). They are either students or working as part-time tutors, day-care helpers, volunteers, housekeepers or vendors. With time, their reality to engage in more

formal jobs diminishes (Magidimisha 2018). Women migrants with no professional status, work as seasonal or illegal wage workers in the service industry. This reality requires a constant redefinition of the self as a woman, her family role(s), and her professional status. Women migrants, therefore, change their roles and occupation in destination countries due to discriminating labour policies, marital status, environmental variations or socio-political tensions (Okyere-Darko and Tetteh 2016).

Globally, despite the challenges, female migrants contribute financially to family maintenance or as long-distance mothers or extended family back home (Baldassar, Kilkey, Merla & Wilding 2018). Women migrants constantly keep negotiating conflicting ideologies such as race, gender, nationality, culture, and class to improve their lives in the host countries despite being on the periphery (Akosah-Twumasi *et al.* 2020; Colomers 2019). They struggle to adjust to various structural inequalities and shift multiple contexts as demanded in the host countries hoping to be assimilated or to transform themselves. This chapter offers valuable insights into the experiences of Intra-African women migrants in Southern Africa, contributing to the existing body of knowledge in this field. Furthermore, the shared experiences shed light on migration policies and can inform the development of intervention programs to support African women migrants.

4 Methodology

Generally, an experiential-phenomenological study uses qualitative methods that allow a stepping-back approach, critical interrogation of enactments and analysis of the phenomenon within the broader social-economic, historical or political contexts (Pithouse 2009). This phenomenological qualitative chapter uses a self-study design within a narrative voice to account for the author's lived experiences as an Intra-African woman migrant. Self-study research seems to be the least used method in the migration field. Moreover, as discourse analysis, self-studies facilitate understanding the self and identities shift over time in different contexts (Georgakopoulou 2013). Last, a self-narrative approach creates an emotionally and academically intriguing scholarly critique.

During the writing process of this narrative, I (the Narrator) kept a reflective diary as an informal, secure space describing experiences and informal conversations with friends, colleagues, and family members who played a part in my life. The diary generated an analytical memo within the

broader theoretical lens and transformed my thoughts into creative writing. This approach resonates with Pithouse (2007), who claims that there is no self-study without involving others. The ‘self’ should be understood with ‘others’ contributions. Reviewing my lived experiences and those of others generates a snapshot of how Intra-African migration impacts the self-identity, family structure, character, growth, shifts in gender roles, and career development from women’s perceptive. However, my position may have influenced crafting the vignette, so the occurrences and events cannot be generalised to another self-study research. Thus, the vignette approach acknowledges lived experiences as dynamic, capturing the social-spatial orientation, subjective and fluid in nature (Georgakopoulou 2013).

5 The Theoretical Framework of the Study

This chapter is rooted in the conceptual frameworks of social construct and transnationalism, which provide a solid foundation for exploring the lived experiences of an Intra-African migrant woman in Southern Africa during a specific period. The chosen theoretical underpinning is apt and effectively connects with the narrative design employed in the study.

The concept of a social construct carries a socio-cultural meaning which stems from Lee’s theory (Lee 1966). According to this theory, the primary drivers of migration are based on ‘perceptions’ after one evaluates the push factors in the place of origin and the pull factors (advantages) in the destination. Social constructs generally assume that people from less-developed economies migrate to more developed countries due to low salaries, lack of work-life balance, poor living standards, political or social suppression, and poor service provisions (Mlambo & Mpanaza 2019). Moreover, professional and personal satisfaction, higher living standards and salaries, and limited political or cultural control are a magnet to new domains (ibid). This study focuses on one woman migrant from East Africa to the more economically developed Southern Africa. Before the movement, most migrants over-evaluate their destination country, ignoring the possible challenges (Lee 1966). In this context, the social constructs of negative emotions, changes in gender roles, identities, and enactments in Southern Africa illuminate contradictory discourses attached to Intra-African migration. This means migrants do not fully comprehend the destination country before the migration and over-evaluate the economic benefits of the host countries. This assumption underpins the narra-

tive in this chapter. The social constructs within the feminist approach assume that women migrants also appreciate international spaces for family advancement and self-empowerment despite the prejudices (Okyere-Darko & Tetteh 2016).

The conceptual understanding of transnationalism focuses on various ways women migrants survive in socially constructed inequities in the host countries. Transnationalism refers to the process by which migrants build, maintain, and strengthen various connections with their country of origin and the international context (Baldassar *et al.* 2018). Most literature using transnationalism theory explores the implications of migrants from poor countries living in developed countries, their relationships with their countries of origin, and their satisfaction in the destination contexts. Some migrants move between countries crossing different cultures or systems but hold on to the collectiveness of family welfare and unity (*ibid*). In this case, the female migrant made a ‘two-step’ migration, first to Botswana and then to South Africa (current destination), while maintaining links with her country of origin.

6 How Intra-African Migration Impacts Family Structure and Career

This section provides my vignette as a female Intra-African migrant following three strands of information. First, the section offers reasons for leaving my homeland, followed by lived experiences in Botswana and South Africa as host countries.

Migration strategies	Country and year	Roles/ responsibilities
Step one: First migration	Kenya - Botswana: 2001-2012	Cultural shock and social prejudices, migrant teacher, wife, motherhood.
Step two: Second migration:	Botswana-South Africa: 2013-2016	Socio-cultural disconnect, migrant identity, autonomy, PhD student; motherhood.
Life in South Africa	South Africa: 2017-2022	Role’s shift, family head, post-doctorate, permanent resident, unemployed Doctorate, brain gain/ waste?

6.1 *Why Did I Leave Kenya in Early 2000?*

My desire in this chapter is to recreate a picture of a female in an African setting who was encouraged from a tender age to pursue a degree in education so that one day she may become *Mwalimu wa Walimu* – loosely translated as ‘teacher of teachers; a lecturer. Based on socio-cultural expectations at that time, my humble family resisted cultural practices such as ignorance, female genital mutilation, poverty, inequality, and patriarchal ideologies, a norm in my village, Eastern Kenya. So, excelling in school and leaving the village life was my desire. I completed my A-level studies in 1988 and enrolled at Kenyatta University in Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya, during President Moi’s reign. In those days, with a bachelor’s degree, one was assured of a permanent job and better living standards in urban areas.

President Moi rose to power when the Kenyan economy began to stagnate in the early 1980s after the death of the first president Jomo Kenyatta. He soon faced increasing opposition from different groups and an attempted military coup. In this context, Moi oversaw an authoritarian regime and depended on a network of loyal supporters. His critics and young graduates described this regime as a centralised and ethnically biased state which Kenyans still grapple with today. These negative antidotes affected the social economy and political arenas. Many young university graduates – including my spouse – migrated to Southern Africa, searching for better-paying jobs to support nuclear and extended families. As a young high school teacher, I had enrolled for a part-time master’s degree, so the idea was perfect, and I anticipated that my dream to become a lecturer was in the pipeline. My spouse left Kenya for Botswana, and I followed him after one year.

6.2 *Life in Botswana: Cultural Shock and Social Prejudice*

I joined my spouse, who had been offered a contract job in Botswana, with my two young girls, aged nine and six. The salary and economic benefits were attractive to any Kenyan graduate struggling to feed the nuclear family and support the extended families back home. As an experienced graduate teacher with a master’s degree in education, I assumed that getting a job and integrating with the local people was automatic.

First, I did not realise that getting a job as a migrant was determined by labour policies in Botswana, and the teacher’s recruiting body no longer employed foreign teachers in public schools. Foreign teachers would only get

an offer of a two-year contract in private schools after 2005. The government stopped renewing contracts to absorb unemployed local teachers with similar teaching skills. Globally this is politically correct and within the migration policies, but most migrants (including myself) do not have adequate knowledge of labour migration policies. This situation was a devastating reality, and I could not envision how to improve my career or convert to becoming a homemaker. Secondly, a social-cultural disconnect and limited integration were perceived, and the question for migrants who move to better economic backgrounds, such as in Botswana, was a logical move. As a family, we settled in a small town called Mochudi in Kgatleng District, 10 km from Gaborone, the capital city, and my spouse was the breadwinner who supported the extended family back in Kenya. It was the first time in my life that I experienced a culture shock. I remember writing a letter to my close colleague in Kenya venting about my new context:

Botswana has a population of 1.2 million and has more elephants than human beings in a vast countryside. I stay at home the whole day while my spouse and children go to school and sometimes no person passes on the estate road. The way people dress is different from Kenya with causal short skirts/short and transparent tops during summer seasons ...!

Anxiety and frustration became my daily emotions. My familiar symbols of a typical day for a teacher and mother vanished. Social interaction was limited to my two young children and my spouse. There were no recreation facilities, so most weekends, we would drive to the city to shop or meet other Diasporan families. This situation was disheartening and required learning the ‘new’ and unlearning my homeland experiences. I felt ‘brain’ wasted, bored and confused. In the spirit of resilience, I enrolled for computer classes in the evenings at a vocational institution while nursing my third child during the day.

After three years of being jobless, I secured a contract job at a private school in Gaborone. The significant social differences inspired us to relocate from Mochudi (a town) to Gaborone (a city) to enable my children to enrol in a better-resourced school near my place of work. My spouse became a commuter which was fine within the family setup. However, the cultural shock as migrant teachers became more pronounced because in our home country, the school community valued discipline, accountability, teamwork, and teachers’

authority, which to a lesser extent, existed in the Botswana context. While working as a student and then a teacher in Kenya, social values such as hard work, resilience, modesty, and self-motivation were deeply embedded in schools. However, this was not the case in Botswana schools. It was a challenge to adapt to students' freedom, carefree attitude, and way of dressing, especially during the hot summers. Luckily, most students, predominantly foreigners with diverse backgrounds, 'perceived' foreign teachers as more hard-working than the local teachers. While we followed the Cambridge education system and the staff enjoyed fee subsidies for their children, I encountered difficulties due to a prevalent belief that 'schools back home were superior'. These stereotypes influenced my perceptions and judgments of the education system and its students. Additionally, I encountered undisciplined and disrespectful behaviour from certain students towards new foreign teachers.

In the community, though the Botswana people are humble, they gave every black migrant the pejorative label of *Mukwerekwere*, loosely translated as 'alien' or 'foreigner' who were up for mischief (Crush & Peberdy 2018:2). The semi and unskilled workers from Zimbabwe who provided cheap labour in the city were perceived as thieves and poor. Likewise, the foreigners stereotyped the local people as lazy and dependent on the rich government. Several times, I would reflect on the USA context, where the word 'black' or 'Negro' refers to the 'African American'. These substitutions are often perceived as less offensive in other parts of the world. They do not understand the discriminatory meanings behind such utterances, which are socially inappropriate and prejudiced toward foreigners. I resented the negativity and disguised the social behaviour in the community. It was difficult to reconcile the two stereotypes, structure systems and employment policies in a peaceful country with a small population, safe environment, good services and higher salaries.

6.3 Family Life: A Spouse and Mother in Botswana

After moving to Botswana, what I experienced, changed my perception and assumptions about family life as a career woman. I struggled as a mother of two young daughters, nursing my son while at the same time job hunting. I realised that getting a job as a teacher was a roller coaster in a foreign country. The pressure was just so much; dealing with postnatal depression, being overwhelmed with housework, stress and insomnia while trying to be a good spouse and a present mother – all without the support system of my extended

family. To exacerbate matters, within the context of patriarchal privileges, beliefs, and practices, my spouse had a demanding job that did not allow him to contribute to household chores.

The attitude and lamentations of my house helper were astonishing. For instance, she would not understand why foreigners came to Botswana and secured professional jobs while the local youth were jobless. On my side, I resented labour laws protecting unskilled workers, like working 8 hours a day and standardised salaries. I used to underestimate the importance of domestic workers in easing the workload that motherhood presents in patriarchal homes – ‘they were angels in Kenya’. As a mother in a foreign land, I had to cope with three young children, mostly with an absent spouse. After struggling emotionally for three years, I started thinking of relocating back to Kenya to seek support from my family and friends and get a teaching job. It is difficult for women who leave everything they value behind to follow their spouses in relocating to a new environment. I needed and craved emotional support, unconditional love, and kindness.

6.4 Life in South Africa: Socio-Cultural Disconnect and Migrant Identity

There is a deep-seated hatred and hostility from the local black South Africans towards the migrants from African countries to the present day. The hostility is characterised by periodic xenophobic verbal abuse and physical attacks, regardless of having or not having visa documents (Moyo *et al.* 2018). As a result, most female migrants lead an isolated life characterised by low self-esteem, negative emotions or depression. In this context, I realised humility and playing down my identity was essential. The implication was that if I had been born in South Africa, where black people had been discriminated against for more than a century, my achievements might not have happened, and I, too, would have had similar hostilities towards foreigners. This new realisation changed my perception of the local black community. It reduced my biases, and I stopped using my Kenyan background to judge people. I started seeing them for who they are (positive), disengaged the ‘leading feeling’, and allowed myself to identify with humanity.

Every black foreigner carries the pejorative label of *Mukwerekwere*, just like in Botswana. Socially and economically, my family felt excluded without a Permanent Residence permit. According to the policies, foreign

students from other regions paid university fees in US dollars – this information is blurred among foreigners. At one point, we had to sell a family house to pay university fees! I was unaware that South Africa has one of the highest violent crime rates in the world, characterised by murder, rape, domestic violence, racism and xenophobia attacks, mass protests, and looting (Crush & Peberdy 2018; Moyo 2017). Metaphors used by the media on how local gang members hijack derelict buildings in the old CBD of cities like Johannesburg or Durban were scary. They collected rent from foreign workers from Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe who could not afford self-contained houses and traumatised them.

Teaching jobs were not available for foreigners in the public sector. Due to historical factors, most private schools were managed along racial lines, with 95% being white teachers. To survive in this big African economy, I enrolled for my PhD in education, and my spouse again became the family's breadwinner. I was positive that our lives were heading in the right direction despite having some medical conditions. When my spouse's job contract ended, he relocated to Kenya, changing my trajectory in South Africa. While studying, I became the head of the family and breadwinner of three children.

6.5 Life as a PhD Student, Part-Time Tutor and a Mother

This period was one of the hardest times of my life. I was abandoned and depressed and wondered why I had left Botswana. However, after completing my PhD, I assumed that becoming a lecturer would be automatic. That gave me the resilience to set my eyes on the prize no matter the challenges. As a full-time PhD student, the University offered teaching opportunities periodically, which was valuable financial support.

I first met Prof Carol Bertram in mid-2012, and our friendship thrived when she became my PhD supervisor, mentor, and role model. Having come from a rote learning background, Professor Bertram significantly impacted my academic journey. She shared her expertise, teaching me critical thinking and academic writing skills that have left a lasting impression. Attending conferences and showcasing my progressive work was a privilege granted to me. The comprehensive training and mentorship I received during this time provided a solid foundation for my post-doctoral fellowship in the faculty of education at Witwatersrand University in 2017.

Despite meeting another inspiring academic scholar, my post-doctoral

fellowship was characterised by family challenges, delays in my permanent residence permit, and medical issues leading to my resignation after my one-year contract. I joined the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) for another post-doctoral year in 2018-19 and secured permanent residence permits for the family. While I appreciated my postdocs, I found myself in a marginal situation - writing and publishing two academic papers in 'reputable' journals were an impossible mission within a given year. I continued to work 'with' the University as a part-time lecturer and teacher-mentor and engaged in research projects until funding was cut off during the Covid-19 breakout. Due to South African equity laws, my desire to become a full-time lecturer has not been realised.

I take pride in my accomplishments as both a mother and an individual who has experienced personal growth while holding a PhD, despite coming from a conservative background and facing prejudices. Furthermore, my two adult children are actively contributing to the economic development of our society. I support my extended family financially whenever needed, demonstrating my commitment to their well-being. Additionally, brewing and enjoying a cup of 'Chai' tea serves as a way for me to reconnect with my heritage and find solace during moments of overwhelming thoughts or work. I believe that sharing these experiences can inspire and empower millions of women in the Diaspora to reflect on their own journeys and reconstruct their own narratives.

7 Key Issues Arising from the Narrative

This chapter examines and highlights the assumptions and expectations of an Intra-African female migrant in Southern Africa and how the migration impacted her family structure and career. The narrator is a PhD holder in education who intentionally takes a subjective position avoiding the details of the lived life. The vignette offers her realities in Southern Africa after voluntarily resigning as a graduate teacher in her homeland to join her spouse for a better life and career development in 2001. The story reveals that the narrator did not know the constraining social spaces and restrictive laws in destination countries before migration. She aspired to a high-paying job to support the nuclear family, empower the self, and uplift the extended family. However, after three years as a homemaker in Botswana, she secured a teaching position in Gaborone between 2004 – 2012 for a meagre salary despite having a master's degree in education. Several studies affirm that women migrants

from developing countries to developed nations have limited knowledge and high expectations, affecting their lives (Okeke-Ihejirika *et al.* 2019).

The chapter illuminates the challenges, prejudices and decision-making professional Diaspora women face as they pursue family dreams and careers. The description also highlights the motivations and education opportunities she and her family achieved at one of the reputable universities in South Africa. Despite the career development, the spouse's return to their homeland in 2016 changed her roles to an independent single parent, family provider, and a 'redundant' PhD holder in South Africa. The female migrant assumptions of the two host countries and her realities are inconsistent. The contradictions affected her socialisation, emotions, career, and family structure and changed her perception. Similar stories have been offered by Brazilian women who moved to Italy to repay family debts and support the family (Baldaassar *et al.* 2018).

On the one hand, the realities of most Diasporas denote their quest for agency, high aspirations and challenges. On the other hand, the migrants appreciate higher salaries, better living standards, remittance and educational advancements in rich economic countries (Okyere-Darko & Tetteh 2016). The narrator struggles to secure steady employment or negotiate several socio-cultural and structural inequalities, discriminatory laws, and xenophobia in Southern Africa. So, her journey from a poor nation to self-empowerment or career growth remains difficult in the contexts in which she has lived for 21 years, partly due to her position being labelled by the social constructs as 'an alien' or 'black foreigner' (Crush & Peberdy 2018; Okyere-Darko & Tetteh 2016).

From an African women's perspective, the narrator's journey describes how correlated factors intimidate and marginalise professional women migrants in destination countries. Such women have qualifications or experience in certain specialisations and desire opportunities to reconstruct their careers, family, and new identities, but the reality is different (Okeke-Ihejirika *et al.* 2019). I argue that ignorance, naivety, desperation and cultural stereotypes make African women migrants overlook the constraints of host nations and international migration laws. The literature and narrative reveal that prejudices and discriminations are moulded by socio-economic dimensions and social constructs (race, class, gender, ethnicity, marriage, nationality). Nevertheless, the narrator's determination and positivistic attitude to succeed against all odds resonate with other migrants in Cape Town and Western Europe (Dodson 2018; Baldassar *et al.* 2018). The narrator's graduation with a PhD in 2017 was a source of delight. However, she works on temporary contracts in South Africa

due to racial discrepancies, equity laws, or other social constructs that affect employment opportunities. The DHA frequently updates a list of critical skills essential to the country's economy. Consequently, her pursuit of identity and agency as a PhD holder reflects a sense of discontentment, frustration, and internal contradictions experienced by many educated women migrants. This internal struggle often makes it challenging for them to express their perspectives and experiences (Okeke-Ihejirika *et al.* 2019).

The narrative resonates with other Diasporan women, such as Emecheta, a Nigerian writer in London, who opposed patriarchal ideologies. Both narrators deliberately avoid the 'feminist's label' due to conflicting ideologies and identities. The feminisation of migration studies argues that such women confine to patriarchy systems and live satisfactorily in the host countries (Muthuki 2013; Okyere-Darko & Tetteh 2016). Emecheta embraced diverse identities to negotiate social constructs such as gender, race, class, ethnicity, language, success, and citizenship, frustrating her endeavours in Nigeria and the UK (Okyere-Darko & Tetteh 2016). In this chapter, the narrator sees things through 'an African woman' (ibid 107), which principally believes in gender-stipulated roles at the expense of individual progression. Despite the humiliation and betrayal; financial and health struggles; the uncertainty of parenting young adults; and limited socialisation, the narrator pursues serenity and vibrant religious life characterised by courage, hard work and motherhood. She finds comfort and reassurance from the minority South African and Diasporan communities. Living or working among the minority seems safer, unlike black African spaces where xenophobia utterances and prejudices are common. Creating such social-economic networks also acts as a survival strategy. It offers a sense of security for single women families during times of distress like the xenophobia attacks and lootings of 2021.

This narrative confirms that married women accompany their working spouses within patriarchal systems to support their families in Diaspora (Baldaassar *et al.* 2018).

Social constructs often fail to recognise educated women's aspirations to reinvent themselves. Expressing self-agency or challenging patriarchal ideologies is often viewed as defiance of cultural norms (Crush & Peberdy 2018; Muthuki 2013). As time passes, the sense of dislocation and internal contradictions can lead to feelings of isolation, prompting a strong desire for affection and a sense of belonging within the family or new society. Okyere-Darko and Tetteh (2016:102) suggest that motherhood among educated

Diasporans can instil a fear of losing their adult children as the latter navigate their own paths in life. Other research confirms that African women migrants face emotional strains and depression due to a lack of support systems, job-related challenges, and cultural adjustments (Okeke-Ihejirika *et al.* 2019). In contrast, single professional women can relocate to any desired destination for work (Hlalele & Mashiya 2019).

The reflections on cultural and workplace conflicts resonate with foreign teacher conflicts in the United States (US), characterised by disrespect for teacher authority in classrooms, miss-appreciation for teacher's efforts, learners' indifference to education and lack of respect for all migrants (Colomer 2019). In the United States, international migration became a contentious topic when Donald Trump made derogatory statements about Mexicans, portraying them as rapists and drug dealers. As a result, he proposed the construction of a physical wall along the Mexico-US border. However, Latinx teachers continue to navigate these social constructs, despite some reluctance from certain segments of the US population to accept foreigners (*ibid*).

In contrast, South Africa presents a different scenario. Recent xenophobic attacks targeting Zimbabweans and Nigerians have raised concerns about the country's foreign policies (Dodson 2018; Mlambo and Mpanza, 2019). These incidents have sparked discussions about how foreigners can be effectively integrated into host societies, prompting the need for future longitudinal studies to explore this issue further.

Drawing from anthropology, migrants can reflect on their social constructs, which promote nationality prejudices and social stereotypes among their host countries (Akosah-Twumasi *et al.* 2020). For instance, Chinese employers in the service industry avoid hiring South African women and maximise profits from cheap Zimbabwean workers as a mutual dependence strategy (Liu 2020:147). The strategy is practical, but the latter obtain the jobs without following the stipulated socio-political procedures. Women migrants ought to 're-invent' themselves whilst in foreign countries. Self-inventiveness means taking a new way of life or livelihood (creating blue ocean strategies) as a survival technique (Kim & Mauborgne 2017). For example, the Uber Taxi business was created by thinking differently - cheaper and more convenient with zero competition from rival public transport systems. Such approaches turn marginality into resilience that can open possibilities for self-empowerment, strengthening and sustainable businesses. Thus, studies on African women migrants and coping mechanisms as such blue ocean initiatives are significant.

At the end of the story, due to family circumstances, the narrator's roles shift from a dependent to an independent woman who intentionally ignores patriarchal ideologies to raise her three children in South Africa. In the hope of 'self-fulfilment' and 'desires', she becomes a symbol of persistence and resilience against all forms of struggles, humiliation, and biases in the host country and among her diasporic community (Okyere-Darko & Tetteh 2016). She asserts herself in various ways to maintain family-work balance and career growth and keeps nexus with her extended family (Baldaassar *et al.* 2018).

The current debates argue that the feminisation of migration is a key element embedded in globalisation (Baldassar *et al.* 2018; Okyere-Darko, and Tetteh 2016). Therefore, this chapter contributes to an emergent body of research that explores the feminisation of Intra-African migration. The self-study also offers empirical insights to validate the desktop analysis and extend the scholarship. Though self-studies are interesting and lead to reflective analysis, this narrative is limited to self-descriptions of one person, thus impossible to generalise all Diasporas. However, the approach offers a basis for comprehensive future studies on the histories, driving forces, post-migration lives and transformation initiatives of female migrants within Africa.

8 Conclusion

The personal narrative in this chapter consists of social constructs of a particular African woman migrant in South Africa influenced by gender, marriage, culture, career, nationality and modern norms. The overall impression shows that the agency of a married, educated woman migrant is complex, and her roles in the family structure keep changing within a specified time and context. For sustainability, Intra-African women migrants must have the capabilities to struggle and cope with interconnected identities that shape identity or character, like resilience, determination, and strong-mindedness, even in times of distress. This chapter extends valuable knowledge to the feminisation of Intra-African migration, where the power of appreciation and positivity spurs survival in their peripheral spaces. The chapter highlights the importance of self- and group-inventiveness strategies and effective support networks for educated women migrants. These recommendations align with the broader field of international migration studies, which emphasises the need for initiatives that carefully assess the unique circumstances, needs, and experiences of migrants. By understanding these factors, it becomes possible to respond appropriately and

effectively to the specific situations faced by migrants. Such tailored approaches can help create a supportive environment that promotes the success and well-being of educated women migrants in their host societies.

References

- Achieng, M., A. El Fadil & E. Righa 2020. What is Wrong with the Narrative on African Migration? In Adepoju, A. with C. Fumagalli & N. Nyabola (ed.): *Africa Migration Report: Challenging the Narrative*. Adidas Ababa: IOM. Available at:
<https://reliefweb.int/sites/default/files/styles/small/public/previews/17/d7/17d7045e-bc7b-30c4-9559-58f030d46a1b.png?2178318-1-0>
(Accessed on 18 June 2023.)
- Akosah-Twumasi, P., F. Alele, A.M. Smith, T.I. Emeto, D. Lindsay, K. Tsey & B.S. Malau-Aduli 2020. Prioritising Family Needs: A Grounded Theory of Acculturation for Sub-Saharan African Migrant Families in Australia. *Social Sciences* 9, 2:17.
<https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci9020017>
- Anganoo, L. & S. Manik 2019. My Coming to South Africa Made Everything Possible: The Socio-Economic and Political Reasons for Migrant Teachers Being in Johannesburg. *Journal of Geography Education in Africa* 2: 15 - 28. <https://doi.org/10.46622/jogea.v2i1.2480>
- Baldassar, L., M. Kilkey, L. Merla & R. Wilding 2018. Transnational Families in the Era of Global Mobility. In Triandafyllidou, A. (ed.): *Handbook of Migration and Globalisation*. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785367519.00035>
- Dodson, B. 2018. Gender, Mobility and Precarity: The Experiences of Migrant African Women in Cape Town, South Africa. In Amrith, M. & N. Sahraoui (eds.): *Gender, Work and Migration*. New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315225210-7>
- Colomer, S.E. 2019. Understanding Racial Literacy through Acts of (Un)Masking: Latinx Teachers in a New Latinx Diaspora Community. *Race, Ethnicity and Education* 22, 2: 194 - 210.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13613324.2018.1468749>
- Crush, J. & S. Peberdy 2018. Criminal Tendencies: Immigrants and Illegality in South Africa. *Migration Policy Brief No. 10*. Cape Town: Southern

- African Migration Project (SAMP).
- Flahaux, M.L. & H. de Haas 2016. African Migration: Trends, Patterns, Drivers. *Comparative Migration Studies* 4,1: 1 - 25.
<https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-015-0015-6> PMCID:PMC4909155
- Georgakopoulou, A. 2013. Small Stories and Identities Analysis as a Framework for the Study of IM/ Politeness-In-Interaction. *Journal of Politeness Research* 9, 1: 55 - 74. <https://doi.org/10.1515/pr-2013-0003>
- Hlalele, D. & N. Mashiya 2019. Understanding Women Teacher Transnational Migration: A Narrative Inquiry from Southern Africa. *Sage Open* 9, 3:1 - 8. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019865366>
- Hiralal, K. 2017. Women and Migration-Challenges and Constraints – A South African Perspective. *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 26, 2: 18 - 18.
- IOM 2019a. *Glossary on Migration*. IML Series number 34, 2019.
- IOM 2019b. *World Migration Report*. Geneva. Available at:
<https://publications.iom.int/books/world> (Accessed on 12 July 2022.)
- Kim, W.C. & R. Mauborgne 2017. *Blue Ocean Shift: Beyond Competing – Proven Steps to Inspire Confidence and Seize New Growth*. New York: Hachette Books. <https://doi.org/10.15358/9783800656622-1>
- Liu, Y.T. 2020. Unequal Interdependency: Chinese Petty Entrepreneurs and Zimbabwean Migrant Labourers. *Studies in Social Justice* 14, 1: 146 - 165.
<https://doi.org/10.26522/ssj.v2020i14.1872>
- Lee, E.S. 1966. A Theory of Migration. *Demography* 3, 1: 47 - 57.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2060063>
- Lucas, R.E.B. 2015. African Migration. In Chiswick B.R. & P.W. Miller (eds.): *The Handbook on the Economics of International Migration*. Amsterdam: Elsevier BV. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53768-3.00026-6>
- Magidimisha, H.H. 2018. Gender, Migration and Crisis in Southern Africa: Contestations and Tensions in the Informal Spaces and ‘Illegal Labour’ Market. In Magidimisha, H.H., N.E. Khalema, L. Chipungu, T.C. Chirimambowa, T.L. Chimedza (eds.): *Crisis, Identity and Migration in Post-Colonial Southern Africa*. New York: Springer International Publishing AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59235-0_5
- Masanja, G.F. 2012. The Female Face of Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Huria: Journal of the Open University of Tanzania* 11: 80 - 97.
- Mberu, B.U. & E.M. Size 2017. The Hidden Side of the Story: Intra-African Migration. In Carbone, G. (ed.): *Out of Africa: Why People Migrate*. Milan: Ledizioni.

- Mlambo, D.N. & S.E. Mpanza 2019. Emerging Determinants of Youth Migration from an Afrocentric Perspective. *African Renaissance* 16, 1: 1744 - 2532. <https://doi.org/10.31920/2516-5305/2019/V16n1a14>
- Moyo, I. 2017. Zimbabwean Cross-Border Traders in Botswana and South Africa: Perspectives on SADC Regional Integration. In Nshimbi, C.C. & I. Moyo (ed.): *Migration, Cross-Border Trade, and Development in Africa: Exploring the Role of Non-State Actors in the SADC Region*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55399-3_3
- Moyo, I., C.C. Nshimbi & T. Gumbo 2018. Migration, Logics of Inclusion and Exclusion and Xenophobia: The Case of African Migrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa. In Magidimisha, H.H., N.E. Khalema, L. Chipungu, T.C. Chirimambowa, T.L. Chimedza (eds.): *Crisis, Identity and Migration in Post-Colonial Southern Africa*. New York: Springer International Publishing AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59235-0_6
- Moyo, I.J., J.P. Laine & C.C. Nshimbi 2021. Intra-Africa Migrations: An Introduction. In Moyo I.J. & C.C. Nshimbi (eds.): *Intra-Africa Migrations: Reimagining Borders and Migration Management*. London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003091721-2>
- Muthuki, J.M. 2013. The Complexities of a Feminist-based Approach in Addressing Gender Inequality: African Professional Migrants in South Africa. *Alternation* Special Edition 7: 93 - 108. <http://alternation.ukzn.ac.za/Files/docs/20.4/07%20Mut.pdf>
- Netshikulwe, A., H. Nyamnjoh & F. Garba 2022. Pushed to the Margins. Ethiopian Migrants in South Africa. *Zanj: Journal of Critical Global South Studies* 5, 1/2: 76 - 92. <https://doi.org/10.13169/zanjglobalsoutstud.5.1.0007>
- Okeke-Ihejirika, P., B. Salami & A. Karimi 2019. African Migrant Women's Transition and Integration into Canadian Society: Expectations, Stressors, and Tensions. *Gender, Place & Culture* 26, 4: 581 - 601. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2018.1553852>
- Okyere-Darko, D. & U.S. Tetteh 2016. Autobiographical Traces of Bond between a Novelist and Her Characters: The Case of Buchi Emecheta. *African Journal of Applied Research* 2, 1: 94 - 109.
- Udelsmann, R.C. & J. Bjarnesen (eds.). 2020. Intra-African Migration: Available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU\(2020\)603514](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2020)603514) (Accessed on 11 June 2022.)

Intra-African Migration Impact on Family Structure and Career

- UNCTAD 2018. *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Migration for Structural Transformation*. Tokyo: UN Economic Development in Africa Report. (UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2018.)
- UNDESA 2019. *United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division International Migrant Stock 2019*. New York: United Nations Database:
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/docs/MigrationStockDocumentation_2019.pdf Available at:
www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp (Accessed on 1 May 2022.)
- UNDESA 2020. *United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division International Migration Highlights*. New York United Nations Database. (ST/ESA/SER.A/452).
- Xulu-Gama, N. 2022. Migrant Women's Experiences in the City: A Relational Comparison. In Rugunanan, P. & N. Xulu-Gama (eds.): *Migration in Southern Africa*. (IMISCOE.) Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9_9

Faith Kimathi
School of Education
University of Kwa Zulu Natal
South Africa
<https://ocid.org/0000-0002-8885-7994>
fkkananu@gmail.com

CHAPTER 10

Framing the Deportation of Zimbabwean Immigrants: A Comparative Analysis of South African and British Online Press

Moipone Mamahlomola Nkhatho

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0009-0007-9189-0430>

Tigere Paidamoyo Muringa

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3773-4959>

Gilbert Zvaita

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0381-9973>

Abstract

Evidence suggests that news framing of immigrants is among the most critical factors contributing to their stigmatisation and disdain by local citizens. The existing body of research on immigrants' news framing suggests that the news media often negatively portray immigrants. No study has been published that examines how the British and South African media framed the deportation of Zimbabwean immigrants from Britain and South Africa between 2020 and 2021. In June 2021, the British government announced that it had reached a landmark agreement with the Zimbabwean government to repatriate dozens of Zimbabweans who have committed crimes and served their sentences. On the other hand, South Africa has always deported Zimbabweans regularly. In this study, the authors investigated how different national news media frame the deportation of Zimbabwean migrants through a cross-national comparison. A qualitative case study approach was used to analyse how the South African media (*Eyewitness*, *OperaNews*, *eNCA Online*, *The Citizen*, *The Herald*, *News24*, *BusinessTech*, *AfricaNews*) and the United Kingdom (UK) media (*The Guardian*, *The Mirror*, *BBC*, *TimesLive*) framed the deportation of Zimbabwean immigrants from Britain and South Africa respectively. Two empirical

questions were asked: What frames were used to report the deported migrants? (ii) In what ways were the deported immigrants represented in the news articles? The research data for this chapter were drawn from twelve online press sources. A purposive sampling technique collected news articles (n=212) from the online news archives. A critical discourse analysis approach was applied for data analysis. Findings suggest a significant difference between the frames used by the newspapers. Furthermore, reports differed on whether the move to deport the ex-convict immigrants was safe. Our findings suggest that the media presented immigrants negatively and endorsed the stereotypes stigmatising immigrants. The authors of this chapter recommend a better representation of minorities in the news by focusing on the positive aspects that the foreign national brings to the host country.

Keywords: Britain, deportation, framing, migration, migrants, news, South Africa, Zimbabwe.

1 Introduction and Background

Available evidence shows that immigration has been a perpetual characteristic in communities and societies from the formation and commencement of history (Sion 2014; Moore, Gross & Threadgold 2012). Immigration has recurrently resulted in significant contributions from the cultural and economic perspective (Lancee 2021; Lirola 2014; Valentino *et al.* 2019). The migratory movements from one country to another and from continent to continent have become part of the political, social, economic, and cultural reality. To illustrate, the migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa and Britain is often perceived as a significant part of the cultural, political, and economic reality, thanks to the media's controversial role in constructing the migration discourse and reality (Kariithi 2017). In the last three decades, Zimbabwe has moved from receiving immigrants (from South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique) to having the highest emigration numbers in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (Monjane 2021). For example, recent evidence shows that almost two million Zimbabweans live outside Zimbabwe (Mhlanga & Ndhlovu 2021). The highest number of Zimbabwean emigrants is found in South Africa (850 000 – 1 020 000), followed by the UK (600 000) and Australia, estimated at 65,000 (Mhlanga & Ndhlovu 2021). Drawing on these figures, it is, therefore, sensible to situate the study in the context of South Africa and

Britain because they have the largest Zimbabwean Diaspora populations.

The news media is essential in communicating the positives of migrants to the host countries. Lirola (2014:484) argues that ‘the press could contribute to this sense by publishing positive news related to immigrants because it plays an important role in the social construction of reality in modern societies’. Despite this imperative role that the press could play, the news media generally considers immigrants the ‘other(s)’ who are unlike us and will never be like us. Lirola (2014) found that the dichotomy of ‘we-they’ is often accentuated when the coverage involves migrants in the press. Moreover, a study by Eberl *et al.* (2018) found that the media tends to represent the bad side of immigration, so immigrants are represented in two main ways.

On the one hand, they provoke fear and are a threat, as they are the people who invade ‘our’ country. On the other hand, they are represented as poor people experiencing difficulties, which provokes pity. Furthermore, the media in both South Africa and Britain is guilty of focusing excessively and disproportionately on the economic effect of migration, migrants’ use of social services, ethno-racial considerations, multiculturalism, and in other instances, migrants as security threats. Lirola (2014) argued that many news articles related to immigration that appear in the African and Western media exhibit negative characteristics. The media framing of migration and migrants has a knock-on effect on how the public perceives immigrants. Evidence from previous studies suggests that media framing of migration and migrants affects public opinion, encourages numerous explanations of the immigration system (being too lenient vs not accommodating enough), or cues specific considerations, including legitimacy, ‘need’, and security (Eberl *et al.* 2018; Robinson 2020).

2 Current Research and Gaps

Recently, researchers have shown an increased interest in the media framing of immigrants (Farris & Mohamed 2018; Moyo & Chiumbu 2020; Viladrich 2019). For instance, Viladrich (2019) explores the media framing of undocumented immigrants in the context of Health Deservingness in the United States of America (USA). His findings concluded that the press focuses on a ‘selective inclusion’ frame that emphasises health services to a certain category of immigrants (Viladrich 2019). Similarly, Ogan, Pennington, Venger, and Metz (2018) examined the ways mainstream national and regional press covered this issue from the Republican National Convention through Election

Day and established that ‘although about half of the stories were neutral or balanced in tone, negative stories were sponsored either by the Trump team or other actors’ (Ogan *et al.* 2018:375). However, much of the research on the media framing of immigrants is limited. Surprisingly, the media framing of deported immigrants has not been closely examined, particularly Zimbabweans’ British and South African media framing. Consequently, little is known about how the British and South African online press framed the deportation of Zimbabwean immigrants from the two countries. Furthermore, the factors that led to the types of frames used to frame the phenomenon are unclear.

This chapter draws on the framing theory¹ and the case study of the deportation of Zimbabwean immigrants to examine South African and British online press framing of the deportation and the expatriated immigrants. In this study, the authors endeavour to answer two key questions:

- i) What frames were used to report the deported migrants?
- ii) How were the deported immigrants framed in the news articles?

To answer these two questions, the researchers consider the importance of language and phrases to broaden the analysis of the news articles into a discursive study of the representation of Zimbabwean migrants in the British and South African press. Consequently, the key frames, the relationship that underlies them and the society in which they are constructed and framed are examined.

The purpose of studying the framing of Zimbabwean migrants’ deportation is for the researchers to observe the various frames and how they were used in reporting on the said group of immigrants to ensure that this group does not belong to the main group, which is not allowed to be in Britain. When analysing the coverage of Zimbabweans in South African and British media, it is evident that the issue of illegality and crime is evoked, which suggests an apparent similarity with the South African and British populations, respectively. This study adds to the literature emphasising the ‘we - they’ social-political dichotomy about race and nationality. Furthermore, this study’s analysis looks

¹ In essence, framing theory proposes that how something is presented to an audience (referred to as ‘the frame’) influences the decisions people make about how to process that information. Frames are abstractions that help to organise or structure message meaning.

at how the Zimbabwean migrants are framed as the ‘other’, those outside the position of power and those who are different from the main group (Lirola 2014). To that end, the central focus of this chapter is to explore the role of discourse in the structure of social relations (Lirola 2014; Fairclough 1989; van Dijk 2009). The authors of this chapter investigate the degree to which the use of language by the press reproduces and preserves unequal social relations among diverse groups in societies (Lirola 2014; van Dijk 2009).

3 Migration Trends in the UK

As of September 2021, approximately 21 million individuals travelled to the UK, including visitors and UK residents returning to the country. Comparatively, this number records a 69% (46.3 million) decrease compared to the previous year, 2020 (National Statistics UK 2021). The Covid-19 pandemic-induced restriction on travel exacerbated this decrease. In 2021 alone, Britain granted 1 115 155 visas. This number is 19% smaller than the amount granted in 2020. National Statistics UK (2021:1) revealed that ‘of the visas granted in this last 12 months, 39% were for study, 23% were to visit, 18% were to work, 4% were for family, and 15% for other reasons’.

The search for better job opportunities is among the main reasons the UK experiences high volumes of migrants. An estimated 205 528 individuals migrated to the UK for work-related activities in 2021 (National Statistics UK 2021). It was a 55% increase in the year ending 2020. National Statistics UK (2021:4) revealed that ‘skilled work, which accounts for 61% of work-related visas granted, saw the largest increase in visa numbers, up 45 866 or 57%’. In 2021 only, the UK witnessed an increase in high-value, skilled workers, temporary workers and other work visas. Moreover, seasonal workers comprised over half (53%) of all temporary work grants and saw a large increase, from 6451 in the previous year to 24 661 (+282%). In the year ending September 2021, there were 428 428 sponsored study visas granted (including dependants), 143% (252 327) more than the previous year and 55% (152 077) higher than the year ending September 2019.

According to UK Immigration, in the year ending September 2021, a staggering 21 365 people entered detention and were returned to their home countries. As of 30 September 2021, the UK recorded 1 410 in immigration detention. Furthermore, in June 2021, enforced returns from the UK were recorded at 2910. National Statistics UK (2021) stresses that most of the

enforced returns in 2021 were foreign national offenders. It is under this cohort that the Zimbabwean migrants were returned to Zimbabwe.

4 Britain Deports Zimbabwean Migrants

In July 2021, the Zimbabwean and British governments reached a landmark decision that would see the deportation of a dozen of Zimbabweans from Britain (Nyathi 2021). For almost two decades, the Zimbabwean government has resisted accepting Zimbabwean citizens who were forcibly returned from the UK (Madzimore 2021). Therefore, this would mean that Zimbabweans who sought asylum in Britain were left there to start families and have children. This radical stance by the Zimbabwean government was abandoned and ushered in a new opportunity for Britain and Zimbabwe to come up with new ways of dealing with the issue of Zimbabweans in Britain (Madzimore 2021). A new deal between the countries was agreed upon on 23 June 2021. The Zimbabwean government agreed to take the citizens and reintegrate them into society. About 50 Zimbabweans were deported; most were murderers, rapists and criminals who had been released from detention after completing their jail terms.

5 Migration Trends in South Africa

In South Africa, immigration is regulated by the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. The Act regulates the admission of persons to, their residence in, and their departure from South Africa and matters connected with the immigration and emigration of persons. Therefore, the Department of Home Affairs monitors and enforces issues related to such matters. Comparatively, South Africa has the largest number of immigrants on the African continent (Umejei 2021). Reliefweb (2021:1) cited factors such as ‘middle-income status, stable democratic institutions, and comparatively industrialised economy’ as reasons why the country has witnessed the highest number of immigrants over the years. According to official estimates published by Statistics South Africa, the country has a resident population of about 2.9 million immigrants (Statistics South Africa 2021). This number accounts for more than 5% of the 60 million people in South Africa. However, various scholars have refuted these estimates, arguing that the number of immigrants surpasses the official figures by far due to the unaccounted-for illegal immigrants, particularly those coming from its

neighbouring country (Pillay, Duncan & de Vries 2021; Plaatjie & Mogashoa 2021; Umejei 2021).

Immigration in South Africa has continued to rise since the advent of democracy in 1994 (Mlambo & Mlambo 2021). Recent evidence from Statistics South Africa points to the fact that ‘a net 853 000 people migrated to the country over the 2016-21 period, a slight reduction from the net immigration of 916 300 over the 2011-16 period but a dramatic increase from the 491 700 in the 2001-06 period’ (Reliefweb 2021:1). Further, between the years 2016 and 2021, ‘net immigration was highest among the African (894 400) and Asian (49 900) populations but offset by a net emigration of nearly 91 000 white residents’ (Reliefweb 2021; Statistics South Africa 2021). The highest number of migrants are housed in Gauteng, South Africa’s most productive and richest province, where the commercial capital (Johannesburg) of South Africa is located. Almost three-quarters of South Africa’s immigrants are from Africa (Statistics South Africa 2021). Furthermore, of these African migrants in South Africa, ‘68% originated from elsewhere within the 16-country Southern African Development Community (SADC) region’ (Reliefweb 2021:1). Figures from the 2020 United Nations data show that Zimbabwe was the largest origins country, accounting for more than 24% of all immigrants residing in South Africa. Between 800 000 and one million Zimbabweans reside in South Africa. The exact number of Zimbabweans in South Africa remains uncertain due to a substantial portion of the population lacking proper documentation, as highlighted by Bhebhe and Ngoepe (2021).

South Africa has also witnessed an increased outflow of some of its population since 1994 (Bhebhe & Ngoepe 2021). Available evidence suggests that the white South African population has left South Africa for other countries like the UK, Australia, and the USA. Reliefweb (2021) and Durrheim and Murray (2021) argue that the emigration of the white population from South Africa gained pace after the demise of Apartheid, as many got intimidated by the black government. Reliefweb (2021:1) stresses that ‘white residents accounted for 11% of South Africa’s population in 1996, 9% in 2011, and just 8% as of mid-2021’. Therefore, this unabated decline is credited to the emigration of the white population and lower fertility rates among white communities (Money & van Zyl-Hermann 2021). Besides the white South Africans leaving the country, available evidence shows a steady outflow of black professionals, particularly in the medical and engineering fields (Adeyemi *et al.* 2018; Mlambo & Adetiba 2019; Pratsinakis 2019).

6 South Africa Deports Zimbabweans

In recent years, the South African government has received increased pressure from its citizens, pressure groups and opposition political parties over its stance on foreigners. Issues over the legality of foreigners, their involvement in crime, and other illegal activities have pressured the South African government to take stern action against foreign nationals and implement a sounder immigration policy. In 2021 alone, the South African government announced deporting 202 Zimbabwean migrants (Madzimure 2021). A sizable number of deportees were ex-offenders who had saved their jail term. Another cohort of those forming part of the group are those Zimbabweans who did not have proper documentation or resided in South Africa illegally. Between December 2021 and January 2022, the South African government announced through the Department of Home Affairs that it had deported more than 11 000 Zimbabweans. They were trying to cross the border illegally without proper documentation. On 9 January 2022, *eNCA* reported that more than 89 000 Zimbabweans trying to cross the border into South Africa were arrested and deported (eNCA 2022).

Although support for immigration in Britain and South Africa is relatively strong and consistent, public perception and opinion towards refugees and immigrants is more fluid. For instance, in both countries, many citizens and other pressure groups raise concerns over the legitimacy of refugee claims and the status of the immigration of most foreign migrants within their borders. In South Africa, Britain and elsewhere, the public discourse around refugees centres around issues that link refugees and immigrants to security threats, ‘bogus claims’, and the abuse of social programs (Lawlor & Tolley 2017).

7 Western Media Framing of African Immigrants

Meanwhile, more recent empirical work has brought new perspectives on the framing of African immigrants in the European media. For instance, Lawlor and Tolley (2017) have examined the news media framing of immigrants and refugees in Canada. An automated content analysis of Canadian print media coverage over ten years was conducted to frame the immigrants and refugees in Canada. Lawlor and Tolley (2017) argued that there is a difference in how immigrants and refugees are framed. For these scholars, the difference stems from Canadians’ difference between economic immigrants and those who arrive on humanitarian grounds. Findings from this study revealed that ‘immigrants are framed in economic terms, while more emphasis is placed on the validity of

refugee claims, potential security threats and the degree the refugees take advantage of the social programs' (Lawlor & Tolley 2017:967).

A study which examines the linguistic and visual representation of Sub-Saharan immigrants in a sample of the Spanish press reveals that the presentation of the Sub-Saharan immigrants demonstrates the following characteristics: 'They are represented as vulnerable, lacking autonomy, and as victims' (Lirola 2014:495). Moreover, this study also found that the presentation of Sub-Saharan migrants in the Spanish press described the migrants as 'vulnerable and in need of help and support from the Spanish government'. Additionally, findings from this study also revealed that the press, in its reportage of sub-Sahara migrants, tended to homogenise them. To illustrate, Lirola (2014:495) argues that 'one of the outstanding characteristics of their representation is as being static, which contributes to their representation as passive; this implies that the main group of the population is active compared to them'.

Lirola's (2014) findings are consistent with findings from other studies. For instance, a group of scholars argue that the Western press tends to represent the negative side of immigration so that immigrants are represented in two main ways: on the one hand, they provoke fear (Granados 2002; Luque & Guirado 2003). They are a threat, as they are the people who invade 'our' country. However, on the other hand, they are represented as poor, as people experiencing difficulties, which provokes pity. For instance, in a study that examined the media presentation of migrants in Andalusia, Granados (2002) found that the media systematically ignored the information about 'the socio-historic causes that provoke migrations; moreover, instead of referring to the global dimension of immigration, the information that most frequently appears in the pieces of news is related to personal issues about the immigrants who arrive'.

Similarly, Sepulveda *et al.* (2008) conclude that Sub-Saharan Africa migrants are often represented in a way that is replete with prejudices. Navas *et al.* (2003:41) argue that the African migrant is presented asking for pity, solidarity or compassion. Kiwan (2009) revealed that 'Africans are portrayed as dangerously 'other', and thus their exclusion through racial or cultural discrimination in many areas of French life, such as employment and education, can be exacerbated'.

In a study outside migration, Chiluwa and Chiluwa (2020) investigated the Western media framing of the Nigerian herder-farmers conflict in the Western and local press. The data corpus for this study comprised online reports on the header-farmer conflicts published by the New York Times, the

Washington Post, and other local Nigerian newspapers. Findings from this study show that the construction of the subjects involved in the conflict was more sensational, divisive and dangerous. The foreign papers adopted a more objective approach. They often appeared to minimise the magnitude of the conflict and ‘construct the actions of the main actors from a perspective that would appeal only to foreign audiences’ (Chiluwa & Chiluwa 2020). Using a cross-national comparison, Dzileński (2017) examined how the different national news media frame migration to their audiences. The researchers examined online news publications from the USA, Germany, and Spain. Results from this study show that ‘national news media construct multiple frames of migration, maintain a significant international focus, and often emphasise their discontent with national governments’ handling of migration issues’ (Dzileński 2017:15). Findings from this study revealed that the frames used to report on the migrants were: ‘exclusion, inferiority, dirtiness, danger, crime, and helplessness’. Dzileński (2017) argues that the press framed the migrants in denigrating, hateful terms that portrayed immigrants negatively.

8 African Media Framing of Foreigners

Vanyoro (2021) examined the framing of migrant domestic workers in the context of labour rights in South Africa. From this study, Vanyoro found a dominance of ‘singular frames that conflate the issues around migrant domestic workers and their rights’, reducing them to rigid categories of either ‘international migrants’ or ‘domestic workers’. Moreover, the study also revealed that the framing of domestic migrant workers as international workers and not as workers like any other local domestic workers tends to generate ‘deep-seated xenophobic discourses about migrants in South Africa’s labour market which are compatible with a citizenship-based workers’ rights movement and “national chauvinism”’ (Vanyoro 2021). He concludes that framing migrant domestic workers as external or ‘other’ has allowed ‘trade unions and NGOs to use it to de-exceptionalise international migrants to appeal to a local constituency concerned about the economy being ‘overrun’ by international migrants’ (Vanyoro 2021:663). In a different study, Wahutu (2018) examines the media representation of the conflict in Darfur in the media in South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, and Rwanda. The study analysed 850 newspaper articles that were published between 2003 and 2008. It also included interviews with journalists in Kenya and South Africa. Findings from this study indicate that the press in

four countries used the same ‘ethnic conflict’ frame to report on the violence in Darfur. However, the ‘ethnic conflict’ frame was used differently in African media than in Western media. Wahutu (2018:44) concludes that ‘African journalists used the ethnic frame to domesticate the news and as a part of a specific political project to demarcate which actors should be understood as Other and with which actors’ audiences share an affinity’.

Studies by Danso and McDonald (2001), McDonald and Jacobs (2005), Nyamnjoh (2010) and Smith (2010) have paid attention to the press reportage of migration in some Southern African countries that include Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These studies illustrate that the media does not reflect what is happening in society but presents itself as an ‘interested’ actor in most cases. Additionally, studies by these scholars have concluded that the press in the Southern African region is generally xenophobic in how it frames and represents immigrants and refugees. Similarly, Moyo and Chiumbu (2020) argue that the press in the southern African region associates immigrants and refugees with ‘illegality, crime, job-stealing and other negative deeds’. To illustrate, Moyo and Chiumbu (2020:8) said, ‘Often these newspapers have used metaphors and visual imagery that frame immigrants in a negative manner, using terms such as “influx”, “illegals” and “swarming”’.

In South Africa, media reporting on immigration tends to be negative, with most news articles representing a negative and anti-immigration stance. Media coverage often falls into two clusters: anti-immigrant and non-analytical articles or pro-immigration and analytical pieces. She argues that ‘coverage tends to embolden negative stereotypes about migrants and contains little evidence of facts having been cross-checked. Instead, government statistics and numbers are regurgitated, be they true or not’ (Freeman 2020).

Freeman’s (2020) study also revealed that the media uses highly emotive language to describe immigration into South Africa. For example, the media was seen to use terms like ‘flooded’ or ‘overrun’ and often talked about ‘aliens’ or ‘illegal immigrants. Moyo and Chiumbu (2020) added weight to the assertion by Freeman (2020) when they revealed that most media reports on foreigners focused on crime and criminal activities by foreigners, presenting non-nationals as perpetrators of such.

9 Theoretical Underpinnings: Framing Theory

Framing theory has its pedigree in the works of Goffman (1974). It is perceived

as a conventional mass communication theory for investigating and understanding communication and communication-related behaviour. According to Goffman (1974:108), ‘People interpret what is going on around their world through their primary framework’. Often, this frame is regarded as primary because people always take it for granted. However, for Goffman (1974), people often use natural and social frameworks². Both these are crucial in influencing how people interpret news text.

Framing theory is a recurring theme in studies examining media reporting on migrants or foreigners worldwide (Dzilenski 2017). Entman (2007) describes framing as an ‘organising device that can assist journalists in presenting information in ways that give salience to some news and events over others’. For Entman (2007), framing as an organising device involves ‘selection and salience – to frame is to select some aspects of reality and make them more salient in a communicating text’. Drawing on Entman’s (2007) conceptualisation of framing, framing suggests that how a reporter or journalist frames issues can directly or indirectly affect the choices their audience or consumers make about processing the packaged information. To illustrate, framing theory examines how journalists and the news media focus on events or topics and place them within a field of meaning (Scheufele 2014:2012). Scholars have debated the relationship between framing theory and agenda-setting.

On the one hand, some argue that framing is an extension of agenda-setting. On the other hand, some scholars contend that framing is independent of agenda setting. Dzilenski (2017:14) made a clear distinction between the two concepts when he argued that ‘although closely tied to agenda-setting theory, which describes the creation of public awareness and concern of salient issues by the news media, framing theory goes beyond it by claiming that how news is presented creates a ‘frame’ for perceiving that information’.

To illustrate, in the process of news production, broadcasters, journalists, and reporters attach ‘frames’ (for easy interpretation) to the information they dispense to the public. They do this not only to inform the consumers of their text about what to think (agenda setting) but also to guide their audience on how to think about topics. D’Angelo *et al.* (2019) argue that when framing issues, journalism offers an interpretive framework that is embedded in the stories they communicate. These frameworks guide the reader in interpreting the text, the next course of action and the final judgment.

² Social frameworks view events as socially driven occurrences, due to the whims, goals, and manipulations on the part of other social players (people).

In framing research, a researcher must understand how to unpack patterns of frames in the news reports to classify and organise them (Moore 2008). For example, Pan and Kosicki (1993:53) categorised devices in the news into four clusters: ‘syntactical structure, script structure, thematic structure, and rhetorical structure, in which lexical choices are located’. Similarly, Entman (2007) notes that to comprehend the workings of frames, researchers ought to know how to locate and identify frames in text: ‘News frames are constructed from and embodied in keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and visual images emphasised in a news narrative. Frames can be detected by probing for particular words and visual images consistently appearing and conveying thematically consonant meanings across media and time. By repeating and reinforcing some words but not others, frames work to make some ideas more salient than others’ (Entman 2007:89).


Therefore, framing theory is appropriate for understanding how the press framed messages about the Zimbabwean immigrants in the context of the British deporting the Zimbabweans in July 2021. Furthermore, an enhanced understanding of the framing theory allows the researchers to analyse the news articles in this study. To ensure a rigorous analysis of the news articles, the researchers focused on the framing devices described by Entman (2007:163) – ‘keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and visual images’ – in a historical analysis of articles, editorials, and letters to editors to answer the proposed research questions. After conducting the framing analysis, the researchers perform a critical discourse analysis of the text that has been evoked.

10 Data, Methodology and Framework

Data for this study were retrieved from the electronic news articles of South African and British online press. In total, twelve national online news websites were used. Data from these articles were retrieved using framing analysis and critical discourse analysis simultaneously. When applied as a data collection instrument, framing analysis involves extracting repeated themes and communication text patterns. In this study, the researchers used framing analysis to search and retrieve ‘stereotypes, metaphors, actors, messages’, and other communication elements found in the media text. Moreso, the framing analysis was used to investigate how important these factors are and how and why the journalist chooses them in news production. All news about Zimbabwean migrants’ deportation was gathered and collected from 01 July

2021 to 31 December 2021. A total of 120 news articles were retrieved from the UK press. An additional 92 were analysed from the South African online press.

Figure 1: Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis Model (1989)



It is important to state that the data collection and analysis processes overlapped in this study. While collecting the data using the framing analysis, the researcher also evoked a Critical Discourse Analysis (hereafter referred to as CDA) to analyse the recurring and dominant themes. CDA focuses on the analysis of language in society. It, therefore, pays attention to the discursive representation of social reality, intending to deconstruct messages to observe the presence of power and inequality in the text under analysis. Fairclough's CDA three-dimensional framework (see Figure 1 above) informed the analysis of this study. Fairclough's (1989; 1995; 2013) model for CDA consists of three interrelated processes of analysis tied to three interrelated dimensions of discourse. These three dimensions are:

- The object of analysis (including verbal, visual or verbal and visual texts);

- The processes through which the object is produced and received (writing/ speaking/ designing and reading/ listening/ viewing) by human subjects; and
- The socio-historical conditions govern these processes.

According to Fairclough (1989; 2013), each of these dimensions requires a different kind of analysis:

- text analysis (description);
- processing analysis (interpretation); and
- social analysis (explanation).

Paying attention to these different kinds of analysis, CDA was useful because it enabled the researchers to focus on the signifiers that structured and made up the text, the specific linguistic selections, their juxtapositioning, the text sequencing, and the text layout (Janks 1997). Furthermore, the researchers must ‘recognise the historical determination of these selections and understand that these choices are tied to the conditions of possibility of that utterance’ (Janks 1997:329). It is another way of saying that texts are instantiations of socially regulated discourses and that the processes of production and reception are socially constrained (Fairclough 1995:98).

11 Findings

The findings in the section below were drawn from 212 news articles the researchers reviewed. Unfortunately, due to the humongous amount of data obtained during this process, the researchers could not include all the extracts from all the news articles. Therefore, only a few were presented in this section for illustration purposes.

11.1 Frames in the British Press Describing the Deportation

In this section, findings that emerged from the British press pertaining to the deportation of Zimbabwean immigrants are presented and analysed.

11.1.1 The ‘Exclusion’ Frames

The ‘exclusion’ frame conceptualised the notion that the Zimbabwean deportees

did not deserve British citizenship. Accordingly, it was emphasised in the press that these Zimbabweans must be sent back and deported to their country. The common words and phrases that were identified in support of the ‘exclusion’ frame are ‘removing’, ‘excluded’, ‘sent back to the home country’, ‘immigrants must be deported’, ‘return to the home country’, and ‘forced to return home’. Moreover, to support the idea that the press emphasised that the Zimbabwean migrants did not deserve to be in Britain, the following excerpts retrieved from the press are highlighted:

We make no apology for seeking to protect the public by removing serious, violent, and persistent foreign national offenders. We have removed more than 700 criminals this year, with a combined sentence of more than 1,500 years in prison (The Guardian 2021).

The first batch of dozens of Zimbabweans deported from the UK landed in the southern African country. Some had been in the UK for decades and were forced to leave their families behind to begin an uncertain future in their country of origin (The Guardian 2021).

Those affected are involuntary returnees who have exhausted the administrative and legal procedures and have lost the legal right to remain in that country (TRTWorld 2021).

Based on the above, it can be concluded that much of the reports centred around the theme of ‘exclusion’. The term exclusion was mentioned in some press that stated that ‘Zimbabwean migrants face exclusion from the UK’. In addition, the press highlighted the idea that the Zimbabwean migrants had lost and exhausted all legal options to remain in Britain. As such, they must be excluded from the UK.

11.1.2 The ‘Criminality’ Frame

The use of the ‘criminality’ frame is important to note, particularly when it comes to issues of migration and immigration. The British press emphasised the term ‘criminals’. The deported Zimbabweans were described as criminals who had served their jail terms. A British online press (TRT WORLD 2021) had a headline that said, ‘Zimbabweans committed murder, rape and other despicable

crimes’. In some press, the increased crime in Britain was blamed on Zimbabweans. Across the newspapers, we identified various descriptions that implied crime, such as ‘criminal offence, rapist, murderous’ – all this implied guilt on the part of the immigrants. The issues of guilt were emphasised in almost all press. It was clear that these deportees ‘were guilty’ of various offences. Below are some examples to support the point presented above.

Zimbabweans committed murder, rape and other despicable crimes (TRTWORLD 2021).

One man has convictions for fraud and driving offences and has been in the UK since 2005 (The Guardian 2021).

We make no apology for seeking to protect the public by removing serious, violent and persistent foreign national offenders. We have removed more than 700 criminals this year, with a combined sentence of more than 1,500 years in prison (The Guardian, 2021)

The UK Home Secretary Priti Patel believes the Zimbabweans committed murder, rape and other despicable crimes (The Citizen 2021).

Those deported and those awaiting deportation were convicted of committing crimes in Britain. They argue that the UK has a right to deport foreigners who commit crimes after they serve their sentences (TRTWORLD 2021).

The evidence above suggests that the press was unrelenting in framing Zimbabwean migrants as criminals. This type of framing was seen in how the media used various descriptors suggestive of criminality.

11.1.3 ‘Helplessness’ Frame

The ‘helpless’ frame was prominent in many British sampled articles. At face value, the articles that carried this theme seemed concerned with the deported Zimbabweans’ welfare when they arrived in Zimbabwe. However, the press provided positive coverage by highlighting efforts made by certain rights

groups and authorities to prevent deportations. These reports revealed that some British lawmakers expressed concern for the welfare of the deported migrants. Below are some examples of how the press carried on presenting concerns about the welfare of the migrants.

Many migrants will struggle when they arrive in Zimbabwe owing to the deteriorating political and economic situation in the country (The Citizen 2021).

Several Zimbabwean detainees at Colnbrook immigration removal centre near Heathrow said they were terrified of being forcibly returned to their home country (The Guardian 2021).

Seventy-five British politicians have written to home secretary Priti Patel asking her to stop the deportations of the Zimbabwean nationals citing the deteriorating political and humanitarian situation in the southern African country (The Citizen 2021).

Dad-of-two locked up and set for deportation after nearly 20 years in Britain. A family is desperate to stop a beloved father-of-two from being kicked out of the UK. But hope is fading for Kuranga, who has lived in Leeds for 18 years and faces being sent to Zimbabwe (The Mirror 2021).

However, on the other hand, a careful analysis of articles that ran the ‘helplessness’ theme suggests that instead of being concerned with the welfare of the migrants, the press instead presented the deported migrants as ‘helpless’ people whose situation is unknown when they arrive in Zimbabwe. To illustrate, in most stories that did not sound derogatory, the impression that was presented about the Zimbabwean migrants is that they were ‘helpless’, ‘pitiful’, ‘terrified of being forcibly returned to their home country’, ‘alone’, ‘exposed’, ‘desperate’ and ‘suffer’. For instance, a story about *The Guardian* (2021) exemplified all these descriptors.

The Guardian reported on 18 July 2021 on the people that were being deported as people who were ‘helpless’. It said:

Plans for the UK Home Office’s first mass deportation flight to Zim-

babwe have been criticised as ‘a grubby operation’ that risks ‘delivering democracy activists to political persecution’ (The Guardian 2021).

Although the above statement seems neutral and suggests that the press was empathetic with the plight of those activists who were to be deported, the phrase ‘*risks delivering democracy activists to political persecution*’ (The Guardian 2021) suggests that the activists who were part of the people to be deported were helpless individuals who needed to be pardoned. From the same reports, other extracts that support the idea that the Zimbabweans were presented as helpless are listed below:

Those affected are involuntary returnees who have exhausted the administrative and legal procedures and have lost the legal right to remain in that country (The Guardian 2021).

One client who came to the UK feeling political persecution told us they fear for their life if deported (The Guardian 2021).

Words and descriptors suggesting helplessness were also rampant in other press, like ‘*uncertain future*’ and ‘*Britain rejected many Zimbabweans whose bids for asylum also face deportation*’ (TRTWorld 2021). In *The Mirror*, it was said:

A family is in a desperate last bid to stop the eviction of a father (The Mirror 2021).

The *BBC News* (2021) reports:

Zimbabwean with football dreams to be kicked out of UK.

All these demonstrate that the press framed the deported migrants as people in a state of helplessness.

11.2 South African Media Framing of Zimbabwean Migrants

11.2.1 The ‘Inferiority’ Frame

Just like the British media presented Zimbabweans as ‘inferior’, similar themes that suggest that Zimbabweans are inferior were also evident in most news

articles in South Africa. For instance, the sampled press was replete with phrases that referred to Zimbabweans as ‘border jumpers’, ‘domestic workers’, ‘smuggled’, and undocumented’. Using such terms and descriptors when reporting on the Zimbabweans, the press reduced the said individuals to an inferior position. To illustrate, ‘border jumper’ is a term that describes a person who is a non-citizen and does not fit in the social strata of the host country – additionally, telling most Zimbabweans as ‘domestic workers’ places them at an inferior level. To illustrate, migrant ‘domestic workers’ are some of the least paid in South Africa and occupy the lowest rank in the South African labour force. Some of the examples drawn from the news articles are listed below:

Zimbabweans are found across South Africa, working particularly in the hospitality, retail and service sectors and as domestic workers (Eyewitness 2021).

The South African Department of Home Affairs, SAPS and SADF have purportedly set up an enormous barrier between Hammanskraal and Kranshop in anticipation of the mass deportation of undocumented Zimbabweans (Opera News 2022).

89,000 border jumpers arrested, deported (eNCA 2022).

Using terms like ‘border jumpers’, ‘undocumented’, and ‘illegal’ to describe these persons is nothing less than a means of belittling them. It strips them away from their humanity and relegates them to animals who do not respect boundaries but instead prefer to ‘jump’ the borders. It is important to note that some people are constantly referred to in derogatory terms. For example, the people who migrate from Zimbabwe to neighbouring countries comprise professionals and educated people. Therefore, it is an unjust representation of all Zimbabweans as illegal criminals, as seen in the data. This assertion is supported by evidence from Moyo and Chiumbu (2020), who argue that many Zimbabwean migrants are professionals in their own right. Moreover, various factors, such as unstable political and economic conditions, trigger their movement to neighbouring countries.

11.2.2 The ‘Criminality’ Frame

The ‘criminal’ frame is crisscrossed with articles about immigrant ‘border jum-

pers’ as a common practice Zimbabwean undocumented do when they want to cross the borders into South Africa. The phrase ‘border jumpers’ carries the connotation of unlawfulness, and the press uses this derogatory term to portray migrants as objects rather than persons. ‘Border jumpers’ and ‘undocumented migrants’ also present migrants as victims of the immigration process and business. Moreover, in the sampled articles from South Africa, there was repeated use of terms that point to the fact that the deported immigrants were ‘criminals’, ‘illegal’, and undeserving of remaining in South Africa because they have committed various crimes. To illustrate, phrases, words and descriptors that were dominant in the articles were: ‘undocumented’, ‘ex-convicts’, ‘murderers’, ‘rapist’, and ‘criminals’. Using such terms points to the fact that the deported Zimbabwean migrants were nothing short of criminals who should be deported by all means possible. Some extracts from the news articles sampled from South Africa are listed below:

The majority [of Zimbabweans] are undocumented and do not hold a permit (BusinessTech 2021).

Seven ex-convicts who completed sentences in South African jails were deported yesterday via Beitbridge along with 213 other people who had been arrested for violating Pretoria’s immigration laws (Eyewitness 2021).

A record 220 individuals – comprising several criminals, overstayers and undocumented individuals – were dispatched from the Lindela Detention Centre in Johannesburg (Times Live 2021).

11.2.3 The ‘Exclusion’ Frames

Often, in the immigration discourse, the theme of exclusion refers to the notion that the local citizens feel that the immigrants do not belong and, therefore, must be excluded and sent back to their country. The ‘exclusion’ also means that the immigrants do not deserve resources in the host country. These meanings were identified in the sampled articles. For instance, the press’s dominant ideas under this theme were that the Zimbabwean migrants do not belong and must be sent back home. This attitude was reflected in descriptors and phrases like ‘back home’, ‘home country’, ‘taking jobs’, and ‘fleeing their country’. Put together,

these descriptors suggest that the migrant Zimbabweans who ‘flee their homes’ are here to ‘take our jobs’ that they do not deserve and must be ‘sent back’ to their ‘home country’. In a *BusinessTech* report (2021), the reporters accused the Zimbabweans of flocking to South Africa and taking away the jobs that belonged to South Africans. Under the exclusion theme, another central idea in the press is that the host countries have every right to deport Zimbabwean immigrants.

Similarly, *The Herald* reported that ‘any country in the world has a right to deport any foreigner from its country’ (*The Herald* 2021). The fact that the host country has a right to expel a person, as recorded here, also brings to light the idea that the host country can exclude certain migrants when they wish to. Some of the examples to illustrate the two points made above are listed below:

Zimbabweans continue to trek to the neighbouring country in search of jobs as the economic problems back home continue to intensify while others run away from political persecution (The Citizen 2021).

South Africa jettisoned a plan that would have forced about 200,000 Zimbabweans to return home (BusinessTech 2021).

South Africa has been plagued by recurrent bouts of xenophobic violence since at least 2008, with foreigners often accused of taking jobs in a country where a third of the workforce is unemployed (BusinessTech 2021).

Since the turn of the century, Zimbabweans have fled their country as economic and political refugees destined for SA and Botswana (BusinessTech 2021).

12 Description and Implications of Theory

This research examined the British and South African media framing of Zimbabwean immigrants in the deportation of 50 Zimbabwean immigrants from Britain in July 2021. Our findings suggest a huge similarity in how the British and South African press participate in the immigrant discourse. The similarity in the analysed articles between the frames and words and descriptors

supports this assertion. Furthermore, most of the frames evoked negative sentiments about immigrants that are seen elsewhere around the globe. A possible explanation of the similarity of the frames and descriptors used to describe Zimbabwean immigrants is that the press's discursive processes are directly or indirectly influenced by the dominant discourse in the sphere of their construction (Chambwera 2016; Muringa 2019). For instance, Fairclough (2013) argues that text producers and interpreters draw on the socially available resources that constitute the order of discourse. Our findings, when interpreted considering Fairclough's (1992; 1989; 2013) assertion above, tempt one to conclude that the frames used by the press were dependent, constituted by the discursive events obtained in both Britain and South Africa and heavily influenced them.

Furthermore, the above assertion adds weight to the conclusions made by Wahutu (2018). In examining the African media framing of the Darfur conflict, Wahutu revealed that the African press used the same frame when covering the Darfur conflict. To illustrate, the study shows how journalists and their media organisations internalise narratives that are used to talk about events such as the atrocities in Darfur. The dominance of these frames is logical within the context of the limited framing repertoires faced by journalists, as illustrated by Savelsberg and King (2005). They posit that narrative genres and frames are often restricted, constricting how much journalists can be innovative in their coverage of atrocities.

The framing patterns relevant in the news articles were those of omission and repetition. It was evident that the journalist emphasised and placed salience on those negative aspects of the topic while omitting certain aspects that may lead to a positive interpretation of the news by its audience (Entman 2007; Goffman 1974). These patterns were crucial in framing Zimbabwean migrants in that they reflected patterns of 'nativism because these frames foster anti-immigrant, xenophobic, racist ideology, the core concepts of nativism' (Moore 2008:113). The themes that emerged from this study's analysis are consistent with themes found in Moore (2008), e.g. the study found that the press reinforced nativism sentiments by framing immigrants in a negative light.

Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. First, our findings that the media framed Zimbabwean migrants as 'criminals' who 'must be deported' by all means possible are supported by studies conducted elsewhere. For instance, Moore (2008) found that the USA, German and Spanish press was unapologetic in portraying immigrants as 'criminals'. The immigrants were presented as the most criminally minded in the media for this scholar. The

common descriptors used to describe immigrants in the above-stated press included ‘suspect’, ‘suspicious’, ‘escaped’, ‘sneaky’, ‘underhanded’, ‘fugitive’, and ‘on the loose’. Furthermore, in another study, Jancsics (2021:26) supports the argument that the press in host countries often portrays immigrants in a negative light when they argue that ‘most papers associated the immigrants with the drug dealing and illegal dealings’.

The findings that the media frame the Zimbabweans as ‘inferior’ is discussed elsewhere in other studies. For instance, Moore’s (2008) study in the USA, Spain and Germany revealed that the ‘inferiority’ frame was evident in describing all ethnic groups, including Asians, Russian Jews, Italians, and Mexicans. To illustrate, the press used metaphors such as ‘scourge’ and ‘swarm’ to portray Russian-Jewish groups as inferior. Additionally, Moore’s study found that ‘Asians and Mexican immigrants were viewed as nothing more than cheap labourers for USA business, and the terms for Asians were particularly hateful’ (Moore 2008:82). Moore’s findings, conducted outside the scope of our study, support our findings that the immigrants are often framed as inferior by media in the host countries.

Our study also revealed that the immigrants were treated as the ‘other’. The press emphasised that the migrants should be returned to their home countries. For instance, in the British press, there was an emphasis on the fact that immigrants do not have any right to be in Britain. That is, they do not belong. On the other hand, in the South African context, the emphasis was on the idea that the immigrants were ‘taking jobs’ belonging to local South Africans. The issues of ‘othering’ immigrants were also evident in the South African presses when they repeated the idea that ‘immigrants must be sent back home’ or ‘are fleeing their home countries’.

The discussion above points to the fact that both the British and South African press evoke the discourse of ‘others’ and ‘we-they’ in their reporting of Zimbabwean migrants. These findings are consistent with findings from other studies. For instance, Arcimaviciene and Baglama (2018) found that the US and European Union media ‘narratives both delegitimise and stigmatise the status of a migrant by deeper entrenching the ‘outsider’ stereotype and, therefore, create the general feeling of instability and intolerance within the EU’. This research shows that ‘othering’ was rampant in South African and British news articles. The othering is an established construct in the rhetorical narrative surrounding hate speech, and the ‘we - they’ dichotomy has long been identified in racist discourse.

13 Conclusion

This investigation aimed to assess British and South African online press framing on the deportation of Zimbabwean immigrants between July 2021 and January 2022. It has shown that the British and South African press applied similar frames in reporting the deportation of Zimbabwean immigrants from South Africa and Britain. Our findings also revealed that the press uses frames that were embedded in negativity to dehumanise and paint a bad picture of the deported immigrants. Among the frames evoked by the press are ‘exclusion’, ‘criminality’, and ‘helplessness’. These findings suggest that the media framing of immigrants is generally negative and consistent with historical and current prevailing discourse during news production. This chapter has provided a deeper insight into the uniformity among news producers regarding immigration discourse. However, this research was limited by the absence of quantitative data and interviews with the journalists who were the key participants in producing the frames used to describe the Zimbabwean immigrants. Notwithstanding these limitations, the study suggests that the press is a key participant in the ‘othering’ of migrants, which is often evident in most news articles. More broadly, research is needed to determine possible solutions to address immigrants’ ever-increasing ‘othering’ in the African and Western press.

References

- Adeyemi, R.A., A. Joel, J.T. Ebenezer & E.Y. Attah 2018. The Effect of Brain Drain on the Economic Development of Developing Countries: Evidence from Selected African Countries. *Journal of Health and Social Issues* 7, 2: 66 - 76.
- Arcimaviciene, L. & S.H. Baglama 2018. Migration, Metaphor and Myth in Media Representations: The Ideological Dichotomy of ‘Them’ and ‘US’. *Sage Open* 8, 2. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244018768657> (Accessed on 25 March 2023.)
- BBC News 2021. *Zimbabwean with Football Dreams to be Kicked out of UK*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57917683> (Accessed on 28 July 2021.)
- Bhebe, S. & M. Ngoepe 2021. Political and Socio-Economic Dynamics on the Access to Oral Sources at National Archives in Zimbabwe and South

- Africa. *Collections: A Journal for Museum and Archives Professionals* 18, 2: 176 - 201.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/15501906211052716>
- BusinessTech, 13 December 2021. South Africa Reverses Plan to Send 200,000 Zimbabweans Home. Available at:
<https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/546524/south-africa-reverses-plan-to-send-200000-zimbabweans-home/>
(Accessed on 13 December 2022.)
- Chambwera, C. 2016. *Legitimising or De-legitimising Political Leaders? The Herald and the Daily News Framing of Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai's Political Leadership post-31 July 2013 Harmonised Elections*. Unpublished Master's dissertation. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.
- Chiluwa, I. & I.M. Chiluwa 2020. Separatists or Terrorists? Jews or Nigerians? Media and Cyber Discourses on the Complex Identity of the 'Biafrans'. *Journal of Language and Politics* 19, 4: 583 - 603.
<https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.19041.chi>
- D'Angelo, P., J. Lule, W.R. Neuman, L. Rodriguez, D.V. Dimitrova & K.M. Carragee 2019. Beyond Framing: A Forum for Framing Researchers. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 96, 1: 12 - 30.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699018825004>
- Danso, R. & D. McDonald 2001. Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the Print Media in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Africa Today* 48, 3: 114 - 137.
<https://doi.org/10.2979/AFT.2001.48.3.114>
- Durrheim, K. & A.J. Murray 2021. Social Justice and The Persistence of Racialised Segregation. In Elcheroth, G. & N. de Mel (eds.): *In the Shadow of Transitional Justice: Cross-national Perspectives on the Transformative Potential of Remembrance*. Philadelphia: Routledge.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003167280-7>
- Dzilenski, E. 2017. Crossing the Border: The Framing of Global Migration by National News Media. *Elon Journal of Undergraduate Research in Communications* 8,1: 14 - 22.
- Eberl, J.M., C.E. Meltzer, T. Heidenreich, B. Herrero, N. Theorin, F. Lind & J. Strömbäck 2018. The European Media Discourse on Immigration and Its Effects: A Literature Review. *Annals of the International Communication Association* 42, 3: 207 - 223.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2018.1497452>

- eNCA 2022. *Zimbabwean Boarder / 89 000 Boarder Jumpers Arrested, Deported*. eNCA, 09 January 2022. Available at: <https://www.enca.com/news/zimbabwe-border-89000-border-jumpers-arrested-deported> (Accessed on 21 November 2022.)
- Entman, R.M. 2007. Framing Bias: Media in The Distribution of Power. *Journal of Communication* 57, 1: 63 - 173. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00336.x>
- Eyewitness 2021. South Africa not Extending Permits for 250,000 Zimbabweans. *Eyewitness* 08 December 2021. Available at: <https://ewn.co.za/2021/11/25/south-africa-not-extending-permits-for-250-000-zimbabweans> (Accessed on 21 November 2022.)
- Fairclough, N. 1989. *Language and Power*. London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. 1992. Intertextuality in Critical Discourse Analysis. *Linguistics and Education* 4, 3-4: 269 - 293. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0898-5898\(92\)90004-G](https://doi.org/10.1016/0898-5898(92)90004-G)
- Fairclough, N. 1995. *Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. 2013. *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. Philadelphia: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315834368>
- Farris, E.M. & H. Silber Mohamed 2018. Picturing Immigration: How the Media Criminalizes Immigrants. *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 6, 4: 814 – 824. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1484375>
- Freeman, L. 2020. Defying Empirical and Causal Evidence: Busting the Media's Myth of Afrophobia in South Africa. In Moyo, D. & S. Mpofu (ed.): *Mediating Xenophobia in Africa: Unpacking Discourses of Migration, Belonging and Othering*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61236-8_2 PMCID:PMC7076959
- Goffman, E. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. https://urup.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Erving_Goffman_Bennett_Berger_Frame_Analysis_BookFi.pdf
- Jancsics, D. 2021. Law Enforcement Corruption along the US Borders. *Security Journal* 34, 1: 26 - 46. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-019-00203-8>
- Janks, H. 1997. Critical Discourse Analysis as a Research Tool. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 18,3: 329 - 342. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0159630970180302>

- Kariithi, N. 2017. *Media Portrayal of Immigration in the South African Media, 2011 - 2015. The Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa-SIHMA*. Working Paper June 2017. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319465176_Media_Portrayal_of_Immigration_in_the_South_African_Media_2011-2015 (Accessed on 18 June 2023.)
- Kiwan, D. 2009. Civil Society, Democracy and Education. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice* 4, 2:83-86. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197909103925>
- Lancee, B. 2021. Ethnic Discrimination in Hiring: Comparing Groups across Contexts. Results from a Cross-National Field Experiment. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47, 6: 1181 - 1200. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1622744>
- Lawlor, A. & E. Tolley 2017. Deciding Who's Legitimate: News Media Framing of Immigrants and Refugees. *International Journal of Communication* 11, 25.
- Lirola, M.M. (ed.). 2014. *Discourses on Immigration in Times of Economic Crisis: A Critical Perspective*. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Luque, M.N. & I.C. Guirado 2003. Actitudes Hacia Gitanos E Inmigrantes Africanos: Un Estudio Comparativo. *Apuntes De Psicología* 30, 1 - 3: 383 - 395. Available at: <https://www.apuntesdepsicologia.es/index.php/revista/article/view/420> (Accessed on 25 March 2023.)
- Madzimore, J. 2021. Zimbabwe: British Government Depots 50 Zimbabweans. *The Herald* 18 July 2021. Available at: <https://allafrica.com/stories/202107210374.html> (Accessed on 17 January 2021.)
- Martínez, A.G. 2002. Es Virtual La Realidad De La Inmigración?: La Construcción Mediática De La Inmigración Extranjera En España. *La Inmigración En España: Contextos Y Alternativas* 2: 437 - 448. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4321854>
- McDonald, D.A. & S. Jacobs 2005. (Re)Writing Xenophobia: Understanding Press Coverage of Cross-Border Migration in South Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 23, 3: 295 - 325. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589000500274050>
- Mhlanga, D. & E. Ndhlovu 2021. Socio-economic and Political Challenges in

- Zimbabwe and the Development Implications for Southern Africa. *Journal of African Foreign Affairs* 8, 2: 75 - 98. <https://doi.org/10.31920/2056-5658/2021/v8n2a5>
- Mlambo, D.N. & V.H. Mlambo 2021. To What Cost to its Continental Hegemonic Standpoint: Making Sense of South Africa's Xenophobia Conundrum Post Democratization. *Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies* 8, 2: 347 - 361. <https://doi.org/10.29333/ejecs/696>
- Mlambo, V.H. & T.C. Adetiba 2019. Brain Drains and South Africa's Socioeconomic Development: The Waves and Its Effects. *Journal of Public Affairs* 19, 4: 1942. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1942>
- Monjane, B.E. 2021. *Rural Struggles and Emancipation in Southern Africa: Agrarian Neoliberalism, Rural Politics and Agrarian Movements in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe*. PhD thesis. Universidade de Coimbra.
- Moore, H. 2008. *Contagion from Abroad: US Press Framing of Immigrants and Epidemics, 1891 – 1893*. PhD Thesis. Georgia State University. Available at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/communication_theses/42 (Accessed on 21 November 2022.)
- Moore, K., B. Gross & T.R. Threadgold 2012. *Migrations and the Media*. Number 6. New York, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Available at: <https://www.peterlang.com/document/1143780> (Accessed on 25 March 2023.)
- Moyo, D. & S.H. Chiumbu 2020. Talk Radio and the Mediation of Xenophobic Violence in South Africa. In Moyo, D. & S. Mpfu (eds.): *Unpacking Discourses of Migration, Belonging and Othering*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61236-8_2
PMCID:PMC7076959
- Muringa, T.P. 2019. *News Covering in the Online Press Media during the ANC Elective Conference of December 2017*. PhD Thesis. Available at: <https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/18727>
(Accessed on 25 March 2023.)
- National Statistics UK, 25 November 2021. *Immigration Statistics, Year Ending September 2021*. GOV.UK. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-september-2021> (Accessed on 13 December 2022.)
- Nava, S., G. Carbone, N. DiBattista, A. Bellone, P. Baiardi, R. Cosentini & P. Groff 2003. Noninvasive Ventilation in Cardiogenic Pulmonary Edema: A

- Multicenter Randomized Trial. *American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine* 168, 12: 1432 - 1437.
<https://doi.org/10.1164/rccm.200211-1270OC> PMID:12958051
- Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2006. *Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa*. Dakar: CODESRIA Books and Zed Books. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350220775>
- Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2010. Racism, Ethnicity and the Media in Africa: Reflections Inspired by Studies of Xenophobia in Cameroon and South Africa. *Africa Spectrum* 45, 1: 57 - 93.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/000203971004500103>
- Nyathi, K. 2021. Zimbabwe: UK to Start Mass Deportation of Zimbabweans. *Daily Nation* 20 July. Available at:
<https://allafrica.com/stories/202107210049.html>
(Accessed on 21 November 2022.)
- Ogan, C., R. Pennington, O. Venger & D. Metz 2018. Who Drove the Discourse? News Coverage and Policy Framing of Immigrants and Refugees in the 2016 US Presidential Election. *Communications* 43, 3: 357 - 378. <https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2018-0014>
- OperaNews 2022. *WATCH: South Africa Departs Zimbabweans*. Available at:
<https://za.opera.news/za/en/politics/b9e734d62cab911f3c3e74a7d7afd164>
(Accessed on 21 November 2022.)
- Pan, Z. & G.M. Kosicki 1993. Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse. *Political Communication* 10, 1: 55 - 75.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.1993.9962963>
- Pillay, S., M. Duncan & P.J. de Vries 2021. Autism in the Western Cape Province of South Africa: Rates, Socio-Demographics, Disability and Educational Characteristics in one Million School Children. *Autism* 25, 4 : 1076 - 1089. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361320978042> PMID:33334147
- Plaatjie, S.R. & M. Mogashoa 2021. South Africa and Xenophobia: Coalescence of ‘Myths’ and Coloniality. In Mafukata, M.A. (ed.): *Impact of Immigration and Xenophobia on Development in Africa*. New York: IGI Global. <https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-7099-9.ch003>
- Pratsinakis, M. 2019. Family-Related Migration and the Crisis-Driven Outflow from Greece. In Panagiotopoulou J., L. Rosen, C. Kirsch, A. Chatzidaki (eds.): *‘New’ Migration of Families from Greece to Europe and Canada*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25521-3_2

- Reliefweb 2021. *South Africa Reckons with Its Status as a Top Immigration Destination, Apartheid History, and Economic Challenges*. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-africa/south-africa-reckons-its-status-top-immigration-destination-apartheid-history> (Accessed on 25 March 2023.)
- Robinson, K. 2020. A ‘Good News’ Story of Social Inclusion: Refugee Resettlement in Australia. In Robinson, K. (ed.): *Sustaining Social Inclusion*. Philadelphia: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429397936-21> PMCID:PMC8264858
- Savelsberg, J.J. & R.D. King 2005. Institutionalizing Collective Memories of Hate: Law and Law Enforcement in Germany and the United States. *American Journal of Sociology* 111,2: 579 – 616. <https://doi.org/10.1086/432779>
- Scheufele, D.A. 2014. Science Communication as Political Communication. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 111, 4: 13585 - 13592. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1317516111> PMID:25225389 PMCID:PMC4183176
- Sepulveda, L., S. Syrett & F. Lyon 2008. New Ethnic Minority Business Communities in Britain: Challenges of Diversity and Informality for the UK Business and Policy Frameworks. *Working Paper Series*, No 1, Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC), Middlesex University.
- Sion, L. 2014. Boundaries Crossing and Blurring: The Case of Tali Fahima. *Current Sociology* 62, 3: 431 - 448. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392113518780>
- Smith, M.J. 2010. *Synthesis Report: The Media’s Coverage of Xenophobia and the Xenophobic Violence Prior to and Including May 2008*. Available at: https://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/7_Media_c.pdf (Accessed on 12 February 2020.)
- Statistics South Africa 2021. *Mid-Year Population Estimates: 2021*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Available at: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022021.pdf> (Accessed on 12 December 2022.)
- The Citizen* 2021. U.K. to Start Mass Deportation of Zimbabweans. *The Citizen*, 18 July 2021. Available at: <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/uk-to-start-mass-deportation-of-zimbabweans-3479648> (Accessed on 21 November 2021.)

- The Citizen* 2021. South Africa Refuses to Renew Permits for 200 000 Zimbabweans. *The Citizen* 26 November 2021. Available at: <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/south-africa-refuses-to-renew-permits-for-200-000-zimbabweans-3632108> (Accessed on 26 November 2021.)
- The Guardian* 2021. U.K. Home Office's Mass Deportation Flight Plan Criticised as 'Grubby'. *The Guardian* 18 July 2021. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jul/18/uk-home-office-mass-deportation-flight-zimbabwe-plan-criticised-as-grubby> (Accessed on 21 November 2021.)
- The Herald* 2021. Zimbabwe: SA Departs Seven Ex-Convicts. Available at: <https://allafrica.com/stories/202107090537.html> (Accessed on 21 November 2022.)
- The Herald* 2021. Zimbabwe: UK Departs Zimbabwean Ex-Convicts. *The Herald*, 21 July 2021. Available at: <https://allafrica.com/stories/202107210213.html> (Accessed on 21 November 2022.)
- The Mirror* 2021. Dad-of-Two Locked Up and Set for Deportation after Nearly 20 Years in Britain. *The Mirror* 18 July 2021. Available at: <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/family-devastated-dad-set-deportation-24581652> (Accessed on 21 November 2022.)
- Times Live* 2021. 220 Zimbabweans Deported through Beitbridge in One Day: Consul-General. *Times Live* 08 July 2021. Available at: <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2021-07-08-220-zimbabweans-deported-through-beitbridge-in-one-day-consul-general/> (Accessed on 21 November 2021.)
- TRT WORLD* 2021. U.K. Departs Zimbabweans as 'Draconian' Laws Go into Effect. *TRT WORLD* 23 July 2021. Available at: <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/uk-deports-zimbabweans-as-draconian-laws-go-into-effect-48613> (Accessed on 21 November 2022.)
- Umejei, A.L. 2021. *The Osun Osogbo Festival in Nigeria: An Investigation of Nigerian Migrants in South Africa as Homebound Tourists and Festival Participants*. PhD thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal. Available at: <https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/20021> (Accessed on 25 March 2023.)
- Valentino, N.A., S.N. Soroka, S. Iyengar, T. Aalberg, R. Duch, M. Fraile, K.S. Hahn, K.M. Hansen, A. Harell, M. Helbling & S.D. Jackman 2019.

- Economic and Cultural Drivers of Immigrant Support Worldwide. *British Journal of Political Science* 49, 4: 1201 - 1226.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341700031X>
- Van Dijk, T.A. 2009. *Society and Discourse: How Social Contexts Influence Text and Talk*. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511575273>
- Vanyoro, K. 2021. Activism for Migrant Domestic Workers in South Africa: Tensions in the Framing of Labour Rights. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 47, 4: 663 - 681.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2020.1862611>
- Viladrich, A. 2019. We Cannot Let them Die: Undocumented Immigrants and Media Framing of Health Deservingness in the United States. *Qualitative Health Research* 29, 10: 1447 - 1460.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732319830426> PMID:30907224
- Wahutu, J.S. 2018. Representations of Africa in African Media: The Case of the Darfur Violence. *African Affairs* 117, 466: 44 - 61.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adx039>

Ms. Moipone Mamahlomola Nkhatho
M&G Research
moiponepsych@gmail.com

Dr. Tigere Paidamoyo Muringa
University of the Free State
tigerem589@gmail.com

Mr. Gilbert Zvaita
Durban University of Technology
gilbert.ramah@gmail.com

SECTION IV

**BRAIN DRAIN AND
SKILLS TRANSFER**

CHAPTER 11

Multi-sectoral Collaboration: A Proposed Means of Mitigating Medical Brain Drain in South Africa

Haseena Majid

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1618-9699>

Ganzamungu Zihindula

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9865-4672>

Abstract

Medical brain drain is an ongoing phenomenon in low and middle-income countries (LMICs), of which South Africa (SA) is no exception. This movement within the human resources for health has a far-reaching socio-economic impact. It is attributed to better economic, working and living conditions offered by opportunities in the private sector and abroad. In SA, this movement has considerably impacted the sustainability of the public healthcare system and its increasing burden due to high poverty levels. Reports monitoring the inflow of foreign-trained and returning South African doctors are lacking. This research was conducted to ascertain gaps in addressing the medical brain drain in SA to identify potential opportunities to mitigate the impacts of the brain drain through retention strategies and innovative strategies to create a sustainable medical labour force within the country. It was desktop-based research conducted using content analysis. A total of 128 relevant documents were retrieved, but only 14 articles, policy documents, and reports met the inclusion and analysis criteria. The results indicated that the number of doctors leaving the country continues to outweigh the number entering the country. Innovative solutions to retain doctors are lacking, and policy implementation is low. Despite the increased number of students being trained, the doctor-patient ratio remains low, and the availability of health services is inequitable. Addressing the

medical brain phenomenon requires multi-sectoral initiatives. Policy barriers to increasing the medical workforce using available resources must be addressed. Efforts to improve the working conditions within the public health system depend on multi-sectoral governance systems that currently function in isolation due to a disconnected public administration system.

Keywords: multi-sectoral approaches, medical brain drain, public health interventions, South Africa.

1 Introduction

As far back as the 1960s, the migration of doctors raised national concern about brain drain in the South African healthcare sector (Wright, Flis & Gupta 2008). Whereas the political activities within South Africa (SA) contributed to the exodus of skilled labour during the apartheid years, the migration in post-apartheid has been driven by dissatisfaction with socio-economic and increasingly difficult working conditions within the country (Vosloo 2020; Rasool & Botha 2011).

The administrative systems to track medical doctors within the country have improved. However, there are gaps in identifying the reason for leaving, which countries they now practice in and at what level. This information is necessary to construct a solution-based approach to mitigate the impact of brain drain (Mahlathi & Dlamini 2017). It is also required for constructive planning mechanisms regarding human resource allocation in the health sector.

Moreover, the focus on ‘brain flight’, as it is referred to, is strongly attached to the economic impact of migration. In recent years, the cost of medical migration in Africa has been approximately USD 45 billion (Zakus & Anteh 2021). The narrowed view about the negative impact of the exodus of doctors has dominated the narrative to the extent that there have been few discussions on its positive outcomes, such as remittances paid, return to the country and the number of foreign doctors entering the country. While the ratio of doctors to patients is lower than the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average of 3.4%, the increase in the number of students being trained is positive (George, Blaauw, Thompson & Green-Thompson 2019). The known benefits of the increase in students trained are not without limitation. Arising challenges for students in SA include finding

placement within the public health sector for the compulsory community service and internship years necessary for qualification. Retention within the public health system beyond these years is low. There is a commonality of push factors from the public health system to the private sector and abroad.

Whereas there is no shortage of literature about the brain drain phenomenon in SA, there has been little known action in practice to address the causes of this phenomenon. This research focused on identifying potential opportunities to mitigate the impact of brain drain based on previously identified gaps in the literature. Thus, the discussion of findings is focused on the impact on the health system, factors favouring brain drain and associated policy perspectives.

This chapter provides the background to the brain drain phenomenon within the South African context. It is premised on a review of literature aligned to specific search criteria, where the summarised content of the reviewed literature is presented in tabular format under the methodology section.

2 Background

SA is renowned for its challenges regarding the delivery and access to the social determinants of health. The consequent socio-economic impact is a growing population exposed to potentially detrimental health outcomes. The quadruple burden of disease in SA – maternal, newborn, and child health; HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis (TB); non-communicable disease; violence and injury – and particularly the HIV/AIDS prevalence, which is worse in low-income communities has resulted in a considerable strain on an already ailing health system. The outbreak of Covid-2019 and its devastating impact on communities has further unmasked the health service delivery and access issues (Burger *et al.* 2020). The cyclic nature of equitable access to the social determinants of health and the health outcomes of people can become a highly debatable area regarding which services should be prioritised in a budget-constrained environment (Mayosi & Benatar 2004). The number of people in chronic healthcare strengthens the argument for much-needed introspection in the health sector. The sustainability of the country's healthcare system concerning the high turnover within its health labour market is attributed to better economic, working and living conditions offered by opportunities in the private sector and abroad. Reports monitoring the inflow of foreign-trained and returning South African doctors are lacking.

In 2010, SA hosted 8443 foreign-trained doctors, while South African

qualified medical graduates in OECD countries accounted for 14933. This figure indicated a net migration of 18% in SA. By 2014, the number of South African-based international medical graduates increased by 4%, and the loss of South African-trained graduates to OECD countries reduced by 15%. By 2017, the emigration of South African physicians dropped from 1.8% to 0.3% per year, translating into a six-fold decline in the emigration rate due to the return of 5095 physicians between 1991 and 2017 (Tankwanchi, Hagopia & Vermund 2019). A paucity of information exists on the emigration trends from 2018 to 2023, notwithstanding the global shutdown in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the civil unrest in SA in July 2021 (Nwadiuko, Switzer, Stern, Day & Paina 2021). In 2013, a South African Migration Program (SAMP) survey of out-of-country employment found that nearly half of the South African doctors who completed the survey had worked in at least one other country, while 15% had worked in at least two other countries. Some had worked in three or more countries, with a maximum of seven countries. As many as 61% of those with work experience outside SA had been to the United Kingdom (UK). Canada was second with 10%, followed by several European countries – Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium – with 9%, Ireland with 9%, and Australia and New Zealand with 6%. Around 5% had worked in newer destinations such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (Crush 2019). Four countries – the US, the UK, Australia, and Canada – jointly employ 72% of the foreign-born nurses and 69% of the doctors working in OECD (WHO 2013), with the US employing the most of any country. An analysis of physician migration from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to the United States by Tankwanchi and colleagues (Tankwanchi *et al.* 2019) highlights two inter-related and worrying trends: (1) migration of these physicians is on the rise; and (2) physician density is declining in most African countries under investigation.

Whereas George and colleagues highlight a reduction in the rate of physician emigration, the country continues to have an imbalance in the physician-patient ratio. For example, in 2017, the ratio of doctors per 1000 people increased from 0,59% in 1996 to 0.91%, yet it was still lower than the OECD countries' average of 3.4% (George *et al.* 2019). In contrast to the number of physicians within and returning to the country, the deficit in the doctor-patient ratios poses pertinent questions about the causes of brain drain within the public health sector. Innovative multi-sectoral approaches to create sustainable, safe and attractive work environments for doctors are necessary to address the labour force gaps.

3 Methodology

This study was a desktop search of existing literature supplemented by additional information accessed from the South African Migration Project (SAMP) office, Statistics SA (Stats-SA), and the Africa Centre for Migration (ACM) based at Wits University in Johannesburg. Articles and other relevant information dated 1997-2021 were included. The search engines utilised were Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, Worldwide Science, Google Books, Refseek and iSeek. The flow chart in Figure 1 below describes the methodology adopted by the authors to extract information for the study.

Keywords

The *keywords* searched were as follows.

Medical brain drain, doctors leaving SA, situation of healthcare workers in SA, why doctors leave SA, strategies to maintain doctors in the SA health system and healthcare workers leaving SA.

A total of 14 articles, policy documents and reports met the inclusion criteria and were considered for analysis.

Inclusion Criteria

Only English articles published between 1997 and 2021 relevant to the South African context were included.


The cut-off point for literature was 1997, as it is three years into the democratic dispensation of the country.

Exclusion Criteria

Not included were papers (relevant policy documents or reports) published by a scientific journal not approved by the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET).

Any publication not in English was rejected together with those published earlier than 1997. Papers about the brain drain of other types of professionals who are not Healthcare Professionals (HCPs) were rejected.

Figure 1: Flow Chart of Sample Selection (Source: Authors)



It was ensured that all sources were visited and exhausted during the search for information. The SAMP, ACM, StatsSA and other relevant institutions’ websites were accessed to ensure all sources were exhausted before conducting the analysis.

The information was then analysed through content analysis to support the focus areas of this chapter, which are: to ascertain the previously identified gaps to address the medical brain drain in SA to identify potential opportunities to mitigate the impacts of the drain through retention strategies as well as to establish how innovative strategies can create a sustainable medical labour force within the country.

Of the total of 14 papers analysed, one used mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative), and two (n=2) used the qualitative method; then three (n=3) were just narrative reports. The qualitative literature was based on the views of

key informants on the topic and information from focus group discussions. The last eight (n=8) papers used a quantitative methodology with an average sample of 480-760 participants. Eight manuscripts were recognised as contributing strong evidence to the literature documenting the brain drain of healthcare professionals from SA as one of the LMICs. The authors created Table 1 below to represent the studies analysed. It summarises the aims, methodology, major findings and identified gaps.

Bibliographical Information	
Nagi, S.E.S. <i>et al.</i> 2020. Impact of Merit-Based Immigration Policies on Brain Drain from Low- and Middle-Income Countries. <i>JCO Global Oncology</i> 6: 185 – 189. http://ascopubs.org/doi/full/10.1200/JGO.19.00266	
Aims	Methods
Address the potential impact of merit-based immigration plans to the USA on healthcare service delivery in LMICs and their preparedness to deal with it.	Data on immigration policies, numbers of international medical graduates practising in high-income countries (HICs), various scientific exchange methods, and efforts for capacity building in LMICs.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
Talented individuals seek to advance their knowledge and skills and may stay in high-income countries (HICs) because of greater rewards or opportunities. HICs also rely on immigrant, international medical graduates to supplement their physician workforces.	LMICs should have opportunities to advance their education and training in more advanced countries. They should increase their educational efforts, research capabilities, and infrastructures and reduce their brain drain phenomenon.

Bibliographical Information	
Zakus, D. & E. Anteh 2021. <i>Brain Drain from Africa - Reasons, Consequences and Impacts: Discussing Outflow of African Health Professionals to More Developed Countries.</i>	
Aims	Methods
Contributory factors of African health practitioners' migration to Canada highlight existing mecha-	This was a desktop-based study. It selected articles related to the topic and conducted a critical review of

nism policies and incentives adopted by governments, health agencies, economic communities and unions to mitigate brain drain and its effects.	the literature with the support of additional HCPs from SA living in Canada.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
The study results indicate that the South African government lacks a clear-cut policy on reducing brain drain, which will impact the country’s socio-economic development in the long term. Using the theoretical framework of Lee’s push-pull theory, it is argued that certain socio-economic factors reinforce brain drain in SA.	The chapter’s authors conclude that SA’s vision of becoming Africa’s industrial hub may remain a dream if the country fails to put losing its skilled professionals under control.

Bibliographical Information	
Crush, J. 2019. <i>Rethinking the Medical Brain Drain Narrative</i> . South African Migration Program (SAMP). https://media.africaportal.org/documents/SAMP81.pdf	
Aims	Methods
Examine the temporary employment opportunities for SA doctors in the UK, Ireland, Canada, and Australia. These include residencies, fellowships, locums, and various temporary worker programs. Global data on the temporary migration of doctors are scarce, but there is enough evidence to test the dominant narrative that all doctor migration is permanent and, by definition, harmful.	Large-scale online surveys were conducted with SA-trained doctors in the country. The survey was completed by 745 doctors in 2007 and 860 doctors in 2013. The first survey found that over one-third (35%) of the respondents had worked outside SA. The second survey found that 593 out of 2,229 physicians surveyed (20%) had experience working outside of SA.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
While some South African physicians fit the traditional picture,	The global phenomenon of temporary doctor migration

<p>research shows that the return intentions of emigrants are very low. The report draws two major conclusions:</p> <p>(a) the dominant brain drain narrative overlooks the complex nature of South African physician migration. It ignores that many doctors have temporary employment experience outside the country.</p> <p>(b) it suggests that temporary employment overseas increases the chances of permanent emigration later.</p>	<p>complicates the conventional brain drain narrative, which sees all departures as permanent and all impacts of doctors leaving a country as negative. The hegemony of this narrative partly explains why so little attention has been paid to mobile physicians and, as a result, there is so little concrete data and research on the subject.</p>
--	---

Bibliographical Information

Mahlathi, P. & J. Dlamini 2017. *From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Understanding and Managing the Movement of Medical Doctors in the South African Health System*. African Institute for Health and Leadership Development. <https://www.readkong.com/page/south-african-health-system-from-brain-drain-to-brain-6553852>

Aims	Methods
<p>(a) to assess the recorded movement of medical officers employed in public health facilities;</p> <p>(b) to gain insight into the views and perspectives in SA of emigrant medical practitioners; and</p> <p>(c) to identify existing policy instruments and practices to maximise benefits and mitigate the negative consequences of the migration of medical doctors.</p>	<p>Data were collected from the provincial Departments of Health, the Medical and Dental Board of the Health Professions Council of SA, the South African Medical Association and individual medical practitioners through a survey. The data utilised were derived from responses to a survey questionnaire. Information on medical doctors is presented, specifically on general practitioners extracted from the HPCSA GP register and on medical officers from provincial-level records.</p>

Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
Of the 754 respondents (South African-trained doctors), 37% had worked outside SA, while 63% had not. The government keeps records of only those that it employs. Once medical doctors resign from public service, there is no mechanism to provide data on their destination. About 57% of respondents believed that migration by medical doctors should be monitored, though there were variations in the reasons put forward as to why it should or should not be monitored. Some respondents are sceptical about managing migration, interpreting it as an attempt to victimise them by controlling their movement.	The country needs to develop a mechanism to record and manage information regarding the mobility of its medical workforce. There are government initiatives to increase the training of medical doctors to boost the stock, though fiscal challenges obstruct progress. The Policy on the Recruitment and Employment of Foreign Health Professionals in the South African Health Sector is used to manage immigration. However, it requires review so that it is aligned with the new immigration laws of the country. Refugees and asylum seekers who are professionals form a component of migration that is not often considered in the literature on the migration of health workers.

Bibliographical Information	
Tankwanchi, A.S. <i>et al.</i> 2019. International Migration of Health Labour: Monitoring the Two-Way Flow of Physicians in SA. <i>BMJ Global Health</i> 4: e001566. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6747914/	
Aims	Methods
To determine the flow of healthcare workers in LMICs.	Data were from the National Reporting Instrument reports, the OECD, and the General Medical Council. Using the numbers of foreign nationals and international medical graduates (IMGs) registered in SA and SA medical graduates registered in OECD, they estimated ‘NM’ as the difference between immigrant physicians and emigrant

	physicians and ‘net loss’ as the difference between OECD-trained IMGs and OECD-based SA-IMGs.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
IMGs represented 46% of 2010–2014 new registrations in SA, with the UK, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo serving as leading sources. Registrants from conflict-scarred Libya increased >100-fold. More than 3400 SA-IMGs exited OECD-based workforces.	NM is a better measure of the brain drain than simply the emigration fraction. Strengthened health personnel data management and reporting through implementation of the Code-related system of National Health Workforce Accounts will further increase our understanding of health worker mobility in LMICs, with policymakers empowered to make more informed policies to address the shortage.

Bibliographical Information	
George, A. <i>et al.</i> 2019. Doctor Retention and Distribution in Post-apartheid SA: Tracking Medical Graduates (2007–2011) from One University. <i>Human Resources for Health</i> 17:100. https://human-resources-health.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12960-019-0439-4	
Aims	Methods
This document reports on the retention and distribution of doctors who graduated from the University of the Witwatersrand, SA (SA), between 2007 and 2011.	Data on 988 graduates were accessed from university databases. A cross-sectional descriptive email survey was used to gather information about graduates’ demographics, work histories, and current work settings. Frequency and proportion count and multiple logistic regressions of predictors of working in a rural area were conducted. Open-ended data were analysed using content analysis.

Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
The survey response rate was 51.8%. Of 497 South African respondents, 60% had completed their vocational training in underserved areas. At the time of the study, 89% (444) worked as doctors in SA, 6.8% (34) practised medicine outside the country, and 3.8% (19) no longer practised medicine. Of the 444 doctors still in SA, 80% worked in the public sector. Only 33 respondents (6.6%) worked in rural areas, of which 20 (60.6%) were Black. Almost half (47.7%) of the 497 doctors still in SA were in specialist training appointments	Most graduates were still in the country, with an overwhelmingly urban and public sector bias to their distribution. Most doctors in the public sector were still in specialist training at the time of the study and may move to the private sector or leave the country. Black graduates, preferentially selected in this graduate cohort, constituted most doctors practising in rural areas. The study confirms the importance of selecting students with rural backgrounds to provide doctors for underserved areas.

Bibliographical Information	
Cometto, G. <i>et al.</i> 2013. Health Workforce Brain Drain: From Denouncing the Challenge to Solving the Problem. <i>PLOS Med</i> 10,9: e1001514. https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001514	
Aims	Methods
Although the objective is not stated in the paper, by reading, it comes out that the researcher wanted to propose solutions to the challenges of health workforce brain drain.	The article is a literature review that uses a narrative approach. The number of relevant documents included was not given, but the authors critically analysed the issue of brain drain from different publications.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
When destination countries tightened their immigration rules, the number of immigrating doctors from SSA was reduced.	The need for evidence-based solutions to move from denouncing brain drain to problem-solving,

There needs to be more than just increasing the salaries of physicians in LMICs	Policy and investment options are needed to create sustainable solutions.
---	---

Bibliographical Information

Labonté, R. *et al.* 2015. Health Worker Migration from SA: Causes, Consequences and Policy Responses. *Human Resources for Health* 13:92. <https://human-resources-health.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12960-015-0093-4>

Aims	Methods
This document arises from a four-country study that sought to understand better the drivers of skilled health worker migration, its consequences, and the strategies countries have employed to mitigate negative impacts. The four countries – Jamaica, India, the Philippines, and SA – have historically been ‘sources’ of skilled health workers (SHWs) migrating to other countries.	It is a scoping review of health workers’ migration from SA and empirical data collected from skilled health workers and stakeholders. Surveys were conducted with physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and dentists and analysed using descriptive statistics and regression models. Interviews were conducted with key informants representing educators, regulators, national and local governments, private and public sector health facilities, recruitment agencies, and professional associations and councils and were analysed thematically.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
There has been an overall decrease in the outmigration of skilled health workers from SA since the early 2000s, attributed to a reduced need for foreign-trained skilled health workers in destination countries, limitations on recruitment, and tighter migration rules. Low levels of worker satisfaction persist,	In the near past, SA’s health worker shortages because of emigration were viewed as significant and harmful. Domestic policies to improve healthcare and the health workforce, including innovations such as new skilled health worker cadres and OSD policies, appear to

although the Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) policy (2007), which increased wages for health workers, has been described as critical in retaining South African nurses. The most promising initiatives are those designed to reinforce the South African health system and undertaken within SA.	have somewhat decreased SHW shortages.
---	--

Bibliographical Information	
Reardon, C & G. George 2014. An examination of the factors fuelling migration amongst Community Service practitioners. <i>African Journal of Primary Healthcare and Family Medicine</i> 6,1: E1–E9. https://doi.org/10.4102/phcfm.v6i1.625	
Aims	Methods
The aims were to: (a) explore the migration intentions and the factors that influence these intentions amongst Community Service (CS) nurses and doctors; (b) explore their views and opinions about the Bilateral Agreement between the UK and SA and other UK policies around the recruitment and employment of foreign HCPs; and (c) understand the impact of these policies on the migration plans of these CS doctors and nurses.	Qualitative focus groups and interviews were conducted with 23 CS doctors and nurses. Six interviews were conducted with five nurses and one doctor who had worked in the UK to supplement this number.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
A higher disposition toward moving abroad was apparent amongst those who had experienced a challenging and frustrating CS year. Poor working conditions, including long working hours, high patient loads,	The findings suggest that government efforts to manage better, recognise and respect the work and contribution of health professionals to the country would

inadequate resources and equipment, low salaries, and perceived ambivalence of the government to the complaints of health practitioners, were influencing decisions to migrate abroad.	go a long way toward retaining health professionals.
--	--

Bibliographical Information

Mahlathi, P. & J. Dlamini 2015. Minimum Data Sets for Human Resources for Health and the Surgical Workforce in SA's Health System. Pretoria: Institute for Health and Leadership Development.

<https://pdf4pro.com/view/minimum-data-sets-for-human-resources-for-health-and-the-3f6326.html>

Aims	Methods
(a) To determine the minimum data sets that the government records, statutory health councils and professional associations in their management systems; (b) to determine the stock of health professionals involved in surgical care; and (c) to establish the existence of data and systems to manage the emigration of South African health professionals.	Data were collected from the National Ministry of Health, provincial departments of health, statutory health councils and the South African Society of Anaesthesiologists. The data sources utilised fell into the following categories: policies, a status report from a payroll system, and statutory health council annual reports and responses to a survey questionnaire.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
Data analysis revealed that the provincial health departments do not collect information on employees uniformly. There is no distinct national register of categories making up the surgical workforce. Consequently, the surgical workforce mostly comprises medical specialities and medical officers. There is, however, no	The National Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Home Affairs need to improve their collaboration on measuring and monitoring emigration by South African health professionals

quantifiable information relating to the number of medical officers offering surgical care at health facilities.	
--	--

Bibliographical Information	
Crush, J. <i>et al.</i> 2014. Brain Drain and Regain: The Migration Behaviour of South African Medical Professionals. Waterloo, ON: Southern African Migration Programme. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 65.	
Aims	Methods
An assessment of whether professional attitudes and perceptions have changed between 2007 and 2013, including (a) whether levels of satisfaction with work and life in SA have improved or worsened; (b) whether emigration potential has declined or intensified amongst health professionals, and (c) whether the ‘brain drain’ from SA will continue. These questions are relevant given the various changes in the health sector since 2007	The survey was developed in collaboration with the Institute of Population Health at the University of Ottawa as part of a CIHR-funded global project on health professional migration from India, Jamaica, the Philippines and SA. The questionnaire was hosted on the MED page’s website, and potential respondents were invited by email to complete the survey. A total of 1,383 completed questionnaires were received from physicians, dentists and pharmacists – a response rate of 7%.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
Previous studies have predicted that medical migration from SA is unlikely to subside in the short and medium term as health professionals and trainees exhibit high emigration potential. This report provides an updated (2013) picture of the state of mind of South African HCPs.	SA remains a destination country for HCPs from other countries, except for official schemes to temporarily import Cuban and Tunisian doctors – which is not an official policy. The study, however, provided an opportunity to profile a sub-group of non-South African doctors to assess whether they are more inclined to

	remain in the country than their South African counterparts.
--	--

Bibliographical Information	
Rasool, F. & C.J. Botha 2011. The Nature, Extent and Effect of Skills Shortages on Skills Migration in SA. <i>SA Journal of Human Resource Management</i> 9,1. https://sajhrm.co.za/index.php/sajhrm/article/view/287	
Aims	Methods
This study focuses on the causes and effects of the skills shortages in SA. Motivation for the study: The researchers undertook this study to highlight the role skilled foreign workers can play in supplementing the shortage of skilled workers in SA. Shortage is partly because of the failure of the national education and training system to supply the economy with much-needed skills.	The researchers undertook a literature study to identify the nature, extent and effect of skills shortages in SA. They consulted a wide range of primary and secondary resources to understand the problem in-depth. The article explains the research approach and method comprehensively. It also outlines the research method the researchers used.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
The researchers mention only two significant implications. Firstly, this article provides a logical description of the nature, extent and effect of skills shortages on the economy. Secondly, it indicates the implications of skills shortages for immigration policy.	This study confirms the findings of similar studies the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) conducted. Opening the doors to highly skilled immigrants can broaden the skills pool.

Bibliographical Information	
Hagopian, A. <i>et al.</i> 2004. The Migration of Physicians from SSA to the United States of America: Measures of the African Brain Drain. <i>Human Resources for Health</i> 2, 17. https://human-resources-health.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1478-4491-2-17	
Aims	Methods
To describe the number and types of physicians practising in the USA	Cross-sectional study using the 2002 American Medical Association

who earned medical degrees in Africa	Masterfile, from the United States of America.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
23.3% of 771491 active physicians in the USA in 2002 were from LMIC, SSA – 5334 86% Nigeria, SA, Ghana	African nations – lack of reliable data on how many health workers have graduated from their schools, how many in the country, and how many in Poor countries need this data for workforce policy and investment

Bibliographical Information	
Mortensen, J. 2008. SA's Medical Brain Drain: Myths, Facts and What (not) to Do. DIIS Working Paper no 2008/18. Danish Institute for International Studies Copenhagen K. Denmark. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/92345/2008-18.pdf	
Aims	Methods
The underlying rationale behind SA's current policies toward the medical brain drain is questioned. It also challenges the dominating view on the medical brain drain that the outmigration of health workers from developing countries has damaging consequences, and curbing that migration is pivotal in safeguarding health systems.	This research is built on a critical literature review and uses a narrative approach. Several published articles are critically interrogated, and a conclusion is drawn in response to the research question.
Major Findings	Gaps in Research and Summary
The authors argue that there is a need to change basic assumptions in perspective on the migration of health workers. The current paradigm is built on questionable theoretical assumptions and hypotheses. It overestimates the effectiveness of its policy recommendations and systematically ignores important negative side	Its conclusions are, thus, not surprising. Instead, a perspective is needed that factors in the positive effects of the migration of health workers, such as remittances, diaspora linkages, and so-called brain gain effects – and which provides realistic policy recommendations without counterproductive side effects.

effects of these. Further, it completely ignores the positive impacts of outmigration and focuses solely on the negative.	
---	--

The table was drawn up to identify trends in the findings and the gaps over 23 years. Most of the research included shows: Poor documentation of the reasons why medical professionals are leaving SA.

Low collaboration between countries, the national and provincial departments of Health, Home Affairs, South African Revenue Service (SARS) and representative bodies like the South African Medical Association (SAMA) to articulate and measure the impact economically and otherwise on the country.

The government's lack of initiative and will in making access to posts possible for foreign-trained doctors and doctors within migrants and refugee committees attracted to living and work opportunities in the country. The results from this research show a commonality in the findings related to the multi-sectoral oversight attached to the retention and attraction of healthcare workers in SA and a view which is rooted in a perhaps intuitively convincing assumption that outmigration and low levels of health workers are tightly correlated – that outward migration causes low levels of health workers in SA.

4 Description of Findings

Medical Brain drain in SA amidst the challenges of a collapsing healthcare system is an under-prioritised government concern. Whereas some barriers to delivering effective public health services, such as budget and infrastructure, are presented among the root causes for the challenges, the causes of human resource challenges are underreported. The increasing difficulties experienced by skilled staff within the health system have been documented over time. Whereas some challenges are unique to the public and private sectors, the commonality of challenges rests within the social and economic impacts healthcare providers face. These include remuneration, safety, career growth, and quality of life. Challenges of this nature warrant interventions beyond what the health ministry can advance independently. It requires collaboration and input from multiple sectors. Identifying the commonalities in gaps reported over 23 years to highlight its multi-sectoral nature underpins the focus of this chapter.

4.1 Brain Drain Effects on SA Health System

Despite many researchers reporting that SA needs more human resources for health (Gumede, Taylor & Kvalsvig 2021; Zihindula, Ross, Gumede & MacGregor 2019), the current list released by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) on critical skills needed in the country did not show the medical field as a scarce skill (DHA 2022). This indication by the DHA is somehow contradictory, obscuring whether the issue of Human Resources for Health (HRH) has been solved in the country, especially in rural areas where public health facilities are most affected compared to their urban counterparts.

Emerging information, such as that by Mortensen (2008), has also shown that brain drain can be beneficial when remittances and other returns are sent by doctors who emigrated. This perspective suggests that brain drain is not necessarily negative but, in some cases, positive to both the sending and receiving countries when viewed from an economic perspective.

In the case of SA, the survey did not show the use of healthcare professionals who hold an asylum seeker's document (refugee) or a work permit and even those who have naturalised whether they intend to stay once employed or if they also seek to leave for greener pastures. Notably, anecdotal evidence echoed by King-Dejardin (2019) suggests that SA is home to thousands of trained healthcare professionals who are found doing a variety of odd jobs like car guards, security, and informal trading due to the difficulties in penetrating the labour system and complicated immigration policies which turn them away. For the policy-related studies (Kaplan 1997), not much was shown as being done by the government to implement retention strategies for healthcare professionals. On the other hand, in the same study, Kaplan (1997) showed that the number of people leaving for the UK in each period was less than those who came to SA from the UK. The number of South Africans that went to Australia was far more than those who came to SA. The results show that 21 485 graduates from five South African universities living abroad were concentrated in the USA, the UK, New Zealand, Australia, and Israel. As Kaplan (1997) speaks about all critical skills and not only medicine, this is also a potential indication that strategies for retaining professionals are inadequate in SA.

4.2 Existing Retention Strategies

This review-based research sought to ascertain the efforts made in policy and practice to create attractive opportunities for the retention of doctors and to

attract foreign qualified personnel. It further sought to establish how innovative strategies can create a sustainable medical labour force within the country. Information emerging from articles reviewed by Nagi *et al.* (2020), Zakus and Anteh (2021), and Crush (2019) illustrate the complexity and interconnected nature of the healthcare systems to bigger governance systems to be able to deliver its mandate. Within health service delivery, healthcare providers are the cornerstone of the system due to the specialised skill set required to perform within their roles. Where healthcare workers are described in the South African Health Acts to be all the people within the health system to enable service delivery, healthcare providers are those providing services in terms of law to include the Acts governing health professionals, allied health professionals, nurses, dental technicians, and pharmacists (Cassim 2007).

Amongst reviews by Labonté *et al.* (2015), Mahlathi and Dlamini (2017) and others, the essential nature of healthcare workers' roles to implement policies for health service delivery is often recognised in absentia of the challenges they face to deliver on their mandate. Research by Buchan, Catton, and Shaffer (2022) highlights the need for key interventions to retain and recruit healthcare providers. These needs include safety in the workplace, better remuneration, work hours and conducive work environments. The discussions surrounding medical brain drain in LMICs have long been influenced by these concerns (Buchan *et al.* 2022).

There is a cyclic connection between the socio-economic status of the country, its political activities and the discomfort felt by skilled health workers sufficient to consider migration (Mchunu 2018). Poor governance and public administration rooted in corruption impact service delivery. Within the health sector, institutions providing essential and critical care at primary and tertiary levels are vulnerable (Presidential Health Summit 2018). Nevertheless, their services are meant to strengthen the South African health system toward an integrated and unified one. The high staff turnover, more than a critical challenge, reflects the unbearable conditions medical practitioners must work under to service an increasingly ill population burdened with chronic disease, violent crime, and poverty.

4.3 Factors Facilitating the Brain Drain of Doctors in SA

Medicine is one of the higher-paying careers in the country, both public and private (Ashmore 2013). The salaries paid, however, do not justify the frustrations

and challenges of a failing health system. These include long working hours, crime, and increasing cost of survival (Reardon & George 2014). The outcome is an ailing society in a cyclic system that cannot achieve the SDGs and the social determinants of health.

Further, HICs depend on international immigrant graduates to sustain their medical workforce. In 2002, 23.3% of the 771 491 active physicians in the USA were from LMICs. Another 5334 (86%) were from SSA – Nigeria, SA, and Ghana. These countries offer the quality of life and work-life balance that South African physicians seek (Hagopian, Thompson, Fordyce, Johnson & Hart 2004; Tankwanchi, Ozden & Vermund 2013). While lucrative opportunities for South African physicians are a known reality, studies have shown that the introduction of regulatory examinations for South African practitioners by the UK led to a reduction in the number of physicians leaving the country, in contrast to countries without regulatory exams and protocols (Cometto *et al.* 2013).

Until recently, the migration of doctors to the global North from the global South in search of better opportunities was seen as a fixed event with no account of the number of people who chose to return. The literature suggests that SA has no system to establish why health workers leave the country (Mahlathi & Dlamini 2017). In addition, there is no repository to track the immigration patterns of physicians and healthcare workers into and out of the country (Chipangura, Mohamed & Mkhize 2020). This lack is problematic for solution-based responses, which require multi-stakeholder collaboration to address causal factors. It is particularly necessary given that solutions require more than simply financial and economic incentives (Cometto *et al.* 2013).

The mobility and flexibility of people in a world that is advancing through technological innovation and artificial intelligence are increasing (Brown, Gosling, Sethi *et al.* 2018). With flexible lifestyles, global migration trends are also changing, where such changes are not necessarily permanent ones. Trends amongst some physicians in SA are leaning toward a more complex one outside the traditional image associated with brain drain (Crush 2019). They can work abroad for varying lengths of time whilst keeping SA as their base.

4.4 Policy Perspective

SA has policies that focus on managing the health workforce, including statutory regulations, employment of medical doctors – junior to senior and speci-

alist levels – and the employment benefits provided to foreign medical doctors in the public health service. However, the retention strategies of the latter are lacking (Zakus & Anteh 2021), and this suggests that the brain drain in SA's public health sector needs more context-specific studies to support a paradigm shift needed in the perspective of migration of its physicians between rural-urban, public, and private, national, and international. The current paradigm is built on non-specific data. It is challenged by the absence of a repository (Chipangura *et al.* 2020), nationally and regionally, to monitor migration patterns among this skill set. The absence of such a repository will likely negatively impact workforce policy and investment within the public health sector.

The authors posit that the decline in the number of physicians emigrating, coupled with the increase in the numbers of foreign-trained doctors servicing rural and outlying communities, indicates significant pull factors to the country, which could outweigh the outmigration influence if strengthened. The return of physicians to SA and the emerging cyclic trend indicates positive opportunities for skill exchange and growth between physicians and countries at a global level.

A sustainable and supportive policy framework for skilled migration, coupled with multi-sectoral collaboration across all sectors, including education, economy, safety, and justice, would advance the agenda for brain gain. Aligned with previous policy recommendations in the field, the influence of multi-sectoral strengthening, particularly regarding public administration and governance, within the health sector, is fundamentally important to improving the working conditions within the public health sector, sufficiently to attract a greater workforce (Cometto *et al.* 2013).

5 Conclusion

Despite emerging literature on the brain drain phenomenon, SA remains slow in addressing the skills scarcity in a critical sector like health service delivery. While the movement of medical professionals cannot be stopped, systems must be in place to balance the skills demand through solutions to address its root cause and mitigate its impact. This recommendation includes an investment in policy, networking, and further attractive opportunities for brain gain. The interventions should be designed to include the skill sets available within refugee and asylum seeker communities. The results show that the number of doctors leaving the country continues to outweigh the number entering the country.

Innovative solutions to retain doctors are lacking, and policy implementation is low. A multi-sectoral approach is needed to reduce the impact of medical brain drain in SA. Ideally, it should include retention strategies through multi-sectoral interventions to improve living and working conditions. Further, strategies to attract foreign healthcare providers should be equally prioritised as a response.

The authors acknowledge that achieving this goal requires collaboration among various sectors, including government, private, and civil society. While health labour migration is a global phenomenon, studies have often overlooked the flow of health workers into LMICs. Therefore, further research is needed to explore this phenomenon and provide an alternative perspective that reframes brain drain as brain gain for LMICs.

References

- Ashmore, J. 2013. 'Going Private': A Qualitative Comparison of Medical Specialists' Job Satisfaction in The Public and Private Sectors of South Africa. *Human Resources for Health* 11, 1: 1 - 12.
<https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-4491-11-1>
PMid:23281664 PMCID:PMC3557181
- Brown, J., T. Gosling, B. Sethi, B. Sheppard, C. Stubbings, J. Sviokla, J. Williams, D. Zarubina & L. Fisher (eds.). 2017. *Workforce of the Future: The Competing Forces Shaping 2030*. PwC. Available at:
<https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/people-organisation/publications/workforce-of-the-future.html>
(Accessed on 24 August 2022.)
- Buchan, J., H. Catton & F.A. Shaffer 2022. *Sustain and Retain in 2022 and Beyond: The Global Nursing Workforce and the COVID-19 Pandemic*. Geneva: International Council of Nurses.
- Burger, R., C. Day, N. Deghaye, L. Nkonki, R. Rensburg, A. Smith & C. van Schalkwyk 2020. *Examining the Unintended Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Public Sector Health Visits: The First 150 Days*. National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (CRAM.) Available at: <https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/16.-Examining-the-unintended-consequences-of-the-COVID-19-pandemic-on-public-sector-health-facility-visits-The-first-150-days-2.pdf> (Accessed on 25 March 2023.)

- Cassim, F.M. 2007. Book Review of: *Health & Democracy: A Guide to Human Rights, Health Law, and Policy in Post-apartheid South Africa*, by Adila Hassim, Mark Heywood & Jonathan Berger (eds.). *South African Journal on Human Rights* 23, 2: 403 - 406.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19962126.2007.11864929>
- Chipangura, B., S. Mohamed & P. Mkhize 2020. Tacit Knowledge Explicitation and Sharing through Social Networks by the South African Healthcare Practitioners. *Evolving Perspectives on ICTs in Global South* 11: 155 - 169. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52014-4_11
- Cometto, G., K. Tulenko, A.S. Muula & R. Krech 2013. Health Workforce Brain Drain: From Denouncing the Challenge to Solving the Problem. *PLOS Medicine* 10, 9: 1 - 3. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001514> PMID:24068895 PMCID:PMC3775719
- Crush, J. 2019. *Rethinking the Medical Brain Drain Narrative*. SAMP Migration Policy Series 81. Waterloo, Ontario: The Southern African Migration Programme, International Migration Research Centre, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Canada.
- Crush, J., A. Chikanda, I. Bourgeault, R. Labonté & G.T. Murphy 2014. *Brain Drain and Regain: The Migration Behaviour of South African Medical Professionals*. Waterloo, ON: Southern African Migration Programme. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 65.
- DHA 2022. Gazette Critical Skills List 2022 - 2023. Republic of South Africa. *Government Gazette*, 680 (45860). Pretoria: Government Printers.
- El Saghir, N.S., B.O. Anderson, J. Gralow, G. Lopes, N.S. Lawrence, H.A. Moukadem, P.P. Yu & G. Hortobagyi 2020. Impact of Merit-based Immigration Policies on Brain Drain from Low- and Middle-Income Countries. *JCO Global Oncology* 6: 185 - 189.
<https://doi.org/10.1200/JGO.19.00266> PMID:32023124 PMCID:PMC7051246
- George, A., D. Blaauw, J. Thompson & L. Green-Thompson 2019. Doctor Retention and Distribution in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Tracking Medical Graduates (2007 – 2011) from One University. *Human Resources for Health* 17, 1: 1 - 9. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12960-019-0439-4> PMID:31842879 PMCID:PMC6916458
- Gumede, D.M., M. Taylor & J.D. Kvalsvig 2021. Engaging Future Healthcare Professionals for Rural Health Services in South Africa: Students, Graduates, and Managers Perceptions. *BMC Health Services Research* 21,

- 1: 1 - 15. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-021-06178-w>
PMid:33706769 PMCID:PMC7953823
- Hagopian, A., J.M. Thompson, M. Fordyce, E.K. Johnson & G.L. Hart 2004. The Migration of Physicians from Sub-Saharan Africa to the United States of America: Measures of the African Brain Drain. *Human Resources for Health* 2, 1: 1 - 10. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-4491-2-17>
PMid:15598344 PMCID:PMC544595
- King-Dejardin, A. 2019. *The Social Construction of Construction Care Work: At the Intersection of Care, Migration, and Gender*. Geneva: International Labour Organization.
- Labonté, R., D. Sanders, T. Mathole, J. Crush, A. Chikanda, Y. Dambisya & I.L. Bourgeault 2015. Health Worker Migration from South Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses. *Human Resources Health* 13, 92. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12960-015-0093-4>
(Accessed on 25 March 2023.) PMid:26635007 PMCID:PMC4669613
- MacGregor, R.G., A.J. Ross & G. Zihindula 2019. A Rural Scholarship Model Addressing the Shortage of Healthcare Workers in Rural Areas. *South African Health Review* 2018, 1:51-57.
- Mahlathi, P. & J. Dlamini 2017. *From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Understanding and Managing the Movement of Medical Doctors in the South African Health System*. South African Medical Association. Available at:
<https://www.readkong.com/page/south-african-health-system-from-brain-drain-to-brain-6553852> (Accessed on 25 March 2023.)
- Mayosi, M.B. & S. Benatar 2004. Health and Healthcare in SA – 20 Years after Mandela. *New England Journal of Medicine* 371, 14: 1344 - 1353.
<https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMSr1405012> PMid:25265493
- Mchunu, N. 2018. *The Impact of Corruption in Recruitment and Procurement Within Local Government and Its Impact on Service Delivery, Using the Kwazulu-Natal Department of Cooperative and Traditional Affairs as a Case Study*. Unpublished Master's thesis. Durban, University of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa.
- Mortensen, J. 2018. *South Africa's Medical Brain Drain: Myths, Facts and What (Not) To Do*. Working Paper no 2008/18. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
- Nwadiuko, J., G.E. Switzer, J. Stern, C. Day & L. Paina 2021. South African Physician Emigration and Return Migration, 1991 - 2017: A Trend Analy-

- sis. *Health Policy Plan* 36, 5: 630 - 638.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czaa193> PMid:33778873
- Presidential Health Summit 2018. *Strengthening the South African Health System Towards an Integrated and Unified Health System*. Birchwood Conference Centre, Johannesburg: The Presidency, Republic of South Africa.
- Rasool, F. & C.J. Botha 2011. The Nature, Extent and Effect of Skills Shortages on Skills Migration in South Africa. *SA Journal of Human Resource Management* 9, 1: 1 - 12.
<https://doi.org/10.4102/sajhrm.v9i1.287>
- Reardon, C. & G. George 2014. An Examination of the Factors Fuelling Migration amongst Community Service Practitioners. *African Journal of Primary Healthcare & Family Medicine* 6, 1: 1 - 9.
<https://doi.org/10.4102/phcfm.v6i1.625>
PMid:26245415 PMCID:PMC4502841
- Tankwanchi, A.B.S., Ç. Özden & S.H. Vermund 2013. Physician Emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa to the United States: Analysis of the 2011 AMA Physician Masterfile. *PLOS Medicine* 10, 12: 1001513 - 1001513.
<https://doi.org/10.1371/annotation/64ffd514-00bb-4a5e-9e2e-584763637d14> PMid:24068894
- Tankwanchi, A.S., A. Hagopian & S.H. Vermund 2019. International Migration of Health Labour: Monitoring the Two-Way Flow of Physicians in South Africa. *BMJ Global Health* 4, 5: 001566 – 001566.
<https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001566>
PMid:31565405 PMCID:PMC6747914
- Vosloo, C. 2020. *Extreme Apartheid: The South African System of Migrant Labour and its Hostels*. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg.
<https://doi.org/10.17159/2617-3255/2020/n34a1>
- WHO 2013. *The Health Workforce: Advances in Responding to Shortages and Migration, and in Preparing for Emerging Needs*. Report by the Secretariat to the World Health Assembly. Available at:
https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/149448/A66_25-en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
(Accessed on 17 July 2013.)
- Wright, D., N. Flis & M. Gupta 2008. The ‘Brain Drain’ of Physicians: Historical Antecedents to an Ethical Debate, 1960 - 1979. *Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine* 3, 1: 1 - 8.

<https://doi.org/10.1186/1747-5341-3-24>

PMid:19000306 PMCID:PMC2613146

Zakus, D. & E. Anteh 2021. *Brain Drains from Africa – Reasons, Consequences and Impacts: Discussing Outflow of African Health Professionals to More Developed Countries*. Available at:

<https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=D402EAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA191&dq=medical+brain+drain+south+africa&ots=Sul>

(Accessed on 25 March 2025.)

Zihindula, G., J.A. Ross, D.M. Gumede & R.G. McGregor 2019. A Review on the Contributions of NGOs in Addressing the Shortage of Healthcare Professionals in Rural South Africa. *Cogent Social Sciences* 5, 1: 1674100 - 1674100. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2019.1674100>

Haseena Majid

School of Management, IT, and Governance,

Tekano for Health Equity and Social Justice

University of Kwazulu-Natal

Durban

South Africa

h.majid@atlanticfellows.org

Ganzamungu Zihindula

College of Health Sciences, School of Public Health Medicine

University of KwaZulu-Natal

Durban

South Africa

g.zihindula@atlanticfellows.org

CHAPTER 12

Challenges of Skills Transfer for Zimbabwean Migrant Workers in the Diaspora: A Systematic Review

Jerald Hondonga

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7608-0818>

Tawanda Chinengundu

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9114-6368>

Abstract

The level of education and skills plays an important role in opening opportunities for migrants in the host country's labour market. However, migrants' skills may not be easily accepted and adaptable in a host country's labour market due to different work practices and structural differences in jobs. This research aims to determine the challenges of skills transfer from the home country by migrants to the Diaspora labour market and to examine how migrants adapt to the host country's labour market skills demands. It draws on the human capital theory propounded by Becker in the 1960s as a theoretical lens for understanding, analysing, and interpreting the role of technical skills in sustaining the livelihoods of migrant workers. The research is based on document analysis and a systematic literature study. Some documents include labour market evaluation reports and research papers on migration and labour. Findings suggest that the lack of portability of embodied competencies for low-skilled migrants challenges the transferability of Zimbabwean migrants' skills and their relevance. In contrast, skilled migrants are deskilled in high technological jobs and have an inadequate orientation to adapt to the Diaspora labour market. The study helps understand the challenges of getting jobs by labour migrants in the Diaspora. It makes recommendations that can help in their employability for host countries to benefit from migrant labour. Further-

more, the study adds a voice to the meaningful development of policy in Southern Africa for migrants retooling and skilling to fully participate in the mainstream labour market of the host country. For policymakers, governments must simultaneously consider the implications of their labour regulations when formulating immigration laws, aligning them with international labour and immigration laws and agreements.

Keywords: Diaspora, migrant, technical skills, relevance, skills transfer, informal sector.

1 Introduction

Zimbabweans significantly contribute to the regional migrant workforce in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. However, it is challenging to determine their exact numbers due to the nature of their migration patterns (International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2020). According to gathered statistics, the number of international migrants in the SADC region was 1.89 million in 2008. By 2017, this number had risen to 5.01 million, indicating a significant increase of 165.4% (SADC 2018). Although Zimbabwe spends a considerable proportion of its budgetary allocations on human capital development with relevant skills for the local labour market, it has not mitigated labour migration to other countries (Mbongwe 2018).

Evidence from the Southern African region shows that migration can be a powerful driver for sustainable development for migrants and their communities in countries of origin, transit, and destination (IOM 2020). However, when migration policies or other relevant policies do not consider the needs of migrants in terms of skills transfer, migrant workers can come under strain, and development gains from migration can be jeopardised. Specifically, developing countries, including Zimbabwe, adopted skills development through Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) starting at the school level to fight unemployment, societal inequalities, and poverty (Coltart 2012). Despite dedicated efforts to address the mismatch between learner skills and the labour market, technological advancements pose challenges in predicting the emergence of relevant skills for the modern workplace, including those needed in the local labour market. For instance, the World Economic Forum (2016) suggested that 65% of today's children will most likely take up jobs that do not

currently exist due to the fast technology changes in the workplace. As such, the relevance and transferability of skills acquired from one country to another are also impacted (UNESCO 2018). This study examined the challenges of skills transfer for Zimbabwean migrant workers in the Diaspora. To accomplish the objectives of this chapter, the following objectives were investigated:

- The challenges associated with skills transfer by migrants in the Diaspora labour market.
- The adaptation process of migrants to meet the skills demand of the Diaspora labour market.

2 Overview

The level of education and skills directly affects migrants' skills transfer and adapting to different labour markets with different contexts (Sanz 2018). It further affects migrants' opportunities to develop other skills in a host country despite the expectation that migrants must use already acquired education and competencies to learn new skills and enhance their employability (Chiswick & Miller 2011). However, skills transfer from one country to another, and skills relevance can be relative to the context of available jobs and technology in the host country (UNESCO 2015). Sanz (2018) argues that migrant skills' relevance is often affected by a foreign skills mismatch in the labour market, different work practices, and structural differences in jobs. Hence, this study investigated the challenges of skills transfer for Zimbabwean migrants in the Diaspora. Millions of Zimbabweans migrated to other countries in search of employment opportunities.

Although labour migration in Southern Africa was recorded even in the 1950s, the migration of Zimbabweans significantly started at the beginning of the 1990s due to the economic downturn induced by the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (Garwe 2014). The economic downturn led to the massive retrenchment of workers because of the downsizing and subsequent closure of several companies operating in the country (Murinda 2014:5). The number of retrenched workers and unemployed youths started to rise unabated, coupled with limited labour market options for those finishing school and other forms of training. For example, the 2012 population census in Zimbabwe revealed that 36% of youths aged between 15 and 24 were part of the 84% of the unemployed population (ZIMSTAT 2012). According to Zimstat (2022),

since 1980, the highest outflow of migrants from Zimbabwe was recorded in 2021. For example, Zimstat reports that 908 914 migrants left Zimbabwe from 21 to 30 April, with 84% seeking greener pastures, and 28% of the emigrants were in the 20 to 24-year age group. The situation triggered the migration of several people from the country, both unskilled, skilled, and professionals, to the Diaspora in search of employment and other economic opportunities to sustain their livelihoods (IOM 2020). The study also investigates how Zimbabwean migrants adapted their skills to find jobs to fit the Diaspora labour market skills demands.

3 Theoretical Framework

The authors draw on the human capital theory propounded by Becker in the 1960s as a theoretical lens for understanding, analysing, and interpreting the role of TVET in skills development for the future workforce in Zimbabwe. The human capital theorists such as Mincer (1989) and Schultz (1963) argue that resources are expended voluntarily for the enhancement of intellectual capital productivity (Becker 1994). The human capital theory also emphasises that human capital is developed differently between individuals in different countries with specific needs, norms, and values. However, due to migration trends, individuals with different practical skills and competencies are not bound to specific work locations. According to the OECD (2014), migrants acquire skills and abilities and supplement the host country's human capital stock. For an all-inclusive representation of human capital-labour outcome linkages, the supply-side analysis must be harmonised with the demand-side analysis (Kingombe 2012). Providing the right skills for the labour force is a vital issue for any policymaker, not simply an adequate number of jobs for the workforce. The human capital theory is also concerned about skills relevance, whether available jobs are of good quality, and whether self-employment is an economic option (Mincer 1989). Concerning the demand side, it should include policy issues related to the curriculum and programme structure, other than policy issues that affect the operation of labour outcomes, for example, the skills mismatch of skills and training in labour markets (Robeyns 2006). The overriding assumption of this theory is that education and training are critical for empowering people to be productive in their lives. For human capital theorists, an educated populace is a productive populace with no specific boundaries (Becker 1994). The researchers posit that the adoption of the human

capital theory to explain Diaspora skills transfer should be, to a certain extent, valid because investment in educating the migrants in their country of origin is rationally driven by the motives of migrants pursuing social mobility upward and more life chances in the host countries (Tan 2014). The theory ties in well with the major aim of TVET education in Zimbabwe, which aims to equip its people with internationally recognised skills to sustain people's lives in the local formal and informal employment sectors and beyond borders.

4 Challenges of Migrants' Skills Transfer

4.1 Migrants' Skills Relevance

Although people migrate hoping to find jobs in the host country, the migrants often face the challenge of foreign skills mismatch in the host country's labour market with different work practices and structural differences in jobs (International Labour Organisation (ILO) 2018). According to Chiswick and Miller (2011), structural changes in jobs due to technological-driven work tasks affect the relevance of migrant skills in the host country's labour market. For instance, Hagan, Lowe, and Quingla (2013) found that some migrants with predominantly craft skills found their skills to be more fragmented in the advanced production industries in the USA than at home and had to either deskill or reskill on the job. Hagan *et al.* (2013) suggested that the transferability of technical skills acquired in a home country with different norms and work practices into different cultural settings of host countries' labour market can be a challenge. In a study to explore Zimbabwean teachers' motives for migrating to South Africa and their future career plans, de Villiers and Weda (2017) established that most teachers improved their academic qualifications to get employment in the tertiary sector. The teachers also intended to migrate to other countries with more competitive salaries. Daniels and Green (2014) acknowledge that the skills, expertise, experience, knowledge, and cultural heritage that migrant teachers bring can enormously impact learners, education, and society.

Other studies on migrants' employability suggest that even if migrants possess relevant skills, they struggle to prove themselves due to labour market complexities, especially in the initial days (Sanz 2018; Thebe 2017). Often, there is a mismatch in employers' expectations regarding work competencies against the embodied (micro-credential) migrant skills (Anatol *et al.* 2013). Migrants must manipulate their skills to suit the job on one side, and employers evaluate them on the other side (IOM 2018). Thus, the issue of skills relevancy

remains key in placing migrants in the host country's labour market and can be, more problematic, especially for low-skilled migrants (Dadush 2014). UNESCO (2020:2) also argues that the situation is worse for low-skilled migrants without paper qualifications as there is no consensus on whether embodied skills can complement or replace qualifications (macro-credentials). Therefore, the portability of embodied skills across borders poses more challenges to those without paper qualifications and may have to settle for low-wage jobs in precarious work situations for their competencies to be recognised. The relevance of migrant skills in a host country becomes relative, especially when migrants take up jobs, even when there is unemployment among citizens.

Constant (2014) found that the relevance of migrants' skills, especially for low-skilled jobs, was determined by their ability to adapt to the existing production technologies and motivation to learn new skills on the job. It creates a perception that low-skilled migrants' skills are relevant at certain levels that do not require subject mastery. However, the findings did not determine a correlation between migrants' skills and the jobs they did since industries adapted their production technologies to the available labour at a lower cost but increased production.

SADC has adopted a new Labour Migration Action Plan (2020 - 2025) to promote skills transfer and match labour supply and demand for regional development and integration (SADC 2021). Furthermore, the Action Plan is in line with Article 19 of the SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour, which seeks to protect and safeguard the rights and welfare of migrant workers and to give them better opportunities to contribute to their countries of origin and destination. Against this background, it is envisaged that implementing the adopted policy instrument through a multi-sectoral approach will contribute to the protection of labour migrants' rights and allow them to make a significant developmental impact on both countries of origin and destination.

4.2 Challenges Due to Skills Recognition

Migrants often face several challenges despite the call by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (UNSDG) number 10.7, which calls for 'safe, regular and responsible migration through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies to reduce inequality within and among countries' (UN 2017). In general, migrants face numerous barriers to the transferability of their skills when their home-acquired skills and qualifications

are not validated in the national framework for equivalency in the host country (UNESCO 2020:2). When there is no equivalency evaluation, migrant skills are not recognised in the host country. Ultimately this affects the utilisation of acquired skills and wage rates. In Southern Africa, the lack of a regional framework for recognising prior learning policy impacts the relevancy of migrants' skills. Such a framework and policy can be used to develop tools to assess migrant's skills, especially for those without paper qualifications to attest to embodied skills (UN 2020). For example, in Europe, there is a system of mutual recognition of qualifications for EU migrants in principle (Iredale 2005). Applicable policies and procedures differ according to the origin of the migrant. However, professional immigrants from outside the EU face challenges since each country assesses them differently (ibid). Similarly, immigrants who studied engineering outside Canada and in institutions not in the USA, UK or France must take up a programme of study that the Canadian association accredits to work as a professional engineer (Boyd & Thomas 2001). It also applies to other professional groups like doctors and teachers (Boyd & Schellenberg 2008; Chikanda 2010).

A study by Chikarara (2019) on the precariousness experienced by Zimbabwean immigrant engineers in South Africa revealed some bureaucratic challenges in obtaining relevant work permits from the Department of Home Affairs. Furthermore, the study found that South African universities' reluctance to recognise Zimbabwean qualifications on par with local qualifications and workplace insecurities placed migrant engineers in precarious positions. Another study (Chikarara 2016) examined how the Engineering Council of South Africa (ECSA) undervalued the academic qualifications of migrant engineers. Chikara found that Zimbabwean engineers were frustrated by the long and complicated process for professional recognition and perceived ECSA as a 'gatekeeper' reserving the engineering profession for South African engineers in a bid to ensure occupational closure for immigrants. Such practices may affect several migrant workers under different professional bodies. Chikarara (2019) recommends that Southern Africa would benefit from a harmonised training system that would produce mutually recognised qualifications throughout the region like that in the European Union (EU) (Iredale 2005). Consequently, this has the potential to help reduce skills wastage.

In a critical analysis of the experiences of Zimbabwean social workers in the United Kingdom (UK) by Chogugudza (2018), differences in social work culture between Zimbabwe and the UK were noted. These differences created

significant barriers to successfully integrating Zimbabwean social workers into the professional system (Willett & Hakak 2020). Chogugudza (2018) found that Zimbabwean social workers could transfer basic social work knowledge and skills they acquired in Zimbabwe when practising in the UK, with relevant adjustments, possibly because the British model of social work strongly influenced social work practice in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, he found barriers to the transfer of knowledge and skills. These were rooted in social, cultural, political, and legislative differences between Zimbabwe and the UK (Chogugudza 2018).

4.3 Challenges Due to Labour Regulations

Labour regulations in a host country often limit migrants from certain mainstream jobs. Despite anti-discrimination legislation to promote equal employment opportunities for migrant workers, Ahmad (2020) found that discrimination continues to marginalise migrants from the mainstream job market. While discrimination disadvantages migrant labour, it also dampens career advancement, job prestige, period of employment, and wage levels (ibid). However, the question is, who perpetuates the discrimination, employers, society, or labour regulations?

In Botswana, work permit application regulations for professionals demand applicants to attach, amongst other documents, clearance from relevant professional regulatory bodies and proof by the employer that they could not find citizens for such jobs. At the same time, citizens who want to employ migrants in low-skilled job categories such as farm workers, seasonal workers, and maids must support work permit applications for prospective migrant employees with much documentation, which often discourages citizen employers. Therefore, according to the Employment of Non-Citizens Act No. 11, 1983 (Chap 47:02), no non-citizens in Botswana are allowed to engage in any occupation unless they have obtained a valid work permit granted by the Botswana government. In a study by Claassen (2017) on the explanation of xenophobia in South Africa, findings suggested that labour migrants face resistance from natives when there is competition for jobs and other resources, and this varied between races and age groups. For instance, the study revealed that most black labour migrants actively searching for employment in the 25 to 49 age groups had their employment prospects dampened by xenophobia attacks. Despite the lack of proper documentation, which kept several Zimbabwean migrants out of the regularised labour market, several migrants

are active in the South African labour market (Bimha 2017). To protect employment for local citizens in South Africa, The Department of Labour and the Department of Home Affairs introduced stricter border access controls to restrain illegal immigrants. Undocumented labour migrants find jobs in the informal sectors where legal rights and social security are precariously coupled with low wages. The Employment Services Act, Act No. 4 of 2014, Sections 8 and 9 in South Africa, which prohibit employers from employing non-citizens before obtaining work visas, are being further enforced to promote the employment of citizens in a country facing an unprecedented 34.9% unemployment rate. The Employment Act of 2014 and its regulations are also meant to protect the labour rights of migrant workers since some employers deliberately prefer foreign migrants as sources of cheap labour as they are prepared to take ‘anything’ for wages (Konle-Seidl 2018:23).

4.4 Challenges Faced by Low-Skilled Migrants

Several reports document numerous challenges faced by low-skilled migrants in getting jobs in the host countries (UN 2017; IOM 2018). The numerous migrant challenges documented include a lack of job opportunities, non-recognition of embodied skills not supported by paper qualifications and language problems. The challenges identified significantly impact migrants’ employment prospects and their ability to integrate into their communities (IOM 2018). These challenges persist even though migrants initially expect better economic opportunities and improved quality of life in the host country.

4.5 Level of Skills and Type of Jobs

Studies on migration and types of jobs in Europe revealed that migrants with low skills and qualifications find it challenging to secure decent jobs in the formal sector (Lucci *et al.* 2016). Low-skilled migrants are more likely to find jobs in the informal sectors where generally, the rewards are low. A study in Kenya about Somali low-skilled migrants and those from Eritrea in Saudi Arabia has shown that young migrants and refugees with low-educational qualifications cannot access decent jobs (UN 2017). Other studies by IOM (2018) and Mlambo (2017) found that migrants with low skills and qualifications tend to take up jobs not taken up by citizens, especially those which are manual, menial, and of meagre wages. In such circumstances,

migrants face further social integration and personal economic development challenges. Therefore, low migrant skills can be recognised in the informal sector, where paper qualifications may not be in demand.

Similarly, it is important to note that a significant portion of Zimbabwean migrants, who constitute the majority, are engaged in informal sectors such as construction, agriculture, and domestic services, which are not captured in conventional labour market statistics (Makina 2012:1). The fact that they work the so-called '3D' jobs –dirty, dangerous, and degrading – does not necessarily mean they are low-skilled (Fink & Gentile 2019; IOM 2020). The lack of recognition of their qualifications and opportunities in their home countries may force many migrants into occupations for which they are over-qualified. As a result, this also contributes to brain waste and inhibits skills transfer.

Chiswick and Miller (2010) suggest that, to some extent, the economic success of a migrant is determined by the educational background, level, and relevance of acquired technical skills to the host country's labour market and how much the migrant will invest in other skills after arrival in a host country. Although people migrate with some skills, the migrants can adapt acquired skills to the host country's labour market skill requirements. This adaptability gives a perception of skills transferability. Migrants must adapt learned skills from home to invest in new skills in the host country's labour market (Campbell & Crush 2012). Even if migrants want to upskill in the host country, they lack the knowledge of available options, access to learning schools and financial support to enrol (UN 2020).

Further, the lack of recognition of prior learning (RPL) often disadvantages those migrants with only embodied skills and no paper qualifications in obtaining work permits to be integrated into the mainstream labour market (IOM 2018). Migrants, therefore, need to possess qualities such as honesty, resourcefulness, and ingenuity to navigate through existing systems with patience and persistence. Additionally, migrants must establish strong social networks, as they play a vital role in providing referrals and personal support when needed. Hence, this study examined the challenges of home-acquired migrants' skills transfer to the labour market in the Diaspora.

4.6 Poor Social Networks to Find Jobs

Labour migration studies found that migrants often face challenges getting their first employment due to lacking social networks to direct job search. For

example, Konle-Seidl (2018:23) notes that labour migrants entering a country without a job offer, find it difficult to get jobs due to legal restrictions on the labour market and rely on social networks to get their initial jobs. Therefore, people would likely migrate to countries with personal and family ties for better arrival reception, survival in the initial days, and initial job referrals (Anatol *et al.* 2013).

It can, therefore, be inferred that migrants rely on personal contacts and social networks to get information about job opportunities. For example, Pellizzari (2010) posits that in Europe, more than one-third of migrant workers reported finding their jobs through friends and relatives. About 42% of low-skilled migrant workers in Italy's vineyards found their current jobs through personal contacts (*ibid.*). Therefore, other than the relevancy of migrant skills to the job market, the ability to have social connections can help in the job search. Bauer *et al.* (2009) found that social support and networking, also known as 'social capital,' were useful when adapting, particularly for those with similar cultural backgrounds, identities, and beliefs (Willett & Hakak 2020). The effectiveness of interpersonal skills shows how migrants adapt to the job search in the host country's labour market.

Studies by Wong (2007) and Colussi (2015) found that in Europe, people of the same nationality, religious background, and speakers of the same language helped each other to find jobs. The same studies accounted for 26% of non-Western migrants who got their first jobs in Denmark through social and personal contacts. Individuals from the same country of origin often refer fellow citizens to their employers, leading to increased rates of arrival-job offers to migrants (Colussi 2015). In another study, Mlambo (2017) found that Somalis in South Africa find jobs in Muslim businesses or work alongside each other in the informal sector. Zimbabweans also tend to work alongside each other in the agricultural and construction sectors. However, the social networks may build working cohorts which negatively impact the rate of social integration of migrants when migrants remain bonded in the comfort of their cohorts. Slow social integration can further lead to the slow acquisition of other skills, such as the ability to speak local languages, and acquisition of local job skills, and cause a reduction in job-search efforts to such an extent that some migrants may remain jobless for a long time (Colussi 2015).

Despite many technocrats from Zimbabwe migrating to developed countries recently, low-skilled Zimbabwean migrants tend to migrate within the region (Mlambo 2017). This trend is probably because of proximity, and social

and family networks, even in situations where reception conditions may be inadequate, hostile or indifferent (Mlambo 2017; Crush *et al.* 2017; Segatti 2017). On the other hand, Kopinsk and Polus (2014) argue that there is relative sympathy toward Zimbabwean migrants in Southern Africa dating back to Zimbabwe's pre-independence era. There is always some form of solidarity for each other among the main revolutionary parties in the region when there are economic and destabilisation issues. For example, Betts and Kaytaz (2009) revealed that Zimbabweans have been migrating in large numbers into neighbouring Botswana since early 2000, and an estimated more than 40,000 Zimbabwean migrants were staying in Botswana by 2009. Furthermore, Botswana adopted an 'open door' policy for Zimbabwean labour seekers due to the country's lack of human resources; Zimbabweans could even take up powerful positions in some cases (*ibid*).

Several thousands of Zimbabweans also migrated into South Africa, the biggest economy in the region. South Africa was the leading destination country for many migrant workers not only in the region but also in the continent accounting for 16.5% of the total migrant population in Africa (2018). According to Viljoen and Wentzel (2020), attempts by the South African government to contest regional trans-border legacies of low-skilled labour and porous borders have caused defects in the management and regulation of low-skilled immigration. Limited opportunities to regulate low-skilled migrants' stay in South Africa through the 2002 Immigration Act resulted in many low-skilled migrants using refugee dispensation offered by the 1998 Refugee Act to obtain legalised status (Viljoen & Wentzel 2020). This regulation led to a flood of low-skilled migrants applying for asylum in South Africa. For example, The Department of Home Affairs in South Africa introduced the Documentation of Zimbabweans Project in 2010. This project was meant to regulate the undocumented Zimbabweans while allowing the migrants to work, study or conduct business in South Africa for a maximum period of four years. The Zimbabwean Dispensation Project has had extensions over the years, although under different names. The regulation through the dispensation project also enhanced skills transfer for the low-skilled migrant workers.

4.7 Language Challenges

Sanz (2018) points out that education helps migrants to learn new skills, such as language, in a host country. Other studies from countries receiving a heavy

influx of migrants, like Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, found the ability to speak local languages in the destination country to be a major factor for migrants being placed into the labour market (Sanz 2018; Chiswick & Miller 2014). On the other hand, fluency in a local language is an important skill for migrants' social integration, job search, economic development, and development of other new skills (ILO 2020). For instance, Lochmann *et al.* (2018) established a positive correlation between migrants' ability to speak local languages and the probability of securing employment in France, Germany, and the UK (Chiswick & Miller 2010). According to Lochmann *et al.* (2018), their research in France revealed that in 2013, 65% of migrants with excellent French speaking and writing skills were employed, compared to 56% of those with limited language skills. Similar patterns were observed in previous years, with employability rates of 59% to 43% in 2011 and 48% to 32% in 2010 after language lessons. These findings indicate that proficiency in the local language has a positive impact on the employability of migrants.

However, Sanz (2018) suggests that migrants may still learn local languages through social interaction in the communities in which they stay and at work. Other than employment benefits to migrants in the UK, Budria and Swedberg (2015) found that the ability to speak English influences the migrant's market value in the labour market. Therefore, language fluency also affects individuals' productivity and level of income. This study determined the extent to which migrants from Zimbabwe experience language as a barrier to finding jobs and economic improvement in the Diaspora.

Although English is the official language used for communication and business in the Southern Africa region, understanding the challenges that Zimbabwean migrants experience concerning their ability to speak local languages in the host countries and its impact on their employability is vital (Blaauw *et al.* 2012). For example, in Botswana, most people have a working knowledge of English, and just below 2.8% of Botswana's population are English first-language speakers (Chebane 2016). Despite the common ethnic languages between some tribes in Zimbabwe and Botswana, English is the official language used for communication and business in the two countries. However, Botswana has several native languages, which migrants must cope with in their job searches (Chebane 2016). The same applies even in South Africa, where there are several native languages with which Zimbabwean migrants must cope in their job searches and social integration (Moyo 2020).

Even though it is important to orient new migrants in a country to local

languages to improve their integration, efforts to provide such language lessons are hampered by the nature of uncoordinated migration and incoherent strategies (UN 2020). Although the provision of language orientation has been possible for migrants and refugees in some OECD countries (OECD 2010), it is, however, a challenge to offer such language lessons, particularly for Zimbabwean migrants, because several of them are not registered at entry points into neighbouring countries making it difficult for coordinated language lessons.

4.8 Challenges Due to the Fourth Industrial Revolution on Migrants' Skills Relevance

According to Schwab (2016), the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) is unfolding globally, changing how work is done and demanding technological skills from employees. The 4IR is bound to impact how we understand the world of work. The fusion of digital technologies characterises the 4IR, the Internet of Things (IoT), robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), nanotechnology, and traditional industries at an exponential rate (McKinsey Digital 2015; Xu, David and Kim 2018). To that end, economic activities are increasingly digitalised and interconnected. Indeed, some expect increasing and persistent technological unemployment due to the disruptive effects of the innovative use of information and communications technology (ICT), the diffusion of learning robotics, the Internet of things, and 3D printing (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014). Digitalisation in several employment sectors is a challenge and an opportunity for migrant workers (Ariyanti and Jannah 2020). One of the challenges of this digitalisation is multiple uncertainties, as these impacts are not limited to potential job losses or gains (Walwei 2016).

For instance, lower-skilled workers are positioned to lose their jobs in the face of labour-saving 4IR advances, and migrants are not only at risk of this but also blamed for precipitating lower labour standards by accepting less attractive employment (Mckenzie 2017; Man & Man 2019; Fink & Gentile 2019). Walwei (2016) refers to this as skill-biased technological change. According to Walwei (2016), in the case of capital-skill complementarity, the demand for highly skilled workers performing creative tasks will increase further. Low-skilled migrant workers might be forced to find work abroad because of the tight competition.

The highly skilled migrants connect their countries of origin to the

knowledge and economic opportunities generated by the 4IR process in the advanced countries (Mckenzie 2017; Commonwealth Secretariat 2018; Fai 2020). This connection tends to increase skill transferability to the country of origin. As migrants increasingly use social media to acquire information on opportunities and support networks, AI can be a game-changer in detecting the patterns of undocumented migration to devise adequate policy responses. Workers may need to reskill or upskill to adapt to the reorganisation of tasks and the emergence of new tasks to prevent potential job loss and navigate transitions to new jobs (Jarrahi 2018; Lane & Saint-Martin 2021). This adaptability will not only mean acquiring AI-related skills but also skills that AI cannot perform so well, such as creative and social intelligence, reasoning skills, and dealing with uncertainty. Under the 4IR, talent competition will escalate globally. Thus, the migration of highly skilled migrants imposes greater challenges for countries to mobilise their talented people, who disperse extensively across the world (Danchev & Porter 2018). The 4IR will result in ‘major disruptions to labour markets in terms of the growth in wholly new occupations, new ways of organising and coordinating work, new skills requirements in all jobs, and new tools to augment workers’ capabilities’ (World Economic Forum 2016). Hunt (2010) posits that evidence from the United States suggests that skilled immigrants boost research, innovation, and technological progress.

5 Recommendations

It is crucial to implement migration mechanisms that ensure employers in destination countries recognise the education and skills credentials of migrants to mitigate the challenges of skills transfer. Skills development programmes in countries of origin should be harmonised with labour demand in the destination countries. Countries in Southern Africa need to engage in bilateral labour migration agreements through which people are trained in the country of origin and provided the choice between migrating and finding a job locally to fill labour shortages in both countries of origin and destination. Migrant workers need to reskill or upskill to adapt to the emergence of new tasks, prevent potential job loss, and navigate transitions to new jobs due to the impact of 4IR. Further studies can be done to determine how migrant labour is assisted in integrating into the mainstream labour market in other regions of the world so that Southern Africa can also benefit. Policymakers and governments should con-

sider the implications of their labour regulations while formulating immigration laws. These regulations should be aligned with international labour and immigration laws and agreements. This approach would enable objective assessments of migrant labour rather than relying solely on the welfare policies of the host country. Additionally, conducting a comprehensive study can help determine the extent to which the ability to speak native languages has facilitated the settlement and employment of Zimbabwean migrants in the Diaspora.

6 Conclusion

The study sought to explore the challenges of home-acquired migrants' skills transfer to the labour market in the Diaspora. The transferability of Zimbabwean migrant skills and their relevance were affected by several factors. These factors include the lack of bankable proof of embodied competencies, specialised skills, deskilling in high technological jobs, inadequate orientation to adapt to the Diaspora labour market, and learning additional skills needed in the new workplace context. Although migrants arrive with skills and contribute to the human capital development of host countries, they still face challenges in skill transfer (OECD 2014). It was established that most Zimbabwean immigrants hope to find jobs in the host countries. However, in some cases, they face the challenge of foreign skills mismatch in the labour market of the host countries with different work practices and structural differences in jobs. The integration of professional immigrants in the host country's labour market is also impacted by how professional associations, local universities treat them, and employers, as experienced by Zimbabwean engineers in South Africa. Furthermore, it was found that Zimbabwean migrants with low skills and qualifications tend to take up jobs not taken up by citizens, especially those which are manual, menial, and of meagre wages (IOM 2016; Mlambo 2017). Consequently, migrants face further challenges of social integration and personal economic development. Therefore, migrants must adapt learnt skills from home to invest in new skills in the host country's labour market.

Extant literature reveals that migrants face challenges getting their first employment due to poor social networks. The observation revealed that Zimbabwean migrant workers often find employment close to each other, particularly in social work, agriculture, and construction sectors. Such social networks may build working cohorts which negatively impact the rate of social integration of migrants when migrants remain bonded in these cohorts. As a

result, the slow social integration can potentially weaken the skills transfer process for migrant workers. In addition, these migrant workers may take a long time to be able to speak the host country's languages. Communicating in a host country's language is crucial for migrants' social integration, job search, economic development, and other new skills. However, language proficiency was one of the barriers for Zimbabwean migrant workers. Providing language orientation to migrant workers as was done in OECD countries (OECD 2010) was not possible for Zimbabwean migrant workers in Botswana and South Africa because most of them were undocumented.

Some evidence indicates that the current technological changes due to the 4IR may exacerbate the ongoing trend towards job polarisation. Lower-skilled workers will most likely lose their jobs due to labour-saving 4IR automation. As a result, low-skilled migrant workers might be forced to find work abroad, upskill or reskill to remain employed. On the other hand, global competition for highly skilled migrant workers is likely to escalate. Therefore, as development strategies adjust to these technological changes, they must also account for the new skills demand they entail and, in turn, their impact on labour migration, translating into policy action in both countries of origin and destination.

References

- Ahmad, A. 2020. Do Equal Qualifications Yield Equal Rewards for Immigrants in the Labour Market? *Work, Employment and Society* 34,5: 826 - 843.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0950017020919670>
- Anatol, M., R.M. Kirton & N. Nana 2013. Becoming an Immigration Magnet: Migrants' Profiles and the Impact of Migration on Human Development in Trinidad and Tobago. *The Anatol Institute of Research and Social Sciences, Research Report ACPOBS/2013/PUB1*
- Ariyanti, F. & L.M. Jannah 2020. *The Importance of Migrant Workers Protection in Industrial Revolution Era 4.0*. (Comparative Study between Indonesia and Philippines.) Conference Paper. ICAS-PGS 2019, October 30-31, Depok, Indonesia. <https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.30-10-2019.2299335>
- Bauer, T., G.S. Epstein & I.N. Gang 2009. Measuring Ethnic Linkages among Migrants. *International Journal of Manpower* 30, 2: 56 - 69.
<https://doi.org/10.1108/01437720910948393>
- Becker, G.S. 1994. *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with*

- Special Reference to Education*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
<https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226041223.001.0001>
- Blaauw, P., A. Pretorius, C. Schoeman & R. Schenck 2012. Explaining Migrant Wages: The Case of Zimbabwean Day Labourers in South Africa. *International Business & Economics Research Journal* 11, 12: 1333 – 1346. <https://doi.org/10.19030/iber.v11i12.7413>
- Betts, A. & E. Kaytaz 2009. National and International Responses to The Zimbabwean Exodus: Implications for The Refugee Protection Regime. *New Issues in Refugee Research*, Research Paper No. 175, The UN Refugee Agency, Policy Development and Evaluation Service.
- Bimha, P.Z.J. 2017. *Legalising the Illegal: An Assessment of The Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project (DZP) and Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) Regularisation Projects*. Master's Thesis. Cape Town: University of Cape Town. Available at:
<https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/25184>
(Accessed on 26 October 2021.)
- Boyd, M. & G. Schellenberg 2008. Re-Accreditation and the Occupations of Immigrant Doctors and Engineers. *Canadian Social Trends* 84: 2 - 10.
- Boyd, M. & D. Thomas 2001. Match or Mismatch? The Employment of Immigrant Engineers in Canada's Labour Force. *Population Research and Policy Review* 20: 107 - 133. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010625515456>
- Brynjolfsson, E. & A. McAfee 2014. *The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc. Publishers.
- Budria, S. & P. Swedberg 2015. The Impact of Language Proficiency on Immigrants' Earnings in Spain. *IZA Discussion Papers* Vol 23. Institute of Labor Economics (IZA). <https://doi.org/102139/ssrn.2170645>
- Campbell, E. & J. Crush 2012. *Unfriendly Neighbours: Contemporary Migration from Zimbabwe to Botswana*. (Rep., pp.1-44.) Waterloo, ON: Southern African Migration Programme. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 61. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_26-1
- Chebane, A. 2016. Found and Lost Languages: A Survey of the Past and Current Situation of Botswana Ethnic and Linguistic Communities. *Botswana Notes and Records* 48: 160 - 175.
- Chikanda, A. 2010. *Emigration of Medical Doctors from Zimbabwe: Migrant Experiences, Transnational Linkages and Prospects for Diasporic Engagement*. Unpublished thesis: University of Western Ontario, Canada.

- Chikarara, S.N. 2016. Barriers to Professional Recognition: Experiences of Zimbabwean Engineers in South Africa. *Professions & Professionalism* 6, 3: 64 - 80. <https://doi.org/10.7577/pp.1669>
- Chikarara, S.N. 2019. The Precariatization of Zimbabwean Engineers in South Africa. *Professions & Professionalism* 9, 3: e3303. <https://doi.org/10.7577/pp.3303>
- Chiswick, B.R. & P.W. Miller 2011. Educational Mismatch: Are High-Skilled Immigrants Really Working in High-Skilled Jobs, and What Price They Pay if They Aren't. In Chiswick B.R. (ed.): *High-Skilled Immigration in a Global Labor Market*. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.
- Chogugudza, C. 2018. *A Critical Analysis of the Recruitment and Experiences of Overseas Zimbabwean Social Workers in the UK*. PhD Thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, London.
- Coltart, D. 2012. *Education for Employment: Developing Skills for Vocation in Zimbabwe*. Presented at the African Brains Conference at the University of Cape Town, 5 - 7 October 2012, Cape Town.
- Claassen, C. 2017. *Explaining South African Xenophobia: Let the People Have a Say*. Afro Barometer Working Papers, Working Paper No. 173. Available at: <https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/wp173-explaining-south-african-xenophobia> (Accessed on 21 March 2023). <https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271607-002>
- Colussi, T. 2015. *Migrant Networks and Job Search Outcomes: Evidence from Displaced Workers*. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour, IZADP No. 9339. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2663769>
- Commonwealth Secretariat 2018. *Strengthening the Commonwealth Advantage: Trade, Technology, Governance*. London; Commonwealth Secretariat. Available at: www.thecommonwealth.org/publications (Accessed on 21 March 2023).
- Constant, A. 2014. Do Migrants Take the Jobs of Native Workers? *IZA World of Labor*. Germany. <https://doi.org/10.15185/izawol.10> Available at: <https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/10/pdfs/do-migrants-take-the-jobs-of-native-workers.pdf>. (Accessed on 21 March 2021). <https://doi.org/10.15185/izawol.10>
- Dadush, U. 2014. *The Effect of Low-Skilled Labour Migration on the Host Economy: KNOMAD Working Paper I*. Paper produced for KNOMAD's Thematic Working Group: Low-Skilled Labour Migration, November 13, 2013. Washington DC: World Bank.

- Danchev, V. & M.A. Porter 2018. Neither Global nor Local: Heterogeneous Connectivity in Spatial Network Structures of World Migration. *Social Networks* 53: 4 - 19. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2017.06.003>
- Daniels, A. & W. Green 2014. Evaluation of International Teacher Qualifications in South Africa. In Keevy, J., W. Green & S. Manik (eds.): *The Status of Migrant Teachers in South Africa: Implications for Policy, Research, Practice*. Waterkloof, South Africa: South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA). Available at: <https://www.saga.org.za/the-status-of-migrant-teachers-in-south-africa-implications-for-policy-research-practice/> (Accessed on 30 October 2021).
- De Villiers, R. & Z. Weda 2017. Zimbabwean Teachers in South Africa: A Transient Greener Pasture. *South African Journal of Education* 37, 3: 1 - 9. <https://doi.org/10.15700/saje.v37n3a1410>
- Fai, F.K. 2020. *Spatial Distribution of Highly Skilled Diaspora of ASEAN-5: Macro-Determinants and Engagement Strategies*. Doctoral Thesis, University Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia.
- Fink, A. & E. Gentile 2019. Skill Flows and the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Future Questions and Directions for the ASEAN Economic Community. In Gentile, E. (ed.): *Skilled Labor Mobility and Migration*. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788116176.00017>
- Garwe, E.C. 2014. Quality Assurance in Higher Education in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Council of Higher Education. *Research in Higher Education Journal* 23: 1 - 10
- Hagan, J., N. Lowe & C. Quingla 2011. Skills on the Move: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Capital and Immigrant Economic Mobility. *Work and Occupations* 38, 2: 149 - 178. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0730888410397918> PMID:23700356
- Hunt, J. 2010. Skilled Immigrants' Contribution to Innovation and Entrepreneurship in the US. *Open for Business: Migrant Entrepreneurship in OECD Countries*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264095830-en>
- International Labour Organisation (ILO) 2020. ILO Toolkit for Quality Apprenticeships. In Aggarwal, A. (ed.): *Volume 2: Guide for Practitioners for Developing, Implementing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Apprenticeship Programmes – Overview*. Geneva: ILO Publishing. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---ifp_skills/documents/publication/wcms_751105.pdf

- ILO 2018. *Approaches to Anticipating Skills for the Future of Work: Report Prepared by the ILO & OECD for the G20 Employment Working Group*. 2nd Meeting of the Employment Working Group. Geneva, Switzerland.
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---inst/documents/publication/wcms_646143.pdf
- IOM 2020. *Southern Africa Regional Strategy 2020 – 2024*. Pretoria, South Africa: IOM Southern Africa Regional Office.
- Iredale, R. 2005. Gender, Immigration Policies and Accreditation: Valuing the Skills of Professional Women Migrants. *Geoforum* 36: 155 - 166.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2004.04.002>
- Jarrahi, M.H. 2018. Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work: Human - AI Symbiosis in Organizational Decision Making. *Business Horizons* 61, 4: 577 - 586. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2018.03.007>
- Kingombe, C. 2012. *Lessons for Developing Countries from Experience with Technical and Vocational Education and Training*. London. International Growth Centre. Available at:
<https://www.theigc.org/sites/default/files/2014/09/Kingombe-2014-Working-Paper.pdf> (Accessed on 12 September 2021).
- Konle-Seidl, R. 2018. *Integration of Refugees in Austria, Germany, and Sweden: Comparative Analysis*. Brussels: European Union, Institute of Employment Research (IAB).
- Kopinsk, D. & A. Polus 2004. *Is Botswana Creating a New Gaza Strip? An Analysis of the 'Fence Discourse'*. In Udelsmann, C. & R. Tomás & J. Tomás (eds.): *Crossing African Borders, Migration and Mobility*. Lisbon: Open Edition Books. Available at: <http://books.openedition.org/cei/235> (Accessed on 22 March 2023).
- Lane, M. & A. Saint-Martin 2021. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on the Labour Market: What Do We Know So Far? *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*. No. 256. Paris: OECD Publishing.
<https://doi.org/10.1787/7c895724-en>
- Lochmann, A., H. Rapoport & B. Speciale 2018. *The Effect of Language Training on Immigrants' Economic Integration: Empirical Evidence from France*. Discussion Paper Series. Bonn: IZA, and Institute of Labor Economics. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3129275>
- Lucci, P., D. Mansour-Ilke, E. Easton-Calabria & C. Cummings 2016. *Sustainable Cities: Internal Migration, Jobs and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: Overseas Development Institute.

- <https://odi.org/en/publications/sustainable-cities-internal-migration-jobs-and-the-2030-agenda-for-sustainable-development/>
- Makina, D. 2012. Migration and Characteristics of Remittance Senders in South Africa. *International Migration* 5: 148 - 158.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00746.x>
- Man, M-G. & M. Man 2019. Challenges in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. *Land Forces Academy Review* XXIV 4, 96: 303 - 307.
<https://doi.org/10.2478/raft-2019-0038>
- Mbongwe, J. 2018. Graduate Employability and Higher Education Responsiveness: The Debate Rages On. *Sunday Standard* 21 October 2018. Available at: <https://www.sundaystandard.info/graduate-employability-and-higher-education-responsiveness-the-debate-rages> (Accessed on 22 March 2023).
- McKenzie, F. 2017. The Fourth Industrial Revolution and International Migration. *Migration and Border Policy Project Working Paper* 5. Sydney, Australia.
- McKinsey Digital. 2015. *Industry 4.0 – How to Navigate Digitization of The Manufacturing Sector*. Sandown, Sandton: McKinsey & Company.
- Mincer, J. 1989. Human Capital and Labour Market: A Review of Current Research. *Educational Research* 18, 4: 27 - 34.
<https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X018004027>
- Mlambo, V. 2017. Cross-border Migration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Benefits, Problems and Future Prospects. *Journal of Social and Development Sciences* 8,4: 42 - 56. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.22610/jsds.v8i4.2062> (Accessed on 22 March 2023.)
- Moyo, M. 2020. ‘Kwerekwere’ or Zimbabwean? A Burden of Identity for Zimbabwean Youth in South Africa. *Alternation (Special Edition)* 34: 39 - 56. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.29086/2519-5476/2020/sp34a3> (Accessed on 22 March 2023).
- Murinda, E. 2014. *Skills Training and the Employment of Young People in Zimbabwe: An Analysis of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and the Employment Situation of Young People in Zimbabwe*. Harare: Government Printers.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2010. *Educating Teachers for Diversity: Meeting the Challenge*. Paris: OECD.
- Pellizzari, M. 2010. Do Friends and Relatives Really Help in Getting a Good

- Job? *Industrial and Labour Relations Review* 63, 3: 494 - 510.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/001979391006300307>
- Robeyns, I. 2006. Three Models of Education: Rights, Capabilities and Human Capital. *Theory and Research in Education* 4: 69 - 84.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878506060683>
- Sanz, R. 2018. *Education and Migration – An Assessment of the Types and Range of IOM’s Education and Vocational Training Projects*. Geneva: IOM.
- Schwab, K. 2016. *The Fourth Industrial Revolution*. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Schultz, T.W. 1963. *Economic Value of Education*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Segatti, A. 2017. *The Southern African Development Community: A Walk Away from the Free Movement of Persons?* UNESCO, Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies: Migration, Free Movement, and Regional Integration. Available at:
<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000368003>
(Accessed on 23 March 2023).
- Southern African Development Community (SADC) 2018. *Labour Migration Statistics Report in Africa: Regional Migration Profile*. Second Edition. Gaborone, Botswana: SADC Secretariat.
- SADC 2021. *SADC Adopts New Labour Migration Plan to Promote Skills Transfer and Match Labour Supply and Demand for Regional Integration*. Gaborone, Botswana: SADC Secretariat.
- Tan, E. 2014. Human Capital Theory: A Holistic Criticism. *Review of Education* 84: 411 - 445. <https://doi.org/10.3102/0034654314532696>
- Thebe, V. 2017. ‘Two Steps Forward, One Step Back’: Zimbabwean Migration and South Africa’s Regularising Programme (the ZDP). *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 18, 2: 613 – 622.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-016-0495-8>
- United Nations (UN) 2017. *Making Migration Work for All – Report of the Secretary-General Seventy-Second Session Agenda Items 14 and 117*, 12 December 2017.
- United Nations 2020. *Policy Brief: Education during COVID-19 and Beyond*. August 2020. Available at:
https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sg_policy_brief_covid-19_and_education-august_2020.pdf (Accessed on 12 August 2020.)

- UNESCO 2015. *Rethinking Education: Towards a Global Common Good*. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
- UNESCO 2018. *Report of the Southern Africa Regional Workshop on Work-Based Learning*, 1-2 March 2018. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
- UNESCO 2020. *Migration and Inclusive Societies*. New York: United Nations.
- Viljoen, J. & M. Wentzel 2020. *Low-Skilled Immigration and The South African Policy Dilemma*. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.
- Walwei, U. 2016. *Digitalization and Structural Labour Market Problems: The Case of Germany*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- Willett, L. & Y. Hakak 2020. The Immigration of Social Workers: From Zimbabwe to England. *International Social Work* 65, 5: 829 – 841.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0020872820962206>
- World Economic Forum 2016. *The Future of Jobs Employment, Skills and Workforce Strategy for the Fourth Industrial Revolution*. Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs.pdf (Accessed on 04 October 2021.)
- Wong, E. 2007. *Labour Market Needs, Immigration Programs, Foreign Credential Recognition & Employment – LIFE in Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada*. Vancouver: Business Council of British Columbia.
- Xu, M., J.M. David & S.H. Kim 2018. The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Opportunities and Challenges. *International Journal of Financial Research* 9, 2: 90 - 95. <https://doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v9n2p90>
- Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency, ZimStats 2012. *Unemployment in Zimbabwe*. Harare: ZimStats.
- Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency, ZimStats 2022. *2022 Population and Housing Census Preliminary Results*. Harare: ZimStats.

Jerald Hondonga
Department of Construction Engineering
New Era College, Botswana
jhondonga@gmail.com

Tawanda Chinengundu
Department of Mathematics, Science, and Technology
University of Pretoria
Pretoria, South Africa
tchinex2@gmail.com

SECTION V

DIGITAL ECONOMY

CHAPTER 13

The Surge of Africa's Digital Economy during COVID-19: Impact on the Diaspora Communities

Everlyn M. Anduvare

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5613-0213>

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the surge in Africa's digital economy during the COVID-19 pandemic. The author examines how digital technologies were adopted and used to enhance economic development during the pandemic. The research is based on a thorough literature review conducted using the Google Search Engine, focusing on literature that explores the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the digital economy in Africa. The reviewed literature demonstrates that the pandemic adversely affected economies in Africa and globally. Specifically, it significantly impacted Diaspora communities, particularly regarding their income and home remittances. Additionally, the literature highlights that digital technologies present an opportunity to transform business models and services across various sectors of different countries' economies. In light of these findings, it is recommended that Diaspora communities adopt a strategic approach to create an enabling environment for adopting and utilising digital technologies, thereby advancing their economic activities and providing a buffer against potential future shocks like COVID-19.

Keywords: COVID-19, Diaspora, digital economy, Fourth Industrial Revolution, innovation

1 Introduction

There is an absence of a generally accepted definition of the digital economy. Consequently, measuring digital economies across the globe can be intricate (Abroskin 2019:3). This is reflected by the various descriptions provided in the

literature. The digital economy has been viewed majorly as a process through which information technologies such as the Internet or other means of communication have transformed economic and social relations to the extent of eliminating or minimising various barriers in international economic relations (Kravchenko *et al.* 2019:1). The digital economy has also been described as a global network of economic activities whose business models are primarily reliant on the use of digital technologies (Bukht & Heeks 2017:11; Rouse 2016). Revenko & Revenko (2017:38) consider the digital economy as the foundation of the fourth industrial revolution.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2013) reports that the digital economy affects the trade of goods and services via e-commerce using the Internet. The World Bank (2016:3), on the other hand, is of the view that the digital economy goes beyond e-commerce and e-business to encompass conducting business, communication, and service provision in various sectors that include transport, financial services, manufacturing, education, healthcare, agriculture, retail, media, entertainment, and business using digital technologies. Afonasova, Panfilova, and Galichkina (2018: 293) assert that the digital economy description goes beyond using technologies to include professional and market knowledge, creativity, and innovation.

The growth in the digital economy in recent years cannot be over-emphasised. A combination of mobile technology, universal access to the Internet, and a shift towards storage, analysis, and development of new applications in the cloud has undeniably altered the dynamics of economic growth (Van Ark 2016:3). Technologies such as the Internet of Things, Industrial Internet, big data, cloud computing, and e-commerce are increasingly playing a critical role in the spheres of economic life resulting in changes in the business models, increased competitiveness of products, enhanced public administration and, raising the living standards of the population (Revenko & Revenko 2017:38).

Thus, the need for investing in digital technology has become apparent as emerging markets ramp up demand for technologies to fuel growth, advance markets, establish new ways to cut costs, and drive Innovation. Digital technologies are also driving consumer income and demand, education and training, and efficient use of capital and resources, which lead to increased economic growth, particularly in emerging markets (Oxford Economics 2011: 2). Van Ark (2016:3) argued that despite the rapid increase in investments in information and communication technologies including mobile technology, the Internet, and cloud, visible progress in productivity growth is yet to be generated.

2 A Snapshot of Global Trends in the Digital Economy

The advancement of the global digital economy has been viewed as the most important driver of innovation, competitiveness, and economic growth around the world, with the major products consisting of goods and services that were provided in the traditional economy now being provided by computer and digital systems such as the global Internet. However, the digital economy is characterised by an on-demand economy whose focus is not on the sale of goods and services but rather on accessibility to them when required (Kravchenko *et al.* 2019:1). Innovation and technological developments are the two major trends demonstrated in the modern world economy (Zolochevskaya, Cherka-sova, Arsenieva & Lozovova 2019:354).

Information and communication technology (ICT) facilitates inclusive participation in the economy by providing network infrastructure accessible to all stakeholders, irrespective of their geographical location (Berisha-Shaqiri, 2015:78). Thus, the Diaspora community has a chance to embrace the emerging technologies to advance economies in their origin and host countries. Afonaso-va, Panfilova and Galichkina (2018:293) assert that digital technologies are core to advancing innovation and competitive advantages in advanced countries. Oxford Economics (2011:2) finds that key technologies such as mobile technology, business intelligence, cloud computing, and social media have been identified as crucial to driving a digital economy in developed and developing economies. Furthermore, it has been established that the shift towards a digital economy has implications for corporations requiring, for instance, that they have a forward-looking strategy for emerging markets by viewing the phone as a primary means of access to the Internet and improving data analytics which can indicate global market shifts.

Communication networks have been established as crucial for the digital economy progress as they underpin the broader use of all ICTs for social and economic development. Communication infrastructures have witnessed continuous growth driven by increasing demand (OECD 2017:114). Furthermore, digital economies have seen a decline in the prices of digital assets, including computers, communication equipment, and software, leading to greater investments in ICT services and a growing emphasis on intangible assets and innovations. As a result, businesses have been presented with a chance to operate at lower costs while increasing their efficiency of products and services at competitive prices.

Transformation in consumer behaviour and new business models have

also been cited as aspects of the global market to be altered by the Internet (Oxford Economics 2011:2). Globally, businesses are experiencing a change in business models influenced by a change in structures, processes, products, and infrastructure adopted by companies or industries (Zimmermann 2000). There is an increased business expenditure on digital services such as cloud computing, data analytics, and other information services in major advanced economies like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany (Van Ark 2016:3). As a result of the influence of technologies and change in business models, it has become imperative for nations to invest in appropriate skills and competencies for employees. According to OECD (2017:114), employment in the ICT sector has gradually grown since 2013, driven by job creation in IT services. Afonassova, Panfilova and Galichkina (2018:293) gave an example of the United Kingdom government, which calculated the necessity to double the number of university graduates with engineering and digital skills up to 1.86 million by 2020. This statistic indicates that there is a need for governments to invest in appropriate skill sets that will drive innovation in digital economies. The Diaspora communities can also leverage the digital economy to acquire skills that benefit both the host and countries of origin.

3 Digital Economy in Africa

The African continent has witnessed growth in the digital economy driven by increased access to and use of technologies in various sectors of the economy. A report by Ndung'u (2018:86) indicates that Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Senegal have consistently outperformed on the innovation index regarding the highest innovation in Africa. Osiakwan (2017) identifies Kenya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa, which he coined as 'Kings' as having taken leadership in technological innovations in the African continent. These countries, he noted, have led the rest of the African continent by establishing increased broadband penetration and developing pro-innovation public policies that expedite digital innovations. Furthermore, the countries were characterised by entrepreneurial ecosystems, vibrant telecoms, tech infrastructure, and explicit government policies and implementation plans that distinguish them from other countries in the continent.

The continent has witnessed a proliferation of innovation hubs, regarded as platforms that facilitate and foster innovations, making significant contributions to the digital economy. Friederici (2019:194) and GSMA (2016:25)

note that hubs have sprung up across the African continent intending to provide spaces that have enabled the creation of local software applications. iHubs have been seen to increase from a handful in 2010 to approximately 310 active tech hubs, including 180 accelerators and incubators across the continent. GSMA (2016) noted that the top three countries with the highest number of hubs as of 2016 included South Africa, 51; Kenya, 26; and Nigeria, 23. According to Osiakwan (2017:60), tech hubs are critical in providing co-working spaces and incubators which have enhanced innovations, creativity, and entrepreneurship.

As noted earlier, technological advancement has played a crucial role in enabling digital economies in the continent. Bogdan-Martin (2019:8) asserts that the network covers 79.5% of the population in Africa, while Miniwatts Marketing Group (2020) reported 39.3% of estimated internet users in Africa as of 31 March 2020. Mobile technology has become a crucial platform of choice that has enabled the creation, distribution, and consuming innovative digital solutions for Africa. The expansion of advanced mobile networks has enhanced this, with the continuing growth of smart devices, accessibility to real-time, rich content on the go, and the underdevelopment of alternative technologies such as fixed lines in the region (GSMA 2016:24).

In 1998, there were fewer than four million mobile phones on the continent (Osiakwan 2017:60). According to Bogdan-Martin (2019:5), mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants continued to grow strongly with an 18.4% year-on-year growth from 2005 to 2019. Osiakwan (2017:60) reports that the economic growth in the continent has been underpinned by high mobile penetration rates (90%) and widely available broadband. GSMA (2016:33) also noted that mobile operators and ecosystems provided approximately 1.3 million people in Africa with jobs in 2015, and this trend continues as more firms adopt mobile systems to provide goods and services. According to Osiakwan (2017:58), Africa's millennials have increasingly opted to develop web applications and be creative in entrepreneurship, disrupting the traditional markets. For instance, The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2018:2) reported that African countries had shown significant progress on several key e-commerce indicators, such as an increase in online shoppers which has surged annually by 18% since 2014, compared with the world average of 12%. An estimated 21 million online shoppers were recorded in Africa in 2017, and the numbers are rising faster than in other world regions. UNCTAD estimates that Africa's business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce market was worth about USD 5.7 billion in 2017.

Other sectors have also been noted in the digital economy in Africa. Boateng *et al.* (2017) identified some formal and informal digital enterprises in Africa that only exist because of ICTs. Formal digital services include telecommunications enterprises that offer voice, text, and, more recently, mobile money and insurance products; digital services such as mobile applications for smartphones that have enabled e-Banking, gaming, social networking, entertainment, and e-payment among other products; software and IT consulting services; hardware manufacturing mostly attributed to assembly; information services dominated by various broadcasting companies who have established different online services from their traditional ones; platform economy that includes social networking, online auctioning and retailing, mobile payment among others; gig economy which encompasses online short-term contracts or freelance jobs; and, sharing economy that includes sharing and lending of good and services via online markets such as Airbnb. Informal digital services include online training, adopting WhatsApp for businesses, network marketing, and negative services such as cybercrime and digital piracy.

Another trend in the digital economy has been noted in the change in payment systems. While Kravchenko *et al.* (2019:2) report that ‘the global trend shows that the main means of payment are credit cards (Asia and North America), in second place is a digital payment system, this is a platform of electronic means that can be used in any calculations (Western Europe and China). Another popular method is debit cards (Africa)’, there has been an increase in mobile money payment. UNCTAD (2018:2) states that the growth in mobile money service providers in Africa has outpaced the global average, with Africa having the largest share of adults with mobile money accounts worldwide. Osiakwan (2017:64) argues that mobile money has played a crucial role in creating an inclusive financial ecosystem, allowing non-cash transactions among individuals at the bottom of the economic pyramid.

4 Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the African Diaspora Investments

The spread of COVID-19 necessitated governments worldwide to take measures to curtail its spread. These measures included closing down physical enterprises, including businesses. As a result, African economies have experienced significant setbacks during this period, mainly in terms of lost productivity and trade within and among countries (Gondwe 2020:3).

Asquith and Opoku-Owusu (2020) recognise four types of Diaspora investments, namely: Diaspora remittances; Diaspora direct investment (DDI); Diaspora real estate as DDI, and Diaspora portfolio investments (DPIs) with remittances being recognised as the major engine of African development. The World Bank notes that African remittance transaction costs are the highest at 9% compared to the global average cost of 7%. However, while African Diaspora investors have a wide range of investment activities across various sectors, it is noted that the informal sector forms a significant percentage of the economy, up to 65% of all jobs and forms a significant component of Diaspora investment activity. Gondwe (2020:6) found this detrimental amid COVID-19 lockdowns. The author asserts that most African economies rely heavily on the informal sector that provides daily wages. Therefore, a complete shutdown essentially results in no income. Similarly, this lack of income was experienced in small and other informal business ventures that sustain livelihoods and economies. Consequently, this would directly impact economies supported by Diaspora communities.

Anyanwu and Salami (2021) state that Africa was hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, with the African Development Bank (2021) estimating that economic growth in the continent shrank by 2.1% in 2020. Economic growth was forecast to resume at a moderate average pace of 3.4% in 2021 before reaching 4.6% in 2022.

Therefore, the COVID-19 measures taken by governments worldwide posed a challenge to the Diaspora community regarding economic development and sustainability of their income and contribution to the economies. Thus, finding innovative ways to safeguard their investments against the effects of events like the pandemic has increasingly become crucial. Technology has been presented as an opportunity in this case.

5 The Influence of COVID-19 on the Digital Economy

While global productivity had been recorded to be remarkably slow for almost a decade and with little indication of the digital economy boosting productivity growth, Van Ark (2016:3) and Jackson, Weiss, Schwarzenberg and Nelson (2020:34) reported that the economic growth in early January 2020, before the COVID-19 outbreak had been mainly projected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to have been slightly more positive than in 2019. However, these projections would be revised downward due to the slowdown in international

trade caused by COVID-19, lower energy and commodity prices, and an increase in the dollar's foreign exchange value.

According to ILO (2020:2), Jackson *et al.* (2020:34) and McKibbin and Fernando (2020:45), the Chinese economy slowed down due to COVID-19, which led to a negative impact on the global economy. There have been contractions in production and disruption in the global supply chain, with commodity-exporting countries likely to experience a greater slowdown in growth. Furthermore, ILO (2020:4), Jackson *et al.* (2020:34) and McKibbin and Fernando (2020:45) established that businesses faced serious challenges following travel restrictions, limitations in transport systems, border closures, and quarantine measures which led to the inability of many workers to go to work which impacted incomes. Sectors such as aviation, tourism, and hospitality faced a real threat with significant declines in revenues, insolvencies, and job losses. For instance, 'an initial assessment by the World Trade and Tourism Council forecasts a decline in international arrivals of up to 25% in 2020, which would place millions of jobs at risk' (ILO 2020:4).

As sectors continue to be affected, consumer confidence also decreases. McKibbin and Fernando (2020:45) found that panic among consumers and firms distorted usual consumption patterns and created market anomalies. Global financial markets have also been responsive to the changes, and global stock indices have plunged. Meyer (2020) reports on social aspects such as restaurants, movie theatres, and gyms that were closed to enhance social distancing, thus, rapidly changing the economy. Most workers were faced with new challenges of working remotely.

Given the best-case scenario, Africa's average GDP growth for 2020 was estimated to fall by 1.4 percentage points, from 3.2% to 1.8%. In a worst-case scenario, a drop of 2.6 percentage points was envisioned. The uncertainty revolving around the virus, coupled with social distancing, lockdowns, and policy actions, led to a reduction in demand for products and a decline in economic activities on the continent (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2020:8). World Bank (2020:1) projected a loss of between USD 37 billion and USD 79 billion in 2020 for the African region. 'The downward growth revision in 2020 reflects macroeconomic risks arising from the sharp decline in output growth among the region's key trading partners, including China and the Euro area, the fall in commodity prices, reduced tourism activity in several countries, as well as the effects of measures to contain the COVID-19 global pandemic'.

Given the circumstances, sectors that could digitalise were likely to thrive under the COVID-19 pandemic conditions. UNECA (2020:31) and World Bank (2020:74) assert that African countries need to strengthen their ICT sector more than ever by establishing legal and regulatory frameworks relating to cybersecurity, personal data protection and privacy, and digital and supporting technology start-ups. Digital technologies can aid in facilitating the interface between supply and demand, as well as boosting social protection systems to combat the impacts of the pandemic. UNECA (2020:31) foresees an acceleration of the digital economy post-COVID-19, given that developed markets are already ahead in digital economy adoption. According to Banda (2020:1), lockdowns generated greater demand for communications, computers, and information services. He gives the example of Safaricom in Kenya, which experienced a 70% surge in data usage as citizens stayed home to curb the virus. Banda found new economic opportunities in digital services like cloud computing, data storage, Internet of Things, Artificial Intelligence, and digitally deliverable services like legal, financial, and business, and e-commerce by manufacturing and services companies and online work.

It is reported that there has been a 20% increase in digital purchasing since 2014, as indicated in Adobe Digital Economy Index. A surge in sales of groceries, cold medications, fitness equipment, and computers was experienced due to COVID-19 (Express Computer 2020). Several sectors will likely experience a surge due to digitalisation resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. The entertainment industry has seen the internet surge between 50% and 70% as millions of people have gone online for entertainment. Streaming has also accelerated by an estimated 12% (Beech 2020). Netflix, for instance, has seen a drastic popularity growth in March and April 2020. Bizcommunity (2020) reported that in early March 2020, Netflix searches had a popularity score of 75, which grew by 17.3% in the second week, and 89 in the final week. By the first week of April 2020, the score had hit 100, a growth of 12.3% from the last week of March and 142% from a similar period in 2019.

The education sector has experienced a shift in teaching methodologies, with most schools finding ways to teach online. According to the World Bank (2020), large-scale national efforts in adopting technologies to support remote learning, distance education, and online learning during the COVID-19 pandemic are evolving rapidly. The OECD estimated that over 421 million children were affected in 39 countries by school closures as of March 13, 2020. Whilst the changes have caused some inconvenience, they have also offered an

opportunity to educational institutions to adopt innovative solutions in the education sector. Tam (2020), however, pointed out that teaching quality relies upon the level and quality of digital access, considering that only 60% of the world's population is online. A digital divide may also be experienced. For instance, while virtual classes on tablets may be the norm in Hong Kong, less developed countries may rely on emailing assignments. Moreover, the cost of digital devices and data may widen the gap in the digital economy.

During COVID-19, many meetings and events were redesigned and conducted in virtual spaces. Given the right technologies, virtual events and meetings can reach a wide audience with fewer limitations, as evidenced by travel restrictions (Congrex Switzerland 2020). Platforms like Zoom have been adopted to support online meetings, conferences, and other functions such as online learning, exercising, parties, virtual work, and funerals. Evans (2020), citing Bernstein Research and Apptopia, reported that Zoom's daily users spiked to 200 million in March 2020, up from 10 million in December 2019.

Naturally, there was a drop in physical retailing as people observed social distancing and quarantine, making online retailing a beneficiary of COVID-19. Therefore, an increase in online shopping was experienced as people turned to eCommerce to acquire items they would otherwise have acquired in person (McKenzie 2020; Meyer 2020). Online retail sales were estimated to reach USD 6.5 trillion by 2023, but the outbreak propelled the numbers into overdrive. Large retailers struggled to keep up with unprecedented consumer demands. Amazon, for instance, was overwhelmed with online shopping that they announced they could not keep up with the demand and would delay deliveries, particularly of non-essential items (Jones 2020). Furthermore, Amazon opted to hire more than 100 000 workers to manage consumer demands, particularly targeting those that had lost jobs during the pandemic (Titcomb 2020).

6 Conclusion

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, governments took drastic measures that affected incomes globally. This situation greatly affected the Diaspora community, considering that they are hosted in countries different from their origin. As a result, their financial contribution towards their host and origin countries affected the economies equally. In this study, the author established that emerging technologies present great opportunities for the Diaspora

community to innovatively enhance ways of generating income, explore a range of sectors that perform well digitally and re-think their means of service delivery. It will help cushion them from eventualities such as pandemics that can easily curtail their economic activities. It is also proposed that governments develop policy frameworks that will enhance technology diffusion and use to enhance Diaspora use of technologies in facilitating digital services.

References

- Abroskin, A. 2019. *Digital Economy: Problems and Prospects of Accounting and Measurement in the System of National Accounts*. Available at: <http://old.iariw.org/moscow/Abroskin.pdf> (Accessed on 23 April 2021.)
- Afonasova, M.A., E.E. Panfilova & M.A. Galichkina 2018. Social and Economic Background of Digital Economy: Conditions for Transition. *European Research Studies Journal* xxi, 3: 292 - 302.
- Anyanwu, J.C. & A.O. Salami 2021. The Impact of COVID-19 on African Economies: An Introduction. PubMed Central. *African Development Review* April, 33, Supplement 1: S1 – S16. Available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8207010/> (Accessed on 23 April 2021.) <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8268.12531> PMID:34149237 PMCID:PMC8207010
- Asquith, P. & S. Opoku-Owusu 2020. Diaspora Investment to Help Achieve the SDGs in Africa: Prospects and Trends. In Maček, A. (ed.): *Foreign Direct Investment Perspective through Foreign Direct Divestment*. London: IntechOpen Limited. Available at: <https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/72728> (Accessed on 27 April 2021.) <https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93129>
- Banga, K. 2020. *Can the Digital Economy Help Mitigate the Economic Losses from COVID-19 in Kenya?* Supporting Economic Transformation (SET). Available at: <https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Can-the-digital-economy-help-mitigate-the-economic-losses-from-COVID-19-in-Kenya.pdf> (Accessed on 27 April 2021.)
- Beech, M. 2020. *COVID-19 Pushes Up Internet Use 70% and Streaming More than 12%, First Figures Reveal*. Forbes. Available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/markbeech/2020/03/25/COVID-19-pushes-up-internet-use-70-streaming-more-than-12-first-figures-reveal/#2fd609603104> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)

- Berisha-Shaqiri, A. & M. Berisha-Namani 2015. Information Technology and the Digital Economy. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 6, 6: 78 - 83. <https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n6p78>
- Bizcommunity 2020. *COVID-19 Causes Interest in Netflix to Rise by 142%*. Available at: <https://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/1/810/202634.html> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- Boateng, R., J. Budu, A.S. Mbrokroh, E. Ansong, S.L. Boateng & A.B. Anderson 2017. *Digital Enterprises in Africa: A Synthesis of Current Evidence*. Manchester: Centre for Development Informatics Global Development Institute, SEED. Available at: <https://diodeweb.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/diode-paper-2-digital-enterprises-in-africa.pdf> (Accessed on 26 April 2021.)
- Bogdan-Martin, D. 2019. *Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2019*. ITU Publications. Available at: <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/FactsFigures2019.pdf> (Accessed on 26 April 2021.)
- Bukht, R. & R. Heeks 2017. Defining, Conceptualising and Measuring the Digital Economy. *Development Informatics Working Paper* 68. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3431732 (Accessed 15 April 2021.) <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3431732>
- Congrex Switzerland 2020. *Disruption in the Business Events Industry: Rising to the Challenges of COVID-19*. Switzerland: Congrex Team Blog. Available at: <https://congrex.com/blog/disruption-business-events-industry-challenges-COVID-19/> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- Evans, D. 2020. *How Zoom became so Popular during Social Distancing*. CNBC. Available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/03/how-zoom-rose-to-the-top-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic.html> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- Express Computer, 5 April 2020. *Adobe's Digital Economy Index: COVID-19 Drives Surge in eCommerce*. India: Express Computer. Available at: <https://www.expresscomputer.in/news/adobes-digital-economy-index-COVID-19-drives-surge-in-e-commerce/52260/> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- Friederici, N. 2019. Hope and Hype in Africa's Digital Economy: The Rise of Innovation Hubs. In Graham, M. (ed.): *Digital Economies at Global Margins*. Cambridge: MIT Press. <https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10890.003.0019>

- GSMA 2016. *The Mobile Economy: Africa 2016*. Groupe Speciale Mobile (GSM) Association. Available at: <https://www.africanbusinesscentral.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Mobile-Economy-Africa-2016-GSMA.pdf> (Accessed on 26 April 2021.)
- Gondwe, G. 2020. Assessing the Impact of COVID-19 on Africa's Economic Development. In *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development* 3. UNCTAD. Available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/aldecmisc2020d3_en.pdf (Accessed on 17 March 2023.)
- ILO 2020. *COVID-19 and the World of Work: Impact and Policy Responses*. Genève, Switzerland. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_738753.pdf (Accessed on 27 April 2021.)
- Jackson, J.K., M.A. Weiss, A.B. Schwarzenberg & R.M. Nelson 2020. *Global Economic Effects of COVID-19*. Congressional Research Services. Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46270.pdf> (Accessed in April 2021.)
- Jones, K. 2020. *The Pandemic Economy: What are Shoppers Buying Online During COVID-19?* Visual Capitalist Licencing. Available at: <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/shoppers-buying-online-ecommerce-COVID-19/> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- McKibbin, W. & R. Fernando 2020. The Economic Impact of COVID-19. In Baldwin, R. & B. Weder di Mauro (eds.). 2020. *Economics in the Time of COVID-19*. London: CEPR Press.
- Meyer, S. 2020. *Understanding The COVID-19 Effect on Online Shopping Behaviour*. Cross-Border Commerce, Europe. Available at: <https://www.bigcommerce.com/blog/COVID-19-ecommerce/> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- Miniwatts Marketing Group 2020. *Internet World Stats*. Available at: <https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm> (Accessed on 26 April 2021.)
- Ndung'u, N.S. 2018. New Frontiers in Africa's Digital Potential. In Ndung'u, N.S. *Harnessing Africa's Digital Potential: New Tools for a New Age*. Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/foresight-2018_chapter-5_web_final1.pdf (Accessed on 26 April 2021.)

- OECD 2017. *OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2017*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264276284-en> (Accessed on 16 April 2021.) <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264276284-en>
- OECD 2013 *The Digital Economy*. Paris: OECD. Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/The-Digital-Economy-2012.pdf> (Accessed on 17 April 2021.)
- Osiakwan, E.M.K. 2017. The Kings of Africa's Digital Economy. In Ndemo, B. & T. Weiss (eds.): *Digital Kenya: An Entrepreneurial Revolution in the Making*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57878-5_3
- Oxford Economics 2011. The New Digital Economy: How it Will Transform Business. *White Paper from a Research Program Sponsored by AT & T, Cisco, Citi, PwC, SAP*. PwC. Available at: <https://www.pwc.com/mt/en/publications/assets/the-new-digital-economy.pdf> (Accessed on 15 April 2021.)
- Revenko, L.S. & N. Revenko 2017. Global Trends and National Specifics of the Development of a Digital Economy. *Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy* 15, 4: 20 - 39. <https://doi.org/10.17994/IT.2017.15.4.51.2>
- Rouse, M. 2016. *Digital Economy*. Newton, MA: TechTarget. Available at: <http://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/digital-economy> (Accessed on 15 April 2021.)
- Tam, G. & D. El-Azar 2020. *3 Ways the Coronavirus Pandemic Could Reshape Education*. World Economic Forum. Available at: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/3-ways-coronavirus-is-reshaping-education-and-what-changes-might-be-here-to-stay/> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- Titcomb, J. 2020. *Amazon to Hire 100 000 Workers and Raise Pay as Orders Surge*. CNBC. Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2020/03/16/amazon-hire-100000-workers-raise-pay-faces-surge-online-shopping/> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- UNCTAD 2018. *Nairobi Manifesto: On the Digital Economy and Inclusive Development in Africa*. Geneva, Switzerland: UN Trade & Development. Available at: https://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/Africa-eWeek2018_NairobiManifesto_en.pdf (Accessed on 26 April 2021.)
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2020. *COVID-19 in Africa: Protecting Lives and Economies*. Addis Ababa. Available at:

- https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/eca_covid_report_en_rev16april_5web.pdf (Accessed on 27 April 2021.)
- Van Ark, B. 2016. The Productivity Paradox of The New Digital Economy. *International Productivity Monitor* 31: 3 - 18.
- Van der Merwe, M., W. du Plessis, V. Suban, J. Mackenzie, K. White, M. Yudaken & M. van Rensburg 2020. *The Impact of COVID-19 on Key African Sectors*. Baker McKenzie Blog. Available at: <https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2020/03/the-impact-of-covid19-on-key-african-sectors> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- World Bank, April 2020. Assessing the Economic Impact of COVID-19 and Policy Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Africa's Pulse Volume 21*. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9781464815683.pdf> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- World Bank 2020. *Remote Learning, EdTech & COVID-19*. IBRD IDA. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/edutech/brief/edtech-COVID-19> (Accessed on 28 April 2021.)
- World Bank 2016. *Digital Economy Concept, Trends and Visions: Towards a Future-Proof Strategy*. Internet for Development. Available at: <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/513361482271099284/Digital-Economy-Russia-Discussion-paper-2016-12-20-eng.pdf> (Accessed on 23 April 2021.)
- Zimmermann, H. 2000. Understanding the Digital Economy: Challenges for New Business Models. *AMCIS 2000 Proceedings, Paper 402*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2566095>
- Zolochetskaya, E.Y., T.P. Cherkasova, V.A. Arsenieva & L.A. Lozovova 2019. Containing Factors of the Russian Digital Transformation at the Transit Stage from the Formation of the Digital Economy to its Development in the Context of Global Trends. *International Conference on Innovations in Science and Education*, 20 - 22 March, Prague, Czech Republic. <https://doi.org/10.12955/cbup.v7.1385>

Dr. Everlyn M. Anduvare
Karatina University Library
Karatina, Kenya
varelynn@gmail.com

CHAPTER 14

Diaspora Investment: Enhancing Opportunities, Growth, and Sustainability in Sub-Saharan African Economies

Adelekan Saidi Adedeji

ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7747-6125>

Abstract

The Diaspora's contribution toward enhancing opportunities, expanding the economy and alleviating poverty has considerably transformed local societies. Nonetheless, Diasporas are marginalised as critical agents that can drive economic reform, increase the economy of the country of origin and increase sustainability drive. Diaspora knowledge, experience, and participation must be better leveraged to achieve the present and future goals of a country. However, the extent to which the Diaspora investment enhances opportunities, growth, and sustainability is still an issue of concern in the extant literature. This chapter addresses Diaspora investment dynamics, specifically how investment opportunities could drive economic and educational growth, sustainability, and innovation while expanding the home country's social change and development drive. The author of this study relied on existing literature and analysis of evidence from developing and emerging economies in Sub-Saharan Africa to achieve the study's objective. This study is anchored on the profits theory of investment, which sees Diaspora investment as a source of internal funds for financing investment. This study implies that the government at all levels must create and harness opportunities that would drive Diaspora investment for economic sustainability.

Keywords: sustainability, innovation, opportunities, Diaspora, investment

1 Introduction

Over the past half-century, African nations have experimented with various economic growth strategies and policy frameworks to enhance opportunities, growth, and sustainability. Several factors to consider include Africa's cultural, political and economic development. Arthur Lewis's two-sector surplus labour model of development, Prebisch and Singer's import substitution or inward-looking industrialisation, and the growth-with-equity paradigm have all been studied and implemented to see how the countries on the continent measure up to developed nations and increase their capacity. These models reveal that foreign inflows in terms of human resources, financial resources and other intangible resources into a country are critical to improving its potential (Salia, Hussain, Alhassan & Ibrahim 2022; Motala, Mbanya, Ramaiya, Pirie & Ekoru 2022; Somerukun 2021). Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) compelled African nations to reject their 1970s-era development plans, producing steady gross domestic product growth (GDP). It marked the beginning of the need for investment from abroad. Many African nations have adopted mixed fiscal policies since the SAP period of the 1980s and 1990s, marked by the economic stagnation of most of the continent (Mohamed, Abdul-Talib & Ramlee 2021; Amin & Ntembe 2021; Taslakian *et al.* 2021). For example, Ethiopia's Growth Transformation Plan I for 2010–2015 and its Growth Transformation Plan II for 2016–2020 are long-term objectives and five-year improvement initiatives that many nations currently have in place. According to Amin and Ramlee (2021), the SAPs created opportunities for Diasporas to invest in their home countries.

Engaging in development planning is becoming more popular, as nations with long-term growth strategies backed by political will have shown during the previous 15 years. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was launched to combat poverty and enable Africa to participate in future global partnerships. An in-depth empirical investigation is required to uncover the factors propelling Africa's economic progress because earlier efforts have failed (Didia & Tahir 2021; Butu, Nsafon, Park & Huh 2021; Edward 2018). External shocks such as war and diseases hinder a country's ability to implement growth-enhancing measures. To develop African economies, however, underlying capacity issues must be addressed. Institutional growth and data are critical when ensuring long-term progress via macroeconomic and institutional governance. Gender-sensitive efforts and establishing a strong and stable development state that includes effective tax administration is also necessary (Emmanuel 2022; Barne & Pirlea 2019).

Empirical investigations have shown that economic growth lessens poverty (Kramer & Zent 2019). However, the Diaspora is critical to addressing these issues and impacting local communities' efforts to provide opportunities, improve the economy, and alleviate poverty.

Diaspora is seen as a well-defined group of migrants and their descendants with a shared cultural identity and continued affinity with the nation or culture they have emigrated from (Salia *et al.* 2022). Through remittances and, more crucially, encouragement of commerce, investments, research and innovation, and knowledge and technology transfers, the Diaspora of developing nations may be an effective force for development in their home country (Motala *et al.* 2022). Diasporas may significantly impact their home nations' economic growth by contributing to economic growth and development in several ways beyond their well-known function of sending money back to their homelands (Frehywot *et al.* 2019).

About 20 million Nigerians are thought to reside outside the country, taking away investments of over USD 300 billion (Emmanuel 2022; Adebayo & Njoku 2022). In a quest for a better life, 10.7% of the nation's tertiary-educated people left in 2000 (Adebayo 2020). There are 10.8% of doctors trained in the nation, 13.6% of physicians born in the country, and 11.7% of nurses in the Diaspora pool of health personnel who could add more value to the Nigerian economy if the government had created an enabling environment to harness contributions from them (Adebayo 2020). According to the World Bank, a staggering USD 21 billion was sent home by Nigerians living abroad in 2015, making it the sixth-largest remittance recipient country worldwide (World Bank 2019).

There is a growing number of success stories about the Diaspora worldwide. Several examples of countries benefitting from Diaspora investments include India, where remittances are about 3.4% of GDP (World Bank 2019). An organised method to unlock the enormous potential of the Nigerian Diaspora is thus required. Despite several studies examining the topic with conflicting results, it remains uncertain if Diasporan investment contributes to Nigeria's economic development (Adebayo & Omololu 2020). Research on foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa has focused on many countries at a time. According to new studies, the association between Diasporan investment and growth may be nation and time-specific. A region's Diasporan investment determinants may differ from those of other areas, according to Asiedu (2001). In the same vein, the factors that

determine Diasporan investment in various nations within a region may vary from one time to the next. Therefore, the goal is to encourage the Diaspora to invest in Nigeria and enable such investment to succeed. The need to use Nigeria as the focus of the study is anchored in the fact that it is the number one economy and the most populous nation in Africa.

A new area of policy and, to some degree, a whole new wealth creation and collaboration sector has developed around the relationship between financial development and economic growth. Host governments who understand the expanding human and economic assets' full potential of their Diaspora groups encourage this growth. This chapter covers the current trends in Diaspora investment and how these investments might contribute to social-economic survival and prosperity in the home countries and the host nations. The African Diaspora, it is said, should be perceived and designed to engage themselves as substantial social entrepreneurs in African conditions that contribute to being recognised as the source of large resource streams to countries of origin or culture via remittances. There are numerous options for government agencies, investment firms, and private companies in Africa's emerging economies to harness and significantly increase these investments for wealth creation by creating and using regulatory frameworks and investment vehicles aimed at Diaspora investors.

According to the international business literature, Diaspora entrepreneurs and investors are rapidly being acknowledged as key forms of capital and innovations in the global economy since the turn of the century (Njoku 2021). Diasporan investment has been coined for cross-border investment flows made by someone living outside their home nation (Asquith & Opoku-Owusu 2020). One of the most frequent Diaspora investments is remittances, which may be made by a single Diasporan or a group of Diasporas, such as hometown associations. Diaspora-led multinational corporations (MNCs) have made direct investments in the country of origin due to their Diasporan employees' executive actions and advocacy. Other examples of such Diaspora direct investments (DDIs) include investments produced in the country of origin by circular-migrating Diasporas (Motala *et al.* 2022). A Diaspora or a group of Diasporas may also make portfolio investments (DPI) in their home countries, such as buying sovereign bonds made available by that nation's government, common stock purchase decisions, investments in fixed-income or other collateralised debt obligations that extend credit to firms only in the nation of origin, stock transactions in the home country, and investments made in the country of origin.

2 Problem Statement

It has been suggested that the African Diaspora populations seldom display the same characteristics at any particular period. Whatever the reason, it seems as if the African Diaspora does not exhibit all of the characteristics that it is often thought of as possessing, such as having an idealised, collective memory and myth about the ancestral home (Didia & Tahir 2021; Butu, Nsafon, Park & Huh 2021; Adebayo 2020). For instance, there has been a change among blacks living in the United States in how they think about themselves – observing that Nigeria vehemently objected to rumours that the Woolwich murderers were of Nigerian heritage. The dilemma of who may be considered a Nigerian or African Diaspora also arises when an African migrates to a foreign place and renounces any links to Africa. The Nigerian government has consistently acknowledged its Diaspora as a constructive actor in its drive for national development.

Nevertheless, the Nigerian government's efforts to connect with its Diaspora were limited to cultural reconnections and not much more (Mohamed, Abdul-Talib & Ramlee 2021; Amin & Ntembe 2021; Njoku 2020). It is crucial to establish appropriate institutional frameworks and create an enabling environment, to harness the significant contributions of the Nigerian Diaspora towards national development.

How is the correct regulatory capacity for embracing the Nigerian Diaspora defined or at least empirically quantified, and how is the sense of national prosperity genuinely grasped within the paradigm of Nigeria's national interest? The solutions to these questions are frequently found in theoretical debates that serve as a yardstick for determining concepts and definitions such as economic and social development and 'the correct institutional framework' (Njoku 2021). There are two problems with using theoretical discourse as a measurement system for policymaking instead of the actual policy. First, its application offers several obstacles, such as the lack of predictability and accuracy. Secondly, theoretical discourse readily leads to a generic analysis of Nigeria's varied and distinct country.

Consequently, to adequately capture the most effective policy options for improving the living circumstances of the individuals involved, a case study of the Nigerian Diaspora contributions needs an equally adaptable framework. This method hopes to provide constructive insight for continued policy debates at the national scale and beyond by serving as criteria for evaluating the government's relationships with the Diaspora and drawing on public policy ideas from

nations in need of tackling economic growth and nation-building necessities. This research also aims to provide a fresh perspective on migration's development potential considering current and future international, regional, and national discussions on the Diaspora.

3 Objectives

The main objective of this chapter is addressed through a systematic literature review, which aims to investigate how investment opportunities can drive economic and educational growth, foster sustainability and innovation, and contribute to social change and development in the home country.

4 Methodology

A systematic literature review is adopted to achieve the objective of this chapter. The systematic literature review helps evaluate data and conclusions from other researchers concerning those topics (Yacob-Haliso 2019). The systematic literature review is often used to assess the current level of knowledge on a certain subject. Creating research agendas, identifying gaps, and discussing a topic are all examples of how systematic literature reviews might be used. Literature reviews might be valuable as part of theory building. Studies on Diaspora investment enhancing opportunities, growth, and sustainability in Sub-Saharan African Economies are used to chart the evolution of a specific study area across time to establish a new conceptual model or theory.

5 Literature Review

The word Diaspora and what comprises Diaspora investment have been defined in various ways. In this chapter, the African Union (AU) interpretation is adopted: 'The African Diaspora comprises individuals of African origin residing outside the continent, regardless of their citizen status and ethnicity and who are interested in contributing toward developing Africa and forming a unified African Union'. Mwambari (2019) estimates that the African Diaspora population was 30.6 million in 2018. Although the overall foreign-born community is counted, it does not include second, third, or subsequent-generation emigrants, many of whom still retain links to their home countries. The African Union recognises five areas of the Diaspora, which include: The Continental African

Diaspora, referring to individuals of African descent who live on the African continent but outside their country of origin; The African Diaspora in the Americas, referring to individuals of African descent living in the Americas, including North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean; The African Diaspora in Europe referring to individuals of African descent living in various countries across Europe; The African Diaspora in Asia referring to individuals of African descent living in various countries across Asia and the African Diaspora in Oceania referring to individuals of African descent living in countries in the Oceania region, such as Australia and New Zealand.

These five areas collectively constitute the Diaspora as recognised by the African Union. The Atlantic Diaspora, which the AU incorporates in its description of Diaspora and its conceptualisation of a sixth area, is likewise left out. Transnationalism generates investments and establishes links between origin and destination countries resulting in ideological, economic, and cultural consequences. It also generates employment opportunities and facilitates disseminating business, technological, and scientific knowledge from host nations to their native countries (Njoku 2021). As a result, these investments should be for economic profit, socio-economic advancement, and a sense of responsibility and commitment to the nation of origin. When it comes to investing in their home country, diasporic investors have a better awareness of the corporate and management practices in the nation. They may consequently have a different risk perception than other investments.

5.1 Diaspora Investment and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Economies

Diaspora portfolio investment (DPI), DDI, Diaspora philanthropy and remittances are the four primary categories of Diaspora investment that are used globally (Todd 2021). However, Motala *et al.* (2022) and Njoku (2021) posit that the context of DDI characterises African Diasporan investments, which refers to direct investments by enterprises linked to Diasporas in productive activities in the home nation of such Diasporas. This characterisation is because African Diaspora investment does not strictly meet the description of investment capital. The Diaspora of immigrants or those who make such commitments expect no financial gains or economic return. Diaspora philanthropy is not included in this chapter, even though it is an essential component of economic growth. Studies at macro and local levels show that

remittances from the Diaspora significantly impact Africa's economic growth. According to the World Bank, official remittances to Africa hit USD 86 billion in 2019 (Simandan 2020a). About 70% of the money was sent to Morocco, Nigeria, and Egypt. For example, in Nigeria, the amount remitted in 2018 was USD 22 billion more than the government budget of USD 18 billion for 2015 (Njoku 2020). Liberia, Cape Verde, and Lesotho contribute more than 10% of GDP via official remittances alone (Simandan 2020a). To transfer money back to Africa, migrants and the Diaspora employ formal and informal means. Remittances in kind are also sent. Annual remittances to Africa might reach USD 200 billion if official, informal, and in-kind transfers are included (Salia, Hussain, Alhassan & Ibrahim 2022; Motala, Mbanya, Ramaiya, Pirie & Ekoru 2022; Adebayo 2021). However, how such remittances have increased or expanded the African economy is yet to be established.

African remittance expenses are among the highest globally, with transaction fees accounting for the bulk of the burden. Recipients of remittances are more likely to invest their money due to the following reasons.

First, remittance flows are often seen as temporary rather than permanent, prompting recipients to consider saving and investing funds instead of immediate consumption.

Second, senders often restrict the purpose of remittances, prioritising specific uses that are more likely to involve investment rather than direct spending. For example, remittances may be earmarked for educational expenses or the purchase of new agricultural equipment, considered investment-related purposes.

Third, remittances are often targeted towards immediate relatives who are more likely to utilise the funds for investment reasons, with a particular emphasis on women rather than men. This focus on investment-oriented expenditures further increases the likelihood of the money being channelled towards productive activities.

Lastly, the impact of remittances extends to enhancing the prospects of entrepreneurial ventures for middle-income families. It is because remittances are often disproportionately deposited in financial institutions that facilitate investments, thus boosting families' capacity for starting or expanding business endeavours.

Overall, these factors contribute to the increased likelihood of recipients utilising remittances for investment purposes, as highlighted by the research conducted by Yacob-Haliso (2020).

Unlike FDI, which is formally recognised by a spectrum of international bodies, there is a shortage of information on systematic DDI flows to Africa. It is suggested that annual assessments should strive to collect information on thresholds of DDI to appraise investment patterns and strategies in this area (Njoku 2021). Because DDI, like remittances, contains both formal and informal streams, the connection between the two is a tangled web. As remittance flows generally increase in crises or disputes when non-Diaspora investors seek to exit complicated markets, there is strong evidence that remittances are counter-cyclical (Todd 2021). Many inflows, like FDI, tend to be riskier. Remittances, on the other hand, tend to be more stable. Remittances have shown greater consistency over time compared to other forms of capital. In addition, family remittances can create economic benefits that provide the basis for more sustainable economic development, as Adebayo and Njoku (2022) and Africa Development Bank (2019) point out.

Further exploration and data are required to fully understand the propensities of Diaspora investments beyond remittances. Like informal remittances, investment opportunities in smaller companies are part of informal DDI. In Africa, the shadow economy accounts for up to 65% of total employment. It is predicted that Diaspora investments in the shadow economy, often in households and small and medium enterprises, make up a substantial proportion of total Diaspora business investment.

Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPIs) are generally contrasted with Direct Investment (DI), defined as cross-border transactions and positions comprising debt or equity instruments other than those included in direct investment or productive resources. Security is a financial instrument representing an ownership stake in an asset, such as a company stock and share, a corporate or governmental bond, or a derivative contract. FPI in Africa is modest and undeveloped compared to other regions globally. Global FPI assets totalled USD 60 trillion in 2017 (Mwambari 2019).

5.2 Nigerian Diaspora

Diaspora identity is claimed by many ethnicities, nations, races, and religions globally, and researchers who study it do not always use the phrase in precise terms. Definitions of Diaspora and the criteria for inclusion in that group are not easy to come by, as seen by the complexities of the issue. Anyone who writes about Nigerians living abroad will almost certainly become bogged down in the

definitional process (Adebayo 2021). There may seem to be nothing complicated about Nigerian Diaspora, but this is not always true. Evaluating the Nigerian Diaspora should begin with understanding its ethnic makeup or general nature. Over 250 ethnicities exist in Nigeria (Njoku 2020). Since independence, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo ethnic groups have been most prominent. Minority ethnic groups, on the other hand, often confront these dominant ethnic groupings. Some Nigerians have questioned the country's national identity because of ethnic tensions over power and resources. In comprehending the dispersion of the Nigerian people, it is essential to look at the country's original homeland. Many individuals who left Nigeria and their ethnicity did so under duress or free will. The things they brought with them in the host country may have morphed into something else in the new environment. Rather than presenting one unified ethnic group, the Nigerian Diaspora comprises several ethnic groupings, each defined by its place of origin. This chapter adopted the African Union's viewpoint on the Diaspora to prevent a never-ending argument on the meaning of the concept. The AU has recognised the African Diaspora as the continent's sixth zone (African Development Bank 2019). The Nigerian Diaspora is defined in this chapter as all Nigerians residing outside of Nigeria, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or geopolitical location, who want to or are already contributing to the growth of Nigeria.

Small and medium-sized businesses have traditionally been established in Africa by the African Diaspora community, frequently operating as family businesses. These businesses lack the building blocks of marketing. Moreover, friends and family generally run the business without the necessary entrepreneurial orientation. As an individual, the Diasporan lacks funding and must contend with uncertainties about access to credit facilities or investment guarantees. Often, their businesses may not be sufficiently funded or adequately connected to other business and enterprise value chain components.

5.3 Factors Affecting Diaspora Investment in Africa

After 2000, only five nations offered Diaspora bonds, with four million people living abroad or 12% of all African migrants. These nations are Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia and Rwanda (Motala *et al.* 2022). Most attempts to draw in Diaspora investments have faltered, while initiatives to draw in the broader spectrum of outside investors involving Diaspora investors have been more effective lately (Matejskova 2014). Ethiopia issued two Diaspora bonds in 2008

and 2011 (The Millennium Corporate Bond 2022). The Diaspora bond – aimed explicitly at the Ethiopian Diaspora – failed to generate enough Diaspora investment because of possible political threats, rising minimum investment control limits, inefficiencies, fixed-rate mechanisms, and a loss of faith in the government’s attempts to ensure the investment. The Renaissance Dam Bond in Ethiopia, which used foreign currency-denominated and floating-rate securities and considerably lower minimum investment, had better outcomes but limited Diaspora acceptance. Investment monies from the Golden Jubilee Savings Bond, which was launched in 2007 in Ghana, were dedicated to development projects around the nation, attracting both Ghanaians in Ghana and those residing abroad. Despite this, the bond was undersubscribed by 60% (Munthali 2021).

Since 2009, Kenya has issued at least six infrastructure bonds, five open to all investors, with no special consideration given to Kenyans living outside the country. Kenyan authorities focused on the country’s sizeable overseas population in 2011 to counter the financial meltdown (Yacob-Haliso 2019). The approach failed, resulting in a net loss of USD 141 million, compared to the goal of USD 600 million. Low uptake of the mechanism can be traced back to several factors, including the failure to implement and ‘know-your-customer’ legal requirements, limitations on advertising and promoting the Diaspora bond in overseas countries, as well as investor perceptions of monetary and foreign exchange risk (African Financial Markets Initiative 2014). Because of the lessons learned from the 2011 incident, Kenya has effectively restarted issuing recurring infrastructure bonds, attracting investments from the Diaspora and non-Diaspora investors (World Bank 2019).

However, despite a long history of deficiencies, Nigeria effectively offered an initial USD 300 million Diaspora bond in 2017 (World Bank 2019). An overcrowded 130% five-year bond was offered at a dividend yield of 5.625 %. This figure shows that these securities proved an excellent retail investment option to lure African Diaspora investments and rekindle the promise of mobilising the undeveloped wealth in the Africa Diaspora.

The bond was constructed in Nigeria as a US dollar-denominated retail vehicle (Butu *et al.* 2021). All investors were welcome, but it was geared towards Nigerians living abroad and was only available via investment lenders and wealth managers, unlike institutions, which tend to deal in considerably more significant amounts (Motala *et al.* 2022). Investing in Nigeria’s future was easier for Nigerians living abroad thanks to the bond’s design as a retail instrument with the principal and interest denominated in US dollars and a USD

2,000 minimum subscription requirement (Mohammed *et al.* 2021). To put this in perspective, the Nigerian government recently issued two Eurobonds totalling USD 2.5 billion and USD 3.2 billion, with interest rates above 7%, respectively (Munthali 2021).

On the other hand, the Diaspora bond generated relatively little money (Motala *et al.* 2022). However, the bond was sold at a far lower interest rate of 5.625 %, indicating a considerable incentive to invest in Nigeria from the Diaspora (Mohammed *et al.* 2022; Adebayo & Njoku 2022). As a result, a new source of long-term funding was established for the country.

5.4 Diaspora Investment and Nigerian Prosperity

Purchases made in the new place of residence by immigrants from their home country may help boost imports, thereby supporting international trade in ethnic products. Expatriates returning to their countries of origin with new skills and knowledge may find opportunities for recruitment through professional organisations, temporary postings in their home countries, or online education (Mohammed *et al.* 2021). In nations with a high brain drain rate, their contributions are especially important in some technological fields. Through its role as a conduit of information and knowledge flows, returning to the home nation, the Diaspora may contribute to developing and transmitting knowledge (Motala *et al.* 2022).

A new body of research shows that the extent of Africa's Diaspora correlates with bilateral flows of FDI into the country of origin of the migrants (Butu, Nsafon, Park & Huh 2021; Edward 2018). Through migrant networks, cross-border information exchanges are made easier, resulting in greater familiarity between the nations of origin and those of destination. When making investment choices, migrants may prefer products from their native country (Wapmuk *et al.* 2014). Asymmetries of information can also be reduced through two channels:

- Migrant communities can inform investors about consumers' tastes in their country of origin and signal the quality of labour, work ethic, and business culture in a particular destination.
- Diaspora networks can indirectly affect investment because they may positively impact the quality of labour, work ethic, and business culture.

A growing number of Diasporas are investing their money in current enterprises and starting new ones in their countries of origin, which has the potential to boost economic growth. For example, in some circumstances, foreign direct investors make these investments reluctantly. Foreign investors are discouraged from making significant investments in weak institutions, social and political risks, insufficient infrastructure or other unattractive structural characteristics in capital-scarce emerging nations (Adebayo *et al.* 2022). Contrary to popular belief, Diasporans may be more inclined than other investors to put their money into economies that are seen as high-risk since they have intimate knowledge of their home countries and a more comprehensive network of contacts.

Additionally, they may be driven by altruistic sentiments of patriotism and a sense of racial superiority. There is very little study on this problem, and much of the current work is theoretical or based on anecdotal evidence (Mohamed, Abdul-Talib & Ramlee 2021; Amin & Ntembe 2021; Taslakian *et al.* 2021). Diaspora business development must be thoroughly evaluated by rigorous empirical research to understand better how Diaspora enterprises might contribute to the growth of their home countries.

5.5 Diaspora Investment and Sustainability in Sub-Saharan Economies

There are many more ways Diasporas may help their home countries grow economically outside of remittances. Diasporas may contribute to growing trade inflows. Immigrants can help boost foreign commerce by buying products and services from their homelands. Diasporans' position as an information bridge between nations might lead to the founding of export companies and assist receiving-country enterprises in finding and targeting exporting customers. Diasporas may also help home-country economic agents access technology and skills via professional organisations, temporary assignments of skilled expatriates in origin countries, remote teaching, and the return of emigrants with increased skills and new information. The Diaspora can aid in generating and disseminating new knowledge by serving as a conduit for the return of new information (Adebayo & Njoku 2022).

Additionally, Diasporas help their home nations become more integrated into the global economy by increasing the presence of FDI. Recently published studies have shown a link between migration's impact on FDI and FDI flows back to countries where migrants originate.

6 Theoretical Framework

House-Soremekun *et al.* (2022) argue that Diaspora members' desire to contribute might be attributed to the anticipated emotional, social and financial benefits they would get. According to these authors, the Diaspora's levels of social embedding, the intensity of the community attachment, and perceived ethnic advantage are all characteristics that influence investment incentives. Nielsen and Riddle's (2007) investment motive paradigm is used to analyse the linear causality assumptions of Nigerian-born Diaspora investment desire. Regarding financial investment goals, the cultural edge is based on the idea that Diaspora members hold the advantage of the knowledge and cultural connections over non-Diaspora investment. Social connectedness can be measured by the depth and robustness of a Diaspora member's social platform within their local Diaspora group and their homeland. A person's ability to give and invest in their place of origin may be facilitated by their social connections, which may put societal pressure on them to do so. Emotional connection and connection to their homeland and home nation might influence a Diasporan's expectation of social return from their Diaspora group. Motivating factors for investors include the desire to earn money and increase the value of their inventories (Obadare & Adebani, 2010). It is common for investment choices to be guided by the goal of maximising financial gains while considering a particular investor's level of risk tolerance. They bring the values and traditions of their native country with them when they relocate. Depending on how much assimilation occurs in the host nation, these beliefs might not evolve. As a result, their 'fandoms' may be culturally different from their country's cultural dimensions for various reasons. Even minor differences may influence Diasporas' ideas of personal ethnic advantage within their cultural background. At the micro-level, Diasporans may believe they are more suited than non-Diasporans to navigate the home economic environment and see possibilities in the home markets. Societal beliefs and values may support the social acceptability of participating in the homeland economy in expatriate communities because of cultural resemblance to the motherland (Nielsen & Riddle 2007). Due to sentiments of disconnection and a lack of understanding about operational and economic realities, Diaspora investors may be less inclined to invest in the homeland as a group.

According to studies investigating the effects of investors, local bias may be influenced by familiarity and better knowledge. In the words of Leblang (2010), familiarity generates investment. Petrzalka and Bell (2000) define

Diasporic members' social embeddedness in terms of their social network's strength and toughness, their emotional bonds of love and devotion to others, and their ability to maintain these links through time. The degree to which an individual is immersed in their country and the Diaspora group may influence their perceptions of the social effect of investment in both settings. Many members of the group who are well-established in their homelands will feel peer pressure to invest there. Frameworks for offering and investing in the home nation will be more widely available. A member's investment activities are more likely to be acknowledged by their contemporaries in the Diaspora when they have a more extensive network of Diaspora citizens in their country of origin and the Diaspora.

According to global investment literature, investment choices have traditionally only been based on financial investment goals. According to Van de Laar and de Neubourg (2006), current research shows that the motivations of investors may be more nuanced than previously thought. According to Van de Laar and de Neubourg (2006), several concepts fail to describe real choices since emotions are usually missing from economic investment models.

According to Zivin and Small (2005), some investors are motivated to invest in socially accountable enterprises by psychological altruism or personal moral beliefs. While researching Jewish investment in Israel, Aharoni (1966) discovered that the Jewish Diaspora's emotional links with their country have an outsized impact on their investment decisions. Diaspora members' investment decisions are influenced by their thoughts of altruism (Gillespie *et al.* 1999; and Aharoni 1966). When evaluating an investment, some Diaspora members could be driven by the hope of receiving a considerable emotional reward. According to Coates (1998), pure prosocial behaviour may not exist since every decision has some payback for the person making it. Diasporans may be incentivised in their homeland by anticipating some inner happiness, even if altruism exists in their community. Due to this occurrence, some Diaspora individuals may decide to invest in their country. The effective interference of Diaspora members in the homeland's socio-economic, institutional, and political changes may be heightened by their socio-economic and socio-cultural context in the homeland. In addition, if they are socially integrated into their residency community, they will engage in an activity valued by the Diaspora community. Emotional values and the two elements of social connectedness have a strong link.

7 Empirical Evidence on Enhancing Opportunities, Growth, and Sustainability in Sub-Saharan African Economies

Diasporans have historically been seen as micro-investors and micro-consumers by governments and the business sector, as investigated by Asquith and Opoku-Owusu (2020). While the Diaspora's involvement in 'creating growth' is becoming recognised, governments, the commercial sector, and even the Diaspora are not yet considered significant societal contributors. Because of the shortfall of money available to meet the Sustainable Development Goals, there is a need to leverage and increase Diaspora investments for social and economic progress. They are divided into four basic categories: Diaspora donations, transfers, DDI, and DPIs are all described in this chapter. Diaspora investments should be considered part of the development financing balance by governments, investment firms, the business community, and the Diaspora themselves, notably as part of 'mixed financing' programs.

Ayanruoh (2018) explores the reasons behind the Nigerian Diaspora's interest in investing in Nigeria and the obstacles they face. Nigerian Diaspora investment motivations and perceived barriers were examined in the research. The study of individual-level Diaspora homeland investment is conceptualised using an interdisciplinary method. According to the survey findings, the Nigerian Diaspora do not invest financially in their own country. As a result of their social ties in both countries of origin and residency, they are more likely to invest based on emotional rewards. They also invest because they believe it will provide them with societal benefits. This tendency is also influenced by the social context in which they live.

An analysis of the significance of the Nigerian Diaspora in economic and social development was carried out by Sharkdam *et al.* (2014), who define and explore the relationship between the Diaspora, prosperity, and the Nigerian Diaspora in particular. The authors claim that the Diaspora may play a role in economic and social development, citing historical and present examples from nations such as India, China, the Philippines, Italy, and Ghana, recognising the different remittances and transfers from Diasporas from various nations. The Nigerian Diaspora has distinct diasporic circumstances and reactions when compared to those of various African nations in the Diaspora. As a result, the Nigerian government has made a concerted effort to engage the Diaspora to connect with Nigeria and increase economic expansion. Seungbin (2018) investigated the Diaspora engagement policies in creating pathways to FDI in Asian countries. The research revealed that emerging economies believe FDI is

economically advantageous in the post-Washington accord world. Despite competing for FDI to foster industrial prosperity, these capital-poor economies have not garnered enough. Investment has, however, been focused on a few nations. In addition, the authors of this study contend that this new Investment strategy is more critical in non-democratic countries and that two categories of Diaspora investment policies are incredibly advantageous in these countries. Diaspora investment policies focused on Investment intelligence might reduce Diaspora investors' doubts regarding investment destinations in non-democratic countries lacking investment information. Furthermore, non-democracies frequently experience animosity from foreign communities.

Rodriguez-Montemayor (2018) asserts that the movement of commodities and wealth is unprecedented in today's globalised world. People's ability to migrate across national boundaries has also grown dramatically. Approximately 215 million individuals reside outside of their home country. Many of these Diasporas are building reputations abroad and are eager to return to their hometowns to make investments. In this research, Rodriguez-Montemayor (2018) examined how direct investments from international corporations, which are linked to Diaspora members through businesses owned by Diaspora members or businesses with top executives primarily consisting of Diaspora members, contribute to the production of goods and services in the countries of their origin. It revealed that because of the strong emotional ties that Diaspora people have to their countries of origin, Diaspora investment tends to be more resilient than other forms of FDI during economic uncertainty. Diaspora investment companies are often regarded as pioneers in a nation due to their valuable cultural knowledge and extensive social networks in their home country. This can potentially result in further investments in the homeland as these investors gain market insights and operational expertise. Such engagement has the potential to foster increased investment activities and economic growth.

The possibility of Diasporans participating in transnational entrepreneurial activity is explored by Akiode (2017). Disparities in Diasporans' qualities and motives for global business are studied in the research on transnational entrepreneurship. Even in countries where conducting business is deemed dangerous, there is an awareness of entrepreneurial activities that transcend both countries of origin and residency. The study investigates the variables that impact Diasporans' readiness to engage in global innovation orientation regarding Nigerian institutional possibilities and obstacles. This chapter focuses on Diasporans' financial investments, small business develop-

ment, business connections, and institutionalised entrepreneurial effort to promote the SME sector. The author investigated Diasporas' chance to engage in transnational activities due to their attitudes about such activities, their interests, and the tools they can obtain to perform such activities. According to the research results, Diasporans expressed a significant preference for family assistance instead of feeling obligated to promote the growth of their place of origin.

Furthermore, family networks may protect investments due to their longevity and the foundation of mutual trust. Establishing connections with individuals who have deep links signifies a willingness to participate in activities and gain access to networks that help reduce costs and risks. According to the findings, most investment options are philanthropic and family-oriented, intending to enhance the well-being and wealth of families in general. Risk-taking Diaspora entrepreneurs and individuals are motivated by profit, and they can serve as mentors and Diaspora venture capital to small businesses.

Simandan (2020b) examined the state of economic growth in Africa and found it was strongly influenced by the continent's economic, social, and political history. As a result of externally forced structural adjustment policies and dynamic attributes, economic output, unemployment, and poverty alleviation were not improved. Significant development has been recorded in most African nations since the year 2000. However, this progress has failed to eliminate inequality. The private sector and other economic players like civil society organisations are regulated and organised in several African nations with better development. Large public infrastructure investments and other economic expansion industries drive economic expansion but with a clear urban bias and increasingly more borrowing. The author of this research concludes that Diaspora investment is a critical tool for achieving better economic output, job creation and adapting to globalisation benefits.

Barjami (2019) examines if economic zones like this can draw investment from the Diaspora and whether Kosovo should continue building and promoting this investment plan. The Kosovar Diaspora is a tremendous resource that the country may tap into to further its progress. Massive amounts of remittances have been given to Kosovo by its Diaspora throughout the years, but they have not been put to good use or steered toward development initiatives. Put another way, the country's growth would suffer if it continued to rely on these remittances. According to research that relies on interviews and surveys to gather qualitative and quantitative data, economic zones have advantages and disadvantages. Diaspora businesses desire to work with such

incentives outside the free sectors since they are now operating successfully in the free sectors. On the other hand, economic zones do not seem to address Diaspora firms' worries about investing in Kosovo, and the conservatism of their placement may pose a problem for the Diaspora. This research suggests how economic zones should be governed and how much government involvement is needed in their implementation in Kosovo.

8 Implications

Diaspora investments are more efficient than domestic factors, but their greater export success extends beyond the disparities in efficiency between the two groups. Diaspora investments have one of the most competitive advantages over local investments and foreign multinationals because they have greater access to information about international and regional trade agreements. In addition to sending money back to their home countries, Diaspora investors and entrepreneurs may contribute to the globalisation of the local economy and, in this way, aid in developing their native countries. The findings support the decision made by several African governments and international organisations to pay increasing attention to their Diaspora groups to capitalise on the investment that the African Diaspora reflects and better systematise its charitable donations to Africa's financial activity.

There is room for a particular strategy to stimulate Diaspora investments within conventional FDI promotion strategies. Like any other prospective investor, Diasporans need a favourable business climate, a transparent and efficient financial sector, quick and efficient legal institutions, and a positive working environment. Several factors can enhance the ability of Diasporan members to participate and engage in their homelands, thus facilitating investments. African governments can contribute to this by enhancing the role of embassies in providing information on trade and investment opportunities, improving the effectiveness of embassies in supporting economic and industrial forums to attract Diasporan investors, and promoting the inclusion and accreditation of Diasporan businesses.

9 Conclusion

The Nigerian Diaspora's contribution to economic and social development is the subject of this study. On the theoretical foundations of Appadurai and Dirlik,

we based our examination on diasporic globalisation and wealth. It contests the widely held belief that a Diaspora is a homogeneous group deeply committed and loyal to the homeland. As the author describes in the study, the Nigerian Diaspora has its roots in previous and more recent migration patterns in Africa. However, as the Nigerian state and global economic integration and free enterprise take on new forms, more people from Nigeria are fleeing the country than ever before. In no uncertain terms, technological advances have made it simpler and cheaper for Diasporas to connect, thereby boosting their sense of community. The Diaspora's heterogeneity and homogeneity have also come to the fore in studying the Nigerian Diaspora and national development. The Nigerian Diaspora stems from Nigeria's multicultural and diversified nature and its ongoing struggles for wealth and power, which takes an additional burden of identity wherever it goes. Simultaneously Nigerians who have relocated to other countries and are attempting to maintain their cultural identity have created a variety of new networks and contacts inside the host nation. These complex matters have largely hampered Nigeria's efforts to participate and tap its Diaspora assets for national strategic benefits. The Nigerian government should consider these facts when using Diaspora resources for employment generation. In conclusion, the points above have significant implications on a broader scale, calling for a reassessment of the Nigerian government's current approach to collaborating with the Nigerian Diaspora for economic growth. While the government has made efforts to engage Nigerians living abroad through initiatives such as the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization and the annual observance of Diaspora Day on 25th July, its focus has mainly been attracting national-development remittances. It is crucial to comprehensively understand diasporic trends and adapt engagement strategies to the changing dynamics of globalisation and Diasporas to engage the Nigerian Diaspora effectively. It indicates that multiple factors will come into play as globalisation advances, creating a complex landscape for government-Diaspora engagement.

The growth potential of the Nigerian Diaspora is expected to increase as people's ability to travel, interact, and engage in trade expands. Factors such as societal divisions and political and economic isolation may drive some Nigerians to seek a better life overseas. However, immigration and citizenship restrictions are likely to limit individual mobility. While the characteristics of the Diasporas studied in various research may differ from the Nigerian Diaspora, there is still valuable knowledge to be gained from these studies. To fully harness the potential of the Diaspora's documented and undocumented

remittances, Nigeria needs to create additional channels for its involvement.

Furthermore, conducting further research and gaining a deeper understanding of the Nigerian Diaspora and its role in development can inform policymaking processes. Despite existing studies, articles, reports, and workshops on financial development and economic growth between Africa and host nations, there is a need to further examine diasporic trends within the context of globalisation and Diasporas. Exploring sustainable opportunities that leverage Diaspora transfers can make a difference in Nigeria's current circumstances.

References

- Adebayo K.O., E.T. Njoku 2022. Local and Transnational Identity, Positionality and Knowledge Production in Africa and the African Diaspora. *Field Methods* 35,1. Available at: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1525822X211051574> (Accessed 27 April 2023). <https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X211051574>
- Adebayo, K.O. 2020. Academic (Im)mobility: Ecology of Ethnographic Research and Knowledge Production on Africans in China. *Journal of Higher Education in Africa/ Revue de l'enseignement supérieur en Afrique* 18: 1 – 22. <https://doi.org/10.57054/jhea.v18i1.1451>
- Adebayo, K.O. & F.O. Omololu. 2020. Everywhere is Home: The Paradox of 'Homing' and Child Upbringing among Nigerian-Chinese Families in Guangzhou City. *International Sociology* 35: 241 - 259. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580920905461>
- Adeniyi-Ogunyankin, G. 2019. In/ Out of Nigeria: Transnational Research and the Politics of Identity and Knowledge Production. *Gender, Place & Culture* 26: 1386 - 1401. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2018.1481370>
- African Development Bank 2019. *African Economic Outlook 2018*. Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire: AfDB.
- African Financial Markets Initiative 2014. *Expansion of the Kenyan Bond Market: Interview with Governor, Central Bank of Kenya*. Available at: www.africanbondmarkets.org/en/news-events/african-bondmarket-review/article/expansion-of-the-kenyan-bond-market-52164/ (Accessed on 27 April 2023.)
- Amin, A.A., & A. Ntembe 2021. Sub-Sahara Africa's Higher Education: Financing, Growth, and Employment. *International Journal of Higher*

- Education* 10, 1: 14 - 23. <https://doi.org/10.5430/ijhe.v10n1p14>
- Barjani, D. 2017. *Attracting Investment from Kosovar Diaspora*. Rochester Institute of Technology: RT Scholar Works. Available at: <https://scholarworks.rit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11374&context=theses> (Accessed 27 April 2023).
- Butu, H.M., B.E.K. Nsamon, S.W. Park & J.S. Huh 2021. Leveraging Community-Based Organisations and Fintech to Improve Small-Scale Renewable Energy Financing in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Energy Research & Social Science* 73: 101949. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.101949>
- Didia, D. & S. Tahir 2021. Enhancing Economic Growth and Government Revenue Generation in Nigeria: The Role of Diaspora Remittances. *The Review of Black Political Economy* 49,2: 00346446211025647. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/00346446211025647> (Accessed 27 April 2023).
- Emmanuel, N.D. 2022. Africa and the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Turning a Curse into a Resource through the Prism of Human Capital. In Benyera, E. (ed.): *Africa and the Fourth Industrial Revolution*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87524-4_5
- House-Soremekun, B. 2022. The African Diaspora in the United States. In Oloruntoba, S.O. & T. Falola (eds.): *The Palgrave Handbook of Africa and the Changing Global Order*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77481-3_7
- Mohamed, M.A., A.N. Abdul-Talib & A. Ramlee 2021. Determinants of the Firm Performance of Returnee Entrepreneurs in Somalia: The Effects of External Environmental Conditions. *Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy* August 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JEC-01-2021-0009>
- Motala, A.A., J.C. Mbanya, K. Ramaiya, F.J. Pirie & K. Ekoru 2022. Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus in sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and Opportunities. *Nature Reviews Endocrinology* 18,4: 219 - 229. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41574-021-00613-y> PMID:34983969
- Mwambari, D. 2019. Local Positionality in the Production of Knowledge in Northern Uganda. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 18: 1 - 12. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1609406919864845>
- Njoku, E.T. 2020. Politics of Conviviality? State - Civil Society Relations within the Context of Counterterrorism in Nigeria. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations* 31:1063 – 1076.

- <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9910-9>
- Njoku, E.T. 2021. The State and the Securitisation of Civil Society Organisations in Nigeria. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 51,1: 190 – 215. <https://doi.org/10.1177/08997640211003256>.
- Obadare, E. & W. Adebaniwi 2010. The Visa God: Would-be Migrants and the Instrumentalisation of Religion. In Adogame, A. & J.V. Spickard (eds.): *Religion Crossing Boundaries: Transnational Religious and Social Dynamics in Africa and the New African Diaspora*. (Religion and Social Order 18.) Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
<https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004187306.i-280.11>
- Park, S. 2018. *Another Pathway to Foreign Direct Investment: Diaspora Engagement Policies*. PhD thesis, Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado. Available at:
https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/td96k2606 (Accessed on 27 March 2023.)
- Rodriguez-Montemayor, E. 2017. *Diaspora Direct Investment Policy Options for Development*. Inter-American Bank. Available at:
<https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Diaspora-Direct-Investment-Policy-Options-for-Development.pdf>
(Accessed 27 April 2023).
- Salia, S., J.G. Hussain, Y. Alhassan & M. Ibrahim 2022. The Impact of Entrepreneurship Framework and Behaviour on Diaspora Remittance: An African Perspective. In Kolade, O., D. Rae, D. Obembe & K.W. Beta (eds.): *The Palgrave Handbook of African Entrepreneurship*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75894-3_7
- Simandan, D. 2020a. Beyond Haraway? Addressing Constructive Criticisms to the ‘Four Epistemic Gaps’ Interpretation of Positionality and Situated Knowledge. *Dialogues in Human Geography* 9: 166 - 170.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/2043820619850272>
- Simandan, D. 2020b. Revisiting Positionality and the Thesis of Situated Knowledge. *Dialogues in Human Geography* 9: 129 - 129.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/2043820619850013>
- Taslakian, E.N., K. Garber & S. Shekherdimian 2022. Diaspora Engagement: A Scoping Review of Diaspora Involvement with Strengthening Health Systems of their Origin Country. *Global Health Action* 15, 1: 2009165.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/16549716.2021.2009165>

PMid:34904934 PMCID:PMC8676662

Todd, J.D. 2021. Experiencing and Embodying Anxiety in Spaces of Academia and Social Research. *Gender, Place & Culture* 28: 475 - 496.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2020.1727862>

Yacob-Haliso, O. 2019. Intersectionalities and Access in Fieldwork in Post-conflict Liberia: Motherland, Motherhood, and Minefields. *African Affairs* 118: 168 - 181. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady046>

World Bank 2013. 'A Billion Dollar Idea': Leveraging Migration for Financing Development. Available at:

https://blogs.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/special_topic.pdf

(Accessed 27 April 2023).

Wapmuk, S., O. Akinkuotu & V. Ibonye 2014. The Nigerian Diaspora & National Development: Contributions, Challenges, and Lessons from Other Countries. *Kritika Kultura* 23, 23: 292 - 342.

<https://doi.org/10.13185/KK2014.02318>

Dr. Adelekan Saidi Adedeji

Department of Business Administration

Faculty of Management Sciences

Lagos State University Ojo

Lagos

Nigeria

elevateddeji2@gmail.com

saidi.adelekan@lasu.edu.ng

Acknowledgements

The Editor in Chief of the Diasporean Volumes 1 and 2 and the Editors in Chief of the *Alternation African Scholarship Book Series*, respectively, would like to thank the volume and general editors of this book (Volume II): *The Diasporean II: Perspectives from beyond Southern Africa*, for their dedication and intellectual input into this book project.

We would also like to thank the reviewers for accepting to be part of this book project and working tirelessly under strict timelines to deliver on their mandates. This volume would not have seen the light of day without their due diligence.

We also acknowledge the hard work of the administrators, Dr. Faith Kimathi and Dr. Patrick Ajibade, for diligently keeping the lines of communication with the authors open and ensuring the various iterations of the reviews were kept in safe custody.

The authors who contributed to this volume are also acknowledged and applauded for their outstanding intellectual contributions.

We herewith wish to acknowledge the reviewers, for their critical and constructive inputs and comments towards the publication of this excellent peer reviewed volume, where each chapter was reviewed by at least two independent peer reviewer specialists in the respective fields of scholarship.

Dr. Abigail Rudorwashe Benhura, Dean of Students, Women's University in Africa, Zimbabwe, arbenhura@gmail.com

Dr. Maud Blose, Senior Lecturer, Department of Communication and Media, University of Johannesburg, maudb@uj.ac.za

Dr. Eric Maritim, Bomet University College, Kenya, ericmaritim@gmail.com

Prof. Peterson Dewah, National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe, peterson.dewah@nust.ac.zw

Dr. Henri-Count Evans, Lecturer, Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Eswatini, henricount@gmail.com

Dr. Martin Kabange, Lecturer, Department of Economics, Durban University of Technology, tino_kab4@yahoo.co.za

Ms. Soomaya Khan, Interim Lecturer, The discipline of Public Governance, University of KwaZulu-Natal, khans4@ukzn.ac.za

Dr. Xenia S. Kyriakon , Academia Writing Support, University of Johannesburg, xeniask7@gmail.com

Dr. Takawira Machimbidza, Senior Lecturer, National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe, tmachimbidza@gmail.com

Dr. Rose Mboya, Food security consultant, mujilarose@yahoo.com

Prof. Relebohile Moletsane, Pro-vice Chancellor, Social Cohesion, University of KwaZulu-Natal, moletsaner@ukzn.ac.za

Prof. Betty Mubangizi, NRF Sarchi Chair, Chair Sustainable Local (Rural) Livelihoods, Managing Editor of the *African Journal of Governance and Development* and Guest Editor of the *Loyola Journal of Social Sciences – Poverty and Rural Livelihood*. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Mubangizib@ukzn.ac.za

Dr. Sizo Nkala, Post-doctoral Research, Centre for Africa-China Studies, University of Johannesburg, sizoski2@gmail.com

Dr. Francis Muga Onyando, Senior Lecturer, Agricultural and Rural Engineering Department, University of Venda, francis.onyando@univen.ac.za

Prof. Rajendra Rajaram, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Rajaramr@ukzn.ac.za

Prof. Labby Ramrathan, School of Education, University of KwaZulu-Natal, ramrathanp@ukzn.ac.za

Prof Fayth Ruffin, Honorary Fellow, University of KwaZulu-Natal, ruffin@ukzn.ac.za

Dr. Elvin Shava, Post-doctoral Fellow, University of Johannesburg,
ellyshava@mail.com

Dr. Ntandoyenkosi Sibindi, Senior lecturer, School of Business Studies,
University of Western Cape, South Africa, nsibindi@uwc.ac.za

Dr. Stella L. Shulika, Research Integrity Coordinator and Postdoc Research
Fellow, Durban University of Technology, lukongstella@gmail.com



The Diasporan I: The Southern African Perspectives *The Diasporan II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa*

Editors:



Katie Mutula

The idea to write a book centred on the Diaspora was conceived by the late Katie Musungu Mutula, who was pursuing a doctoral degree in international economics at the School of Accounting, Economics and Finance at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. This book has been written to recognise her intellectual thought and input in this project – may her soul rest in eternal peace!



Stephen Mutula

This volume contributes to co-creating knowledge on Diaspora while bridging the gap between research and practice. The book is aimed at scholars, the academe, students, international partners, business, civil society, government, industry and non-professionals who wish to understand or reference their personal experiences and critical and constructive reflections on the Diaspora.

Advanced Recommendations

In two volumes, *The Diasporan I & II* (2023) delve into the depths of critical intellectual enquiry using inter- and multi-disciplinary lenses to achieve considerable depth into a topic many scholars have stayed clear from. The books unearth critical issues dovetailed into the social, economic and political contextual nuances engraved onto Africa's reality, and grappled with the framework espoused in the Agenda 2063 *'The Africa We Want'*. *Prof Kelvin Joseph Bwaiya Sohar, University, Sultanate of Oman*

In a world shaped by the monumental events of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of apartheid, *The Diasporan I & II* unravel the complexities of intra-African and global migration. Crucial themes such as financial integration, xenophobia, gender roles, technology and skills transfer, and the impact of the digital economy, provide thoughtful, comprehensive and insightful analyses, for the comprehensive understanding, advancement of knowledge, and informed policymaking, on this currently world-changing phenomenon. *Professor Wole Michael Olatokun, Dean, Faculty of Multidisciplinary Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria*

The Diasporan I & II serve as a poignant examination of the intersectionality within the socio-economic and political realms of the African diaspora. They provide lenses for contemplating the intricacies of financial outflows, the ramifications of xenophobia, diverse gender dynamics, and the paramount importance of human life. The authors succinctly capture these complexities, rendering it a relevant and engaging read for those intrigued by the multifaceted dimensions of the African diaspora. *Professor Johannes J. Britz, PhD, Interim Senior Vice President, Universities of Wisconsin Office of Academic and Student Affairs, Madison, WI 53706.*

CSSALL, Durban

ISBN: 978-0-9869937-6-3