

# THE DIASPOREAN I: THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES

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EDITOR:  
**Stephen Mutula**



*Alternation African Scholarship Book Series, Volume #15*









The *Diasporean I* and *Diasporean II* research project, and two published book volumes, are dedicated to the memory of Katie Mutula (1991 - 2021).



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- Mutula, S.M. (ed.). 2024. *The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa. Volume #16.*
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*The Diasporean I:  
The Southern African  
Perspectives*

Editor

Stephen M. Mutula

2024

CSSALL  
Durban

Published in 2024 in South Africa

CSSALL Publishers (Pty) Ltd  
c/o POSTNET SUITE 158  
Private Bag X9118  
Pietermaritzburg  
KwaZulu-Natal  
3200

Email: [cssall123@gmail.com](mailto:cssall123@gmail.com)  
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*Alternation African Scholarship Book Series Volume #15*  
© CSSALL Publishers (Pty) Ltd

Title: *The Diasporean I: The Southern African Perspectives.*  
Editor: Stephen M. Mutula

ISBN: 978-0-9869937-5-6  
DOI number: <https://doi.org/10.29086/978-0-9869937-5-6/2024/AASBS15>  
BOOK URL: <http://alternation.ukzn.ac.za/books/series/The-Diasporean-I-The-Southern-Africa-Perspectives.aspx>

Cover design by Imvelo Siphamandla Zimu, [ZimuI@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:ZimuI@ukzn.ac.za)  
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Printed and bound by Print Connection, Tel (031) 202-7766

# Preface

World-historical events such as the fall of the Berlin wall, and the fall of ideologies such as apartheid, opened borders for world travel and the global movements of people, like seldom before. Often driven to move away from drought and disaster-prone geographical areas, some people also move to new countries in search for better education, working, or health opportunities. For whichever decisions people move, and especially when they move with their immediate family, such movements themselves are often perilous, in addition to which one then has to set up a home, and become a member of the population of the new country of adoption.

Conceptualised by the late Katie Mutula, these two volumes of *The Diasporean*, are together, simultaneously, a prime sample of research excellence, and the power of interdisciplinary research, focused on such a fluid social and historical phenomenon as human movement, migration, as well as challenges that accompany our diaspora communities of the world. *The Diasporean I: The Southern African Perspectives*, covers five main sections, all together presenting 11 exceptional chapters. The main topics covered are,

- financial integration, that covers issues related to financial development dynamics in both home and host countries, and access to credit;
- xenophobia and Afriphobia in the contexts of increasing forms of local nativisms and populist xenophobia on social media; and family language policies of home country languages;
- feminisation and gendered roles in migration, within transnational relations; how it impacts family life, and how diasporean experiences are also in themselves gendered, in the transnational space; and
- the significance of technology and skills transfer for developing sustainable livelihoods, and also the significance of education, in this context, especially postgraduate education.
- The final chapter in *The Diasporean I*, covers food security challenges that migrants experience in South Africa.

*The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa*, likewise cover five main thematic focuses. These are the study of,

- existing diaspora policy in Africa, including how these determine challenges concerning ‘capital structure’ and the growth of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Africa, as well as philanthropy in rural areas; and how
- foreign remittances bring data and related arguments to the fore, on the impact of COVID-19 on remittances, the nature, size and scale of foreign remittances from elite migrants, and how remittances also impact rural development in home countries.
- Section three develops topics on immigration policy, analyzing how diasporians’ human dignity is harmed in how they are portrayed and framed in the press, how it impacts family structures and careers, and how repatriation or deportation are portrayed by the online press in South Africa and in Britain.
- This is followed by a section on the notion of the ‘brain drain’ and skills transfer related to possibilities for multi-sectoral collaboration in the medical field, and challenges of skills transfer in diaspora contexts.
- The final section on the digital economy, addresses the acceleration of the digital economies world-wide during the COVID-19 pandemic, and investment opportunities that accompany the diaspora movements of peoples.

Each in its own way, but also as a two-volume collaborative research project, *The Diasporian I* and *The Diasporian II*, are comprehensive and are the result of incisive scholarship in a critical field of study both in South Africa and Africa more further afield.

We are thankful, that Prof. Stephen M. Mutula and the team who was working with the late Katie Mutula, saw the project through to its conclusion. The project itself as well as the quality of the research for the two volumes, stand as a testimony to Katie’s character and a monument in her name on behalf of all those mentioned or not mentioned, who formed part of the project, and too, those who have passed on due to migratory experiences, and the nameless ones, who got lost at sea or in sandy deserts or forests or strange countries.

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# CHAPTER 1 - Editorial

## The Diasporean I: The Southern African Perspectives

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The UN International Organisation on Migration regularly provides snapshots of global statistics on migration trends and finance outflows, especially to low- and middle-income countries, which often exceeds the official development assistance provided. These monies are contributed by migrants who have moved to the host countries on account of, among other factors, forcible displacement from their homes due to persecution, conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations, disasters, or other reasons such as education, job opportunities, natural and social disasters. Some migrants end up in the host countries as refugees, and others lose their lives during migration.

International migration, therefore, continues to pose great challenges but also generates opportunities for the migrants' home and host countries that may be attributed to many factors, including globalisation. The complexity and multidimensional nature of international migration call for robust policy and practical interventions to manage the Diaspora phenomenon humanely and profitably for the common global public good. There is also a need to develop pragmatic strategies to ensure that the global community of nations are strategically positioned to attract and retain productive human capital in different professional and technical fields. This publication of This publication of '*The Diasporean*<sup>1</sup>: *The Southern Africa Perspectives*', Volume 1, was conceived and written from inter-, multi-, trans and cross-disciplinary perspectives. This approach was followed because not all the complex problems on international

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'Diasporean' is not a commonly used word, but it can be used to describe individuals who have been impacted by diaspora and maintain a connection to their original culture and community.

mobility and migration are amenable to a single disciplinary perspective. This volume presents both theoretical and empirical chapters. The chapters published in this volume were each peer-reviewed by at least two experts in the relevant fields. The list of reviewers and their affiliations has been provided.

The idea to write a book centred on the Diaspora was conceived by the late Katie Musungu Mutula, who was pursuing a doctoral degree in international economics at the School of Accounting, Economics and Finance at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. This book has been written to recognise her intellectual thought and input in this project – may her soul rest in eternal peace!

This volume contributes to co-creating knowledge on Diaspora while bridging the gap between research and practice. The book is aimed at scholars, the academe, students, international partners, business, civil society, government, industry and non-professionals who wish to understand or reference their personal experiences in the Diaspora.



Volume 1 of this publication, *The Diasporean I: The Southern African Perspectives*, is divided into five sections containing 11 chapters. Section I covers Financial Integration and has two chapters.

The first chapter, is ‘Regional Financial Integration and Financial Development in the Southern African Development Community: Implications on Diaspora Remittance Inflows’. It was authored by Nomusa Ndlovu and Forget Mingiri Kapingura, and Asrat Tsegaye. The second chapter is titled ‘Access to Credit from Formal Financial Institutions: A Case Study of Ethiopian Migrant Entrepreneurs in Durban, South Africa’, written by Perminus Moinogu.

Section II broadly covers the subject of Xenophobia and Afriphobia in Southern Africa. It presents three inextricably linked chapters. The first is ‘Migrants in the Face of Growing Nativism and Xenophobia: South African Experiences, authored by Sybert Mutereko’. The second chapter is titled ‘A Critical Analysis of Populism and Xenophobic Discourse on Social Media in South Africa: A Case of @Operation Dudula and PutSouthAfricansFirst Twitter Accounts’, written by Tigere Paidamoyo Muringa. The third chapter is titled ‘Family Language Policy in a Xenophobic Context: The Case of Kalanga Transnational Families in South Africa’. Busani Maseko and Dion Nkomo are the co-authors.



Section III considers Feminisation and Gendered Roles in Migration featured in three chapters. The first is ‘Reconstruction of Gender Roles and Relations among Somali Women within the Transnational Context of South Africa’, co-authored by Anthony Gathambiri Waiganjo and Janet Muthuki. The second is titled ‘Feminisation of Migration Impacting Family Life: Zimbabwean Female Migrant Cases in South Africa’, written by Mfazo Clifford Madondo. The third chapter, ‘Gendered Challenges Facing Somali Migrant Women within Transnational Contexts in South Africa’, was authored by Anthony Gathambiri Waiganjo.

Section IV presents two chapters about Technology and Skills Transfer. The first is titled ‘Relevance of Migrants’ Technical Skills for Sustainable Livelihood: A Case of Low-Skilled Zimbabwean Migrants in Botswana’s Southeast District’. Jerald Hondonga, Manto Sylvia Ramaligela, and Moses Makgato co-authored it. The second chapter, ‘Prospects and Challenges of Postgraduate Education in the Diaspora: A Case of Ugandan Returnee Students from South Africa’, was co-authored by Clement Nabutto Lutaaya and Gorrety Maria Juma.

Section V of this volume is on food security and presents one chapter titled ‘The Food Security Challenges of African Immigrants in South Africa: A Literature Review’, co-authored by Adetayo Olorunlana and Aloysius Odii.

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**SECTION I**  
**FINANCIAL INTEGRATION**



# CHAPTER 2

## Regional Financial Integration and Financial Sector Development in the Southern African Development Community: Implications on Diaspora Remittance Inflows

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### Abstract

The chapter investigates the effect of regional financial integration on financial development and its interaction with Diaspora remittance inflows in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region from 2006 to 2018. The study employed *de jure* and *de facto* indicators of financial integration, whilst financial development is measured using credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. The econometric analysis utilises the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Results show that the *de facto* measure of financial integration has a significant positive impact on financial development, whilst *de jure* indicators give mixed and insignificant results. However, given that literature shows that *de facto* indicators are robust compared to *de jure* indicators, it is concluded that the impact of financial integration on financial development is positive and linear. The authors of this chapter also analyse the interaction between financial sector development and Diaspora remittance flows by employing panel Granger Causality Tests, which show a bi-directional causality between financial sector development and Diaspora remittance flows

in the SADC region. These findings suggest that innovations in the financial sector influence Diaspora remittance inflows and vice-versa. Thus, the authors of this chapter recommend that governments of member states in the SADC region formulate and implement policies that enhance financial integration. This action may involve financial institutions opening branches in any country within the region, allowing remitters to remit at lower transaction costs and have implications for economic growth and poverty alleviation.

**Keywords:** financial sector development, financial integration, migration, remittances, Southern African Development Community, Generalized Method of Moments.

## **1 Introduction**

The financial integration – financial sector development nexus has received much attention in recent years. On the one hand, evidence shows that financial integration stimulates financial development. This perspective's main argument is primarily based on the premise that financial integration improves financial system efficiency and depth, thereby eliminating distortions in the financial system. This stance implies that financial integration reduces transaction costs, stimulating the use of financial services and thus allowing many participants to partake in the formal financial system. The evidence further shows that countries characterised by developed and integrated financial markets have greater levels of investment, a more vibrant business environment, and higher living standards (Alotaibi 2014). It is also argued that financial markets provide, amongst others, a channel through which funds are transferred from surplus to deficit units effectively. In other words, as financial markets develop, users and suppliers of capital connect at lower costs, thus increasing the level of investment in an economy (Levine 1997; Mishkin 2006; Pathak 2010).

Eyraud, Singh, and Sutton (2017) highlight that numerous benefits come with financial integration. These authors argue that financial integration allows savers and borrowers to invest and borrow domestically and abroad. The benefits of financial integration manifest in many ways, including greater access to a pool of funds (Nokaneng 2009). In addition, Ntlemeza and Kapingura (2019) postulate that regional financial integration enhances access to efficient and liquid financial sectors. This stance promotes investment and stimulates growth (Bong & Pramaratne 2019; Eyraud *et al.* 2017).

Theoretically, two contrasting views exist on the link between financial integration and financial development. These are the complementarity and the substitutability view. The complementarity view is based on the notion that financial integration augments domestic financial development. On the other hand, the substitutability view argues that financial integration may provide an alternative to financial development (Aziakpono, Burger & Plessis 2009; Jeanne and Gourinchas 2004).

In addition, the literature also shows that financial integration deters financial development. In inefficient markets, economic agents bypass the local financial sector and utilise more efficient foreign financial systems to satisfy their needs. This process can then mop up liquidity from the domestic financial system (Shahbaz, Mallick, Mahalik & Hammoudeh 2018). The empirical literature also shows that the interaction between financial integration and financial development hinges on institutional quality and the legal environment (Chinn & Ito 2006; Elkhuizen, Hermes, Jacobs & Meesters 2018). These diverging views show that there is generally a lack of consensus on the interaction between financial integration and financial development.

Literature also indicates that the financial sector has increasingly become recognised or acknowledged as one of the most important determinants of Diaspora finance (Bangake & Eggoh 2020; Fromentin 2017). Financial sector development is argued to be an essential determinant of remittance prices (Freund & Spatafora 2008; Uddin, Ichihashi & Barua 2022). The financial development of home countries influences migrants' decision to remit or to send money home through formal channels (Bang, Mitra & Wunnava 2015; Pandikasala, Vyas and Mani 2020). Financial sector development will likely improve immigrants' confidence in their home countries, resulting in lower transaction costs and thus increasing the frequency and magnitude of remittances (Nsiah, Fayissa & Wu 2019).

Literature contends that adverse financial conditions in countries of origin may lead migrants to remit funds to assist their families in compensating for their lack of access to financial markets and institutions (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2009; Issahaku 2019). This form of assistance implies that remittances may play a substitution role for the financial intermediation role. In line with this, Diaspora remittances are a crucial source of household income in some countries in the SADC region. However, the cost of remitting to and within the SADC region is significantly higher than in other regions worldwide (World Bank 2018). Historically, remittances to Africa are accompanied by high

transactional costs.

Strengthening the role of financial institutions and lowering transaction costs in cross-border transactions can encourage migrants to remit through formal channels (Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt & Pería 2011). Currently, formal channels of remitting are characterised by high transaction costs. They are not easily accessible to undocumented migrants in countries like South Africa and are unaffordable to low-income migrants who desire to send money to their home countries. As a result, these migrants always prefer the informal route as it does not have as many obstacles as the formal route. However, as much as informal channels are convenient and affordable, they are risky. Hence, formal remittance channels must be encouraged (World Bank 2018). One way to do this is through developing financial sectors in receiving countries.

## ***1.1 Background***

Understanding the importance of the relationship between regional financial integration and financial sector development, as well as its link with Diaspora remittances, is an area of importance for the SADC region, which has been pursuing different financial reforms aimed at enhancing financial development in member countries and, consequently, regional economic growth (SADC 2022). However, the region's financial development level remains low (Moyo and Le Roux 2020; Sulemana & Dramani 2020). Le Roux, Mutonhori, Nyamutowa and Abel (2019) also explain that the financial system in SADC remains unstable, so growth is likely to be adversely affected. The SADC region's average credit remains low compared to other regions, such as Latin America, East Asia, and the Caribbean (Mahawiya 2015; Sulamana & Dramani 2020). The level of financial development in the SADC region, as measured by domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP), remains low for most SADC member states except South Africa, Mauritius, and Namibia. As of 2018, South Africa, Mauritius, and Namibia's domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP) was 138.79, 78.25, and 66.96, respectively. Furthermore, countries such as Angola, DRC, Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania have levels of financial development that remained significantly below 50% (World Bank 2022). This figure indicates that the region's financial sector is still underdeveloped.

The need to use formal channels arises because such can promote economic development in the recipient country by supplying earnings to the domestic financial sector, thus making more resources available in the form of



loanable funds (Demirgüç-Kunt, Córdova, Pería & Woodruff 2011). In addition, using formal channels may lead individuals to utilise other formal financial services, such as savings, which can accelerate financial development. In a way, it suggests that mechanisms to develop the financial sector will go a long way in encouraging the use of formal channels when remitting (Demirgüç-Kunt *et al.* 2011).

As already highlighted, the literature indicates that financial integration contributes toward financial development, lowering transaction costs and increasing volumes of remittances. Based on this, the study investigated the impact of financial integration on financial development in the SADC region. The analysis further examined the interaction between financial sector development and remittance inflows in SADC.

This study adds to the literature by analysing the impact of regional financial integration on the development of the financial sector in the SADC region. Moreover, the causal relationship between Diaspora remittance inflows and regional financial sector development is examined. The study employed the GMM technique, given the endogeneity problem with the variables at hand. The findings from the study show that financial integration has a positive impact on domestic financial development. The panel Granger Causality Test results also revealed a bi-directional causality between Diaspora remittance inflows and financial sector development in the SADC region. These results have implications for remittance inflows, given that the development of the financial sector will likely reduce the costs of Diaspora remittances and increase their volume to countries of origin. In addition, remittance inflows are likely to enhance the development of the financial sector. Thus, increasing the volume of remittances in SADC member states will likely improve economic growth and development, alleviate poverty, and reduce financial exclusion.

The study comprises the following sections: Following the first section, which covers the introduction, background, and stylised facts on Diaspora remittances and migration, the second section provides a review of relevant literature. The third section presents the study's methodology, whilst the fourth section presents and describes the results. Finally, the fifth section provides the conclusion and policy recommendations of the study.

## ***1.2 Diaspora Remittances and Migration: Stylised Facts***

Migration is defined as the movement of people across the boundaries of their

countries of origin (Ratha, Kim, Plalooked, Seshan, Shaw & Yameogo 2019). In other words, migrants are people who move from their countries to other countries for employment purposes or political reasons, amongst other reasons. Remittances refer to money or goods migrants send to their countries of origin (Gelb, Kalantaryan, McMahon & Perez-Fernandez 2021). Diaspora remittances are important for poverty alleviation and economic growth and development.

Diaspora remittances have become indispensable to growth and development for most developing economies. They appear to be a stable source of income compared to foreign direct investment (FDI) (De, Islamaj & Yousefi 2015; Ratha 2019). Diaspora remittances have increasingly become a significant component of international capital inflows to Africa. According to the World Bank (2021), regardless of COVID-19 in 2020, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries remained resilient. The World Bank further explained that Diaspora remittances flowing to sub-Saharan Africa fell during the 2020 period, although this decline was mostly due to a decrease in remittances to Nigeria. When Nigeria was excluded, Diaspora remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa rose 2.3% (World Bank 2021). During this period, Diaspora remittance inflows were expected to decrease because most African migrants often work within the service and hospitality sectors, which were affected by lockdown restrictions in host countries. In addition, mobility shutdowns and restrictions in host countries were expected to result in a decline in remittance flows.

The observed increase in Diaspora remittance flows during COVID-19 could be due to the rising use of formal channels by migrants, given that they could not continue using informal channels. For example, in Zimbabwe, remittances have become an integral source of foreign currency. Remittances transferred formally from the Diaspora to Zimbabwe rose from USD 636 million (2019) to USD one billion (2020) (Economist Intelligence Unit 2021). Formal channels in Zimbabwe remained operational during the COVID-19 pandemic, whilst informal channels were largely closed to the Diaspora, like sending money home via bus drivers, as almost all countries shut their borders (Economist Intelligence Unit 2021).

In addition, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) (2020) shows that in respect of emigrants from Southern Africa, about 64% are within Africa, 22% are in Europe, and 7% are in Northern America, and 6% in Oceania. The portal went further to show that the top five

destinations for emigrants from Southern Africa are South Africa (23%), the UK (9%), Uganda (6%), the USA (5%), and France (5%). In SADC, South Africa is recognised as an economic hub with large volumes of Diaspora remittances flowing from South Africa to various counterparts. Many of these Diaspora remittances are sent informally through cross-border buses and mini-buses (Finmark 2016). Total remittances from South Africa to SADC counterparts were approximately R 21.87 billion by 2018 (Finmark 2020). Of these Diaspora remittances, 52% are estimated to be remitted informally, showing the need for developed financial institutions and lower transaction costs to encourage increased use of formal channels. It is also interesting to note that at a global level, as of 2019, Southern African countries received around seven billion USD in Diaspora remittance inflows (UN DESA 2020). These statistics indicate that remittance inflows are indeed one of the main sources of foreign capital, contributing greatly to income for households in developing countries.

## **2 Literature Review**

### **2.1 Theoretical Literature**

The McKinnon and Shaw Model was the framework used to analyse how financial integration impacts financial sector development, which aligns with studies such as (Tembo 2018). The model suggests that the financial sector will stagnate under financial repression. However, financial liberalisation will develop the financial sector as economic agents shift investments from real to financial assets. In addition, financial liberalisation removes capital controls, leading to increased capital inflows and easier access to foreign markets. Also, financial liberalisation encourages foreign banks to enter the domestic market, which may increase competition (Jappelli & Pagano 2008). Through this competition, households and firms of countries characterised by underdeveloped financial sectors will benefit from access to financial services at lower costs, improving financial deepening. Literature suggests that financial integration is another form of financial liberalisation. Tembo (2018) indicates that financial integration will likely increase investment inflows as local firms have access to international markets, and foreign firms invest in domestic markets, expanding domestic financial sectors.

### **2.2 Empirical Literature**

The available literature on financial integration suggests that it has the potential

to boost economic growth both directly and indirectly. One such indirect channel is the financial sector development channel (Mahajan & Verma 2015; Aziakpono 2013). Allegret and Azzabi (2014) indicate that financial openness, which can be achieved through financial integration, improves the efficiency and depth of the financial sectors. However, several authors contend that financial development is a precondition for financial integration (Fetai 2015; Chen & Quang 2014; Kose, Prasad & Taylor 2011). Two contrasting views regarding the relationship between financial integration and financial development exist. More specifically, these views are on the matter as to whether financial integration is an alternative to domestic financial development or complements it (Aziakpono *et al.* 2009; Jeanne and Gourinchas 2004).

### *2.2.1 Financial Openness as a Complement for Financial Sector Development*

Financial openness may stimulate domestic financial sector development through competitive pressures on the domestic financial sector. The openness of financial markets affects financial development through its ability to increase competition (Jappelli & Pagano 2008; Baltagi Demetriades & Law 2009; Tovar-Garcia 2012). As a result of this competition, households and firms from countries with less developed financial sectors will gain access to low-cost financial services, thus stimulating financial depth. Harmonisation of national regulation is another channel through which financial integration will influence the development of financial systems (Jappelli & Pagano 2008; Stavárek, Řepková & Gajdošová 2012). Also, the entry of foreign banks into the domestic economy helps stabilise financial systems and facilitates technology transfer. It will boost financial sector efficiency and, in doing so, stimulate the development of domestic financial sectors.

Furthermore, Lee and Chou (2018) have shown that improved financial integration stimulates financial development in emerging economies compared to advanced economies. The authors emphasise the importance of strict bank regulation, supervision, and institutional quality. Elkhuisen *et al.* (2018) further highlight that institutional quality is a vital precondition for financial integration to yield positive benefits. This precondition implies that poor institutional-quality countries may not benefit from financial openness (Chinn & Ito 2006; Rajan & Zangales 2003).

### *2.2.2 Financial Integration as a Substitute for Financial Development*

Literature also indicates that financial integration can weaken the domestic financial sector. It normally happens when economic agents bypass an inefficient local financial sector to access foreign markets, which are, in most cases, more efficient in satisfying their financial needs (Aziakpono *et al.* 2009). Moreover, financial integration may lead to an outflow of savings from economies with weak financial institutions to foreign markets with strong financial systems. Consequently, this increases the cost of acquiring financial services, particularly for small businesses, thus depressing the domestic financial market (Jeanne & Gourinchas 2004).

### *2.2.3 Financial Development and Diaspora Remittances*

Theoretically, variations in wage rates and prevailing economic circumstances in the home nation and the host determine Diaspora remittance inflows (El-Sakka & McNabb 1999; Ahmad, Hussan, Sial, Hussain & Akram 2008). Financial development is among the variables identified in the literature as a determinant of Diaspora remittance inflows (Adenutsi & Ahoritor 2021). Two views emerge from the literature about the financial development-remittance nexus. First, the substitutability view argues that Diaspora remittances create a substitute for credit markets, especially if the receiving country's financial sector is underdeveloped. Studies like Opperman and Adjasi (2019) and Uddin and Sjo (2013) confirm this view. In contrast, there is the complementary hypothesis, which postulates that Diaspora remittance inflows may stimulate the financial development of the receiving country (Aggarwal *et al.* 2011; Bangake and Eggoh 2020; Fromentin 2017; Kakhkharovoc & Rohde 2020).

The empirical literature on the impact of financial development on Diaspora remittance inflows suggests that developed financial systems attract such inflows. Tabit and Moussir (2016) investigated factors determining Diaspora remittances in the case of developing countries and found that financial development significantly influenced Diaspora remittance inflows for the countries concerned. This finding aligns with Adenutsi, Aziakpono, and Ocran (2012), who indicate that financial sector development encourages Diaspora remittance inflows through formal channels like banks in countries characterised by well-developed and sophisticated financial sectors.

The literature review indicates no consensus regarding the relationship

between financial integration and financial development. Also, there are divergent views on the relationship between financial development and Diaspora remittances. It is worth noting that the greater population benefits from Diaspora remittances in the SADC region, just like in other parts of the African community, are generally excluded from the formal financial sector and cannot borrow from the formal banking sector. Thus, the study adds to the ongoing discussion on the financial integration-financial development nexus and how it influences Diaspora remittance inflows.

### **3 Methodology**

This section describes the approach utilised in investigating the effect of financial integration on financial development and the interaction between financial development and remittance inflows.

#### **3.1 Data and Sample**

The panel data set employed in this chapter included 14 SADC countries (Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Eswatini, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania, South Africa, and Zambia). This panel data spans from 2006 to 2018. Data on financial development, trade openness, GDP per capita, inflation, and institutional quality was collected from the World Bank, whilst data on financial integration was obtained from Chinn and Ito (2006) (updated in 2019) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) websites.

#### **3.2 Model Specification and Variable Description**

The study followed the works of Ayadi, Arbak, Naceur, and De Groen (2015) to investigate the determinants of financial development in the SADC region. A wide range of independent variables was examined, as shown in Equation 1, to accomplish the study's objective. The baseline economic model for financial development is specified in Equation 1 below:

$$FD_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FD_{it-1} + \beta_2 LGDPPK_{it} + \beta_4 IQ_{it} + \beta_5 INF_{it} + \beta_6 TOP_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \dots (1)$$

Financial integration variables were introduced into the model, as proxied by *de*

*jure* (KAOPEN index) and *de facto* (LFI) indicators. The model takes the following form:

$$FD_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FD_{it-1} + \beta_2 FI_{it} + \beta_3 LGDPPK_{it} + \beta_4 IQ_{it} + \beta_5 INF_{it} + \beta_6 TOP_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \dots \dots \dots (2)$$

Where FD is financial sector development, FI is financial integration (which is shown as either KAOPEN or LFI). TOP represents trade openness, whilst LGDPPK is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. IQ is institutional quality measured by the political stability index, while INF is inflation. The study further evaluated if the influence of financial integration on financial development was linear or non-linear by adding a quadratic term of financial integration:

$$FD_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FD_{it-1} + \beta_2 FI2_{it} + \beta_3 Z_{it}^2 + \beta_4 LGDPPK_{it} + \beta_5 IQ_{it} + \beta_6 INF_{it} + \beta_7 TOP_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \dots \dots \dots (3)$$

Where  $FI2_{it}$  represents the quadratic term of financial integration.

### **3.3 Variable Definitions and A Priori Expectations**

**Financial development** is the dependent variable. Literature has shown that financial sectors in Africa are dominated by the banking sector (Andrianavo & Yartey 2010; Tembo 2018). As a result, this study measures financial sector development using credit to the private sector (% of GDP).

**Financial Integration:** There are three different proxies for financial integration, *de facto*, *de jure*, and hybrid (blended) measures. The study employed both the *de facto* and *de jure* measures. The most used *de facto* measure is the total foreign financial assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2003, 2007). Specifically, the study adopted the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti measure and the KAOPEN index to proxy financial openness. The KAOPEN index was introduced by Chinn and Ito (2006). The KAOPEN index has been widely used in literature (Arif-Ur-Rahman & Inaba 2020; Fan, Mohtadi, and Neumann 2014). Mahajan and Verma (2015) note that the Lane

and Milesi-Ferretti *de facto* measure is consistent when compared to *de jure* measures (the rule base measures). The Lane and Milesi-Ferretti indicator is the stock of a country's foreign assets plus liabilities as a share of GDP. The study employed two different proxies of financial integration and their quadratic term for robust results.

Other control variables employed in the study were the log of GDP per capita, institutional quality as measured by the political stability index, trade openness, and inflation.

### **3.4 Estimation Techniques**

The analysis began with investigating the impact of financial integration on financial development using GMM. Based on these findings, the second analysis stage focused on establishing the relationship between financial sector development and Diaspora remittance inflows in the SADC region. Literature has highlighted that financial development encourages the Diaspora to remit formally rather than informally. Thus, if financial integration improves financial development, that would imply an increase in Diaspora remittance inflows.

#### **3.4.1 General Method of Moments (GMM)**

The study employed panel GMM developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) in investigating the impact of financial integration on financial development. This technique was employed due to its ability to control for endogeneity problems. Roodman (2006) states that 'the Arellano-Bond (1991) generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator was designed for panels with 'small T and large N''. In this study, N was greater than T, thus making GMM an appropriate technique. The Arellano and Bond estimator takes the first difference to eliminate the individual effects and then uses information  $y_{it}$  as an instrument; hence it is known as a difference GMM. According to Baum (2013), 'the difference GMM approach deals with endogeneity by transforming the data to remove the fixed effects'. This approach is consistent in the absence of second-order serial correlation. The Arellano-Bond test was utilised to check that there was no second-order serial correlation, whilst Sargan's test was employed to test for over-identification.



### 3.4.2 Granger Causality Test

A panel Granger Causality Test was also conducted to analyse the possible causal link between financial sector development and Diaspora remittance inflows. This model took the following form:

$$REM_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^p \delta_{ij} REM_{it-k} + \sum_{k=1}^p \delta_{2k} FD_{it-k} \Delta u_{1it} \dots \dots \dots (4)$$

$$FD_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^p \gamma_{ij} FD_{it-k} + \sum_{k=1}^p \gamma_{2k} REM_{it-k} \Delta u_{2it} \dots \dots \dots (5)$$

Equation 4 tests the hypothesis that Diaspora remittance inflows (REM) granger causes financial sector development (FD) if  $\delta_{2k} \neq 0 \forall i$ . Alternatively, Equation 5 tests the view that financial sector development (FD) granger causes Diaspora remittance inflows (REM) if  $\gamma_{2k} \neq 0 \forall i$ . Due to missing observations, broad money supply (BM) was utilised to measure financial sector development. It was not possible to estimate both Equations 4 and 5 with credit to the private sector.

## 4 Presentation and Analysis of Empirical Results

Table 1 presents the GMM results obtained when credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP is employed as a proxy for financial sector development.

The empirical results confirmed that current levels of financial development depend on their immediate past value or previous lags. The baseline regression results have shown that the lagged dependent variables, economic development (LGDPK), institutional quality (IQ), and trade openness (TOP), are significant factors determining the level of financial sector development. Trade openness has a positive and statistically significant impact on financial development. These findings concurred with Asongu and De Moor (2017). Institutional quality displayed mixed results, which were, however, mostly insignificant. The insignificance of the variable could be attributed to the overall low levels of institutional quality in SADC member states.

As explained in the methodology section, two proxies of financial integration have been employed in this study. Looking at the *de facto* measure (LFI), financial integration positively and significantly impacts financial development. It implies that financial sectors in the SADC region will benefit

from removing and lowering barriers in the movement of financial flows within and outside the region.

**Table 1: GMM Results**

	BASELINE	LFI	LFI 2	KAOPEN	KAOPEN 2
FD (-1)	0.541185*	0.053548	0.047637	0.348566*	0.021996***
LGDPK	0.949711**	0.749583*	0.865176**	0.612135*	0.988692**
INF	-0.337734	-0.371582	-0.363108	-1.024158	-0.583729
TOP	0.556083*	0.599919**	0.604561**	0.288986*	0.214915
IQ	4.220922*	4.255384	4.304457	-4.264458	-3.464878
LFI		0.671875**	0.976858**		
LFI2			0.893135**		
KAOPEN				-0.73325	0.167849
KAOPEN 2					1.962901
JSTATS (P-VALUE)	0.281423	0.750897	0.449100	0.477327	0.317102
AR (2)	0.5239	0.5183	0.8052	0.0318	

The findings also imply that financial openness could improve the supply of finance in underdeveloped markets, thus enhancing financial depth. This finding contradicts the substitution hypothesis, as Aziakpono (2013) and Jeane and Gourinchas (2004) indicated that financial integration could substitute for financial development. These results also confirmed the findings by Ahmed (2016), who suggested that financial integration positively affects financial development by enhancing technological diffusion and stimulating financial innovation. When the non-linear impact of financial integration on financial development was investigated, LFA2 displayed a significant positive coefficient. These results show a linear relationship between the two variables concerned.

Meanwhile, the *de jure* (KAOPEN) measure employed in the study had an insignificant influence on financial development. Because *de jure* indicators are rule-based, this result might mean that formulated policies are not always implemented. In other words, *de jure* (KAOPEN) measures are less reflective because the SADC countries fail to enforce set capital controls. The quadratic term (KAOPEN2) displayed insignificant mixed results. As previously mentioned, *de jure* measures are not as robust (Mahajan & Vermar 2015); hence the authors have concluded based on the results from the *de facto* indicator.

### 4.1 Robustness Checks

Broad money (BM) as a share of GDP was employed as a measure of financial sector development for the robust test, which is in line with Tembo (2018). The results are presented in Table 2 below.

**Table 2: GMM Results: Broad Money Supply as a Percentage of GDP as a Measure of Financial Sector Development**

	BASELINE	LFI	LFI 2	KAOPEN	KAOPEN 2
BM (-1)	0.651592**	0.444944**	0.115539*	0.185962*	0.343215***
LGDPK	0.999210**	0.648285*	0.745495*	0.916581*	0.544313**
INF	-0.139274	0.432179	0.425854	0.088567	0.797262
TOP	0.235620*	0.677939**	0.682321**	0.244167*	0.519918**
IQ	-1.592003	-4.100733	-4.162311	-0.873008	0.933534
LFI		0.562458*	0.652387**		
LFI2			0.237810*		
KAOPEN				7.049825	15.41725
KAOPEN 2					11,57361
JSTATS (PVALUE)	0.246682	0.987027	0.877510	0.233568	
AR (2)	0.7976	0.1453	0.2134	0.8970	

The findings in Table 2 support the earlier results presented in Table 1 in that the *de facto* financial integration measure positively affects financial sector development. However, the *de jure* measure (KAOPEN) and its quadratic term still show an insignificant effect on financial development. The results above show that financial integration positively affects financial development in the SADC region. The development of the financial sector will thus have implications on remittance inflows. This implication will be described further under the Granger Causality Test results.

Both Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the models did not suffer from second-order serial correlation and that the instruments used were valid.

Table 3 indicates that the null hypothesis that Diaspora remittances do not granger cause financial sector development is rejected. The same also applies to the null hypothesis that financial sector development does not granger cause Diaspora remittances. This indication implies a bi-directional causality between Diaspora remittance inflow and financial sector development. In other words, past values of Diaspora remittance inflow contribute to financial sector

development. At the same time, financial sector development promotes Diaspora remittance inflows.

**Table 3: Panel Granger Causality Results**

Pairwise Dumitrescu Hurlin Panel Causality Tests			
Null Hypothesis:	W-Stat.	Zbar-Stat.	Prob.
REM does not homogeneously cause FD	3.61660	3.79198	0.0001
FD does not homogeneously cause REM	3.26017	3.21212	0.0013

This result specifically agrees with Bolarinwa and Akinbobola (2021) concerning Nigeria and Kenya. These authors indicated that as the financial sector develops, it will reduce transaction costs, enabling more economic agents to utilise formal channels for sending Diaspora remittances. At the same time, family members in recipient countries can also access banking services such as savings, boosting the financial sector’s development.

#### ***4.2 The Implication of Financial Integration and Financial Sector Development on Diaspora Remittances***

This research identified financial integration as a crucial determinant of financial development and economic growth. Financial integration entails cooperation at regional levels and can affect financial sector development. Financial cooperation across the border can affect the volume of Diaspora remittance flows transferred formally through the financial sector. Improving financial development through financial integration can lower transaction costs across borders, boosting migrants’ confidence in the financial sectors of their countries of origin. In other words, migrants may have confidence in the financial sectors of their home countries and be encouraged to remit formally instead of informally.

In addition, due to increased financial integration, home countries’ financial institutions can open branches in any country in the region, allowing remitters to remit at lower transaction costs. Also, a regional corporation can

enhance labour mobility. Labour mobility will enhance the allocation of the migrants' labour force in more productive markets in foreign countries, allowing home countries to capture gains they could not access if they were in autarky.

## **5 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations**

### **5.1 Conclusions**

The study's objective was to analyse the impact of financial integration on financial sector development in the SADC region and to further derive the implications this has on diaspora remittances inflow. The study employed the first difference GMM given its ability to deal with potential endogeneity. Credit to the private sector (% GDP) was utilised to proxy financial development. Two proxies for financial integration, the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti measure (LFI) and the KAOPEN index were employed, respectively. Results indicated that the immediate lag of the dependent variable, financial integration, the log of GDP per capita, and trade openness significantly affected financial development in the SADC region. The *de facto* indicator of financial openness positively impacted financial development, whilst the *de jure* measure had mixed results. The study ensured the robustness of the findings by employing broad money as a proxy for financial development, which similarly concluded that the *de facto* financial integration positively affected financial development. Key findings thus reveal that *de facto* financial integration is particularly important for regional financial development. These findings suggest that financial integration complements domestic financial development in the SADC region.

The study also examined the interaction between financial development and Diaspora remittance inflows employing the Granger Causality Test. Findings indicated that the relationship between these two variables was bidirectional, meaning that financial development stimulates remittance inflows and *vice versa*. The positive impact that financial integration had on financial development implied that financial openness encourages remittance through its impact on financial development. In other words, as financial integration in the region improves and financial sectors develop, it should be easy and affordable for Africans in the Diaspora to formally send money to their home countries, which is a safer method and can contribute to the development of the banking sector. Lower transaction costs encourage the use of formal channels in place of in-formal channels when sending remittances to the country of origin. It implies that financial development can have positive gains for both the African Diasporas and their home countries.

## 5.2 Policy Recommendations

Based on the findings obtained, the authors of this study suggest that SADC countries should continue with financial sector reforms as this might ameliorate the depth, efficiency, and access to financial markets and institutions of member countries given that high financial transaction costs and low access to financial services characterise most countries in the region. These reforms will increase the number of people using formal financial services. It also has implications for savings, a critical component of economic growth.

It is further recommended that governments of member states in the SADC region should again continue pursuing financial integration as this stimulates financial development and Diaspora remittance inflows. Also, financial openness may result in financial institutions opening branches in any country within the region. That can increase the volume of remittances which are sent to member countries. As per the findings, this also has implications for financial sector development.

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# CHAPTER 3

## Access to Credit from Formal Financial Institutions: A Case Study of Ethiopian Migrant Entrepreneurs in Durban, South Africa

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### Abstract

Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs operate small to medium enterprises (SMEs) across Durban, South Africa, relying solely on their informal credit sources to finance their businesses. Although these SMEs create jobs for local communities, which positively impact the economy, only 5% of migrant entrepreneurs can gain access to credit from formal financial institutions (FFIs). This research explores the experiences of Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs and the challenges they encounter when accessing credit from FFIs. It also enriches the literature on migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa by creating awareness of their need for credit from FFIs. Recommendations on improving FFI financing for migrant entrepreneurs are provided. The study, therefore, adopts a qualitative research design and employs face-to-face interviews to collect data from 20 Ethiopian migrants in Durban, South Africa. Data analysis is conducted through the five-step content analysis process, which indicates that FFIs disqualify Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs from accessing credit due to a lack of assets, collateral, and credit history. FFI regulations do not support financing Ethiopian entrepreneurs who do not have a South African identity document or permanent resident visa, owing to the risks involved in investing in the unpredictable nature of operations of the migrant's SMEs. In addition, most of these SMEs have inconsistent business annual reports, bank accounts and credit profiles. Nonetheless, the findings also reveal positive impacts such as poverty reduction, wealth

creation and business skills development among the South African communities, thus stimulating the economy.

**Keywords:** Ethiopian, migrant, entrepreneurs, credit, SMEs, formal financial institutions, South Africa

## **1 Introduction**

Access to credit from FFIs for financing migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa has recently attracted considerable research. According to the World Bank (2019), migrant-run small to medium enterprises create new jobs through creativity and innovation, which positively impacts many economies and creates wealth for the entrepreneurs in the host country. According to Acs, Estrine, Mickiewicz and Szerb (2018), migrant small to medium enterprises create wealth for themselves and employment and skills for the local citizens. In the same vein, the Centre for Entrepreneurs and DueDil (2014) commend migrant small to medium enterprises in the United Kingdom for creating wealth and job opportunities, thus contributing to the economic stimulation of the host countries.

The introduction of the economic reform programmes in 1996 showed how positive and serious the South African government was regarding entrepreneurship. As such, the government has gone further as pin-pointing entrepreneurship as a priority field that requires more investment to create jobs that will solve the unemployment dilemma the country is facing presently, which approximately stands at 29.6%, based on (Statistics SA 2020).

Moreover, for developing countries such as South Africa to solve the problem of chronic poverty and high unemployment, it is required to employ a migration policy shift in entrepreneurship investment that promotes the growth and development of migrant small to medium enterprises (World Bank 2019).

Furthermore, Furawo and Scheepers (2018) posit that migrant small to medium enterprises positively impact the South African economy because of their economic stimulation in the local and general economies. Nonetheless, the FFIs are unwilling to finance migrant SMEs, perceived as high-risk initiatives due to inappropriate documentation and lack of credit history (Tengeh & Nkem 2017). Similarly, Radipere and Dhliwayo (2014) state that the lack of valuable assets, collateral, and equity distribution are among the main reasons why FFIs

do not credit Ethiopian migrant SMMEs in South Africa.

The Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) Indicates that 80% of all the credit applications that migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa submit are declined by FFIs (SEDA 2017). Only approximately 5% of all migrant entrepreneurs gained access to credit from commercial banks in South Africa (Fatoki 2014).

Against this backdrop, migrant small to medium enterprises have developed a culture of grouping and funding themselves through creating informal credit associations. They can generate credit for their small to medium enterprises, such as the Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs' informal credit association (Iqub), a traditional association from Ethiopian rural areas. In this association, members contribute a fixed amount of money every week, which is then credited to one member with no interest charged (Mersha, Sriram & Hailu 2010). In this chapter, the nature and complexities faced by Ethiopian migrants to access credit to finance their businesses from FFIs in South Africa are interrogated.

## ***1.1 Objectives***

The objectives of the research are as follows.

1. To investigate the impact of Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs in Durban, South Africa.
2. To explore how FFIs offer credits to migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.
3. To describe challenges faced by migrant entrepreneurs regarding accessing credit for their businesses.

## ***1.2 Problem Statement***

The FFIs are not willing to finance Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs. They claim that migrant SMEs are too risky to invest in because of their informal nature and lack of credit history, assets, collateral, and unpredictability. Due to the challenges in accessing credit from FFIs to finance migrant entrepreneurs, Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs have started their own informal credit associations. Mersha, Sriram and Hailu (2010) attest that these informal credit facili-



ties are created by friends, family, and fellow citizens to gather contributions from each other weekly and, using a lottery system, credit one member who then starts up an SME.

Against this background, through this study, the nature of credit offered to a small group of Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs in Durban, South Africa, was explored.

### ***1.3 Theoretical Framework***

This chapter is supported by the ethnic entrepreneurs' theory, which is closely linked to Ethiopian entrepreneurs and their strong ethnic affiliations. As such, Waldinger, Aldrich and Ward (1990) explain migrant entrepreneurship according to three interactive components: access to opportunities, group characteristics, and emergent strategies. Access to opportunity entails the market conditions from which migrant SMEs operate. For instance, the market conditions may favour the goods and services that the migrant SMEs are engaging in within that market. It is all related to the co-ethnic or non-ethnic market. Migrant SMEs flourish in environments dependent on inter-ethnic competition governed by state policies (Waldinger, Aldrich & Ward 1990).

In the context of South Africa, Liedeman, Charman, Piper and Petersen (2013) state that contemporary literature points to much competition between locally-owned and migrant-owned SMEs. Migrant-owned SMEs seemed to grow and prevail compared to their local counterparts. It is assumed that it is due to a culture of discipline and determination portrayed by migrant SME owners in serving their communities with affordable and quality goods and services. This determination has innovatively led the Ethiopian SMEs owners to develop their own informal credit associations to finance their businesses in the host country (Washinyira 2015).

Group characteristics define certain groups according to their culture and motives for migration. It specifically includes the necessity of resource mobilisation, especially because it creates a secure source of informal credit to finance their SMEs. Other vital characteristics include social networks, trust, general organisation, and government department policies that facilitate or limit resource access. Coulthard and Loos (2007) note that building, managing, and strengthening strong relations with family, friends, and colleagues is important because it assists with networking and sharing opportunities when they are spotted.

The study by Khosa and Kalitanyi (2015) shows the same correlation, attesting that migrant entrepreneurs create their own environment to share ideas, solve their problems and expand their businesses. For instance, the Ethiopian migrant entrepreneur's network is evidenced on Sundays at their places of worship. Hence, this Ethiopian networking entrepreneurs' culture is essential to mitigate challenges created by limiting government policies that prevent migrant SMEs' access to financial resources from FFIs (Asoba & Tengeh 2016).

Lastly, the ethnic strategies that stem from engaging in opportunities and group characteristics are the final component. How easily ethnic groups adapt to their environments from a socially cohesive perspective through engagements between locals and migrant SMEs, the former can benefit through gaining entrepreneurship skills from the latter (Aaltonen & Akola 2014).

Migrant SMEs are competitive by applying their creativity to sell affordable, quality products and meet clients' demands (Mac & Bhaird 2010). Introducing new quality products and the friendly service offered to the client base creates an enabling environment for their businesses to flourish (Mason & Rown 2013). Finally, this theory is suitable for this study because it provides a bigger picture of how migrant SMEs engage with their host communities. Moreover, the theory allows the scientific study of migrant entrepreneurs and their SMEs in the host country, especially through employment creation (Habiyakare, Owusu, Mbare & Landy 2009).

## **2 Literature Review**

In this section, literature has been reviewed on the following issues: the positive impact of migrant entrepreneurship on the South African economy, job creation, and wealth creation; FFIs and migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa regarding access to credit; and the challenges faced by migrant entrepreneurs when accessing credit from FFIs.

### ***2.1 Migrant Entrepreneurship in South Africa***

A report on entrepreneurship in the United Kingdom (UK), shared by the Centre for Entrepreneurs and Duedil (2014), indicates that there has been a major contribution in terms of economic impact and employment creation by migrant SMEs in developed countries, especially in the present times which has been specifically towards economic growth activities. As such, in the case of the

United States of America (USA), migrants have played a significant role in starting technological companies with great influence and generally remaining majority shareholders and owners at a 60% margin.

To this end, regarding job creation and the economic impact of migrant SMEs in the USA, The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2017) reports that migrant entrepreneur SMEs are responsible for 14.5% of national job creation figures. The Centre for Entrepreneurs and Duedil (2014) states that not only do migrant entrepreneurs own 20% of all businesses in the UK, but they also contribute towards 14% of employment. Additionally, migrant SMEs were responsible for the contribution of 11% revenue of all businesses in the UK (European Commission SMEs Performance Review 2013).

From the South African perspective, Kahn, LaMattina, MacGarvie and Ginter (2013) state that, though the Ethiopian migrant entrepreneur SMEs may face a variety of roadblocks relating to inappropriate documentation and access to credit, they still enter into the host country (South Africa) and establish a business from the bottom up, through insourcing of capital from colleagues and family. As such, after a period of hardship and perseverance, they emerged successfully by starting their businesses and creating employment for the locals, where they settled and based their businesses. From a broader perspective, their SMEs contribute to the economy by stimulating economic activities.

Ethiopian entrepreneurs not only positively impact the socio-economic well-being of the local communities where they are based but also benefit through profit-making and networking amongst each other to create self-help groups that assist others with informal credit as a form of capital (Kahn *et al.* 2013).

As explained by John Calvin, cited in Schaefer (2014), Ethiopian migrants generally possess a natural creed for enterprise, which, when applied, forms part of the protestant ethic. As such, one of Protestantism's many results has been capitalism's emergence. Moreover, as explained in the previous sentence, social capital emerged from capitalism, a social structure embedded in all individuals within their social circles. In general, inclusive of the above explanation, the character of Ethiopian migrants within their society in South Africa is underpinned by the aspect of capital and entrepreneurialism, which they carry with them from their home country as an expression of cultural capital, which is an advantage to the host country due to the concept of skills development (Field 2003).

Migrant entrepreneurs provide jobs for local South Africans, and these

ventures can be viewed as one of the many ways of addressing unemployment (Fatoki & Patswariwairi 2012). The migrant entrepreneurs and their SMEs contribute immensely to job creation, positively impacting South African provinces' GDP (Abor & Quartey 2010). It shows that migrant entrepreneurs and their SMEs purposefully create jobs for the locals. According to Kalitanyi and Visser (2010), the major positive impact of migrant entrepreneurs is job creation. This action directly benefits the locals, who complement the migrant entrepreneurs by overcoming or navigating the language barrier, which allows locals to gain business skills.

## ***2.2 Formal Financial Institutions and Migrant Entrepreneurship in South Africa***

The World Bank (2019) indicates that FFIs have developed a negative attitude toward financing migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa. As a result, this is despite the impact and role played by the migrant entrepreneurs SMEs in the South African economy, which translates to poverty reduction, employment creation, and skills development. Most importantly, it stimulates economic activities regionally and nationally.

The migrant entrepreneurs experience various challenges, making it difficult to access credit from the host country, South Africa. According to a Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM 2020) report, the lack of credit from FFIs is one of the biggest limitations for most migrant-owned SMEs in South Africa. In the report, the authors argue that if the barriers to entry are addressed or limited, it could positively impact many entrepreneurs, migrant-owned SMEs, and the host country's economy.

The primary challenge for migrant entrepreneurs is the lack of access to credit from FFIs (World Bank 2019). According to recent research, the lack of credit to finance the migrant SMEs created a negative boomerang effect that stifled the growth of the SMEs. Though they remain operational due to their informal sources of credit, their expansion and growth become difficult (World Bank, 2019). In addition, shared information by international organisations indicates that approximately 20% or less of migrant SMEs that operate in developing countries gain access to credit from FFIs (GEM 2020; World Bank 2019; OECD 2017).

GEM (2020) noted that due to a lack of South African identity documents or a permanent residence permit, most migrant SME owners fail to

access credit from FFIs in South Africa. Because of such issues, FFIs find it difficult to finance migrant-owned SMEs due to the fear of defaulting on payments, which, when accumulating with interest, becomes difficult to trace if they vanish. Due to such fears, the FFIs developed a regulation known as first-class collateral to reduce the risk incurred when lending. This regulation means that the FFI can repossess the collateral if the credit consumer has defaulted, which means a win-win situation for the FFIs (Rahman, Zheng & Ashraf 2015).

Furthermore, as detailed earlier, when migrant entrepreneurs apply for credit, they must have a credit profile, which is usually non-existent due to the use of refugee documentation. They also do not have an annual turnover report due to the nature of their business and lack of business education. Such a report can be used to evaluate the profit and loss margins of their migrant SMEs by the FFIs (Ntiamoah, Li & Kwamega 2016).

African migrant entrepreneurs with valid business or work permits and business registration documentation are categorised as legal business owners in South Africa. This rule qualifies them for the first stage of the credit process (Furawo & Scheepers 2018). However, the unwillingness to offer financial support from FFIs remains problematic among the qualifying migrant entrepreneurs (Furawo & Scheepers 2018).

The Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) in South Africa highlights that more than 80% of credit applications by migrant entrepreneurs are rejected by the South African FFIs (SEDA 2017). Against this backdrop, migrant entrepreneurs have continued to set up businesses through informal access to credit sourced from family and friends. Although growth prospects remain slim, they remain afloat against all odds. Contemporary scholars hope the South African policies placed on FFIs for redemption will change and offer access to credit for migrant SMEs (Akinboade 2015; Fatoki 2014; Herrington & Kew 2014).

### ***2.3 Challenges Faced by FFIs and Migrant Entrepreneurs Regarding Access to Credit***

Arena (2011) studied the effects of information asymmetry and how it influences FFIs to develop a credit rationing attitude toward migrant credit consumers. This study found that FFIs increased the interest rates, making it difficult for Level 1 applicants to qualify for credit. Their reason for this was that most migrant entrepreneurs were applicants without debt. In a similar study,

La Rocca and Cariola (2011) posited that the credit rationing attitude created by the FFIs arose from strict market conditions due to a lack of accountability and transparency when issuing credit to migrant entrepreneurs. The FFIs explain this attitude as a lack of collateral and a high risk of dismissal of applications (La Rocca & Cariola 2011).

According to Baby and Joseph (2016), financing migrant SMEs with no equity contribution from the owners is riskier for the FFIs than financing big established businesses with credit history and many assets. It correlates with the study by Ntiamoah, Li and Kwamega (2016), which indicates that the FFIs state that it is due to a lack of documentation regarding credit history or financial records from the migrant entrepreneurs. In addition, there are no clear proposals or projections for the future growth of their businesses (Ntiamoah, Li & Kwamega 2016).

La Rocca and Cariola (2011) further indicate that among the main reasons for rejecting the majority of migrant credit applications was because they were unable to afford existing market interest rates and financial instability. Similarly, Liang, Huang, Liao, and Gao (2017) state that FFIs have shifted their attitude and have become unwilling to issue access to credit to migrant entrepreneurs. Bushe (2019), Chowdhury and Alam (2017), and Liang *et al.* (2017) attest that FFIs have developed a biased attitude toward viewing migrant entrepreneurs negatively.

Nonetheless, approximately only 5% of the total population of migrant entrepreneur owners are successfully granted access to credit from commercial banks in South Africa (Andersson & Waldenstrom 2017). Hence, there are very few migrant SMEs that have access to credit from FFIs in South Africa, and there are signs of unwillingness to finance the majority of African migrant SMEs or structure them in the FFIs system.

According to Fatoki and Asah (2011), migrant entrepreneurs from different sectors face various challenges, including access to credit from FFIs. A similar study by Makomeke and Chitura (2016) showed that many migrant SMEs have resorted to relying on their informal credit sources because qualifying for credit or acquiring collateral status is difficult. Nonetheless, despite the skills set of operating SMEs, job creation, and economic stimulation, these migrant entrepreneurs encounter insurmountable challenges wherever they travel (Andersson & Waldenstrom 2017). Consistent with the findings of Andersson and Waldernstrom (2017), Tengeh and Nkem (2017) posit that the existing poor levels of financing for migrant entrepreneurs are associated with

issues that arise from the FFIs and not from the migrant entrepreneurs.

A study by Claessens (2006) indicates that many SMEs lack access to finance, which impedes their growth. In this regard, the provision of credit has increasingly been regarded as an important tool for igniting growth in SMEs, mainly through mobilising resources for more productive uses (Atieno 2001). The challenge of accessing credit from FFIs stems from stringent lending regulations requiring minimum loan amounts, strict application procedures, and limited options for granting credit to consumers. In agreement with Atieno (2001), Claessens (2006) states that access to credit refers to the supply of funds. Credit consumption is the connection between supply and demand for all migrant SMEs. She states that reliable access to credit for migrant SMEs is very important for ensuring their survival. Atieno (2001) argues that the type of FFI determines the level of access regarding its regulations.

Nonetheless, Ethiopian migrant SMEs owners developed their own home-made informal credit financing system known as ‘ukub’, which is also structured as an informal credit association that requires its members to each contribute a fixed amount of money weekly; the money is then credited to one member with no interest charged. The systematic way the money is credited to each member is selectively done through a lottery system. When a member wins a lottery but is not prepared to accept the credit offer, they can agree with another member to receive it on their behalf but at an agreed percentage of the weekly draw (Mersha, Sriram & Hailu 2010).

### **3 Research Methodology**

This chapter was designed within a qualitative research paradigm. Creswell (2014) attests that the qualitative research method is particularly significant because it allows the participants to share their opinions and perceptions regarding their experiences in a free and safe environment. Regarding the sample size, 20 respondents were purposively selected using the purposive sampling technique, all being Ethiopian migrant SME owners operating in different sections of the CBD in Durban. The data was collected through one-on-one, face-to-face interviews between 45 mins to one hour. The face-to-face interviews were suitable for this study due to the need to build trust and acquire relevant primary data from participants.

A qualitative research design was employed that is interlinked with the interpretivist research paradigm, which is structured within the epistemological

tradition of constructivism to achieve its objectives from a researcher's perspective (Collis & Hussey 2014). As such, the constructivist model dictates that all opinions and views be objective and constructed from the individual's personal view and social interaction. Hence, the constructivist approach is founded on the assumption that multiple realities and interpretations exist.

The study mainly focused on 20 Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs that specifically owned SMEs based within Durban's business central district. Moreover, the method adopted for sampling the participants was purposive, which goes in hand with the qualitative research design and the careful selection of the 20 Ethiopian entrepreneur participants based on ownership of the business venture, the SME size, location, availability, and willingness to participate. The credibility of the study findings was ensured by providing the participants with a copy of the analysed data for confirmation.

The study also employed purposive sampling to select the participants based on their demographics within the city of the Durban CBD. Due to the nature and difficulty of tracing the right participants for the study, the criteria used to select the respondents were based on their education levels, their ability to communicate effectively using the English language, their age, and the number of years they lived in Durban, and the number of local citizens employed by their SMEs. Many Ethiopian entrepreneurs are undergoing financial challenges stemming from a lack of access to credit, affecting their SMEs' growth and development.

As such, they operate registered businesses legally recognised by the eThekweni municipality. Moreover, approximately 80% or more Ethiopian entrepreneurs operate their SMEs on their informal credit sources within the city due to the challenges in accessing credit from FFIs. The minority that accesses credit from FFIs cannot support the marginalised majority.

As a result, most Ethiopian entrepreneurs based in Durban are forced to rely on their informal credit sources to support their SMEs. The remaining challenge is the issue of growth and expansion.

### ***3.1 Data Analysis***

Concerning data analysis, a content analysis process was used, which involved five steps (Terre Blanche, Durrheim & Kelly 2006). They were employed as follows: familiarisation and immersion, inducing themes, coding, elaboration, interpretation, and checking. Familiarisation and immersion assist the researcher with an in-depth understanding of the interviews. In contrast,



inducing themes assists the researcher with an in-depth examination of the similarities and differences of any patterns. Coding helps the researcher break down data and group them differently; interpretation enables the researcher to examine, compare and determine patterns. The elaboration helps the researcher to explore and create a whole picture of the data when thematic groupings drive interpretation and checking (ibid)).

### **3.2 Results of the Study**

A total of 20 face-to-face interviews were administered to Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs living in Durban. There were males (seventeen) and females (three) aged between 24 and 31 years old, of whom (two) were married, (one) single, (one) non-separated, and (nine) non-widows. The males were uncomfortable giving their marital status, so this question was not included in the analysis of this data. Regarding educational attainment, the highest qualification was matric/bachelor, and the lowest was Grade five.

**Table 1: Gender, Age, Level of Education and Duration of Stay in South Africa**

<b>NAME (Pseudonyms)</b>	<b>GENDER</b>	<b>AGE</b>	<b>LEVEL OF EDUCATION</b>	<b>DURATION OF STAY IN SA (No of years)</b>
Gabreselasie	Male	29	Completed High school	3 Years
Mary	Female	24	College Graduate	6 Years
Aaron	Male	28	Grade 11	4 Years
Misgun	Male	40	Diploma graduate	5 Years
Lili	Female	31	Completed High School	5 Years
Tesfu	Male	28	Completed High School	6 Years
Mihret	Female	25	Certificate in Teaching	5 Years
Sirak	Male	29	Completed High School	3 Years

Meles	Male	26	Completed High School	4 Years
Meckonen	Male	30	Grade 9	5 Years and 4 Months
Yoseph	Male	42	Grade 6	6 Years
Yared	Male	27	Completed High School	5 Years
Ephrem	Male	35	Grade 4	4 Years
Teshome	Male	28	Bachelor's Degree	5 Years
Ayalkibet	Male	23	Completed High School	4 Years and 6 Months
Berhanu	Male	31	Grade 10	5 Years
Gebre	Male	33	Completed High School	3 Years and 1 Month
Tesfaye	Male	41	Grade 5	1 Year and 2 Months
Liqu	Male	22	Completed High School	2 Years
Desta	Male	34	Diploma Graduate	7 Years

### ***3.3 Impact of Migrant SMEs on the Local Economy***

Participants indicated that migrant SMEs had made some contributions to the local economy. These include poverty alleviation, wealth creation, and business skills development. Concerning job creation, a participant stated that ‘currently, we have employed two South Africans, and we would like to employ more, provided we are granted credit by the FFIs. The credit will cause our business to expand and grow and thereby require us to employ more people’ (Participant #8). Also, local employees are instrumental in establishing good interaction between businesses and customers since they help to bridge the language barrier. A participant stated that ‘there is a great need to employ locals due to their language and cultural advantages’ (Participant #9). To be more specific, the contribution of locals is more needed when it comes to dealing with and relating to local customers on behalf of the migrant entrepreneurs (Participant #9). Regarding skills development, locals are empowered with business skills while working for migrant entrepreneurs (Participant #10). This position leads migrant entrepreneurs to have some claims regarding FFIs.

### ***3.4 Challenges Faced by Ethiopian SMEs in Durban***

#### ***3.4.1 Challenges***

Participants experienced numerous challenges inherent to the requirements of FFIs and other operational issues. They expressed concern over unmet needs regarding support and discriminatory selection criteria. It means that participants believe they deserve the most support since they each operate a single SME. In other words, they must start by creating a business and do their best to expand it.

#### ***3.4.2 Discrimination***

Regarding discrimination, they reported that ‘the lending behaviour of FFIs is unequal, especially when you compare the rate of credit application rejections and acceptance between South African and migrant entrepreneurs’ (Participant #11). Furthermore, they reported being unable to understand credit regulations. The importance of better communication between FFIs and migrant entrepreneurs was emphasised as they indicated that ‘it would be better if the FFIs could educate us about their regulations so we can start preparing ourselves’ (Participant #17- male). They even suggested the arbitration of the government to deal with issues that FFIs cannot address. For instance, a participant was quoted highlighting that ‘when it comes to the challenge of acquiring a South African identity document, the government needs to step in and implement migrant entrepreneur-friendly policies, which will result in many qualifying for both the identity document and credit from FFIs’ (Participant #17- male).

#### ***3.4.3 Credit Access Challenges***

It is not easy to access credit as a migrant entrepreneur in South Africa when using a refugee permit. However, it does not prevent migrant entrepreneurs from starting their SMEs and employing locals. The only challenge faced by migrant entrepreneurs when it comes to business growth is access to credit from FFIs (Participant #1- male; age group 25-29).

The lack of a bank account is among the main challenges affecting Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs in Durban. As such, even during the Covid-19 pandemic, when many migrant entrepreneurs lost their businesses through looting, while others closed as a result of the lengthy national lockdown that

caused their perishable goods to expire, and they could not afford the accumulated rent (Participant #16 – male; employed three locals; age group 30-35).

Another participant stated that FFIs should support migrant entrepreneurs that register their businesses with a local partner because it would benefit both partners. However, the FFI's response to migrant entrepreneurs who have partnered with South African nationals is still negative, although the business will benefit a local citizen and a migrant entrepreneur (Participant #18 – male; employed four locals; age group 40-45).

The male participants #19 and #20 in the age group 20-35, who employed five locals, posit that FFIs are not interested or willing to finance migrant entrepreneurs. The FFIs claim they cannot trust them not to run away when they default on payments. Therefore, they feel it is too risky to finance migrant entrepreneurs due to the possession of refugee documents.

However, when the migrant entrepreneur does not have a South African identity document or permanent residence permit, it becomes problematic for the FFIs to finance their SME (Participants #3, #4, #5, #6 and #7 employed 15 locals aged 20 - 39).

## **4 Analysis**

Section one on migrant entrepreneurship (OECD 2017) findings indicate that migrant entrepreneurship in developed countries like the UK and USA regarding job creation and economic stimulation are very positive and steadily growing. According to participants #11, #12 and #13, the impact of migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa has been and will continue to be inclusive and positive. As such, migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa, as explained by John Calvin (Schaefer 2014), shows that Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs, in general, possess a natural creed and inclination towards enterprise. Inclusive of the above explanation, the character of Ethiopian migrants within their society in South Africa is underpinned by the aspects of capital and entrepreneurialism, which they carry with them from their home country as an expression of cultural capital, which is an advantage to the host country due to the impact they make on job creation, poverty reduction and skills development (Field 2003).

Though the Ethiopian migrant entrepreneur SMEs may face a variety of roadblocks relating to inappropriate documentation and access to credit, they still enter the host country, South Africa, and establish a business from the bottom up. As such, after a period of hardship and perseverance, they emerge

successful in starting their businesses and creating employment for the locals where they have settled and based their businesses. From a broader perspective, their SMEs contribute to the economy by stimulating economic activities (Kahn *et al.* 2013). Participant #1 states that though it is not easy for migrant entrepreneurs to access credit from FFIs, they still support each other financially through informal credit associations.

Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs provide jobs for local South Africans, and their SME ventures can be viewed as one of the many ways of addressing unemployment. A similar study by Abor and Quartey (2010) showed that migrant entrepreneurs and their SMEs contributed immensely to job creation, positively impacting the Gauteng Province's GDP. As noted by participants #14 and #15, though many migrant entrepreneurs operate a single SME registered with a municipality that permits SMEs, they still do not qualify for credit from FFIs.

As noted in section two, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor GEM (2020), lack of credit from FFIs is one of the biggest limitations for many migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa. In the report, the authors argue that if the barriers to entry are addressed or limited, it could positively impact many entrepreneurs, migrant-owned SMEs, and the host country's economy. However, according to Participant #18, many migrant entrepreneurs have accepted the difficulties of accessing credit from FFIs in South Africa. Those who have tried to partner with local citizens in business or marriage have also failed to qualify. World Bank (2019) indicates that FFIs have developed a negative attitude toward financing migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, despite the impact and role played by the migrant entrepreneurs' SMEs in the South African economy.

FFIs and migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa indicate that due to a lack of South African identity documents or a permanent residence permit, most migrant entrepreneurs fail to access credit from FFIs in South Africa. Because of such issues, FFIs find it difficult to finance migrant entrepreneurs due to fears of them disappearing when they default on payments. Moreover, African migrant SME owners possessing a valid business or work permit and business registration documentation graded as legal and formal businesses in South Africa are also denied access to credit due to the unwillingness of the FFIs to support them (Furawo & Scheepers 2018). Participants #2, #14 and #15 posit that FFIs are highly unequal when lending credit to consumers, especially when comparing local citizens and migrant entrepreneurs.

Section three reveals that challenges faced by migrant entrepreneurs

when accessing credit show that the main reasons for the rejection of most migrant credit applications were that the migrant entrepreneurs did not have annual sales records, credit history and many other FFIs requirements. Moreover, similar research by Chowdhury and Alam (2017) shows that FFIs have shifted their attitude and have become unwilling to grant access to credit to migrant entrepreneurs. According to male participant #16, the Covid-19 pandemic revealed the true nature of FFIs when dealing with migrant entrepreneurs who apply for credit in South Africa. The participant noted that the rejection rate is high when it comes to migrant entrepreneurs. Those rejected meet when accessing credit from their informal associations and describe their experiences with FFIs.

Furthermore, as noted in section three, La Rocca and Cariola (2011) posit that the credit rationing attitude developed by the FFIs arose from strict market conditions that resulted in a high rate of credit rejections, affecting many migrant entrepreneurs negatively. Nonetheless, participants #19 and #20 maintain that FFIs do not trust migrant entrepreneurs. Their main fears are that the migrant entrepreneurs could disappear without being found after defaulting on credit payments. Additionally, Baby and Joseph (2016) attest that financing migrant SMEs with no equity contribution from the owners is riskier for the FFIs than financing big established businesses with credit history and many assets. Correlating with the latter, Ntiamoah *et al.* (2016) show that the poor financial records and no credit history of migrant entrepreneurs block the issue of financing because FFIs cannot find evidence of future growth or credit history (Baby & Joseph 2016).

Herrington and Kew (2014) note that several research gaps require attention, concerning access to credit for migrant entrepreneurs from FFIs in South Africa. Firstly, research could focus on FFIs' lending inequality when it comes to local citizens and migrant entrepreneurs. Another research focus should be on the building of trustful relations between FFIs and migrant entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, in terms of current practices, migrant entrepreneurs benefit all economic sectors, including FFIs. Although they deny them credit, their employees are locals, and they do qualify for credit.

## **5 Conclusion**

In this study, the author investigated the role played by Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs concerning employment creation opportunities that benefit local South African communities and the challenges that they face accessing credit

from FFIs that can help them with growing SMEs. The data analysis revealed that Ethiopian migrant entrepreneurs create jobs for locals, reduce poverty, create wealth and stimulate economic activity.

Nonetheless, according to the participants, the two most pressing issues were access to credit from FFIs, and the other was accessing a South African identity document. They said these two key issues created an impediment to growing their SMEs and, most importantly, their business ventures' survival. This research study, therefore, recommends that the South African government, together with the FFIs, team up, acknowledge and celebrate the contributions made by migrant entrepreneurs to South African society. Moreover, all concerned stakeholders should recommit themselves to the migrant entrepreneurs and introduce permits allowing them to operate their SMEs with all benefits freely.

Additionally, the South African government should review business support and access to credit and ensure that this initiative does not leave migrant entrepreneurs behind. Finally, the government and FFIs should begin to promote migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa by encouraging entrepreneurs from all over the world to settle and start up their businesses and increase access to credit for all migrant entrepreneurs.

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**SECTION II**

**XENOPHOBIA AND AFRIPHOBIA**



# CHAPTER 4

## Migrants in the Face of Growing Nativism and Xenophobia: South African Experiences

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### Abstract

Globalists are slowly being replaced by nativists in many parts of the world. In the face of dwindling resources and diminishing service delivery, many believe nation-states should prioritise their citizens over international migrants. These sentiments have often resulted in violent attacks on international migrants. The problem is compounded by reduced economic growth and a high unemployment rate in post-colonial Africa. This chapter employs Fanon's analysis of the pitfalls of national consciousness and Harris's (2002) three hypotheses of xenophobia to understand the recent attacks on African international migrants in South Africa. A well-organised militant group, Operation Dudula targets African immigrants, identifying them through physical and biological factors and cultural differences, demanding that they leave the country. In the chapter, by applying the Fanonian lenses, the author argues that these attacks are not unique to South Africa but are common across most independent African countries such as Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire. South African citizens often attack black African migrants based on allegations that they are causing unemployment or a high crime rate. Drawing on Fanon, it is illustrated that such problems exist but are not caused by African migrants. The chapter contributes to the growing literature on international migration, xenophobia and nativism using data from scholarly sources, newspapers and social media. The insights gained here may assist international migration practitioners and policymakers in South Africa in crafting strategies that consider natives' needs without compromising the security and livelihoods of international migrants.

**Keywords:** xenophobia, South Africa, nativism, Operation Dudula, migrants.

## **1 Introduction**

The pincer movement of push and pull factors conspire to dislodge people from their countries of origin and induce them to settle in foreign lands. While this is not an entirely new phenomenon, the recent violent outburst of negative reactions to immigrants in post-colonial Africa, driven by nativist attitudes, seems to be a significant concern. In South Africa, nativist-driven xenophobia has led to the destruction of property and the loss of lives. According to Fuo (2020), since the dawn of South African democracy, foreign nationals have made up about 7% of the population. Invariably, most of these people seek economic opportunities or are refugees fleeing their home countries for various reasons. While this proportion is comparatively large, it is significantly lower than the United States, which is 13% – but there are no such violent outbursts in the United States (Batalova, Hanna & Levesque 2021). The convergence of foreigners and South African citizens is unique to South Africa and a source of conflict due to competition over limited services, space and resources. Fuo (2020) argues that some government officials and cabinet ministers have resorted to nativist-informed strategies to reduce this competition and shield themselves from their failure to achieve the aspirations expressed in the 1955 Freedom Charter and the 1996 Constitution. Drawing on an analysis of the implementation of the policies relating to the indigent, Fuo (2020) demonstrates that foreigners have been excluded from accessing free essential services even when they could satisfy all the other criteria for accessing such essential services, such as being indigent. Based on the nativist overtones of the indigent policies, indigent foreigners are virtually excluded from receiving essential services regardless of their residential status.

Nativism, defined as ‘the belief that an internal minority with foreign connections is a threat to the nation’ (Arraiza, Aye & Shakirova 2020:195), has been a driving force behind anti-migration attitudes and attacks. In one study, Kim and Kim (2021) establish that at the individual level, national pride is positively related to cultural nativism among citizens of East and Southeast Asian countries. Their study also shows regional pride and anti-migration attitudes related to subnational regions and other contextual factors. It drew on the Asian Barometer Survey (2014 – 2016) to explain why certain people reject foreign cultural influences while others embrace them. The former they name ‘cultural nativist’; the latter ‘cultural globalist’. Their explanation for the variation is based mainly on subnational regional residency.

Some scholars, particularly those with Fanonian leanings, trace the gen-



esis of nativism and xenophobia to the liberation period. For instance, drawing on South Africa's and Zimbabwe's history, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) argues that the genesis of Afro-radicalism and nativism in post-colonial Africa can be traced back to the antinomies of black liberation discourse. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) asserts that nativism provides a practical approach to grasping and thinking through the African national project in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) uses Frantz Fanon's arguments to assert that first, there would be competition between Europeans and the native *bourgeoisie*, followed by competition between the poor majority in each country, that would fight non-national Africans. This Fanonian view illuminates what has played out in most xenophobic attacks in South Africa, which has led some to argue that the source of the events was mainly 'Afrophobia'.

While these studies (Landau *et al.* 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2010; Nenjerama 2021; Nkabane & Mutereko 2021) provide valuable insights into the xenophobic outbursts in South Africa, they fall short of providing the information needed to understand the causes of, the nature of, and possible solutions to the problem. Our understanding of these issues is primarily based on anecdotal evidence. In this chapter, the author aims to describe the causes and nature of violent attacks on African migrants in South Africa. Using the Fanonian lenses in the broad scope of this book, *The Diasporean: The South African Perspectives*, this chapter contributes to the growing corpus of literature on the African Diaspora by exploring the history, causes and nature of nativist-driven xenophobia with a specific focus on Operation Dudula and #PutSouthAfricansFirst. Data for this chapter were drawn from scholarly literature, government documents, newspaper articles and social media, which were selected for convenience and relevance. The chapter draws parallels between Fanon's (1961:125) examples of how foreigners in the Ivory Coast were called on to leave their homes while their shops were being burnt and their street vending stalls wrecked and what is happening in South Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. These understandings have profound implications for migration policymakers, practitioners and scholars alike. Lessons from such cases could be used to respond to the current xenophobic crises and reduce the likelihood of their future occurrence.

Beyond this introduction, the next section presents the Fanonian views on migration and xenophobia as a theoretical prism to understand the current immigration and xenophobia in sub-Saharan Africa. It is followed by an analysis of Harris' (2002) three hypotheses on xenophobia in South Africa. The third section presents Operation Dudula as a classic case of the 'pitfalls of

national consciousness' and shows why and how international immigrants are targeted. The chapter ends on a positive note by demonstrating that policy-makers can play an essential role in integrating international migrants into their host communities if they understand the causes of xenophobia.

## **2 Nativism and Xenophobia through the Fanonian Prism**

In his seminal 1963 work, Fanon proposes that one of the causes of xenophobia and xenophobic attacks is the failure of the national middle class to grow the economy in newly independent African countries. In Chapter 3 of his influential book, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon presents a polemical attack on what he foresaw as the pitfalls of national consciousness and the struggle for the liberation of African countries. This section attempts to draw parallels between Fanon's arguments and the lived experiences of the migration and migrant phenomenon in South Africa. As the section will illustrate, Fanon's assertions portray what is happening in South Africa and Africa.

Fanon begins his polemic by describing and explaining how nationalist parties mobilise masses to overthrow colonialism. He argues that the struggle to overthrow colonialism would leave the confusion of universal neo-liberalism alongside an unprepared educated class with little to no practical links between them and the masses of the people. Fanon (1963:119) argues that the tragic mishaps of the national consciousness would emerge from the laziness and the cowardice of the educated class. Because of this, he asserts that national consciousness or freedom would be 'an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what might have been' (1963:19). Interestingly, Fanon attributes this to the weaknesses and incapacity of the middle class, the national middle class, to think through popular action. He argues that the national middle class takes power from the former colonial masters but lacks economic power. It then finds itself in an unenviable position to seek assistance from the former colonial masters. Members of the national middle class are characterised by being few, being concentrated in urban centres, and participating in business, agriculture and the liberal professions, with few to none of them in industry or finance. This national middle class does not participate in production or invention. Their efforts are 'canalised into activities of an intermediary nature' (Fanon 1963:120). These characteristics would be an essential catalyst for nativism and xenophobia or, more specifically, Afrophobia, as will be illustrated in later sections of this chapter.

## *Migrants in the Face of Growing Nativism and Xenophobia*

In the struggle for independence, Fanon (1963) sees the objective of the nationalist parties as being to mobilise the masses with slogans for independence without any thorough planning about post-colonialism. This approach is understandable, but intriguingly, Fanon claims that such nationalists lack a proper understanding of the economic programmes or the regime they would like to install. The evidence for such a paucity of understanding of economic and political processes would emerge in newly independent countries where the bookish understanding of the economy is soon exposed. Fanon argues that this middle class then agitates for the nationalisation of the economy. Although Fanon agrees with nationalisation, he bemoans the nationalist middle class' conceptualisation of such. Rather than placing the whole economy at the nation's service, the national middle class sees nationalisation as a process of transferring into the natives' hands all the unfair advantages characteristic of the colonial masters. At the same time, the 'native *bourgeoisie* which comes to power uses its class aggressiveness to corner the positions formerly kept for foreigners' (Fanon 1963:155) while making a minimal effort to grow the economy.

The negative attitude of the native *bourgeoisie* towards what he calls colonial personalities is central to the xenophobic attacks on fellow Africans. For instance, Fanon argues that the native middle class or native *bourgeoisie*, as he calls them, attacks colonial personalities to lend credence to nationalisation and Africanisation. This same attitude is adopted by the unemployed masses, small artisans and artisans who target non-national Africans. Citing West African cases, Fanon states that when 'the national *bourgeoisie* competes with the Europeans, the artisans and craftsmen start a fight against *non-national* Africans' (1963:156). In the Ivory Coast, Fanon points out that 'the Dahoman [from Benin] and Voltaic peoples [Mali and Burkina Faso], who control the greater part of the petty trade, are, once independence is declared, the object of hostile' and xenophobic attacks. Their shops were burnt, street stalls wrecked, and the newly independent country commanded the foreigners to leave to satisfy their nationals' demands. Fanon then concludes that:

As we see it, the mechanism is identical in the two sets of circumstances. If the Europeans get in the way of the intellectuals and business *bourgeoisie* of the young nation, for the mass of the people in the towns competition is represented principally by Africans of another nation (Fanon 1963:156).

The parallels Fanon draws between the native *bourgeoisie*'s antagonism against

colonial personalities and the masses' antagonism against non-national Africans are central to understanding xenophobia through a post-colonial prism. His work provides essential theoretical tools to think through xenophobic attacks against migrants in post-apartheid South Africa. As an analytic tool, it helps even to understand the current situation of migrants in South Africa in the wave of Operation Dudula targeting foreigners.

Some scholars in post-colonial discourse have employed Fanon's perspectives to understand nativism and xenophobia, nativism and racism in Zimbabwe and South Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2010). For instance, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) draws on Fanon to argue that the highly anticipated African unity faded quicker and quicker into oblivion. Through the Fanonian prism, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010) interrogates the notion of African identities in the context of nativism and xenophobia. He concludes that there is a challenge in forging stable African identities in the face of the diversities of nationality, race, ethnicity, religion and other cultural forms.

However, the Fanonian views on xenophobia and its causes cannot be accepted without reservation, particularly concerning its relevance to the South African situation. Fanon's characterisation of the middle class or the native *bourgeoisie* is arguably spot on, but to argue that the masses mimic the attitude of the middle class could be misleading. There could be different reasons for xenophobia that Fanon ignored or did not exist in the West African post-colonial period. In the next section, Harris (2002) proposes three hypotheses to explore xenophobia in the South African context further.

### **3 Attacks on Migrants in South Africa: Harris' Three Hypotheses**

On the one hand, conflicts and economic hardships in other parts of Africa have resulted in one-way migration and long-standing labour migration patterns south towards South Africa. On the other hand, South Africa's peace and prosperity have made it a strong magnet for immigrants from Africa and some parts of Asia (Landau *et al.* 2005). However, the recent shortages of resources, particularly employment opportunities, seem to have led to a deep-seated dislike of foreigners by South African natives. The hatred becomes an everyday reality in various ways, from the mere development of negative attitudes to actual physical attacks resulting in death. Landau *et al.* (2005:2), this, controversially claim that 'South Africa is a highly xenophobic society, which out of fear of foreign-

ers, does not naturally value the human rights of non-nationals'. This characterisation of xenophobia has been primarily concerned with the attitudes of black South Africans towards Africans from elsewhere on the continent, a feature Fanon underscores. White immigrants do not seem to face the same xenophobia as African non-nationals. This discriminative nature of xenophobia in South Africa begs one question: What are the causes of xenophobia in South Africa?

There are many causes of xenophobia, but few are dominant in South Africa. The first one is based on scapegoating theory (Harris 2002). Drawing on Harris (2002), Hewitt *et al.* (2020) assert that foreigners are vulnerable, and locals and powerful groups often blame them for the economic and social ills they may not be responsible for. They argue that black non-nationals in South Africa are often blamed for housing shortages, unemployment, crime and economic hardships. However, no empirical evidence suggests that such ills result from African non-nationals residing in South Africa. This scapegoating may be a result of ignorance. Building upon the concept of scapegoating, Tella and Ogunnubi (2014:3) state that 'scapegoating is a shift of aggression to another target when the original target becomes inaccessible or difficult'. Unsurprisingly, many South African groups do not understand the real causes of the ills plaguing South African society. For instance, the economic and unemployment problems South Africa faces result from multifaceted causes that do not include the presence of immigrants. The literature indicates that unemployment and other economic challenges have been attributed to poor economic growth (Banda *et al.* 2016). Many people seem to lack this understanding or choose to ignore it. Alternatively, in Tella and Ogunnubi's (2014) words, they choose to shift their aggression to those they have othered [foreigners] when the original target [economic growth] becomes inaccessible or difficult to attack. Other problems cited, such as crime and infrastructure shortages, can be easily traced to slow economic growth. No matter that these perceptions may be unfounded, their impact on xenophobic attitudes and attacks is quite profound.

Historical isolation is the second cause of xenophobia in South Africa (Harris 2002). According to this view, the long isolation of South Africa from the rest of the continent and the world during Apartheid deprived locals of the knowledge and understanding of African foreigners (Tella & Ogunnubi 2014). Consequently, Africans were virtually unknown to South Africans during the isolation period except for those who struggled to dislodge the regime. However, the isolation hypothesis should be treated with caution as it is common knowledge that many non-native African nationals worked in the

mines and other South African sectors during Apartheid. However, some perceptions held by nationals, such as that some foreigners are cannibals, seem to strengthen the isolation hypothesis. The bottom line is that it is human nature to fear people one does not fully understand, leading to hostility. Drawing on Morris' (1998) works, Harris (2002) concludes that any society that lacks a history of staying with strangers is unlikely to find it easy to welcome them.

The third cause of xenophobia is based on Harris' (2002) biocultural hypothesis of xenophobia. Unlike the scapegoating and isolation hypotheses, the biocultural hypothesis explains the asymmetrical characteristics of xenophobia targeting non-citizen Africans. This view is consistent with Fanon's description of xenophobia as targeting black African foreigners but not Europeans or other races. Research has consistently demonstrated that xenophobia in South Africa is not homogenous among foreigners in South Africa (Harris 2002; Hewitt *et al.* 2020; Tella and Ogunnubi 2014). The biocultural hypothesis explains the selective nature of xenophobia based on 'visible difference, or otherness, i.e. in terms of physical and biological factors and cultural differences exhibited by African foreigners in the country' (Harris 2002:6). For instance, Morris (1998) suggests that certain African foreigners are easily identifiable based on their physical features, clothing style, inability to speak indigenous languages, vaccination marks and accent. The biocultural hypothesis of xenophobia provides a powerful tool for understanding a foreigner's identification but fails to explain why such a foreigner is hated or attacked. Perhaps the argument is based on differences as a cause of xenophobia. However, that also does not hold as South Africa has many indigenous languages, and its people do not necessarily have similar physical features or dress codes. It could be a fallacy to treat native South Africans as a homogenous group. Notwithstanding these limitations, the biocultural hypothesis of xenophobia is useful in understanding the broader spectrum of xenophobic processes.

The Fanonian views and Harris' (2002) three hypotheses of xenophobia are central to this chapter. On the one hand, despite their stated limitations, in this chapter, the author draws on Fanon's (1963) work to argue that colonialism and the struggle to remove it significantly influences the causes and nature of xenophobia experienced by the Diasporas in South Africa. Again, his characterisation of the middle class may accurately reflect the turf war on economic resources and nationalisation discourse. The destruction of Dahoman and Voltaic peoples' vending stalls in the Ivory Coast by the locals that Fanon describes is barely distinguishable from what is experienced in South Africa.

On the other hand, Harris' (2002) three xenophobia hypotheses are valuable and generative for grasping how xenophobia occurs in South Africa. As the next section shows, his three hypotheses allow one to consider how such foreigners are identified and attacked. Comprehending xenophobia according to Harris' (2002) hypotheses will allow the reader to grasp its causes and nature. The following section uses these theories to understand the critical drivers of Operation Dudula and #PutSouthAfricansfirst.

### ***3.1 Attacks on Migrants: Operation Dudula and the #PutSouthAfricansFirst Case***

This section analyses the recent (2021 - 2022) xenophobic incidents in South Africa. They have been spearheaded by and run under the banner of what has been termed *Operation Dudula*. In social media, they appear under the banner *#PutSouthAfricansFirst*. This operation aims to 'remove all illegal foreign nationals by force'. The magnitude of the operation is reflected in how it captured the attention of many media houses, as shown in print and electronic newspapers. Table 1 shows such headlines.

**Table 1: Operation Dudula**

<b>DATE</b>	<b>NEWSPAPER</b>	<b>HEADLINE</b>
24 January 2022	<i>Sunday Independent</i>	<i>Bara taxi rank deserted in wake of Operation Dudula</i>
01 February 2022	<i>Daily Maverick</i>	<i>Ring the alarm: We need to act against xenophobia before lives are lost to violence<sup>1</sup></i>
18 January 2022	<i>News24</i>	<i>Hawkers caught in the middle as Soweto residents descend on Bara taxi rank to remove illegal immigrants<sup>2</sup></i>

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-02-01-ring-the-alarm-we-need-to-act-against-xenophobia-before-lives-are-lost-to-violence/>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/hawkers-caught-in-the-middle-as-soweto-residents-descend-on-bara-taxi-rank-to-remove-illegal-immigrants-20220118>

02 February 2022	<i>News24</i>	<i>Immigrant traders in Gauteng fear for their safety after threats of xenophobic attacks</i> <sup>3</sup>
09 February 2022	<i>New Frame</i>	<i>How politicians stoke fires of xenophobic resentment</i> <sup>4</sup>
22 January 2022	<i>Sowetan Live</i>	<i>Human rights foundation slams #OperationDudula targeting illegal foreign nationals</i> <sup>5</sup>
14 February 2022	<i>Sowetan Live</i>	<i>Fear grips foreign nationals as Dudula wave rages. Traders forced to abandon stalls</i> <sup>6</sup>

Before analysing the news headlines and the actual excerpts of the news, it is imperative to understand the origins and nature of the operation. The operation seems to have taken its name from a similar operation launched in 2006 to target criminal acts of musical piracy initiated by high-profile musicians (Republic of South Africa 2006). On the one hand, Operation Dudula was formed to eradicate the sale of fake CDs and DVDs, depriving musicians of an income. On the other hand, like the 2006 Operation Dudula, the current operation (2022), which was relaunched in 2021, ostensibly targets ‘all illegal foreign nationals’ (Bornman 2021) who are characterised as either causing criminality, being undocumented, or taking South Africans’ jobs. Coincidentally, particularly from the Fanonian perspective, is the organisers’ timing of the relaunching of the operation, which coincided with the South African Youth Day, ‘which commemorates those who died at the hands of the oppressive apartheid forces on June 16 1976, while protesting against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in schools’ (Bornman 2021). Like the Operation Dudula of 2006, which targeted ‘criminals’ who benefited from the music they neither composed nor sang, the metaphor suggests that foreigners want to benefit where they have

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/immigrant-traders-in-gauteng-fear-for-their-safety-after-threats-of-xenophobic-attacks-20220202>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.newframe.com/why-politicians-stoke-fires-of-xenophobic-resentment/>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-01-22-human-rights-foundation-slams-operationdudula-targeting-illegal-foreign-nationals/>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-02-14-fear-grips-foreign-nationals-as-dudula-wave-rages/>



not worked. Ignoring this significant fact would be ignoring Fanon's (1963) critical arguments of the pitfalls of national consciousness in the post-colonial period. As Fanon would argue, some of the sentiments expressed by Operation Dudula exemplify Fanon's thesis for xenophobia in post-colonial Africa. For instance, in the Ivory Coast, 'the Dahoman and Voltaic peoples, who control the greater part of the petty trade, are, once independence is declared, the object of hostile manifestations on the part of the people of the Ivory Coast' (Fanon 1963:155). Like what is happening in South Africa, Fanon describes what was happening in Ivory Coast as follows:

From nationalism, we have passed to ultranationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism. These foreigners are called on to leave, their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked, and in fact, the government of the Ivory Coast commands them to go, thus giving their nationals satisfaction.

There is no better way to describe what is happening in South Africa than Fanon's insightful description above. As in the Ivory Coast, *The Sowetan Live* reported that the Operation Dudula campaign forced undocumented foreigners out of informal trading in townships and chased away dozens of people from the Johannesburg CBD, Alexandra and Orange Grove (Marupeng 2022). Similar scenes were reported in the *IOL* newspaper, which states that 'residents from Diepkloof in Soweto woke up to the scenes of a mop-up operation aimed at removing illegal foreign nationals and South Africans who sell goods without permits while occupying stands at the Bara taxi rank' (Makgatho 2022). Makgatho reports that video footage shows members of Operation Dudula burning boxes and goods left behind. There is a striking resemblance between Fanon's characterisation of xenophobic actions in the Ivory Coast and what is happening in South Africa. Nevertheless, what are the actual causes of this xenophobic attitude towards migrants? In the following section, this issue will be explored in greater detail.

### **3.2 Operation Dudula: Causes of Xenophobia**

In earlier sections, the general causes of xenophobia, hypothesised by Fanon (1963) and its specific causes in South Africa based on Harris' (2002) three hypotheses have been explored. To what extent do these explanations match Operation Dudula in particular and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* in general? *First*,

this section focuses on the explicit and implied causes expressed by the operation's proponents. It draws on social media as well as on evidence in electronic newspapers. The causes of xenophobia and the key drivers of Operation Dudula are premised on illegal immigrants, job opportunities and crime.

The proponents of Operation Dudula often assert that immigrants are in South Africa illegally. They describe them as 'undocumented'. This assertion has severe ramifications for the other two causes. It seems to be a consistent feeling among the proponents of Operation Dudula and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* that immigrants are illegal and undocumented. These perceptions seem to feed on social media and electronic newspapers showing people crossing the border along the Limpopo River. One Twitter user who uses the Twitter handle *@Secure SA Borders* expressed this sentiment when responding to some South African citizens who seem sympathetic to foreigners. The Twitter user noted:

The truth is struggling South Africans who use public facilities, who live with *these undocumented immigrants* [emphasis added] in their communities are the ones who are severely affected by influx of immigrants, so we are not expecting privileged people to understand our complaints about foreigners. (*@majiya\_sqhamoTruth.*)

Emphasising the issue of undocumented immigrants, another Twitter user, Barry Saayman, seemed to respect lawful migrants in the country. Based on that, the user believes Operation Dudula is lawful and justified:

The way I understand it, the protestors have nothing against law-abiding foreigners that respect our immigration, tax, health, and labour laws. There is no place in SA for undocumented immigrants. They should rather voluntary leave SA sooner than later. (*@SaaymanBarry.*)

While the issue of undocumented immigrants seems straightforward, another matter related to this concerns immigrants with fraudulent documents. This matter is more complicated as it includes, on the one hand, migrants with unauthentic documents purporting to authorise them to stay and work in the country. On the other hand, it includes migrants with authentic documents they obtained fraudulently through collusion with officials working in the Department of Home Affairs (DHA 2020). However, targeting immigrants on any of these grounds by members of Operation Dudula is highly problematic and ineffective for many reasons. First, many immigrants are legally in the

country. An untrained person will, in most cases, be unable to distinguish between the documented and the undocumented. As a result, all foreigners will be targeted using Harris' (2002) biocultural traits, which have nothing to do with their documentation. The 'undocumented' mantra is arguably just a smoke-screen for unexpressed feelings and reasons that are not immediately visible. Arguably, using Harris' arguments of the biocultural hypothesis, foreigners are targeted based on their visible differences rather than their immigration documents. These could be physical-biological or cultural differences (Harris 2002; Morris 1998). Screening people for documentation would require road-blocks that evaluate everyone rather than the selected few. The operation's selectiveness cements this argument of bias, for their targets are mainly black Africans to the exclusion of other races.

The *second* reason flowing directly from the 'undocumented migrants' argument is that these immigrants steal jobs from deserving South Africans. This assertion seems to be one of the critical drivers of Operation Dudula and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst*. This sentiment is illustrated in the following quotations from Twitter users:

#OperationDudula is on a mission to make at least 2000 Zimbabweans losing their Employment Every Week. If You Zimbabweans and you work at Eskom, Uber, Bolt, Food Lovers, Spar etc. please pack your bags Your job is lost. We Taking Back Stolen Jobs. @lawyerPTSA1st #OperationDudula. We are winning. We went to different shops, hotels and restaurants. Cambridge requested only 3 working days instead of 7 to get rid of their foreign staff. Shoprite were 100% south Africans. Spar, they agreed to implement 7 days deadline.  
(Ngube' Ngcuka@Aa\_Thembisile.)

There seems to be a strong sense among the proponents of Operation Dudula that foreigners are causing the rising unemployment in South Africa. To cement this argument, the members of Operation Dudula went around shops, mainly in the hospitality industry, demanding to see and change the proportion of foreigners employed (see Ngube *Ngcuka@Aa\_Thembisile* above). This sentiment is not restricted to formal jobs, as we have also seen informal traders being driven out, as mentioned in the earlier sections of this chapter. While Fanon (1963) does not seem to provide useful theoretical tools to think through this kind of xenophobia, Harris' (2002) scapegoating hypothesis does provide useful

insights into this cause of xenophobia. As Harris argues, instead of facing the actual causes of rising unemployment, such as low economic growth (Khalid *et al.* 2021), the proponents of Operation Dudula seem to be scapegoating. Drawing on Morris' (1998) work, Harris (2002:4) suggests that 'hostility towards foreigners is explained concerning limited resources, such as housing, education, health care and employment, coupled with high expectations during the transition'. The transition from Apartheid brought high expectations for the previously disadvantaged black South Africans. However, the transition did not deliver on their expectations.

Consequently, out of frustration, people often create a 'frustration-scapegoat' (Tshitereke 1999:4), which are African foreigners. This psychological feeling of discontent is based on the belief that black South Africans are getting less than they feel entitled to, due to the presence of foreigners. That feeling drives the proponents of Operation Dudula to march to shops and give the shopkeepers the ultimatum to fire all foreigners and hire black South Africans. Interestingly, the demand to displace foreign workers does not consider whether they are documented.

The *third* and most emotive driver for the proponents of Operation Dudula and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* is the perception that foreigners in the country drive crime and are difficult to trace because they are undocumented. In earlier sections of this chapter, the general causes of xenophobia hypothesised by Fanon (1963) and the specific causes in South Africa based on Harris' (2002) three hypotheses are described. To what extent do these explanations match with Operation Dudula and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst*? First, this section focuses on the explicit and implied causes expressed by the operation's proponents. It draws on social media and evidence gleaned from electronic newspapers. The primary driver of Operation Dudula is the crime committed by 'undocumented' illegal immigrants. The crimes range from robbery to drug trafficking. One parent who supported Operation Dudula said the following:

My son has cleaned out my house. My duvets, pots and many other household items have been stolen. He has vandalised the house to feed his addiction, and I blame the drugs. The people [foreigners] who are killing our children should go (Simelane 2021).

This sentiment is not limited to drugs alone but extends to serious crimes such as murder and robbery. A Twitter user responding to the reported 60% increase

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in car hijacking in the last three years reported in the *Sowetan Live* newspaper, seems to imply in the response below that foreigners are the cause of this:

a good majority of South Africans will go through the trauma of being hijacked. Our cars are ordered by African brothers across the border.  
(...@LisasaysSA1st.)

Still related to crime, another Twitter user, while responding to a SABC political commentator who insinuated that the majority of people who vandalised the railway infrastructure were foreigners, stated:

We have been saying it for years now. Foreigners from Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, and elsewhere vandalise our infrastructure and do the most crime. You called us xenophobic for speaking the truth.  
(@landback.)

Because of the high level of crime in South Africa, the perception that foreigners cause crime seems to heighten xenophobia and sympathy for Operation Dudula. Against the backdrop of prison statistics, this perception seems based on facts. The World Prison Brief (2021) reports that foreign prisoners constituted about 10% of all people in South African correctional facilities in 2021. This figure may appear insignificant if about 90% of inmates are South Africans. However, comparing the figure with other African countries illustrates that the percentage of foreign prisoners in South African prisons is disproportionately high, only lower than that of Cote d'Ivoire, which is 30%. For instance, the percentages in some other African countries are as follows: Nigeria (0.3%), Egypt (1%), Kenya (0.6%) and Zimbabwe (1.9%) (World Prison Brief 2021). However, the proportion of the prison population should also be viewed in light of the proportion of international migrants in South Africa, which is significantly high. Both Cote d'Ivoire and South Africa have a significantly higher proportion of international migrants. Therefore, arguing that foreigners cause crime may be erroneous and misleading. In 2000 Peberdy questioned the use of terms like 'illegals' and 'illegal immigrants' to describe undocumented immigrants, which implies that they are engaged in crime and criminal acts (Peberdy 2000). The conflation of arrested undocumented immigrants and arrested criminals arguably fuels misconceptions and xenophobia, often perpetuated through social media (Nkabane & Mutereko 2021). This conflation misdirects attention from the actual causes of crime and scapegoating, as Harris (2002) characterises them.

While Fanon's (1963) views on the pitfalls of national consciousness do not seem to provide comprehensive insights into crime and the lack of employment opportunities as critical drivers of xenophobia, his characterisation of the transition from Apartheid to democratic government and xenophobic attacks has significant parallels (Phiri 2021; Nenjerama 2021). Several studies have drawn from Fanon and post-colonial discourse in general to understand xenophobia in Africa (Nenjerama 2021; Mpofu 2021; Phiri 2021). An uppermost issue related to xenophobia is the entrance of the black middle class into positions of political power but with little or no economic means. Fanon notes:

The national middle class which took over power at the end of the colonial regime is an underdeveloped middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case, it is in no way commensurate with the *bourgeoisie* of the mother country which it hopes to replace (Fanon 1963).

As a result, the economic power has remained in the hands of the formerly advantaged. The native masses, as a result, seem to compete for employment opportunities offered by the former colonial masters with African foreigners. To remove or reduce the competition, proponents of Operation Dudula demand the removal of foreigners. The implicit message is that 'these are our employers'. Therefore, it can be argued that Operation Dudula's mission is not about the economic emancipation of black South Africans. Ironically, it is about replacing foreign African workers with local black South Africans in white-owned businesses. Fanon says this is because 'the national economy of the period of independence is not set on a new footing' (Fanon 1963:151). It is still much the same in terms of ownership. Fanon argues that as the black middle class demands the power held hitherto by the foreigner, the masses on their lower level present the same demands but are confined to replacing the foreign Africans in employment. This assertion explains the selective targeting of Operation Dudula in particular and xenophobia in general.

## 4 Conclusion

There are considerable difficulties in simplifying a complex issue such as xenophobia. It is not to say that these difficulties are insurmountable but that we should be aware of them to come up with lasting solutions to the problem.

In the broader context of the book, *The Diasporan: South African Perspectives*, this chapter has sought to understand and contribute to the growing corpus of literature on Diasporan experiences in South Africa. Drawing on the post-colonial tools developed by Fanon and Harris' three hypotheses, the chapter has demonstrated that xenophobia and the experiences of international migrants are shaped by both the history of colonisation and the processes and form of transition. As Fanon has shown, Operation Dudula, which poses a significant threat to many migrants in South Africa, is not unique to South Africa. Fanon (1963) predicted that such a situation would likely arise in all newly independent African countries. He blames this phenomenon on the fact that the national middle class, which took over power at the end of the colonial regimes, is underdeveloped. He provocatively argues that this national middle class is intellectually lazy and has no clue how to grow the economy, which would create opportunities for the frustrated masses. Drawing on Harris' hypotheses, this chapter has illustrated that the frustrated masses and some politicians blame the lack of opportunities on African foreigners as scapegoats. It is a combination of economic failures and the frustration of the high hopes at the end of Apartheid that drives Operation Dudula and #PutSouthAfricansFirst. It is important to acknowledge that Operation Dudula and #PutSouthansFirst may indeed have legitimate concerns regarding unemployment and crime in South Africa. It is argued that the causes of the limited employment and high crime rate are not to be situated in the presence of African foreigners in the country. Removing the foreigners per the demands of the agitators without fundamental changes to the economic policy will not solve the problems of unemployment and crime.

In general, it seems that South Africa has genuine unemployment problems and a high crime rate and that these are arguably significant drivers of xenophobia targeted at African migrants. The contribution of this chapter has been to illustrate that such problems are not peculiar to South Africa but are a common phenomenon in most post-colonial countries in Africa. While host nationals' responses might differ in form and character, they all seem to border on xenophobia. The absence of the voices of the migrants limited this study. Their understanding could have enriched the analysis by providing an alternative angle.

Notwithstanding the relatively limited perspectives presented here, this chapter offers valuable insights into xenophobia in two ways. First, it uses powerful theoretical lenses to illuminate the xenophobia black box. Because of that, it introduces a novel understanding of xenophobia from a post-colonial

perspective. Secondly, the chapter contributes to international policy on migration and xenophobia in South Africa and other post-colonial states.

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# CHAPTER 5

## A Critical Analysis of Populism and Xenophobic Discourse on Social Media in South Africa: A Case of *@OperationDudula* and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* Twitter Accounts

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### Abstract

Anti-immigration sentiments dominate public discussion in South Africa across all social media platforms. Recent literature illustrates how social media debates on immigration and immigrants reinforce stereotypes and anti-immigration views. In some cases, these sentiments are manifested in the sporadic xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Over the years, the implementation of harsher and anti-immigration policies in South Africa mirrors these public sentiments. Concurrently, the online public plays a crucial role in shaping public discourse on immigrants. However, ‘the dynamics’ of these groups are under-researched. In this chapter, the author explores the strategies of anti-immigration actors on social media in South Africa and the discursive construction of immigrants in user interaction on Twitter. In this chapter, the author emphasises the role of emotions in xenophobic discourse and analyses how two Twitter accounts (*@OperationDudula* and *@Account Citizens* and the *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* Movement) generate and circulate xenophobic sentiments to a large audience. It also analyses the general communicative features of these accounts, including the user interactions between 1 January 2022 and 28 March 2022. Two empirical questions were asked: i) what strategies were used by the anti-immigration Twitter users in their online engagement; and ii) how the users constructed their views of the immigrants. Data were retrieved from (n=500) Twitter posts *@OperationDudula* and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* accounts and users’ reactions. A critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach was used to analyse the data. Findings from this study expose how anti-immigration and

xenophobic sentiments are constructed through interactivity between actors in the digital public sphere. Moreover, findings from this study suggest that anti-immigration accounts and groups online should be perceived as influential publics, where anti-immigration expressions and explicit xenophobic sentiments are normalised. Findings suggest that these anti-immigration accounts and groups must be considered when addressing contemporary society's causes of anti-immigration and xenophobic sentiments.

**Keywords:** Twitter, Big-tech, South Africa, populism anti-migration, xenophobia, @OperationDudula and #PutSouthAfricansFirst

## **1 Background and Introduction**

The rapid proliferation and ongoing transformation of digital technologies and social media platforms have substantially impacted the participatory cultures of citizens and their associated social connections (Marlowe, Bartley & Collins 2017). Social media platforms often engender various means to communicate with friends and family living in their ideal state in different parts of the world. This communication is typically done in pictures, audio, and video-based content that can be sustained in 'synchronous and asynchronous contexts' (Borup, West & Graham 2012). Marlowe *et al.* (2017) argue that the different forms of communication and connection through social media arguably constitute key components of the 'polymedia' concept. For Smith, Leonis and Anandavalli (2021), forums such as Facebook, Skype, Twitter, YouTube, Snapchat and Viber have become imperative technologies of 'connection and belonging for a wide range of individuals and communities' (Marlowe *et al.* 2017:85).

Social media platforms are powerful tools for members of migrant communities whose lives are often characterised by multi-scalar relations and attachment across multiple identities (Kochan 2016; Marlowe *et al.* 2017). The shifting possibilities of social media communication are also associated with the increased availability and affordability of digital and mobile interfaces that influence how people interact through social media and other communicative platforms (Ennaji & Bignami 2019). Marlowe *et al.* (2017) established that individuals from ethnic minorities and migrants have unprecedented opportunities to utilise online technologies to maintain transnational ties and connect to family and friends overseas. However, while social media technologies are

mostly represented concerning the increased connection, particularly across transnational and diasporic spaces, the proliferation of these communicative forms raises serious questions about how migrants become involved in more localised social formations and the prospects for social cohesion (Costanza-Chock 2011).

### ***1.1 Problem Statement***

Studies show that social media platforms (Twitter and Facebook) provide a fertile ground for online bigoted, racially prejudiced, and nationalistic dis-courses (Ekman 2018; Makombe, Sinyonde, Tladi, & Thambo 2016). Farkas, Schou & Neumayer (2018) argue that social media platforms shape antago-nistic attitudes towards immigrants. Because of their size and broad reach, social media platforms tend to influence the mainstream discourse on immi-gration and mi-grants. The impact of social media platforms on the migration discourse is notable in how they assist in normalising the previously ostracised forms of sentiments, opinions, and attitudes towards migrants (Makombe *et al.* 2020). Ekman (2018:607) established that ‘anti-immigration groups and publics on commercial social networking services (SNSs) also seem to amplify xeno-phobic and racist attitudes among their participants’.

Researchers at the CABC have cited a few examples of social media populism (CABC 2022; Ekman 2018). To illustrate, Ekman (2018) notes an example of a Swedish woman convicted of hate speech after posting several abusive comments on Facebook directed toward Somali migrants. This woman actively participated in one of the largest (Swedish) Facebook groups, ‘Stand up for Sweden’. In South Africa, hashtags have emerged on social media as a rallying cry for the government and private sector (Best & Meng 2015) to prioritise local jobs for South Africans over foreign nationals while blaming immigrants for crime and other social issues (CABC 2022). A study by CABC (2022) revealed how hashtags and populist groups are used to weed social discord among the blooms of democracy, particularly during the election process.

In August 2020, the *@uLerato Pillay* Twitter account used online disinformation tactics and infiltrated socially divisive content into over 50,000 Twitter accounts (CABC 2022). According to the CABC’s analysis of the *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* conversation between August 2020 and February 2022, elements of misinformation associated with the hashtag persist. An examination of the narrative surrounding the hashtags *#PutSouthAfricansFirst*, and many

others over the last two years reveals how real social issues such as unemployment, crime, and illegal immigration were used to gain traction. These issues became part of the political discourse as election campaigns heated up. As the democratic process of fostering social cohesion progressed, attempts to sow social discord on social media gained traction (CABC 2022).

Despite the increased research that attempts to examine online populism and anti-immigration discourse on social media platforms, much research, up to now, has been restricted to Western countries and thus limited in nature. As a result, available research tends to negate the dynamics of the anti-migration discourse in social media spaces in the global South (Ekman 2018; de Saint Laurent, Constance & Chaudet 2020). Surprisingly, the strategies of anti-immigration actors on social media in South Africa and the discursive construction of immigrants in user interaction on Twitter have not been closely examined. Subsequently, little is known about how Twitter users construct immigrants, and it is unclear what strategies are used in the discursive construction of migrants in South Africa. In this chapter, the author explores the strategies of anti-immigration actors on social media in South Africa and the discursive construction of immigrants in user interaction on Twitter. The role of emotions is emphasised in xenophobic discourse and analyses how two Twitter accounts (@OperationDudula and @Account Citizens (#PutSouthAfricansFirst), generate and circulate xenophobic sentiments to a large audience. This study concentrates on Twitter because of its importance for mass media agendas and, as a result, for public perception of political issues. Research shows that mainstream news media frequently respond to trending topics on Twitter (Araujo & van der Meer 2020), which can be seen particularly well in the mass media coverage of tweets by US American President Donald Trump (Fuchs 2017). In addition, journalists frequently use Twitter as a source of news. One could even speak of 'a reversed agenda-setting pattern' (Araujo & Van der Meer 2020:647). Thus, Twitter debates influence public debates outside of Twitter.

## ***1.2 @OperationDudula***

The increasing debates around anti-immigration have led to the emergence of some populist groups like @OperationDudula in South Africa. However, no available literature offers credible information about the history and development of the populist group. As a result, knowledge about @OperationDudula is based on public documents such as newspaper reports and information provi-

ed by the leaders and members on various occasions.

*@OperationDudula* began its operations in 2021 (Charles 2022). It started as an online movement, mobilising South African citizens who believed the plight and economic woes an ordinary South African face were due to the influx of African migrants (Charles 2022). The group also expressed dissatisfaction over how authorities handle the immigration issue. It has no clear organisational structure, and its leadership is not clearly defined. Nhlanhla Lux<sup>1</sup> has recently been cited as the group leader. While the group does not have an ideology that underpins its beliefs or philosophical dispositions, it is well-known for its radical stance against the employment of migrants, mainly from other African countries (Myeni 2022). Among some of its ideas is the argument that all jobs must be reserved for South African citizens (Charles 2022).

The group has a robust online presence. However, since early 2022, the group has been mobilising South Africans of like mind to join efforts to ‘safeguard’ their communities from migrant ‘criminals’ and ‘illegal’ migrants (Myeni 2022). Between January and March 2022, *Operation Dudula* trolled the streets of Johannesburg, demanding the closure of foreign-owned shops and accusing business owners of selling drugs and human trafficking (Charles 2022). The group has also been visiting restaurants and other businesses, searching for foreign employees and verifying their migration status in South Africa (Myeni 2022). The CABC (CABC 2022:1) argue that ‘the *@OperationDudula* movement’s recent spate of activities against foreign nationals indicates a resurgence of mobilisation coupled with intensified social media tactics that exploit social divisions by fostering xenophobic sentiments under the banner of nationalism and patriotism’. Online posts from the group often come under scrutiny for violating hate speech legislation. Nevertheless, the group is very active on Twitter, with its posts generating thousands of likes and retweets daily.

### ***1.3 @Account Citizens (#PutSouthAfricansFirst Movement)***

The *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* Movement has a more pronounced history than *@OperationDudula*. The anti-migration movement started as an online hashtag that became prominent on social media platforms for rallying behind a cam-

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<sup>1</sup> The Dudula leader was arrested after one South African citizen, Ramerafe, opened a case at the police. This followed a raid on his home by the movement’s supporters, acting on information they said they had received that linked him to ‘drug dealing’.



paign calling on the South African government and the private sector to prioritise local citizens when hiring for jobs (CABC 2022). The group also blames immigrants for crimes and other societal ills, which bewilders most South African communities. Charles (2022:1) argues that ‘the #PutSouthAfricansFirst Movement has become the first organised group to publicly spew hatred against foreign nationals’. The social media movement was spearheaded by @uLerato\_Pillay1<sup>2</sup>, a Twitter character with an unknown identity. However, it was later unmasked by the DFRLab in 2020 as one Sfiso Gwala, a former member of the South African National Defence Force (CABC 2022).

The movement does not have defined leadership and thus is not premised on ideological foundations. Instead, the messages shared by the #PutSouthAfricansFirst Movement morphed into #PutSouthAfricansFirst and intrigued other hashtags like #WeWantOurCountryBack, #ForeignersMustGo (Charles 2022). The movement’s messages aim to create tension between South Africans and foreign nationals (CABC 2022). It also divided South Africans into opposing camps; those supporting foreign nationals and those against immigrants. A single post from this movement generates many user comments, creating lively, multi-flow communication. On several occasions, the movement mobilised and operated in some parts of Johannesburg. They visited restaurants and demanded proof that employees were South African (CABC 2022).

## **2 The Rise of Social Media Populism**

It is widely assumed that there is a link between the rise of populism and the increased use of social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. According to Spiekermann (2020), the way social media has restructured the functioning of the public sphere and how citizens relate to one another in the public sphere is conducive to the populist agenda. Research on social media and populism shows an ‘affinity between a populist communication style and the media logic’ (Spiekermann 2020). To Bartlett (2014), populist players profit more from the prevalence of new digital media platforms because their inherent logic perfectly matches their communication style. Research by Mazzoleni and Bracciale (2018) shows that the logic of social media involves emotional, controversial, and even violent content typical of populist activism. Users share this content

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<sup>2</sup> The account was suspended by Twitter for sending out offensive and derogatory posts. Currently, the Put South Africa First Movement is operating using the twitter handle @Account Citizens.

more frequently than information with an impartial opinion expression. This tendency explains why misinformation and disinformation spread quickly on social media. Social media platforms like Twitter have a horizontal architecture that allows uncensored communication. This horizontal setup allows messages to spread to the public easily. In the context of Twitter, ‘a handful of hops in a retweet chain is enough to reach a substantial audience, and saturation is usually reached within one day’ (Araujo & Van der Meer 2020:636).

Moreover, Pannini (2017), cited in Postil (2018:755), describes an ‘elective affinity’. What this means is that there is a strong match between social media and populism, with social media acting as a perfect arena ‘for the populist appeal to ordinary people against a liberal establishment by [those who] feel victimised’ (Postil 2018:755). Similarly, Pariser (2011) argues that social media provides a social imagination for the people’s voices (opinion-building) and an excellent venue for people’s rallies (movement-building). Pannini (2017), cited in Postil (2018:755), adds weight to this assertion and argues that ‘the social media ‘filter bubble’ effect strengthens people’s sense of belonging and commitment to a populist cause’.

Beyond Europe and the United States, factors other than cultural identity and the failure of neoliberalism have led to the rise of social media populism (Chevigny 2003; Postill 2018). Chevigny (2003) argues that in countries like Brazil, the Philippines and Mexico, a populism of fear may prevail over strictly economic or cultural concerns. For instance, a Philippines study by Curato (2017:91) established that ‘Rodrigo Duterte’s electoral success was largely due to his penal populism’. To illustrate, it was predicated on two distinct yet mutually reinforcing political logic; the politics of anxiety and the politics of hope (Curato 2017). Postill (2011) adds weight to this assertion and argues that, in most parts of the world, the battle to combat criminal elements often becomes an ecumenical issue that can forge unity between diverse groups around a perceived existential threat. Drawing on the above arguments, it can be summed up that the roots and development of populism in social media spaces are a concoction of economic, cultural, existential, and other factors (Chevigny 2003; Postill 2018). However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to research the rise and roots of social media populism.

### **3 Anti-Migration Populist Groups in South Africa**

This chapter uses the case of two anti-immigration online movements – Opera-

tion Dudula and PutSouthAfricansFirst — to ascertain Twitter users' role in producing and circulating anti-migration discourse. The positions of these two groups are of interest given that South Africa has some of the most liberal policies on refugees and immigration<sup>3</sup>. However, the spate of violence and hate against migrants has increased (Hollifield & Foley 2022). In the past ten years, South Africa has recorded more than 20 xenophobic attacks against African migrants (Mkhize & Makau 2018).

The South African government introduced many changes to its immigration laws, leaving many immigrants facing deportation (Mkhize & Makau 2018). Amongst the changes is the Minister of Home Affairs directive that terminated the Zimbabwean Exemption Permit granted to Zimbabweans in 2009 (BusinessTech 2021). These changes in the migration laws led to a sharp decline in the positive attitude towards immigration and immigrants among the South African public. Reliefweb's (2022) evidence revealed that most South Africans hold negative beliefs about foreigners, particularly those from Africa. The rising negative attitude towards immigration and immigrants is noticeable online, including on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook (Ekman 2018; Olteanu, Castillo, Boy & Varshney 2018).

Online forums have become fertile terrains for incubating populist groups who express concern over the police and government's failure to address crime, primarily blamed on foreigners and the influx of illegal immigrants in South Africa (Olteanu *et al.* 2018). Charles (2022) observed that small populist groups such as Operation Dudula and PutSouthAfricansFirst were born out of citizen discontent over the government's failure to handle the immigration problem effectively. The group aims to support the South African authorities in combating immigration-related social and economic ills. Operation Dudula and PutSouthAfricansFirst claim to be responsible for raising awareness and mobilising citizens against migrants in digital spaces. When these groups have gained momentum and a sizable following, they transmute their operations into physical and sometimes confrontational encounters (Charles 2022).

#### **4 Anti-Migrant Discourse on Social Media**

Much literature has been published on social media and anti-migration senti-

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<sup>3</sup> Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that the right to enjoy full legal protection, and the right to remain in the the Republic of South Africa.

ments on digital online platforms (Ekman 2018; Krzyżanowski & Ledin 2017; Papacharissi 2015; van Dijck 2013). For instance, Ekman (2018) assessed the various strategies of anti-immigration actors on social media and the discursive construction of immigrants and refugees in user interaction on Facebook. The study was based on an online Swedish anti-migration group called Surf. In this study, Ekman (2018:608) argues that ‘anti-immigration groups online can be understood as affective publics, in which racial expressions and overt racism are becoming increasingly normalised’. For this scholar, the online public should be carefully considered when addressing the causes of anti-immigration and racist sentiments in modern-day democratic societies (Ekman 2018).

Evidence suggests that the role of social media in its various forms has shifted drastically (Papacharissi 2015; Van Dijck 2013). For instance, van Dijck (2013:88) argues that ‘social media, including social network systems, are not only digital spaces for entertainment, connectivity and interpersonal communication’. Instead, they have metamorphosed into platforms for political discourse and identity-making (Papacharissi 2015). Farkas, Schou and Neumayer (2018: 464) argue that – to understand the upsurge in anti-migration attitudes – there is an urgent need to recognise and acknowledge the place of social media as a socio-technical system that plays an ‘increasingly important role in shaping social relations, including those of race and racism’. This assertion is supported by Alvares and Dahlgren (2016), who argue that besides social unrest, socio-economic circumstances, and dismal integration policies, there should be a specific focus on digital communication roles when assessing the various impacts of anti-immigration and racist political actors in contemporary society. Ekman (2018) and van Dijck (2013) established that social network systems are constituted of diverse and complex sets of technical affordances that anti-immigration users can utilise when creating contentious online publics (Alvares & Dahlgren 2016).

Ekman (2018) describes the anti-immigration strategies the online publics use to create contentious discourses. For this scholar, anti-immigration groups ‘remediate and recontextualise mainstream news on issues related to immigration and immigrants’. News stories often focus on negative topics such as crime, public unrest, and economic challenges. However, reframing the news is done by reformulating paragraphs and omitting facts that may explain the story’s reality. Ekman (2018:608) argues that ‘recontextualisation means that seemingly ‘neutral’ news items transmute into news pervaded by an anti-immigration or racist agenda’. Krzyżanowski and Ledin (2017) add weight to

Ekman's (2018) observation when they argue that recontextualised stories often, encompass a mixture of 'civil framing', for instance, accentuating public safety, and 'uncivil' frames, like reductive culturalist explanations – that is, that foreigners have different behaviours from the host citizens because of their 'culture' or 'religion'.

Philo, Briant, and Donald (2013) argue that the continuous flow of 'depraved news' on immigrants and refugees is sustained by dissemination on enormous social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, to be precise. Thus, by circulating and embedding content published on anti-migrant digital media, anti-immigration populist groups and their followers can reach enormous potential followers with restricted resources. The construction and circulation of anti-migration content depend on the collaborative efforts of both the leaders and ordinary members. To illustrate, Fuchs (2017:40) establishes that 'Facebook users provide anti-immigration actors with raw material for stories by sharing mainstream news, circulating narratives relating to refugees and immigrants, or articulating experiences and in return, share the "news" produced by anti-immigration websites'. However, the participation and circulation of anti-immigration information is not always conscious. Ignorant users like, disseminate, and share information from anti-immigration groups without considering the source's reliability or political objectives.

Social media communication is sustained by constructing and disseminating emotions (Dean 2010). For Dean (2010:88), 'social media thrive on the production and circulation of 'affect as a binding technique''. Affect is conceptualised as the mixture of emotions disseminating between interlocutors in a communicative planetary. Affect is constructed and circulated when subjects and bodies relate. According to Dean (2010:95), this affect is fashioned in a communicative interaction, giving users meaning, attention and enjoyment. Papacharissi (2015:125) adds weight to the previous assertion when he argues that participation in online social forums engenders feelings of mutual recognition and belonging.

On the other hand, this engagement on these forums leads to exclusion. Ekman (2018: 609) argues that users' reciprocal emotions of inclusion and exclusion when participating on social media platforms 'drive the circuits of communication, that is, constitute the gratification of user labour'. Similarly, Papacharissi (2015:125) stresses that the affective public is 'networked public formations mobilised and connected or disconnected through expressions of sentiments'. This scholar decries the argument that online racist groups can

serve as examples of effective publics because of the means they use to suppress pluralism and deliberations (Papacharissi 2015:122).

However, effective publics are also formed around uncivil expressions, including racism and hate. To illustrate, Ekman (2018) argues that in the 2016 American presidential elections, some of Trump's supporters used racist, sexist, and anti-Semitic memes and tropes 'developed by "alt-right" white nationalists ... develop[ing] a sort of weaponised, automated affective public' (Karpf 2017: 201 - 202). Though the racism and anti-migration social media groups may not advance pluralism and deliberation, they are founded on 'mutual circulation of affective discourse and social connectivity' (Ekman 2018:608). The social media public creates storytelling exercises, real-life experiences, and affective engagements predicated on the sentiment of mistrust, hatred, fear and hate, group understanding, recognition and in-group solidarity. This assertion fits well with the observations made by Ahmed (2004:117-139) that 'emotions such as insecurity, fear, hostility, or hatred align bodies of individuals within the network (creating a sense of belonging) while excluding other bodies'. To illustrate, communication in anti-migration social media communities build an 'in-group and out-group identification'. Ahmed (2004:117) argues that 'the construction of a common nation, national identity or 'culture' relies on the exclusion of "others" based on fear'.

## **5 Theoretical Underpinning: Fowler's Model of Critical Discourse Analysis**

This study adopts Fowler's (1986) Model of CDA. It examines the strategies of anti-immigration actors on social media in South Africa and the discursive construction of immigrants in user interaction on Twitter. CDA is committed to analysing linguistic and semiotic aspects of social practices and problems (Wodak 2011). To that end, the structural attributes of any given discourse must be interpreted through the relationship between linguistic practices and social practices (Fairclough 1998).

Fowler (1986) claims that the combination of linguistic analysis and social context study always manifests the hidden ideology in the discourse. To illustrate, Fowler (1986) argues that individuals from diverse social strata tend to use various linguistic structures in a similar area of experience. As such, 'the particular set of linguistic features, on the one hand, reflects the language user's particular way of assessment and evaluation, and on the other hand, these linguistic characteristics are, in essence, deeply rooted in the social structure' (Fow-

ler 1986:56). Fairclough (1985:67) agrees with Fowler (1986) when he argues that the ‘practical use of language is largely out of the speaker or writer’s control but determined by the complex social structure’. To that end, it is crucial to investigate the general social context of the discourse because it allows for a clearer explanation of the conspicuous linguistic features inherent in the text.

Concurrently, language is intimately bound with ideology, and ideology originated from an asymmetrical society (Fowler 1986). Drawing on this assertion, Qianbo (2016:36) argues that ‘the interlocutor’s distinctive language use must reflect the distinctive ideology of his or her social group, usually manifested in the power relationship and group interests’. Fowler’s model of CDA is crucial for this study because it helps the researcher identify the relationship between language and ideology. Moreover, its application to this current study allows the researchers to conduct a careful process of linguistic analysis and social background research. Qianbo (2016:36) suggests that ‘the social and historical background helps explain the noticeable linguistic structures in the text, and as a result, reveal the hidden ideology through power relationship and interests of dominant groups’. The author uses the CDA to argue that social media populist groups do not operate in a vacuum. They share hybrid-mediated spaces and arenas with other populists and with non-populists.

## **6 Methodology**

Data for this study comprised n=500 Tweets that were retrieved manually. The tweets were retrieved from two Twitter accounts; *@OperationDudula* and *@Account Citizens (#PutSouthAfricansFirst)*. A purposive sampling approach was used to select the tweets according to their relevance to the topic. Data were collected from 01 December 2021 to 10 March 2022. To retrieve the tweets, two keywords were used: *#OperationDudula* and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst*. The choice of keywords was informed by the idea that they were already trending hashtags on Twitter and also that they were derived from the topic. The keywords were run on the Twitter search option. The search produced at least 1200 tweets that were collected. However, not all tweets were essential for this study’s analysis. Duplicate and irrelevant tweets were discarded after reading and rereading the corpus of data. The final data corpus comprised 500 tweets.

Data collection and analysis were conducted simultaneously using Fairclough’s (1998) model for CDA. The CDA stems from a critical theory of language that perceives the use of language as a form of social practice (Fairclough 1998). Moreover, proponents of CDA argue that all social rules are tangled in

specific historical contexts and ‘are how existing social relations are reproduced or contested and different interests are served’ (Fairclough 1998:67).

Fairclough’s (1989) model is composed of three interrelated processes of analysis tied to three interrelated dimensions of discourse. First, these dimensions for analysis involve the analysis of verbal, visual or verbal - visual texts. Secondly, it also examines the processes employed by human subjects to produce and receive the object (writing/ speaking/ designing and reading/ listening/ viewing). Finally, the third dimension of analysis was based on searching for the socio-historical conditions that govern these text production processes.

The analyses involved the three phases of Fairclough’s (1989) model for CDA to analyse how anti-migration attitudes are created through communicative interaction among Twitter users. The researchers applied their three formulated stages to assess the user comments on four posts (two from each group) published by *@OperationDudula* and the *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* movement. The researcher strategically collected the four Twitter posts to highlight the differences and similarities; both included ‘immigration/ foreigners’ and ‘crime’. This study’s qualitative approach draws on the CDA and assesses the social-political dimension of language use in everyday communication on the micro-level of social network services.

Firstly, all the comments (n=500) were retrieved and read manually. Secondly, the gathered comments were structured thematically. In that process, the researcher kept the original user conversation/ interaction clusters intact (reply comments are ordered chronologically below the ‘original’ comment and are here called responses) (Ekman 2018:611). Thirdly, the collected user comments were closely analysed, evaluating the construction of ‘immigrants/ foreigners’ at predicational, referential and argumentational levels (Wodak 2011). What is helpful about this approach is that it enables the researcher to focus on the signifiers that make up the text, the specific linguistic selections, their juxta positioning, their sequencing, and their layout. However, it also allows the researcher to recognise the historical determination of these selections and understand that these choices are tied to the conditions of the possibility of that utterance.

The Twitter profiles for *@OperationDudula* and *@Account Citizens (PutSouthAfricansFirst Movement)* are publicly available. It implies that the users who post their comments on these platforms are conscious that their posts are open to the public and available to researchers. However, for ethical considerations, usernames were not used in the presentation and analysis of data.



## **6.1 Data Analysis**

### **6.1.1 Twitter Comments as Cumulative Anti-immigration**

Social media platforms such as Twitter are founded on user-generated content. Unlike the traditional media platforms that restrict text production to the media institutions and its elites, Twitter augments networking practices like sharing, commenting, reacting, and even group discussions that come in the form of ‘Twitter Spaces’. This characteristic of Twitter is termed ‘platformed sociality’ (van Dijck 2013). Ekman (2018) stresses that the social media platform provides two pathways to the user. To illustrate, he argues that ‘the practices of user responses draw attention to the profile (individual) who publishes content’ (Ekman 2018:14). As a result, the affordances of Twitter make connectivity among users possible. It is this connectivity that then transmutes into a novel sense of recognition. The author argues that user engagement with the ‘uncivil’ public can quicken the construction and circulation of anti-migration discourse through communicative interactions between users. Wahlström and Törnberg’s (2019) argument that online group undercurrents can intensify hostile and vicious attitudes and behaviours is supported. In the following section, user comments in four posts from the sample are analysed to understand how user interaction leads to negative attitudes and xenophobia towards immigrants in South Africa. All the posts cover the topics of immigrants/foreigners as subjects. The analysis is developed and constructed to highlight how the interaction between user profiles creates an understanding of the phenomenon. It begins with a post from the official profiles of the anti-immigration movements, then traces the engagement’s development and how it shifts focus from one issue to another.

## **6.2 @OperationDudula**

### **6.2.1 Post 1: *We will be duduling BMW, Nissan, Brewery and Coke. Let us all go out in numbers. Jobs will be created for South Africans; please let us go, Madudula...***

On 28 March 2022, Operation Dudula posted an invitation flyer on its official Twitter page. The pamphlet invited South Africans to join the Operation Dudula launch in Tshwane (Pretoria) to visit businesses allegedly hiring foreigners. Besides the flyer, the post also captioned, *We will be duduling BMW, Nissan, Brewery and Coke. Let us all go out in numbers. Jobs will be created for South Africans; please let us go, Madudula ....*

**Figures 1 & 2: Illustration of Tweeter Post Circulated by @Operation Dudula and the Ensuing Responses from Users**



The post attracted 113 comments, 537 retweets and 1 697 likes. User responses and comments were directed at the caption instead of the invitation. From the comments, users' expressed disdain and anger about the companies hiring foreigners instead of South Africans. Also, most comments were highly charged with hate and dislike of foreigners because they allegedly took away jobs that belonged to South Africans. Other users went as far as calling for companies hiring immigrants to leave South Africa.

## Populism and Xenophobic Discourse on Social Media

Below are some of the sentiments.



**Source: @OperationDudula Twitter account (2022)**

Below are some tweets from user interactions in response to the post by @OperationDudula.

*If those companies want to employ Zimbabweans while operating in South Africa, they might as well pack and go to Zimbabwe.*

*Here in South Africa, we want companies that will elevate the burden of unemployment on South Africans, not foreigners. So, I'm not fond of these companies at all.*

The post articulates the idea of victimisation using the ‘them’ and ‘us dichotomy’. Victimisation occurs when the users complain that they are losing their jobs to foreigners. In this case, the locals blame the foreigners for the shortage of jobs. ‘They take our jobs’, ‘we are losing our job’, and ‘the remaining jobs belong to South Africans’. These comments give the impression that the immigrants are victimising the locals. The ‘them’ and ‘us’ dichotomy becomes clear when the users express that the job taken by foreigners (them) belongs to South Africans (us). The articulation of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy creates boundaries of identities where the foreigner is described as the one who cannot be us. Debras (2018) argues that ‘the discourse of ‘we/us vs them/others’ is the construction of a boundary which creates a separation between groups and identities’.

The post advances the idea of belonging and not belonging. In this case, the jobs belong to South Africa, and they do not belong to foreigners. Because of this, most South Africans are unemployed (victimisation). The post invites South Africans to visit the companies and reclaim their reserved spaces – ‘their’ jobs to address the situation. The discourse of belonging and not belonging is a dominant and recurring argument within the anti-immigration discourse. In the user responses, there is a sense that belonging tends to be naturalised, articulated, and politicised because it is threatened by foreigners (Yuval-Davis 2006).

Operation Dududula posted an invitation to visit companies hiring foreigners to reclaim their sense of belonging. The users’ responses did not only direct their attack on migrants who were hired. Instead, their comments began to call for a physical mobilisation to visit these companies and eliminate ‘illegal’ foreigners. The users’ comments below call for physically invading spaces occupied by ‘illegal’ foreigners.

*Please, maDudula male, can you please also go to Braamfischer? Zimbabweans and Sothos hijack the place each week. There are murders, especially in-between phases 3 and 4; a neighbour’s brother was brutally robbed, stabbed and beaten to death on Sundays fighting together.*

*All foreigners must go now. It is the time for people of South Africans who are not working.*

*People should organise themselves in their townships or suburbs and deal with illegal immigration and business hiring foreigners as cheap labour.*

The comments above also seem to articulate invasion through binary oppositions – producing ‘us’ as victims of the immigrants’ actions and behaviours. There is a sense in the comments that the immigrants have invaded spaces and jobs that belong to South Africans. As a response to that invasion, the South Africans (‘us’) who are victims must now go to reclaim those spaces and jobs that foreigners occupy. One user said:

*Let’s fight them together. All foreigners must go now. It is time people from South Africa are not working to Khuphuka.*

*6.2.2 Post 2: Zimbabweans are now telling us what to do in South Africa. Zimbabweans should make peace with the fact that they are getting deported. The law is the law.*

On 8 March 2022, Operation Dudula posted a video on its official profile. In the video, members of the South African Police Services (SAPS) were locking the doors of a shop that supposedly Zimbabwean immigrants owned. In the video, a Zulu-speaking man said:

*... it’s not like we don’t know how we handle these foreigners. They did intimidate us. We have respected them long enough. If they don’t respect us, we are closing this shop, which will not open again. No one will ever operate this shop here.*

Moreover, a caption accompanied the video saying:

*Zimbabweans are now telling us what to do in South Africa. Zimbabweans should make peace with the fact that they are getting deported. The law is the law.*

The post had 133 retweets, 21 quote tweets, and 317 likes when that data was sampled. In total, the post had 417 engagements. The profile post was directed at Zimbabweans and the idea that they were breaking the law. The post attracted a cocktail of responses from the users, who immediately blamed the South African authorities for the influx of foreigners and illegal activities associated with foreigners. The government was instantly placed at the centre of the blame. Some user responses highlighted blame as follows:

*All this mess is because the government is reluctant to deal with and address the problem of foreigners in this country.*

*What is our government gaining from foreigners that make them reluctant to intervene and deport foreigners? African National Congress did South Africans dirt.*

Immediately, the users in this post shifted their focus towards discussing the subject or object of the foreigner. The comments quickly established that the people conducting illegal business in South Africa are foreigners. A recurring idea featured prominently in the comments and responses was that the foreigners are ‘breaking the laws’ and must be ‘deported’ back to ‘their’ countries. Furthermore, from the answers, the users were adamant that foreigners do not belong in South Africa and must be ‘chased away’. For instance, some of the phrases used that were suggestive of the fact that the foreigners do not ‘belong’ in South Africa were: ‘we must chase them away’, ‘they must go back to their country’, ‘let them go’, ‘must be deported’. Below are some extracts illustrative of the argument that the Twitter users expressed dislike.

*Why are you saying Zimbabweans? What about Mozambicans, Malawians and Nigerians? all foreigners must go back to their countries, and Bo mastand [landlords] must chase them.*

*We have our own here .... indeed, Zulus are needed in this matter. We call on the taxi industry to join the revolution. It cannot be that these scumbags harass our people.*

*Enough is enough. We want our country back. If you are carrying a passport, you are a visitor. If you are undocumented, you are an illegal alien. Finish!!*

From the above responses, users evoked the strategy of ‘othering’, where the line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ must be drawn. It was evident when their engagements were calling the foreigners to go. By emphasising that foreigners must return to their home countries, the users played into the common argument of anti-migration and anti-racist discourses that the ‘other’ who does not belong to ‘us’ should never be accommodated. In this user engagement, the ‘other’ is the foreigner who has occupied the place of ‘us’ (the South Africans). Therefore, these others must be ‘chased away’ to where they

belong. One user refers to foreigners as ‘visitors’ who carry a passport and should never forget when it is time to go.

There is also a sense of stereotyping all foreigners as single and homogenous populations. As one user said, ‘they are alike, ‘they are all the same’, ‘they all smell armpits’, and ‘they all don’t belong here’. The exercise of stereotyping foreigners can be seen in how the profile in the caption referred to the foreigners in the video as Zimbabweans. The aspect that the objects/subjects were Zimbabweans was rebutted by users who contested the nationality of the foreigners. However, it was established by other users that the people in the video were not Zimbabweans. The division led to some reaching conclusion that all foreigners are the same. The extracts below illustrate the user reactions and comments on the subject’s nationality.

*Your problem is you think every foreigner is Zimbabwean .... Why are you saying Zimbabweans? What about Mozambiqueans, Malawians and Nigerians? all foreigners must return to their countries. Every foreigner is not a Zimbabwean... why do uu hate those people that much?*

*This Is not Zimbabwean speaking. You are obsessed with Zimbos as if every foreigner is a Zimbabwean*

The responses above show comments from a group of users who opposed the notion of stereotyping and homogenising all foreign nationals as Zimbabweans. Stereotyping is a common practice in the xenophobia discourse where a single characteristic of a group describes all groups not regarded as citizens in that country (Alesina, Carlana, La Ferrara & Pinotti 2018).


### **6.3 #PutSouthAfricansFirst Movement**

#### **6.3.1 Post 1: Look at these things crossing Illegally into our country only yesterday...**

On 21 October 2022, at the height of the calls for the deportation of illegal foreigners from South Africa, the #PutSouthAfricansFirst Movement circulated a video (<https://twitter.com/i/status/1449559755488387074>) clip of a group of Ndebele-speaking Zimbabweans. They were crossing the Limpopo River into South Africa. The Limpopo River is a river that marks the boundary between

Zimbabwe and South Africa. The post attracted engagement from a large pool of users. The post had a total response of 510 users at the sampling time. The video's caption used derogatory terms that dehumanised the people in the video, as shown in the image below:


### **Figures 3 & 4: Illustration of Tweeter Post from #PutSouthAfricansFirst Movement and the User Responses**



Comments from the users corroborate the post's caption in 'dehumanising' the subject/ object foreigner in the video. The engagements' subtle sense of agreement upheld the idea that the foreigners were 'things'. The word 'things' when referring to foreigners is common in the anti-migration and anti-racist discourse. It is commonly applied to remove the humanness of foreigners and make them objects. The word, in its literal sense, refers to humans as objects. It deprives the subject at whom this manner of reference is directed of its fundamental human status.



## *Populism and Xenophobic Discourse on Social Media*



**Source: Tweets retrieved from #PutSouthAfricansFirst tweeter account (2022)**

Below are some responses that add to the argument that the engagements responding to the video applied the strategy of dehumanising the foreigner.

Figure 5 & 6: Illustration of Tweeter Post from #PutSouthAfricansFirst Movement and the User Responses



The users' phrases that suggest the dehumanisation of foreigners are 'things', 'no human-like that', 'they are dining with crocodiles', 'they breed like roaches', 'all smell armpits', 'Scumbags', 'Zimbabweans are nauseating'.

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Source: Tweets retrieved from #PutSouthAfricansFirst tweeter account (2022)

In the comments, the subjects are deprived of human qualities through the association with animal behaviour when depicting them as ‘cockroaches’, ‘they are dining with crocodiles’, and ‘creatures’. The practice of equating immigrants to animals has been described by Ekman (2018). He states the subjects are figuratively excluded from possessing any human qualities in anti-immigration discourse, saying, ‘the use of animals and vermin as metaphors mirrors historical references in war propaganda and genocide. Similar signifying practices have legitimised atrocities against civilians and ethnic groups’ (Ekman 2018:607).

The comments from the user immediately morphed into the argument that the people illegally crossing the borders are the perpetrators of crime in South Africa. In the subsequent comments, various phrases were used to link foreigners to criminal activities in South Africa: ‘Criminals’, ‘makwerekwere’s<sup>4</sup>, ‘crooks’, ‘robbers’, ‘car hijackers’, ‘terrorising our country’, ‘rob and kill people’. One user claimed that foreigners ‘rape’ their sisters and women.

*Soon as those things dry, they grow balls to demand free health care, free education, free SASSA grants, spike South African highways, rob & kill people, hijack cars, call South Africans lazy, learn & claim to be Zulu and breed like roaches.*

*Why is the government not arresting these criminals before they get to our communities? Crime in South Africa will always be high because of these makwerekweres*

*Are these #Zimbabweans who will be terrorising our country and our people and overwhelming our health system@HealthZA He, guys, let’s hear what the Pres of*

### *6.3.2 Post 2: Parliament says there are approx*

On 30 September 2021, the #PutSouthAfricansFirst Movement, through its official Twitter profile, posted an image that read, *control immigration. South*

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<sup>4</sup> A derogatory neologism for ‘foreigners’. It is used by South Africans to refer to African migrants.

*Africans cannot accommodate the entire African continent.* The photo's caption had figures supposedly taken from the just-released statement of the South African parliament indicating the number of immigrants living in South Africa. At the time of sampling, the post had 310 engagements. The caption was notable: *INVASION OF SOUTH AFRICA*. The post revealed 8 million Zimbabweans, 2 million Mozambicans, 500 000 Lesotho, 1.2 million Nigeria, and 1 million Somalia (see the rest in the figure below). However, what is interesting is that these figures were highly inflated because they contradicted the figure from Statistics South Africa that says there are 4 million immigrants in South Africa. The user began by disputing the authenticity of the figures, arguing that the numbers on the ground are higher than those posted. Moreover, the user stated that more foreigners are in South Africa than the numbers provided by the state.

**Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10: Examples of Tweets from the Official Account of the #PutSouthAfricansFirst Movement**



11:29

← Tweet

**Mzansi citizens fir...** · 30 Sep 21  
Replying to [@AccountCitizens](#)  
There are more than 500k Chinese people in SA. We have a chaotic immigration situation in SA

**NerholmC** · 09 Apr  
Replying to [@AccountCitizens](#) and [@ssbl369j](#)  
Just think about Zimbabwe's statistics og 14 million so only 4 million is left In Zim 🇿🇼 🇿🇼 🇿🇼

**Mzansi citizens first** · 10 Apr  
It's possible hey!! I can find you Zimbabweans with ease in SA within an hour. There are just too many. If they were 800k in a population of 60M then I would hardly meet one Zimbabwean.

**gofa @gofaona\_ram...** · 01 Oct 21  
Replying to [@AccountCitizens](#)

Tweet your reply

11:31

← Tweet

**gofa @gofaona\_ram...** · 01 Oct 21  
Replying to [@AccountCitizens](#)  
Botswana has a population of just 2 million. And 1 million are in S.A? Impossible.

**Mr X @Xollaannii** · 01 Oct 21  
Zimbabwe has a total population of 15 million and 8 million are in South Africa? Impossible

**VK @ACEMIDIAN** · 30 Sep 21  
Replying to [@AccountCitizens](#)  
Clearly, many immigrants have listened to Malema and found creative ways of entering the country illegally.

**Junior Mos @uBaba...** · 30 Sep 21  
Replying to [@AccountCitizens](#)  
Tell this to EFF please

Tweet your reply

## Populism and Xenophobic Discourse on Social Media



**Source: Tweets retrieved from the #PutSouthAfricansFirst post and the user interaction on Twitter (2022)**

Below are some extracts from the Twitter users:

*Our country is under invasion by these illegal foreigners. Therefore, something must do as soon as possible. This is war Many immigrants have listened to Malema and found creative ways of entering the country illegally. Foreigners are occupying every corner of our streets. We can't sit and watch. These numbers will only grow if we don't do anything about it. They are so many in this country.*

The comments from the users who engaged in the posts immediately transmuted and shifted focus to the 'invasion' argument. Users expressed fears and anxie-

ties that their country was under imminent invasion from foreigners whose numbers grew exponentially. Various phrases that suggested that the government was under an imminent invasion were utilised. For instance, standard terms were ‘we are under attack’, ‘South Africa is invaded’, ‘invasion’, and ‘occupation’. User’s comments also associated this invasion with ‘illegality’, where most claim that the foreigners are coming to the country illegally and without proper documentation. The comment also became more violent, with some users claiming the invasion should be considered ‘war’.

## **7 Analysis of the Findings and their Implications**

In this chapter, the author explores the strategies of anti-immigration actors in South Africa and the discursive construction of immigrants in user interaction on Twitter. The role of emotions is explored in xenophobic discourse and analyses how two Twitter accounts (*@OperationDudula* and *@AccountCitizens*) generate and circulate xenophobic sentiments to a large audience. Additionally, the general communicative features of these accounts are analysed, including the user interactions between 1 January 2020 and 28 March 2022. Finally, two empirical questions were asked: (i) What strategies are used by anti-immigration Twitter users? (ii) How do the users construct the immigrants? This section analyses the findings and their implications on the critical research questions and theory.

The first research objective of this study was to examine the strategies used by the anti-immigration populist groups who use Twitter in South Africa. The study identified various strategies the anti-immigration groups employed to raise awareness and mobilise the public concerning their anti-immigration and xenophobic ideas. Results revealed wanton usage of emotive communication techniques. *@OperationDudula* and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* used similar emotive strategies. Their posts, communicative text, and responses were consciously or unconsciously designed to evoke malevolent feelings of hate and anger against the object/subject, the foreigner. A shared sense of revulsion, vulnerability, anxiety and fear from the ‘invasion from the foreigners’ was carefully constructed and circulated. These emotive strategies helped create a community of in-group recognition while facilitating the exclusion of the other, the out-group (immigrants). The findings are comparable to Papacharissi (2015:125), who establishes that emotive strategies are common among digital affective publics. According to Papacharissi (2015:125), ‘Net-



worked public formations are mobilised and connected or disconnected through expressions of sentiments'. These sentiments are either driven towards a unifying objective or an exclusionary agenda.

Additionally, this study's findings that user interactions and communicative engagements on Twitter were predicated on affective and emotive strategies fit well with the arguments from de Saint Laurent *et al.* (2020). These scholars argue that social media users have unique and different behaviours and use different strategies in creating echo chambers online. The analysis of this study shows that the anti-immigration groups used common phrases, words and slogan variations that have precise identity functions and serve the objective of building a community – anti-immigration online groups. The use of common and familiar anti-immigration phrases popularly used in xenophobic and racist discourses seems to support the arguments from various critical discourse studies and scholars (Fowler 1986; Fairclough 1989). For instance, phrases such as 'we' and 'them' suggest that in the communicative process, the anti-immigration groups and their followers effectively pirate, refabricate and reinvent pre-existing anti-immigration sentiments that constitute the broader anti-immigration socio-political discourses in offline spaces.

Evidence from this analysis shows that Twitter provides a fertile platform where toxic and often derogatory language is generated and circulated. For instance, the foreigner was constructed and represented in derogatory ways. De-legitimising and dehumanising 'illegal' and overtly xenophobic constructions of immigrants were an intrinsic part of the data. Common terms like 'illegal immigrants', 'criminals', 'robbers', 'things', and 'cockroaches' were unambiguously used. All these forms of representation dehumanised immigrants and stripped them of all qualities that make a person human.

However, what is important to note is that the users seem to have borrowed common anti-immigration strategies of dehumanising and naturalising the difference between 'in-groups' and 'out-groups'. Nortio, Niska, Renvik and Jasinskaja-Lahti (2021) support this finding when they argue that the strategies in the form of phrases, words, and expressions used by anti-immigration xenophobic groups in online spaces bear a strong resemblance with those commonly employed by the traditional media when reporting on immigrants. Lorenzetti (2020) points out that in traditional media, immigrants are dehumanised and often presented as the 'other' who do not belong to the natural group of the so-called 'natives'. Drawing on the previous assertion, it is safe to argue that social media populist groups do not operate in a vacuum. They

share hybrid-mediated spaces and arenas with other populists and with non-populists. The findings in this study confirm Fowler's (1986) and Fairclough's (1998) argument that media and societal discourses are interdependent.

Findings from this study suggest that despite being used as a 'liberating tool' – as in the case of the Arab Spring – social media platforms (specifically Twitter) and user engagement with 'uncivil' publics can quicken the construction and circulation of anti-migration discourse through communicative interactions between users. Analysis from this study shows that *@OperationDudula* and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* followers created affective publics of people who subscribe to similar anti-immigration sentiments. The user's efforts to unite created an exclusionary community and an out-group in the object/subject foreigner. Leberecht (2010) argues that Twitter is now and then shunned as a social media platform for propagating misinformation, rumours, and, in extreme cases, untrue information about events and individuals. This study's findings suggest that extreme behaviours and malevolent information generated by communicative interactions in online social platforms transmute to physical spaces. Findings here reveal that the user engagements were cumulative, and the anger generated by the users led them to call for the 'attack' and 'visit' of foreign-owned shops and 'chase away' illegal immigrants. The sentiments generated and shared on Twitter mutate directly into the hate of immigrants in communities. This assertion is supported by findings of a survey conducted by *Relief in South Africa*. The survey results reveal that most South Africans gain knowledge about immigration from online platforms. Furthermore, the results show that most people who gain information about immigrants from online platforms hold negative beliefs.

## **8 Conclusion**

This study, which forms the basis of this chapter, shows that large and open Twitter groups can constitute a 'weaponised, automated anti-immigration public'. Because the technical structure of social media platforms shapes and nurtures anti-immigration and xenophobia in various ways, it can be effectually manipulated by anti-immigration and xenophobic groups and individuals. Anti-immigration discourse depends heavily on affect and emotions to attract enough attention and dissemination. This finding means *@OperationDudula* and *#PutSouthAfricansFirst* facilitate affective and emotive communication using social media architecture and technical affordances. The groups created a forum

where user interaction augmented anti-immigration comments and responses, transforming nationality hostility into discursive violence. Therefore, open Twitter posts and the subsequent user interactions move and shift boundaries of what is typically and publicly acceptable language on topics related to immigration and migrants. Törnberg and Wahlström (2019:2) support this assertion when they say, 'By taking advantage of commercial social media, anti-immigration actors gradually normalise previously unacceptable attitudes and utterances, and as recent research suggests, radical right-wing sentiments on social media may instigate and facilitate violent (anti-immigrant) political action'. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that anti-immigration discourse does not exist on social media only. Instead, they manifest in the groups' actions participating in the online construction and circulation of xenophobia.

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# CHAPTER 6

## Family Language Policy in a Xenophobic Context: The Case of Kalanga Transnational Families in South Africa

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### **Abstract**

Due to globalisation and people's mobility, transnational families have become a common feature worldwide. As they settle in host countries, a diminished need and opportunities to use their heritage languages usually follow. This tendency places pressure on immigrant languages, particularly in countries that do not support their teaching in education. In highly ethnicised and racialised contexts like South Africa, parents' transnational experiences impact decisions regarding language use in identity construction in the host country. This study examines the family language policies of three transnational Zimbabwean Kalanga families in South Africa. It reveals how their language transactions, negotiations and contestations are enmeshed with considerations of the ever-present xenophobic sentiment in South African society. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with parents from three focal Zimbabwean families of Kalanga heritage. The findings show that parents' experiences of xenophobia in South Africa shape their language acquisition decisions for their children in considerable ways. The preference for acquiring and using Zulu and English at the expense of Kalanga is motivated by parents' desire and aspiration for their children's assimilation into a South African identity to minimise exposure to xenophobic attacks, for children's schooling and general upward social mobility. Findings also suggest that transnationalism presents challenges

for the intergenerational transmission of Kalanga within the focal families. Given that Kalanga is already minoritised and marginalised in Zimbabwe, characterised by diminished use in public and official domains, parents' language ideologies are key to its revitalisation, and the family domain is critical in that endeavour. Therefore, this study contributes to understanding the dynamics of intergenerational language transmission among transnational families, particularly those in hostile contexts.

**Keywords:** family language policy, transnational families Kalanga, language practices, xenophobia, South Africa

## **1 Introduction**

The overall mobility of populations across national and continental borders has become a major defining feature of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Schwartz 2008). One major outcome of this mobility has been the proliferation of transnational families, particularly in countries offering the promise and allure of better opportunities. According to Ndhlovu (2009a), Families in immigration contexts are usually faced with several dilemmas relating to their language transactions and identity negotiations, particularly in contexts where their heritage languages have no recognisable status, and opportunities to learn them are not readily available and formally supported. Despite the pervasive nature of this phenomenon, few studies have been done to understand how transnational families articulate and negotiate their family language policies in the new environs. Given that social, economic and political conditions and experiences differ according to host countries, there is a need to:

[...] understand what is going on within such families; how their transnational and multilingual experiences impact on the family dynamics and their everyday life; how they cope with the new and ever-changing environment; and how they construct their identities and build social relations (Hua & Wei 2016: 655).

However, some studies have been done to understand the trajectories of intergenerational heritage language transmission, language maintenance and loss (Kasatkina 2011) and to examine how transnational families deploy family language policy to assimilate into the host country. Apart from examining how

transnational families preserve their heritage languages for their symbolic importance (Seloni & Sarfati 2013), other studies have investigated the dispositions by parents and other authorities within the family, in its various forms, to raise children bilingually and to develop ‘a good knowledge of the languages of the new resident country as it would enable members of the transnational family to access services, education and employment’ (Hua & Wei 2016:657).

There has been little interest in examining the dynamics of family language policies of transnational families in xenophobic contexts. To address this gap, this study focuses on three Zimbabwean transnational Kalanga families in South Africa to understand how they construct, articulate, and negotiate their family language policies against the backdrop of increasing xenophobic sentiment present in various levels of South African society. The study reveals how family language policies of the focal families are related to parents’ experiences of xenophobia in South Africa. We then attempt to connect these explicitly reported family language practices and family language policies with the intergenerational trajectories of the Kalanga heritage language within focal families. Kalanga is a marginalised and minoritised indigenous language in Zimbabwe and Botswana. Given this, the widespread immigration of Zimbabwean Kalanga speakers into South Africa presents challenges for its intergenerational transmission and maintenance. Without proper government support for immigrant languages, and because of the attendant sociolinguistic situation, the family becomes the only possible support for the language’s intergenerational transmission. Writing on how to reverse language shift among linguistic minorities, Fishman (1991) identified the use of the minority language at home among all three generations as the most critical element of language maintenance. It is so because the home ‘acts like a natural boundary and a bulwark against outside pressures’ (Schwartz & Verschik 2013:2). However, the family is never completely closed off or protected from community-wide language ideologies, some of which are related to the prevailing socio-political situation. In xenophobic and ethnicised contexts like South Africa, how immigrant families negotiate and instantiate their language practices is, to some degree, a function of the prevailing social formation.

In light of the above, this study sought to answer the following research questions:

- What kind of family language policies are Kalanga transnational families pursuing in a xenophobic context in South Africa?

- How are these family language policies related to parents' experiences of xenophobia and language ideologies in South Africa?
- What implications do these family language policies have for the intergenerational transmission of Kalanga?

Inclusive of the introduction, this chapter is divided into eight sections. In the following section, the context of the study is presented and described. It is followed by an analysis of the conceptual lens that frames the study and a description of relevant literature. The study's methodology is then outlined and discussed, then succeeded by presenting the findings. The authors discuss the findings in the penultimate section, followed by the conclusion.

## **2 Research Context**

The findings presented in this study are based on interviews with parents of three focal Zimbabwean families of Kalanga heritage in South Africa. Siziba (2013) notes that Zimbabweans are generally dispersed worldwide due to several decades-long economic and political crises. Out of different destinations, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, South Africa stands out as the most convenient destination because of its proximity and accessibility to Zimbabwe (Siziba 2013). Between 3.5 million to 4 million Zimbabweans are estimated to reside in South Africa (Sisulu, Moyo & Tshuma 2007). Until recently, most Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa have been from the country's South-Western parts. Some have settled almost permanently, having set up families. Because these families still maintain contact with family and friends in Zimbabwe, and back-and-forth cross-border mobility remains a feature of their experiences, we refer to them as transnational families instead of migrant or immigrant families to acknowledge that reality (Hua & Wei 2016). Kalanga speakers from Zimbabwe constitute a significant percentage of the Zimbabwean transnational population in South Africa.

Kalanga is one of Zimbabwe's 16 officially recognised languages (Government of Zimbabwe 2013; Nkomo & Maseko 2017). It is spoken in the South-Western parts of Zimbabwe, covering Bulilima, Mangwe, Plumtree and Tsholotsho districts (Ndhlovu 2009b). These are some of Zimbabwe's most socially and economically marginalised regions, characterised by extreme

poverty, inexistent infrastructure and low literacy levels. The language is marginalised in official spaces and has not been taught in schools for a long time (Maseko & Mutasa 2018). Kalanga speakers and those of several other minoritised languages in parts of Matabeleland provinces continue to subordinate to the politically dominant Shona and Ndebele groups. Speakers of Kalanga generally coalesce under the Ndebele collective identity for political expediency, owing to their long and somewhat harmonious coexistence with the Ndebele people dating back to pre-colonial times (Msindo 2005; Maseko & Dhlamini 2020). However, this coexistence has not been without its low points. There have been occasional tensions where Kalanga speakers have expressed the need to free themselves from Ndebele hegemony. Ndhlovu (2009b) has shown how the colonial hand contributed to the present ethnolinguistic dynamics in post-colonial Zimbabwe, particularly how Clement Doke's recommendations that Ndebele be the only indigenous language taught in schools in Matabeleland marked the genesis of Kalanga marginalisation (Msindo 2005; Ndhlovu 2009b). Resultantly, Kalanga speakers have been forced to contend with this structuring of power and the dominance of English, Shona and Ndebele languages.

The exodus to South Africa is a response to this marginalisation for many reasons. The late former president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, in one of his many unprovoked diatribes aimed at Zimbabweans in South Africa, unwittingly acknowledged this reality when he rebuked Kalanga people for what he described as an aversion to education which led them to abandon their country and settle in South Africa where they commit petty crimes (Newsday 2015). We consider Mugabe's jibe insensitive given his 1980s genocidal misadventures, which left the South-Western parts of the country with poor educational facilities and employment opportunities before the sustained shortcomings of his government resulted in the economic meltdown that compelled the Zimbabwean exodus (Siziba 2013).

While the allure of South Africa promises opportunity and a better life, the shrinking economic space has amplified competition for employment and other resources between the locals and immigrants. It has often resulted in violent attacks on immigrants by locals, ostensibly to drive them back to their home countries, hopefully freeing up jobs they are thought to occupy. These attacks have commonly come to be known as 'xenophobic attacks' although some have preferred the term 'Afrophobia' (Kgari-Masondo & Masondo 2019). In most cases, it is African immigrants from countries such as Zimbabwe,

Nigeria, Mozambique, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) who have been targeted. In contrast, white and Asian immigrants from other parts of the world are spared (Kgari-Masondo & Masondo 2019). During these attacks, the language issue has often come to the fore. South Africa is multilingual, with 12 official languages, including the recently officialised South African Sign Language. As an identity marker, language has, in many cases, provided ‘the supporting armory’ (Kgari-Masondo & Masondo 2019: 87) for xenophobia and has been manipulated in the service of threat construction and hatred during the attacks (Kgari-Masondo & Masondo 2019). Failure to speak intelligibly in local languages tends to mark one as an outsider and puts a target on their back. With its shifting shades of meaning, the term ‘*amakwerekwere*’ has been expressly reserved as a derogatory reference for African immigrants ‘who speak unintelligible languages’ (Kgari-Masondo & Masondo 2019; Siziba 2013). In some unfortunate situations, speakers of minoritised South African languages such as Tshivenda and Xitsonga have been mistaken for foreigners by dominant Sotho and Nguni groups. Siziba (2013) observes how Ndebele-speaking Zimbabweans in South Africa profit from their mutual linguistic intelligibility with the Zulu to navigate this label by approximating Zulu’s linguistic and cultural identity. Unlike Ndebele, Kalanga does not share significant mutual intelligibility with any of the South African languages.

### **3 Conceptual Framework**

#### **3.1 Family Language Policy**

The concept of family language policy undergirds this study. It is an approach that is gaining traction in applied linguistics and language policy studies as researchers seek to understand how ‘languages are managed, learned, and negotiated within families’ (King, Fogle & Logan-Terry 2008:907) especially in ‘the presence of at least two languages in the child’s immediate socio-cultural environment’ (Smith-Christmas 2014:511). It is defined as explicit and overt planning concerning language use within the home among family members (King, Fogle & Logan-Terry 2008; Shohamy 2006). Macalister and Mirvahedi (2017) contend that family language policy should be extended to encompass implicit and unconscious decisions about language use within the family in its subtle forms. To that end, they aver that:

Family language policy, then, is concerned with the dynamics of language use within the family (which should be read as meaning not contemporary western-style nuclear family but rather ‘family’ in its many diverse manifestations) and the factors both internal and external, that affect that use (Macalister & Mirvahedi 2017: 4).

Language policy is a notion that pervades almost all societal levels, including the family (Spolsky 2004; 2009). Because the family forms the most inescapable basis for heritage language maintenance, it is a domain relevant to language policy (Schwartz & Verschik 2013). Like other language policies, family language policy is underpinned by three interrelated components. These are its practices, ideologies and management (Spolsky 2004; 2009). What the family does with the languages in its linguistic repertoire constitutes practices, while ideologies are what the family believes must be done. Management relates to the conscious steps or strategies deployed by powerful family figures or authorities, typically parents, to influence the language practices of less powerful members, typically children (Spolsky 2004; 2009). For this study, the authors draw on the family language policy concept to explain how selected transnational Zimbabwean Kalanga families in South Africa articulate and negotiate their family language policies in their transnational experiences in a xenophobic environment. We show how these families are predisposed to choose between their heritage languages for symbolic and identity purposes or to assimilate to the majority language practices of the host country for instrumental and security purposes. According to (Curd-Christiansen 2013:1), the family language policy approach is deployed to understand questions such as:

Why (and how) do members of some transnational families maintain their language while members of other families lose their language? How is it that some children, growing up in a largely monolingual society, become bilinguals while other children, growing up in a bilingual environment, become monolinguals? What policies and practices do parents implement to promote or discourage the use and practice of particular languages? And how are these language policies and practices negotiated in private domains, and concomitantly, related to broader ideologies of language?

Given the above, the authors support the view of the family as an important

language policy domain whose language practices, ideologies and management are central to the intergenerational transmission of heritage languages (Spolsky 2004; 2009). The family is, however, not entirely closed off or insulated from language practices and ideologies circulating in the community at large (Schwartz & Verschik 2013). For example, Bourdieu (1991) deploys economic notions of linguistic capital and linguistic markets to demonstrate that various socio-economic, socio-cultural, political and ideological factors motivate the use and learning of certain languages and not others. This study also advances that extra-familial language experiences and ideologies in a xenophobic context may impact how transnational families manage and negotiate language and linguistic identities. Locating the study within this approach sheds light on how the focal families use their linguistic capital to construct new or maintain old identities while negotiating xenophobia-related language prejudices and stereotypes in South Africa. Building on this insight, we expose how family language policy is more than a ‘neutral and uncontested state of private affairs’ (Curdt-Christiansen 2013:1) but is shaped by the prevailing economic, socio-cultural and political realities. Although the family has long been considered the private and backstage of social life, the line between the private and public is increasingly blurred because of globalisation, technological advancement and transnationalism (Hua & Wei 2016).

#### **4 Literature Review**

Although family language policy is a nascent offshoot in language planning and language policy studies (King, Fogle & Logan Terry 2008), it is quickly gaining traction. It has begun to arouse interest from scholars researching language policies in immigration contexts. Most studies have focused on how immigrant families, particularly in Europe, America, and Asia, negotiate their family language policies to foster the maintenance of their heritage languages (Hua & Wei 2016; Kasatkina 2011; Seloni & Sarfati 2013). Among the many topical themes, some studies revolve around understanding how family language ideologies influence the nature and direction of family language policy in indigenous and immigration contexts (Maseko 2021; 2022; Maseko & Mutasa 2018; Pérez Baez 2013; Seloni & Sarfati 2013). Other studies have centred on how parents’ aspirations for their children’s educational success and needs influence parents’ orientations towards children’s multilingual development trajectories and language socialisation (Hua & Wei 2016; Luykx 2005; Said & Zhu 2019).



Hua and Wei (2016) studied three multilingual Chinese families living in Britain to expose how the transnational experiences of different generations in each family correlated with their attitudes and perceptions about bilingualism and multilingualism. Hua and Wei (2016) also showed how these differences related to their nuanced constructions and presentations of their identities and social relations (Hua & Wei 2016). They demonstrated how different socio-cultural experiences of individuals within the same family impacted family relations and language policy. Hua and Wei (2016) illuminate the present study in several ways. First, it lends insights into the centrality of immigrants' socio-cultural experiences in constructing and articulating family language policy. It also demonstrates the extent to which family language policy is a complex affair enmeshed with individual members' experiences as they negotiate new identities and challenge prejudices and stereotypes in navigating the language ecology in the host country (Hua & Wei 2016). The study also reveals family language policy's responsiveness to different ideologies and beliefs shaped by 'experiences, histories, imaginations, why they (speakers) feel the way they feel and why they do things the way they do' (Hua & Wei 2016: 656).

Schwartz (2008) investigated factors impacting first language maintenance among second-generation Russian-Jewish immigrants in Israel. The study participants comprised 70 Russian-Hebrew-speaking children with a mean age of seven years and two months (Schwartz 2008). Drawing on Spolsky's (2004) model of language policy, she sought to understand how specific family language management interventions influenced bilingual children's mother tongue (L1) vocabulary development skills (Schwartz 2008). The findings of this study validated the important role of teaching the first language in formal and non-formal educational settings and the importance of children's positive attitudes and dispositions towards their home language in fostering language maintenance (Schwartz 2008).

Similarly, Kasatkina (2011) unpacked how some Russian immigrants from the former Soviet Union living in the United States of America (USA) were able to maintain their mother language in a country that did not support multilingualism for immigrants (Kasatkina 2011). The study unravelled how maintaining the Russian heritage language was linked to speakers' dispositions and attitudes towards Russian. By deploying the Integrated Public Microdata Series (IPUMAS) (Kasatkina 2013:35), she discovered that dispositions toward the maintenance of Russian by immigrants were discordant with increased opportunities for communication. For example, the study showed how the

influx of Russian-speaking immigrants into the United States between 1990 and 2000 did not correlate with an increased desire to maintain the language (Kasatkina 2011). Importantly, it is inferred from the findings that maintaining heritage languages in immigrant contexts is related to several other factors beyond the demographic, including prevailing conditions in the host country during the period of immigration (Kasatkina 2011). However, without explicitly deploying the family language policy approach, she explains how the loss of Russian by the general immigrant population was reproduced and reified within the family milieu through their language practices and management.

Addressing the question of agency in family language policy, Luykx (2005) examined the importance of children as agents of their language socialisation. In the process, she showed how children's practices impacted family language policy in ways that turned on its head the view that has traditionally cast parents as 'experts' and children as 'novices' in language socialisation (Duff 2010). Drawing on the concepts of family language policy and language socialisation, Luykx (2005) studied family language policies of Quechua-speaking families in Bolivia to understand how children's language practices and experiences influenced parents' language negotiations, thereby showing how children can no longer be viewed as passive novices in language socialisation (Fogle & King 2013). Luykx (2005) suggests that parental aspirations for children's education and economic advantage can lead parents to capitulate to children's preference to use the majority language, thereby placing themselves in a linguistically subservient position at home. Deploying an ethnographic approach, Said and Zhu (2019) also studied mealtime interactions of a transnational English and Arabic bilingual family in the United Kingdom to understand how children creatively mobilised their multiple linguistic repertoires to 'assert their agency in language use and socialisation and why these acts of agency are conducive to successful maintenance of the so-called 'home', 'community' or 'minority' language' (Said & Zhu 2019:771).

Both studies powerfully demonstrate the importance of children's agency in family language policy and how this agency is linked to parental aspirations for children's assimilation into majority language practices. Fogle and King (2013) also reported similar findings from three studies of different kinds of transnational families: three English-Russian adoptive families, two Spanish-English bilingual families and one Ecuadorian immigrant family. They also suggest that family language policy is '... a constant, ongoing and effortful notion that is understood and enacted in specific ways that suit the family' (Said

& Zhu 2019:782). Similarly, Kheirkhah (2016) also explored family interactions in five bi- and multilingual Iranian immigrant families in Sweden to expose how family language policies are never cast in stone but are subject to negotiation and instantiation in parent-child interactions (Kheirkhah 2016).

Seloni and Sarfati (2013) demonstrated how the host country's national language policy might affect transnational families' dispositions toward their heritage languages. For example, they showed how the amelioration of the Turkish language and identity contributed to the demise and endangerment of Judeo-Spanish among Jews in Turkey. Seloni and Sarfati (2013) found that the reciprocal interaction between societal language ideologies and family internal language practices was central to that endangerment (Seloni & Sarfati 2013). The opening of Alliance schools, which were used to promote the national *Turkification* ideology, packaged in the exclusionary 'Citizen Speak Turkish!' slogan to cultivate Turkish monolingualism effectively relegated to the margins, alternative ways of being thereby engendering negative attitudes towards Judeo-Spanish. These attitudes tended to permeate the family milieu and be reproduced in the family language policies. Importantly, Seloni and Sarfati (2013) demonstrate how family language policies of transnational families are seldom immune to community and state language ideologies. Although parents' language awareness and language ideologies are central to the articulation of family language policy, community and national language ideologies may diminish their 'impact beliefs' (De Houwer 2009), resulting in their giving in to the dominant language practices. Impact beliefs are the convictions that parents have regarding their potential to influence the language practices of their children (Pérez Báez 2013). Because impact beliefs are linked to levels of language awareness and loyalty, the most important factors impacting language maintenance or shift (Ravindranath 2009), strong impact beliefs engender in the parents a resolve to articulate heritage-language-centred family language policies. Pérez Báez (2013) showed how weak impact beliefs among speakers of San Lucas Quiavini Zapotec (SLQZ), a language spoken by Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles, precipitated into language shift. Their family language policies reproduced extra familial language ideologies and practices of the Los Angeles community, much like Seloni and Sarfati's (2013) findings which suggest that many transnational families' family language policies resonate with the host community's prevailing socio-political realities.

In the African context, the field of family language policy remains largely underexplored. However, this seems to be changing as scholars seek to

understand the involvement of family institutions in language revitalisation and how language practices and ideologies impact the trajectory of intergenerational language transmission of minoritised indigenous languages (Maseko 2021; Maseko and Mutasa 2018; 2019). No study known to the authors has been done to understand the family language policy of any Zimbabwean transnational and diaspora communities in a xenophobic context. Recent studies have focused on the emotional aspects of family language policy in post-conflict and post-genocide contexts. Maseko (2022) suggests that the family language policy is deployed as a coping and defence mechanism by survivors of the Gukurahundi genocide in Zimbabwe. The study shows how a strictly pro-Ndebele family language policy was motivated by the focal family's language experiences during the Gukurahundi genocide of the 1980s.

Although not couched in the family language policy approach, Siziba (2013) has shown how Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa deploy language as capital entry fees in negotiating their identities in the context of xenophobia. He suggests that Ndebele-speaking Zimbabwean migrants easily assimilate into the Zulu identity because of the mutual cultural and linguistic ties with Zulu speakers. However, Shona-speaking immigrants face challenges because of a linguistic and cultural distance from the major South African Nguni linguistic groups. Siziba (2013) sheds light on the importance of language as a transacting currency in navigating identity politics among immigrant populations in South Africa but does not show how that impacts language ideologies and management at the family level. Another more relevant work is Kamuangu (2006), who sought to understand how immigrant families from the DRC articulated their family language policies in conversation with the broader extra-familial language practices in South African schools. Kamuangu (2006) demonstrated how family language policies of immigrant DRC families are infused with considerations of identity. Family language policies are also shown to be mediated by family members' feelings of marginalisation and exclusion in the quest to fit into the host society and acquire material resources (Kamuangu 2006).

## **5 Research Methodology**

Family language policy is a nuanced and muddled notion that responds to spatial and contextual variables (Macalister & Mirvahedi 2017). Predictably, it is also characterised by diverse methodological approaches (Schwartz and Ver-

schik 2013). Most previous studies have deployed qualitative methodological lines of inquiry by interviewing members of focal families, typically parents (Maseko & Mutasa 2018; 2019). Some used ethnographic methods (Hua & Wei 2016; Smith-Christmas 2014). Fewer studies have triangulated qualitative and quantitative approaches (Kasatkina 2011; Schwartz & Moin 2011).

The present study adopted a qualitative approach to collect, present and analyse data. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data. Three transnational Kalanga heritage families living in Johannesburg were purposively selected to participate in the study. Although Zimbabwean immigrants are found throughout South Africa, most are concentrated in Johannesburg (Siziba 2013). The first author approached a contact and acquaintance of Kalanga heritage whose family was also enrolled in this study. The initial family was selected because of its known Kalanga heritage. The contact referred two other families with similar profiles who could participate in the study to grow the sample. Both parents in the focal families had to be of Kalanga heritage, irrespective of their competence in the Kalanga language. The selected families had to have at least one child attending school in South Africa. The focal families were designated Family#1, Family#2 and Family#3, using the chronology of the interviews to adhere to the ethics of confidentiality. Pre-interview discussions were done where parents were afforded the latitude to choose who, between the mother and the father, would represent the family in the interview. A more detailed profile of each family is given in the findings section. An interview guide was generated to guide the interviews. The fathers represented Family#1 and Family#2, whereas the mother represented Family#3. Participants informed consent was sought before the interviews. The researchers explained the study's nature, purpose, and procedures for ensuring participants' confidentiality. Interviews were conducted in English and were audio-recorded and later transcribed. Some field notes were also made as the interviews progressed. Through principles of thematic analysis, interview transcripts and field notes were iteratively studied to distil major themes emerging from the data. Data analysis was treated as an ongoing and iterative activity throughout the different stages of the research. It involved moving back and forth between interview transcripts, field notes, the literature, and the conceptual lens to establish how these components spoke to each other. In presenting the data, participants' voices were foregrounded using verbatim responses. Participants were also invited to comment on the interview transcripts to ensure that the content reflected their views. These procedures ensure the validity and reliability of the findings.

## **6 Parents' Reflections on Language Experiences in South Africa and Family Language Policy**

### **6.1 Family Language Policy in Flux: The Case of Family#1**

Family#1 is a family of four. Both parents immigrated to South Africa from Zimbabwe in January 2008, at the height of Zimbabwe's economic meltdown, infamously referred to as the lost decade. The father is a 42-year-old professional counsellor, while the mother is a 38-year-old community development practitioner. They have two daughters, aged nine and four. The father can speak, understand and write Kalanga very well, while the mother possesses intermediate proficiencies in the language. The two children, born in South Africa, 'have very limited proficiencies in Kalanga' (interview with the father). Both the mother and father are fluent in English and Ndebele and can also speak Zulu proficiently. They did not experience any significant Kalanga in formal education in Zimbabwe, and much of the language they know is either self-taught or acquired from the community. For much of their schooling, they were exposed to English as the language of instruction and Ndebele as an indigenous language subject.

Although there is no explicitly articulated family language policy within Family#1, parents, particularly the father, are concerned with the children's language development and would like to see the children learn to speak Kalanga. As a result, he often exposes children to concepts related to the Kalanga language and culture. This is revealed in the excerpt below:

*I have been motivated to teach my family my language as it is one thing that will help us keep our heritage. I try to teach them, but progress is slow. I use every little opportunity I get to use my language. I also have put together a collection of Kalanga music and literature which I also try and expose my children to.*

Although the father's language ideologies have influenced him to expose the children to Kalanga, the competing alternatives in the linguistic market of South Africa have posed some difficulties to the preferred family language policy and practices within Family#1. For example, the school language policy was thought to impact children's language preferences even within the home, such that they prefer Zulu and English and not so much Kalanga. This has led to a weaker and less effective family language policy as parents also give in to their children's language preferences. The father therefore observed:

## *Family Language Policy in a Xenophobic Context*

*Unfortunately, we don't really have a language policy to enforce the use of Kalanga in our home. Every effort is made for them to understand and use the language in a rather informal way mainly by talking to them and teaching them alternative Kalanga terms and names for things in the house, playing Kalanga music and via social media platforms.*

The father further described how South Africa's education language policy impacted the direction and trajectory of the use of Kalanga at home:

*The main reason for not enforcing the language at home is that South Africa has more than nine official languages and our children get exposed to about four to five languages in their schooling environment. So, you find a child having to do homework for English, Zulu and Afrikaans, while at school the same child interacts with children that speak Xhosa, Sotho or Sepedi. So, for us having to strictly enforce the Kalanga language will be an 'overload' on them. So, for now they will be learning the other South African languages as it gives them a competitive advantage at school and boosts their confidence.*

Besides children's schooling being one of the main extra familial language experiences leading to an infective Kalanga-centred family language policy, experiences of xenophobia and other related transnational 'otherings' also made parents cautious about their language use in public spaces, subsequently importing that caution into the home. For example, the father explained how his experiences of xenophobia, in May 2008, within five months of immigrating to South Africa, made him think differently about language. He recalled how he felt unsafe and scared to speak in public, fearing that 'my Kalanga accent would betray my identity'. He also revealed how he would sometimes avoid going to work, especially at the height of the xenophobic attacks in 2008:

*My work involves working with communities and at times I would get people questioning why foreigners are bringing services. I would avoid going to work. In some instances, I got called names simply because of the accent, because the Kalanga language has a tone that one cannot miss. So, I may be speaking any official South African language but still be labelled a kwerekwere because of the accent.*

Because of the associated labelling that comes with speaking a foreign lang-

uage, the father explained how, after their first child was born, the family initially wanted to socialise her into the Zulu language and culture because of its proximity to the Zimbabwean Ndebele. This decision was meant to help their child to assimilate into a new identity that would shield her from being a potential target of future xenophobic sentiments and attacks. However, he explained how that disposition weakened a few years after acclimatising to the South African atmosphere, leading them to revise their family language policy by teaching Kalanga to their children, despite the ever-present threat of xenophobia. He recalled thus:

*Because of our experiences of xenophobia in the first few months of moving to South Africa, we wanted our firstborn to learn to speak Zulu. We were also trying to protect her from xenophobia so even at home we used Zulu when speaking to her. Maybe that is why when we eventually got used to South Africa, it seemed it was a bit too late to start using Kalanga with her at home.*

Distilling from the above, the early family language policy in Family#1 initially responded to parents' experiences and fears of anti-foreigner sentiment during their early years in South Africa and the desire for their children's assimilation into a South African identity and satisfy educational demands. These experiences compelled parents to reify a Zulu-centred family language policy. Although parents later revised their family language policy to foreground the Kalanga language, by the father's admission, the damage had already been done regarding the children's acquisition of Kalanga. These decisions show that the family language policy in Family#1 has been in flux over the years, mainly in response to the family's language experiences in South Africa. As the family acclimatised to South African society, the weakening of their fears led them to revise their language ideologies by incorporating their Kalanga heritage language into their language practices later.

## ***6.2 A Family in Shift: Contradictory Language Ideologies and Practices in Family#2***

Family#2 comprises the father, a 45-year-old construction project manager, the mother, a 38-year-old beauty therapist and two children. The children are boys aged 11 and eight, born in South Africa. The family migrated to South Africa



in 2005 for better employment and living conditions, just like Family#1. The father speaks and understands Kalanga fairly well, while the mother has limited Kalanga speaking and understanding abilities. The children do not speak nor understand the language. Both the mother and the father are fluent in English, Ndebele and Zulu but have no experience of formal Kalanga learning during their school years as they learnt English and Ndebele.

Unlike Family#1, this family does not seem enthused to pass on their Kalanga language to the children, despite their awareness regarding the significance of their language, culture and heritage. To demonstrate this awareness, the father observed thus:

*We are aware that our heritage language is an important vehicle of preserving our culture, but sometimes we are faced with serious obstacles here in South Africa. If you don't speak a South African language, you are easily identified as a foreigner and you can be killed for it. This discourages us to use our mother tongue and we are forced to use South African languages. We also teach these to our children at home.*

The above excerpt shows that within Family#2, security and safety in the host country are of primary concern, taking precedence over linguistic and cultural identity preservation. In the following excerpt, the father admits that the family has succumbed to xenophobic pressures by eliminating the use of Kalanga at home.

*The environment in which we live in South Africa dictates that we should not use our mother language in communication. It follows that a local language like Zulu is now the home language. Kids are strictly taught not to use their original language as this might expose who they are.*

Discerning this expressed ideology explicitly, parents in this family do not possess strong impact beliefs to go against what the wider society perceives as unmarked language practices. In cases like Family#2, parents usually give in to socio-political pressures by embracing community-wide language choices considered less marked. The use of Zulu as an alternative for Kalanga in Family#2 points to a language shift in progress, thus presenting a negative prognosis for Kalanga in this family. The fact that the mother and father in

Family#2 are not entirely fluent in Kalanga compounds matters. At best, for Family#2, if Kalanga had to be learnt by children at all, it would be for use in interactions with family members back home in Zimbabwe during the family's frequent transnational encounters. As the father noted:

*It could be a nice thing to have kids learning to speak Kalanga, not for use in South Africa but for use back home in Zimbabwe when we visit. Unfortunately, we have no means of acquiring any material to teach them Kalanga due to unavailability.*

The acquisition of Kalanga by the children and its utilisation within the family is not a primary imperative for this family but rather an unforeseen option and potential outcome that was never deliberately planned for. The attitude towards securing learning materials to help children acquire Kalanga is, at best, non-committal as there appear to be no efforts to acquire such materials, compared to Family#1. As such, language management and family language policy in Family#2 foreground using dominant South African languages such as Zulu and English. English is encouraged because it is the main language of instruction in schools in South Africa, and its acquisition by children presents opportunities. Children in this family also have an affinity for the English language 'because it is cool and because their friends are from different countries, so when they play, they speak English'. It also suggests that parental aspirations for the children's assimilation into a South African identity led to articulating a Zulu and English-dominant family language policy in Family#2. Although the parents are aware of the importance of the heritage language, findings suggest that their practices and family language policy contradict their ideologies. The influence of extra-familial ideologies and practices accounts for this contradiction.

### ***6.3 Reproducing the South African Linguistic Market in Family#3***

Family#3 comprises a 44-year-old father, who works for a fast-food chain and a 39-year-old mother, who runs her own events management company. They have three children: a boy aged 13 and two girls aged nine and six, respectively. The father moved to South Africa in 2003 and the mother in 2004, for the same reasons as did Family#1 and Family#2. The mother and father speak and understand Kalanga well, while the older boy child has limited speaking and

understanding abilities. The two younger sisters do not speak or understand Kalanga. Both parents also speak English and Zulu fluently. As with the parents of the first two families, the parents also had no formal Kalanga learning. They also experienced being taught in English for most of their schooling while Ndebele was their indigenous language subject.

Family#3 also does not overtly enforce the speaking of Kalanga, but according to the mother, they happily embrace all languages spoken within the community. This ideological stance deliberately promotes and supports children's multilingual development. The following response of the mother captures the pro-multilingual family language policy embraced by Family#2:

*At home my husband and I are not very strict with the children in terms of what language to use. Children can use any language they want. That's why they speak many languages like English, Zulu, Ndebele, Sotho and a bit of Afrikaans. The older boy can speak a bit of Kalanga as well. When he was born, we were excited about him as an heir, and we wanted him to learn Kalanga. We used to speak Kalanga with him, but we soon gave up because he seemed to prefer to use more of Zulu and English as he grew. The two girls do not speak or understand Kalanga.*

Language practices in Family#3 typically reproduce the general South African linguistic market, which embraces multilingualism and values different languages differently. The preference for the use of English and Zulu by children also reproduces their language experiences at school and in the community. Akin to Family#1 and Family#2, parents in this family also allow their children to speak the dominant South African languages for schooling and assimilation into a new identity to avoid being labelled as 'amakwerekwere'. Parents' extra familial language experiences also influence their decision to use South African languages with their children at home. The following excerpt demonstrates how parents' xenophobic encounters influence their family language policy:

*My husband and I were once threatened by a group of men who told us to go back to our home country. I think our accent told them that we are foreigners. Since then, I am more careful about what language I use when in public. I feel it is not safe to speak Kalanga. Even if I meet other Kalangas, I use Zulu instead which is spoken in Johannesburg to avoid any unnecessary attention to my nationality and language. It's*

*safer for children to learn these languages of South Africa as well.*

The mother of Family#3 also explained how she even avoids using Kalanga in telephone conversations with relatives back in Zimbabwe:

*While I have never directly experienced physical harm because of xenophobic incidences, I am cautious about using Kalanga in public places. Even if my phone rings while I am in a mall or some other public place and it's my mother calling, I am bound to respond in Zulu instead of Kalanga as I normally would when in a safer space. Sometimes it can get really dangerous especially during periods when xenophobia is at its highest.*

As a result of self-censorship to use Kalanga in language-concordant telephone calls with her Kalanga-speaking mother back in Zimbabwe, the mother of Family#3 is likely to import such self-censorship into precipitating a cautious and conscious proscription of Kalanga in the home. This practice, although happening in extra-familial spaces, will likely impact the mother's language ideologies and, therefore, the family's language policy negotiations.

## **6 Analysis**

The study's findings suggest that family language policies within transnational families are nuanced, although they share similarities that capture the sociolinguistic realities deriving from the socio-political situation. In this study, parents' articulation of family language policies is a response to the xenophobic experiences to some degree. Family language policies within the focal families are also driven by parents' aspirations for their children's success at school and assimilation into a South African linguistic and cultural identity. The study's findings also demonstrate how parents' reported language ideologies and practices within the three focal families of Kalanga heritage mainly foreground South African languages as the primary languages of communication at home at the expense of Kalanga, sometimes contradicting their language ideologies. These findings resonate with studies of transnational families in other contexts that show how socio-political and educational realities of host countries are infused into family language ideologies and practices (Fogle & King 2013; Luykx 2005; Said & Zhu 2019; Seloni & Sarfati 2013).

Although it is indicated from the findings that the three families embrace pro-multilingual family language policies, these families do not necessarily employ conscious language management that imposes sole use of Kalanga in the homes. For Family#1, however, the father tries to expose children to Kalanga music and literature to arouse their interest in learning the language. By Family#1's father's admission, however, these strategies seem to have negligible impact on children's proficiency in Kalanga and on children's practices. Family#2 and Family#3 appear to have somewhat resigned to Zulu and English dominant family language policies as an expression of their aspirations for children's assimilation into a new identity. Parents' aspirations for their children have been shown to shape the family language policies of both indigenous and transnational families in many other studies (Hua & Wei 2016; Luykx 2005; Maseko & Mutasa 2018). The parents' reflections from all three families indicate that the significant journey to South Africa is a double-edged sword, presenting unique challenges for the intergenerational transmission of Kalanga within each family. In countries that do not formally support the teaching of immigrant languages, the intergenerational trajectories of these languages are always disrupted (Pérez Báez 2013; Seloni & Sarfati 2013). For the three focal families described in this study, this rings true.

However, studies in different contexts have shown that immigrants can maintain their heritage language even if the host country does not formally support its acquisition in education (Kasatkina 2011). Kalanga is minoritised in Zimbabwe, where it is spoken as an indigenous language and marked as a 'kwerekwere' language in South Africa. Because its distinctive phonological features do not approximate any of the dominant South African Nguni languages, its speakers are prone to be marked as outsiders. It is, therefore, safer not to use it to duck the label 'amakwerekwere'. Siziba (2013) has also shown how language has been deployed as capital and entry fees in identity negotiation by Shona and Ndebele-speaking immigrants in South Africa, where Ndebele-speaking Zimbabweans enjoy some degree of safety compared to speakers of other Zimbabwean languages which share little or no mutual intelligibility with Nguni languages.

To navigate and negotiate the new language demands presented by the language in education policy, the toxically xenophobic atmosphere in South Africa led parents to permit and encourage using South African languages to camouflage their Zimbabwean Kalanga identity and reduce their markedness and chances of being targeted by xenophobic elements. Therefore, extra-

familial parents' language experiences are important in articulating family language policy within the three families. It resonates with the observation that although the intimacy associated with the family helps form a bulwark against outside forces, the family is never completely insulated from dominant language practices prevailing in the larger community (Schwartz & Verschik 2013). The contradictory ideologies and practices feed into the avowal that ideologies are not practices, although they may influence and be influenced by them (Spolsky 2004; 2009). In Zimbabwe, where Kalanga is spoken as an indigenous language, Maseko and Mutasa (2018) reveal the subservience of the language in the community and official spaces, which has been reproduced in the homes as speakers elect for the use, acquisition and spread of the politically, socially and educationally dominant Ndebele language, even in areas long considered Kalanga enclaves (Maseko & Mutasa 2018). While the three families find themselves in similar conditions, their nuanced dispositions towards their heritage language, as reflected in their family language policies, construe the idea that family language policy is a muddled, nuanced and messy affair that is seldom uniform from family to family (Macalister & Mirvahedi 2017). However, it is common that the host country's socio-political, sociolinguistic and educational realities permeate family language policy in many ways, leading parents and children to negotiate their stances and orientations towards their heritage languages.

## **7 Conclusion**

This study focused on parents' perspectives from three Zimbabwean Kalanga families living in South Africa to understand how transnational experiences and the pervasive xenophobic atmosphere shaped their family language policies and concomitant dispositions towards their Kalanga heritage language. Although parental reports from all three families showed differing proficiency levels in the Kalanga language, socio-political pressures and educational demands in South Africa valorised the South African Zulu language and English in ways also reproduced in the focal families' homes. The desire of parents to help children escape xenophobic scrutiny also led to parents' indifference towards enforcing the use and acquisition of Kalanga in the home, particularly by children. Therefore, the three families' language policies and practices point to a language shift in progress, as very little is being done to encourage the intergenerational transmission of Kalanga in the home. Although interviewed

parents still maintain some proficiency in Kalanga, they avoid using it for ordinary conversation in public spaces opting for its use in language-concordant conversations with other family members in Zimbabwe, but only in ‘safer spaces’. This study was limited to parental reports of their language experiences and family language policy in South Africa. Future studies could therefore investigate how children’s own language experiences impact their negotiation of parents’ explicitly and implicitly articulated family language policy. Some studies may seek to understand family language policy within intermarried families. Other studies may deploy an ethnographic approach to understanding the family language policies of other Zimbabwean immigrant groups within the context of generalised xenophobia in South Africa and other destination countries.

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**SECTION III**

**FEMINISATION AND GENDERED  
ROLES IN MIGRATION**



# CHAPTER 7

## Reconstruction of Gender Roles and Relations among Somali Women within the Transnational Context of South Africa

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### **Abstract**

Reconstruction of gender roles and gender relations is inevitable for most refugees in transnational terrains as they navigate a new socio-cultural context. In Somalia, women operate from a highly patriarchal system that legitimises dependence on men, but in the host country, they are making remarkable inroads in redefining gender roles and relations. In this chapter, the authors interrogate how Somali women reconstruct gender roles and relations within the transnational terrains in the context of South Africa using feminist intersectionality. It is informed by a qualitative study that drew data from in-depth interviews of 40 Somali refugees in Gauteng, whose purpose was to interrogate the gendered complexities of Somali women in the South African context. The study establishes that redefining gender roles and power relations was elicited by pressing livelihood demands and the South African context, which gives Somali women the ability to access rights more easily than in Somalia. The Somali women reconstruct gender roles and relations in their Diaspora households as they strive to build themselves in South Africa. When these women have an income and access to resources in these transnational terrains, they control the household budget and decision-making. The women venture into the male domains to maximise family returns to support their families in the Diaspora and, importantly, send remittances home. This work contributes to the literature in the field of migration by specifically

focusing on Somali women refugees and how they negotiate gender roles in the transnational space to be economically independent, which in turn positions them to have decision-making power in their homes. Finally, it contributes to the literature on the intersectionality theory within gender and transnationalism.

**Keywords:** gender roles, gender relations, transnational space, transnational migration, Somali women, South Africa.

## **1 Introduction**

The transnational migration<sup>1</sup> has reconfigured, redefined, and reinforced the gender roles<sup>2</sup> and gender relations<sup>3</sup> among Somali women living in South Africa due to the pressing socio-economic demands. This chapter explores the following gender roles and power re-negotiation that continuously shape the identity of Somali women within the transnational space<sup>4</sup>. Somalia is a highly patriarchal system that legitimises the socio-economic dependence on men, though women are making remarkable inroads in redefining gender relations. The chapter describes the shifting gender roles and how women negotiate gender power structures when they come to South Africa. In South Africa, they navigate various complexities like financial challenges that demand them to redefine their gendered roles to meet household needs while remitting money home. How these women navigate through the transnational space in the context of South Africa is divulged in this chapter.

Due to the pressing economic demands among migrants, a shift in gender roles is expected. Although Somali women originated from highly androcentric backgrounds, transnational space proffers them the possibility to redefine and negotiate their gender relations in a transnational space. This shifting of gender roles and power relations has been born out of the livelihood demands that induce them to venture into the male domains to maximise the

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<sup>1</sup> Migrants' movement processes across national borders.

<sup>2</sup> Gender role is an outcome of social and cultural interactions that dictate the expected behaviour appropriate to one's gender.

<sup>3</sup> Gender relation denotes hierarchical relations of power that disadvantage women.

<sup>4</sup> Transnational space is a dense web of ties among migrants across and beyond their host nation and country of origin.



economic returns and cater for their families. South Africa allows them to negotiate those power hierarchies within the Somali institutions much easier than in Somalia or Kenya.

Transnational migrants forge and retain multi-stranded ties that link them with their families and friends at home and in the recipient nation while negotiating the liminal space. Transnationalism cannot be overlooked in a study like this because it is a phenomenon reproduced by migrants as they rebuild their identities within those ‘new spaces’ (Maleku *et al.* 2022; Muthuki 2013; Tedeschi, Vorobeva & Jauhiainen 2022). Transnationalism describes this ever-evolving differing, fluid nature of the web of connections that migrants interact with between their country of origin and the receiving country. It is never a static process but an ever-evolving process that continuously enables migrants to forge their identities within the host country (Tedeschi *et al.* 2022).

Due to social, political, and economic opportunities in South Africa, the country remains a huge attraction destination for migrants. Migration into South Africa has also been occasioned by the democratic landscape governed by a very progressive Constitution. Migrants, marred by debilitating poverty, unemployment, low wages, and intermittent wars, flee their countries and migrate to South Africa for peace and economic stability.

Propelled by their fluid mobility with nomadic lifestyles, Somalis moved to other countries, notably South Africa, for better opportunities. Their movement is instigated by political instability occasioned by the Al-Shabab menace and ethnic tensions in Somalia. The Somali people also migrated to flee famine and drought in the dry parts of North Eastern Kenya (Ibrahim, Rizwan, Afzal & Malik 2022). Thus, led by a dense social network, they are attracted by the perception that South Africa has a boisterous economy that would give them opportunities to rebuild their lives in the democratic landscape of South Africa.

A qualitative study was conducted among 40 Somali women from Gauteng. Few community members identified women that could provide more relevant responses to the interview questions.

In-depth interviews were conducted to understand better how those women reconstructed their role in South Africa. The study aimed to answer the question, ‘How do Somali women negotiate gender relations in the transnational context?’ The justification for the choice of Gauteng Province was that it is the point of entry for most migrants. It is also the province where

Pretoria is located. Pretoria is significant to the migrants coming to South Africa as it is their reference point for getting asylum or renewal of their permits. The Department of Home Affairs that issues asylum permits is based in Pretoria. Besides, Johannesburg is an economic hub of Africa, which pulls a considerable population of migrants into the province. Mayfair and Pretoria West (both suburbs in Gauteng) were selected as the study sites because most Somali women reside in the two suburbs.

The key theory adopted in this chapter is feminist intersectionality, an analytical tool based on the concept that interlocking oppression systems affect women's lives (Atewologun 2018; Hanklvsy & Cormier 2019). Somali women's lives cannot be understood clearly without the theory because intersecting factors – class, race, nationality, education, age, gender, race, religion, and refugee status – affect them directly. These factors have to be concurrently understood because they are interconnected and interdependent on one another.

The chapter contributes to the literature in the field of migration by focusing on Somali women refugees and how they negotiate their gender roles in the transnational space to be economically independent. The negotiation aspects, in turn, positions them to have decision-making power in their homes. The chapter also contributes to the body of knowledge under consideration by analysing and understanding the migrant's lived experiences. Also, the study contributes to the literature on the intersectionality theory within Gender and transnationalism.

## **2 Methodology**

This chapter adopts a qualitative method. The qualitative method is a naturalistic inquiry that is invaluable for interpreting and describing social phenomena (Ancker, Benda, Reddy, Unertl & Veinot 2021). This work, whose purpose is to interrogate how Somali women reconstruct gender roles within transnational contexts, is naturalistic and, therefore, a qualitative approach that suits the study. The work was done within the interpretivism paradigm. Interpretivism engenders considering various interpretations of a given social context to attain deep knowledge (Junjie & Yinxin 2021). Forty research subjects were interviewed in-depth using semi-structured questions. Although the study could have exceeded 40, the researcher considered it a saturation point where no new information arose from the field.

Some Somali population (students) interviewed were also sourced from

the University of Pretoria, the University of South Africa (UNISA), and Johannesburg. The women interviewed were in Johannesburg and Pretoria West in Gauteng Province and within the South African Somali Women Network (SASOWNET). Pretoria and Johannesburg have the largest population of Somali women in South Africa. Johannesburg is the largest economic hub in South Africa, making it an ideal destination for Somali who do business. Pretoria is the town where Home Affairs is located. The Somali women are therefore located a few kilometres from Home Affairs. In order to gather in-depth knowledge of women's experiences in reconstructing gender roles, this study adopted semi-structured interviews. A semi-structured interview is a flexible approach that allows the study to obtain in-depth data and evidence from the subjects while considering the study focus (Mashuri, Sarib, Alhabsyi & Syam 2022). Thematic analysis was applied in this study. The salient themes from the interview were used to describe issues pertaining redefinition of gender roles and power relations among Somali women.

### **3 The Theoretical Framework of the Study**

#### ***3.1 Feminist Intersectionality***

This chapter adopts Feminist intersectionality. The theory was coined by Kimberly Crenshaw<sup>5</sup>, who argued that women's lives are constructed by interlocking systems; social, political, and cultural systems of oppression. The proponents of the theory see how the marginalisation of women is sustained by the intersection of various axis of social identities (Al-Faham & Ernst 2019). The theory penetrates and reveals issues relating to women, not from single elements but intertwining social factors of oppression that simultaneously affect women's lives (Chaulagain & Pathal 2021; Kassam, Marcellus, Clark & O'Mahony 2022; Standke-Erdmann 2021). Therefore, women's inequality results from interwoven experiences, power relations and social factors, not a singular social factor (Atewologun 2018; Hanklvsky & Cormier 2019). The intersectionality concept came about following the inability of single factors of structural inequality to recognise the web of interconnection between various systems of oppression (Martin & Chang 2022). The theory enables the authors of this work to understand how intersecting factors of oppression affect how they negotiate gender roles and power relations in transnational contexts.

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<sup>5</sup> Kimberley Crenshaw, an American Black Feminist, coined the theory of Feminist intersectionality.

### **3.2 Gendered Geographies of Power**

In this chapter, the authors examine how transnational migrants negotiate gender powers. Four blocks constitute the theory: 'power geometrics, geographic scales, imagination, and social locations' (Kofman 2020; Thomas 2021). This work adopts the social locations element to understand how gender is reconstructed within transnational terrains. The concept of social locations implies that migrants are born into a particular social location that disadvantages or advantages them. The lives of migrant women are either disadvantaged or advantaged by factors such as their education level, gender, class, race, religion or nationality.

## **4 Literature Review**

### **4.1 Negotiation of Gender Relations among Migrants**

There is extant literature about negotiating gender relations among the migrants in the host countries (Bleeker, Escribano, Gonzales, Liberati & Mawby 2021; Wandscheneider, Batram-Zantvoort, Razum & Miami 2020). During the migration process, women experience traditionally gendered roles and expectations differently because migration is an activity that redefines gender roles (Wandscheneider *et al.* 2020). Besides, for those that face gender-based discrimination, like women and the LGBT community, it could be a way to their self-actualisation (Bleeker *et al.* 2021). Although displacement adversely impacts migrant women, such as facing horror and trauma, Daniely and Lederman (2019) argue that it gives them a platform to deconstruct gendered roles and change power. Ripero-Muniz (2020), who investigates the negotiation of culture and religion among Somali women in Nairobi and Johannesburg, claims that while transnational migration plays a vital role in the reconstruction of gender roles, Islam is equally important in defining gender roles and relations, as gender interlocks with religion and culture. Fresnoza-Flot (2021), who interrogates literature on mobility focusing on definitions of gender in transnational contexts, argues that most literature is heavily heteronormative. Weber (2015) examines how children migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa construct, transmit and negotiate their gender identity in France. The study found that the children are active participants in constructing their gender identity by negotiating the gendered layout which their parents constructed for them. Similarly, Duda-Mikulin (2015), who looked at the effect of migration on Polish women in the United Kingdom, argues that

migration can empower migrants. Duda-Mikulin (2015) further argues that transnational terrains expose migrants to different gendered expectations and regimes. It helps them to compare and contrast how gender roles have changed between their home and host countries. Thus, those migrants can interrogate the current gender roles and power relations in the host countries. Pinnawala's (2013) work focuses on Sri Lankan female returnees that have worked as domestic workers in the Middle East. The study found that migration significantly impacted household tasks, family relationships, and power relations. Besides, women remain home to create a comfortable environment for their husbands, who return home weighed down by work-related stress. The work of Okeke-ihejirika, Punjani and Salami (2022) focuses on extended family relations among African women migrants. They argue that the gender role shift within the family can upset gender relations among migrant women. Muthuki (2013) examines how the African international students at KwaZulu-Natal negotiate familial relationships transnationally and how those students gain autonomy or become empowered in the process of forging familial meanings within the transnational terrains.

The above-mentioned scholarly works demonstrate that the negotiation of gender roles and relations among migrants in the host countries has been studied. Nonetheless, those works (Bleeker *et al.* 2021; Duda-Mikulin 2015; Muthuki 2013; Okeke-ihejirika *et al.* 2022; Shaffer, 2013; Wand-schneider *et al.* 2020; Weber 2015) have not taken cognisance of the intersectionality of gender and other social locations – nationality, religion, language, education – that affect women's lives in transnational terrain. These social locations either enhance or encumber women's negotiation in the host nation. There seems to be a paucity of literature considering social locations in examining how gender roles are negotiated in the transnational space. This chapter advances that the lives of migrant women cannot be comprehended deeply without interacting with the social locations of gender, race, religion, nationality, education, and language that either enhance or encumber their navigation of the transnational space.

## ***4.2 Gender Relations in the Somalia Context***

In order to understand the manner wherein Somali women negotiate their gender identity in Gauteng, a quest into the gender relation discourse in the context of Somalia is pertinent. Understanding their social backgrounds is

crucial to establishing how their activities are impacted by religious, cultural, and statutory structures that reinforce their subordination or enhance their emancipation in Gauteng Province.

Gender relations in Somalia have historically been shaped by the religious and cultural institutions that define the status of women. This socio-cultural setting in Somalia has seen the exclusion of women from public participation, despite the push by civil society organisations (CSOs). Male-structured institutions with less political will have marginalised Somali women to recognise their leadership and decision-making roles (Abdi 2021; Ali & Ali 2013; Ochiltree & Toma 2021). The responsibilities of power and respect in the community, like elders, religious leaders and decision-making roles, are retained within men's domain (Ochiltree & Toma 2021). This condition is reinforced by men being socialised in an overtly patriarchal society. The gender inequality, shaped by the deeply rooted patriarchy, was exacerbated by the two decades of military rule that saw boys and girls socialised in an androcentric environment. Similarly, the collapse of Siad Barre's<sup>6</sup> regime precipitated gender segregation of Somali women in educational institutions and places of work. The absence of national policies that are gender empowering has resulted in slow progress in the power structures, which has impacted negatively on gender relations.

The Social Locations concept underscores that people are born into power hierarchies that either offer them an advantage or disadvantage in navigating the patriarchal institutions within the transnational territories (Forsberg Stenbacka 2022; Moolman 2013; Woods, Benschop & Van De Brink 2021). For instance, Somali women coming into South Africa from Kenya have a Swahili and English language background and a more open culture than those from Somalia. That social location of origin enables them to interact with other nationalities from Africa. Most Somalis in Kenya have interacted with other cultures among Kenyan communities in the North-Eastern regions, namely, the Oromo, Samburu, Gabra and Rendille.

In Somalia, the community operates from a very male-controlled belief system that legitimises the social-economic independence of men. In the pre-colonial era, women were expected to be the housekeepers and caretakers of the livestock (Guyo 2017; Ochiltree and Toma 2021), a gender role that was very significant for the household's survival. Political engagement was a no-

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<sup>6</sup> Siad Barre was a military general who later became the third Somali president and ruled from 1969 to 1991.

go zone for Somali women, and so were the roles outside the household. Men were regarded as the breadwinners in line with religious and socio-cultural expectations (Abdi 2021; Guyo 2017; Ochiltree & Toma 2021). The colonial masters would later reinforce this dependence of women on men, thus, placing women in a state of subordination to the community and the Somali state (Abdi 2021; Ochiltree & Toma 2021). The women were socio-politically and economically marginalised, so much that they depended on men in varied ways.

Somalia is a highly patriarchal state with few policies safeguarding women's rights against gender-based violence and discrimination against women at border control checkpoints (Abdi 2021; Carter, Rogers & Turner 2021). The patriarchal system buttresses overlapping complexities based on gender, culture, and religion. Due to their gender, women are discriminated against regarding access to inheritance and land rights. Somali women are also subject to limited access to education facilities due to the country's inequalities (Abdi 2021; Al-Sharman & Mustasaari 2020).

Somalis, predominantly Muslims, hold to the teachings of Prophet Mohamed, as contained in the Holy Qur'an, the Islamic doctrines taught by their Imams, and cultural norms and belief systems, which are significant in ordering the lives of the Somali community. Nevertheless, the place of women has progressively improved due to the emerging economic demands that push women to challenge norms that restrain them in traditional gendered roles. Somali women have notably engaged actively in public circles in Somalia and Kenya, albeit with complexities due to patriarchal institutions. Somalia's new constitution, adopted in 2012 in Mogadishu,<sup>7</sup> advocated for women's political rights while annihilating the clan system of governance that hampered women's public participation.

Although Somalia is a United Nations Member State, it has not ratified the Convention for Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This failure presents Somali women, who face various forms of discrimination, with a challenge as they could have used CEDAW as the international law to safeguard their rights. The Federal government of Somalia has a constitution that guarantees the participation of women in the public arena, albeit conservative institutions that exist to relegate women. The Hadith or Koran does not exclude Somali women from public participation. The exclusion is elicited by the belief that women can fall prey to temptations and conflict because of their moral vulnerability, which hampers their struggle toward public

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<sup>7</sup> Mogadishu is the capital city of Somalia.

participation.

Although there are ongoing efforts to improve women's lives in keeping with the constitution and the women's call for their emancipation through various agencies, roles and expectations are still gendered. Their belief systems and traditions continuously weaken the full participation of women within male domains. Most Somali women are unaware of their rights in Islam, leading to fear of pursuing specific roles involving public participation. When those women have access to education, property, and political participation and know those rights, they can negotiate gender powers that define their roles. A school of thought among Muslim scholars advances the view that Islam is positive about the equality of men and women in society (Henning 2016; Saujan, Mazahir & Ibrahim 2022; Sirri 2020). The school argues that, to comprehend the dimension of justice, equality, and being considerate to the other person, the reader of the Qur'an has to apply contextual reading. The Islamic faith allows women to access rights to inherit, possess property, get an education, and any other treatment that a man would have, based on the equality of persons (Abdi 2021; Henning 2016; Saujan, Mazahir & Ibrahim 2022).

In Somalia, women have been victims of rape, gendercide, and other forms of violence as a strategy to intimidate them. Rape humiliates, ethnically cleanses, and silences opponents during the war. The work of Sri (2022) regarding the Ukraine war points out that rape is the cheapest weapon used by opponents to instil fear and degrade women. The community suffers because men are de-masculinised while women's bodies are besmirched. Similarly, rape is considered a property crime in the Somali community because women are part of men's possessions. The stories narrated by the women demonstrated that Al-Shabaab would use rape, forced marriages, and graphics of kidnapped women to intimidate them and consequently demonstrate their power over an anti-Al-Shabaab society. The Al-Shabaab uses culture and religion as a tool to justify their acts of violence. In this regard, women pointed out that rape and sexually related intimidation kept women indoors, as women are traditionally perceived to belong within the household confines. Thus, according to Fatima,<sup>8</sup> when those insurgents realised that some community members were supplying the African Mission to Somalia (AMISON) and the Somali government with intelligence information, they intimidated them through

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<sup>8</sup> Fatima was one of the forty participants interviewed. Other participants featuring in this work were Aisha, Amina, Zara, Kuresha, and Amira.



sexual violence or even killed them. Somali women would narrate horrendous stories about rape, kidnapping, and torture. The Al-Shabaab would show them graphics of women who had been kidnapped, raped, forced into marriage and used as suicide bombers to instill fear. This tactic was aimed at discouraging them from reporting the group to the government. As a result, Somali women left the country and sought refuge in South Africa.

### ***4.3 Gender Dynamics in the Context of South Africa***

In order to understand the context in which Somali women negotiate gender relations and power structures in the transnational space, a focus on gender relations and expectations of women in the recipient nation cannot be ignored. However, the context of South Africa is not homogeneous, and the same can be expected of the experiences of South African women whom the apartheid regime positioned at the bottom of the social and economic ladder. The reality of South Africa is uniquely different from that of other African countries because the colour-based cleavage defines a women's position. Black women experienced disenfranchisement out of their 'blackness' that is varied because they are not a homogeneous entity. In South Africa, black women differ regarding their social, political, and economic status (wealthy/ poor, educated/ uneducated, affiliated/ non-affiliated to the ruling party, rural/ urban). The Islamic faith does not prohibit women from having incomes as long as they do not engage in proscribed business and dress outside the Islamic dress code (Khalif & Cabdirisaaq 2019; Saujan, Mazahir & Ibrahim 2022). Although Islam has been used to reinforce an androcentric<sup>9</sup> environment, some Muslim scholars increasingly engage Islam in comprehending women's rights within Islamic jurisprudence. Due to those intersecting forms of domination, black women were prohibited from voting, possessing bank accounts, or owning land. In order to obliterate such imbalances based on the interweaving forms of domination, South African black women-initiated activism was geared towards realising change (Lewis & Baderon 2021; Stuhlohofer 2022). As these women envisaged citizenship devoid of disenfranchisement along gender, race, and class, they organised themselves into political liberation move-

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<sup>9</sup> I.e., women have to cover their whole body because it could be a source of temptation to men - yet Islam does not order men to cover their bodies as it does to Muslim women. Women's traveling during migration is also discouraged in some communities by invoking the sacred teachings within Islam.

ments that fought against the dehumanising ‘Pass Laws of 1956’. This law required every black person to carry the Pass, designed to segregate the black population. This day is so significant to the South African nation that it is celebrated every year on the 9<sup>th</sup> of August.

Due to the patriarchal landscape in the South African context, gender roles were predominantly reinforced (Strebel, Crawford, Shefer & Cloete 2020). Those gendered roles determined their responsibilities in public and private domains. Due to this phenomenon, women were relegated to roles that circumscribed them from participation in decision-making and public domains of economic and political nature.

Nonetheless, the post-apartheid era has been characterised by women participating in the social, political, and economic spheres, albeit with several challenges. South African women have made incredible headway in their struggle for inclusion into the public domain. For instance, the phenomenon of gender mainstreaming has been enhanced by vibrant women’s movements that have called for the inclusion of women into public institutions (Rai 2018). The Constitutional and gender equality<sup>10</sup> clause was brought into the limelight after several years of struggle by South African women’s organisations. Thanks to these organisations, the force of South African women has been felt in their fight against gender-based violence, the political inclusion of women, and decision-making processes. Although South African women have brought about remarkable progress in addressing the forces of apartheid, they still grapple with those forces in their efforts to jettison social imbalances (Zulu 2021). The forces of institutionalised racism challenge women’s activism and their access to the government’s opportunities.

## **5 Negotiation of Gender Roles in the Transnational Space**

Gender is neither a natural nor immutable phenomenon but a never-ending looping expectation and societal norms that change with time. Thus, gender roles and power relations cannot be static or natural but constantly change over time. In South Africa, Somali women are redefining the gender roles that were initially traditional because of the need to meet livelihood demands. Somali

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<sup>10</sup> Gender equality denotes that men and women should be treated the same, irrespective of their gender. It is different from gender equity which maintains that men and women ought to be treated according to their individual needs i.e., reproductive needs to women.

women manage their homes without their male counterparts' assistance and engage in economic activities that enable them to earn their livelihoods (Ripero-Muniz 2020; Shafer 2013). Nevertheless, the change of gender roles is still intricate as customary norms coupled with Islam confine women to traditional roles.

Through Feminist intersectionality, the authors of this study argue that Somali women's multiple jeopardies within the transnational terrain are not only a result of gendered structures but a multifaceted axis of oppression that interact with each other. Due to these factors, Somali women are at the receiving end of overt and covert Xenophobia-Afrophobia<sup>11</sup>. Xenophobia-Afrophobia is a significant element that leads to a redefinition of gender roles whereby Somali women shift from housekeeping and reproduction to assuming the responsibilities their husbands were engaging in before their death or incapacitation due to overt Xenophobia. This shift from a traditionally gendered role to a breadwinner role is a herculean task for most Somali women who stay home to care for their children.

Due to her gender, a Somali woman also suffers from discrimination and Xenophobia as a non-South African. She is cut off from opportunities due to her education level and the language barrier. These axes of domination intersect while placing Somali women at the crossroads of oppression. This axis of oppression complicates their participation in social and economic activities outside the traditional roles. Generally, due to a lack of education, most Somali women are unaware and unable to access rights enshrined in the South African constitution and international treaties protecting migrants. During the interview, one participant indicated that Somali women, when assaulted, cannot report it to the police because of the fear of victimisation.

This study, however, established that the transnational space is an important site for Somali women's gender role rearrangement due to the daily demands that leave them with no other option than to forge that space for their benefit. Education has been a key player in facilitating this shift in gender roles. There is an increase in enrolments of Somali women in South African tertiary

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<sup>11</sup> Xenophobia denotes the fear of foreign nationals, while Afrophia refers to the fear of Black foreigners from other African nations. The chapter adopts the term Xenophobia-Afrophobia because antforeigner bigotry is targeted towards foreign nationals from other African or Xenophobia is relevant when speaking about Somalis because they are perceived as not pure Africans due to their complexion, hair texture that resembles that of Indians.

institutions, as demonstrated by Aisha.<sup>12</sup> Somali women realise that education is a prerequisite for a decent life, so much so that the traditionally held idea of a woman being a housewife is slowly fading. Aisha says:

*There is a considerable number of Somali students enrolling in the universities, especially around Gauteng Province. Initially, they used to be housewives but they came to a country where education is their main target in order for them to succeed. Now at least they are learning something. So when you look at the statistics of the Somalis enrolling in the universities, there are so many young ladies doing so. So, that tells you that women who were initially considered mere housewives are somehow privileged today.*

Education enlightens women about their fundamental rights, thus influencing their responses to traditional gender expectations enshrined in their cultural and religious norms. Besides, education offers them a higher status that enables them to challenge gender expectations defined and reinforced by patriarchal institutions. Although Somali parents have laid traditions that they hand down to their children, young Somali women negotiate and recreate their identity dynamically. Notwithstanding societal expectations to conform to the norms of their progenitors who highly buttress gendered roles, they can resist them in the transnational terrain. The reconstruction of their gender identity is prompted by interactions with other people and education, redesigning their thinking. Under the Social Locations concept, in this chapter, the authors contend that Somali women who originated from Kenya or had been to Kenya as refugees have an advantage over those from Somalia regarding access to Higher Education and interaction with the locals. The Somali women from Kenya can speak English, enabling them to navigate South African institutions better than their counterparts from Somalia.

International migration can remodel power relations and gendered expectations (Papatzani & Knappers 2020). In Somali women's context, transnational terrains offer them a viable space for transgressing gender roles and societal expectations. Nevertheless, in terms of women performing roles outside their gender expectations, men play a significant role in determining what they can and cannot do outside their gender expectations (Papatzani & Knappers 2020; Abdi 2021). For instance, Ali demonstrated that women are

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<sup>12</sup> Aisha is one of the research participants from Johannesburg.

free to work outside their homes as long as their men permit them; otherwise, it would be very insolent if they did it without their permission. In contrast, Amina pointed out that looking after the family and cooking is the principal responsibility of Somali women. Nonetheless, her response alludes that they can also perform other activities if the husband permits them. She says:

*My primary work as a woman is to look after the children. I have to remain at home. Nevertheless, Somali women from our community are working outside their homesteads, the same as South Africans. Whether to work or not is not written anywhere. It depends on your husband.*

However, due to huge responsibilities that demand them to send much remittance home, Somali women negotiate traditional gender roles that confine them to housekeeping and childrearing. Thus, to deal with this pressure, they improve their income by venturing into informal businesses, some of which jeopardise their lives. Somali women have interpersonal links with other migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community of origin (Oliff 2022). Thus, just as potential migrants expect kin or acquaintances who have already migrated to assist them, the households of origin also expect migrants to give financial support. These remittances are countercyclical as women send money to help their kin deal with economic shocks such as Covid-19, famine, and illnesses (Takenaka, Gaspar, Villafuerte & Narayanan 2020).

These women remit part of their earnings, and because of the familial expectation at home, households select the members to migrate. Although Somali women in Gauteng engage in informal businesses that are lowly paid, it does not deter them from sending remittances. However, they ensure they send a little money home whenever they can to support their families. A Somali, Zara, says she left her children with her older sister and mother and sends a little money home to cater for her children's clothing, food, and school fees. She says:

*I lost my first husband in Somalia in war. Life was not easy for me, and so I had to come to South Africa. I left behind my children with my elder sister and mother. Although my daily wages are small, I save and send some money to my family to support my children because I have a big responsibility for them.*

The Social Location concept accentuates that people are born into positions

that confer certain advantages and disadvantages (Enriquez & Millan 2021). The Somali women are within power hierarchies created through the clan, religion, and cultural androcentric norms. The South African context allows them to negotiate these power hierarchies within Somali institutions more easily than in Somalia or Kenya. For instance, in Somali customary laws, it is difficult for a woman to divorce a husband without his consent (Al-Sharman & Mustasaari 2020; Jenifer 2015). While in Somalia, it is hard for women to get a court order to provide child support. In South Africa, women are favoured for the children's welfare (Jenifer 2015). Amira says:

*Somali we are a very patriarchal society by nature. We are living in South Africa, where the institutions protect the rights of women. When they come to me to seek help, I direct them to the right institutions where they seek for their rights. In South Africa, due to such 'fluid' territory, women are visible in social, political, and economic activities where they make decisions of their own and contribute to building those communities.*

A study conducted by Abdi (2014), who looked at the experiences of Somali men and women in Minnesota (USA), recounts how men, after establishing that women are getting incomes and support from the government, felt threatened for fear of power loss. Such a threat would affect the relationship between the husband and wife from a patriarchal background (Abdi 2021; Papatzani & Knappers 2020). In Pretoria West, Kureshi, a Kenyan Somali, argues that some men do not like their wives to get a job because they feel that they are taking the place of men who are 'supposed to be the family providers'. Their power as head of the household is compromised, a phenomenon which she finds unfavourable for a Somali man. According to her, men are jealous of their women working and would like it when they stay home.

Nevertheless, due to the family's financial needs that the husband struggles to meet, women negotiate these gender confinements to maximise the family income by acquiring a job. Women feel that their men are failing in their obligation to look after their families; thus, negotiating gender relations becomes inevitable. Kureshi observes that:

*When a woman is working, the man feels jealous. He does not want you to work. He says it is our tradition for a woman to stay at home. So the*

## *Gender Roles and Relations among Somali Women*

*man forces you not to work. He wants you to stay home, yet what he gives you does not sustain the family. So you suffer because you have to obey your husband. Sometimes it happens to many ladies here, who have to go out of their homes and irrespective of regulations that confine them because the money he gives cannot sustain them.*

However, the employment of Somali women outside their households proffers them economic independence. It gives them the power of decision-making in their homes. Financial independence prompts the shift of gender roles from traditional to non-traditional ones. Although Somali women become the financial managers in the home and gain power in decision-making, this kind of empowerment can be considered contestable. It is because the negotiation of power relations and shift of gender roles is occasioned by the need to fulfil various household responsibilities in both the host and home countries. Congruent to this view, most literature has indicated that women take over the male responsibilities when their male partners are absent. Therefore, it is not proper to say that they are empowered. Thus, women feel uncomfortable whenever their husbands are absent. They feel overburdened by household responsibilities when they play the paternal and maternal roles.

During my interviews, Somali women told me that Somali culture and Islam define women as being expected to cook for their husbands, keep the house tidy, and stay home while their husbands work. By contrast, men are expected to provide for the family. Nonetheless, the women said they decided to leave their homestead because their men had failed to provide for the family. This study established that most Somali women in South Africa would have preferred to remain at home if their male spouses provided for their families. Although international migration does not necessarily lead to the emancipation of women within the transnational space, there are some notable gains in crossing those borders. Through those transnational territories, women can access the resources and more rights that enable them to redefine the existing gender hierarchies that impede decision-making within the community. Women gain more control over decision-making, the household budget, and flexibility when they have wages and access to resources. This trend has not been perceived well by some Somali men. These negotiated gender power relations resulting from access to resources and rights in South Africa have been detrimental to the wife-husband relationship. Aisha says they have acquired too much freedom competing with the male presence as the head of

the household:

*In my own opinion, women have seen several changes here. She has a voice now. She can talk because she has freedom. She is doing her own business. Some of these women bring up their families on their own. Somali families today are breaking away because of this new issue, whereby women want to 'walk on their own self,' while saying that they cannot stay at home 24 hours.*

The gender, cultural and religious intersections are fundamental elements determining women's place and roles in private and public domains. In the effort to shift their gendered roles, this chapter argues that Somali women in Gauteng stand in a space where they grapple with the intersectionality of culture, religion, and gender. The religious and cultural norms among Somali women aim to safeguard the family's dignity. They are excluded from men during some cultural and religious occasions. However, this exclusion gradually diminishes as women get educated or interact with other cultures that change such restrictive practices. During an interview with Mohamed, a Somali in Pretoria West, in his restaurant, I learnt that women do not eat together with men. Men were eating downstairs while women were eating separately at the upstairs apartment. After some inquiry, Mohamed said that separate eating in public was part of the cultural norms within the Somali community.

Under the Social Locations<sup>13</sup> concept, which accentuates that migrants are born into environments that proffer them advantages and disadvantages, this study indicates that their cultural and national background disadvantages Somali women. As foreigners with a 'Cushitic'<sup>14</sup> background, they are considered non-Africans because of physical features such as the texture of their hair and skin tone. Besides, being Muslims in a predominantly Christian nation (South Africa) complicates their negotiation in the transnational space. The patriarchal setting reinforced by religious and cultural institutions has also

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<sup>13</sup> Social location is one of the four constituents of gendered geographies of power.

<sup>14</sup> Most of the Cushitic have a lighter skin, smooth hair different from Black Africans who are the majority in South Africa. Due to the aforementioned features the South African Blacks perceive them differently from other migrants.



hampered Somali women's full expression of their identity in public. This view was expressed by Pretty, who pointed out that women actively participate in debates during the meetings, but whenever there are men, they shy away from talking. Pretty pointed out that their androcentric cultural background makes Somali women believe they should not talk when a man is talking.

Conversely, women gradually emerge from those norms that restrain their negotiation in the host country. The Action Support Centre located in Johannesburg encourages women to come out of their socio-cultural confinements that fetter the actualisation of their potential. The organisation creates a platform allowing them to share their experiences on gender-based violence while discussing strategies to reduce that violence. In these forums, men are also engaged in such discussions. The women are challenged not to see men as the 'problem', thereby sustaining gendered power systems. In order to avoid the scenario where women's shared experiences could exacerbate violence against their male counterparts, the organisers try to create a friendly environment that feels like it is not reporting one another but rather, a platform to find a panacea to gender-based violence in the community without victimising anyone.

## **6 Conclusion**

As migrants face pressing economic demands in transnational contexts, a shift in gender roles becomes inevitable. This study demonstrates that despite originating from highly androcentric and patriarchal backgrounds in Somalia and Kenya, Somali women have the ability to redefine and negotiate their gender relations in the transnational space. These shifts in gender roles and power dynamics arise from the livelihood pressures that drive them to enter traditionally male domains to maximise economic returns and support their families. The South African context provides them with a greater opportunity to negotiate power hierarchies within Somali institutions compared to Somalia or Kenya.

This study suggests that policymakers need to ask a key question about what could be done to create gender sensitisation on the power relations in the transnational space. Addressing that question would be the prerequisite to transforming cultural values that still define what a migrant woman can and cannot do.

The authors of this chapter recommend that SASOWNET, in liaison with other CSOs, should develop and push for strategies that would facilitate

the realisation of gender-sensitive rights<sup>15</sup>. Effective emancipation of migrant women could only happen if the organisations described above adopted theories like feminist intersectionality to craft those policies.

The transnational space proffers Somali women a platform to reconstruct their gender roles and power relations through financial independence because they gain more control over household budgets, decision-making, and planning. Though Somali women run small businesses outside the household territory, the South African government must collaborate with migrant communities to facilitate business-friendly environments free from Xenophobia-Afrophobia, gendercide, and rape.

Although Somali women originate from Somalia and Kenya's highly traditional and androcentric backgrounds that legitimise their disenfranchisement, the authors suggest training that focuses on de-gendering family religious and cultural institutions. This process would involve joint examination by male and female participants of the religious and cultural beliefs that sustain patriarchy. In such a forum, both genders could be given various roles within the training environment.

Besides, civil society organisations must create platforms or give more support to the already existing women networks like SASOWNET to break barriers that dissuade women from public participation. The economic responsibilities that women carry for their families engender the shift of gendered roles in the transnational space. In this regard, initiatives that would enhance access to financial growth and security should be put in place by the state.

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15 SASOWNET means South African Somali Women Network. The network is a platform meant to give Somali women a collective voice. Most of my research participants belong to this organisation. The rationale for use of SASOWNET is because, the organisation is a constituent of Somali women themselves, and for any initiative to advance their concerns, it must go through this institution.

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# CHAPTER 8

## Feminisation of Migration Impacting Family Life: Zimbabwean Female Migrant Cases in South Africa

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### **Abstract**

This chapter provides a feminisation of migration perspective, which impacts the family life of Zimbabwean female migrants. Research on the feminisation of Zimbabwean migration in South Africa is growing, addressing employment, violence, and oppressive conditions. Therefore, there is ample support for women migrants to have the ease of movement to return home to Zimbabwe. However, there is little interrogation of how the feminisation of migration impacts changes in social roles in families of migrating women. The aim is to establish a set of assumptions about this feminisation of migration concerning families of Zimbabwean female migrants in South Africa. The objective is to understand the influence of feminine migration on family life, exemplified by some Zimbabwean female migrant cases in South Africa. In this qualitative study, a systematic literature review was employed to evaluate critically and to clearly explain changing social roles within the Zimbabwean family life context. Data were obtained using a literature review method, and interpretation and reflection analysis methods and techniques were used. Theoretical considerations that underpin this chapter are the feminisation of migration and the feminisation of kinship. The results comprise some preconceptions, values, and assumptions about the influence of feminine migration on changing social roles within the family life of Zimbabwean female migrants in South Africa. The contribution is towards the link between the feminisation of migration and the feminisation of family life in the Zimbabwe-South Africa migration context. The significance of this chapter is to offer another angle by contributing to diasporic encounters and experiences, migration policy, and family life studies.

This chapter concludes that empirical data sets are required to advance the discourse on feminine migration influencing the feminisation of family life in southern Africa.

**Keywords:** feminine migration, family life, South Africa, Zimbabwean females, migrants

## **1 Introduction**

Since the 2000s, the migration of Zimbabwean women to South Africa has grown to be the largest in the region (Chisholm 2022; Thebe & Maviza 2019; Zhira 2016). Beyond resilience and risk-taking generalisable to all migrants across the globe, this chapter draws inspiration from feminine migration realities – a natural affinity for self-sufficiency and home of origin. Zimbabwean women migrating to South Africa display self-sufficiency blended with a striving for home life.

This study addresses the feminisation of migration impacting gender roles in family life, focusing on some Zimbabwean female migrants' cases in South Africa. Feminisation is considered in sociology as the changing of socially gendered societal roles with a focus on the feminine (Acharya 2010). Migration is broadly understood as the voluntary or involuntary, permanent or semi-permanent spatial movement of people (Dingle and Drake 2007; Clemens 2014). Female migration studies show that the feminisation of migration is increasing in all forms of global female migration flows (Gabaccia 2016). Gabaccia (2016) views this issue as the recognition that gendered migration patterns among migrant populations are changing. Family sociology and psychology studies propound the idea of family life as entailing parameters of family members – parents, adults and children – working together to shape an interdependent life (Hess, Handel & LaRossa 2017).

When studies are examined, they link migrating women to their homes and family life. However, there is insufficient research into how feminine migration influences family life to draw any compelling conclusions about the feminisation of migration's impact on family life.

Contextually, the Zimbabwe-to-South Africa migration setting is characterised by female migrants. South Africa is their work world, and Zimbabwe is their family world. Affinity is here considered as perceived empathy for home life. Traditionally, Zimbabwean beliefs judge affinity for

home as positive, and women are believed to shape this home life (Samanga & Matiza 2020). Zimbabwean female migration displays the association between finding a source of income and the feminine roles played in the home. The feminisation of work life (hustling) impacts the feminisation of family life (home) because women migrants strive to maintain the strong chains of family bonds (Samanga and Matiza 2020). Hence the idiom *musha mukadzi* or *umuzingumama* is translated into English as homemakers (Samanga & Matiza 2020). Women are like glue: they hold family life together. Insights say that increasing female migration is altering this traditional view of women as homemakers. Zimbabwean female migrants are ‘hustler-homemakers’ instead, which then may point to feminine migration as weakening family life.

This study aims to theoretically examine feminine migration’s impact on family life using the Zimbabwean female migrants’ cases in South Africa. It examines how feminine migration is changing socially gendered roles in the family life of Zimbabwean female migrants in South Africa. How is feminine migration impacting socially gendered roles in family life, and how can this be associated with Zimbabwean female migrants in South Africa?

A qualitative methodology was adopted, employing a systematic literature review. A literature review method was used to critically evaluate and define feminine migration’s impact on changing socially gendered roles in family life within the Zimbabwean context. Data sets were obtained, and a document analysis technique was used to interpret and reflect on the insights gathered from the Zimbabwean women migrant examples in South Africa. In this chapter, there is a description of the increased number of migrating women as the basis for the feminisation of migration impacting family life.

This chapter contributes to diasporic studies and international migration research. It finds that the increasing feminine migration phenomenon impacts changes in socially gendered roles in the family life of many female migrants. However, the issue compels the feminisation of migration studies to be more intensive. This chapter begins by exploring theoretical lenses. It is then followed by describing feminised migration as the world of work and feminised family life as the home world. It concludes with key discoveries and recommendations.

## **2 Theoretical Lenses**

There are various theories about the feminisation of migration influencing the

family life of women migrants. This chapter adopts four theoretical lenses to explain this complex reality: African feminism, migration, feminisation of migration, and feminisation of kinship.

## **2.1 African Feminism**

African feminism reflects and acts on the diverse daily realities and challenges African women encounter (Ahikire 2014; Atanga 2013; Maathai 2006). Theorists explain African women's struggles and activism as acceptable processes against mainstream patriarchal power (Dosekun 2021; Ahikire 2014). African feminist activism and interventions treat the ending of women's oppression and are a response to gender inequality. They advocate for women's rights, dignity and security (Dosekun 2021; Ahikire 2014).

African feminism challenges inequality and subjugation and relegates women to traditional homes with dire living conditions (Dosekun 2021; Chiweshe, Chakona & Helliker 2015; Ahikire 2014). African feminism helps to analyse, narrate, interpret, and explain the patterns and stories of Zimbabwean women migrants in South Africa. Thus, like all African women in Diaspora, migrating Zimbabwean women face all forms of injustices, destabilisation, and marginalisation evident in education, health care, clean water, and land issues (Chiweshe *et al.* 2015). Women are enduring patriarchal migration systems that position migrant males first (Dosekun 2021). African feminism, therefore, advocates that migrating Zimbabwean women must manoeuvre and negotiate their way out of such patriarchal migration systems to improve their livelihoods and even their households (Dosekun 2021; Chiweshe *et al.* 2015).

## **2.2 Migration**

Black *et al.* (2006) posit human migration as the voluntary or involuntary, external and internal, movement from one place to a new location. Globally, external migration involves movement often over long distances and from one country to another, while internal migration is a movement within short distances – a country's provinces and districts (Clemens 2014; Dingle & Drake 2007). Migration in Africa is largely characterised by external movement in search of livelihoods and with the supply of labour to other more affluent regions (Dingle & Drake 2007; Marinucci 2007). Zimbabwe-South Africa migration is a good example of this definition and the challenges of African migration today.

The Zimbabwe – South Africa cross-border migration displays more women migrating for better livelihoods, to escape poverty, and to find employment as a source of income for poor households (Tittensor & Mansouri 2017). Acharya (2010:20) posits that ‘women were increasingly migrating as the main economic providers, or ‘breadwinners’ for their households’. Thebe and Maviza (2019) establish that depleted household income is influential in the post-2000 patterns of Zimbabwean female migration independent of men. Women migrants generate ways to alleviate poverty in their homes and families without the authority of males (husbands and brothers). They are fostering empowerment as a means of i) self-governing; and ii) reducing family poverty in Zimbabwe (Thebe & Maviza 2019). Increased Zimbabwean female migration is a reality.

There are substantive migration issues and contextual migration issues (Marinucci 2007; Black *et al.* 2006). Substantive migration issues around female migrants are (Marinucci 2007; Black *et al.* 2006):

- Labour markets (skilled, unskilled and expertise);
- Livelihoods (household income, poverty, wars, conflict and trafficking); and
- Women empowerment (social security, healthcare and education).

Contextual migration issues around the changes in social processes in family life due to women’s migration are (Marinucci 2007):

- Source of income;
- Remittances;
- Household dependence;
- Household livelihoods; and
- Family safety and security.

This conception of migration allows us to postulate the feminisation of the migration phenomenon.

### **2.3 *Feminisation of Migration***

Ann Douglas (1977) theorises feminisation as a social process of change in gender roles focusing on adopting feminine qualities in society. Drawing from

this theorisation, the adoption of feminine qualities in migration explains how the migration of women displays social processes of change in gender roles as known in traditional family environments. The feminisation of migration describes the increasing acceptance of feminine qualities and forms of migratory flows of women globally (Gabaccia 2016; Acharya 2010). Acharya (2010) conceives the 'feminisation of migration' as female-related migration where women translocate to other countries to occupy various jobs. Tittensor and Mansouri (2017) posit that the feminisation of migration is an everyday reality but not a new phenomenon. This normality is evident in the commercialised migration of women as skilled professional workers and unskilled domestic workers, caregivers, sex work and marriage (Acharya 2010). A visibly growing promotion of women's power and rights adds to this feminine character, but it remains unaccounted for in migration studies (Tittensor & Mansouri 2017). Tittensor and Mansouri (2017) argue that the feminisation of migration needs further critical exploration. Pande (2021) confirms Tittensor and Mansouri's (2017) argument. The feminisation of migration phenomenon is real; however not yet clearly defined because the migration of women remains understudied (Pande 2021). Thus, the lack of feminisation of migration data is real.

### *2.3.1 Feminisation of Migration in Context*

Insights are drawn from the feminisation theory of migration upon looking closely at women's migration research in Africa. Marinucci (2007:7) posits,

*In the African continent, the extreme poverty, desertification of the territory, diseases and warlike conflicts caused a huge increase in female mobility. It went from 42% in 1960 to 47,4% in 2005. 'An intense feminine migration is registered in Western and Eastern Africa, where the percentage is between 48% and 49%'. Acharya (2010:20) draws on the UNDP (2005) and notes that 'women constitute 49.6% of global migratory flows, though the proportion varied significantly by country and could be as high as 70 to 80 % in some cases'.*

Women migration research in Africa pursues the increase in causes and patterns of intense feminine migration. The feminisation of migration research puts forward social, economic and political ills and policy formation as characterising female migratory flows (Gouws 2010). Much of the debate revolves around factors leading to increased female mobility, including poverty, disease

and conflict (Acharya 2010; Gouws 2010; Marinucci 2007). Migrating women issues include experiences of hostility, sexual violence and oppressive and harsh working conditions. Based on available studies, the suggestion seems to be that, as migrating parents, women often migrate for short periods to trade or do seasonal work and then return to their families (Antman 2012; Gouws 2010). Intense feminine migration negatively impacts women's parenting roles in their families (Antman 2012; Cruz 2012). Men and women in migration do not have the same status even when they have both migrated for the same reasons and are doing similar jobs (Cruz 2012). This context makes the feminisation of migration an important matter.

Even though feminine migration occurs on a large scale, there is little research and information on how migration alters women's traditional family roles in Africa. Studies are more concerned with increasing the burden on governments' infrastructure and providing social security (Hassan 2020). Recent studies address issues concerning women-centric professions and livelihoods. For instance, the concerns related to women migrants' survival in the face of gender-based violence and their legal or illegal status in the host country have been addressed in studies by (Kwakwa *et al.* 2021; Pande 2021; Vuningoma, Lorini, & Chigona 2021). Kwakwa *et al.* (2021) argue that the political history of South Africa makes the country inhospitable to migrants. Therefore, migration policies and programmes in South Africa need to prioritise the safety of women migrants beyond their illegal status.

While women migration studies are occurring, more research is needed to understand migrating women's changing roles and affinity with families. This feminisation of migration in Africa hardly attracts research interest. There is a gap between the stipulated legislation about women migrants and implementation, for example, in the social change issues occurring in certain Zimbabwean societal norms and values due to increased feminine migration.

### *2.3.2 Zimbabwean Feminisation of Migration*

According to Zanamwe and Devillard (2010), it is estimated that since 2009-2010, Zimbabwean migrants living in foreign countries ranged from half a million to around 4 million for one of three reasons:

- Employment;
- Study purposes; and
- Forced emigration.

Black *et al.* (2006) posit that ‘South Africa, in turn, attracted skilled and semi-skilled Zimbabweans to its own farms and mines’. There is no data on emigration flows for Zimbabwe from 2013 onwards. This lack of data makes it difficult to determine Zimbabwean women’s emigration flow data. However, the studies on Zimbabwean women migrants in South Africa address critical patterns and perspectives on employment, study purposes, and economic refugees. On this ground, it can be argued that there are knowledge gaps regarding Zimbabwean feminine migration.

Zimbabwean feminine migration finds its basis in education, livelihoods, family economic activities and reduced family productivity. For instance, Chisholm (2022) establishes the role of education in the lives of Zimbabwean migrants and how their educational values, beliefs and practices migrate with them. Ncube and Bahta (2021) conclude, agreeing with Zanamwe and Devillard (2010), that economic reasons, security issues and a desire for better living standards influence large numbers of women migrants from Zimbabwe. There are arguments on misguided societal perceptions that labour laws do not apply to illegal female migrants (Kwakwa *et al.* 2021; Nqambaza 2016). The feminisation of migration research in the context of Zimbabwean women migrants in South Africa emphasises varied issues of policy, parenthood, education, healthcare and violence, among other difficulties.

Thebe and Maviza (2019) argue that the family unit no longer produces an income because family members rely on remittances from the women that migrated for survival. Women as migrant parents threaten family longevity and continuity because, for example, children are left with caregivers. The mothering roles of socialising children are becoming futile as the women’s family functions are fast changing (Thebe & Maviza 2019). Therefore, Thebe and Maviza (2019:80) conclude: ‘feminised migration negatively affects the very foundations that aid family socialisation’. The migration of women facilitates various social changes in families.

Feminine migration, focusing on Zimbabwe, must be viewed from perspectives of female migrant parenting, family economic activities, women’s rights and financial and social burdens. The feminisation of migration postulates that skilled and unskilled Zimbabwean women are increasingly migrating to seek employment, education, and asylum. Studies are prevalent on the differences in education systems between sending and host countries. In the case of Zimbabwe, the country continuously loses great minds and resourceful women to South Africa; however, South Africa does not reward such resourcefulness



as it rewards its female citizens more (Ncube & Bahta 2021). Other examples are studies on South African public hospitals that refuse to render health care services to undocumented Zimbabwean male and female migrants. Knowledge gaps on this type of feminisation of migration still exist despite growing research. For example, the change aspect of Zimbabwean women migrants playing their social roles in family life is interesting.

#### **2.4 *Feminisation of Family Life***

Zimbabwean feminine migration is considered within family and kinship theories. Family and kinship theories postulate family life. Rogers (1964:264) posits, 'family is a semi-closed system of interacting personalities which is composed of interrelated positions and roles defined by the society of which it is a part as unique to that system'. A family is composed of individual persons relationally living and interacting together, displaying attachment, familial continuity, child-to-adult socialisation, and unifying behaviour of a family unit (Hess, Handel & LaRossa 2017; Rogers 1964). Narrowly, family means adults, parents and children living together as a unit and as descendants of a common ancestor (Hess *et al.* 2017). Family life is, therefore, an expression of kinship, defined as a web of social relationships with social reproduction, genealogical attachments, domesticity and a sense of home life (Hess *et al.* 2017; Jackson 2015). Matrifocal means the mother figure heads and controls family life, while patrifocal denotes the father figure heads the family and controls family life. In the case of Zimbabwe, family life is expressed in the sense of home life and kinships as patrifocal physical and social spaces (Hess *et al.* 2017; Jackson 2015). The preceding description implies the link between family life and expressions of matrifocal kinships.

Increased matrifocal family life suggests feminisation of family life. In this study, matrifocal family life is increased in single-mother families with intense women's self-sufficiency and independence (Jackson 2015; Hertz & Ferguson 1997). This insight shows a shift from a patrifocal family to a matrifocal social structure (Jackson 2015). Castro Torres, Pesando and Kohler (2022) found matrifocal configurations in African rural and urban families. Increasingly, women are taking control of their families because more are getting absorbed in both industrialisation and agrarianisation (Castro Torres *et al.* 2022; Bryceson 2019). These matrifocal configurations suggest a relationship between feminine family life and feminine workplaces and point to the

changing social roles in family life and workplaces (Bryceson 2019). For instance, the more women get absorbed into industrialisation and agrarianisation, the more they emotionally invest in social caring for their children, husbands and other family members. Practically, for women, this is dual existence. Existing in the world of work on the one hand, and on the other hand existing in the world of the family where they are taking on roles and responsibilities as breadwinners and head-providers of households and families.

These descriptions of feminine families and workplaces resonate with Zimbabwean feminine migration, which displays self-sufficiency and independence. For example, some Zimbabwean women migrants increasingly take jobs that pay enough to sustain their families at home and escape the poverty line, economic crises, and reduced rural livelihoods (Thebe & Maviza 2019; Acharya 2010). In this process of changing social roles, Zimbabwean women migrants – skilled and unskilled alike – have the affinity to take control and head families because of their self-sufficiency and independence.

### **3 Methodology**

Qualitative methodology was relevant for this chapter. It developed from adopting a systematic literature review. It used the pre-literature review method to critically evaluate and clearly explain the migration of feminine reality within the Zimbabwean family life context. Data were obtained from cases of Zimbabwean women migrating to South Africa. Document analysis methods and techniques were used to generate an interpretation and in-depth reflection on the migration of feminine affinity with family life among some Zimbabwean women in South Africa. The method was limited in that research relied on Internet material. Empirical methods could have generated more objective results.

### **4 Description: Feminised Migration and Feminised Family Life**

Migration studies extensively treat feminised migration in the Zimbabwe-South Africa context. Efforts try to comprehensively understand the brain drain from professional outflows, remittances, risk and exploitation, including women's working and living vulnerabilities (Mutambara & Maheshvari 2019; Thebe & Maviza 2019; Zhira 2016). However, a critical argument on how feminine migration influences family life is missing. Analysing feminine migration

influencing family life draws from case examples of unskilled Zimbabwean female migrants in South Africa.

## ***4.1 Zimbabwean Female Migrant Cases in South Africa***

### ***4.1.1 Case Example 1: Grootplaas Estates (Bolt 2016)***

At Grootplaas Estates, recruitment for the harvest was under way. In the yard outside the farm's workshop, women who had been employed in previous years stood in rows. Some jostled; others rushed forward. All hoped to be selected first for jobs in the 'packshed', sorting and boxing the farm's oranges and grapefruits for export ... (Bolt 2016).

Eventually, the recruitment roll was completed: two teams of 30 male pickers and one of 30 female pickers; and 40 men and 80 women for the packshed. There would be further recruitment ....

Yet, away from the ritual of recruitment, distinctions between people become more complex. The farms and their settled workforces represent sites around which diverse people gravitate. The majority of workers hail from Zimbabwe, but many have relatives elsewhere in South Africa with who they remain in constant contact. Large numbers of Zimbabwean seasonal workers are employed on the farms each winter, and while some stay for the whole harvest, others quickly move on southwards into South Africa. Others again, who lack employment, are connected to workers through kinship, friendship, and sexual relationships (Source: Bolt 2016).

### ***4.1.2 Case Example 2: The Story of Precious (Dzimwasha 2014)***

Migrants crossing Zimbabwe border to Musina in search of a better life are vulnerable to robbery, slavery and sexual abuse...

Precious made the journey when she was 16. She was looking for domestic work to support her family after the death of her father and hoped to make enough money to help pay for her mother's medicine and siblings' school fees. According to Precious 'with the little money I was making I was able to send it home to my family, so my mother could buy her pills and my brother and sisters could go to school'. Thus, for Precious securing work in the informal sector as a domestic worker often means being paid less than

South African workers, or salary withheld indefinitely, and also experiencing unending sexual abuses (Source: Dzimwasha 2014).

These two cases typify a circular feminine migration tendency. Two categories of factors in the feminisation of migration emerge: work-world factors and family-life factors.

#### ***4.2 Feminised Migration in the World of Work***

Zimbabwean women's migration to South Africa is influenced by labour market factors and livelihood factors represented by working on farms, domestic workspaces, and mines (Samanga & Matiza 2020; Zhira 2016; Jackson 2015; Ndlovu 2010). The case examples embody South Africa as the 'work world' and Zimbabwe as the 'family world'. Evidence shows that females regularly return to family life, which is the circular feminine mobility tendency. South Africa offers job opportunities and better livelihoods, and Zimbabwe offers secure home and family network bases. The circular feminine mobility tendency suggests the influence of feminine migration on feminine family life.

Reflecting further, the cases of Zimbabwean circular feminine migration in South Africa display the following factors:

- Supportive family life bases;
- Adaptive strategies for short-term and circular mobility;
- Mitigating or limiting the flow or return of females to their home country;
- Female brain drain; and
- Apathy towards the family life of female migrants.

The feminine migration factors engender female social role trade-offs in family life. It can be argued, therefore, that the feminisation of migration is changing the feminisation of family life.

#### ***4.3 Feminine Migration Converging with Family Life***

The argument is convergent. On the one hand, it points to feminisation as foregrounded in international migration discourses concerned with increasing women's migration. On the other hand, feminisation is also central to family world discourses preoccupied with increasing feminine kinship matters. Inter-

rogating feminisation intersects intense female migrants' issues with female kinship matters. Zimbabwe-to-South Africa, feminine migration cases have factors that co-exist with personal and familial livelihoods. Migrating female parental figures experience the world of work factor and family world factor. However, both provide for children and parents (Samanga & Matiza 2020).

The stories of migrating female Zimbabweans will certainly differ between educated, skilled, and professional women migrants and the less educated unskilled (some undocumented) women migrants. However, the common factor is that all women migrants seek much more than they bargained for. Skilled or unskilled female migrants take jobs at fast food restaurants, farms, factories, and in houses as maids for severely low wages only to support and sustain their families at home in Zimbabwe (Gadzikwa & Jones 2020; Dzimwasha 2014; Ndlovu 2010). The convergent factor between feminine migration and feminine family life is the natural affinity for family and children. For example, the Musina agricultural season characterises migrating female Zimbabweans striving to work temporarily to raise enough money to sustain and support family networks (Dzimwasha 2014).

Stella Mpisi<sup>1</sup> articulates this convergent factor experienced between feminine migration and feminine family life: 'Some want peace, some want stability, and some just want so much more'. The phrase 'much more' reflects a desire for a better life and happiness not only while one is in the Diaspora but also a quality life of peace and stability enjoyed with relatives left at home in Zimbabwe (Gadzikwa & Jones 2020; Samanga & Matiza 2020; Ndlovu 2010). Ndlovu (2010:118) confirms the quality of life aspect, 'Home is an emotionally loaded word that [in the] exploration of the transmigration of Zimbabweans [...] home is where the heart is'. This means feminine migration shares in feminine family life. The following are feminine value-laden experience factors associated with Zimbabwean feminine migration:

- |                 |            |
|-----------------|------------|
| * Affectivity;  | *Affinity; |
| * Belonging;    | * Freedom; |
| * Identity; and | *Values.   |

These factors share in home-sweet-home or no-place-like-home perspectives (Samanga & Matiza 2020; Ndlovu 2010). In a nutshell, Zimbabwean feminine migration converging with feminine family is a complex social phenomenon.

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<sup>1</sup> International Organisation for Migration (IOM 2012).

Zimbabwean women migrants are playing new social roles beyond traditionally perceived roles as homemakers. Feminine migration is changing Zimbabwean 'family' and 'home' life systems.

#### ***4.4 The Essence of Family Life***

Feminine migration is changing the essence of Zimbabwean family life. The essence of family life stems from affectivity and affinity affectionately expressed in this IsiNdebele idiom *intandane enhle ngumakhothwa ngunina* translated into English as 'a beautiful orphan is the one licked by the mother' (Samanga & Matiza 2020; Ndlovu 2010). It is further expressed in the words *musha mukadzi/ umuzingumama*, which in direct English means, 'a home is a woman/ mother' (Samanga & Matiza 2020; Ndlovu 2010). Feminine migration means the physical absence of a female parent figure in a family. This absence impacts the socialisation of children and the overall stability of families (Samanga & Dzimwasha 2014). She economically interacts with the extended family and has affectivity in motherhood.

Zimbabwean women migrants bargain with the essence of family life. It is evident in the emotionally loaded Easter and Christmas seasons illustrated by the Grootplaas Estates case (Bolt 2016). The regular movement from South Africa back to Zimbabwe to commemorate and celebrate festive days and moments as families is enough evidence of the negotiation between migration and family life. For Zimbabwean female migrants' home is home; hence, as in the case with Precious, there is a need for women migrants to negotiate with the hosting environment to fulfil their naturally shared family values of 'motherhood' and breadwinner roles as daughters, sisters and aunts in the extended family (Dzimwasha 2014).

The essence of family life is to invoke emotional belonging. Family life is where home is, home is where family is, and this is where one belongs (Samanga & Matiza 2020; Hess *et al.* 2017). A sense of emotional belonging in family life is when Zimbabwean women in the Diaspora regularly interact with the nucleus and biological family members, including extended relatives at home. Family life is the nest and hive of many migrant women and their emotional belonging. It is where they see the value of parenthood and motherhood sacrifices. Thus, no matter how far a female is, Zimbabwean kinship and homes offer optimum therapeutic life, although no longer in the traditional sense of family life.

#### **4.5 Kinship Keeping**

Zimbabwe – South Africa women migration imposes – shifts in socio-cultural roles in kinship beyond patrilineal lines (Castro Torres *et al.* 2021; Jackson 2015). Thus, women’s migration leads to the discovery of new forms of matrikin filiations. Matrikin filiation refers to the ties mothers have with children and extended family having to take full control of households as breadwinners and heads independently from males. With female migrants, the income and the remote control of family or home expenses make it difficult to maintain a patri-focal kinship type of culture in families. Consequently, husbands and children may have to endure and accept that their wives and mothers are never at home for a good reason. The sense of void and mother-child attachment gaps encroach in times of need and crises like sickness and death, financial constraints, and hunger.

#### **4.6 Challenging Patri-Migration Policy Prescriptivism**

Feminine migration studies in Southern Africa are filled with patri-migration policy prescriptivism. Migration policy items are set by clear patriarchal rules externally imposed on female migrants. Patri-migration policy narration preoccupies itself with patterns, poverty and inequality conditions, livelihood strategies of the poor, human rights observance, and forms and dynamics with the historical reality of forced and labour migration (Porter, Binns, Elliot & Smith 2018; Black *et al.* 2006). This policy prescriptivism is challenged considering feminine family life reflected in the Zimbabwean female migrants’ cases. This argument is because general migration policy reforms lack recognition and prioritisation of women migrants’ affinity for family life. For example, ‘South Africa’s current restrictions on movement from Zimbabwe are causing major difficulties for small traders [especially] Zimbabwean women’ (Black *et al.* 2006: 132).

It cannot be understated that post-2007, there have been observable efforts to address issues of Zimbabwean women migrants in South Africa (Chimbidzikai 2021; Moyo 2018). For example, business activities such as Mukuru, Paisa, and Malaicha.com, among others, were formed to facilitate easy and safe remittances that include women’s activities (Crush *et al.* 2018). In addition to remittance, South African Home Affairs introduced the 90-day visa, as well as the Zimbabwean Exemption Permit (ZEP) and the Zimbabwean Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) that most male and female migrants benefit

from for staying legally (Chimbidzikai 2021; Moyo 2018). On these grounds, how arguable is the current feminine migration policy? The underlying argument is that women migrants are still struggling with access, distance issues, and exclusion, as Acharya (2010:20) posits:

The growing number of females in migration process is an inevitable outcome of feminisation of poverty and feminisation of employment in world labour markets. The contributing factors to feminisation of employment are female labour in cheap, flexible, unorganised [jobs], also women can be employed at piece rate, part-time, home-based work and female migrants can be forced to accept low waged, undervalued jobs in the informal sector.

Acharya's (2010) argument is still valid in the context of Zimbabwean female migrants living in South Africa. Migration policies do not seek to address the symbiotic relationship between the feminisation of migration and the feminisation of poverty and family life. This argument can be viewed considering Mpsi's words, 'leaving your home, heading for a place you have never seen before ... Whatever the reason may be, we all search for that one open door'<sup>2</sup>. Policies need to address feminine migration to open doors for feminine potential and opportunities because of individual women's affinity for family life.

## **5 Key Claims**

This chapter puts forward the claim that contemporary feminine migration is influencing feminine family life as follows:

- There are mutual feminine qualities between the feminisation of migration and family life;
- Migration research is prevalent on the feminisation of migration, but studies have not delved into contemporary feminine migration qualities mutually influencing changes in social gender roles in family life;

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<sup>2</sup> IOM (2012).



- Evident continuous juggling between their migrant work world and family – home world among Zimbabwean women migrants’ cases in South Africa exemplifies natural feminine affinity with family life; and
- Patri-migration policy reforms are challenged to redress and bridge the feminine qualities gap between the feminisation of migration and family life.

## **6 Conclusion**

The description in this chapter was centred on the feminisation of migration impacting on feminisation of family life. Zimbabwean female migrant cases in South Africa were examined to determine migrating women’s affinity for family life. The analysis relied on social theory to ground migration, feminisation of migration, and feminisation of kinship. Current literature established that patterns of Zimbabwean women abound with examples of the two-world existence, simultaneously existing in the work and family worlds. Generally, the feminisation of migration is real and not a new phenomenon. However, studies and data on the feminisation of migration are still minimal compared with the reality of increasing feminine migration. In addition, the literature confirms the feminisation of family life. The Discovery is that feminine qualities mutuality occurs between feminine migration and family life. The Zimbabwean women migration cases show this mutual occurrence because they display a natural affinity for returning home to children and parents. This feminine affinity is a site of social shifts in gender roles in traditional Zimbabwean homes. Migrating women use self-sufficiency and independence to be breadwinners and heads of homes. Historically, these roles were exclusively designated for males. The contention is that the growing migration tendencies characterised by feminine qualities inherent in women’s natural inclination towards family life, remain an area of insufficient research. Consequently, this could explain why migration policy reforms have failed to address this overlooked reality.

In conclusion, the feminisation of migration impacting the feminisation of family life is a phenomenon of research interest in migration and Diaspora studies in Africa. Both academia and policymakers need further to encourage research interests in this area of migration. Therefore, future research must generate data sets that empirically prove the influence of feminine migration on family life.

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# CHAPTER 9

## Gendered Challenges Facing Somali Migrant Women within Transnational Contexts in South Africa

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### Abstract

In this study, the author interrogates the gendered challenges that Somali migrant women experience in South Africa (Gauteng Province) within transnational contexts. Those challenges are interrogated through a feminist intersectionality lens and gendered geographies of power theories. The study is qualitative; therefore, data were gathered through in-depth interviews with 40 participants residing in Gauteng Province, South Africa. The participants were chosen through the snowball sampling technique. Somali women are not a homogeneous community but a heterogeneous entity defined by different social, political and economic backgrounds. In that respect, it is highlighted in this study that gendered challenges facing these women impact them varyingly along multiple factors that facilitate or hinder the negotiation of their space in the transnational context. The Somali migrant women in the spaces explored stand at the intersection of diverse planes of identification, namely gender (as women), nationality (as foreigners), faith (as Muslims) and race (tone and texture of hair and skin).

**Keywords:** transnational space, Somali women, intersectionality, gender, South Africa, Gauteng.

## **1 Introduction**

Although a sizable population of African migrants is impelled by the quest for education, recreation, and employment opportunities, conflicts are a key factor that propels their migration. Women increasingly leave their home countries to settle in other countries unaccompanied by their husbands or male counterparts. This step induces their vulnerability to sexual and gender-based violence outside the household setting (Farley 2019). Their mobility is complicated by the gendered nature of migratory routes beginning from the moment they set out to migrate during their journey and settlement in the host country.

Migratory routes are gendered spaces that impact migrants' lives differently. Because migrants are not homogeneous but heterogeneous entities, they are impacted differently. The objective of this chapter is to examine the gendered complexities that Somali refugee women encounter in the transnational space within the South African context. In this chapter, therefore, the author seeks to address the question, 'What gendered complexities do Somali refugee women encounter in the transnational space in the South African context?' Migratory spaces are territories that impact the lives of migrants by exposing them to multifaceted forms of vulnerabilities. The positive side is that these also proffer Somali women opportunities to redefine gender roles and power relations. They are crucial spaces to rebuild their lives economically and assist them in sending home remittances to their dependents.

Nonetheless, these same territories can potentially expose female migrants to multifaceted challenges due to legal status and the perception of migrants as 'the other.' The phenomenon of 'othering' migrants is tied to the underlying feeling that migrants are likely to take up job opportunities, compete for already scarce resources, and have the possibility of disturbing the norms and value systems of a nation. The resentment towards migrants in South Africa chips away solidarity and is normally irrational, making Somali women shy away from territories of higher economic opportunities like South African townships.

Somali women face gendered complexities and social factors that bolster or diminish their resilience. They are not homogeneous entities but people born into distinct social locations that either advantage or disadvantage their ability to navigate their existence in the transnational space. Migration is an expensive venture involving strategising and using substantial resources to facilitate migrant mobility. In light of gendered geographies of power theory, Somali women who originated from families and clans of the higher social and



economic class would adjust to the South African context better than those from the lower class. It is because higher-status people have more resources to support their transnational mobility. Similarly, migrants who find friends or familial network systems on their way to South Africa have an advantage over those that do not. These networks from families and friends often support them with resources, accommodation, direction, and emotional aid during the journey, thus boosting their resilience.

This study was conducted in the Gauteng Province. The location selection was justified by the fact that the majority of Somali women live in Gauteng. It is an economic hub of Africa, and therefore it is a city of attraction for most migrants within and outside Africa. The Somali migrants constitute a business-oriented community and would look to such vibrant economic spaces for their business interests. Gauteng is also the province that hosts the Department of Home Affairs and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The women are constantly attached to the Home Affairs and United High Commissioner for Refugees to renew their permits (from Home Affairs) and seek refugee protection (from UNHCR).

Male mobility experiences have eclipsed most literature on women's transnational migration. Thus, mobility has long been documented as a male phenomenon because migration scholarship is majorly economically oriented (Braun 2020; Zanabazar Kho & Jigjiddori 2021). In this regard, women migrants were depicted as having no significance in the host nation's social, political and economic progress.

This study is significant because it adds to the scanty literature about transnational experiences from a feminist perspective. The geographies of power and feminist intersectionality theories highlight Somali women's heterogeneity. This work is significant to actors that provide services to migrants as it sheds light on the diversity of needs for women migrants. Similarly, adopting the feminist frameworks would help the policymakers make migration policies that are gender sensitive.

## **2 Research Methodology**

This chapter adopted a qualitative method because it required an in-depth understanding of gendered challenges in the migratory terrains. Qualitative research describes and offers a deeper grasp of a particular social phenomenon (Adedoyin 2020; Bus 2020; Tenny, Brannan, Brannan & Sharts-Hopko 2017).

The approach permits understanding people's experiences using in-depth data collection and interpretation processes (Adedoyin 2020; Buseto *et al.* 2020; LaMarre & Chamberlain 2022; Tenny *et al.* 2017). In the current chapter focusing on Somali women's gendered challenges, the qualitative method was deemed the best approach for a study of this nature which centres on elusive experiential data. The data was gathered using face-to-face interviews with the participants in the Gauteng Province. The justification for face-to-face interviews was that understanding people's experiences requires a method to optimise verbal and non-verbal communication (Saarijarvi & Bratt 2021; Self 2021). Since the subjects were new to the researcher, the snowball sampling technique was applied to reach the Somali women who were better informed about the subject matter. The 40 women interviewed were from diverse sectors such as trading, housekeeping, or employed in Somali shops. The researcher used the South African Somali Women Network (SASOWNET) to identify and reach suitable subjects for this study. Based in Johannesburg (the Gauteng Province), SASOWNET provides Somali women with an avenue for empowerment that would enable them to have a robust joint voice of action.

Regarding methodological challenges, there was a language barrier between the researcher and the Somali migrants who did not understand the Swahili language. The researcher had to use an interpreter conversant in Somali, English and Swahili. He also guided me to the homes and shops where I would locate Somali women. Additionally, interviewing the women was difficult because of the Islamic divide expected between men and women. During my interview, however, I had to use community leaders who introduced me to the community. The community leaders were very helpful in inducting me into the Somali community. Also, because most of those migrants were affected by violence orchestrated by the locals in the townships, there was suspicion towards an outsider. Therefore, I had to introduce myself as a student sent by the University of KwaZulu-Natal to study certain aspects of their lives. I also established a rapport with them and created a sense of belonging among them by introducing myself as a fellow migrant from East Africa.

### **3 Theoretical Frameworks**

Feminist Intersectionality is a framework coined by Black feminist Kimberlé Crenshaw, who argues that women's lives are built on multiple intersecting systems of oppression (Kelly *et al.* 2021; Woods, Benschop & Van den Brink

2021). The theory argues that women's inequalities are never an outcome of a single distinct factor but an outcome of interconnected power relations, experiences and social identity categories (Hvenegard-Lassen, Staunæs & Lund 2020; Shelton, Flynn & Grosland 2018). The theory penetrates and unearths issues about women, not from a single factor but intertwining social variables of oppression that affect women simultaneously (Chaulagain & Pathak 2021; Kassam, Marcellus, Clerk & O'Mahony 2022; Standke-Erdmann 2021). The theoretical intervention in the context of this chapter was significant in unpacking how gender complexities result from intersecting factors – gender, language, nationality, religion, education level, and class – that complicate Somali women's mobility within transnational space. The framework is germane to this chapter because it helps the researcher comprehend how Somali women's interaction with these interlocking multiple identification planes privilege or disadvantage them in interacting with power hierarchies as they navigate gendered challenges in the transnational space. The gendered challenges can only be understood clearly by being cognisant of those interwoven identities that privilege or disadvantage them in interacting with power hierarchies.

Gendered geographies of power examine how migrants negotiate gender powers within the transnational space. The theory comprises four aspects: 'imagination', 'power geometrics', 'geographic scales' and 'social locations' (Kofman 2020; Carruthers Thomas 2021). This study espoused power geometrics and social locations as the analytical lens to examine the data on the Somali-gendered complexities in the transnational space. The social location claims that humans are born into a certain social location which advantages or disadvantages them. The nationality, race, gender, religion, class, and educational background advantages or disadvantages women's lives in the transnational space. The argument emerging from this proposition is that we see ourselves or are perceived as representing various factors of differentiation – race, nationality, religion, education and class. Power geometrics argues that women have a sense of agency rather than being passive recipients of oppression. The relocation of migrant women to a foreign country improves their status back home. These women being the breadwinners and dependants, are perceived in high regard despite marginalised locations in their highly patriarchal backgrounds in Somalia. Thus, the new space in South Africa, finding employment, and contact with more open cultures offer them opportunities for the agency to negotiate gendered territories in the transnational space.

## **4 Literature Review**

The migration concept denotes people's movement through geographical borders while aiming at establishing a temporary or permanent space elsewhere. More than ever, transnational migration has risen exponentially, provoked by push and pull factors that propel people's mobility. Historically, Braun (2020) observes that many women have migrated independently or with their families. However, literature on transnational migration depicts their obscurity in those migratory routes or features their presence in a limited way. Their movement happened even without the endorsement of the 'gatekeepers' within their families and male-dominated social set-ups. Most scholars traditionally focus on questions that are gender-neutral such as migration motivations, migrants' experiences in the host country, and remittances, while neglecting questions that are gender specific. The failure to incorporate gender into transnational migration literature makes it difficult to elucidate the motivations behind women's mobility, such as who informed their decision to migrate and why they remain predominant in certain occupations. Also, there were no gender theories underpinning women-centric migration studies. This androcentric worldview weighed heavily on the literature on transnational migration. Transnational migration and gender are gradually receiving scholarly attention (Braun 2020; Pande 2022; Yamamura & Lassalle 2022) as they try to comprehend how migrants interact with male power structures in the host country. While there is growing literature on gender and migration, there is still a lacuna in the literature about gender and transnational space, highlighting gendered challenges within the transnational space from an intersectionality perspective. Most literature (Jolof, Rocca, Mazaheri, Emegwa & Carlsson 2022; Nhengu 2022; Tan & Kuschminder 2022) highlight those complexities only within the host country and forgetting that their lives are a web of interconnected past and present and that those complexities are not homogeneous, despite those women belonging to one community. Thus, their experiences are multi-stranded, and this aspect cannot be ignored if we are to gain a better understanding of gendered challenges.

## **5 Contexts**

### ***5.1 The Context of South Africa***

At the inception of clan-driven politics in Somalia, Somali women began to flee the country after Said Bare's fall in 1991. The aftermath of these wars was insecurity and resistance to an authoritative president characterised by

competition for power by different armed groups. These wars and clan-based tensions pushed many Somali women to migrate to the countries within and outside the Horn of Africa. Some women used Kenya as a route to South Africa and Western countries. After getting into South Africa, Somali women spread mainly to the Eastern Cape, the Western Cape and Gauteng, where they established ethnic enclaves. Their movement to the provinces mentioned above grew exponentially. They have also moved to other parts of the country to exercise their entrepreneurial acumen (Brown 2015; Kleist & Abdi 2022), especially in the unpredictably dangerous and racially segregated townships. The Somali movement was characterised by a transition period when South Africa came from Apartheid rule to becoming a democratic state. Despite this transition from an oppressive regime to a more democratic environment, the social, political and economic structures of Apartheid remained. These Apartheid legacies, which include ethnic bigotry and racism, affected South African blacks disproportionately (Pirtle 2022; Whitaker 2020). Apartheid, which means to ‘set people apart’ (Lanziotti, Bulut, Buonsenso & Gonzalez-Dambrauskas 2022), divided South African settlements along their skin colour. The South African blacks were thrown out of town centres and settled in townships leaving the whites to rule from those cities. In this setting, Somali and other migrants, like Ethiopians, took advantage of acting as intermediaries between the blacks in the townships and the cities, where they started retail shops to serve the blacks in townships. The Somali entry into business received heavy opposition from South African blacks, who saw them as threatening their job and business opportunities. Their business acumen and passion for entrepreneurship have helped the Somalis to lure a large population of customers compared to the locals. They lure the customers by lowering commodities costs as they can buy goods in bulk as a community and divide them among Somali Spaza shop owners. Their business shrewdness is also manifested in their way of packaging commodities into smaller items, which attracts most locals to buy from them because of their affordability (Abdi 2015). These strategies create tough competition between the Somali and the local shopkeepers, often triggering anti-foreigner bigotry (Xenophobia).

## ***5.2 Gauteng in the Context of this Study***

Gauteng is South Africa’s most populous province, with a quarter of the population residing in the region (Blaauw & Pretorius 2022). Despite boasting

as the most populous province, it is the smallest in land size. The province is one of nine provinces with most migrant communities that either reside in or are transiting the province. In the same vein, in the context of transnational space, Gauteng plays a crucial role in the lives of migrants, even for the migrants that do not reside in the province. It is because migrants in different provinces connect with their acquaintances in the Gauteng Province or have memories of reporting to Gauteng to legalise their asylum and refugee permits. The province comprises three major municipalities, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Ekurhuleni, hosting over 13 million people. The huge population of nationals and migrants is mainly in Pretoria and Johannesburg. Many migrants from Africa and beyond inhabit the two cities. Gauteng leads the nine provinces in the crime figures in the context of gendered complexities in South Africa.

The high crime level is elicited by multifaceted factors, including unemployment, rapid urbanisation and firearms proliferation (Garidzirai 2021; Ndlela 2020). In advancing the argument, Garidzirai (2021) argues that the high crime rate in Gauteng could be attributed to unprecedented poverty and income inequalities. Those crimes, however, reflect a fraction of several crimes that happen in the province, as most crimes go unreported or underreported. Interpersonal crimes, such as rape, domestic and sexual violence, are underreported as women fear victimisation.

Additionally, the legacies of Apartheid, such as male chauvinism and sexism, sustain negative perceptions towards the aggrieved. The violence manifested in coordinated xenophobia and other forms of crime hurt migrant businesses immensely (Pirtle 2022; Whitaker 2020). Thus in the context of increased violence, Somali migrant women not only have to endure this violence, but these adversities are necessarily gendered.

## **6 Transnational Space**

Transnational space is an area that has recently received huge attention from scholars as it has become ubiquitous in understanding how refugee lives are navigated and organised. The concept seemed ephemeral, but with the increasing levels of mobility, the concept has been crucial in understanding migrant lives in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This concept was conceived from transnationalism, which denotes how immigrants forge and maintain social networks that connect their host country's communities with those of origin (Tedeschi, Vorobeva & Jauhainen 2022; Xiang 2022). This space involves a

compound network of ties and realities that continually impact the lives of migrants upon entering their host country. That multi-stranded relationship connects not only the migrants with their societies back home but also with their memories of countries they might have visited. Thus, for the migrants to adapt to this space, their capability to meet and associate with other fellow migrants from their country of origin and country of abode is essential (Sandal-Onal, Bayad, Zick and Düzen 2022; Tedeschi *et al.* 2022; Xiang 2022). Thus, the idea that immigrants exist in a single territory that limits them to singular constitutional and cultural norms is no longer tenable. They exist in an ‘in-between space’ characterised by multiple connectedness with their host and home country and even beyond those locations. Globalisation and technological advancements have elicited stronger migrant connections between the country of abode and the home community. Citizenship has hugely been affected by this phenomenon which has also instigated complexity in migration regulation among the host nations. Immigrants will continually participate easily in their home countries’ affairs while retaining their presence in their country of residence. Even the most socially economic and politically stable nations cannot manage to regulate migrant flows and their affairs because of the strong multi-stranded web of networks within the transnational space.

## **7 Transnational Space as a Gendered Territory**

The transnational spaces are gendered territories traditionally considered male spaces, despite the huge, unprecedented increase of the female migrant movement, which has received little attention. It is the case because most scholars on transnational migration have focused on the economic dimension of migration, which has misrepresented the mobility process as a purely male domain. In that respect skimming through most of the literature, female obscurity depicts male-controlled territories. In some instances, women have also been stereotyped as accompanying their male counterparts as wives or sisters and, therefore, have no role in the economic development of the host nation.

## **8 Research Findings**

### ***8.1 Gendered Challenges in Transnational Space***

Gender and the associated concepts cannot be overlooked in the migratory process because gender shapes migration patterns. Because gender interacts

with migration, ignoring the concept would hinder a researcher from understanding the gender dynamics that shape the lives of migrant women. The Somali women are exposed to gender-based violence on their journey to South Africa by the individuals who provide them with services at border points and for transportation and accommodation while soliciting sexual favours from them. Enticed by the pursuit of perceived opportunities in their destination and because of the fear of losing vital services on their way to South Africa, the migrant Somali women often acquiesce to sexual demands. In this case, Somali women are at the crossroads of overlapping forces of nationality – as foreigners, gender, race – skin tone and hair texture, and Islamic faith.

Despite sharing the commonality of origin and foreignness with other foreigners, especially from Eastern African nations, Somali women are cognisant of variations with other Cushitic communities (Eritreans, Ethiopians). Somali women do not open up easily to other immigrants they travel with. It is due to their religious and cultural differences and fear of people who do not belong to their community.

Somali women are affected by Afrophobia and other crimes along migratory routes. Those hostilities have greatly played out on women's bodies through beatings, emotional abuse and sexual assault. Their multiple jeopardies are also witnessed whenever their residences which function as a domicile of safety, are damaged through anti-foreigner vandalism. The emotional and physical violence women suffer is sustained by structured patriarchy within cultures. The patriarchal system is manifested in attitudes, ideas and actions revealed through gendered violence (Van der Heijden, Harries & Abrahams 2020). During those conflicts, sexual violence harms women as individuals and has a long-term effect on the entire community of aggrieved migrant women. Therefore, any violence affects the social, political and cultural structures built by the society during settlement. The violence, argues Van der Heijden *et al.* (2020), damages women's bodily integrity and obliterates existing community ties with the same history, values and identity. Rape is among the most disturbing experiences that inflict guilt and shame among migrant women. The act of rape is not about the perpetrator's sexual gratification but emotional and mental violence tied to power and domination by hegemonic gendered systems in which the victims lose power over their sexuality, body, and, importantly, their self-esteem (Maung 2021; Metz, Myers & Wallace 2021). Somali women have been victims of rape within the transnational space. These women keep silent after rape incidents because they risk social stigma if they disclose the rape.



Consequently, the stigma leads to their ‘un-marriageability’ and the possibility of them being divorced by their spouses. The silence culture of rape victims is sustained by the fear that the perpetrator could retaliate should the victim reveal his identity. Because of the shameful sentiments related to rape, the victim fears being ostracised by her family (Metz *et al.* 2021; Schmitt, Robjant, Elbert & Koebach 2021). Women get minimal assistance through the judicial system on sexual violence, yet the institution is constitutionally mandated to protect anyone regardless of nationality, gender or race. Law enforcement agencies are also reluctant to respond to the migrant’s grievances. The lack of proper court representation intensifies their predicament because the South African judicial system is also chauvinistic. Those statutory institutions assigned to effect justice for the people have patriarchal undertones that buttress and sustain unequal power structures. Similarly, cultural and religious norms cannot be overlooked if an authentic search for the factors that underlie the sexual oppression of women within the transnational terrains during conflicts are to be pursued.

Somali women are subject to fear of working in traditionally perceived male spaces that are normally violent. Due to rampant gender-based violence manifested in Xenophobia-Afrophobia attacks and numerous crimes in South African townships, Somali women avoid those locations. Somali women in ‘locations’ do not run Spaza<sup>1</sup> shops or vend items independently as they would in urban centres and suburbs. The townships, also popularly known as ‘locations’, are principally male spaces because those spaces are operated by males who depict some resilience to withstand Afrophobia and other criminalities as opposed to women who are considered unable to withstand such violence. According to Abdi (2015), it is men that enter those black townships (rural), while Somali women enter racially mixed neighbourhoods (urban) in order to mix with Indian Muslims for their security. Therefore, Somali women depend on wages from their male counterparts working in those places or menial work within locations like Pretoria West and Mayfair – a suburb within Johannesburg that has the highest population of Somali migrants<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Spaza - A South African slang among the Black population to mean the unregulated business designed for ‘convenience’ sake, and are meant to boost the household earnings for the owner (Yesufu 2022; Tuomala & Grant 2021). It’s an informal business, with a wide range of items, particularly household commodities.

<sup>2</sup> It is also called Small Mogadishu, which is named after the Somalia capital.

The Somali women interviewed also pointed out discrimination in formal and informal employment. They could not be absorbed in the formal sector because they were non-citizens in a male-dominated state. This situation is aggravated by the patriarchal system in their communities that does not allow them to participate in some informal sector jobs. This study found that certain jobs are primarily male-orientated in their own communities. Due to the socio-cultural expectations in their community, Somali women shy away from taking such male-dominated jobs. The religious and cultural norms (Bjork-James 2019; de Vries *et al.* 2022) reinforce the gendered roles and expectations that impede Somali women from entering those male-dominated occupations. De Vries *et al.* (2022) point out that when a family is very religious, children are highly likely to be socialised into gender stereotypes and patriarchal gendered roles. After interviewing Aisha, I learnt that activities like driving taxis<sup>3</sup> are gendered and that any Somali woman attempting such a job would be considered going against their cultural norms. Aisha said:

*Imagine myself driving a taxi. It doesn't happen anywhere, and is not something within our culture as Somali community and so it would look odd. Maybe one day the Somali women will take that challenge, although it will take quite some time.*

Another significant difficult experience encountered by Somali women is related to Islamophobia and Hijabophobia. How those women dress, which differs from the South African majority, provokes antagonistic sentiments among South Africans. Women have been discriminated against in various state departments (Home Affairs, the Police and Health departments). The discrimination is based on the Islamic garb, which labels them with an Islamic identity intersecting with several other social factors. A lack of intense orientation about the South African social, cultural, and religious contexts also facilitates the Somali women's predicament. The orientation would help the women to be well prepared for resistance against their religious background, indicated by Islamic attire. As obligatory attire, the 'Burqa' and 'Hijab' are worn whenever those women are in public domains to signify modesty and, importantly, as a covering to their bodies only meant for their husbands. Amina says:

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<sup>3</sup> Taxi business is a common activity among males who transport Somalis from one community to another within the Johannesburg and Pretoria Central Business Districts and in townships.

## *Gendered Challenges Facing Somali Migrant Women*

*South African culture is different from ours as Somalis. You know we dress differently from most of South Africans who are Christians. So when we put on Hijab to cover our bodies, but we become targets of xenophobia and other forms of violence. When you travel on a taxi, go to market like Marabastad<sup>4</sup> everyone is able to spot you from a distance. They ask us why we should cover ourselves with those clothes different from their women. Sometimes they can even rape you because of that cloth that shows that you are Muslim and a foreigner.*

Though Gauteng Province is home to several migrants, Somali women are impacted differently by the gendered challenges. A Somali woman dressed in Hijab can easily be spotted as non-South African, increasing their susceptibility to sexual abuse during migration. This phenomenon is also ubiquitous among Somali women within transnational routes. Although South African Muslims dress in Islamic attire like Hijab, Somali women can be spotted easily because of its conspicuous disparities, such as colourful Garbasaar<sup>5</sup> and Jilbab.<sup>6</sup> Through intersectionality theory, the author argues that Somali women's violence is based on intertwined social factors that affect them simultaneously. They suffer gendered challenges ranging from rape, sexual harassment, xenophobia, and discrimination because of the intersecting dimensions of identification, namely that of nationality (they are foreigners in South Africa (nationality), women (gender), Muslims in Christian territories (religion), and skin colour (different skin tone and hair texture). Those women receive negative sentiments, derogatory and demeaning based on their gender, nationality and religion that affect them concurrently. They receive emotional abuse from males and physical and sexual abuse within those routes. Sarah said:

*We are harassed sexually on our journey to South Africa. They see us in Hijab and tell us that we are wearing a duvet, and ask us how we wear it in the heat. Why you don't throw it away, you are young, you are beautiful? Why don't you wear the trouser? Are you having a*

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<sup>4</sup> Malabastad is a region within Pretoria West that has a significant population of Somali migrants and is the actual location of South African Home Affairs.

<sup>5</sup> Gabasaar is a Shawl worn by married Somali women. The wear is fashioned in different colours.

<sup>6</sup> Jilbab is muslim female costume that covers the whole woman's body as opposed to Hijab that covers the upper part of the body.

*menstrual cramp which you are hiding in this Hijab? You are coming with something that we don't know.*

South Africa is principally a nation with a huge population of Christians. The Muslims are the minority in South Africa and are normally categorised as Indians. Therefore, Somalis dressed in Islamic attire, although black persons with soft-textured hair, are classified by most South African blacks as 'outsiders' in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Through intersectionality theory, it is argued that various forms of stereotypes and gendered abuse that women migrants encounter in transnational contexts differ from what Somali male migrants face. Gender (women) interacts with other social factors to disadvantage Somali women more than their male counterparts. Through intersectionality, the author establishes that other Muslim women with light skin colour, such as Asians, are not perceived the same as Somalis, with fairly lighter tones (than most South Africans). Muslims of Asian origin are perceived in higher regard. The Somali Muslim's identity, skin tone, and Cushitic language manifest some 'foreignness' even to their fellow African migrants. Amina observed:

*You know some tell us that we are from Pakistan because they have no experience of other Africans that have some different physical features. You know Somali the way they look like? You know the Ethiopian and Somali hair does not look exactly as African hair which is strong and darker than ours. Our structure and our hair make us look a bit different from other Africans in South Africa.*

Somali migrant women face a psychic load of gendered traumas of the past. Those women hold memories that affect their adaptability within the transnational space. They commence their journey to South Africa, already ruptured emotionally. They later encounter other experiences that traumatise them more in the transnational space. Due to the stigma and emotive nature of those experiences, Somali women find it hard to disclose them. When conducting interviews, I discovered that many women were divorcees, and separated from their husbands, while others died in the war. Thus, the absence of spouses resulted in the challenge of migrating alone and caring for their families in a foreign country. Besides, the scenario impacts the entire family's adaptability within South Africa. Fatuma, a middle-aged mother from Mayfair who lost her spouse in the war, said:

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*When our men are killed, it pains us so much, we get stressed. Our children are impacted a lot because they don't have the source of livelihood or no father figure. We don't want to remember or speak what happened because it troubles us so much.*

Somali women are victims of domestic violence in their household settings. They face this violence reinforced by the ethnic community, religion, clan system, and other hegemonic institutions (Farley 2019; Mkhize & Vilakazi 2021; Ripero-Muniz 2020). Faced with this kind of violence, these women face a dilemma as they must choose between pursuing Somali patriarchal structures<sup>7</sup> or reporting the incident to the South African police service (Mkhize and Vilakazi 2021), which, within the Gauteng province would only favour men (Ripero-Muniz 2020). As they face spousal violence, those women sometimes suffer silently because most of them depend on their husbands for the legalisation of their stay in the host country and their financial sustenance. In other words, gendered violence is used to assert dominance by the perpetrator over the victim. In this form of gendered crime, the aggressor justifies their actions and compels women to take responsibility for their actions. This phenomenon leads to 'internalising the guilt' and normalising the perpetrator's behaviour against her as justified. Being 'a good wife' or a 'potential good wife' – a common phenomenon – has also led Somali women to internalise the violent behaviour of their male spouses, thereby stopping them from seeking help from the justice system.

Most Somali women living in South Africa are uneducated and have no English language as a medium of communication which would enable them to seek employment with ease like any other foreigners<sup>8</sup> from Anglo-Saxon nations. The Somali women's condition is also aggravated by their status in the country, whereby many of them are undocumented migrants or have expired asylum permits. Since these undocumented migrants avoid public spaces to avoid arrests by South African police and military that conduct sporadic searches for illegal migrants, some opt to work in private spaces (Moyo &

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<sup>7</sup> Somali community has systems for resolving conflicts among themselves which are male controlled and favour men in most cases.

<sup>8</sup> Zimbabweans, Nigerians and other agro-Saxons integrate better in South Africa and find it easier to seek employment in informal and formal sectors because they can express themselves well in English, which is one of the eleven South African official languages.

Zanker 2022). Normally, private spaces are potential grounds for gender violence and economic exploitation of women because of their invisibility.

Somali women face challenges in accessing maternal health. Due to the gendered expectation of performing the reproductive role as mothers, those women experience more suffering than men. Besides routine visits arising from the need for treatment, these women need pre-natal, anti-natal and post-natal care. In other words, they constantly need medical attention regardless of their financial or social status as non-citizens. The negative feelings towards Somali women due to their high fecundity level were among the salient problems that emerged recurrently from the interviews. Thus, their fecundity exhibited in their big family size resulted in them being perceived as a burden to the midwives and, importantly, to the country's economy. Subsequently, those women received insults and statements that carried Xenophobic-Afrophobic undertones. Maria<sup>9</sup>, a lady who has experienced delivering a baby in a South African hospital, points out that having a large family is their tradition. This phenomenon is challenged in South Africa, where mothers are expected to control the size of their families. Maria said:

*As a way of continuing our Somali ancestry it's our responsibility to give birth to the number of kids we want. And Somali women have the tendency to produce many kids as much as ten or even more. This tendency of giving birth to many children receives a lot of criticism from the health staff whom we meet in these maternity wards. When they see that the same women keep coming year after year to deliver a baby in the hospital, the nurses inject some medicine that stops them from producing more children. They also use the local language to insult us or even call us names that tell that they don't want us to come again in hospital to deliver the babies. At times the expectant mothers die in the process of long waiting because the locals are given more preference than us foreigners.*

Similarly, since household health care is gendered, Somali women are responsible for constantly attending hospitals to seek treatment for their children. In Gauteng, many Somali women have no husbands due to death or divorce, which separates them from their male companions. On the other hand, the husband's

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<sup>9</sup> One of my interviewers residing in Pretoria West (located in Gauteng province). She hails from Mogadishu (Somali Capital).

absenteeism is not unusual in the province, as male spouses eschew their paternal roles as heads of the families. In addition to providing other necessities like shelter, clothing and food, women in such homes struggle to provide for their children and their health. In the light of feminist intersectionality, Somali women's suffering is due to interconnected social factors constraining their health access in the transnational space. Their gender (as women), marital status (single women), culture (one that confines them to reproductive roles), and nationality (foreigners) complicates their ability to access health.

The author argues that in light of the geographies of power theory, Somali women's manner of facing these health challenges is determined by their social locations, which are either advantageous or disadvantageous. These women do not suffer the same, but they are either disadvantaged or given the power to negotiate health structures according to social factors. A Somali woman from a wealthy family would navigate the gendered complexities in health easier than one from a low economic status family. It is because those from wealthy families or who are well-connected can afford better quality health services even from private facilities<sup>10</sup>. Similarly, women with an education background where English was taught can express themselves more confidently in English than those who can only speak Somali, Swahili, or an Arabic language not spoken in South Africa. In accessing health services, most of the Kenyan-born Somalis or those that have been in Daadab camps have the advantage of speaking the English language over those that come from Somalia. Thus, without the English language, argues Pandey *et al.* (2021), migrants cannot communicate at a reception or information desk, nor at subsequent offices where they would be required to give the right or specific information and documents or seek clarification and this could lead to misdiagnosis.

Somali women are disproportionately affected by challenges to accessing education than their male counterparts. It is because of the gender inequalities in education institutions in Somalia that these women come to South Africa without academic papers. In Somalia, for instance, Jama and Barre (2019) argue that many women are high school dropouts because they face discriminatory gender norms like teenage pregnancies, early marriages and girl child engagement in domestic chores. Traditional gender ideologies lead to women's domestication, ultimately denying them education opportunities and household incomes (Hyunanda, Ramírez, Martínez & Sánchez 2021; Sopamena

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<sup>10</sup> In private facilities you don't get much antagonisms against foreigners, as the owners operate these hospitals as business enterprises.

2020). Besides, the clan systems, which have much power in running the affairs of the Somali community, prefer boy children moving up the academic ladder. Boys are perceived to bring more benefits to society than girls. Thus, in South Africa, the lack of proper documents and resources impedes access to education. Most Somali women cited access to university and other higher learning institutions as a huge challenge because of the need for a SAQA (South African Qualification Authority) certificate. Most of these women do not have qualifications that match the SAQA requirement. Also, most Somali women struggle as refugees to raise money for tuition. This challenge cannot be the same among Somali women because some said they received help from their kin. Other members struggled to access education for themselves or their children. Somali women cited family connections' role in supporting their education or their children's. The interpersonal networks make it easier for new migrants to access the required resources and opportunities in their destination countries (Bilecen & Lubbers 2021; Djundeva & Ellwardt 2020). Somali women cited South African Somali Women and the Action Support Centre as institutions facilitating women's access to education. Aisha says:

*In South Africa, Somali women find hard to get education especially when they do not have varied documents. Universities need SAQA, which most of us cannot meet to its standards. The lack of money to educate our children are part of other challenges we have. But some people are just lucky because they have relatives and friends who support their education. There are also some few organisations that facilitate women acquisition of education.*

In the transnational space, Somali women are victims of religious and cultural-based oppression from their communities. Gender interlocks with religion and culture to buttress the social expectations of Muslim women of Somali origin (Gallo & Scrinzi 2021). The cultural and religious norms safeguard their chastity and sexual modesty, which ultimately gives the husband, family and community some honour. Thus, in our context, Somali women must represent their families while being monitored. The monitoring from the community curtails their social relations with anyone and confines them to behave in a manner that is in tandem with their religious and social expectations. Muslim feminists maintain the need to replace patriarchal exegesis with a technique that reads Quran with a more critical eye (Izadi 2020). The women must behave within the 'definition' of



Muslim women of Somali ethnic background. In one of my interviews, I remember a young Somali woman resisted when reaching out to shake hands with her. I understood they are restricted to only shaking hands with their close family members. This phenomenon is exemplified by Islam's purdah values, which restrict females from physically interacting with people outside their immediate family. In addition, the concept of 'Izzet' dictates that Somali women are expected to uphold honour and dignity for their families and the broader community.

Somali women are traditionally expected to play the gendered role of providing nourishment for their families. However, this role has been met with challenges related to the unavailability of food to suit their tastes and in line with their faith. This phenomenon was exacerbated by the Covid-19 lockdowns that restricted their movement (Mutambara, Crankshaw & Freedman 2022) and access to the importation of their foreign foods. Somali migrant women encounter food-related challenges. They find that South African diets vary from their ethnic dishes. The women interviewed preferred dishes prepared in their homes or eating meals from Somali-owned eateries whenever they needed a change. They preferred their restaurants because South African eateries did not have Somali food, which they considered 'strong'. In addition, the Islamic religion restricts its adherents from consuming certain foods and permits them to eat others (Halal<sup>11</sup>). This Islamic restriction posed challenges to Somali women because South Africa has many tinned foods that contain small quantities of pork. Nonetheless, retaining the ethnic dishes is a herculean task for most women due to the 'unaffordability' of ingredients imported from Somalia and other East African countries. Therefore, due to the high importation cost of ingredients for their food from East Africa, and stringent border restrictions, Somali food is expensive. Amina said:

*We find it hard to adapt to the food in South Africa, because it's very different from what we eat. As Muslims, we have halal which you are allowed to take and there is food that you are not permitted to eat. Most of supermarkets are full of canned food which you have what has been prohibited by Islamic laws. It's a challenge to eat Somali food also because we lack ingredients, or they are expensive. They are expensive because of the difficulty in bringing them here.*

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<sup>11</sup> Halal, also Halaal food is the one permitted by Islamic laws such as vegetables and beef. The Muslims are forbidden to eat pork or food that have pork.

## **9 Conclusion**

The author has argued that transnational space is a gendered territory within which Somali women negotiate their new home in the host country while connecting with society in their home country. Within this space, these women face gendered complexities that affect them differently because they are a heterogeneous community of diverse social locations that are either advantageous or disadvantageous. The gendered complexities these women face include domestic violence, spousal abuse, traumas of the past arising from the loss of children or husbands, 'Hijabophobia', gendered 'Islamophobia', gendered xenophobia and crime that targets women, challenges to accessing health (maternal and family health) and education.

It is recommended that the South African government develop programs meant to provide migrants with a good orientation as a strategy of induction into the South African context. Such an orientation would help Somali women to integrate with the locals after understanding their social, cultural and religious contexts. Besides, it is suggested that religious communities, in the spirit of interfaith dialogue, must set up programmes to unite Christians and Muslims through humanitarian collaborations like poverty alleviation initiatives, Covid-19 prevention programs, and affirmative action.

In liaison with Civil Society Organisations, the South African government should set up platforms that would augment the participation of women migrants or at least facilitate their economic empowerment. They must tap into their abilities and skills and incorporate them into the mainstream economy. This facilitation would benefit those women and ultimately benefit the South African economy. Some women migrants have completed nursing courses, and a country like South Africa, overwhelmed by Covid-19, could have tapped such skills to arrest the spread of the pandemic among fellow migrants and locals.

More gender training programs must be incorporated into all migration sectors to ensure their understanding of sexual and gender-based violence and how to prevent it. Such training could comprise academics and researchers, religious and community leaders of both migrant and host communities, and most importantly, the migrants with lived experiences of those gendered challenges.

Reviewing migration policies that are not gender sensitive is proposed. Gender-neutral laws and policies assume that migrants are homogeneous entities that suffer the same inequalities. These laws are prerequisites for gender-based complexities in the migratory process.

A proposed study would focus on the gendered challenges experienced by male Somali migrants. It would be interesting to see how males are affected by the forces in the migratory process as they try to assert their masculinity traits within the transnational space. It would also be interesting to see the mechanisms the males would adopt to cope with those gendered challenges. Finally, a future study is proposed to focus on the gendered challenges of Somali women migrants from another context outside the Gauteng Province. Research can have different outcomes whenever social context and research subjects are altered. Cape Town, for instance, has a different social context where such a study could be done due to the considerably large population of Somali migrants living there.

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## **SECTION IV**

# **TECHNOLOGY AND SKILLS TRANSFER**



## **CHAPTER 10**

# **Relevance of Migrants' Technical Skills for Sustainable Livelihoods: A Case of Low-skilled Zimbabwean Migrants in Botswana's Southeast District**

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### **Abstract**

Several Zimbabwean school leavers migrate from the country without specialised training to look for employment in neighbouring countries. The purpose of this study was to investigate the relevance of low-skilled migrants' technical skills in Botswana's labour market to sustain livelihoods. A mixed method research design was used for this study where 60 questionnaires collected quantitative data, whilst 19 interviews collected qualitative data. Quantitative data were analysed using the Statistical Programme on Social Sciences (SPSS), and the results were presented using tables and bar graphs. Narratives were used to present and analyse qualitative data. Random sampling was used to select Zimbabwean school leaver migrants as research participants. This study, grounded in the relevance theory by Sperber and Wilson (1981), indicates that relevance is interpreted from social context and reflective thinking processes enhanced by educational intervention. It is suggested as a result of the findings that low-skilled migrants from Zimbabwe perceived that their technical skills were relevant to their jobs, and the skills enabled them to do different jobs in

Botswana. Based on the findings, recommendations were that relevance of technical skills should not be viewed as only meeting local labour market skill needs but internationally benchmarking those technical skill requirements for the evolving world of work. Since this study was on a small scale, larger studies could be carried out in other districts of Botswana and neighbouring countries where low-skilled Zimbabweans are migrating to obtain broader conclusions that can be generalised.

**Keywords:** curriculum, informal sector, low-skilled migrants, school-leaver, technical skills, relevance

## **1 Introduction**

The inclusion of Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) in general education at the school level has been adopted by many nations to meet socio-economic development aspirations (Zimmermann 2017). In Zimbabwe, technical skills taught in school-level TVET subjects are meant to equip learners with basic skills essential for further training so that skilled or competent learners can engage in income-generating activities in the economy's informal sector (Munetsi 2016; Coltart 2012). Despite the clear aims of TVET at schools in the country, Zimbabwe is experiencing a high youth unemployment rate. Questions are raised on the relevance of the school TVET skills needed in the context of the local labour market to curb labour migration. For instance, the 2012 population census in Zimbabwe revealed that 36% of youths aged between 15 and 24 comprise 84% of the unemployed population (ZimStat 2012). Coltart (2012) posits that rising youth unemployment in Zimbabwe can be ascribed to irrelevant curricula, a low domestic job market in the country, and policies which are not in sync with the local context. The low domestic job market in Zimbabwe since the early 1990s triggered a huge labour migration in search of employment opportunities in other countries despite shrinking global labour markets due to recessions and pandemics. More answers were sought in this study on whether TVET technical skills from one country's school system are relevant to the type of jobs in a destination country. It is generally acknowledged that technological advancement is changing the nature of work and its effect on how people operate in the workplace (World Development Report [WDR] 2019). The relevance of migrant technical skills in a different context becomes relative. Hence, the authors of this study investigated the perceptions of school-

leaver migrants on the relevance of technical skills acquired at school to the type of work they engaged in in Botswana. In turn, this reflected how Zimbabwe migrants perceived the effectiveness of Zimbabwe's schooling of TVET in imparting technical skills for the world of work.

Since technical skills relate to hands-on skills and related knowledge, skills relevance can be described based on how applicable the skills are to do the work, producing goods and solving existing problems (Mupinga, Burnett & Redmann 2005). The role of TVET in preparing a workforce for human development with relevant job skills is well acknowledged in developing countries today (Zimmermann 2017; UNESCO 2018). On the one hand, school TVET in developing countries grapples with problems of skills shortage, graduate-job skills mismatch, inequality, lack of access to training, school leaver unemployment and poverty. (Allais 2012; Munetsi 2016). On the other hand, developed nations continue to emphasise school TVET for human capital development to improve their economies' productivity and sustainable development (Zimmermann 2017). Key to sustainable skills development is the relevance of skills to the job market to reduce increasing unemployment because of a graduate-job skills mismatch. In many developing nations, the increased importance of strategies for improving the relevance of skills development to the job market is reflected in national development agendas, poverty eradication strategies, education reform strategies and policies, as well as increased budgetary allocations (UNESCO 2018). However, major targets seem not to be realised. It reflects in the current global upsurge of labour migration from developing countries, whereby the young school leavers and those in the ranks of unemployment are on the move in search of employment opportunities outside their countries. Campbell and Crush (2012) found that the youth and active working age groups tend to migrate if they realise there is limited value for their education in their country of origin and if they perceive hope for economic opportunities in a destination country. The challenge to this dilemma is whether embodied low-level skills from one country are relevant in the destination country and the effect low-skilled migrants have on the job market of the receiving countries.

Whilst high-school leavers with TVET skills grapple with the unemployment crisis in Zimbabwe, some migrate to neighbouring countries, including Botswana, because of proximity and social and family networks for easy first arrival reception (Mlambo 2017). However, it is acknowledged that migrants often face the challenge of a foreign skills mismatch in the host country's

labour market with different work practices and structural differences in jobs (International Labour Organisation [ILO] 2018). On the other hand, Kopinsk and Polus (2014) suggest that Botswana adopted relative sympathy towards migrant labour due to the lack of a workforce in a country with a population of 2.3 million people. Despite migrants seeking employment in Botswana, the country is also grappling with a shrinking labour market and an estimated youth unemployment rate of 38% as of 2020 (ILO 2020). A World Development Report, WDR (2019) indicates that the nature of work is rapidly changing because of technology, work policy changes, and the need for social inclusion, which may all result in the mismatch between available jobs in a host country and migrant skills. Crush *et al.* (2017) argue that school leavers from Zimbabwe increasingly migrate to neighbouring Botswana probably due to proximity, social and family networks, relative peace, value and stability of the Botswana currency, the Pula (BWP), despite reception and employment challenges.

The objectives of this study were to,

- i. investigate how Zimbabwean migrants perceive the relevance of school TVET technical skills to types of jobs in Botswana;
- ii. determine the type of skills migrants bring with them and the type of jobs they take up in Botswana; and
- iii. examine the challenges faced by low-skilled migrants in Botswana's labour market.

There is limited literature on the relevance of technical skills for school-leaver migrants, as most studies focus largely on the general employability of skilled migrant graduates (Chhinzer & Russo 2017). The study's value is that the perceptions of relevance were from school-leaver migrants who were first-hand partakers of the curriculum. Literature was reviewed around the definition of relevance as it relates to education, high school TVET in Zimbabwe, migrant jobs and challenges faced by migrants in a host country. The analysis section interpreted the findings and their implications. The results and conclusions brought to the fore the perceptions of school-leaver migrants on the relevance of technical skills they acquired from school to the labour market. The results and conclusion helped to recommend improving TVET skills relevant to the job market.



## **2 Theoretical Framework**

The study was grounded in the relevance theory by Sperber and Wilson (1981). The theory was chosen because analysis of the relationship between technical skills and the type of jobs taken up by school-leaver migrants is a key test of technical skills-labour market relevance. A positive relationship between the technical skills learnt and those skills needed in the workplace shows relevance. The theory acknowledges that humans have prospective intuitions of relevance in general. It posits that relevance is interpreted from social context, communication and abstract cognitive and reflective thinking processes, which educational intervention enhances. The theory suggests that after a teaching and learning intervention, learners expect skills learnt to be relevant in their lives, and these expectations can be personal or functional. From one viewpoint, personal relevance occurs when learning is connected to an individual's interests, aspirations, and life experiences and if the skills are beneficial for survival. Murinda (2014) points out that curriculum content and learning experiences will be considered relevant if they meet the learner's expectations and interests. However, curriculum relevance can be functional if employers benefit from it and when qualifying trainees get employment and increased income. The relevance theory was used to evaluate the relationship of technical skills to the job market in a destination country. The relationship between high-school technical skills and the type of jobs assumed by migrants demonstrates the perception of relevance between technical skills and type of jobs.

## **3 Literature Review**

### ***3.1 Relevance of Technical Education and Vocational Training***

In TVET, relevance is subjective to the end user's expectations after a teaching and learning intervention; these expectations can be personal or functional. From one viewpoint, personal relevance occurs when learning is connected to an individual student's interests, aspirations, and life experiences (Murinda 2014). Curriculum content and learning experiences will be considered relevant if they meet the learner's expectations and interests. Hiim (2015) sees relevant curriculum as developing students to gain skills to be functional in their vocation. From another viewpoint, Lauglo (2006) posits that curriculum relevance can be functional, as seen through performance indicators reflecting either external or internal effectiveness. Lauglo (2006) elaborates that external effectiveness can be answered by questions such as: are people and employers

benefitting from the curriculum? Are qualifying trainees getting employment? However, internal effectiveness relates to personal benefits such as improved employment chances and income. Therefore, in the context of a Zimbabwe migrant, the relevancy of the TVET curriculum can be viewed as knowledge and skills that are internationally aligned since most of the graduates go to work in other countries. Based on the current economic status in the country, relevancy in Zimbabwe cannot be localised. Hence benchmarking TVET skills with other African and international countries is paramount. It is, therefore, important for TVET curricula developers to align subject knowledge and skills with other countries. The school TVET system in Zimbabwe is described next to understand the relevance of school TVET technical skills to the job market.

### **3.2 High School TVET in Zimbabwe**

It is important to give an overview of the Zimbabwean school TVET system to appreciate how technical skills are taught at the school level. High school TVET in Zimbabwe is available for six years of high school from Form 1 to 6, and it is embedded in public school curricula where students choose at least two TVET subjects alongside other academic and commercial subjects (Munetsi 1996). However, not all schools offer TVET subjects due to limited resources (Mupinga *et al.* 2005:12). A student can exit at Form 4 (Ordinary level) after four years of high school or at Form 6 (Advanced level) two years after Ordinary level. The Ordinary level TVET subjects include Building Studies, Woodwork, Metalwork, Technical Graphics, Home Economics and Agriculture, Music, Art, and Computer Studies. At this level, learners are taught both theory and practical skills while inculcating the right work attitudes of the trade. Upon exiting at the Ordinary level, school leavers are expected to carry out work activities effectively and appreciate the dignity of labour in different jobs they may undertake (Munetsi 1996: 13; Coltart 2012:8). Some students proceed to do TVET subjects at the Advanced level, the upper high school exit level.

Advanced-level, learners are taught to apply practical, theoretical, research and problem-solving approaches to acquire competency-based technical skills, knowledge, and positive work attitudes. TVET subjects offered at the Advanced level include Agriculture, Textiles, Clothing Technology, Building Technology, Food Science, Design and Technology, and Computer Science, amongst others. Therefore, learners can exit Form 4 at the age of 16 years and proceed to find employment or further training, whilst others can

## *Relevance of Migrants' Technical Skills for Sustainable Livelihoods*

complete Form 6 at the age of 18 years and proceed to tertiary education. Over and above the TVET subjects offered in the general school curricula, some schools offer the National Foundation Certificate (NFC) after the first two years of high school (Coltart 2012: 23).

The NFCs are single-subject courses which are more trade-specific than the related TVET subjects offered in the general high school curricula. NFCs are examined by the Higher Examination Council (HEXCO) responsible for industrial trades. The courses are offered over two years, and the entry-level is two years of secondary education for those learners willing to pursue trade courses. NFCs are more oriented towards skills training and have more time allocated for practicals than the general TVET subjects (Chinyamunzore 1995). For instance, the delivery and assessment components are weighed 60% for practical and 40% for associated theory. Students who take up the NFC must go for work-based learning (WBL) with industrial attachment to acquire on-the-job skills. Upon leaving school with an NFC qualification, one can directly go into employment in a related trade or occupation as a semi-skilled worker and upgrade through trade tests to journeyman. Additionally, NFC learners are taught entrepreneurship skills so that those school leavers who fail to obtain employment in the formal sector can set up small businesses in the informal sector. Table 1 below shows the general practical subjects in the school curriculum and the matching NFC subjects.

<b>General (Form 1-4)</b>	<b>National Foundation Certificate (NFC)</b>
Agriculture	Horticulture
Building Studies	Brick and Block laying
Fashion and Fabrics	Tailoring, Clothing and Textiles
Metalwork	Machine Shop Engineering
Technical Graphics	Technical Graphics
Woodwork	Carpentry and Joinery
Food and Nutrition	Catering

**Table 1: General Practical Subjects and their Matching National Foundation Certificate Qualifications**

The argument for offering NFCs at the school level is that the general TVET practical subjects are insufficient to equip students with skills for employment,

while a more serious thrust in skills training is necessary (Commission of Inquiry into Education and Training [CIET] 1999). Mandebvu (1994) argues that specialised skills training at school has been the dimension most developing nations take to meet employment and labour needs. With NFC trade-specific skills, learners, upon leaving school, are likely to take up jobs or go for further training in areas related to the vocational subjects they did at school (Woyo 2013). Numerous examples of trade-specific skills training at the school level exist in other countries, such as pre-vocational in the United States of America and pre-apprenticeships in England, Germany, Austria, France, and Switzerland. These courses are meant to give school-level learners work-oriented technical skills (Woessmann 2018).

### ***3.3 Perceptions on the Relevance of Migrant Technical Skills***

Students' and employers' perceptions of TVET relevancy have been investigated in various countries. For instance, in Indonesia, Suarta *et al.* (2018) found that the relevance of TVET skills is perceived through the employability of a new job entrant after the completion of the probation period to the satisfaction of the employer. In a study in the United Kingdom (UK) with employers, Fettes *et al.* (2018) found that most employers perceived technical skills as relevant if they can be 'put to work' in the job context. In another study in Malaysia by Haron *et al.* (2019) on the feedback from employer perceptions on graduate skills needed in the industry, findings revealed that employers perceived the ability to apply skills on the job and being able to transfer such ability to different situations as a measure of skills relevancy. Therefore, training programmes must not be divorced from industry skills requirements.

TVET programmes should be designed in line with national economic needs and global technological advancements to meet the changing nature of the future of work to remain relevant (WDR 2019). The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Education and Training (CIET) 1999 in Zimbabwe found that the TVET system in the country was not 'compliant and compatible' with technological advancements in the labour market and recommended 'tissue rejection' from the curricula to deliver relevant technical skills for global labour market participation. In another study on the relevance of Zimbabwe TVET curricula to the labour market by Munyaradzi and Mupondi (2017), findings imply that the country's TVET curricula at secondary and tertiary curricula lagged on global industry skills relevance. This finding was blamed on the weak

## *Relevance of Migrants' Technical Skills for Sustainable Livelihoods*

collaboration between the education and industry sectors on curriculum development issues and skills training coordination, poor funding, and lack of adequate and appropriate infrastructure, tools and equipment in schools, thereby affecting the acquisition of relevant skills. Despite the alleged irrelevant school TVET, Zimbabwean post-school leavers migrate to other countries with such technical skills and find jobs (Mlambo 2017).

The relevance of migrants' skills in a host country becomes relative, especially when migrants take up jobs even when there is unemployment among citizens (Hondonga, Ramaligela & Makgato 2022). For example, in the USA, Dadush (2014) investigated the employability of migrants from Mexico and found that migrants take up those jobs not preferred by natives in the low-level grades. In a similar study in Germany, Austria, Greece, and Italy on the employability of migrants after their influx into Europe, Constant (2014) found that the relevance of migrants' skills, especially for low-skilled jobs, was determined by their ability to adapt to the existing production technologies and motivation to learn new skills on the job. It creates a perception that migrants' skills are relevant at certain levels that do not require subject mastery. However, the findings did not find a correlation between migrants' skills and the jobs they did since industries adapted their production technologies to the available labour at a lower cost but increased production.

It is well acknowledged in a World Development Report, WDR (2019), that learner skills-work relevance is now affected by structural changes in jobs because of technological and globalisation-driven work tasks, especially in advanced economies, and the relevance of migrant skills in a host country is not spared. For instance, Hagan *et al.* (2013), in a study of the relationship between migrant human capital and migrants' jobs in the USA, found that some migrants found their craft skills to be more fragmented in the advanced production industries and had to accept to either deskilling or reskill on-the-job. In another study by Dengler and Matthes (2018) on the effect of digital transformation on the labour market in Germany, Sweden, and Denmark, the findings indicated a serious decline in employment opportunities for low-skilled migrant labour in the usually labour-intensive industries due to mechanisation and automation of operations. Therefore, the relevance of Zimbabwean migrants' skills in other countries with different contexts and work practices was investigated in this study.

In a study of the skills mismatch between natives and migrants in European labour, the International Labour Organisation, ILO (2017) found that the migrant skills mismatch is becoming common since their skills and

knowledge from home may not be relevant to the host country labour market. In addition, other studies on migrant employability by Sanz (2018); IOM (2018); Thebe (2017); and Segatti (2017) suggest that even if migrants possess relevant skills, they struggle to prove themselves, especially in the initial days, due to labour market complexity. Anatol *et al.* (2013) point out that there could be a mismatch of expectations from employers and embodied migrant skills. Mi-grants must manipulate their skills concerning the job, on the one hand, and employers evaluating them on the other. In this study, the type of jobs taken up by migrants and factors that determine such placement into jobs were highlighted.

### **3.4 Migrant Employment**

Chiswick and Miller (2011) found that the level of migrant skills influences the type and level of jobs taken up by migrants in a host country's job market. In this context, low-skilled migrants with limited qualifications and no specialised trade training are likelier to find work in low-wage jobs. In another study, Benach, Muntaner, Delco, Menéndez and Ronquillo (2011) found that low-skilled migrant labourers find jobs more easily in sectors which require abundant manual labour like agriculture, food processing and construction because of their low human capital. The jobs are mostly temporary short contracts and part-time that are not taxed. Other studies by Sanz (2018:21) and Segatti (2017:23) suggest that the level of education and migration are, therefore, intertwined and impact migrants' placement in the labour market of a host country with debatable effects on the economy and competition for jobs with low-skilled natives. However, Dadush (2014) found that regulations of the host country's labour markets generally push people with low human capital to low-wage jobs, while high-technology jobs attract skilled migrants. Hence, in this study, the type of jobs taken up by Zimbabwean migrants with only high school TVET skills in Botswana were investigated.

Despite the various type of jobs, Dadush (2014) points out that migration of low-skilled migrants remains a contentious issue even though they are also needed to perform certain functions, especially those shunned by citizens in a host country. For example, in a study of refugees' jobs in Europe, Andersson, Eriksson and Scocco (2019) found that the migration of low-skilled refugees contributed to the growth of low-paid jobs. Migrants in the low-skilled category have limited job mobility despite continuously gaining experience.

However, Sanz (2018:21) observes that, to a lesser extent, improved personal, job and informal social networks over time make low-skilled migrants learn new skills and occupy new jobs.

Studies in countries with a long tradition of labour migration, such as Canada and the USA by Segatti (2017) and Giovanni (2010), respectively, found that low-skilled migrants even take up jobs unrelated to their past experiences. It is noted in several studies, including those by Segatti (2017:18) and Dadush (2014), that migrants work in places where even their safety is compromised. For example, a fact file sheet compiled on foreign workers in South Africa by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) (2017) reveals that foreign-born migrants are more likely to be employed in precarious jobs in the informal sector, on short-contract and low-paying jobs than citizens. The fact file suggests that migrants accept these jobs as a stepping stone into the formal labour market. Influence of peers, ethnic niches, and lack of social networks on arrival determines the first migrant jobs and are powerful centres of non-formal on-the-job skills development for low-skilled migrants (Hagan, Lowe & Quingla 2013; Lowe, Hagan & Iskande 2010). Konle-Seidl (2018:23) points out that low-skilled migrants depend on each other to get jobs upon arrival in a host country and may not break away from such working cohorts and ethnic groupings despite the working conditions. As such, migrants may face several challenges in a host country.

### ***3.5 Challenges Faced by Low-skilled Zimbabweans in Botswana***

Although low-skilled Zimbabwean school-leaver migrants in Botswana engage in different types of jobs in the host country, they face some challenges. For instance, migrants are regarded as threatening the employment of locals such that migrants face further challenges of social integration in their communities (IOM 2018). Study findings by the UN (2018) and IOM (2016) indicate that low-skilled migrants present 'unnecessary' competition with citizens for jobs that do not require special skills, which is a breeding ground for hostility against migrants. For example, some causes of xenophobia in South Africa include accusations that foreigners 'steal' jobs from locals, accept low wages and are involved in criminal activities, and encourage the natural dislike of foreigners in some communities (Chinomona & Maziriri 2015; Mnyaka 2003). Those migrants without professional jobs are often accused of engaging in anti-social behaviours and bringing unnecessary competition for jobs with citizens on their

level of skills. Botswana is grappling with a shrinking labour market and an estimated youth unemployment rate of 38% as of 2020. High school leavers from Zimbabwe migrate to Botswana to look for employment opportunities (ILO 2020). Untrained, low-skilled migrant labourers who enter a country without a job offer find it difficult to get jobs due to legal restrictions on the labour market (Konle-Seidl 2018).

#### **4 Research Methodology**

This study used a mixed method research design (QUAN-QUAL), combining qualitative and quantitative approaches in data collection and analysis in one study (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner 2007:124). The research elements included viewpoints, data collection and presentation methods, and inference techniques for broad understanding and corroboration. It allowed inference of meanings from data collected from respondents about their views on the relevance of school TVET technical skills to the type of jobs they are doing in Botswana. The mixed method provided for data collection and analysis triangulation (Tashakkori, Tieddlie & Sines 2013:11). The research design is a pragmatic methodology accepting the compatibility of quantitative and qualitative data gathering and analysis methods in one study. Furthermore, the two data collection methods, quantitative and qualitative, were used to give respondents a choice on the method they preferred to provide data with, considering their availability and anonymity issues. Study respondents were Zimbabwean high school leavers who did not receive specialised trade training after high school but depended on the TVET skills gained to find jobs in Botswana. These migrants did not have work experience from home but gained work experience from the various economic activities they engaged in Botswana.

The researcher used a systematic sampling design to select participants from a target population of migrant Zimbabweans working in sectors related to TVET subject areas taught in the Zimbabwean school curriculum. These sectors include the construction sector, where TVET subjects such as Building Studies, Technical Graphics and Woodwork are aligned, the agricultural sector, and the domestic sector, where those who have followed Home Economics or Home Management may be working. The sampling frame was first divided into segments, clusters, or intervals. The random sampling (RS) technique selected the element from the first interval. The selection of subsequent elements from



other intervals depended on the order of the element selected in the first interval. If it were the third element in the first interval, the third element of each subsequent interval would be chosen. The participants were identified at construction sites, farms, and domestic houses. Probability sampling was used for cluster sampling of the areas where the participants were to be drawn from, and random sampling was done to get the exact respondents for the study. Probability sampling was chosen as it afforded an equal and independent chance for all Zimbabwean migrant school leavers in the chosen clusters to be picked for the research (Kothari 2014; Kumar 2011). The study used two sampling methods because probability sampling was used to select only a few clusters likely to have migrant workers. In contrast, random sampling was now used to specifically choose the participants for the study in the clusters amongst the several possible participants.

Quantitative data were obtained using questionnaires, while semi-structured interviews collected qualitative data to allow narrative accounts to be heard and probing for further clarifications was made possible (Creswell 2007; Johnson *et al.* 2007). Questionnaires were administered to 60 migrants, and 19 responded to the semi-structured interviews during data collection. The size of the interviewed sample of 19 participants was considered adequate since the researcher was no longer getting new or different responses. A larger sample of 60 participants was needed to give statistical validity to the responses.

The questionnaire had closed and open-ended items inviting respondents to clarify experiences. The questionnaire had three sections and 30 items. Section A had items asking for respondents' biographical data such as age, gender, academic qualifications and TVET subject(s) done at school. Section B asked about the relevancy of TVET skills studied in high school to the type of jobs migrants were doing in Botswana. Section C covered migrant challenges to mirror the relationship between skills and the availability of jobs. The questionnaire was tested for stability and homogeneity to ensure its reliability. It was re-administered with the same participants on whom piloting was done with the instrument, as they were accessible to the researcher. Each research question was treated separately, and the type of data the research question solicited, whether qualitative or quantitative, was first established to ensure the validity of instruments (Cohen, Manion & Morrison 2007: 133). A matrix was produced to guide on generating items of each instrument based on the research questions and reviewed literature. Quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics with the aid of SPSS since a large amount of data

needed an accurate tool to handle and analyse accurately. These interviewees were coded M1-M19, and the same codes were used to present the interview data results. Coding was done for ethical reasons to protect the interviewees' anonymity and confidentiality.

## **5 Results and Analyses**


The purpose of this study was to investigate the perceptions of school-leaver migrants on the relevance of Zimbabwean school TVET technical skills to the type of work they were doing in Botswana. The quantitative results were presented using figures and tables, whilst narratives were used for the qualitative data.

### ***5.1 Migrants' Biographical Data***

This biographic data is on migrants' gender, ages, and qualifications. In the case study conducted in the Southeast region of Botswana, 49 (81.7%) respondents were males against 11 (18.3%) females. Statistics revealed that most school leaver migrants were 18 years by the time they migrated, consistent with the exit ages from the Zimbabwe high school education cycle (Coltart 2012). The migrants did not receive further training after school. Findings indicated that 38 (63.3%) respondents completed Ordinary Level, the lower high school exit point in Zimbabwe. Amongst the respondents, four (6.7%) had an NFC qualification, and the general TVET subject, suggesting that not many schools offered NFC qualifications. Data revealed that five (8.33%) respondents had Advanced level high school qualifications. Therefore, most respondents had Ordinary levels and did a TVET subject at school, but those school leavers with Advanced levels probably get other opportunities in their home country. They are less likely to migrate with only a high school qualification.

### ***5.2 TVET Subjects Done by Migrants***

Determining the TVET subject(s) learnt by school-leaver migrants was done to establish the kind of skills migrants brought into Botswana and the relationship between the skills and jobs being done by migrants in Botswana. Figure 1 shows TVET subjects studied by respondents.



**Figure 1: TVET Subjects Done by School-Leaver Migrants to Botswana**


Figure 1 shows that most migrants did a TVET subject in school. Building Studies was the most popular practical subject, having been done by 27 (45%), followed by Agriculture with 16 (26.7%), Woodwork and Fashion and Fabrics with six (10%) alike. Other subjects done by migrants were Metalwork one (1.7%), Computer Studies one (1.7%), and Technical Graphics one (1.7%). Therefore, most school leavers did Building Studies followed by Agriculture. It could be because these subjects are institutionalised in many high schools in Zimbabwe, even in remote rural settings without electricity, compared to other TVET subjects, and they do not require expensive training consumables (Misozi, Juma, Edziwa & Chakamba 2013:895). The subjects and related skills acquired by migrants are compared to the nature of jobs migrants were doing in Botswana.

### ***5.3 Type of Work Migrants Did in Botswana***

Data in Figure 2 were collected to establish if the TVET skills learnt by migrants related to the type of work they engaged in Botswana.

Of most migrant school leavers from Zimbabwe, 48 (80%) were working in the construction sector, followed by eight (13.3%) who were working in domestic jobs, three (3.33%) in the manufacturing sector and two (3.4%) in agriculture-related jobs. Results suggest that most migrants worked

in the construction sector because many respondents did construction-related TVET subjects (Building Studies, Woodwork and Metalwork), as shown in Figure 1. Results suggest that the jobs available in Botswana can absorb even semi-skilled labour. Table 2 went further to check the correlation between the TVET subjects done at school and the sectors where migrants were working.



**Figure 2: Type of Work Migrants Did in Botswana**

**Correlation of TVET subjects done at High School and Sectors where migrants were working**

	Correlation	TVET Subjects Done	Sectors where Migrants Work
<b>TVET Subject Done</b>	<b>Pearson Correlation</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.430**</b>
	<b>Significance (2-tailed)</b>		<b>.001</b>
	<b>N</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Sectors where Migrants Work</b>	<b>Pearson Correlation</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.430**</b>
	<b>Significance (2-tailed)</b>		<b>.001</b>
	<b>N</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>** . Correlation is Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)</b>			


**Table 2: Correlation of TVET Subjects Done at High Schools and Sectors where Migrants were Working**

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The SPSS was used to measure the Pearson correlation coefficient between TVET subjects studied in Zimbabwean high schools and the type of jobs taken up by school-leaver migrants in Botswana. Table 2 revealed a significant positive correlation of 0.01, implying that migrants worked in those sectors related to the subjects they had done in high school (Bhebhe, Dziva & Maphosa 2014:447). However, further research can be done to determine if this is attributed to the availability of jobs in related industries, directed job searches, referrals, or other factors.

### ***5.4 Perceptions on the Relevance of Technical Skills Acquired in the Learning of TVET Subjects at School in Enhancing Chances of Employment***

Respondents were asked to indicate their perceptions about the relevance of technical skills acquired in school to their jobs in Botswana. Respondents were to provide a rating from 'Relevant', 'Not Relevant', and 'Not Sure'. Ratings by the respondents are summarised in Figure 3.



**Figure 3: Rating on Relevance of Technical Skills Acquired in The Learning of TVET Subjects in School for Available Jobs**

On the one hand, most respondents in Figure 3, 48 (80%), rated the technical skills they acquired from school as 'Relevant' and enhanced their chances of

getting jobs in Botswana. On the other hand, seven (11.7%) respondents indicated that the skills were 'Not Relevant', whilst five (8.3%) were 'Not Sure' if the technical skills from TVET subjects were relevant or not to their jobs. Therefore, most migrants indicated that the technical skills they acquired at school were relevant and increased their chances of getting jobs since most migrants were working on jobs related to the TVET subjects they did at school.

Qualitative data from respondents suggested that upon leaving school, some migrants did not have some of the relevant technical skills since they did not do all the practical skills due to the limited scope of practical work and shortages of equipment in schools. For instance, some of the respondents said:

**M1** (construction worker): *I cannot say I had adequate skills when I left school, but the two months of industrial attachment when I was doing National Foundation Course gave me some confidence.*

**M2** (construction worker): *No, the skills I had were limited because at school we worked on small projects and did not do some bigger aspects of the practicals.*


**M16** (welder): *No, not on big jobs and using big machines because we did not have a lot of equipment in school to operate, but I was confident to do basic tasks.*

Since many respondents concurred that the technical skills acquired from school were relevant and enhanced their chances of getting employment, it explains that as humans, we acknowledge our prospective intuitions of relevance once our expectations of relevance are fulfilled as espoused from the functional perspective of relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1981). Most of the school-leaver migrants utilised learnt skills in the workplaces fulfilling their expectations. The technical skills were relevant if they afforded the learners to accomplish their tasks Hiim (2015), develop more job skills Crush *et al.* (2017), adapt and adopt the acquired skills to take up economic opportunities to sustain their livelihoods in Botswana (Jeon 2019; Haron *et al.* 2019). This approach reflected the relevance of Zimbabwe school TVET technical skills to the type of work migrants did in Botswana. Lauglo (2006) posits that curriculum relevance is seen through external effectiveness if migrants can get jobs,

perform their work, and complete them; or through internal effectiveness when migrants continuously have chances of finding employment and improved income to sustain themselves in a host country.

### **5.5 Challenges Faced by Zimbabwean Migrants with Only TVET Skills in Botswana**

Challenges faced by school-leaver migrants in Botswana were investigated since the type of challenges mirrored the relevance of migrants' skills to the type of jobs they were doing in Botswana. The questionnaire provided for respondents to state at least five challenges. These challenges are summarised in Figure 4.



**Figure 4: Challenges Faced by Low-Skilled Migrants**

Figure 4 shows that 45 (75%) respondents had challenges acquiring work and resident permits. It can be attributed to high school TVET skills being regarded as low-level skills, and migrants with such qualifications did not qualify to get work permits in Botswana. Migrants with such low qualifications could find it challenging to secure decent jobs in the formal sector but were more likely to find jobs in the informal sectors where the rewards are generally low. Botswana

labour market regulations force migrants with only TVET skills from school to take up those jobs shunned by citizens, especially those that are manual, menial and of meagre wages. Figure 4 shows that some migrants indicated they were not accepted in some sections of the communities as they were accused of engaging in anti-social behaviour and creating unnecessary competition for jobs with citizens on their level of skills.

Even when migrant skills were relevant, seven (11.6%) respondents indicated that their low-level technical skills were a disadvantage when big projects were available on a tender. They were forced to charge less than what citizens could charge for the same jobs. If they wanted to charge market-related prices for jobs, often they would lose the jobs and go for prolonged non-working periods, as indicated by 26 (43.3%).

Interview responses from Zimbabwean school-leaver migrants in Botswana attested to the challenges migrants are facing as follows:

**M1** (construction worker): *I'm not always having jobs, we get small jobs for short durations, but at times we go for days and weeks with no work, it's difficult.*

**M2** (construction worker): *I don't have a passport and any specialised training, so I cannot get apply for a work permit.*

**M17** (gardener): *I take up any other small jobs without being selective like cutting trees, washing cars or dressing chickens at the nearby farm.*

The interview responses suggested that migrants took up any jobs available, even menial jobs unrelated to their embodied technical skills, for payment. Although some migrants were aware of opportunities to upskill their technical skills, migrants did not bother to pursue the opportunities. Some migrants did not have the required documents to enrol, whilst others were not interested in schooling but would rather work to get money for sustenance and help their families back home. For example, the following responses were captured:

**M3** (construction worker): *I never tried to enrol for training here; --- I want work to get money only.*

**M16** (construction worker): *I don't have documents and the money to enrol for training in Botswana.*



## *Relevance of Migrants' Technical Skills for Sustainable Livelihoods*

**M19** (domestic worker): *I am aware of schooling opportunities, but I can't afford, I have to work and have money for my survival and help those at home.*

The qualitative responses implied that the migrant workers would learn from each other informally in the workplace and prioritised generating income to sustain livelihoods. Even if migrants wanted to upskill their technical skills, respondents indicated that there were no government strategies or organisations offering skills training specifically for migrants in Botswana other than to refugees. For instance, the following responses were captured:

**M5** (construction worker): *– no, I never heard of a place where migrants like me are trained otherwise that place could be full.*

**M12** (construction worker): *I heard that only those who are treated as refugees are getting training at Dukwi Refugee Camp.*

Responses suggested that low-skilled migrants have limited opportunities to learn new skills and occupy new jobs and may remain in the cycle of poverty (Sanz 2018:21). To a lesser extent, skills transfer is more informal amongst migrants, and this happens within migrant working cohorts and with citizens in the workplace.

## **6 Recommendations**

Based on the findings and descriptions above, some recommendations for practice and further research were put forward. For practice, to enhance the relevance of school TVET skills, relevance should not be viewed as only meeting local labour market skills needs, but internationally benchmarking those technical skill requirements to include in the curricula for the evolving world of work (Lauglo 2006; Hiim 2015). In terms of further research, a more comprehensive study could be carried out in other districts of Botswana and regional countries hosting several Zimbabwean migrants. It could lead to more comprehensive conclusions that could be generalised about the relevance of technical skills embodied by migrants from Zimbabwe to those skills needed in the labour market of the host countries.

## **7 Conclusion**

This study found that most Zimbabwean school leavers who migrated and were domiciled in the Southeast district of Botswana did a TVET subject at school. The migrants found that the technical skills they acquired at school were relevant to the jobs they were engaged in. A correlation was found between TVET subjects studied at school and the type of jobs taken up by the migrants in Botswana's Southeast district. This relationship reflected the relevance of Zimbabwe school TVET technical skills to the type of work migrants did in Botswana. The acquired technical skills also enhanced migrants' chances of getting jobs unrelated to the technical skills acquired in school and sustained migrants' livelihoods. Some migrants leveraged the learnt technical skills to learn new skills in the host country's labour market. The study findings suggest that learnt skills enabled migrants to adapt to new work situations for survival. Therefore, the skills were personal and functionally relevant. This finding is well supported by the relevance theory of Sperber and Wilson (1981), which purports that curriculum content and learning experiences will be considered relevant if they can meet the expectations of the learner and their interests. Although migrants got jobs in Botswana, most jobs were in the precarious informal sectors and low-skills levels where the rewards were generally low. The host country's labour market regulations forced migrants with low-level skills to take up jobs shunned by citizens, especially those that are manual and menial. The migrants faced social and integration challenges as they were accused of engaging in anti-social behaviours and creating unnecessary competition for jobs with citizens. However, the study findings cannot be generalised about migrants staying in Botswana due to the study's limited number of respondents and geographic coverage.

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# CHAPTER 11

## Prospects and Challenges of Postgraduate Education in the Diaspora: A Case of Ugandan Returnee Students from South Africa

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### Abstract

The forces of global capital, cultural exchange, technological advancements and the free flow of information have necessitated a reconsideration of the African Diaspora and its evolving meanings. ‘Diaspora’ refers to a dispersed population with a shared heritage residing across the globe. Diasporas can have a significant impact on the economic development of their countries of origin, contributing through financial remittances, facilitating access to quality education, fostering networks, transferring technology, knowledge, and skills, fostering career development, promoting trade and foreign direct investment, establishing businesses, and stimulating entrepreneurship, among other factors. Research indicates a consistent increase in Ugandan students seeking to study in the Diaspora. However, those who have returned home face numerous challenges while living in the host country. This study aimed to examine the prospects and challenges of postgraduate education in South Africa for Ugandan students and propose strategies for improvement. The super-diversity theory served as the appropriate theoretical framework for this study. Utilising a phenomenological research design and employing a qualitative research approach, the researchers employed an interview schedule to gather data. The snowball sampling identified respondents, ensuring a diverse and comprehensive participant pool. The

findings revealed various challenges, including a lack of funding and inadequate support systems from both the host and the students' country of origin.

**Keywords:** Postgraduate Education, Diaspora, student mobility, South Africa, Uganda

## **1 Background**

The African postgraduate student Diaspora is growing and helping the internationalisation of higher education (Tefera 2010; Zaleza 2013). Postgraduate students from Uganda seeking higher education in the Diaspora have an enormous role in creating bonds amongst universities and providing novel lifespans to advanced education through skills and technology transfer back home. Despite the growing mobility of postgraduate students from Uganda to the Diaspora, little is known of what is expected of them in the host country and when they return home. Countries like China, India and Germany are gradually tapping into their Diaspora to grow their skills base and technology transfer back home. Similarly, the Ugandan government should encourage its students to seek university education abroad by implementing strategies to support such students with finance and incentives to attract them back when they complete their studies. The Ugandan government should also appeal to the private sector to finance the university education of Ugandans who seek to study in the Diaspora.

## **2 Problem Statement**

Postgraduate students from Uganda seek to study in the Diaspora for varied reasons (Twinoburyo & Talemwa 2010) but, more importantly, to access higher education opportunities that may not be available at home. Some may be offered scholarships to study abroad, while others may wish to remain and live abroad after their studies. Some individuals aim to enhance their job prospects by pursuing further studies after completing their education. In contrast, others seek to study abroad for the prestige and the opportunity to gain new experiences in multicultural and multi-diverse environments. However, despite the growing number of postgraduate students opting to study in foreign countries, Li, Olson, and Frieze (2013) argue that these students encounter various challenges along the way. This chapter focuses on Ugandan postgraduate stu-

dents seeking higher education in South Africa, their challenges while in the host country, and their prospects when returning to Uganda.

### **3 Objectives**

The main objectives of this chapter are to:

1. Present the challenges and prospects of Ugandans pursuing postgraduate education in the Diaspora; and
2. Examine measures needed to address the challenges faced by Ugandan students seeking postgraduate students in the Diaspora.

The chapter further addresses the following specific objectives:

- 1 Examine the challenges and prospects for Ugandans pursuing postgraduate education in South Africa;
- 2 Assess measures needed to address the challenges faced by Ugandan students seeking postgraduate studies in South Africa; and
- 3 Understand the role of Uganda's government in supporting its citizens pursuing postgraduate education in South Africa.

### **4 Theoretical Framework**

The super-diversity theory provided a framework for this study. This theory was coined by Steven Vertovec in 2007 (Kirwan 2022) and emphasised increased diversity among people of different ethnicities and cultures. 'Super-diversity' has been coined to describe a condition in cities where the arrival of migrants from many different countries, combined with longer-established minority populations, has resulted in an unprecedented variety of cultures, social conditions, identities, languages, and immigration statuses. This theory asserts that people perceive things differently and respond differently to the same circumstances. The theory emphasises the level and difficulty that a people or nation has previously experienced from the perspective of small and dispersed, multiple-origin, transnationally linked, socio-economically diverse people such as migrants (Freedland 2005).

### **5 Literature Review**

#### ***5.1 Benefits and Opportunities of Postgraduate Education in the Diaspora***

There are various benefits for Ugandans seeking higher education abroad. It has

been observed that some Ugandan postgraduate students in the Diaspora have completed their studies in record time (Bhatt, Bell, Rubin, Shiflet & Hodges 2022). It could be attributed to various factors such as host universities' enabling policies regarding research, a serene study environment, structural and organisational aspects of the programs and offered financial support to the postgraduate students (Geven, Skopek & Triventi 2018). However, some writers like Fowler (2015) have opined that some postgraduate students experience burnout, which can be witnessed through constant strain, depression, loss of sleep, and over-worrying, which can lead to mental health problems. This burnout would cause some students to lag in their studies. However, many institutions of higher education in the Diaspora, like the University of KwaZulu-Natal and UNISA, among others, provide their students with mental health care which results in students having less mental health issues, thereby improving their completion rate (Sverdlik Hall, McAlpine & Hubbard 2018).

Twinoburyo and Talemwa (2010) opined that education in the Diaspora, especially in South Africa, is cheaper than in Ugandan Universities. The lower cost may be attributed to some universities offering their postgraduate students waivers, bursaries, and full sponsorship. In contrast, Uganda's postgraduate education is perceived as expensive because of the cost levied upon postgraduate students (Mande & Nakayita 2015). Furthermore, these fees keep increasing annually, resulting in students at both public and private universities opposing such fee policies that have increased the cost of university education over time (Mande & Nakayita 2015).

Postgraduate students at South African Universities are offered extensive lectures on Research Methodology, theories and critical thinking (Lombard & Grosser 2008). This approach seems different for postgraduate students in Uganda, as Muriisa (2015) noted, who asked Ugandan universities to strengthen foundational courses in Methodology, theories and critical thinking because students who lacked the said skills could not adequately write their theses. This discrepancy may therefore be perceived as postgraduate students at South African universities having a competitive advantage compared to their Ugandan counterparts.

Marginson and van der Wende (2007) opine that the globalisation of education has opened doors to many students worldwide. This trend has resulted in students, including Ugandans, getting opportunities to study in the Diaspora, especially in South Africa. Globalisation has resulted in universities recruiting more international students (Asmar 2005).

## ***5.2 The Challenges Faced in Acquiring Postgraduate Education in the Diaspora***

Postgraduate students face numerous challenges, especially in the Diaspora (Khanal & Gaulee 2019). Notwithstanding this, there has also been an increasing demand for higher education in the Diaspora by nationals from various nations (Waheed, Gilani & Shoukat 2019), including Uganda. These challenges can be categorised as pre-departure, post-departure and post-study challenges.

### ***5.2.1 Pre-Departure Challenges***

Durkin (2008) identified the pre-departure period as the stage of ‘entry points’ for studying abroad. These points help the person seeking to study abroad have an easy process. However, studies show that many students seeking graduate education in the Diaspora often have difficulty obtaining such accurate information. In a study by Chen (2017), he pointed out that the information lacked included: study abroad programs, choosing the best university, admission procedures, preparation of documents for visa acquisition and information concerning vaccinations.

### ***5.2.2 Post-Departure***

On arrival in the host country, international students can only hope for a positive educational experience. However, they are bound to face various challenges, like language barriers for those who, for example, do not have English as their first language (Andrade & Valtcheva 2009; Ravichandran *et al.* 2017), financial issues (Safipour, Wenneberg & Hadziabdic 2017) and cultural adjustment which causes feelings of discomfort, frustration, and confusion (Gardner 2013). However, to relieve these students from anxiety caused by the challenges, there is a need to provide them with relevant information.

### ***5.2.3 Post-Study Challenges***

Ugwu and Adamuti-Trache (2017) noted that postgraduate students faced various challenges after returning to their countries. Some challenges included re-adjusting to former cultures (Chen, Akpanudo & Hasler 2020; Le & Lacost 2017) hence being confronted with a reverse culture shock.

Additionally, Diaspora graduate returnee students face pressure after

graduating. Although they are perceived by family, friends and colleagues as having made an achievement, they may still struggle to obtain employment. If they get a university faculty placement, it is usually temporary (Moon 2018). It means that they may have to wait until such a time when these universities advertise for postings.

In order for postgraduate students in the Diaspora not to burden family and friends with financial support, it is paramount for them to look for payable internship opportunities while studying (Sverdlik *et al.* 2018). However, these internship opportunities should be critically analysed since the work involved may overrun the real reason why the student is in the Diaspora in the first place. Getting an internship opportunity while studying may also help the student gain more work experience, hence building their professional curriculum vitae, which may result in more work experience and employability skills upon returning to their countries (Helyer & Lee 2014).

Furthermore, Pipitone (2018) suggested that there was a need for students intending to study abroad to get all the required information for their desired country of destination. It would mean that the information could be gathered from various sources, especially from the relevant government ministries of the host country, such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the known alums of that particular university.

Additionally, Li and Lacost (2017) strongly advise that useful information could also be obtained from the agents employed by various universities. However, it may be difficult for persons seeking the much-desired information to ascertain the authenticity of these agents since there are currently some whose certification may not be known.

Concerning reversing the cultural shock, the researchers found very limited literature. However, Almutairi (2020) strongly advised that the Diaspora returnees should embrace open-mindedness and accept what is at hand in order for them to blend into the community.

## **6 Ugandan Government's Role in Supporting Postgraduate Education in the Diaspora**

The authors found much information on how the Diaspora can help transform education but not how governments can support the Diaspora education. However, from the little literature gathered, governments can offer the following support.

Generally, consular services go a long way in easing postgraduate students' travel to study abroad. Naturally, these services may include information and services regarding immigration policies, student visa requirements and being the intermediary between the students and their governments while abroad (Leong 2015). Therefore, governments should ensure that their consular services are reachable, friendly and available.

Khanal and Gaulee (2019) observed that many postgraduate students enter the Diaspora without adequate preparations before departure. It, therefore, calls on governments through the relevant ministries to carry out some preparations for students with placement in the universities in the Diaspora. Studies have shown that some governments in the developed world have given scholarships to students, especially from developing countries. These scholarships could be tagged to a certain course or open if the candidate meets the requirements. However, developing countries like Uganda should prioritise sponsoring their postgraduate students since it is assumed that they would still bring back the knowledge gained in the Diaspora, as suggested (Lemay-Hébert, Marcelin, Pallage & Cela 2020).

### ***6.1 Strengthen Diaspora Associations***

Pescinski (2018), in his report, indicated that Diaspora associations go a long way to maintaining transnational ties with 'home' countries. Therefore, to ensure this happens, the Ugandan government should enact more engaging policies for their Diaspora regarding national politics and economic development (Ren & Liu 2021). Hence, governments should encourage the Diaspora to join and strengthen these associations by funding some of their activities.

## **7 Research Methodology**

This chapter adopted a phenomenological research design. This qualitative research design focuses on the commonality of a lived experience (Creswell & Creswell 2018). This design and approach were used because the researchers intended to maximise the depth of information collected from the Ugandan postgraduate returnees. It enabled the researchers to use less structured interviews, allowing them to delve into the study participants' perceptions, understandings and feelings since they had lived and studied in South Africa.

Exponential non-discriminative snowball sampling was used to recruit

participants. The study involved fifteen participants in total. These participants had either attained a postgraduate diploma, a master's degree or a PhD and had returned to Uganda. In exponential non-discriminative snowball sampling, the first respondent is recruited, and then they provide multiple referrals (Kothari 2009). This approach was adopted because it was the most reliable method for identifying participants. The researchers purposefully identified the first respondent, who then provided the researcher with more referrals for the study. Interviews were conducted for three weeks, and data were collected until saturation was realised.

Participation in the study was voluntary, with individual permission sought and participants given all the required details regarding the study objectives. An assurance of the freedom to respond or not was emphasised, as well as the assurance of protection, confidentiality and ethical use of collected data.

Interviews were conducted through online video conferencing using Zoom due to its enormous advantages, such as security and cost-effectiveness. The responses were recorded, transcribed, sorted, and tabulated using an MS Excel sheet, categorised under various themes coined from the research objectives, creating the basis of the analysis.

## **8 Results and Analyses**

The findings of the study are thematically presented based on the objectives, which included the benefits of postgraduate education in South Africa, challenges faced in acquiring postgraduate education in South Africa, mitigating measures to counter setbacks in attaining postgraduate education in South Africa and the Ugandan government's role in supporting postgraduate education in South Africa.

### ***8.1 Benefits of Studying in the Diaspora (South Africa)***

Most participants indicated that universities in South Africa had a holistic approach to academics. According to the participants, this enabled them to complete their graduate studies in the shortest period possible. Furthermore, most supervisors were fast and efficient with their work, as evident in the following responses:

*The lecturers were more involved and truly invested in our education*



*and went above and beyond their call of duty sometimes and this was so amazing.*

The fact that some lecturers went beyond their call of duty to ensure that their students were catered for academically might have been useful. It may have encouraged students to work harder and helped keep stress at bay, thus maintaining their mental health. This view is supported by Sverdlik *et al.* (2018), who assert that part of the record time completion rate among students is attributable to the devotion shown by supervisors. This notion implies that supervisors in South Africa had time for their students.

*I had a great supervisor who held my hand at every stage of my research as it was my first attempt at doing research. This made me feel that I had to do my best because I had the necessary help and in return, I was able to complete my course in record time.*

Another respondent added:

*This meant that supervisors play a key role in students' completion in record time.*

In support of this, Muriisa (2015) urged that if the fundamental course in research methodology, theories and critical thinking were not adequately handled at a postgraduate level, students would have difficulties completing their thesis. Thus, it appears that the students in some South African universities had the fundamental courses in research catered for; hence their completion of the respective courses on time.

The high-end universities in sub-Saharan Africa, including South Africa, offer and adopt a holistic approach to education (Takyi-Amoako & Assié-Lumumba 2018). In return, this has seen many university professors use information communication technologies to reach out to their students (Ankiewicz 2021). As such, students enjoy the vast advantages that come with technology, and hence some of them can complete their education in record time, as one participant said:

*Studying in South Africa exposed me to so much technology. I was introduced to the use of so many applications such as wiki's which greatly helped with assignments, cloud computing which helped*

*majorly with research since I was able to create and distribute forms for research.*

Participants also indicated that they could create networks with different students and lecturers. Some created networks have brought enormous benefits to the participants, which they still enjoy. As a result of the networks, participants could create international collaborations, which have helped some respondents to do collaborative academic writing.

One interviewee shared the following:

*My supervisor gave me a job that paid me as well, so I did not lack finances at all which was great. This specific supervisor has also continued referring me to other opportunities which have come in handy. In fact, my current placement is as a result of one of the referrals.*

This response emphasises that studying in Diaspora opens collaboration linkages with different people and organisations.

These findings are aligned with Wu, Garza and Guzman's (2015) study, which asserts that international students can create networks with students from other countries. Indeed, these networks may be useful, especially during international collaborations and referrals.

Furthermore, some participants indicated they got new exposure to education where tuition was waived, making the qualification cost less. However, Abdalla, Omar and Badr (2016) noted that this is a common practice by most international universities for those who qualify. This practice, in return, is advantageous for the students who benefit since the financial burden is reduced, and they can concentrate better on their academics. However, it is different for the students who opt to study in Uganda since many universities do not offer fee waivers nor reduced tuition fees, especially for postgraduate students (Mande & Nakayita 2015).

Respondents cited that they obtained additional skills, such as laboratory skills, project programme implementation skills and consultancy skills which they did not have prior to studying in South Africa, as noted in the following comments.

*My undergraduate studies were majorly theoretical with minimum hands on time, this was due to the fact that our laboratories lacked*

*most desired tools for some tests and therefore we just learned theoretically, however, during the study in South Africa, I was able to get more hands on training which greatly improved my laboratory skills.*

*In one of the course units, the lecturer gave us assignments which we presented during the semester seminar presentations and these assignments were majorly supposed to help us understand and gain project programme implementation skills and consultancy skills.*

The above results could be attributed to the fact that most world-class universities are now more practical and employ more hands-on skills. This switch has been done to meet market expectations, especially in information technology and artificial intelligence (Tannehill, Serapiglia, Guiler & Sharp 2018).

Some participants indicated that they were able to gain international exposure by studying in South Africa, as noted below:

*I had never travelled or studied outside of Uganda, when the opportunity of studying in south Africa came I was glad because I would at least meet and mingle with other international students, we would be able to share experiences and hence gain international exposure.*

The international exposure is attributed to many students from various nations studying in South Africa, bringing international experience since many have different backgrounds and cultures.

The results also revealed that the participants were able to get exposed to world-class seminars and conferences, which assisted in perfecting their research skills and research output as one participant responded:

*My University would organise for its students' conferences and seminars and the students were expected to present papers which would go through a lot of scrutiny before being accepted.*

The above results collaborate with the findings of Tannehill *et al.* (2018), who

assert that students got much exposure from academic seminars and conferences, which positively impacted their general performance.

## ***8.2 Challenges Faced by Postgraduate Students from Uganda in the Diaspora***

The study sought to determine whether the participants experienced any challenges while undertaking their studies in South Africa, and all participants agreed that they encountered challenges. The challenges ranged from feeling homesick, racism, insecurity, difficulty with relocating to South Africa, difficulty in getting the required clearance from the South Africa Foreign Qualification Authority, expensive accommodation, fatty foods causing discomfort, different weather patterns, language barrier, sophisticated laboratories, automated systems, the lack of class activities and cultural shock as illustrated by interviewee responses below and descriptions that follow.

Racism was a major challenge for most of the participants. Although it may be seen as a century-long practice, and there is no excuse for racism, it continues to happen just because some people are accustomed to being around people of the same backgrounds, culture, colour and language (Hunt, Folberg & Ryan 2021). It may cause this group of people to think they are better than others. Additionally, regardless of age, some people have learnt to believe what their society and cultures teach them about other cultures and races, which unfortunately promotes racism. One respondent had this to say:

*Although many lecturers were good and friendly, a few were overtly racist and didn't care to hide it. For instance, if a black student raised their hand to answer a question, they would not be picked but instead the lecturer would still ask if anyone knew the answer yet when a white student raised their hand, they would be picked immediately.*

In line with Busey and Coleman-King (2020), sometimes people become racist just because that is what society has fed them.

Another challenge encountered by participants was insecurity, as noted in the following comment:

*Many towns in South Africa are very beautiful but unfortunately most of them are quite insecure almost in equal measure. I was almost*

*mugged three times in the almost three years that I was there, and all these events occurred near the university which is where most stories of mugging took place. This made it hard to enjoy this very scenic city as one always had to look over their shoulders.*

The insecurity could be due to reasons given by Lemanski (2004), who pointed out that crime has always been a major problem in South Africa and has worsened due to rising poverty levels (Cheteni, Mah & Yohane 2018).

Additionally, participants shared that they felt homesick during their study period, and some indicated that their stomachs could not accommodate food being offered in South Africa, as noted in the following comments:

*I felt homesick especially in my first year as it was my first time to be so far away from home. This was made worse since I had a young family at that time.*

*I was used to eating healthy boiled food but in South Africa I found that food was too fatty and overly spiced that it sometimes got me an upset stomach.*

These comments imply that most people feel homesick while away from home. It can be attributed to sudden separation from friends and family, resulting in anxiety. The same findings are reflected in (Rathakrishnan *et al.* 2021; Ugwu & Adamuti-Trache 2017).

The participants also indicated that getting visas was difficult for them. The visa fees were relatively high, and the paperwork was too much. Additionally, the relevant information required was not readily available for the participants, as indicated in the following comments:

*Relocating to South Africa was such a cumbersome process for me. There was so much paper work involved and yet the information available was scarce. Furthermore, getting a visa was so challenging such that some people missed their chance to study in South Africa due to delayed visas.*

The above statement supports the opinion by González (2021), who alludes that visa policies discriminate in various ways, depending on the country. Some

countries have difficult administrative processes and procedures, which are often cumbersome for those desiring to travel to those countries.

Respondents also cited that getting clearance from the South Africa Foreign Qualification Authority (SAQA) was difficult, as noted by a particular respondent:

*Getting clearance from the South Africa Foreign Qualification Authority (SAQA) was not easy. The process in itself is so long yet there is no way one can get admitted without the clearance certificate.*

The long process of SAQA certification may be because each country has its own clearance protocols for international students. South Africa may want to ensure that those admitted to their universities are qualified.

Participants also decried the extra fees they incurred, as indicated by one participant's response:

*In as much as I had a fees waiver, the accommodation and insurance were very expensive.*

The situation above could have arisen due to students not understanding the various types of waivers provided by the various universities and how to apply for other avenues for financial aid, as Gurantz *et al.* (2021) note.

Additionally, participants shared that the different weather patterns in South Africa were a challenge since most of them were used to the weather in Uganda, as captured in the following response:

*Uganda has a different weather pattern from that of South Africa, for example we don't have winter in Uganda yet it is experienced in South Africa. This had a very negative effect on my health since I already had asthma.*

The weather being a challenge, as indicated above, could be because Uganda is located in the savannah. Therefore, it is mostly warm and does not experience winter except at the mountain tops. Conversely, South Africa has the opposite weather pattern, as Graham (2020) reveals. The affected participants might have been unprepared for this change, which is a challenge. Additionally, the affected participants may not have gathered adequate information before studying in South Africa. Chen (2017) notes that many students often fail to

seek all the necessary information to study in the Diaspora.

Another challenge identified by the participants was the language barrier, as captured in this comment:

*Sometimes Afrikaans was the language used on campus by many south African nationals which made socialising difficult and to make matters worse, some lecturers often used it in class as well.*

The language barrier could have arisen due to words having different meanings, different accents and differences in gestures, as opined by Abuarqoub (2019). Furthermore, the language barrier could have also been caused by an individual's fear of making grammar mistakes or being embarrassed by their accent or pronunciation of words.

Participants also shared that the universities had state-of-the-art facilities, such as laboratories and libraries, which were difficult to utilise, as captured in the following comment:

*My University had very sophisticated laboratories, and automated systems and I had never used some of the technologies before.*

The above result could be attributed to some students' non-exposure to sophisticated systems used in institutions of higher learning, as observed by (Sheng, Goldie, Pulling & Luctkar-Flude 2019).

Additionally, participants shared that they encountered cultural shock, which in turn caused them anxiety, as indicated in the following comments:

*When I reached S/A I was shocked that people had very minimal clothing's on them and it seemed very okay. This caused me disorientation and anxiety whenever I moved around.*

*Some people would eat food and snacks while walking. This disturbed me a lot especially when I had just started my studies because back home, one has to find a place to sit then eat their food.*

These findings above support the opinions of Sharma and Shearman (2021); Wu, Garza, and Guzman (2015), who report that students in the Diaspora usually face cultural shock. Zhou, Jindal-Snape, Topping and Todman (2008),

who report that students attending universities away from their countries could not escape the cultural shock, support these findings.

### ***8.3 Mitigation Strategies to Challenges Faced by Postgraduate Students in the Diaspora***

Respondents confirmed that they overcame their challenges by employing various tactics. However, participants also indicated that some of the challenges were emotional, so there was nothing they could do other than persevere. Most participants could live with racism since they could not do anything about it. One respondent said:

*I learned to live with racism because I couldn't do anything to change it. I was consoled by the fact that one day I would leave and return home to a more embracing environment.*

The above findings align with Park, Wang, Williams and Alegría (2018), who stressed that rather than doing nothing about racism, forming an ethnic and racial identity through groups would help to avert the negative impact of racism by creating the much-needed social support.

Technological advancement helped many participants overcome feeling lonely and homesick. Most participants indicated they occasionally connected with friends and family through phone and video calls. One respondent shared:

*My family frequently called me through WhatsApp video conferencing, and this helped me to unwind, in return the loneliness kept reducing until I could feel it no more.*

Another respondent said:

*I always called my children through Viber over the weekend. Their unending stories and laughter made me feel like I was not very far away from them and hence the homesickness I felt when I had just gone to South Africa reduced tremendously.*

From the above findings, it can be argued that technology, as noted by Kelly and Cheng (2021), is one of the best ways to avert homesickness because



technology is used to build co-presence and bring distant places closer. Additionally, some participants who were on scholarships shared that they were given annual tickets to go back home, as noted:

*My scholarship allowed me an annual return ticket and so I was assured of seeing my family once a year hence reducing homesickness.*

To overcome insecurity, participants shared that they learned to move in groups and found out which were unsafe places to avoid that would make them vulnerable. One member said:

*We tried to move in groups and avoid moving very late or very early. And we also soon learned what the unsafe places were, so we tried to avoid them. That being said, however, some unsafe places were unavoidable for example the shuttle stops as we had to take the shuttle between our student residences and campus.*

The findings corroborate with Dako-Gyeke and Adu (2017), who assert that people are likely to depend on one another for protection and support during heightened insecurity periods.

Many respondents indicated difficulty relocating to South Africa and obtaining clearance from the South Africa Foreign Qualification Authority (SAQA). They had to exercise patience and also tried to get all the required information before departure. The above strategy is generally applicable since the challenge of clearance delays may not be purely attributed to unexpected delays or momentary problems (Lee, Paulidor & Mpaga 2018).

Additionally, participants indicated that they had to take out loans or look for temporary employment to manage their expenses. In contrast, others opted for short visits of up to three months at a time in South Africa compared to staying for the whole duration of the course. The above findings align with Wu *et al.* (2015), who assert that for international students to finance themselves comfortably, they need a paid-up internship or temporary employment, also advising that international students could take short-term loans from family and friends.

Additionally, participants indicated that they had to learn and practise using sophisticated libraries and automated systems to understand them better. They also shared experiences that helped them to cope with their experience in libraries. One participant said:

*The library was fully automated which I must confess gave me very hard time at the beginning, however, with the help of the librarians, I learned how to use the automated system.*

#### **8.4 Government's Role in Supporting Postgraduate Education in The Diaspora**

In describing what role the Ugandan government can play in supporting postgraduate education in the Diaspora, most participants indicated that the government could promote exchange programmes as indicated by a participant:

*The government should promote exchange programs between countries that send many students to SA and various SA Universities to improve bilateral relationships. This would also remove the unspoken feeling that other countries especially Ugandans come to SA to only take away yet South Africans do not necessarily benefit in return.*

The above findings align with Mulvey (2020), who asserts that governments should explore exchange programmes to encourage international relations, which may also ease friendliness among students. In addition, participants indicated that the Ugandan government should consider offering financial support to postgraduate students to ease their financial burden. One participant indicated:

*Countries that send students to foreign countries for education should offer some financial support to these students even if it is in form of students' loans.*

Another participant said:

*Studying in the Diaspora is not for the fainthearted. One needs all the financial support they can get. Therefore, it would be a good thing for governments to offer some form of financial support say in Visa fees or even flight fees to these students.*

The above findings align with the recommendations of Khanal and Gaulee (2019), who suggest that governments should financially support postgraduate

education to ease the burden that postgraduates carry. This form of government support may go a long way in ensuring these students attain good grades since they would have fewer worries and financial troubles.

Some participants shared that they had to resign from their jobs before going to study further in South Africa, as shared by one participant below:

*My employer did not grant me study leave and instead advised I chose between my job and to study. I felt this was not right and the government needed to protect people like me from our employers because choosing one of the two is difficult and eventually contributes to brain drain.*

From the above, it would be appropriate for governments to engage stakeholders, especially employers, to see how best they can maintain their staff who choose to further their education in the Diaspora and not impose unnecessary expenses on the employer. Li *et al.* (2017) point out that when an employee leaves an organisation for greener pastures, the organisation and government both lose skilled human capital to brain drain. Therefore, it is in the interest of these governments to encourage the organisations to retain human capital by enacting good policies (Chand 2016).

### **8.5 Contribution to Relevant Body of Knowledge**

The chapter represents the experiences of Ugandan postgraduate returnees from South Africa. It includes the benefits of studying in South Africa, their challenges and how they overcame them, and finally, the Ugandan government's role in supporting them in the host country and once back in their home country.

This study makes a unique contribution to the body of knowledge, especially on Diaspora education for postgraduate students, as it attempts to present evidence based on their experiences while living in the Diaspora. Furthermore, the paper highlights how governments, particularly those in developing countries like Uganda, can support students in the Diaspora.

Importantly, the chapter aims to inform future students intending to study in the Diaspora of the benefits they stand to gain while highlighting some challenges they are bound to face.

## **9 Recommendations**

The following recommendations are proposed:

1. The Ugandan Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should work hand in hand to ease the visa requirements for students seeking to study abroad.
2. Uganda's government and relevant stakeholders should devise ways to support students financially, especially the Diaspora postgraduate students, even if that means giving students loans.
3. The students interested in postgraduate studies in the Diaspora should gather all relevant information concerning the desired country of study. Such information could include aspects such as the weather, food, and language.

## **10 Conclusion**

Based on the findings, the benefits and opportunities of postgraduate education in the Diaspora outweigh the education challenges. South Africa, as a country, appears to have good policies and programs that have attracted international students from Uganda, who confirm the competitive advantage higher education in South Africa has over their home country. However, the fact that students face racial discrimination cannot be downplayed in this era, more so from a country commonly referred to as a 'rainbow nation'.

While the returnees found various ways of mitigating the challenges encountered in the Diaspora, not all the identified challenges had solutions. It speaks to the need to be aware of the environment they can control and be cognisant that they may have no control over others. It is, therefore, imperative that the government of Uganda benchmarks good practices from the Diaspora and eases access to postgraduate education locally in Uganda.

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**SECTION V**

**FOOD SECURITY**



# CHAPTER 12

## The Food Security Challenges of African Immigrants in South Africa: A Literature Review

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### Abstract

Available reports show that South Africa is one of the main destinations for migrants across Africa. As the immigration rate continues to increase, the South African population is expected to rise, increasing the demand for critical resources like food. Therefore, the government faces the challenges of controlling immigration and increasing food production to serve the needs of the people. In this chapter, the authors examine extant literature on food security challenges facing African immigrants in South Africa. The review shows that social, economic and political factors pull African migrants to South Africa. The chapter buttresses that climate change and extreme weather conditions pose severe threats to South African farmers, increasing food security challenges. The consequences are enormous, especially for African immigrants, who are rarely considered in government policies and programmes. The chapter concludes that the government and stakeholders must engage the agricultural sector to develop policies encouraging food production to reduce food insecurity, particularly for African immigrants. It will help reduce tension among the immigrants and the citizens of South Africa and contribute to the economy.

**Keywords:** African immigration, South Africa, food insecurity, migration

## **1 Introduction**

The European Commission Joint Research Centre (2018) estimated 36.3 million African migrants in 2017 globally, of which 53% remained on the African continent. South Africa has remained one of the main destinations of African migrants since the discovery of gold in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and more recently, due to a relatively industrialised economy, stable democratic institutions and middle-income status (Langalanga 2019; Moyo 2021).

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM 2020) estimated that the number of international migrants in South Africa has experienced a progressive increase since 2010. As of 2021, Stats SA documented about 3.95 million official immigrants in South Africa, which accounts for 6.5% of the population of over 60 million people (Stats SA 2021). However, this figure is believed to be underreported because of the number of undocumented immigrants. To account for the gap, Migration Data Portal (2021) pegged the number of immigrants (documented and undocumented) in Southern Africa to about 6.4 million. South Africa has a large population of immigrants who are of African heritage, with the majority hailing from Southern Africa (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Top 10 Immigrants Countries in South Africa in 2020**

Country of Origin	Number	Percentage of Total
Zimbabwe	690,200	24%
Mozambique	350,500	12%
Lesotho	192,000	7%
Malawi	94,100	3%
United Kingdom	67,400	2%
The Democratic Republic of the Congo	63,900	2%
Somalia	58,500	2%
Botswana	50,500	2%
Angola	47,900	2%
Eswatini	45,400	2%

**Source: (UN DESA 2020). United Nations Population Division. ‘International Migrant Stock 2020: Destination and Origin’.**



## *The Food Security Challenges of African Immigrants in S.A.*

The state's primary responsibility is the security of everyone in its territory, including those with immigrant status. Food security is a critical national security dimension. It refers to the ability of individuals within a country to access food that meets their preferences and needs at all times (Mueller, Grépin, Rabbani, Navia, Ngunjiri & Wu 2022). South African law recognises that access to food is a human right, and the country also subscribes to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the African Union Agenda 2063, both of which aim, among other things, to end hunger and accelerate sustainable development (Mazenda, Molepo & Mushayanyama 2022).

The extent to which food as a human right has been met in South Africa demands scrutiny, especially for immigrants. According to a survey from 2020, about 24% of South Africans had moderate to severe food insecurity, with about 15% dealing with extreme food insecurity (Stats SA 2020). The Stats SA report did not capture the extent of food insecurity in South Africa among immigrants. As 2030 draws near, there is doubt about South Africa's ability to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal of Zero Hunger due to the country's slow decline of moderate and severe food insecurity (Stats SA 2019).

African immigrants in South Africa may experience a deeper impact of food crises due to their immigrant status and other contextual factors. Immigrants tend to have limited access to financial and non-financial resources, which language barriers and immigration policies may exacerbate (Anderson, Hadzibegovic & Moseley 2014; Vahabi & Damba 2013). Food insecurity may also be worsened during crises or conflict situations. Immigrants in South Africa are subjected to xenophobic attacks, with many of these attacks directed towards individuals of African descent. The occurrence of xenophobic attacks can be traced back to 1994 when the first reports highlighted violence against Mozambicans and Congolese migrants in South Africa (Boyo 2019). These attacks are prompted by the perception that immigrants contribute to inequities in accessing basic social and economic resources (Choane, Shulika & Mthombeni 2011).

The objectives of this chapter are threefold:

- To trace the history and continued immigration of Africans to South Africa;
- To describe the food insecurity in South Africa; and

- To describe food insecurity from the perspective of African immigrants in South Africa.

Data for the narrative literature review were gathered from published and unpublished research and other policy documents on immigration and food security. The chapter is concluded with recommendations for policies and programmes to address the food insecurity of African immigrants in South Africa.

## **2 Methodology**

The chapter is based on a narrative review of published and unpublished international migration and food security documents. The narrative literature review aims to identify a few studies that describe a problem of interest (Demiris, Oliver & Washington 2019). This type of review does not follow a systematic procedure, standard or protocol. Although it has limitations, having an overview of problems is important. The four steps for conducting a narrative review, defined by Fins, Schwager and Acres (2000), were followed, starting with a single literature search on journal databases and government sites. The databases include PubMed, Google Scholar, CINAHL, African Journal Online and ResearchGate. Documents were derived from government sites like Stats SA. The search was broadened using identified keywords of initial papers. It was concluded by reviewing abstracts and articles, and in the process, duplicate files that did not address research questions were removed. Finally, the findings were summarised and synthesised under three broad headings.

## **3 African Immigration to South Africa**

South Africa's migration story can be traced back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Human Sciences Research Council [HSRC] 2020), after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand. Since then, South Africa has been a magnet for migrants from the surrounding regions. A significant proportion of the mining workforce during the gold boom, who were regarded as labour migrants, were sourced from neighbouring countries such as Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Langanaga (2019) noted that, subsequently, mechanisms such as the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association were created to facilitate a regional migrant labour system.

Migration was circular, with migrants' movements strictly regulated by the colonial and apartheid governments. South Africa opened its borders post-apartheid in 1994, inadvertently unleashing a second and unprecedented wave of migrants (Thompson 2000; Magezi 2019; Langalanga 2019). In the post-1994 period, South Africa has also attracted waves of migrants from countries outside the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, like Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In addition to these historical migration patterns, pre-1994, South Africa hosted refugees from the Angolan civil war and the Mozambican conflict (Carciotto 2016). After 1994, South Africa offered Mozambican refugees who had settled in Mpumalanga province and parts of Limpopo province permanent residence and citizenship. The Angolan refugees were repatriated much later, around 2015, when it became clear that, in the post-war era, stability had returned to Luanda (Carciotto 2016).

According to Langalanga's (2019) report, South Africa has attracted two types of migrants since 1994. First, the country has continued to attract documented labour migrants who work in the mining and agricultural sectors. The South African government introduced a corporate work visa system that allows seasonal migrant labourers to work and remain in South Africa for three months to ensure these migrants contribute to the local economy. The visas are underpinned by bilateral agreements between South Africa and its neighbours (SADL 2007). Most of these cultural migrants come from Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and the southern parts of Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Stats SA 2017). These migrations closely mirror historical, intra-regional migratory patterns based on longstanding cultural identity links with South Africa.

Alongside these new migration pressures, South Africa experienced a surge in migrants from Asia, the Horn of Africa and West Africa who could enter the country – partially – because of her liberal refugee regime (IOM 2020). South Africa's refugee regime is governed by the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (South Africa Refugees Act 1998), an instrument that does not recognise economic refugees but affords asylum seekers the right to work, live and access social benefits while their cases are adjudicated. These provisions allowed many migrants to enter South Africa on asylum claims (Mbiyozo 2018), while others overstayed their visas. According to the White Paper on International Migration, more than 90% of asylum-seeker applications are rejected due to false claims (Department of Home Affairs [DHA] 2017).

We could argue that economic and political instability are push factors

for asylum seekers, refugees and other immigrants. Statistics show that when South Africa's population was about 58.78 million in 2019, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was \$344 billion in the same year (Stats SA 2020; Langalanga 2019). The main pull factor for migrants to South Africa has been the country's relatively stronger and better-performing economy *vis-à-vis* that of other countries in the region. According to the African Development Bank Group (2019), South Africa contributes a wholesome 60% to the regional GDP, followed by Angola, which contributes 20%, while Lesotho and Eswatini *são tomé and príncipe* account for 1.2%. The preceding affirms that African immigration to South Africa can be attributed to the geographical location and economic size relative to the regional neighbours (Langalanga 2019).

Another factor of interest which attracts many migrants to South Africa could be attributed to her political stability. As regional countries experience internal crises, the South African liberal refugee regime is a buffer (Internews 2021; Migration Data Portal 2021). For example, in 1998, while South Africa was grappling with its internal migration pressures and sorting out the status of traditional migrants from Angola, Mozambique and other neighbouring countries, war broke out in the DRC. The fact that the DRC was strategically incorporated into SADC allowed easy movement of its nationals into South Africa as refugees. Two years later, Zimbabwe's economy began to experience recessions, which led to a massive exodus of Zimbabweans into South Africa (Internews 2021).


#### **4 Food Insecurity in South Africa**

According to the International Trade Association (ITA 2021), South Africa is by far the most productive, modern and diverse agricultural economy compared to the rest of Africa. It was observed that South Africa has a well-developed agricultural sector, which will stand the country in good stead in the face of continuing uncertainty both economically and in terms of climate change. South Africa has approximately 32,000 commercial farmers, of which between 5,000 and 7,000 produce approximately 80% of agricultural output. This production is despite several factors impacting the sector, such as credit rating downgrades, land reform concerns, volatile exchange rates, ongoing climate change concerns and the recent Covid-19 pandemic (Ngarava 2022).

The report of the International Trade Association confirmed that over the past 20 years, after the deregulation of the agricultural markets in 1997, there

has been a decreasing trend in the area planted with wheat despite increasing local consumption (ITA 2021). It has led to declining profit margins as local farmers scaled down on wheat production and switched to other crops like canola, corn, soybeans, and increased livestock production. Moreover, the trend in wheat production has been sporadic over the past 20 years because of unpredictable weather conditions. It is concluded that without technological advancements or policy changes, the decreasing trend in hectares planted with wheat in South Africa will continue (Esterhuizen 2022).

In sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa is one of the highest wheat consumers, only producing 55% while importing 45% annually (ITA 2021). It, therefore, faces a food crisis, with about 2.5 million at risk of hunger daily (Spaull & Tomlinson 2021).



**Figure 1: Prevalence of Running Out of Money to Buy Food (Source: Spaull and Tomlinson 2021)**

Around 2.4 billion loaves of bread, or 40 per person per year, are consumed. This statistic makes wheat consumption increase on average by about 2% per annum and increases demand through population growth over the past ten years in South Africa (Esterhuizen 2022). The current Russia - Ukraine war also created uncertainty in the global wheat market, pushing local prices to record-high levels. Wheat consumers face countless challenges, including high levels of unemployment, increased inflation – especially for fuel and food – and higher interest rates (Esterhuizen 2022). It has contributed to millions of South Africans running out of money to buy food daily (see Figure 1 above).

## **5 African Immigrants' Experience with Food Insecurity**

African immigrants who arrive in South Africa may be unable to grow their own food because of the complexities of land in South Africa (Odunitan-wayas, Alaba & Lambert 2021). Based on the land audit of 2017 by the South African government, about 72% of the country's arable land is controlled by whites, who only represent about 10% of the country's population (Clark 2019). The poor land distribution issue in South Africa makes it difficult for many households to access land for agricultural production (Orefi 2012). The land reform, which makes provision for the acquisition of land and rights to land by labour tenants, has been heavily criticised for failing to sustain capital-intensive land uses, thereby affecting the agricultural production and livelihood of beneficiaries (Rusenga 2022). This experience is unique to African immigrants because, compared to the natives, they have relatively lower access to land for subsistence and commercial farming. Farmlands are mostly private property that may require huge capital and stringent legal process to acquire, making it difficult for African immigrants who intend to take up farming.

While most African immigrants in South Africa do not primarily migrate to engage in farming, their contribution to the agricultural space is notable. Zimbabwean immigrants, for example, are known to be highly skilled and have vast experience working on tobacco and big maize farms (Taylor 2010). However, most entered the country illegally, opening the door for South African farmers to employ and pay them far below the minimum wage. However, one less explored area is how food insecurity fuels the slave wages of African immigrants in South Africa. Food insecure people were found to be ready to accept far lesser wages with the hope of earning a living (Naser, Solomon & Louw 2021).

Outside agriculture, African immigrants are underemployed in the in-

formal economy and are equally facing the daunting challenges of food insecurity. A study reported low hours worked and low wage earnings; as a result, they frequently struggle to meet their daily requirements for food (Theodore, Pretorius, Blaauw & Schenck 2017). The study showed that more than half (52%) of respondents said there were instances in the preceding month when they had no food to eat in their home due to a lack of means to buy food, with 20% saying this happened five or more times. Similarly, 39% of respondents acknowledged that there had been occasions in the previous month when someone in the home had gone to bed hungry due to the lack of food. With low earnings, many African immigrants struggle to meet their daily food requirements. However, one study reported that Zimbabwean day labourers earned significantly higher income levels than the average South African day labourer. However, they are uncertain about their earnings (Pretorius & Blaauw 2015).

Immigrants must adjust to all aspects of life, including food preferences and consumption patterns in their host countries (Majee, Dinbabo, Ile & Belebema 2019). African immigrants in South Africa reportedly face food challenges, leading to immigrant households failing to follow their traditional diets. It is evidenced that they treasure their traditional and local foods, but high prices, limited variety, and unavailability have continuously hindered access to their preferred foods (Mbombo-Dweba, Agyepong, Oguttu & Mbajiorgu 2017).

For people to experience food security, they must not only access and utilise foods, but they must also be able to access the foods they prefer, which defines the cultural dimension of food security (Food and Agriculture Organisation [FAO] 2001). Most food-related policies and programmes have focused on access, availability, and utilisation without considering cultural perspectives (Tarraf, Sanou & Giroux 2017). The cultural perspective on food security is important for African immigrants who sometimes adopt poor eating habits that may affect their health (Mbombo-Dweba *et al.* 2017). It has also been shown that immigrants experience the stress and pressure of importing and preserving their local foods (Chimnga & Meier 2014). Some have had to cope by relying on less preferred foods and replacing unavailable ingredients with similar ingredients (Mbombo-Dweba *et al.* 2017). This adjustment is a common experience for African immigrants in South Africa who reported that they consume their local diets daily because it is part of their culture and reminds them of relatives back home.

The Covid-19 pandemic disrupted South Africa's agricultural productivity and the processing and distribution of foods. This disruption negatively

impacted people's livelihoods, especially vulnerable households, including African immigrants. A study by Ngarava (2022) found that food insecurity increased as Covid-19 progressed from the first to the fifth wave. Meanwhile, most African immigrants were left out of the opportunity of benefiting from government relief packages and were without social welfare safety nets to cushion the effects of the pandemic (Odunitan-wayas *et al.* 2021; Tinuola *et al.* 2022). The pandemic increased unemployment, and many African immigrants were laid off (Mekonnen & Amede 2022). It also increased poverty and food insecurity among African immigrants and further widened the gap between immigrants and people from their host communities.

Xenophobia has made headline news in South Africa from 2008 to 2018, as migrants in the country have increasingly been subjected to various degrees of violence, including the destruction of their properties, injuries, and sometimes loss of life. Nationwide xenophobic attacks displaced thousands of migrants, resulting in more than 60 deaths like those in 2008 (Landau 2018). More recently, xenophobic attacks in 2018 led to several deaths, looting and the destruction of property belonging to foreign nationals. The violence extended into 2019, with more lives lost (Amnesty International 2018).

Outbreaks of xenophobic violence are most common in South Africa's townships and other economically poor neighbourhoods, where residents often blame African immigrants for high crime rates and job losses (EUROSTAT 2010). African immigrants are also subjected to xenophobic attacks because they believe they 'take all the food and money to their home countries' (Chimbga & Meier 2014). Therefore, African immigrants are thought to increase food security challenges (Steinberg 2011). Studies have shown that some African immigrants contribute to the formal economy through employment creation and revenue generation (Moyo 2015). However, the literature rarely highlights how xenophobic attacks may have increased African immigrants' food insecurity.

## **6 Implications for Policies, Programmes and Research**

The 1999 White Paper on International Migration (DHA 2017) set out the South African policy on international migration. As reported by the Department of Home Affairs (2017), this was implemented through the Immigration Act 2002 (Act No. 13 of 2002) and partly through the Refugees Act 1998 (Act No. 130 of 1998). The DHA undertook a comprehensive review of the international



migration policy in 2016-2017 and developed a new White Paper on International Migration, which the Cabinet approved on 29 March 2017. The 2017 White Paper incorporates much of the content of the 1999 White Paper but locates it within a much broader and more relevant policy framework and addresses serious policy gaps. In the said 2017 White Paper, the state and society can manage international migration to actively achieve clear development goals as set out in the National Development Plan (NDP). If the White Paper policy recommendations are followed, some of the identified negative experiences, like food insecurity by African immigrants, will be resolved.

Income is an important aspect of household food security. Therefore, innovative strategies that improve investments may increase employment and income opportunities for vulnerable groups like African immigrants (Mazenda, Molepo & Mushayanyama 2022). The government should apply social justice to food security by making food available for all, regardless of immigration status (Odunitan-wayas *et al.* 2021). The government must also partner with foreign national bodies and other stakeholders concerned with vulnerable groups to bridge the food insecurity gap between immigrants and non-immigrants.

More studies are needed to capture African immigrants' experiences regarding food insecurity. Most studies and documents lump blacks together, thereby overlooking the effect of immigration status on food security.

## **7 Conclusion**

This chapter describes the experience of African immigrants in South Africa and the challenges of food insecurity. South Africa has been a desired destination for many African migrants due to socio, economic and political factors. Meanwhile, food insecurity continues to be challenging due to many contextual and political obstacles. The experiences of food insecurity by African immigrants are in no way different but maybe worse due to unavailable safety nets. The national government must engage the agricultural sector with policies encouraging food production by African immigrants and the locals. Food security will reduce tension and increase South Africa's economy. As recommended by the White Paper, stakeholders should be actively involved in managing international migration to achieve clear development goals.

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# Acknowledgements

The Editor in Chief of the Diasporean Volumes 1 and 2 and the Editors in Chief of the *Alternation African Scholarship Book Series*, respectively, would like to thank the volume and general editors of this book (Volume 1): *The Diasporean I: The Southern Africa Perspectives*, for their dedication and intellectual input into this book project.

We would also like to thank the reviewers for accepting to be part of this book project and working tirelessly under strict timelines to deliver on their mandates. This volume would not have seen the light of day without their due diligence.

We also acknowledge the hard work of the administrators, Dr. Faith Kimathi and Dr. Patrick Ajibade, for diligently keeping the lines of communication with the authors open and ensuring the various iterations of the reviews were kept in safe custody.

The authors who contributed to this volume are also acknowledged and applauded for their outstanding intellectual contributions.

We herewith wish to acknowledge the reviewers, for their critical and constructive inputs and comments towards the publication of this excellent peer reviewed volume, where each chapter was reviewed by at least two independent peer reviewer specialists in the respective fields of scholarship.

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# *The Diasporean I: The Southern African Perspectives* *The Diasporean II: Perspectives from Beyond Southern Africa*

Editors:



## **Katie Mutula**

The idea to write a book centred on the Diaspora was conceived by the late Katie Musungu Mutula, who was pursuing a doctoral degree in international economics at the School of Accounting, Economics and Finance at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. This book has been written to recognise her intellectual thought and input in this project – may her soul rest in eternal peace!



## **Stephen Mutula**

This volume contributes to co-creating knowledge on Diaspora while bridging the gap between research and practice. The book is aimed at scholars, the academe, students, international partners, business, civil society, government, industry and non-professionals who wish to understand or reference their personal experiences and critical and constructive reflections on the Diaspora.

## **Advanced Recommendations**

In two volumes, *The Diasporean I & II* (2023) delve into the depths of critical intellectual enquiry using inter- and multi-disciplinary lenses to achieve considerable depth into a topic many scholars have stayed clear from. The books unearth critical issues dovetailed into the social, economic and political contextual nuances engraved onto Africa's reality, and grappled with the framework espoused in the Agenda 2063 *'The Africa We Want'*. Prof Kelvin Joseph Bwalya Sohar, University, Sultanate of Oman

In a world shaped by the monumental events of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of apartheid, *The Diasporean I & II* unravel the complexities of intra-African and global migration. Crucial themes such as financial integration, xenophobia, gender roles, technology and skills transfer, and the impact of the digital economy, provide thoughtful, comprehensive and insightful analyses, for the comprehensive understanding, advancement of knowledge, and informed policymaking, on this currently world-changing phenomenon. Professor Wole Michael Olatokun, Dean, Faculty of Multidisciplinary Studies. University of Ibadan, Nigeria

*The Diasporean I & II* serve as a poignant examination of the intersectionality within the socio-economic and political realms of the African diaspora. They provide lenses for contemplating the intricacies of financial outflows, the ramifications of xenophobia, diverse gender dynamics, and the paramount importance of human life. The authors succinctly capture these complexities, rendering it a relevant and engaging read for those intrigued by the multifaceted dimensions of the African diaspora. Professor Johannes J. Britz, PhD, Interim Senior Vice President, Universities of Wisconsin Office of Academic and Student Affairs, Madison, WI 53706.