Primitive Times

Shane Moran

PRIMITIVE TIMES

Shane Moran

CSSALL, Durban

South Africa

2022

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.29086/978-0-6397-0950-5/2022/AASBS10

Earlier versions of chapters 4 and 5 appeared in *Alternation: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of the Arts and Humanities in Southern Africa* Special Edition 38 (2021).

Publication Data available at: SANB, National Library of South Africa Pretoria Campus, PO Box 397, Pretoria 0001. Tel: (012) 401 9700. Fax: (012) 325 5984.

Email: legaldep@nlsa.ac.za

ISBN 978-0-6397-0950-5

Cover design Clair Durow. Front image: Roman Rock Lighthouse, False Bay—Wikipedia. Back cover image: Uvongo.

First Edition

Imagination withdrew and returned to Africa ... where Dutch and English profit by the Negro millions, those hosts were stirred by vague dreams of freedom. Peering beyond the whole bulge of Africa, beyond cloud-spread Table Mountain, I saw the Southern Ocean, black with storms.

—Olaf Stapledon, *Star Maker*

Contents

Preface

> He's afraid, really afraid, of where a thought
> like that, taken to its conclusion, might lead.
> —Hans Fallada, *Alone in Berlin*

This is another book about resistance, this time resistance to reading. If intellectual freedom is a pre-condition of free speech and political freedom, then the texts we choose to read, or not to read, matter. Because the dream of academic responsibility involves reading texts carefully, giving an objective, detailed account of an argument evaluated on its own terms as well as by the standards of impartial judgement, it inevitably takes time. At a push, interpretation can be delegated to third party intermediaries—the soft underbelly of censorship—who are always keen to save us time.

Those with prior immunity to critical thinking prove useful. Those who believed they were the opposition, now thoroughly acquainted with fear, find themselves card carrying fellow travellers. Discursive, conceptual, and narrative devices are deployed in accordance with pre-determined strategy and verifiable outcomes. Self-replicating arguments have logical consequences that shape the terrain of struggle and call for countermeasures from multiple sources at multiple levels. Criticism by hearsay inevitably passes by way of dogmatic bickering over competing authorities only to arrive at the terminus of sectarianism. Which is not to say that pacific inclusiveness cannot also be part of the problem rather than the solution, and lead to a familiar destination.

Recall the protagonist of H.G. Wells's *The Sleeper Awakes* who finds himself in the year 2100 with 'this world of base servitude in hypertrophied cities' in the grip of a totalitarian conspiracy. He comes across a copy of *Heart of Darkness*, which he hasn't heard of before. Is he looking at a representation of primitive times or an image of the present? 'How long had he slept?' he asks himself.

Clair illuminated and fought and is everywhere in this text. My thanks to Tony Voss for his meticulous reading and encouragement, and to David Johnson who helped despite seeing much that he didn't like.

South Africa
August 2022

Introduction

> "How far is our intellectual freedom here still ours only because, as a matter of fact, we are too discreet to exercise it?"
>
> —H.G. Wells, *Star-Begotten. A Biological Fantasia*

Primitive Times aims to identify some of the roots of contemporary globalisation in the enlightenment legacy of human rights, colonialism, and imperialism. Fear of global enslavement under the boot of corporate masters, and pleas for a rational world order, are part of a tradition that can illuminate the present. To this end, the following pages address:

1. Colonial modernity, taking South Africa as privileged but unexceptional example in terms of economic development, apartheid, and human origins.
2 The discourse of human rights in the context of the transatlantic slave trade, and the model of human development underlying both the pro-slavery and the abolitionist arguments.
3 The philosophical elaboration of the concept of race and human development underlying the idea of the human race and the prospect of planetary colonisation.
4. The liberal rationale for imperialism and colonialism in terms of responsibility and development, and the place of South Africa in this financial and political nexus.
5. The impact of the Boer War, and South African colonialism and development in general, on H.G. Wells's representation of alien invasion and world government.
6. Recent scenarios concerned with global health security and genetic engineering that reassemble the infrastructure of the discourse of race in the process of claiming to save the human race.

This study joins others in analysing the resurgence of earlier forms of domination which, if they ever truly went away, can provide some pointers to understanding the paralysing sense of inevitability felt by those struggling to analyse the present. In local, South African terms it stands with the contributors to Trevor Ngwane and Malehoko Tshoaedi's *The Fourth Industrial Revolution. A Sociological*

Critique (2021) and offers a philosophical and literary perspective. More generally, it looks to the work of those who have tried to discover what Hannah Arendt, in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, described as 'the hidden mechanics' behind 'the mere process of disintegration [that] has become an irresistible temptation, not only because it has assumed the spurious grandeur of "historical necessity," but also because everything outside it has begun to appear lifeless, bloodless, meaningless, and unreal' (1951: xxvi).[1]

My contribution is to focus on the historical and symbolic importance of South Africa in connection with these issues, and to draw lessons that might contribute to understanding the current situation. The topicality of the phrase 'global apartheid' to describe the process of globalisation that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union—but whose contours were already discernible—provides the theoretical opening. As the rest of the world catches up with South African levels of inequality, the South Africanisation of the globe suggests that the former polecat of the world community may represent the future rather than the past.[2]

Unmoored from its native soil, the global 'South-Africanisation of society' (Gorz 1989: 151) denotes minority rule in international decision-making and implies a parallel between Bantustans and the poorer states in the world. It also suggests the utilisation of bioweapons.[3] This is why the building blocks of separate development are relevant, as are the strategies used to defeat legislated apartheid. If "'the Final Solution to the African problem'" (Dick 1962: 30) is indeed becoming the planetary template, then the colonial and imperial precedents of this country might be usefully revisited.

The current situation can usefully be viewed through the lens of its colonial and imperial preconditions. Taking the long view, the course towards what we now call globalisation has been charted by predecessors making their own plea for a rational world order. For a relatively recent example, consider *The Great Analysis: A Plea for a Rational World Order* from 1912:

> Year after year, decade after decade, have filled in for us the outlines drawn by Vasco da Gama and Columbus, Cabot, Magellan, and Cook. Great gulf-streams of migration have swept from Europe to every quarter of the globe where a weaker race invited expropriation. The process of expansion has led to many wars, to the boundless enrichment of certain classes of men, and to a very real increase in the re- sources and potentialities of life for all and sundry. But, while the political and economic aspects of the expansion have been amply studied and realized, we have as yet overlooked what may be called the spiritual significance of the great fact that we now know, in its whole extent, the planet we live in, and

> can, and must, turn our attention to intensive knowledge and mastery of it. (Archer 1912: 55-56)

When the sense of planetary destiny is accompanied by alarms regarding direct bodily regulation, and economic and financial manipulation, the colonial paradigm presents itself as viable heuristic. The suspicion that the techniques of biopower developed in the laboratory of racism and techno-bureaucratic control identified by Arendt in chapter three of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* are the new normal is rife.[4]

While the paradoxical phrase *settlers at a distance* perhaps captures some of the invasiveness facilitated by modern technology, the hyperbolic *alien invasion* sharpens the sense of scale. After all, 'settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event' (Wolffe 2006: 388). Its weakness is that the identification of the alienness of the alienators as residing in their inhumanity hardly narrows down the field of candidates. If the precedent of what one colonial administrator termed 'the colonisation of Africa by alien races' provides a point of comparison for those feeling powerless, the threat of being 'exterminated in a business-like fashion' (Johnston 1899: 82) for non-compliance seems like hyperbole.[5] Still, the reward for submission, being treated with 'patriarchal kindness and leniency' (82), feels familiar.

Only when the spectre of colonialism is supplemented by the conception of apartheid as developmental strategy rather than racist aberration does the debate regarding globalisation reveal aspects of our unfolding present and possible future.[6] Although one might question, as I propose to do, whether 'debate' is really the correct word to describe the public use of reason prevalent today, it seems important to pursue the clarification of issues in a spirit of critical engagement. Those untroubled by the wasps of indecision will form their own circle.

Apartheid's mechanism of coercive complicity included economic, political psychological, bureaucratic, pedagogical, and biosecurity measures. The possibility that this network, rooted in colonial practices and knowledges, might return in a virulent form had been noted by the critics of globalisation I was reading. Is a colonial ideology geared to preserve the privileges of a minority by manipulating political representation and distorting information re-emerging?

My attempt to understand a context in which moral appeals (the future of humanity) entwine with a narrative of progress (technology as fate; economics as destiny), and where ruminations on world government intertwine with a

narrative of dehumanisation, aims to register and analyse what is often dismissed. If we are back (if ever we left it) to a world of wire pullers and conspirators, then we have little choice but to trace the lineage of this problematic.[7] A self-reflexive approach attuned to one's own embeddedness in an unfolding context must also form part of the analysis. And the possibility that those sighting a connection between globalist trusteeship and late modern colonialisation are trapped in the past must also be addressed, not least because this accusation is often used to deflect and disable those "'navigating this present great catastrophe'" (Wells 1940: 32). Understanding involves reflection on the process of interpretation.

If the title *Primitive Times* would seem to give away the game and pre-empt the conclusion it is well to recall Olive Schreiner's contention that 'primitive times' are distinguished by the virtues of 'indomitable courage and a love of independence' (1913: 240). How exactly those virtues play out in different contexts is another matter, and Schreiner suggests that they may not always be compatible with 'impartiality of judgement.' In what follows we will be concerned with tracking the process of interpretation and judgement.

The primitivism all too often accomplished by insistently warning about all-consuming barbarism and the necessity of avoiding it is difficult to ignore.[8] It is not just that no type of politics, and not just the alarmist variety, manages to avoid this gesture and the compliance it garners for those making it. *Primitive Times* argues it is necessary to remain alert to the deflective effect of invoking the primitive in the form of the recidivist flagging of recidivism that all too frequently ensures its intensified presence.[9] More specifically, accusations of racism call for interrogation when the compatibility of human rights and slavery is in the offing and renewed calls for 'a vast and comprehensive campaign of enlightenment' (Wolff 2021) are reissued.

Scrutinising the re-fabrication of earlier forms of domination which, if they ever truly went away, can provide some pointers to understanding the forces shaping the present.[10] Concern with the capacity to resist is not limited to time and place, even if each situation makes its own demands and calls forth a singular response. Positing analogies, drawing parallels and divergences, constructing narratives, deploying images and discursive strategies—all form part of the imaginative response capable of sustaining resistance as much as they are marshalled to undermine it. As Klaus Schwab remarked: "'In order to shape the future, you have first to imagine the future, you have to design the

future, and then you have to execute it,' he added" (in Hinchliffe 2021).[11] Engaging your imagination is what is at stake.

Primitive Times identifies the intersection of direct bodily domination associated with colonialism and the often (but not always) more diffuse and veiled financial machinations associated with liberal imperialism as indicative of late modern colonialisation. This is at once a project and a process that consciously and unconsciously weaves liberatory motifs from the past into new forms of domination.[12] Its present form calls for the revaluation of the forms that resistance to what H.G. Wells called "'pro-slavery rebellion'" (1941: 57) takes, its narratives and imagery, that are all too often dismissed as reductive and reactionary. Confronting the process of primitive accumulation that utilises the expropriation and legislation necessary to destroy other economic and social relations to make them productive for capital can throw up its own primitive reaction (see Coulthard 2014).

In this tangle of intentions and results, spotting the co-option of liberal discourse and global principles of human rights must now include reflective criticism of one's own interpretation of the current wave of fear and separation. The power of judgement, and the creation of a set of diverse stories or scenarios about how the future could evolve, are rooted in imagination. And imagination shapes the perspective through which we experience and judge. What Arendt called training 'one's imagination to go visiting' (1982: 43) can be a matter of life and death in an era of disinformation, lies and propaganda.[13]

As participants in the public and private use of reason, the bitter struggle to maintain the protocols of rational debate is a reminder of the fragility of reason often consigned to previous human catastrophes that saw the great mass of mankind 'reduced to the rank of slaves and cattle for the service of the few' (Godwin 1793: 727).[14] The perennial question 'How could it have happened that people descended to such vindictive irrationality?' is now well and truly stripped of its insulating condescension. The sense of a hidden purpose behind apparently unconnected events, the scramble for evidence that is deflected or declared incredible, signals what Immanuel Kant called 'a presentiment [*Ahnung*] of our reason' (1790: 261). *Ahnung* can also been translated as suspicion or foreboding sensing the movement from conspiracy theory to conspiracy fact.

In the current context Kant is associated with the positive sense of ongoing movement towards a federal world state:

> Although this political body exists for the present only in the roughest of outlines, it nonetheless seems as if a feeling is beginning to stir in all its members, each of which has an interest in maintaining the whole. And this encourages the hope that, after many revolutions, with all their transforming effects, the highest purpose of nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realized as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop. (1784: 51)[15]

Hegel is associated with labelling the idea 'that the human race should form a single state' 'a well-meaning thought' (1817/18: #162, 303). There will always be sectional interests:

> Kant had an idea for securing 'perpetual peace' by a League of Nations [*Staatenbund*: federation] to adjust every dispute. It was to be a power recognised by each individual state, and was to arbitrate in all cases of dissension in order to make it impossible for disputants to resort to war in order to settle them. This idea presupposes an accord between states; this would rest on moral or religious or other grounds and considerations, but in any case would always depend ultimately on a particular sovereign will and for that reason would remain infected with contingency.' (Hegel 1821: #333, 213-214)

The terms of this debate have hardly shifted in two hundred years.[16] And yet this philosophical footnote to history has taken on new life as the capacity of non-state actors to shape through technology the balance of global power is now a reality. If the book ending of the world government debate by the Kant/Hegel dyad is no longer credible because of changes in material conditions, the question of power they addressed has clearly not gone away. Geoffrey Bennington has noted that for Kant even approaching the world state is to move towards what is 'necessarily despotic and as close as can be to collapse into the most violent state of nature' (2017: 82-83).

The alacrity with which the discourses of humanism and progress are digested in the mist of misinformation and deflection suggests the need to revisit fundamental concepts and narratives.[17] We confront what might be termed racial capitalism without race, except for the fact that the human race is integral to the claim to be committed to 'a new collective and moral consciousness based on a shared sense of destiny' (Schwab 2016: 134).[18] That race and that destiny are shot through with colonial and imperial trappings.

A few words to explain the prominence of South Africa in what follows. Apart from biographical contingency—it is where I live and work—South Africa has risen to prominence as a synecdoche of bad globalisation. Human rights loom large in the South African 'crucible of the racialised international

economic order' (Hart and Padayachee 2013: 79) because of the notable importance of the narratives of progress and development in its history. Post-1994, the struggle to break the bonds of racial inequality have produced reflections on the legacy of colonialism and the nature of capitalism. Sombre assessments of the relationship between democracy and capitalism proliferate: 'The arrival of "democracy" since 1994 in the form of black majority rule has seen an increase in economic inequality' (56). Has the beacon of hope become a warning sign by which we might orient our grasp of the regressive tendencies at work now? 'Maybe we'll just go on and end up in a new apartheid nightmare.' (Žižek 2015)

South Africa's exemplarity in terms of what has been called 'framing a context' (Derrida 1988: 151) is difficult to deny. But that does not make it a determining model, even if as critical, historical, rhetorical, and ethico-political touchstone it does foreshadow a possible future, just as it distils a familiar past.[19] Poised between emblem of congenital recidivism and weathered icon of hope and hopelessness, South Africa's symbolic function often resembles a parable; of primitive colonial modernity, racism and its possible transcendence, and now premonitory globalisation in miniature. A vessel or container for a range of meanings, it forms the vehicle for analogical transport with a didactic and pedagogical purpose (see Derrida 1998: 102). At times it can seem as if South Africa, encrusted with the signifiers of colonialism, returns as the ghost ship of a state that will not go away.

Because of its well-documented distillation of colonialism and racial capitalism—which are by definition never purely local but rather of universal, i.e., moral, significance—globality and South Africa are entwined.[20] As Paul Gilroy remarked, 'if the status of "race" can be transformed even in South Africa, the one place on earth where its salience for politics and government could not be denied' (2000: 27), there is hope. South Africa, like other nations (*natio*), is bound up with questions of origin and destination.

Not that the South African variant of colonial development is exceptional, for as much as conditions here are unique, as are those of any context, they are also part of a pattern that can be isolated in its principles and operative conceptual and rhetorical modes. Invoking apartheid points to something verifiable, a known quantity, that promises to keep us to 'the continuous coastline of experience:' 'a coastline that we cannot leave without venturing out onto a shoreless ocean, which, among always deceptive prospects, forces us in the end to abandon as hopeless all out troublesome and tedious efforts'

(Kant 1781: A396, 439). It is not the whole story, a story that is not over anyway, but it can throw into relief some of the essentials of the broader picture. Excavating other situations, other names and contexts, histories, would yield similar connections with their unique alignment and rhythm.

The shift from speaking of race to speaking of nations and respect for national differences and diversity—touting multinationalism rather than central control, plural democracy among a confederation of independent states—culminating in reform and self-determination is nothing new. On the contrary, South Africa shows that appeals to multi-community development and good neighbourliness are indicative of attempts to veil manipulation with decolonization. Are we in the midst of what Fredric Jameson has called 'patently a guilt fantasy' (2005: 265) of the beneficiaries of colonialism, or the cognitive mapping of a real threat—or both?[21]

Perhaps the unspoken lesson taken from apartheid is that it works, but not for the majority. Recall that profit rates did not decline during apartheid. In fact the South African investment portfolio on the London Stock Exchange increased from 2.0 per cent (1940s) to 3.3 percent (1950s) and 10.1 per cent (1960s). The overall average of 5.1 percent per year (1940-1969) indicates that from the metropolitan point of view of imperial capital, apartheid was profitable. Between 1940 and 1969 the Anglo-American Corporation returned 10.4 per cent annually to investors (see Rönnbäck and Broberg 2017). Racial coercion became an integral part of cost reduction and development from which the majority were supposed to benefit after the painful medicine had done its work**.** This is the story that emerges from the statistics that are 'prerequisite to navigating, purposefully and with direction, the sea of quantities around us' (Everett 2017: 23), told from a certain perspective, according to certain norms and presuppositions.

Global apartheid suggests total colonialism or world takeover, and the normalisation of alien invasion. South Africa headlines the roster of incrimination: 'Beyond the specifics of South Africa, the term *apartheid* can be applied to the global order, that is, the so-called New World Order, and not simply as an effective metaphor' (Harrison 2008: 24). The hope that apartheid 'will be the name of something finally abolished, reduced to the state of term in disuse', 'the setting in the West of racism' (Derrida 1983: 377, 379), is as yet unfulfilled. Apartheid as a negative resource goes some way to explaining why the subject of decolonisation as self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) in an interconnected world has returned.[22]

As the proper meaning of the world order, apartheid would therefore signify an all-encompassing internal colonialism and a global native problem. Was what Derrida in 1983 called 'the heading and the cape to be rounded'—to see 'South Africa beyond *apartheid*, South Africa in memory of *apartheid*' (380)—merely prelude to the planetary act?[23]

Built on colonialism, the rise of South African mining capital in the late nineteenth-century is often taken to be illustrative of the process of globalisation in its imperial phase. Recall the struggle between national capital and imperial capital that culminated in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902; the undermining of African indigenous, non-capitalist, modes of production; the relative tenacity of Boer semi-feudal systems; the creation of a white and black proletariat, and the rise of an indigenous industrial bourgeoisie (see Bozzoli 1981).[24]

According to William Freund '[i]mperialism itself was not a sufficient condition' (2019: 4) to explain the racial politics developed in South Africa. The developmental state retained the capacity to 'defy the logic of market forces which may constrain structural transformation' (4). Structural transformation along capitalist lines was not synonymous with capitalism, or at least not capitalist dogma regarding the free market. Not because racism overdetermined the normal functioning of capitalism—although that did happen—but because the goal of development entailed defying and holding up or constraining market forces in the interest of sustaining market forces. Economic prosperity and survival were understood to depend on such principled, transformative moments which included '[k]eeping the ship afloat in the eyes of foreign investors was always a priority' (Freund 2021: 183). Whether such *development* amounted to *progress* depended largely on one's position within the process.[25]

When world government is proffered as apex developmental state, South Africa's colonial, apartheid, and post-apartheid narrative provides a workable template of parallels and analogies. Dispossession and market dependence, the imperialist strategy of undermining indigenous (national) production abroad, and the corporatisation of liberation in favour of global corporations—all form a familiar scenario as 'settler colonialism enacts itself as settler imperialism at this crucial moment in history when everything appears to be headed towards collapse' (Byrd 2011: ix).

For example, the concept of racial capitalism that emerged in the early 1970s to criticise the shortcomings of liberal opposition to apartheid becomes

a useful model for grasping the processes at work (see Legassick and Hemson 1976). South African liberals—and beyond South Africa Henry Kissinger, The World Bank and the IMF—argued that racism and apartheid were a distortion of normal capitalism.[26] Freed from its ideological straitjacket, South Africa would follow a path of competitive, market-driven development in which inequality would not be primarily determined by race. Dissenting critics warned that such a transition would simply replace one racial elite with another, and reinforce the dynamic of capitalist extraction which would be dominated and controlled by foreign interests. In such a state of dependency, sovereignty and executive power reside elsewhere.

The argument that racist ideology, and the political forms of racial discrimination, were a consequence of capitalist development and not a toxic supplement rejects the idea that race and racism are the final determinant. Recent work on colonial and imperial logics has confirmed and extended this insight (see Lowe 2015; and Brown 2014). Rather, the lesson to draw from the segregation and division of the working class on a racial basis is that, whether explicitly appealing to racial identification or not, progressive politics and economic policies can employ techniques of division that further increase domination by foreign capital. Or, since capital no longer needs a national home, perhaps we should say simply global capital (or just capital) is the means of enforcing dependency. Where are we in the light of our present criticism of existing arrangements and of other remembered utopian aspirations that cannot be reduced to a single paradigm?

Recall Olaf Stapledon's vision of the situation after the Euro-American war: 'The planet was now a delicately organized economic unit, and big business in all lands was emphatically contemptuous of patriotism' (1930: 43). Following war between America and China over diminishing fossil fuels the first World State emerged with improved living conditions but workers reduced to slaves under the tutelage of a fusion of religion and science.

Notes

[1] 'Earlier colonialists came by boats to "the new world" and expanded their empires by building railroads, farms and infrastructure. Today's colonialists are digital; they implement communication infrastructures such as social media in order to harvest data and turn it into money.' (Lehohla 2018) See Milanovic (2019); and Green (2021). 'The technologies of modernity—as in both mechanics and knowledges, including the application of instrumental

reason—were defined through colonial relations in all the ways that have become familiar.' (Kenny 2021: 143)

[2] Timothy Mitchell comments on the existence of a universal process (modernity, capitalism, globalisation): 'In fact it may have been at the level of the colony rather than the metropolitan power that this territorial framing of an economy was first possible' (2002: 3, 6).

[3] Wouter Basson: '"I must confirm that the structure of the project [South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme] was based on the U.S. system. That's where we learnt the most."' (quoted in Washington 2006: 356)

[4] 'It has always been about the goal of implementing a global biosecurity plan and a transhumanist control grid that, if allowed to come to fruition, would signify the end of the human species.' (Skripac 2021: 28)

[5] Johnston's *The Colonization of Africa by Alien Races* (1899) was published the year after H.G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds*, which originally appeared in serialised form in 1897.

[6] Jean-Paul Sartre: 'The first characteristic of these [colonialist] norms, is that the subhumanity of the *indigène* is not an objectively detectable fact, but a value to be maintained. And super-exploitation ... is a categorical imperative: "Act in such a way that you always treat the *indigène* as an inessential means and never as an end".' (quoted in Arthur 2010: 143)

[7] Are we moving 'towards a society in which the possessors shall remain possessed, the dispossessed shall remain dispossessed, in which the mass of men shall still work for the advantage of a few, and in which those few shall still enjoy the surplus values produced by labour, but in which the special evils of insecurity and insufficiency, in the main the product of freedom, have been eliminated by the destruction of freedom' (Belloc 1912: 126-7)?).

[8] 'The zenith of human prosperity seemed to have been reached in the superficial and frivolous sense of the word. For the last fifty years, the final establishment of the great Asiatic-American-European confederacy, and its indisputable supremacy over what was still left, here and there, in Oceania and central Africa of barbarous tribes incapable of assimilation, had habituated all the nations, now converted into provinces, to the delights of universal and henceforth inviolable peace. It had required not less than 150 years of war fare to arrive at this wonderful result.' (Tarde 1905: 23)

[9] 'Race making—the construction of race as a way to rationalize global inequalities—also creates a basis for global collective action.' (Mullings 2008: 11) That such a situation is not unprecedented can be verified by consulting Bernays (1928: 20). For an antidote see Freeman and Kagarlitsky (2004: 29); Jameson (2005: 384–392); Satia (2008); and Losurdo (2002: 790), to note only a few of the most recent studies.

[10] 'If you were to approach those millions of families now living at a wage, with the proposal for a contract of service for life, guaranteeing them employment at what each regarded as his usual full wage, how many would refuse? Such a contract would, of course, involve a loss of freedom: a life-contract of the kind is, to be accurate, no contract at all. It is the negation of contract and the acceptation of status. It would lay the man that undertook it under an obligation of forced labour, coterminous and coincident with his power to labour. It would be a permanent renunciation of his right (if such a right exists) to the surplus values created by his labour. If we ask ourselves how many men, or rather how many families, would prefer freedom (with its accompaniments of certain insecurity and possible insufficiency) to such a life-contract, no one can deny that the answer is: "Very few would refuse it." That is the key

to the whole matter. What proportion would refuse it no one can determine; but I say that even as a voluntary offer, and not as a compulsory obligation, a contract of this sort which would for the future destroy contract and re-erect status of a servile sort would be thought a boon by the mass of the proletariat to-day.' (Belloc 1912: 140-41) H.G. Wells's protagonist in *The Sleeper Awakes*: 'He wakes up to find himself the puppet of a conspiracy of highly intellectual men in a world which is a practical realisation of Mr. Belloc's nightmare of the Servile State' (1921: np.).

[11] 'At issue in war is the *capacity to resist*, understood by Clausewitz as the sum of material means along with the moral will to resist the enemy. War, whether offensive or defensive, is oriented towards compromising or resisting any attempt to compromise the capacity to resist.' (Caygill 2013: 16)

[12] 'Today, we see a resurgence of liberal arguments for empire … that is, a variety of arguments in favour of the use of force for transformative political projects (across borders). While some advocates of empire evoke British precedents, even without direct analogies, in an important sense, contemporary imperial forms work in the shadow of the specifically modern reconstitution of modern empire that took shape in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.' (Karuna 2010: 187).

[13] 'We live on the verge of dictatorship ... becoming the puppets of propaganda. For the press seems to have given up the fight for freedom of thought and expression, so as to survive financially.' (Mutloatse 1980: 4)

[14] 'But the hushing of the criticism of honest opponents is a dangerous thing. It leads some of the best of the critics to unfortunate silence and paralysis of effort, and others to burst into speech so passionately and intemperately as to lose listeners. Honest and earnest criticism from those whose interests are most nearly touched,—criticism of writers by readers—this is the soul of democracy and the safeguard of modern society.' (Du Bois 1903: 45-46) See also Yagisawa et al. (2021); and Jureidini and McHenry (2022).

[15] 'So *philosophical chiliasm*, which hopes for a state of perpetual peace based on a federation of nations united in a world republic, is universally derided as sheer fantasy as much as *theological chiliasm*, which waits for the complete moral improvement of the human race.' (Kant 1793: 81)

[16] 'It may be said with perfect truth that, if we would only realize it, a "new planet" has "swum into our ken"—the planet on which we live. It is given us to subjugate and fashion to our uses; and before we can rationally subjugate it in fact, it is clear that we must subjugate it in thought, must envelop it, so to speak, in organizing intelligence.' (Archer 1912: 58)

[17] 'This is the beginning of a great "conspiracy trial" and we are expecting more people to be arrested … They are also adopting a new technique now of just arresting a person and alleging a breach of some law. Then they keep you in jail on the ground that they are investigating, and refuse bail.' (Joseph Gaobakwe Matthews in Hirson 1988: 83, 92) See Merrett (1994; and Merrett nd.) for the South African template; and Bugg (2014) for another historical precedent.

[18] See Wells's ironic and deadly serious depiction of commitment to 'one world state, working together, building up and up' in the context of the story of the Tower of Babel: "'Behold the people is one'" (1940: 39, 37).

[19] "'Yes," resumed the younger stranger after a moment's interval. "'Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different

planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws." "You speak of … THE RICH AND THE POOR.'" (Disraeli 1845: 68-69, 174) See Mbeki (1998).

[20] 'The struggle for the liberation of the people of South Africa has always had a global significance.' (Magubane 1986: 23)

[21] 'By now it should be clear that COVID-19 is, essentially, a symptom of financial capital running amok. More broadly, it is a symptom of a world that is no longer able to reproduce itself by profiting from human labour, thus relying on a contemporary logic of perpetual *monetary doping*. While the structural shrinking of the work based economy inflates the finance sector, the latter's volatility can only be contained through global emergencies, mass propaganda and the tyranny of biosecurity.' (Vighi 2021) See Roth (2021) and Elliot (2022) on the massive transfer of wealth upwards that we are living through in what some wit has described as a *covet*, rather than a COVID, epidemic.

[22] 'If '[d]isintegration of the existing world economic system is order of the day,' then '[d]e-colonisation is not merely a movement against political dependence; it is turned against economic dependence as well.' (Bonn 1934: 847, 846) See also McKinley (2017: 48-49).

[23] 'When it became clear that no attempt would be made to end discrimination, Karellen gave his warning. It merely named a date and time-no more … All that happened was that as the sun passed the meridian at Cape Town it went out. There remained visible merely a pale, purple ghost, giving no heat or light. Somehow, out in space, the light of the sun had been polarized by two crossed fields so that no radiation could pass. The area affected was five hundred kilometres across, and perfectly circular. The demonstration lasted thirty minutes. It was sufficient; the next day the Government of South Africa announced that full civil rights would be restored to the white minority.' (Clarke 1953: 12-13) See Visser (1993); Boyce (1999); McClintock and Nixon (1986: 141-142); and Evans (2017).

[24] In the wake of the First World War, under the title "Milestones to Armageddon," Winston Churchill dated 'the beginning of these violent times in our country from the Jameson Raid, in 1896' (1923: 20). See also Schreuder and Butler (2002).

[25] 'The condition of stable equilibrium implied in the very idea of world-order can never be attained until the process of expansion is completed; and it is precisely because the end of that process, however far off, is now within measurable distance, that we can begin seriously to think of a world-order.' (Archer 1912: 49)

[26] 'Since the Industrial Revolution, modern prosperity has spread from its European birthplace to many corners of the world ... the effect of barriers to the spread of prosperity has diminished in the age of globalisation.' (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2017: 51, 58)

References

Archer, William 1912. *The Great Analysis: A Plea for a Rational World Order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. https://archive.org/details/greatanalysisap00murrgoog

Arendt, Hannah 1951 [2004]. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Schocken Books.

---- 1982 [1992]. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. Translated by R. Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Arthur, Paige 2010. *Unfinished Projects: Decolonization and the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*. New York: Verso.

Belloc, Hilaire 1912. *The Servile State*. London: T.N. Foulis.

Bennington, Geoffrey 2017. *Kant on the Frontier: Philosophy, Politics, and the Ends of the Earth*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Bernays, Edward L. 1928. *Propaganda*. New York: Horace Liveright.

Bonn, M. 1934. "The Age of Counter-Colonisation." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 13, no. 6 (Nov–Dec): 845–847.

Boyce, David George 1999. *Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.

Bozzoli, Belinda 1981. *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South Africa 1890-1933*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Brown, Nicholas A. 2014. "The logic of settler accumulation in a landscape of perpetual vanishing." *Settler Colonial Studies* 4, no. 1: 1-26.

Bugg, John 2014. *Five Long Winters: The Trials of British Romanticism*. California: Stanford University Press.

Byrd, Jodi A. 2011. *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Caygill, Howard 2013. *On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance*. London: Bloomsbury.

Churchill, Winston S. 1923. *The World Crisis*. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada. https://archive.org/details/worldcrisis00chur/page/n7/mode/2up

Clarke, A.C. 1953 [1990]. *Childhood's End*. New York: Del Ray.

Coulthard, Glen 2014. "From Wards of the State to Subjects of Recognition? Marx, Indigenous Peoples, and the Politics of Dispossession in Denendeh." *Theorizing Native Studies*. Edited by Audra Simpson and Andrea Smith. Durhan: Duke University Press, 56-98

Derrida, Jacques 1983 [2007]. "Racism's Last Word." In: *Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume I*. Edited by Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg. Translated by Peggy Kamuf. California: Stanford University Press, 377-386.

---- 1998 [1987]. "The *Retrait* of Metaphor." Translated by F. Gasdner. In: *The Derrida Reader. Writing Performances*. Edited by Julian Wolfreys, 102-129.

---- 1988. "Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion." In: *Limited Inc*. Translated by Samuel Weber. Evanston Il: Northwestern University Press, 111-160.

Dick, Philip 1962 [1965]. *The Man in The High Castle*. London: Penguin Books.

Disraeli, Benjamin 1845. *Sibyl. Or The Two Nations*. Leipzig: Tauchnitz. Sybil, Or, The Two Nations : Benjamin Disraeli : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Dodsworth, Laura 2021. *State of Fear: How the UK Government Weaponised Fear During the COVID-19 Epidemic*. London: Pinter and Martin.

Du Bois, W.E.B. 1903. *The Souls of Black Folk. Essays and Sketches*. London: Chicago: A.C. McLurg and Co. https://archive.org/details/cu31924024920492/page/n8

Elliott, Larry 2022. "World's 10 richest men see their wealth double during Covid pandemic." *The Guardian*, January 17. World's 10 richest men see their wealth double during Covid pandemic | Rich lists | The Guardian

Evans, Laura 2017. "South Africa's Bantustans and the Dynamics of 'Decolonisation:' reflections on writing histories of the homelands." In: *New Histories of South Africa's Apartheid-Era Bantustans*. Edited by Shireen Ally and Ariana Lissoni. Oxford: Routledge, 73-191.

Everett, Caleb 2017. *Numbers and the Making of US: Counting and the Course of Human Cultures*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Freeman, A. and B. Kagarlitsky (eds.) 2004. *The Politics of Empire: Globalisation and Crisis*. London: Pluto Press.

Freund, William 2019. *Twentieth-Century South Africa. A Developmental History*. UK: Cambridge University Press.

---- 2021. *An Historian's Passage to Africa. An Autobiography*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Gilroy, Paul 2000. *Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Godwin, William 1793 [1976]. *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*. London: Penguin.

Gorz, André 1989. *Critique of Economic Reason*. Translated by Gillian Handyside and Chris Turner. London: Verso.

Green, Toby 2021. *The Covid Consensus: The New Politics of Global Inequality*. London: C. Hurst and Co.

Harrison, F.V. 2008. "Global Apartheid, Foreign Policy, and Human Rights." In: *Transnational Blackness: Navigating the Global Color Line*. Edited by M. Manning and Vanessa Agard-Jones. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 19–40.

Hart, Keith. and Vishnu Padayachee 2013. "A history of South African capitalism in national and global perspective." *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa* 81/82: 55-85.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1817/18 [1995]. *Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science. The First Philosophy of Right*. Translated by Michael Stewart and Peter G. Hodgson. Berkeley: University of California Press,

---- 1821 [1967]. *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Translated by T.M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hinchliffe, Tim 2021. "WEF Founder Klaus Schwab calls for a 'great narrative' for humankind at meeting in Dubai." *The Sociable*, November 11. WEF Founder Klaus Schwab Calls for a 'Great Narrative' for Humankind (sociable.co)

Hirson, Baruch 1988. "The Defiance Campaign, 1952: Social Struggle or Party Stratagem?" *Searchlight South Africa* 1, no. 1 (September): 70-102. slsep88.7.pdf (ukzn.ac.za)

Jameson, Fredric 2005 [2003]. "Fear and Loathing in Globalization." *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*. London: Verso, 384–392.

Johnston, Sir Harry H. 1899. *The Colonization of Africa by Alien Races*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jureidini, Jon, and Leemon P. McHenry 2022. "The Illusion of Evidence based Medicine." *British Medical Journal* (March). https://www.bmj.com/content/376/bmj.o702

Kant, Immanuel 1781/87 [1998]. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

---- 1784 [2007]. "Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim." In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 107-120.

---- 1790 [2000]. *Critique of the Power of Judgement*. Edited and translated by Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
---- 1793 [1996]. "Religion within the boundaries of mere reason." In: *Religion and Rational Theology*. Translated and edited by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 39-216.
Kazanjian, David 2003. *The Colonizing Trick: National Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kenny, Bridget 2021. "The New 'Arcadia'? Racial Capitalism, Technological Histories, and the 'Utopian' Future of Labour." In: *The Fourth Industrial Revolution: A Sociological Critique*. Edited by Trevor Ngwane and Malehoko Tshoaedi. Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 133-146.
Legassick, Martin, and David Hemson 1976. "Foreign Investment and the Reproduction of Racial Capitalism in South Africa." *Anti-Apartheid Movement*. London. Foreign Investment and the Reproduction of Racial Capitalism in South Africa by Martin Legassick and David Hemson | South African History Online (sahistory.org.za)
Lehohla, P. 2018. "Opinion: Digital colonialism on the African continent." *Business Report*, October 16. https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/opinion/opinion-digital-colonialism-on-the-african-continent-17493010
Losurdo, D. 2002 [2019]. *Nietzsche, the Aristocratic Rebel: Intellectual Biography and Critical Balance-Sheet*. Translated by G. Benton. Leiden: Brill.
Lowe, Lisa 2015. *The Intimacies of Four Continents*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Magubane, B. 1986. "South Africa: On the Verge of Revolution." *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies* 15, no.1-2: 22-57. https://repositories.cdlib.org/uc/item/2d3649kd
Mantena, Karuna 2010. *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.*
Mbeki, Thabo 1998. "Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the Opening of the Debate in the National Assembly, on Reconciliation and Nation Building, National Assembly Cape Town, 29 May 1998." Department of international Relations and Cooperation. Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the Opening of the Debate in the National Assembly, on "Reconciliation and Nation Building, National Assembly Cape Town, 29 May 1998 (dirco.gov.za)
McClintock, Anne, and Rob Nixon 1986. "No Names Apart: The Separation of Word and History in Derrida's 'Le Dernier Mot du Racisme'." *Critical Inquiry* 13 (Autumn): 140-154.
McKinley, Dale T. 2017. *South Africa's Corporatised Liberation*. Auckland Park: Jacana Media.
Merrett, Christopher E. 1994. *A Culture of Censorship: Secrecy and Intellectual Repression in South Africa*. Cape Town: David Philip.
---- nd. "Political Censorship in South Africa: Aims and Consequences." *South African History Online*. https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/DC/remar82.3/remar82.3.pdf
Milanovic, B. 2019. *Capitalism Alone: The Future of the System that Rules the World*. London: Harvard University Press.
Mitchell, Timothy. 2002. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mullings, L. 2008. "Race and Globalization: Racialization from Below." In: *Transnational Blackness: Navigating the Global Color Line*. Edited by M. Marable and V. Agard-Jones. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 11–18.

Mutloatse, Mothobi 1980. "Introduction." *Forced Landing. Africa South: Contemporary Writings*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1-7.

Rönnbäck, Klas and Oscar Broberg 2019. *Capitalism and Colonialism: The Return on British Investments in Africa 1869*-1969. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Roth, Carol 2021. "We're Living Through the Greatest Transfer of Wealth From the Middle Class to the Elites in History." *Newsweek*, October 24. We're Living Through the Greatest Transfer of Wealth From the Middle Class to the Elites in History | Opinion (newsweek.com)

Satia, Priya 2008. *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle* East. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schreiner, Olive 1913 [1923]. *Thoughts On South Africa*. Edited by Cronwright Schreiner. London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd.

Schreuder, D., and J. Butler 2002. *Sir Graham Bower's Secret History of the Jameson Raid and the South African Crisis, 1895-1902*. Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck Society.

Schwab, Klaus 2016. *The Fourth Industrial Revolution*. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/

Skripac, David 2021. *Our Species is Being Genetically Modified: Are We Witnessing Humanity's March toward Extinction? Viruses Are Our Friends, Not Our Foes*. Global Research E Book, December. SkripacGenetically Modified.pdf

Spolaore, Enrico, and Romain Wacziarg 2017. "Barriers to the Spread of Prosperity." In: *The Long Economic and Political Shadow of History. Volume 1. A Global View*. Edited by Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou. London: CER [Centre for Economic Policy Research] Press, 51-61. https://voxeu.org/content/long-economic-and-political-shadow-history-volume-1

Stapledon, O. 1930 [1999]. *Last and first Men: A Story of the Near and Far Future*. London: Millennium. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/Last_and_First_Men.pdf

Tarde, Gabriel 1896 [1905]. *Underground Man*. Translated by Cloudesley Brereton. London: Duckworth and Co. https://archive.org/details/undergroundman00tard

Vighi, Fabio 2021. "The Central Bankers' Long Covid: An Incurable Condition." *The Philosophical Salon*. Los Angeles Review of Books. October 18. The Central Bankers' Long Covid: An Incurable Condition - The Philosophical Salon

Washington, Harriet A. 2006. *Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present*. New York: Harlem Moon Broadway Books.

Wells, H.G. 1921 [1910]. *The Sleeper Awakes*. In: *The Sleeper Awakes and Men Like Gods*. London: Odhams Press Limited, 1-184. *The Sleeper Awakes* is a revised edition of "When the Sleeper Awakes" (1899).

---- 1937. *Star-Begotten. A Biological Fantasia.* New York: The Viking Press. https://archive.org/details/WellsH.G.StarBegotten1937

---- 1940. *All Aboard for Ararat*. London: Secker and Warburg. https://ia802904.us.archive.org/13/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.158780/2015. 158780.

---- 1941. *Guide to the New World: A Handbook of Constructive World Revolution.* London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. WellsGuide.pdf

Wolff, Ernst 2021. "Uncovering the Corona Narrative." *Odysee.com*, August. https://odysee.com/@LongXXvids:c/Ernst-Wolf-speech---summary:3

Wolfe, Patrick 2006. "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native." *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (December): 387-409.

Yagisawa, Morimasa, Patrick J. Foster, Hideaki Hanaki and Satoshi Ōmura 2021. "Global trends in clinical studies of ivermectin in COVID-19." *The Japanese Journal of Antibiotics* 74, no. 1 (March): 44-95. http://jja-contents.wdc-jp.com/pdf/JJA74/74-1-open/74-1_44-95.pdf

Žižek, Slavoj 2015 "Slavoj Žižek on Looming Split between Capitalism and Democracy and Rise of Neo-Apartheid." *The South African Civil Society Information Service*, January 22. http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/2255.

1. The Wake of Colonialism

> Hopeless was voyaging round the Cape of Good Hope in a little boat. It was early in the morning, a strong wind was blowing. Hopeless hoisted a little sail and leaned back tranquilly. What should he fear in the little boat, which with its tiny draft glided over the reefs in those dangerous waters with the nimbleness of a living being?
>
> —Franz Kafka, *The Blue Octavo Notebooks*

As Kafka penned this sketch the gathering storm of the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic was about to break at the Cape of Good Hope, colonial mother city, place of global strategic importance, and index of modernity. The Cape has been a slave colony, a Royal Navy base since 1814, and is second only to Egypt and the Suez Canal for English maritime access to the Far East.[1]

Kafka's imaginary pilot might have glimpsed the penal colony of Robben Island where in 1821 Makanda Nxele, the prophet of the 1819 Cape frontier war, died when his boat capsized trying to escape the island prison. Thereafter the Xhosa awaited his return to finish the fight against the colonisers. As Nelson Mandela put it: 'The memory of that loss is woven into the language of my people who speak of a "forlorn hope" by the phrase "*Ukuza kuka Nxele*"' (2013: 325). The sense of hopelessness permeating post-apartheid South Africa was condensed in the conspiracy theory that the real Nelson Mandela died in 1985 and a look-a-like by the name of Gibson Makanda was installed by the apartheid government to negotiate the historic settlement (see Shoki 2020).

The Cape of Good Hope was named *Cabo das Tormentas* by Bartholomew Dias. Mr John Maxwell explained to The Royal Society that the name *Cabo das Tormentas* was changed by Dias's patron John II, King of Portugal, because 'when that Cape was doubled, he had good hopes of finding out a way by Sea to the *East Indies*, about which he was then very solicitous' (1707: 2424). Kafka's snapshot of the hopeless helmsman plays on the fact that often the word 'hope' is dropped and 'the Cape' suffices. Never, it seems, simply 'Cape Hope,' perhaps so as not to overplay a necessarily fragile optimism when confronted with the unpredictability of nature.[2] It is no accident that the vantage point from the Western Cape has often been taken as exemplary and

enigmatic, at once opening up perspective and clarification while threatening disorientation; as Maxwell described it, 'seeing it is a shred of Land stetch'd out into a vast Ocean on each side' (2424).[3]

Kafka's textual voyager could hardly have missed sea-emerging Table Mountain, the Roman Rock Lighthouse at Simon's Town, and across False Bay the enfolding Hottentots Holland Mountains. Simon's Town is named after Simon van der Stel, employee of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and first Governor of the Cape Dutch Colony. Outside of South Africa, Van der Stel is best known today for featuring in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (1755). In the notes to part two Rousseau recounts the following 'well-attested example, which I submit to the scrutiny of admirers of European political order:'

> All the efforts of the Dutch missionaries at the Cape of Good Hope have never been able to convert a single Hottentot. Van der Stel, Governor of the Cape, having taken one in as a baby, had him reared in the principles of the Christian religion and the practice of European customs. He was richly dressed, taught several languages, and his progress matched the care taken in his upbringing. The Governor, full of high hopes based on the boy's intelligence, sent him to India with a commissioner-general who employed the boy usefully in the company business. He returned to the Cape on the commissioner's death. A few days after his return, while he was visiting some of his Hottentot kinsmen, he decided to strip off his European finery and clothe himself in a sheepskin. He returned to the fort in this new garb, carrying a package which contained his former clothes, and presenting them to the Governor, he made the following speech: "Kindly observe, sir, that I disown this apparel for good. I also disown the Christian religion for the rest of my life. My resolution is to live and die in the religion, customs, and usages of my ancestors. The one favour I ask of you is to allow me to keep the necklace and the cutlass I am wearing. I shall keep them for the love of you." Immediately, without waiting for Van der Stel's reply, he took to his heels to escape and was never seen again at the Cape. (Rousseau 1994: 118)[4]

Home to the Khoekhoen (Hottentot) and the Khoisan (Bushmen), the Cape is bound up with the paradigm of primitivism and the dynamic tension between rejuvenating origin and threatening recidivism.[5] It is historically inseparable from questions of development and progress, justice and equality. For example, the Cape features in the first volume of Harriet Martineau's *Illustrations of Political Economy* (1832) that fed into Marx's critique of political economy.[6]

Here at the Atlantic peninsula of Africa, gateway to the East and byway to Europe, lurk the reefs and dangerous waters of the world system. Linchpin of European commercial development and cornerstone of the whole British colonial system, one of the prime sources of mineral riches and key link in the global financial system, the African promontory was a vital part of what has been described as the first modern age of globalisation (1870-1914). It is worth noting at the outset that, as Yuk Hui has recently underlined, the idea of globalisation is nothing new. Indeed, the idea of world as reciprocally connected whole—cause and effect of itself—is familiar from Plato's conception of the world soul in *Timaeus* and the Kant's analysis of the interconnected purposiveness of nature in §64 of *Critique of Judgement* (see Hui 2019: 62).

We might say that we are here in the presence of a literary—that is to say, an aesthetic and imaginative—landscape, knowing that such a topology or image begs the question of what it is to *be* in such a context. As much a question of awareness as of judgment, how does one orient oneself in such an all-encompassing representation? From which vantage-point can one represent such a representation, one that must include this very act of representing?

Kafka's craftsman can serve as a useful guide regarding this legacy. Whether purposively or by chance (fortuitously), the little boat gliding with the metaphorical 'nimbleness of a living being' depicts one of the key conceptions of metaphor itself; as transport, the analogical passage of qualities based on perceived similarity. Most important for what follows is the tethering of the exemplary image of the boat or ship to thinking about politics. Plato has Socrates explain to Alcibiades the link between personal virtue and the good politician:

> SOC. Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation [*aretes kybernetikes*], do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow-sailors?
>
> ALC. I do: they must all perish.
>
> SOC . And in just the same way, if a state, or any office or authority, is lacking in excellence or virtue, it will be overtaken by failure? (1964: 135c, 219)[7]

The one in charge, at sea and at home, must be good at steering (*kybernetikos*) for the safety of himself and his craft depend on such skill. Governance, self-regulation—what today is often called social cohesion or sovereignty, independence, freedom—is a matter of control and communication. Hence

our use of *cybernetics* to denote communication or feedback systems in which cause and effect form a loop, or control and communication in the animal and the machine. Survival depends upon the functioning of the system, the interactive relation of parts and whole in the purposive system.

When Aristotle explains the various kind of rule, he underlines that '[t]he trainer or the helmsman considers the good of those committed to his care' (*Politics*, 1279a, 2029).[8] (Aristotle is arguing against the assumption on the part of citizens that they, like the helmsman who is also a sailor, can govern because they have been governed.) This is part of the recapitulation of the central argument *Politics* 'that man is by nature a political animal' that lays out the basis of community:

> And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together; not but that they are also brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states.

It would be difficult find, in the western tradition at least, a more consequential set of propositions concerning the importance of speech or language in the development of man and society away from (or towards the fulfilment of) their natural state. We shall see this bedrock of concepts and narratives, with its contradictory teleology and evaluative discrimination, return again and again in what follows.

Amid what Antonio Guterres has called 'a tsunami of hate' (2020) traceable concepts, narratives, rhetorical strategies, and imagery inform interpretation of whether we are witnessing the unique window of opportunity for liberty and security or more global carpet-bagging.[9] Poised between failure of imagination and overactive imagination, reason is once again at stake. Are we confronting the master plan of globalist takeover or clumsy attempts to hide an increasingly familiar 'blind panic' (Streeck 2014: 10)? Others are more positive: ""The pandemic represents a rare but narrow window of opportunity to reflect, reimagine and reset our world"" (Schwab 2020a).[10]

Those who have benefitted from the system that now needs reforming see themselves as most able to guide us to a true global civilisation. What is required is trust: 'we face a terrible lack of trust' (UN 2017: 2). The moral critique of capitalism folds into a case for protective world government (or federation of nations) built on that system in the interest of humanity. Somewhere between necessity and obligation, we have a choice. The work of Kant, the aporias of political and moral thinking that distinguish his writings,

and the humanist self-righteousness he is often accused of embodying, are as essential today as they were to understanding the first modern era of globalisation.[11] Besieged by information warfare and waves of fear, the end of the road might be the graveyard of freedom. What is striking is the prevalence of Kantian schemas in public discourse.

Howard Caygill (1989) has shown the intersection of moral philosophy and political economy that underlies the discourse of progress emphatically directed by practical efficiency and the common good. The realm of the harmony of private and public interests involves the interplay between imagination and understanding. This is what Kant called 'the aesthetic power of judgement' and it 'constitutes enlightenment proper' (1790: 161 §40, note). Holding judgement up to reason and putting oneself 'in the position of everyone else' is 'a relation between understanding and imagination' (162). It is linked to the moral point of view, human development and world history. As much as the call to decision embraces what is economic, technological, philosophical and moral, it is also ineradicably aesthetic: 'an art of political soothsaying about future changes in states' (Kant 1784: 119; see Gottschalk 1963: vi). Man cannot conceive of himself without a goal, the determination of his ends by reason, and it is here that we try to orient ourselves amidst 'a narrative of dehumanisation' (Dodsworth 2021: 64).

Appropriating the language of emancipation is an indispensable step in response to what the authors of *The Great Reset* describe as 'this unprecedented opportunity to reimagine our world' (Schwab and Malleret 2020: 17).[12] On 'a terrain propitious for conspiracy theories and the propagation of rumours, fake news, mistruths and other pernicious ideas' (182), all else is dismissed as paranoia shielding itself behind fearmongering. Selfish individuals who, given the existential crisis, are not selfish enough. As Schwab and Malleret put it, when 'narratives drive our behaviour' and 'our collective imaginations' (207) are at stake, judgement can 'be reframed as an ethical choice, reflecting that, in almost all cases, human practices labour under moral considerations' (189).[13] Resistance is recoded as failing to act in a way that we sanction: 'Doing nothing, or too little, is to sleepwalk to ever-more social inequality, economic imbalances, injustice and environmental degradation' (244).[14]

Modernity as techno-economic progress associated with capitalism meets the necessity of progress grounded in technological development associated with Marx's dialectical materialism. When the only remaining question boils down to one of authority—who will be at the helm?—the question of

personnel will be adjudicated by those already in charge. The solution to 'the organized global conquest of the earth' (Heidegger 1991: 248) is to guide the process. In a global state of emergency, steering a course through environmental catastrophe and/or economic catastrophe, it is not the truth that matters but whether it is considered harmful. Suffocated by an idiocy that cannot see its own limitations—that takes its own foreshortening for progress—, the prospect of returning to nature as a consequence of poisoning nature looms. Build back better, or destroy to replace?

The necessary circularity of the responsible demand for a responsible response (agreement), as programmed and predictable, is not only rhetorical in pre-dicting an essential excluded antagonist. The closure of imminent disaster is open to a choice that submits to measures for halting the inevitable—which is then not inevitable, or rather its inevitability must (inevitably) be invoked to forestall it. On the one hand, we have the element of choice (a great opportunity), while on the other hand the exclusion of choice (there is no alternative). You are free to make this (non)choice. Either the precondition of freedom (life) is gone, or freedom is given up to preserve life. Perhaps one should just submit to the irresistible tide of propaganda? As Kant put it: 'Brooding over one and the same idea when there is no possible point to it … is dumb *madness*' (Kant 1798: 309-10). Or, faced with such incessant fixation, does one have an obligation to refuse compliance?

What you believe might just influence the way things turn out.[15] Are we looking at a rear-guard effort to shore up corporate capitalism or a transformative impulse for improvement? Reading the causal connections and motivations at work involves negotiating the sophistical snares and aporetics of public debate, amid the fog of censorship. Who benefits from the current crisis intensifying "'chains of suspicion, and the technological explosion'" (Cixin 2016: 7)?[16] To be baffled at paranoia is itself baffling with so many coincidences lining up as if by chance.

So far the ongoing crisis does not appear to have delivered on the hoped for 'widening of dialogic communities' and 'more inclusive communication communities' (Linklater 1998: 5), but rather the opposite. Reactions to the first modern age of globalisation feel relevant as echoes of the appeal for 'a concerted world-wide effort to sustain and continue the progress of the past two centuries' (Wells 1932: 782) resound.[17] Suspicion of the promised 'post-nation state, worldwide, universalizing-without-colonizing redress of most of the wrongs of history' (Brown 2009: 122; see Derrida 2005: 57) is as prevalent

today as it was then, and the public use of reason curtailed. Fear of global enslavement under the boot of corporate masters excites hopelessness and imagination: "'It wasn't an alien invasion, but it was like an alien invasion'" (Hayes 2021).

In such a context, the worst possible outcome would be a state weakened, for example, by corruption and/or incompetence. International agencies would then be seen as means of disciplining the ruling party who would attempt to use that lever to assert their hegemony. Working at one and the same time to shore up national sovereignty and abandon the nation state they hope to save themselves by ascending to the safe haven of global governance. Leaving behind a weakened state, the national bourgeoisie would present themselves as defenders of the remains of national sovereignty and loyal intermediaries hammering out a necessary compromise with strategic intelligence (see WEF 2020; and Wecke 2021).[18]

Is the colonialist trick—proffer oneself as the solution to the problems one has created—to be repeated at the national and global level by way of a surveillance and control system? Or is there a genuine attempt 'to build a new social contract that honours the dignity of every human being' (Schwab 2020b)?

With humanity again at stake, the prospect of a developmental world state spawning a state of dependency summons up the nightmare of colonialism with the globe as occupied territory. Whether we are confronting a global pro-slavery rebellion is the problem that this study seeks to address. One searches for precedents, parallels, and presentiments that might orientate thinking and interpretation. And since these coordinates are also the product of interpretation, and 'the foundational intersection of aesthetics and politics' (Kazanjian 2003: 141), judgement confronts an abyss.

Recall Kafka's hunter Gracchus—himself victim of an inattentive helmsman—telling his woke interlocutor about an image from the South African headland:

> "On the wall opposite me is a little picture, evidently of a bushman [Buschmann] who is aiming his spear at me and taking cover as best he can behind a beautifully painted shield. On shipboard one often comes across silly pictures, but that is the silliest of them all." (Kafka 1917: 229)

Notes

[1] 'Despite the growing importance of the Suez Canal [opened 1869] for British trade with Asia, the Cape remained a military base of "immense importance for England" (Chamberlain) for the simple reason that the Canal might be vulnerable to closure in a major European war. It remained, in the Colonial Secretary's view, "the cornerstone of the whole British colonial system".' (Ferguson 2003: 207)

[2] Joseph Conrad wondered whether because 'men are shy of confessing their good hopes, it has become the nameless cape—the Cape *tout court*' (1906: 121). Kafka's traveller follows in the wake of Eudoxus, navigator for Ptolemaic Egypt, as does another literary precursor, Robinson Crusoe, who made his 'way directly over the Atlantic Sea, to the Cape de bon Esperance, or as we call it, The Cape of Good Hope' (Defoe 1719: 203). See Immanuel Kant on the dream of happily spending one's life 'on some island unknown to the rest of the world—all of which novelists and writers of Robinsonades use so cleverly' (1790: 137, §29). To say nothing of the unlikely hypothesis that the great fish carried Jonah round the Cape of Good Hope to the Persian Gulf (see Fraser 1909: 218); and the theological-political importance of the figure of Leviathan (see chapter 1 of Schmitt 1938).

[3] As Olive Schreiner observed, looking out seaward from the top of the Kloof behind Cape Town, 'to your right is Table Mountain, one of the sublimest masses of solid matter in the world, below is the town,' and '[a]s you turn, behind you is the blue South Atlantic as far as the eye can reach' (1891: 32).

[4] This incident is depicted in the engraving by Charles Dominique Joseph Eisen that forms the frontispiece to the first edition of Rousseau's text (see Klausen 2014: 216). Rousseau's source was Abbé Prévost's *General History of Voyages* (1746) which reproduces volume 1 of Peter Kolben's *The Present State of the Cape of Good Hope* (1742). John Maxwell also relays this story: 'There was a Hottentot, who had liv'd for some considerable time in Holland and the and had learned to speak Dutch and Portugeze very well, whom, upon his return home, his Wife, Children, or Friends, could not endure, nor would they converse with him, till upon returning his Ancient Habit, Diet, and Customs, he had returned to their way of Living' (1707: 2427). It seems that Maxwell met Kolben, who was also known as Kolbe and Kolb: 'When I was at the Cape of Good Hope, I met with one Mr. Kolbe, who was sent thither by a Prussian Lord, the Baron Krosik' (2432). See also Govier (1999) on the involvement of The Royal Society in the slave trade; Schoeman (2207: 375-384) on Van der Stel; and Penn (1997) on Kolben.

[5] According to Wensel Heemra, speaking in 1830, 'the cause of the Hottentots was like a ship in a storm, rolling from side to side, every moment expecting to sink or be wrecked' (in Ross 2017: 9). As one the earliest novels in English about South Africa and Makanda Nxele (referred to above by Mandela) opens with the phrase: 'THE turbulence of the storm was past, but its power remained' (Anonymous 1834: 1).

[6] 'That was where they landed, back in the seventeenth century. That was where it all started. This life of endless warring; of massacres; of detentions without access to the law; of maiming and death in detention; this railroad to prison; this denial of millions of people, guilty of only one 'crime'— the pigmentation of their skins.' (Matshoba 1979: 11)

[7] Such skill is not the monopoly of the good leader: 'A really good ship's doctor or captain, for example, can distinguish in the exercise of his skill between what is feasible and what is not feasible. He attempts what is feasible, and avoids what is not feasible. What is more, if he makes a false move somewhere, he is capable of correcting it. That is how it can be with our unjust man' (Plato 2003: 360e-361, 41).

[8] 'With Mandela at the helm, we were on the move. It was a time of embracing, of grand gestures, of style and the possibility of everyday freedom, whatever the structural and historical constraints. For those of us who had lived under the stop-watch of race, whose fathers and mothers knew only stigmatization, our lives compressed into tight racial corners, we too it seemed were released from long-term imprisonment.' (Desai 2014) See Kant (1783: 58-59).

[9] Invoking H.G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds*, Slavoj Žižek sees an opportunity in the current crisis that signals 'the urgent need for a reorganization of the global economy which will no longer be at the mercy of the world market' (2020: 44).To understand what he means by the opportunity to reinvent Communism, Žižek quotes with approval WHO chief Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, and concludes: 'The coronavirus epidemic does not signal just the limit of the market globalization, it also signals the even more fatal limit of nationalist populism which insists on full state sovereignty' (68). According to Al Gore, the current crisis has the potential "'to move the world in the right direction'" (quoted in Goode and Rogers 2020). The Managing Director of the IMF has also seen 'some tremendous opportunities' (Georgieva 2020). See also see Horn (2018); and Fleming (2021).

[10] 'It was eventually revealed, thanks to a review and report carried out by the Swiss authorities and a man named Peter Hug, that Sulzer Escher-Wyss began secretly procuring and building key parts for nuclear weapons during the 1960s. The company, while Schwab was on the board, also began playing a critical key role in the development of South Africa's illegal nuclear weapons programme during the darkest years of the apartheid regime. Klaus Schwab was a leading figure in the founding of a company culture which helped Pretoria build six nuclear weapons and partially assemble a seventh.' (Vedmore 2021) See Kries (2007: 381).

[11] 'Human rights discourse, which has been dominant since the end of the Second World War, is a discourse that stems fairly directly from Kant's moral philosophy.' (Vial 2016: 24; see Brennan 1997). 'President Bush may be severely criticized for assigning himself far too grandiose a role in the shaping of human destiny, but he has tried to shape this destiny in accordance with the noble ideals that uplifted the mind of the Abbe St. Pierre, the Marquis de Condorcet, and Immanuel Kant.' (Harris 2007: 49) Stone (2016) identifies Kant with the emergent the New World Order and self-imposed slavery. See also Vine (2020); Project for the New American Century (2000); and Pilger (2020).

[12] Shareholder value is to be turned into stakeholder value (see Denning 2020). Terence Corcoran (2002) attempts to defend the market system by comparing current moves to institute stakeholder capitalism with the Nazi corporate law. However, it seems that the Nazis boosted corporate profit in Germany and reduced employment: election promises were honoured (see Kessler 1938: 661; and Bel 2010). See also Rickards (2016) on economics before neoliberalism; and Rogan (2017), Deer (2019), Mason (2019), Joubert (2020), and Goldstone and Hoffman (2021) for interpretations of the current system. Who would want to enslave humanity and destroy the world economy by way of what H.G. Wells in *The New World Order* described as: 'A sort of massacre of small and independent businesses' (1940: 78)?

[13] 'Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the United Nations System, Governments, and Major Groups in every area in which humans impact on the environment.' (UNCED 1992) 'There is a growing consensus that the world is experiencing a "third wave of autocratization." For the first time in nearly 20 years, autocracies outstrip democracies: 92 countries or 54 percent of the world's population currently live under authoritarian rule. Researchers from V-Dem estimate that 2.6 billion people, or 35 percent of the world's population, are living through autocratization, a process inverse to democratization in which political rights and freedoms are increasingly limited.' (Feldstein 2021: 2-3)

[14] The Great Analysis is called for because 'things are coming to a breaking-point:' 'Capitalism is everywhere caricaturing itself; most of all in America, where the grab-bag is richer' (Archer 1912: 11, 108). 'But is there one to whom we can look with the faintest gleam of hope for a world-shaping, world-redeeming thought? Is there one who has shown any sense of the new conditions of planetary life, the vast new issues opening out before the human race?' (95-96)

[15] "'First we've got population. The world today has 6.8 billion people—that's headed up to about 9 billion. Now if we do a really great job on new vaccines, health care, reproductive health services we could lower that by perhaps ten or fifteen per cent.'" (Gates 2010: 443–449) It seems that Gates may have had in mind the reduction in the reproduction of children that appears to follow from improved health. Skouras (2020) offers an alternative interpretation. See also Weinstein (2021); and Hindmarsh (2021).

[16] 'One area of real success [Of China's COVID policy], and that may have application in other countries, is the rapid development of an online "health code" system (健康码). This innovative app tracks an individual's travel, contact history, and biometric data (for example, body temperature) directly through one's smartphone.' (Tan 2020)

[17] "'We have been born and brought up in a social order that is now obviously a failure in quite primary respects. Our social order is bankrupt. It is not delivering the goods. It is defaulting and breaking up. War, pervading and increasing brutality, lack of any liberty, economic mismanagement, frightful insufficiency in the midst of possible super-abundance—am I overstating the indictment?'" (Wells 1937: 164-165) See Desmet (2021) on mass formation; and Goldberg (2021). For an example of the ecology of the disinformation industry see *Revolver News* (2022); and High Court of South Africa (2021) for the operation of the law.

[18] 'More fundamentally, our basic narrative has lost its credibility and appeal ... We need a new narrative to shape the next stage of globalization. The more thoughtful that new narrative, the healthier our economies will be.' (Rodrik 2011: xiii) See Toussaint (1999) and Campe (2002: 271). See also Koehler (1995); Bond (2004); Barnard-Naudé (2017: 119) and Slobodian (2018: 87–88). Assuredly, 'the dominant views of an economic epoch are distinctive and as important as the technological and epochal innovation that characterizes it' (Kuznets 1960: 12). See Okonta (2020: 26).

References

Anonymous 1834. *Makanna; Or, The Land of the Savage. Volume 1*. London: Whittaker

and Co.
https://archive.org/details/makannaorlandofs01londiala
Archer, William 1912. *The Great Analysis: A Plea for a Rational World Order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. The Great Analysis: A Plea for a Rational World-order : William Archer , Gilbert Murray : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive Arendt,
Hannah 1951 [2004]. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Schocken Books.
Aristotle *Politics*. In: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Bollingen Series LXXI. Volume 2. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. New Haven: Princeton University Press, 1995, 1986–2129.
Barnard-Naudé, J. 2017. "Hannah Arendt's Work of Mourning: The Politics of Loss, 'The Rise of the Social' and the Ends of Apartheid." In: *Remains of the Social: Desiring the Post-Apartheid*. Edited by M. van Bever Donker, R. Truscott, G. Minkley, and P. Lalu. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 117–145.
Bel, Germa 2010. "Against the Mainstream: Nazi Privatization in 1930s Germany." *The Economic History Review* 63, no. 1 (February): 34-55.
https://libcom.org/files/Nazi%20Privatisation.pdf
Bond, P. 2004. "Facing Global Apartheid." In: *The Politics of Empire: Globalisation and Crisis*. Edited by A. Freeman and B. Kagarlitsky. London: Pluto Press, 189–230.
Brennan, Timothy 1997. *At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Brown, W. 2009. "Sovereign Hesitations." In: *Derrida and the Time of the Political*. Edited by P. Cheah and S. Guerlac. London: Duke University Press, 114–132.
Campe, Rüdiger 2002 [2012]. *The Game of Probability: Literature and Calculation from Pascal to Kleist*. Translated by Ellwood H. Wiggins, Jr. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
Caygill, Howard 1989. *The Art of Judgement*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Conrad, Joseph 1906. *The Mirror of the Sea*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers. https://archive.org/details/cu31924013598762/page/n3/mode/2up
Corcoran, Terence 2020. "The murky rise of Klaus Schwab's stakeholder 'capitalism' and the WEF's Davos corporate plan." *Financial Post*, January 22.
https://financialpost.com/opinion/terence-corcoran-the-murky-rise-of-stakeholder-capitalism
Deer, Jemma 2019. "Quenched: Five Fires for Thinking Extinction." *Oxford Literary Review* 4, no.1: 1-17.
Defoe, Daniel 1719. *The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, Being the Second and Last Part of His Life, and Strange Surprising Accounts of His Travels Round three Parts of the Globe. Written By Himself*. London: W. Taylor. Second edition.
Denning, Steve 2020. "Why Stakeholder Capitalism Will Fail." *For Economic Justice*.
https://www.foreconomicjustice.org/?p=19853#:~:text=%20Why%20Stakeholder%20Capitalism%20Will%20Fail%20%201,rules%20and%20procedures%2C%20and%20conflicts%20about...%20More%20
Derrida, Jacques 2005 [2003]. *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason*. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Desai, Ashwin 2014. "Mandela's Long Walk." *Against the Current* 168 (Jan-Feb.).
https://againstthecurrent.org/atc168/p4064/

Desmet, Mattias 2021. "Totalitarianism & Mass Formation in the World explained." Dr. Mattias Desmet: Totalitarianism & Mass Formation in the World explained (extremelyamerican.com)

Dodsworth, Laura 2021. *State of Fear: How the UK Government Weaponised Fear During the COVID-19 Epidemic*. London: Pinter and Martin.

Feldstein, Steven 2021. *The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ferguson, Niall 2003. *Empire: the Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*. New York: Basic Books.

Fleming, Richard M. 20121. *Is COVID-19 a Bioweapon? A Scientific and Forensic Investigation*. New York: Skyhorse Publishing.

Fraser, David 1909. *The Short Cut to India. The Record of a Journey along the Route of the Baghdad Railway*. London: William Blackwood and Sons.

Gates, B. 2010. "Innovating to Zero," *TED2010. Youtube.* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JaF-fq2Zn7I

Georgieva, K. 2020. "The Great Reset: Remarks to World Economic Forum" *International Monetary Fund*, May 22. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/03/sp060320-remarks-to-world-economic-forum-the-great-reset

Goldberg, Kim 2021. "Mass Formation: How the Left Got Duped." December 28. Mass Formation: How the Left Got Duped - Kim Goldberg (substack.com)

Goldstone, Richard, and Paul Hoffman 2021. "Do kleptocrats call the shots at the UN? Its special session against corruption was a wasted opportunity." *Daily Maverick*, June 8. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-06-08-do-kleptocrats-call-the-shots-at-the-un-its-special-session-against-corruption-was-a-wasted-opportunity/

Goode, L., and A. Rogers 2020. "Global Warming. Inequality. Covid-19. And Al Gore Is ... Optimistic?" *Wired*, July 8. https://www.wired.com/story/global-warming-inequality-covid-19-and-al-gore-is-optimistic/

Gottschalk, Louis 1963. "Foreword." *Generalization in the Writing of History. A Report of the Committee of Historical Analysis of the Social Science Research Council*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Govier, Mark 1999. "The Royal Society, Slavery and the Island of Jamaica: 1660-1700." *Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London* 53, no. 2 (May): 203-217. The Royal Society, slavery and the island of jamaica: 1660-1700 | Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London (royalsocietypublishing.org)

Guterres, Antonio 2020. "Secretary-General Denounces 'Tsunami' of Xenophobia Unleashed amid COVID-19, Calling for All-Out Effort against Hate Speech." *United Nations Press Release*, May 8. https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20076.doc.htm

Harris, Lee 2007. *The Suicide of Reason: Radical Islam's Threat to the West*. New York: Basic Books.

Hayes, Liz 2021. "Was COVID-19 made inside a Chinese lab?" *60 Minutes Australia. Under Investigation*, April 14. https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=zgTeNFIY-b0

Heidegger, Martin 1991. *Nietzsche. Volumes 3 and 4. The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics*. Edited by David Farrell Krell. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi. New York: Harper Collins.

High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division, Cape Town) 2021. CASE NO.: 5852/2021 DATE: 2021.05.27. HIGH COURT (filesusr.com)

Hindmarsh, Bruce 2021. "Till We Have Faces: An Analysis of COVID-19 and Public Policy." *Canadian Covid Care Alliance*. November. https://www.canadiancovidcarealliance.org/media-resources/till-we-have-faces-an-analysis-of-covid-19-and-public-policy/?__cf_chl_f_tk=liUf_osfEjQ06R7ROAm_wRrilLAZ_Xf_yPu1heCsrnk-1638787794-0-gaNycGzNB9E

Horn, Eva 2018 [2014]. *The Future as Catastrophe: Imagining Disaster in the Modern Age*. Translated by Valentine Pakis. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hui, Yuk 2019. *Recursivity and Contingency*. London: Rowman and Littlefield.

Joubert, C. 2020. "The Great Reset," *Goldbroker*, June 17. https://www.goldbroker.com/news/the-great-reset-1878#:~:text=The%20Great%20RESET%20On%20June%203%2C%202020%20%2C,she%20declared%20that%20this%20epidemic%20is%20an%20

Kafka, Franz 1917 [1983]. "The Hunter Gracchus." In: *The Complete Stories and Parables*. Edited by Norman N. Glatzer. Translated by Willa and Edwin Muir. New York: Quality Paperback Book Club, 226-230.

---- 1918 [1991]. *The Blue Octavo Notebooks*. Edited by Max Brod. Translated by Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins. Cambridge: Exact Change.

Kant, Immanuel 1783 [2002]. "Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as a science." In: *Theoretical Philosophy After 1781*. Edited by Henry Allison and Peter Heath. Translated by Gary Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 29-169.

---- 1784 [2007]. "Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim." In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 107-120.

---- 1790 [1987]. *Critique of Judgement*. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

---- 1798 [2007]. "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view." In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Kessler, William Conrad 1938. "The German Corporation Law of 1937." *The American Economic Review* 28, no. 4 (December): 653-662.

Klausen, Jeremy Casas 1994. *Fugitive Rousseau: Slavery, Primitivism, and Political Freedom*. New York Fordham University Press.

Koehler, G. 1995. "The Three Meanings of Global Apartheid: Empirical, Normative, Existential." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 20, no.3 (July–Sept): 403–413.

Kreis, George 2007. *Switzerland and South Africa 1948-1994. Final Report of the NFP 42+ commissioned by the Swiss Federal Council*. Oxford: Peter Lang.

Kuznets, Simon 1960. *Modern Economic* Growth. New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing.

Mandela, Nelson 1 9 9 4 [2013] *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*.New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company.

Mason, Paul 2019. *Clear, Bright Future: A Radical Defence of the Human Being*. London: Penguin.

Matshoba, Mtutuzeli 1979. "A Pilgrimage to the Isle of Makana." *Staffrider* 2, no. 2 (April/May): 10-21.

Maxwell, John 1707. "An Account of the Cape of Good Hope, by Mr. John Maxwell: Communicated by the Reverend Dr. John Harris, F.R.S." *Philosophical Transactions (1683-1775)* 25 (1706-1707), no. 310 (01 June): 2423-2434. VII. An account of the Cape of Good Hope (royalsocietypublishing.org)

Okonta, Ike 2020. *The Failure of Leadership in Africa's Development*. Maryland: Lexington Books.

Penn, Nigel 1997. "Notes Towards a Rereading of Peter Kolb." *Kronos* 24 (November): 41-45.

Pilger, J. 2020. "John Pilger reveals the American plan: a new Pearl Harbour." December 16. https://www.newstatesman.com/node/192545

Plato 1964. *Alcibiades I*. In: *Charmides, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, The Lovers, Theages, Minos, Epinomes*. Translated by W.R.M. Lamb. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 151-153. 93-223

---- 2003. *The Republic*. Edited by G.R.F. Ferrari. Translated by Tom Griffith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Project for the New American Century 2000. "*Rebuilding America's Defences: strategy, forces and resources for a new century*." September. https://ia803100.us.archive.org/32/items/RebuildingAmericasDefenses/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf

Revolver News 2022. "Busted: Disinformation Operative Who Attacked Elon Musk's Push for "Free Speech" Caught Red-Handed in Secret Influence Operation." *RevolverNews*, May 22. Busted: Disinformation Operative Who Attacked Elon Musk's Push for "Free Speech" Caught Red-Handed in Secret Influence Operation - Revolver

Rickards, James 2016. *The Road to Ruin: The Global Elite's Secret Plan for the Next Financial* Crisis. New York: Penguin Random House.

Rodrik, Dani 2011. *The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Market Can't Coexist*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rogan, Tim 2017. *The Moral Economists: R.H. Tawney, Karl Polanyi, E.P. Thompson, and the Critique of Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ross, Robert 2017. "Document 5: The Bethelsdorp dinner to celebrate Ordinance 50." *These Oppressions Won't Cease. An Anthology of the Political Thought of the Cape Khoesan, 1777-1879*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 9-12.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 1994 [1755]. *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. Edited by Patrick Coleman and translated by Franklin Philip. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmitt, Carl 1938 [1996]. *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol*. Translated by George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein. London: Greenwood Press.

Schoeman, Karel 2007. *Early Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1717*. Pretoria: Protea Book House.

Schreiner, Olive 1891 [1923]. "South Africa: Its Natural Features, Its Diverse Peoples, Its Political Status: The Problem." *Thoughts on South Africa*. London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 27-64.

Schwab, Klaus 2020a. *World Economic Forum, Sustainable Development Summit, 21-24 September*. https://www.weforum.org/great-reset/

Schwab, Klaus 2020b. "The Great Reset." *World Economic Forum*. The Great Reset | World Economic Forum (weforum.org)

Schwab, Klaus, and Thierry Malleret 2020. *COVID-19: The Great Reset*. Geneva: The World Economic Forum.

Shoki, William 2020. "On Conspiracy Theories." *Africa is a Country*, January 15. On conspiracy theories (africasacountry.com)

Skouras, S. 2020. "David Icke Interview: Bill Gates, Elon Musk & Soros Are Frontmen For The Top of the Pyramid." April 17. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F3zKaZlKaDY

Slobodian, Q. 2018. *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*. London: Harvard University Press.

Stone, Sean 2016. *New World Order: A Strategy of Imperialism*. Walterville, OR: Trine Day LLC.

Streeck, W. 2014 [2013]. *Buying Time: the Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism*. Translated by P. Camiller. London: Verso.

Tan, Shining 2020. "China's Novel Health Tracker: Green on Public Health, Red on Data Surveillance." *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, May 4. https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/chinas-novel-health-tracker-green-public-health-red-data-surveillance

Toussaint, E. 1999. *Your Money or Your Life: The Tyranny of Global Finance*. Translated by R. Krishnan and V. Briault Manus. London: Pluto Press.

UNCED (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) 1992. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/outcomedocuments/agenda21

UN (United Nations) 2017. "Secretary-General's remarks at the World Government Summit with Q&A." *Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth*. https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2017/02/secretary-generals-remarks-world-government-summit-qa/

Vedmore, Johnny 2021. "Schwab Family Values." *Unlimited Hangout*. February 20. https://unlimitedhangout.com/2021/02/investigative-reports/schwab-family-values/

Vial, Theodore 2016. *Modern Religion, Modern Race*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vine, David 2020. *United States of War: A Global History of America's Endless Conflicts, from Columbus to the United States*. Oakland: University of California Press.

Visser, N. 1993. "The Politics of Future Projection in South African fiction." In: *Black/White Writing: Essays on South African Literature*. Edited by P. Fletcher. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 62–82.

Wecke, Ivan 2021. "Conspiracy theories aside, there is something fishy about the Great Reset." *OpenDemocracy*. August 16. Conspiracy theories aside, there is something fishy about the Great Reset | openDemocracy

Weinstein, Bret 2021. "COVID, Ivermectin, and the Crime of the Century." *DarkHorse Podcast*, June. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AMenTxut2Os

Wells, H.G. 1932. *The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind*. London: William Heinemann Ltd. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.222465
---- 1937. *Star-Begotten. A Biological Fantasia.* New York: The Viking Press. https://archive.org/details/WellsH.G.StarBegotten1937
---- 1940. *The New World Order. Whether it is attainable, how it can be attained, and what sort of world a world at peace will have to* be. London: Secker and Warburg. https://archive.org/details/TheNewWorldOrder
WEF (World Economic Forum) 2020. "Strategic insights and contextual intelligence from the World Economic Forum." September 17. https://intelligence.weforum.org/
Žižek, Slavoj 2020. *Pandemic! COVID-19 Shakes the World*. New York: OR Books.

This Vanishing Race



The South African Khoisan Bushmen are entangled in the idea of the origin and destination of the human race. At once vanished indigenes and resisters of colonialism, bearers of mitochondrial DNA linking them to the earliest humans, they represent a lost past and the inexorability of change. The motto on the South African coat of arms, '!ke e: ǀxarra ǁke,' is Khoisan for 'diverse people unite.'

Once a threat to the colonial settlers and African pastoralists alike, the fate of the Bushmen is both a warning from the past and a possible scenario about our future. As one of the colonial children in Olive Schreiner's *The Story of an African Farm*, set in 1862, remarks

> "It was one of them, one of these old wild Bushmen, that painted those," said the boy, nodding towards the pictures ... "Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a little yellow face peeping out among the stones." He paused, a dreamy look coming over his face. "And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on here, looking at everything like they look now." (Schreiner 1883: 17-18)

Commemorating the victims of colonialism and development is part of the baggage of colonial melancholy.[1]

Like indigenes elsewhere, the Khoisan were exterminated, enslaved, and assimilated as they became a portion of an established system, which left absolute power in the hands of the very people who most benefitted from their oppression. Those sacrificed to the juggernaut of historical progress serve as a proxy for the nervous contemplation of the fate that may lie in store for the current victors:

> Little is now known of the final struggle of the clans that once occupied the present Cape Colony. The actors therein have with few exceptions passed away, and the only remembrance preserved is that in every instance they maintained the hopeless conflict with an unconquerable spirit, fighting 'without conscience' to the very last against the men who had predetermined to destroy them utterly. (Stow 1905: 216)

Narcissism transmutes history into nature, and the invisible hand of fate becomes the final arbiter of primitive times. Those who fall behind in the race are destined to become a detail of history.

John Philip, Superintendent of the London Missionary Society at the Cape and follower of Adam Smith's political economy, witnessed the resistance of the Bushmen. He concluded: 'The spirit which animated the Spartans who fell at Thermopylae, contending for their political rights, was not more resolute and determined than that which actuates the roving Bushmen when they have no alternative but *personal* slavery or death" (1828 II: 320). Invoking the slave-owning Spartans confirms a law of nature: "[s]elf-preservation is the first law of nature" (5).[2]

Philip linked the nineteenth century oppression of the natives to 'the change which has taken place in their relative value as labourers, by the abolition of the slave-trade in 1807:'

> While slaves could be got for a trifle, by the vessels engaged in this trade touching at the Cape, the natives were not of much importance to the colonists, and many of them in those districts in which slaves were numerous were allowed to live after their ancient manner. In the more remote and thinly-inhabited districts of the colony, in which there were few slaves, and in which the restraints of law and government were scarcely felt, the natives were more dreaded, and, therefore, more hated and oppressed. (1828 I: xvii)

Philip campaigned tirelessly for the benefits of free labour and equality before the law along the lines of the morality preached to the British working class.[3]

Abolitionism bore fruit in Ordinance 50 of 1828 that freed the Hottentots and Bushmen from legal discrimination, releasing them to own land and sell their labour on the open market. Slavery was abolished in the British empire

in 1834, and 1838 saw the end of 'apprenticeship' at the Cape. However, the Masters and Servants Act of 1841 repealed Ordinance 50 of 1828, giving employers a firmer hold over their servants. This was the first labour law to include workers of all races, and the Masters and Servants Act of 1856 was even more ruthless (Simons and Simons 1969). A free labour regime did not suit the conditions of colonial development.

When in the mid-nineteenth century philologist Wilhelm Bleek explored the language and folklore of the Bushmen he thought he had found living traces of the origin of humanity. For Bleek the language and culture of '"this dying out race"' (quoted in Thornton 1983: 8) held clues to the nature of human development. With the publication of *Specimens of Bushmen Folklore* (1911), edited by his daughter-in-law Lucy Lloyd, the Bushmen as symbols of a common past and victims of the attrition of history were monumentalised.

The influence of Bleek and Lloyd's South African archive can be found in Philip K. Dick's 1964 science-fiction novel *Martian Time-Slip*. Set in 1994, Dick explores colonialism and racism in the context of the destruction of the small businessman by corporate capitalism. Colonists on Mars consumed with property speculation on the arid Red Planet employ indigenous house-servants. Connected to the land and telepathic, the dispossessed indigenes are called 'Bleekmen' and still wander over the desolate landscape they call home, occasionally firing poisoned arrows in self-defence (a capital offense) at the Martian prospectors. Gifted with presentiment of the future pollution (development) of their planet by the mega-corporation AM-WEB (*Alle Menschen werden Brüder*: All men become brothers), a group of Bleekmen retreat ahead of the impending planetary destruction into the desert.

The Bleekmen are joined by a psychotic boy, Manfred, who, like the indigenes, has seen the future: he 'did not understand the words [of the Bleekmen], but he got their thoughts: cautious and friendly, with no undertones of hate. He sensed inside them no desire to hurt him, and that was pleasant' (Dick 1964: 225). Manfred and the Bleekmen see that in the future the vast dormitory to be built for immigrants to Mars will become a home for the aged, the infirm, and the poor who cannot return to earth. The surplus useless eaters will be consigned to a medicalized version of the fate meted out to the Bleekmen. The colony will become a dumping ground for those considered no longer economically productive on earth and on Mars.

The Bleekmen's curse on the land the settlers took from them sows a bitter harvest that confronts the dedicated work of the 'business-like and competent

and patient' (Dick 2005: 231) colonists. For Manfred, freed by imagination and insight from the settler mentality of acquisition and destruction, resistance involves siding with the oppressed: 'I will not have to live in AM-WEB, Manfred said to himself as he kept up with the Bleekmen. Through these dark shadows I will escape' (226).

At the end of the novel Manfred reappears from the future, a paralysed old man kept alive by machinery, in the company of his Bleekmen friends. He has come to say an overdue (for him) goodbye to his mother. She covers her eyes and cannot bear to look at her now decrepit child. The future, like the past, appears to offer no escape from dependency on technology. Fredric Jameson reads this ending as cautiously utopian, holding up the value of 'the collective, the primitive community of the aboriginals' (2005: 383) in the face of voracious capitalism. One can also read it in terms of the naturalisation of colonialism, dependency on technology, and subjection to corporate power.[4]

Today the Khoisan have become the focus of research into the human genome and the origin of humanity. Scientists report that the image of the '[s]tone age hunter-gatherers who have lived in splendid isolation since the dawn of humankind can, without any doubt, be put to rest' (Pakendorf and Stoneking 2021: 53). Far from being an originary genetically homogeneous people, the Khoisan exhibit striking genetic diversity and have been the largest population throughout most of modern human history. Shaped by migration and climate, they are less likely to be candidates for the aura of vanishing organic community with its racial undertones.[5] One lesson from the first people is that you do not have to be a vulnerable minority in order to be enslaved and extirpated.

Notes

[1] 'In 1824 there were men still living who could remember this state of things in the Cape Colony, and in 1876 there were voortrakkers [sic] who could recollect when the hunting parties that first crossed the 'Nu 'Gariep … were [welcomed and] when the men of the old hunter race hailed their advent as visitors bringing in their train days of plenty and rejoicing. Depredations commenced on the one hand, commandos on the other, retaliation followed, and commandos, until they became a portion of an established system, which left absolute power in the hands of the very men who most benefited by their continuance. The grown people were therefore shot down without mercy, and the children were dragged into a state of perpetual servitude; injuries were inflicted on both sides, and mutual hatred, as a natural consequence, increased in intensity.' (Stow 1905: 217)

[2] 'We are all born savages, whether we are brought into the world in the populous city or in the lonely desert. It is the discipline of education, and the circumstances under which we are placed, which create the difference between the rude barbarian and the polished citizen—the listless savage and the man of commercial enterprise—the man of the woods and the literary recluse. Take a number of children from the nursery, place them apart, and allow them to grow up without instruction or discipline, the first state of society into which they would naturally form would be the hunter's state ... And we may see what our ancestors were at the time Julius Caesar invaded Britain, by the present condition of the Caffer tribes of South Africa. It is here we see, as in a mirror, the features of our progenitors, and, by our own history, we may learn the pitch to which such tribes may be elevated, by means favourable to their improvement.' (Philip 1828 II: 216-217)

[3] Stanley Trapido argues that 'Philip, an egalitarian as well as a Smithian, drew from his own experience in the late eighteenth-century Scottish lowlands' (1990: 98). He was the beneficiary of the new capitalism which gave those from artisan backgrounds education and opportunity. Philip recruited Gottlob Schreiner, Olive's father, who arrived at the Cape in 1838.

[4] Jameson elides the temporal quarantine at work in colonial poetics: 'In other words, indigenous peoples are located outside temporality and presence, even in the face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives' (Byrd 2011: 6). Dick's literal portrayal of this is liberatory only if one accepts the compensatory logic of the fictional representation, thereby swallowing the ideological hook.

[5] As exemplary indigenes, the Bushmen are entangled in the idea of 'the blood kinship of "the same people living in the same place"' (Eliot 1934: 18). The political and aesthetic demand that '[s]tability is obviously necessary, and '[t]he population should be homogeneous' (p.19), is linked to the discourse of race. The cave painting we have just reproduced is related to the work of the Paleolithic Magdalenian draftsmen referred to in Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919). See Moran (2009). We will return to the fear of being 'invaded by foreign races' (Eliot 1934: 16).

References

San Cave Painting. Annika and Mini 2017. "TO SEE: 27000 YEARS OLD BUSHMAN PAINTINGS IN LESOTHO." To see: 27000 years old Bushman Paintings In Lesotho - Finally Lost

Byrd, Jodi A. 2011. *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Dick, Philip K. 1964 [2005]. *Martian Time-Slip*. In: *Five Novels of the 1960s and 70s*. United States: The Library of America, 3-231.

Eliot, T.S. 1934. *After Strange Gods: A Primer in Modern Heresy*. London: Faber and Faber Limited

Jameson, F. 2005. *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*. London: Verso.

Moran, Shane 2009. *Representing Bushmen: South Africa and the Origin of Language*. New York: University of Rochester Press.

Pakendorf, Brigitte, and Mark Stoneking 2021. "The genomic prehistory of peoples speaking Khoisan languages." *Human Molecular Genetics* 30, no 2: 49-55. The Genomic Prehistory Of People Speaking Khoisan Languages - Brigitte Pakendorf and Mark Stoneking : Pakendorf, Brigitte : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Philip, John 1828 [1969]. *Researches in South Africa; Illustrating the Civil, Moral, and Religious Condition of the Native Tribes. Journals of the Author's Travels in the Interior together with detailed accounts of the Christian Missions exhibiting the influence of Christianity in promoting Civilization. Volumes 1 and 2*. New York: Negro University Press.

Schreiner, Olive 1883 [1892]. *The Story of an African Farm*, London: Chapman and Hall Ltd.

Simons, Jack, and Ray Simons 1969. *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. http://www.anc.org.za/books/ccsa.html

Stow, George W. 1905. *Native Races of South Africa: A history of the Intrusion of the Hottentots and Bantu into the Hunting Grounds of the Bushmen, the Aborigines of the County*. Edited by George McCall Theal. London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co.

Thornton, R.J. 1983. "'This Dying Out Race:' W.H.I. Bleek's Approach to the Languages of Southern Africa." *Social Dynamics* 9, no. 2:1-10.

Trapido, Stanley 1990. "From Paternalism to Liberalism: The Cape Colony, 1800-1834." *The International History Review* 12, no. 1: 76-104.

2. Spectres of the Atlantic

> The Exchequer of pure reason, like that of the State, never refunds.
>
> —William Hazlitt, "William Godwin"

Ian Baucom's *Spectres of the Atlantic: Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History* traces the roots of the complex 'trade in abstract values' (2005: 56) whereby finance capital secures the exchange economy of theoretical reason and universalises modernity's typical mode of subjectivity. Baucom links the interplay between imagination and understanding to the concept of the modern self and the abstract collective project of freedom, and finance capital. The conclusion is that the trans-Atlantic slave trade licensed the global spread of finance capital and the universal claims of abstract human rights. Moral progress can lag behind economic progress; or rather, economic progress is not necessarily synonymous with moral progress.

Values are erected into truths and hypostatized into substances according to an economy of discourse 'which can neither function without the *value* (of truth), nor without fetishizing general equivalence as the basis on which values can be distinguished and exchanged' (Nancy 2008: 3). Today, when finance capitalism appears to have reached an unprecedented dominance, the question of slavery, and freedom, is unavoidable. The very idea of human progress is tied up with the supersession of slavery and entangled with morality, reason, and property. The texts of Immanuel Kant and Olaudah Equiano provide a glimpse of the infrastructure of modern progress.

Kant

> It is not enough that we ascribe freedom to our will on whatever ground, if we do not have sufficient ground for attributing it also to all rational beings.
>
> —Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals"

Regarding slavery, how do things stand in terms of morality and reason? Kant, so fond of making examples of others, is an interesting example

regarding this question.

"On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" (1788) sets forth Kant's reflection on the subject of slavery and the nature of the human race. The subject is the '*entire* original predisposition' of the human species who were fit for all climates and adapted themselves to each variation, and so survived. Those that did not, did not:

> Thus there was no need for a special arrangement to bring them to a place where their special arrangement fit. Rather wherever they went by chance and continued their generation over long periods of time, there developed this germ for the region of the earth to be found in their organization, which made them fit for such a climate. (1788a: 208)

The development of predispositions depended on the places, and on the predisposition to have predispositions (adaptability). But what happens 'in the case of *a second transplanting*' (208)?

What of the 'inner purposiveness' (209) when it is quite clear that transplanted people do not uniformly adapt to their new climate and become like the indigenous inhabitants? To be more specific:

> And where have Indians and Negroes attempted to expand into northern regions?—But those who were driven there have never been able to bring about in their progeny (such as Creole *Negroes*, or the *Indians* under the name of gypsies) a sort that would be fit for farmers or manual laborers. (209)

The 'inner purposiveness' that has 'provided for their preservation' apparently meets its limit. And, we might add, so too does the nicety of abstract concepts and the pleasure of formalism.[1]

Moving to individual instances, empirical examples, however typological, is to step into a territory strewn with snares for the unwary. They haven't gone native, is the proposition, and neither have their children. Kant adds a clarificatory note:

> The last remark was not put forward here in order to prove something but is nevertheless not insignificant. In Hr. *Sprengel's* Contributions, 5th Part, pp.287- 92, a knowledgeable man, adduces the following against Ramsay's wish to use all Negro slaves as free laborers: that among the many thousand freed Negroes which one encounters in America and England he knew of no example someone engaged in a business which one could properly call *labor*; rather that, when they are set free, they soon abandon an easy craft which previously as slaves they had been forced to carry out, and instead become hawkers, wretched innkeepers, lackeys, and people who go fishing and hunting, in a word, tramps. The same is to be found in the gypsies among us. (209, note)

Kant's reference here is to M. C. Sprengel's *Beiträge zur Völker und Länderkunde* (Contributions to the Study of Peoples and Countries) which the editors of the Cambridge edition of Kant's works explain 'contains an essay in German "Notes on Ramsay's work on the treatment of the Negro slaves in the West Indies," which refers critically to the work of James Ramsay, former pastor on the island St. Kitts' (Zöller and Louden 2007: 510).

It seems that Kant read a summary of James Tobin's *Cursory Remarks upon the Reverend Mr. Ramsay's Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the Sugar Colonies* (1784).[2] Read and approved of a pro-slavery argument attacking abolitionist James Ramsay. Ramsay, along with Granville Sharp and Thomas Clarkson, are honoured by Equiano in the final pages of *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African. Written by Himself* (1789).

Was Kant, the renowned excavator of foundations, not only deficient in understanding, never mind empathy? It is not as if the belief that former slaves lost their desire to work when freed amounted to denying that the former slave is 'a being that has reason and a will' (1785: 50)—on the contrary, aversion to work after enslavement can be taken as a sign of reason and will. Could Kant not see that the pro-slavery case arose from 'a self- seeking purpose' (53) and 'merely for purposes of self-interest' (55)? Was his lack of resistance to the pro-slavery case because he was blind to the 'empirical inducements' (64) and 'our covert incentives' (61)?

Suppose Kant's aside on slavery was not 'an intentionally untrue declaration' (1797a: 612). It was not a lie[3] but more of an error arising from ignorance: no harm was intended. Since it was not a legal declaration, taken under oath, it has not harmed humanity generally, inasmuch as it makes the source of right unusable' (612). Did he lack good will to people of colour because of susceptibility to 'certain subjective limitations and hindrances' (1785: 52)?[4] Does Kant himself demonstrate the contamination of reason with 'empirical motives,' 'the actions and conditions of human volition generally, which for the most part are drawn from psychology' (46)? In short, can we trust Kant's judgement?

The endorsement of a central justification of slavery does not appear to accord with the universal principle of right: 'Any act is right if can co-exist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each man can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law' (1797b: 387). Moreover

'whoever hinders me in it [i.e., coexisting with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law] does me *wrong*; for this hindrance (resistance) cannot coexist with freedom in accordance with a universal law' (387). On the matter of slavery, and race, Kant, by his own moral standard, was in the wrong.[5]

Beyond the question of Kant's good will, the issue of slavery raises issues that are often passed over in discussions of Kant and racism. As well as human types, classification, potential and destiny, slavery foregrounds the economic aspect of the discussion of morality and human progress. Freedom is linked to what 'one could properly call *labor*.' Productivity and social utility, price rather than dignity, are not exterior to morality and its presupposition, freedom. And we might add, property.

Although Kant does not defend slavery, he does endorse the importance and value of labour:

> The same author [Sprengel] notes on this matter that that it is not the northern climate that makes Negroes disinclined for labor. For they would rather endure waiting behind the coaches of their masters or, during the worst winter nights, in the cold entrances of the theatres (in England) than to be threshing, digging, carrying loads, etc. (1788a: 209 note)

The problem with freedmen (and women) is that 'when they are set free, they soon abandon an easy craft which previously as slaves they had been forced to carry out.' Free of direct coercion, they become lackeys (menials) and tramps (negligent or even hostile to fixed property).

In the case of former slaves the price of freedom threatens the economy and hence the stability of society.[6] Kant faithfully relays Tobin's central argument against the practicality of manumission on the grounds that there is no evidence that freedmen gravitate to 'any laborious task' (Tobin 1785: 117).[7] Tobin also counters the hypothesis 'that their choice of employment in England may, in some measure, be influenced by the climate' by citing evidence from Jamaica and St. Vincent that former slaves refuse 'to labour in the field for hire' (119).

From this information Kant looks for causes in human types and their predispositions:

> Should one not conclude from this that, in addition to the *faculty* to work, there is also an immediate drive to activity (especially to the sustained activity that one calls industry), which is independent of all enticement and which is especially interwoven with certain natural predispositions; and that Indians as well as Negroes do not bring any more of this impetus into other climes and pass it on

> to their offspring than was needed for their preservation in their old motherland and had been received from nature; and that this inner disposition extinguishes just as little as the external one. (1788a: 209 note)

Going one step further than Tobin, Kant is able to combine an argument from environment with the theorisation of certain natural dispositions. They embrace their own minority and subordination.[8] The discourse of human rights, the primacy of freedom and rationality, and the necessity of respect, can coexist with the pro-slavery principle of economic productivity and force.[9]

What Kant shares with the pro-slavery camp is as striking as what the abolitionist case shares with Kant. This points to an underlying affinity that facilitates the slippage from asserting the primacy of human freedom (autonomy) to embracing the necessity of coercion and domination (heteronomy). The moral debate about slavery is inseparable from the narrative of development.

Equiano's *Interesting Narrative* shows the switches and relays of the discourse of progress. It was Equiano who labelled 'Mr James Tobin, a zealous labourer in the vineyard of slavery', and included Ramsay in the company of Sharp and Clarkson: 'our approved friends, men of virtue … an honour to their country, ornamental to human nature, happy in themselves, and benefactors to mankind' (1789: 45, 108).

Equiano

> That part of Africa, known by the name of Guinea, to which the trade for slaves is carried on, extends along the coast above 3400 miles, from the Senegal to Angola, and includes a variety of kingdoms. Of these the most considerable is the kingdom of Benen, both as to extent and wealth, the richness and cultivation of the soil, the power of its king, and the number and warlike disposition of the inhabitants … This kingdom is divided into many provinces or districts: in one of the most remote and fertile of which, called Eboe, I was born, in the year 1745, in a charming fruitful vale, named Essaka.
>
> —*The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African. Written by Himself.*

Equiano's credibility as 'the African' is interwoven with the case against slavery. The autobiographical mark foregrounds the issue of morality and 'all

the tender connexions' (Equiano 1789: 3),[10] both for the authorial subject and the reader.

Discussing that part of Africa, known by the name of Guinea, in particular the kingdom of 'Benen',[11] he remarks the government and administration of justice of his homeland, and gives examples of the punishment for 'kidnapping' and '[a]dultery' which 'was sometimes punished with slavery or death' (6). Marital relations deem the wife 'the sole property of her husband' (6)—nor do I remember to have ever heard of an instance of incontinence amongst them before marriage' (9)—and domestic relations are sketched. Any other property is common property for in this 'uncommonly rich and fruitful' land '[a]ll our industry is exerted to improve those blessings of nature':

> As our manners are simple, our luxuries are few ... Our manner of living is entirely plain ... Agriculture is our chief employment; and every one, even the children and women, are engaged in it. Thus we are all habituated to labour from our earliest years. Every one contributes something to the common stock; and as we are unacquainted with idleness, we have no beggars. The benefits of such a mode of living are obvious.(7)[12]

From government, law, domestic relations, food, and labour we move to religion: 'As to religion, the natives believe that there is one Creator of all things', and 'are extremely cleanly ... and therefore we had many purifications and washings; indeed almost as many, and used on the same occasions, if my recollection does not fail me, as the Jews' (9-10).[13] Equiano reflects on his account:

> Such is the imperfect sketch my memory has furnished me with of the manners and customs of a people among whom I first drew my breath. And here I cannot forbear suggesting what has long struck me very forcibly, namely, the strong analogy which even by this sketch, imperfect as it is, appears to prevail in the manners and customs of my countrymen and those of the Jews, before they reached the Land of Promise, and particularly the patriarchs while they were yet in that pastoral state which is described in Genesis—an analogy, which alone would induce me to think that the one people had sprung from the other. Indeed this is the opinion of Dr. Gill, who, in his commentary on Genesis, very ably deduces the pedigree of the Africans from Afer and Afra, the descendants of Abraham by Keturah his wife and concubine (for both these titles are applied to her). It is also conformable to the sentiments of Dr. John Clarke, formerly Dean of Sarum, in his *Truth of the Christian Religion*: both these authors concur in ascribing to us this original. (11-12)

Equiano's claim that for a 'strong analogy' between 'the Israelites in their primitive state' (12) and contemporary Africans lacks the textual authority to which he appeals.[14] The only 'corroboration' (120) is 'the imperfect sketch my memory has furnished me with of the manners and customs of a people among whom I first drew my breath' (11).

This is why the debate around Equiano's origin, his claim to have been born in Africa, circulates with such intensity.[15] While the threat to the evidentiary value of the claim to an African origin and first-hand experience of the middle passage is obvious, the value of Equiano's account is not thereby vitiated. The case against the slave trade does not fall with the insecurity of the opening two chapters of the *Interesting Narrative*.

Equiano's motive is, he declares in the dedication, to become 'an instrument towards the relief of his suffering countrymen' and if his account 'in the smallest degree promotes the interests of humanity, the ends for which it was undertaken will be fully attained' (5). Departing from the moral absolutism that is often a feature of abolitionist texts, there is a complexification and ambivalence. Apparently forgoing the ritualised citation of familiar sources and testimony regarding slavery, Equiano pulls the focus onto himself, or rather, his self-creation.[16]

This innovation aims to strengthen the anti-slavery cause by a more modulated and uncomfortable appeal to imagination and compassion than had become standard within abolitionist rhetoric. The self-creation of Equiano, author and subject, narrator and reader of himself, is also an attempt to create and mould a readerly sensibility and institute a moral economy that avoids the pitfalls of moralising.[17]

Although Equiano's warns on the first page that 'I offer here the history of neither a saint, a hero, nor a tyrant' (5), this abjuration sets the scene for complex manoeuvres that break the frame of condemnation and exoneration. Equiano knows that his narrative, with its derivations, compromises and complicities, will not sustain a pose of moral sanctimony. Relaying his choice to work in the slave trade as a free agent means that there cannot be any simple inside or outside. While the evil of the slave trade is never in doubt, the motives and actions of those caught within it—including slave owners, traders and survivors—are not judged programmatically. For example, the frequency with which Equiano adjudges his masters/owners to be 'very charitable and humane,' such that 'I was very grateful' (41) is striking.

Whatever the strategic value of engaging his English audience with a variegated portrait of their fellow countrymen, this mode of presentation complicates the logic of jeremiad which aims at an inclusive and thoroughgoing condemnation of individual behavior. There are exceptions and gradations of reprehensibility, and there is even virtue in the midst of complicity: 'he was to me a friend and a father' (64). But there is also, as if by reflection, a range of moral judgement, or reserve of judgement, elicited here that encompasses the figure of Equiano himself.

The perhaps questionable extension of charitable judgement on the actions of others, the refusal to treat then as a monolithic function of the slave economy, effectively pre-empts any absolute judgement on Equiano's voluntary participation in the slave trade following his manumission.[18] The process of judgement—Equiano's judgement, our judgment of him, and our reflection on the process of judgement—is foregrounded. The 'attempt to counteract the lies and slander invented by some Europeans to justify the slave trade' (Achebe 1976: 80) calls for self-reflection in addition to refutation.

Transporting slaves to Georgia, Equiano's ship runs aground on the Bahama Bank '*but the crew are preserved, principally by means of the author*' (64). Striking a rock at night the captain orders the hatches nailed down to prevent twenty slaves from overcrowding the boat. Equiano refuses and all the slaves and crew are saved by his leadership. By putting his own life at risk he is able to save others. Guiding crew and cargo to an island, a new fear arises:

> On that part of it where we first attempted to land there stood some very large birds, called flamingoes: these, from the reflection of the sun, appeared to us at a little distance as large as men; and, when they walked backwards and forwards, we could not conceive what they were: our captain swore they were cannibals. (66)

Equiano confronts the apparent cannibals and they 'took flight' (66). The story of the disaster weaves 'my guilty head' (65) with heroic vindication of the author as helmsman. Foregrounding the process of misrecognition puts interpretation and judgement, and their practical, moral consequences, at the centre of the narrative.

This image of self-sacrificing Equiano the slave trader is counterpointed by his participation in Doctor Irving's 'new adventure in cultivating a plantation at Jamaica and the Musquito Shore [present day Honduras]' (92). 'Our vessel being ready to sail for the Musquito shore, I went with the

Doctor on board a Guinea-man, to purchase some slaves to carry with us, and cultivate a plantation; and I chose them all my own countrymen.' (93) The extensive account of South American native life, in which he recalls 'a passage I had read in the life of Columbus' (94),[19] is followed by his attempt to leave the Mosquito coast whereupon he experiences Crusoe-like adventures on barren inlets and islands and is repeatedly held against his will 'without judge or jury' (96).

Threatened with being sold into slavery and on more than one occasion threatened with death—'Seeing this I got an axe … having resolved in myself as soon as he attempted to put the fire in the barrel to chop him down that instant' (99)—he meets his former business partner, Dr Irving:

> I now learned that after I had left the estate which I managed for this gentleman on the Musquito shore, during which the slaves were well fed and comfortable, a white overseer had supplied my place: this man, through inhumanity and ill-judged avarice, beat and cut the poor slaves most unmercifully; and the consequence was, that every one got into a large Puriogua canoe, and endeavoured to escape; but not knowing where to go, or how to manage the canoe, they were all drowned; in consequence of which the doctor's plantation was left uncultivated, and he was now returning to Jamaica to purchase more slaves and stock it again. (99)

Following in the wake of slavers and colonialists, Equiano is both victim of, and participant in, what he condemns. Having abandoned his countrymen, and the place of manager taken by 'a white overseer,' it unclear if Equiano was himself a black overseer-cum-manager. He does not address the question of his responsibility for the death of his countrymen, and the morality of his action (which includes his narration) is left for the reader to decide. Lacking the evidence necessary to move beyond suspicion or trust, we are left to guide our own judgement.

Perhaps the thinking behind recounting such events is that while one may counter and hopefully defeat arguments for slavery by a polarising attack—good versus bad—such bifurcation does not facilitate understanding the moral economy of that trade. Grasping the dynamics of the trade may be necessary for bringing about its abolition, but grasping its exploitative, dehumanising essence must also include the fraying of categories. When Equiano castigates the slave traders his words implicate the reader too: "Must every tender feeling be likewise sacrificed to your avarice?' (21).[20]

We are at stake here and whether or not we sacrifice the sacrificers we will remain implicated, left in the wake of 'the inhuman slave trade' (108).

Equiano's profession of complicity pushes onto the reader the responsibility for judging and poses implicit questions: From what position of non-complicity do you judge? How can you acknowledge your complicity without undermining the grounds of your own judgement; after all, who are you to judge? And how can you not judge?

Equiano turns one of his opponents' weapons against them, for generalised complicity is precisely what the pro-slavery argument mobilises. He provides an antidote, not by retreating to sanctimony (saintliness) nor by conceding general sinfulness (tyranny), but rather by offering the reader participation in contradiction rather than resolution or transcendence. What is achieved by this can be appreciated by briefly comparing Thomas Pringle's strategy in his editor's notes to *The History of Mary Prince Related by Herself* (1831).

Mary Prince

> Our best weapon against them is not to marshal facts, of which they are truly managers, but passion. Passion is our hope and strength, a very present help in trouble.
>
> —Chinua Achebe, *Anthills of the Savannah*

Attempting to bolster slave Mary Prince's credibility and give credence to her history of abuse, Pringle attempts to discredit those attempting to discredit Prince as a 'despicable tool' (MacQueen 1831: 755) of the anti-slavery lobby.

Against what he terms 'colonial special pleading,' Pringle appeals to witnesses and to 'the reader's reflections,' and to 'natural affection' (in Prince 1831: 34, 19, 9). The reader is offered the opportunity to be on the side of the angels:

> The facts there stated must necessarily rest entirely, —since we have no collateral evidence,—upon their intrinsic claims to probability, and upon the reliance the reader may feel disposed, after perusing the foregoing pages, to place on her veracity.(31)[21]

Pringle goes as far as to say that the guilt or innocence of those accused by Mary Prince is secondary to the goal of immediately abolishing colonial slavery. Or rather, guilt is a foregone conclusion since they are part of a reprehensible system, 'the true spirit of the slave system' (30).

The attempt to lend credibility to Mary Prince's testimony ends by

dismissing the need for proof: 'suppose the whole of her own statement to be false, and even the whole of her conduct since she came under our observation to be a tissue of hypocrisy;—suppose all this—and leave the negro woman as black in character as in complexion—yet it would not affect the main facts' (29). The fate of the individual is secondary to the greater cause—here the justification or condemnation of slavery which is accused of sacrificing individuals to a greater cause, profit—for it is the system which is on trial (see Thomas 2005). (And you, too, benefit from the system, is the automatic pro-slavery response.)

Forty years earlier Equiano aimed at the same goal but adopted a different strategy. With the abolition of the slave trade accomplished, perhaps Pringle could afford to be more cavalier, sensing that history was on his side.[22] How can one abolish the slave trade and yet retain slavery? Pringle's slide into abandoning the criteria of proof, or rather, taking that proof to be incontrovertible, is to cross the line from moral fervor to mastery. He might even have crossed the line that is supposed to separate the abolitionist from the pro-slavery hack who 'was too apt to let prejudice usurp the place of proof' (Ramsay 1784: 249).[23]

Equiano's textual strategy is to offer a more demanding process to the reader's reflections. There is no redemptive transcendence in Equiano's world, no opting out by way of denunciatory salvation. But there is a correct interpretation, and, by implication, a correct thing to do. To what degree the reader knowingly participates in the economy of contamination will affect the degree to which the question of Equiano's African origin is felt to determine the truthfulness of his narrative.[24] As he writes after having referenced Anthony Benezet and Thomas Clarkson:

> I hope the reader will not think I have trespassed on his patience in introducing myself to him with some account of the manners and customs of my country. They had been implanted in me with great care, and made an impression on my mind, which time could not erase, and which all the adversity and variety of fortune I have since experienced served only to rivet and record; for, whether the love of one's country be real or imaginary, or a lesson of reason, or an instinct of nature, I still look back with pleasure on the first scenes of my life, though that pleasure has been for the most part mingled with sorrow. (11)

Is Equiano signalling that his memoir is a mix of experience and reading, memory and imagination; an 'implanted' or transplanted hybrid of childhood memory augmented and supplemented by subsequent experience/reading? Or has his childhood memory supplemented his reading?

Whatever the readers' answer to these questions it is difficult to forget that to maintain the importance of verifiability and factuality in an area that militates against verification is to invite bias. The testimony of Equiano is not 'sustained by a cloud of witnesses' (Garrison 1845: 8) that attend, for example, Frederick Douglass' narrative. It is in this instance just to side with one side of the dispute. After all, even Kant concedes that it is permissible to lie to someone who aims to maliciously use my truthfulness, hence 'the concept of the necessary lie' (Kant 1997a: 204).[25] Equiano foregrounds the equivocal nature of his moral position, that is to say, his moral judgement and, by implication, the judgement of the reader.

We shall see that Equiano's strategy, far from muddying the waters of moral judgement, has by the very act of surrendering moral binarism presented the reader with an equally telling choice. There can be no escape. None of us will come out of this intertextual history clean. As Equiano puts it, with the world being what it is rather than what it ought to be, 'none but the generous mind can judge' (61) the complicities one falls into. The condition of the slave 'doomed to be a witness and a participant' (Douglass 1845: 14) is mirrored by the reader as spectator who is likewise implicated.

The universal and necessary categorical appeal to humanity is beset with impurity, and the scramble for moral superiority can be used against you. Equiano's text does not grant the reader the pose of objective adjudication, or recipient of uncontaminated truth. Do not be tempted by the prospect of the level moral playing field to blot out asymmetry of power. When one is forced 'to set a powerless truth against a truthless power' (Foucault 2000: 33) it is the nature of power that is illuminated.

Analogical Reasoning

> Doubtless, in a subject like this, where we must be satisfied with general accounts, probable conjectures, and analogical reasoning, a person inclined to take the other side may select many things to be objected to, many to be contradicted.
>
> —James Ramsay, *An Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies*

With this in mind, how do matters stand with our understanding of Kant's participation in the slavery debate on the side of the accused? Are we looking

at Kant's all too human self-opacity, seduced by 'a matter of returning to something elementary, savage' (Wahl 2016: 69)?[26] Assuredly, the life of a thinker does not over-determine, negate or compromise their writings. But then neither can one dismiss or down-play the coexistence of these elements. They are not identical but neither are they unrelated, and it is the economy of this relationship that is of interest.

Kant changed his mind on matters of race, it is claimed. But the pro-slavery argument still stands, amenable to quotation in and out of context. Judging Kant seems more straightforward than judging Equiano for the latter was a victim, and spoke for other voiceless victims, of the slave trade. Kant, however, had only the prejudices and self-serving distortions of his time to contend with.[27] His statements were not forced on him, 'compelled to make by an unjust constraint, in order to prevent a threatened misdeed to himself or to another' (Kant 1797a: 612). He failed, at least (perhaps) at first, to come up to the standard he himself was in the process of promoting, and thereby helped to create racism in the process of (eventually) promoting its opposite, freedom.

To condemn Kant's contamination by prejudice is to risk appearing to exonerate oneself as his expense (see Flikshuh and Ypi 2014). To defend him along the lines of 'Kant's own failure vindicates necessity of his philosophy' (Louden 2000: 105-6)[28] is to risk minimising the intertwining of equality and inequality. It is perilously close to the defect of optimism that 'regards exceptions as necessary defects … just as a sailor sacrifices part of his cargo in order to save his ship and the rest of the cargo' (Kant 1759: 81).

To quickly distinguish Kant's liberal cosmopolitanism from our supposed cosmopolitanism on the grounds that today we are more attuned to the pitfalls of ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism risks eliding the striking continuities. A haunting question remains: Was racism necessary for the conception of liberal cosmopolitanism?

Equiano's portrait of Essaka, and by implication Africa, reworks the idea of the primitive, which is to say he remains within the terms of the narrative continuum of progress from an origin. Essaka is an instituted society, with a legal system, private property (slaves),[29] duties and sanctions. He is careful to avoid the depiction of African primitive community based primarily on collective possession. Slaves are the distillation of private property, which belongs to the family, or more precisely the (male) head of the family. In marriage 'the parents of the bridegroom present gifts to those of the bride,

whose property she is looked upon before marriage; but after it she is esteemed the sole property of her husband' (1789: 6).

Nothing in the depiction of African society derails Equiano's narrative paean to the desirability of private property as precondition of freedom. According to Equiano, not only is this origin shared, it is also asynchronous for different stages can and do exist simultaneously. Africans are rational subjects bound by universal principles and lawfulness. And property ownership.

In short Africans have dignity, and so we might claim—in terms of the second version of the categorical imperative—they are deserving of respect as ends in themselves. They are part of general humanity, and, to invoke the third version of the categorical imperative, part of the Kingdom of Ends. As Equiano puts it on the opening page of his account, he seeks to promote the interests of humanity and his anti-slavery appeal to innate freedom accords with Kant's description of the only innate right:

> *Freedom* (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity. (1797b: 393)

A principle, a concept, as well as a feeling of duty to the moral law without which there could be no moral law.

Critique of Practical Reason (1788) explains this relationship between principle and feeling as regards the moral law under the heading "Doctrine of the Method of Pure Practical Reason." Kant emphasises that such an explanation of method, unlike other such explanations, cannot hope to provide clarity by delineating pure practical principles out of which a system could be constructed. Rather such a discussion of moral law follows 'the way in which one can make objectively practical reason *subjectively* practical' (1788b: 261).

Even the limited appeal that legality has must be grounded in a subjective feeling for virtue otherwise 'everything would be sheer hypocrisy; the law would be hated or even despised, though still observed for the sake of one's own advantage' (261). Following the law would be merely following the machinery of its police, guided only by what was done without troubling [ourselves] about the motives for which it was done.' This is not to say that moral education does not use its own 'machinery, these leading strings' up to

a point that 'teaches the human being to feel his own dignity' (262), but only to a certain degree.

This 'receptivity to pure moral interest' (262) must not remain at the level of feeling:

> In our times, when one hopes to have more influence on the mind through melting, tender feelings or high-flown, puffed-up pretensions, which make the heart languid instead of strengthening it, than by a dry and earnest representation of duty, which is more suited to human imperfection and to progress in goodness, it is more necessary than ever to direct attention to this method. (265)

Intensity of feeling is transitory and does not lead to concerted action. Only principles built on concepts and their representation considered 'in relation to human beings and to the individual human being' (266) can provide the foundation for duty in conformity with the moral law.

Kant proffers an example, which as part of the machinery, the leading strings, of instruction is purely a means to an end:

> Let us now see in an example whether there is more subjective moving force as an incentive if an action is represented as a noble and magnanimous one than if it is represented merely as duty in relation to the earnest moral law. The action by which someone tries with extreme danger to his life to rescue people from a shipwreck, finally losing his own life in the attempt, will indeed be reckoned, on one side, as duty but on the other and even for the most part as a meritorious action; but our esteem for it will be greatly weakened by the concept *of duty to himself,* which seems in this case to suffer some infringement. (266)

Duty to himself as an example of humanity and as a unique individual to preserve his own life. He is not obligated to sacrifice himself for others, and one must not confuse the feeling on his part that he ought to with duty to the moral law. Kant adds that a person who lays down his life might on the face of it be a better example of duty to moral law, except that to do this of one's own accord is to offer up an example that will be dangerous to the nation one wishes to save if others imitate it.

Whereas Kant proposes to clarify the conflict between duty and inclination, Equiano confesses to 'struggling between inclination and duty' (1789: 61). The reader is solicited to judge with 'a generous mind', which I take to be one that does not assume moral superiority. Pringle makes the same pitch on behalf of Mary Prince, appealing to a shared sense of moral and emotional superiority ('natural affection'), and opens himself to the charge of sanctimony. But what of that, if his cause was just? It is not

irrelevant that the argument that whatever the untruths of Mary's (and his own) account 'it gets things right at the level of basic principles and values' (Wood 2008: 12) echoes the defence of Kant.

Notable is Equiano's wariness regarding sentiment. The dedication of the *Interesting Narrative* declares 'the chief design … is to excite … a sense of compassion for the misery which the Slave-Trade has entailed on my unfortunate countrymen.' And the opening page of the narrative underlines that what is to follow is not like those memoirs 'which abound in great or striking events, those, in short, which in high degree excite either admiration and pity, all others they consign to contempt or oblivion' (1789: 5).

Although Equiano is susceptible to feeling pity for other—'so moved me with pity for him' (50)—his petition to Queen Charlotte makes the following distinction: 'Yet I do not solicit your royal pity for my own distress; my sufferings, although numerous, are in a measure forgotten. I supplicate your Majesty's compassion for millions of my African countrymen, who groan under the lash of tyranny in the West Indies' (107). The difference between pity and compassion seems to rest on the active nature of compassion, which, unlike pity, aims at the alleviation of the conditions that cause suffering.[30] A guilty conscience does not necessarily lead to action.

Equiano's account of abandoning fellow countrymen who drowned while fleeing the enslavement to which he brought them foreshadows Kant's discussion of ambiguity in respect of right in *The Metaphysics of Morals*:

> In other words, there can be no *penal law* that would assign the death penalty to someone in a shipwreck who, in order to save his own life, shoves another, whose life is equally in danger, off a plank on which he had saved himself. For the punishment threatened by the law could not be greater than the loss of his own life. A penal law of this sort could not have the effect intended, since a threat of an ill that is still *uncertain* (death by a judicial verdict) cannot outweigh the fear of an ill that is *certain* (drowning). Hence the deed of saving one's life by violence is not to be judged *inculpable (inculpabile)* but only *unpunishable (impunibile),* and by a strange confusion jurists take this *subjective* impunity to be *objective* impunity (conformity with law). (1797b: 392)

Cannot Equiano also claim to have survived, even if others did not (and perhaps did not because he did)? Do the rescue and the abandonment cancel each other out—if not for the victims, then at least as regards Equiano's overall culpability?

Equiano presents us with a case 'in which a right is in question but for which no judge can be appointed to render a decision' (Kant 1797a: 390)—

which might also be taken to mean that anyone can judge, although not with an absolute assurance of being in a rightful position to judge. The abyss between right of equity and right of necessity confronts the reader who is in the position of judge where no judgement is possible but where judgment is necessary. As soon as someone steps in to judge another wrong is perpetuated in the name of justice because to judge is to claim rightness, to be beyond the general pervasive contamination of an unjust system, which is effectively to undermine the charge that the whole system is unjust. Who is to judge? How can one not judge?

Equiano ends his text by appealing to economic motives as he punts the plan to settle ex-slaves in Sierra Leone where they will exploit the resources of Africa for the benefit of the home market by opening up new markets to British manufactures.[31] While Kant's note on freedmen expresses scepticism regarding the automatic benefit of free labour, Equiano tirelessly argues for its benefits over slavery.[32] Despite this difference, or rather perhaps because of it, they are both able to integrate economic and moral concerns. Both appeal to individualism and freedom, rights and duties, labour and development: moral economy as political economy (see Berry 2010). This is the thread that runs through the anti-slavery argument for the sacrifice of self-interest and against '[d]isregard of the Right of Mankind, and the feelings of humanity' (Benezet 1762: 12).[33] It is also central to the pro-slavery argument.

Conclusion

> One need only consider, for example, the actions which take place unnoticed within us when we *read*.
>
> —Immanuel Kant, "Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy"

The key lesson to draw from Kant's aside on slavery is that promotion of human rights can coexist with the pro-slavery principle of economic productivity and force.[34] Where that principle is active, the imperative of survival and competitiveness can always reanimate slavery under a different name.

Equiano shows that treating all equally—requiring incontrovertible

evidence for his claims—will reinforce inequality. In other words, the plutocratic slave holders and their spokesmen are not to be granted the presumption of innocence because they are in a dominant position. The spectacle of disproportionate power provokes a feeling for justice that is itself contaminated with injustice. The receptive reader is offered a mode of reflective self-formation on the way to being 'able to transcend the limits of merely personal experiences to identify general truths' (Carretta 2010: 93).

The *Interesting Narrative* evokes a necessarily subjective feeling of respect for the moral law that confirms the latter's objectivity. However much one must guard against lapsing into visionary enthusiasm by way of a feeling that purports to be the basis of knowledge, one must also guard against being deceived by blind confidence in the pretences of reason.[35] What looks like a discourse on economics may in fact be a sermon on duty, and vice versa, that defines ethical choice in *these* terms.

Setting Kant next to Equiano provides a glimpse of the process of abstraction and universalisation integral to reason. It also foregrounds the limits of protest and dissent; what Frederick Douglass called the 'obstacles and sinuousities' (1894: 756) of the public use of reason. Not only is the credibility of the advocate on the line, perception of the balance of forces at play informs the process of interpretation and the sifting of what Kant termed 'falsely inventive powers of imagination [whereby] self- representations are regarded as perceptions' (1798b: 320). The lineaments of pro-slavery rebellion are visible at the inception of the modern discourse of human rights.

The moralising discourse of just deserts and social harmony (the greater good) has never lost its currency. Tobin's admonition to beware those brooding with their 'usual style of petulance' and distributing 'many chimerical proposals' (1785: 146) is also familiar. What if the perennial pro- slavery rebellion could harness the discourse of human rights and emancipation from poverty to short-circuit resistance and coerce consent?

Notes

[1] 'It is easier for us, with two hundred years' hindsight, to see such contradictions in Kant himself (or in other eighteenth- or nineteenth-century) thinkers than to see them in ourselves. In that sense, it is dangerous for us to focus on Kant's (now obvious) errors about issues of race or gender, as if we thought that we ourselves might be immune to similar

criticisms by future philosophers reflecting on our views.' (Wood 2008: 11) Alternatively one can simply ignore these issues altogether (see Guyer 2016).

[2] See Bernasconi (2019: 28) on James Tobin; and Bernasconi (2002: 148-149).

[3] 'A human being who lies has no character at all, and if he has anything good in him, this is merely due to his temperament. … The withdrawal of respect is the only appropriate punishment for lying.' (Kant 1803: 471)

[4] 'Though Kant never directly defends the institution of black slavery, in a footnote he quotes with approval the observations of a German opponent of its abolition, who claims that freed slaves generally lose the laboring skills they formerly possessed.' (Wood 1999: 8) Wood claims that Kant doesn't deny moral status to any human being on the basis of race (338-339, note 4). Kant does mention the slave trade in *The Conflict of the Faculties* where the English parliamentary debate on slave trade crops up as an example of a political diversion or disguise. The apparent tension between the monarch and some of those acting as representatives of the people regarding the legitimacy of the slave trade conceals the fact that the monarch's will is decisive, despite the British claim to have moved from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy. (see 1798a: 163)

[5] 'Even by the standards of his own time, let alone by those of our time, Kant was not always entirely enlightened, especially when his views (as on matters of race) could only be second-hand because of the social and geographical limits of his own experience.' (Guyer 2007: 21). For Kant slavery devalues humans to a market price: 'A seafarer listened to the dispute in a society led by scholars over the rank of their respective faculties. He decided it in his own way, namely: how much would a human being he had captured bring in for him at the sale in the marketplace in Algiers?' (1798b: 390).

[6] Endorsing Tobin's critique of Ramsay, Gordon Turnbull espies Ramsey '[a]t the head of those fanaticks, who set themselves up as reformers, and have the presumption to think themselves wiser than the rest of mankind' (1786: 17-18). The truth is 'that the negroes are much happier than peasants in most parts of the world,' and 'that many of the *free* negroes in that part of the world are far less happy than slaves' (32: 33).

[7] 'The great number of negroes at present in England, the strange partiality shown to them by the lower orders of women, and the rapid increase of a dark and contaminated breed, are evils which have long been complained of, and call every day more loudly for enquiry and redress.' (Tobin 1785: 118, note)

[8] Macrobius Theodosius: 'Assuredly no form of slavery is more shameful than that which is self-imposed.' This quotation from Macrobius concludes Gilbert Francklyn's *An Answer to the Rev. Mr. Clarkson's Essay* (1789, 243). For the continuation of this bitter debate see William Hannibal Thomas (1901: 338-339).

[9] 'This problem [the achievement of civil society through unsociability] is at the same time the most difficult and the latest to be solved by the human species. The difficulty which the mere idea of this problem lays before our eyes is this: the human being is an *animal which*, when it lives among others of its species, *has need of a master*. For he certainly misuses his freedom in regard to others of his kind; and although as a rational creature he wishes a law that sets limits to the freedom of all, his selfish animal inclination still misleads him into excepting himself from it where he may. Thus he needs a *master*, who breaks his stubborn

will and necessitates him to obey a valid will with which everyone can be free. But where will he get this master? Nowhere else but from the human species. But then this master is exactly as much an animal who has need of a master.' (Kant 1784: 113)

[10] See J. Philmore on 'this bond of humanity, that is the foundation of all other particular connexions between men' (1760: 9). Clarkson quotes Anders Sparrman's *A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope* (1785) on the enslavement of Hottentots at the Cape: "'in cold blood they destroy the bands which nature has knit between their husbands, and their wives and children, &c.'" (1788: 48). Sparrman joined Cook's second arctic voyage as assistant to Johann and George Forster.

[11] 'That part of *Africa* whence the negroes are brought, commonly known by the name of *Guinea*, extends along the coast, in the whole, between three and four thousand miles. From the river *Senegal*, (seventeen degrees north of the line) to Cape *Sierra Leona*, it contains seven hundred miles. Thence it runs eastward about fifteen hundred miles, including the *Grain- Coast*, the *Ivory-Coast*, the *Gold-Coast*, and the *Slave-Coast*, with the large kingdom of *Benin*.' (Wesley 1774: 4-5) Wesley quotes Andrew Brue, who lived in Senegal for sixteen years, on the area's 'fruitfulness': "'The farther you go from sea, the more fruitful and well-improved is the country ... the land so well cultivated'" (5). Wesley concludes: 'The *Gold-coast* and *Slave- coast*, all who have seen it agree, is exceeding fruitful and plentiful ... is one of the most fruitful as well as the most pleasant countries in the known world ... Such is the country from which the Negroes are brought' (5). Shortly before his death Wesley read Equiano's *Interesting Narrative* without noting the similarity between their texts (see Wesley 1791: 265).

[12] Wesley describes the mode of 'government' and the administration of justice, and 'the simplicity of their dress and manners:' 'they are remarkably industrious' (1774: 7). 'They punish murder and adultery severely; very frequently with death. Theft and robbery are punished by a fine proportionable to the goods that were taken.—All the natives of this coast, though heathens, believe there is one God ... we may leave England and France, to seek genuine honesty in *Benin*, *Congo*, or *Angola*' (7-9). Anthony Benezet quotes Peter Kolben (Kolb) on the Negro inhabitants of the Cape of Good Hope governing their government administration of justice, mentioning punishments for "'Adulteries and Robberies'" and "'their Stricktness and Celerity in the Execution of Justice'" (1762: 21-23)

[13] Senegal 'is very fruitful and populous ... They are a clean People, especially the Women' (Benezet 1762: 74-76).

[14] Regarding Equiano's references to John Gill's *Commentary on Genesis* and John Clarke's translation of Grotius, *The Truth of the Christian Religion* (1711), Sylvester A. Johnson has noted that '*none* of these commentators actually claim that Africans are descendants of ancient Jews; the claim is Equiano's exclusively' (2015: 147). Johnson generously concludes: '[t]he degree to which Equiano handles his sources to derive an interpretation is uniquely his own' (149). See also the striking similarity between Lawrence Harlow's *An account of the conversion of an Indian, in a letter to a friend* (1774) and chapter 10 of Equiano's *Interesting Narrative*. Equiano does mention 'a little book, entitled "The Conversation of an Indian"' (83).

[15] See Vincent Carretta (2005); John Bugg (2006); and Gloria Chuku (2013). Chinua Achebe:

'I have myself pinpointed to my own satisfaction and from the evidence in his text the village of his birth as Iseke' (2009: 74).

[16] Equiano's weaving of moralising humanism and business logic does not fit Ian Baucom's formula of the two distinct discourses of property active in the Zong trial: 'a contest between the speculative imagination of finance capital and the sentimental, romantic imagination of melancholy … a *formulaic* melancholy … and a formalized finance capitalism can sometimes operate not only as antagonists but as secret sharers in the philosophical discourse of modernity' (2005: 205).

[17] Equiano addressing Tobin, in George Schuyler mode: 'Away with your narrow impolitic notion of preventing by law what will be a national honour, national strength, and productive of national virtue—Intermarriages!' (1788: 218).

[18] Equiano's truthfulness regarding his involuntary and then voluntary collaboration with slave traders accords with Kant's principle that 'truthfulness (if he must speak) is an unconditional duty' (1797a: 614).

[19] The site of his and Dr Irving's enterprise, Cape Gracias a Dios (Equiano 1789: 93), was named by Columbus on his last voyage.

[20] 'How many Thousands of our harmless Fellow Creatures have, for a long Course of Years, fallen a Sacrifice to that selfish Avarice, which gives life to this complicated Wickedness.' (Benezet 1762: 4)

[21] "'It bears in my judgement the genuine stamp of truth and nature.'" (Joseph Phillips in Prince 1831: 26)

[22] Making the economic case for slavery and against 'this anticolonial *fungus*,' MacQueen also noted the censorship of newspapers imposed on the West Indies under Benjamin D'Urban: "'Abstinence from all comments on the slave question, except such as are calculated to promote the measure recommended by His Majesty's government, and sanctioned by Parliament'" (1831: 751, 756). Equiano contributed to that shift in forces, with the slavers on the back-foot.

[23] Ramsay is referring to Quashi's master from the fateful tale that encapsulated the evils of slavery. Tobin (1785: 165-166) takes time to rebut this story. See also Joseph Addison, *The Spectator*, no. 215 (Tuesday, November 6, 1711).

[24] On the evidence of a letter, written at Equiano's request and reproduced at the end of *The Interesting Narrative*, historian Simon Schama concludes that 'Equiano had gone all the way back to his own origins and the source of the evil, West Africa, where he served as an unordained chaplain and preacher to Governor Matthias Macnamara at Cape Coast Castle' (2006: 167). The author of the letter on which Schama basis his claim for the African origin of Equiano is described by Vincent Carretta: 'Macnamara had been lieutenant governor of Senegambia in 1774 and governor in November 1775, but he was not a well-liked man, and as an administrator he was arrogant, self-important, impolitic and deceitful' (2005: 198). See also Kazanjian (2016).

[25] For 'if, in all cases, we were to remain faithful to every detail of the truth, we might often expose ourselves to the wickedness of others, which wanted to abuse out truthfulness' (Kant 1997a: 204). See Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).

[26] Was Kant unknowingly peddling the default mode normative whiteness? [T]think of "flesh-colored" crayons and band aids' (Mills 2018: 22).

[27] 'My hypothesis is that Kant's cosmopolitanism—his search for a purpose in human history—made his racism even more pronounced because the racial inferiority he already recognized now struck him as an offence against all humanity, an offence against this very cosmopolitanism.' (Bernasconi 2003: 18)

[28] 'But Kant's theory is fortunately stronger than his prejudices, and it is the theory on which philosophers should focus ... The "redemption of the hopes of the past" [Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*] is still a task worth pursuing, and we should not let ourselves be deceived by self-serving distortions of these hopes." (Louden 2000: 105-106) Nor should we be taken in by the equation of criticism with an attack on the values of enlightenment.

[29] 'Those prisoners which were not sold or redeemed we kept as slaves: but how different was their condition from that of the slaves in the West Indies! With us they do no more work than other members of the community, even their masters; their food, clothing and lodging were nearly the same as theirs, (except that they were not permitted to eat with those who were free-born); and there was scarce any other difference between them, than a superior degree of importance which the head of a family possesses in our state, and that authority which, as such, he exercises over every part of his household. Some of these slaves have even slaves under them as their own property, and for their own use.' (Equiano 1789: 9)

[30] Pity can be a means of studied indifference: "The party attached to liberty is, upon that supposition, the numerous one; they are the persons of true energy, and who have an object worthy of their zeal. Their oppressors, few in number, and degraded to the rank of lifeless machines, wander with no certain destination or prospect over the vast surface, and are objects of pity rather than serious alarm' (Godwin 1793: 259).

[31] See Cugoano on the Sierra Leone project: 'This prospect of settling a free colony to Great-Britain in a peaceable alliance with the inhabitants of Africa at Sierra Leona, has neither altogether met with the credulous approbation of the Africans here, nor yet been sought after with any prudent and right plan by the promoters of it' (1787: 139-140). See Williams (1977: 40).

[32] In this Equiano follows Benezet's argument for ex-slaves 'to become profitable Members of Society' as abolishing slavery altogether will increase the opportunity of those whose labour is undercut by slaves (1762: 70, 79; and see 33). 'I remember that, in 1838, many were waiting for the results of the West India experiment, before they could come into our ranks. Those "results" have come long ago; but, alas! few of that number have come with them, as converts. A man must be disposed to judge of emancipation by other tests than whether it has increased the produce of sugar, —and to hate slavery for other reasons than because it starves men and whips women,—before he is ready to lay the first stone of his anti-slavery life.' (Phillips 1845: 9) The economic argument for manumission was discredited.

[33] "'Humanity and benevolence are fine pretences; but interest prompted him [Ramsay]".' (Letter from the Vestry-Men and Church Warden of the Parish Church of St. Christopher [Saint Kitts] in Tobin 1785: 162) For his part Ramsay advised 'to contract an intimacy with

them [slaves], to enter into their little interests, to hear patiently their doubts and complaints, to condescend to their weakness and ignorance, to lead them on slowly and gently, to exhort them affectionately, to avoid carefully magisterial threatenings and commands' (1785: 164).

[34] See Foucault on 'a general scheme, a great mechanism of transformation: How can men's time and their bodies, their lives, be made into something that is productive force?' (2000: 85)

[35] Seymour Drescher underlines the context in which the anti-slavery lobby won their fight for freedom: 'The same elites that successfully removed the national blemish of the slave trade were able to neutralize a variety of social and political threats to their dominance. In effecting the prohibition of a distant evil, British rulers simultaneously pre-empted domestic agitation and forged a formidable new weapon of nationalist mobilization against the Napoleonic menace' (1994: 139).

References

Achebe, Chinua 1976 [1964]. "The African Writer and the English Language." In: *Morning Yet on Creation Day*. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 74–84.

---- 1987. *Anthills of the* Savannah. Johannesburg: Heinemann.

---- 2009 [2011]. "Recognitions." In: *The Education of a British Protected Child*. London: Penguin Classics, 73-76.

Addison, Joseph 1711. *The Spectator*, no. 215. Tuesday, November 6. https://www.fulltextarchive.com/pdfs/The-Spectator-Volume-2-.pdf

Baucom, Ian 2005. *Specters of the Atlantic; Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Benezet, Anthony 1762. *A short account of that part of Africa inhabited by the negroes*. Philadelphia: W. Dunlap. Second enlarged edition. https://archive.org/details/shortaccountofth00benerich

Bernasconi, Robert 2002. "Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism." In: *Philosophers on Race. Critical Essays*. Edited by Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 145-166.

---- 2003. "Will the real Kant please stand up? The challenge of Enlightenment racism to the study of the history of philosophy." *Radical Philosophy* 117 (Jan/Feb): 13-22.

---- 2019. "Ottabah Cugoano's place in the history of political philosophy: slavery in the philosophical canon." In: *Debating African Philosophy: Perspective on Identity, Decolonial Ethics and Comparative Philosophy*. Edited by George Hull. Abingdon: Routledge, 25-42.

Berry, Christopher J. 2010. "Adam Smith's Moral Economy." *The Kyoto Economic Review* 79, no. 1 (166) (June): 2-15.

Bugg, John 2006. "The Other Interesting Narrative: Olaudah Equiano's Public Book Tour." *Proceedings of the Modern Language Association* 121, no. 5 (October): 1424–1442.

Carretta, Vincent 2005. *Equiano, the African: Biography of a Self-Made Man*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

---- 2010. "Equiano's Paradise Lost: The Limits of Allusion in Chapter Five of *The Interesting*

Narrative." In: *Imagining Transatlantic Slavery*. Edited by Cora Kaplan and John Oldfield. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 79-95.

Chuku, Gloria 2013. "Olaudah Equiano and the Foundation of Igbo Intellectual Tradition." In: *The Igbo Intellectual Tradition: Creative Conflict in African and African Diasporic Thought*. Edited by Gloria Chuku. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 33-65.

Clarkson, Thomas. 1788 [1808]. *An Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species, Particularly the Africa*. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees and Orme. https://archive.org/details/essayonslaveryco00clar

Cugoano, Quobna Ottoba 1787. *Thoughts on the Evil and wicked traffic of the slavery and commerce of the human special, humbly submitted to the inhabitants of Great Britain, by Ottoba Cugoano, A Native of Africa*. London.

Douglass, Frederick 1845 [2005]. *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself*. The Antislavery Literature Project. Antislavery Literature Project – Providing public access to the literature of slavery

---- 1894 [1999]. "Why is the Negro Lynched?" In: *Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings*. Edited by Philip S. Foner and Yuval Taylor. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 750-776.

Drescher, Seymour 1994. "Whose Abolition? Popular Pressure and the Ending of the British Slave Trade." *Past and Present* 143 (May): 136-166.

Equiano, Olaudah 1788. "Letter to James Tobin, January 28, 1788 [*The Public Advertiser*]." In: *The Interesting Narrative of Olaudah Equiano, Written by Himself*. Edited by Robert J. Allison. New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2007, 215-218.

---- 1789. *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African. Written by Himself*. London. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15399/15399-h/15399-h.htm
For different editions of Equiano's text: Equiano's World (equianosworld.org)

Flikshuh, Katrin, and Lea Ypi (eds.) 2014. *Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foucault, Michel 2000. "Truth and Juridical Forms." In: *Power*. Volume 3 of *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984*. Edited by James D. Faubion. Translated by Robert Hurley *et* al. New York: The New Press, 1-89.

Francklyn, Gilbert 1789. *An Answer to the Rev. Mr. Clarkson's Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species, particularly the African; In a Series of Letters from a Gentleman in Jamaica to His Friend in London: Wherein many of the Mistakes and Misrepresentations of Mr. Clarkson are pointed out, both with regard to the Manner in which that Commerce is carried on the Africa, and the Treatment of Slaves in the West Indies, shewing, at the same time, the Antiquity, Universality, and Lawfulness of Slavery, as ever having been one of the States and Conditions of Mankind*. London. https://archive.org/details/ananswertorevmr00frangoog

Garrison, William Lloyd 1845. "Preface." In: *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave*. Boston, 4-9

Godwin, William 1793 [1976]. *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*. London: Penguin.

Guyer, Paul 2007. "Translator's Introduction. "Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime'." In: Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by

Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 18-21.

Guyer, Paul (ed.) 2016. *Virtues of Freedom. Selected Essays on Kant*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hazlitt, William 1825 [1947]. "William Godwin." *The Spirit of the Age*. London: Oxford University Press, 17-34.

Johnson, Sylvester A. 2015. *African American Religions, 1500-2000: Colonialism, Democracy, and Freedom*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, Immanuel 1759 [1992]. "An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism. Appendix: Three manuscript reflections on optimism." In: *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*. Translated and edited by David Walford in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 77-83.

---- 1763 [1992]. "Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy." In: *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*. Translated and edited by David Walford in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 203-241.

---- 1784 [2007]. "Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim." In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 107-120.

---- 1785 [1996]. "Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 41-108.

---- 1788a [2007]. "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy." In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 192-218.

---- 1788b [1996]. "Critique of Practical Reason." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 133-271.

---- 1797a [1996]. "On the supposed right to lie from philanthropy." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 605-15.

---- 1797b [1996]. "The Metaphysics of Morals." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 353-603.

---- 1798a [1979]. *The Conflict of the Faculties (Der Streit Der Facultaten)*. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. USA: Abaris Books.

---- 1798b [2007]. "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view." In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

---- 1803 [2007]. "Lectures on pedagogy." In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 434-85.

Kazanjian, David 2016. *The Brink of Freedom: Improvising Life in the Nineteenth-Century World*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Louden, Robert P. 2000. *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings*. New York: Oxford University Press.

MacQueen, James 1831. "The Colonial Empire of Great Britain. Letter to Earl Grey, First Lord of the Treasury." *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* 187 (November): 744-764.

Mills, Charles W. 2018. "Black Radical Kantianism." *Res Philosophica* 95, no.1 (January): 1-33. https://simpsoncenter.org/sites/simpson/files/Charles-Mills-Black-Radical-Kantianism.pdf

Nancy, Jean-Luc 2008 [1976]. *The Discourse of the Syncope: Logodaedalus*. Translated by Saul Anton. California: Stanford University Press.

Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review* 101, no. 7: 3221-3252.

Phillips, Wendell 1845. "Letter from Wendell Phillips, Esq. Boston, April 22nd, 1845." In: Frederick Douglass, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave*. Boston, 9-11. https://archive.org/details/douglasfred00dougrich

Philmore, J. 1760. *Two Dialogues on the Man-trade.* London. https://archive.org/details/TwoDialoguesOnTheMan-tradelondon1760

Prince, Mary 1831. *The History of Mary Prince, A West Indian Slave, Related by Herself. With a Supplement by the Editor. To which is added the Narrative of Asa-Asa, A Captured African*. London: F. Westley and A.H. Davis. https://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/prince/prince.html

Ramsay, James 1784. *An Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies*. London: James Phillips. An essay on the treatment and conversion of African slaves in the British sugar colonies : Ramsay, James, 1733-1789 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Schama, Simon 2006. *Rough Crossings: The Slaves, The British, and the American Revolution*. New York: HarperCollins.

Thomas, Sue 2005. "Pringle v. Cadell and Wood v. Pringle: The Libel Cases over *The History of Mary Prince*." *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 40, no. 1: 113-135.

Thomas, William Hannibal 1901. *The American Negro. What he Was, What He is, and What He May Become—a critical and practical discussion*. New York: The Macmillan Company. https://archive.org/details/americannegrowh00thomgoog

Tobin, James 1785. *Cursory Remarks upon the Reverend Mr. Ramsay's Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the Sugar Colonies*. Bristol.

Turnbull, Gordon 1786. *An Apology for Negro Slavery; or, the West-India Planters Vindicated from the Charge of Inhumanity*. London: Stewart and Stevenson.

Wahl, Jean 2016 [1944]. *Human Existence and Transcendence*. Edited and translated by William C. Hackett. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Wesley, John 1791 [1931]. "John Wesley to William Wilberforce, February 24th, 1791." In: *The Letters of John Wesley. Volume 8*. Edited by John Telford. London: Epworth Press. Letters Of The Rev John Wesley : Telford, John Ed. : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

---- 1774 [1792]. *Thoughts Upon Slavery*. London: G. Paramore. Fifth edition. https://archive.org/details/thoughtsuponslav00wesl

Williams, Howard 1977. "Kant's Concept of Property." *The Philosophical Quarterly* 27, no. 106 (January): 32-40.

Wood, Allen W. 1999. *Kant's Ethical Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
---- 2008. *Kantian Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zöller, Günter and Robert P. Louden (eds.) 2007. *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Primitive Times

In the first chapter of his *Interesting Narrative*, Equiano refers approvingly to Thomas Clarkson's anti-slavery *An Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species, Particularly the African* (1788).

Clarkson defends James Ramsay against James Tobin's attack by making the case against slavery via a compendium of classical sources.[1] This genealogy underlines the hypothesis of the novelty of modern slavery. The basic proposition is: 'Mankind cannot be considered as property' (1788: xx). How, then. does man come to have the property of not being property?

Clarkson's account of measures that will 'at once afford security to the acquisition of the industrious, and heal the intestine disorders of the community, by the introduction of Laws' (1788: 51) links human rights and

property. It is at once classical and thoroughly modern, and it reveals some of the conceptual ingredients that circulate today.

It seems that slavery 'was founded on the idea that men were *property*; and, as this idea was coeval with the first order of *involuntary* slaves, it must have arisen ... in the first practices of barter' (37). While the owner of property is by definition superior to his property over which he exercises possession—'if all property must not be in its nature inferior to its possessor' (148)—there is no essential difference between the slave and his master except '*chance*' (56). The argument for human equality historicises slavery and simultaneously naturalises the concept of property.

Not only is the assertion of human rights tied to property; the idea of property is tied to a conception of the human and the rights considered proper to that subject. Moreover, the human and its rights are embedded in a historico-economic narrative. It is impossible to underestimate the force and ramifications of this normative and historical account.

The abbreviated rendition given by Clarkson is valuable because of its assurance that ultimately rests on the supposition of incontrovertibility—for who could disagree with the sequence of human social forms thus narrated? Even his opponents, the pro-slavery lobby, will share this fundamental understanding of human development and disagree only about whether the category of property should be applied to humans. In working to clarify—historically juridically and philosophically—the concept of property as it applies, or does not apply, to human beings, this abolitionist analysis reveals more than its didactic trajectory would lead one to expect.

Tracing the history of servants and debtors (voluntary slavery), and piracy and captives of war (involuntary slavery), Clarkson notes that the former could only have arisen in a state of society governed by commerce and distinctions of wealth and status: 'when property, after its division, had become so unequal, as to multiply the wants of individuals' (25). It seems, at least initially, that the unequal division of property is the source of slavery.

Although slavery declined in Europe by the twelfth century because of the spread of Christianity, it was the Portuguese in the fifteenth-century in Africa who resuscitated European involvement in the trade:

> The commerce therefore, which was begun in the primitive ages of the world, by classing them with the brutal specie, and by habituating the mind to consider the terms of brute and slave as synonymous, soon caused them to be viewed in a low and despicable light, and as greatly inferior to the human species. (32)

Although avarice is the cause of this return of barbarism, the assumption of 'a *natural* right to domination and [the belief] that the rest of the world, from the inferiority of their own, were to be considered and treated as the *irrational* part of creation' (33) has as its condition '*commerce*, in consequence of which, people with the same faculties and feelings as ourselves, were made subject to the laws and limitations of *possession*' (56).

Specific economic and technological conditions intersect with a perennial problem: 'there are always men, of every age, country, and persuasion, who are ready to sacrifice their dearest principles at the shrine of gain' (43). The weakness of human nature, shared by 'the despotick sovereigns of Africa' (45), permits avarice and ambition to flourish. Slavers (in this instance the Dutch at the Cape) are 'more savage than the brutes themselves' (48).

Moving on from the history of slavery, Clarkson resolves under the heading "The African Commerce, or Slave Trade" to set slavery, both modern and ancient, in its proper context. The aim is to show that the transatlantic slave trade is a throw-back to more primitive times, a lapse into a custom 'revived by some of the nations of Europe in the persons of the unfortunate Africans' (49). Slavery is a throwback to primitive times.

The story of human progress from 'the primitive ages of the world' (32) to the present is designed to bolster the charge of recidivism levelled at the slavers and their silent and not so silent partners:

> For this purpose we shall inquire into the rise, nature, and design of government. Such an inquiry will be particularly useful in the present place; it will afford us that general knowledge of subordination and liberty, which is necessary in the case before us, and will be found, as it were, a source, to which we may frequently refer for many and valuable arguments. (49)

The generality of the account of the nature and design of government is its virtue for here we can see categories and typology underlying 'that general knowledge of subordination and liberty' so necessary to judge particular instances.

Like fables, we might add. Aesop has already been enlisted as an example of the ability of slaves, his fables 'furnishing maxims of prudence and virtue, at a time when speculative principles of philosophy are too difficult to be understood' (35). Hence his stories have 'been introduced by the most civilised nations into their system of education' (35).

The elements of the story are well known, originating in divine writings and 'other fables of the time' (50). 'It appears that mankind were originally

free'; 'there was no rank, no distinction, no superior'; '[e]very man wandered where he chose'; 'everything was common' in 'primitive times'. It was 'a state of *dissociation* and *independence*:'

> This conclusion concerning the dissociated state of mankind, is confirmed by all the early writers, with whose descriptions of primitive times no other conclusion is reconcilable. (50, note)[2]

However, 'this original equality of men' could not last and 'the grand principles of preservation and defence ... began to operate' and from family units '*societies* began to be formed and established ... taking to themselves names from particular occurrences' (50).

Naming and society are intertwined, and the unity of society has a linguistic, nominative, denotative consolidation: '[t]hey were still independent and free; for they were still without discipline and law; they had everything still in common' (50-51). Everything in common is the pre-condition of private property, which in turn is the basis of slavery.[3]

Now wandering 'in *herds* ... as a *public body*' they did 'what they had been accustomed to do as *individuals* before' (51). Having 'left their original state of *dissociation*' they entered 'a state of independent society.' Independence passes from lawless freedom to social independence.

From here the natural increase in population led to the development of agriculture, and the need to regulate labour and produce:

> An *assignation* of *property* would not only enforce an application, but excite an emulation, to labour; and *government* would at once afford a security to the acquisitions of the industrious, and heal the intestine disorders of the community, by the introduction of Laws. (51)

In this third situation of mankind, 'a state of *subordinate society*' (52), societies were divided into 'tribes' and 'to every tribe was allotted a particular district for its support': 'The *societies*, which had hitherto seen their members, undistinguished either by authority or rank, admitted now of magistratical pre-eminence' (51).[4] From everything in common to divisions of rank and authority; from liberty to subordination and juridical and executive power—such is the condition of liberty.

Having 'traced the situation of man from unbounded liberty to subordination' (52), Clarkson explores 'who first achieved pre-eminence in these *primeval societies*'; was it by '*compulsion* or *consent*' (52)? In other words, is society based on involuntary, compelled subordination or on consensual, self-imposed subordination? Is society *per se* based on slavery? The issue of

slavery—its origin and legitimacy—being a question of subordination, the origin of 'rank' and legal distinction must be accounted for since this is what slavery grows from:

> How could [any particular individual] forcibly have usurped the jurisdiction at a time, when, all being equally free, there was not a single person, whose assistance he could command? Add to this, that, in a state of universal liberty, force had been repaid by force, and the attempt had been fatal to the usurper. (52)

It is clear that '*empire* then could never have been gained at first by *compulsion*' (52). Competition, retribution and egalitarian violence would veto any attempt to dominate. It is only by consent of the whole community, all being equally free, that the 'important sacrifice' of their individual and collective freedom could be securely established 'for their mutual happiness.' The distinction accorded to a pre-eminent individual could only be elicited by confidence in such an individual's '*wisdom*, *justice*, *prudence*, and *virtue*' (53).[5] This confidence or trust underwrites a contract binding everyone, willed by the majority rather than enforced by the violent imposition of a particular will.[6]

The '*assignation* of *property*' facilitated distinctions of rank, and yet such distinctions are the result of consent. The management of production and distribution secreted the law and its personnel. Through the medium of consent distilled in the recognition of *wisdom*, *justice*, *prudence*, and *virtue wisdom*, *justice*, *prudence*, and *virtue* established in society. Property is bound up with economic and moral categories.

The security of government being the government of security, the defence against outside threats is complemented by the need to 'heal the intestine disorders of the community.' Consent is thus not merely recognition of the qualities of an individual, but also implicit recognition of the conditions necessary for the self-preservation of society and its members.[7] Physical survival dictates certain transformations, but, according to Clarkson, the thread of originary freedom is not lost.

In this account of the transition from hunter-gatherer to settled, agricultural society the assignation of property precedes the foundation of law. Population increase and the regulation of labour and the necessity of distribution give rise to the enabling supplement of law and government. There is an organic, physiological base to the social superstructure. Consent to authority and rank is recognition that coercion can bring about a state of affairs where minimum coercion exists.[8]

With the other option being physical annihilation, this course is the least

bad option. Property is attributed to someone—assigned to someone or to some group; delegated, inscribed and marked with possessory sign—and ownership implies subordination, as Clarkson puts it. The account of natural liberty foregrounds productivity and property, and hints at the division of labour (coded as status). Recalling Adam Smith's account, the laws of market are presented as an internal metabolism that must be protected from 'the violence and invasion of other independent societies' (1776: 747).

Yet domination and subjection must not be extended from things and animals to other humans (excepting certain family members).[9] Since slaves are men and not beasts, slavery is wrong in theory (men are not things or animals) and in practice (slavery degrades men to animals). People cannot become property because they are rational, yet reason and freedom are the product of a system of coercion and subordination.

Lurking here is the possibility, not addressed by Clarkson, that a people could consent to sacrifice members of their society to slavery to ensure survival in a precarious world. Or even that one can consent to be slave oneself, hence the legal prohibition of such a contract. The proposition, or rather the axiom, that consent implies mutual respect and some minimal degree of equity is a shaky foundation for political economy. Could self-enslavement be a survival strategy?

According to Clarkson, slavery is at one and the same time the product of civilisation (epitomised by the Egyptian market) and a reversion to brute nature. More precisely, reversion to brute nature is not something that might befall society, something exterior, but something within it. The division between brute nature and society is not a division but a fold whereby outside becomes inside, which means that the seeds of society are within nature (natural). The coercive system of right must be transcended in the name of originary, innate right.

The pro-slavery argument that embroiled Kant adheres to many of the elements of this narrative, as does the record of Clarkson's antagonists. For example, arguing that slavery has always existed, and that inequality and subordination is the motor of progress, Gilbert Francklyn declared Clarkson's tract to be 'a fable,' and dismissed 'the vehemence of Mr Clarkson's humanity' (1789: 1, 169).

In other words, the pro-slavery propagandists accused the abolitionists of fanaticism. Not only did they naively whitewash human history, they also spread misinformation about the present:

> There can be the less reason for any such step [the abolition of slavery], if, I hope it has been clearly shown, that slavery or servitude, in some degree, exists in every part of the world, and that the poor people of every denomination, and everywhere, are truly and essentially those who bear, and ever must bear, burdens heavier or lighter according as circumstances may occur … which is an absolute proof, that this difference of condition is everywhere the lot of human nature, and consequently conformable to the will of God. (Francklyn 1789: 242)

Economic collapse will follow if slavery is abolished.[10] Life, liberty and security are at stake. Confusing what ought to be with what is, the abolitionists propose to undermine the very basis of freedom and prosperity, and threaten our physical survival

The foundation is the sanctity of property, more precisely private property, which has incited emulation and competitiveness. Without the discipline of unsociable sociality, authority and rank, there would be no prosperity and no freedom. Those who best understand the system should guide its reform, not those embroiled in mistakes and misrepresentations.[11]

The proximity of the anti-slavery and pro-slavery arguments is striking. The essential links in the narrative of progress—principally liberty and economic development through property—are accepted by both parties.[12] It is the extension of the category of property to include human beings that is at issue:

> And how can any man fulfil this scheme of universal benevolence, who reduces an unfortunate person against his will, to the most insupportable of all human conditions; who considers him as his private property, and treats him, not as a brother, nor as one of the same parentage with himself, but as *an animal of the brute creation*? (Clarkson 1788: 151)

Extending the category of property to humans reduces the category of the human. And yet the necessity of subordination persists, and a telling and essential ambiguity in Clarkson's rendering of consent to the necessity of authority and rank recodes rather rules out coercion. This proximity might explain why Kant could drift into the outskirts of the pro-slavery camp, despite his commitment to freedom as an essential idea of reason. What is law without coercion? Under the banner of progress regression flourishes.[13]

Equality of birth—Clarkson's 'of the same parentage'—universalised as equality of humanity transforms natural equality of birth (*isogonía*) into equality of rights (*isonomía*): 'Nature commands law; equality of birth founds *in necessity* legal equality' (Derrida 2005a: 93). The archetypal narrative of human development interweaves nature and necessity, freedom and law, slavery and

property.

Is the idea of development, of progress, bound up with the idea of race? Clarkson doesn't mention race or consanguinity, but the anti-slavery argument moves along the frontier between nature and right. Equality of birth (*isogonia*) is latent in the idea of families that coalesce (however peacefully or violently—he doesn't say) for mutual security, etc.

To push the terms of Clarkson's conjectural history to its historico-logical conclusion let us say that freedom and property are imbricated in the state's obligation to maintain its territorial and institutional integrity. For the pro-slavery lobby the economic benefits of slavery are covered by that obligation. Whether families represent the cells of the primal horde or if each family is in miniature the horde that gives rise to unsociably sociality is unclear. The idea of an original contract rather than coercion is an empirical, psychological claim, but also a regulative idea that justifies the case against slavery. And yet the narrative regarding the natural evolution of private property is integral to slavery.

It is also, from the perspective of abolitionism (and, I would suggest, of human rights) unstable. Not only is the very naturalness of this supplement in question. In so far as it undermines and complicates the very idea of nature itself, it is also haunted by what is veiled by the idea of development or evolution; the violence and subjugation, even slavery, integral to the process. A price worth paying. We shall see that this mechanism of (self)sacrifice, investment, and consent that answers the imperative of survival runs like a thread from the past to the present.

In short, clinging to private property will not protect you from slavery. What happens when the state's obligation to maintain its territorial and institutional integrity becomes that of an emergent world state obligated to defend the very existence of the Anthropocene? What if the 'important sacrifice' of individual and collective freedom could be securely established 'for their mutual happiness'?

Will future generations look back with gratitude on the benevolence of those who, in a moment of supreme crisis, had the confidence to coerce consent for the good of the human race?

Notes

[1] Clarkson refers to Tobin as 'the *cursory remarker*' (x), as does Quobna Ottoba Cugoano in his *Thoughts on the Evil and wicked traffic of the slavery and commerce of the human special, humbly submitted to the inhabitants of Great Britain, by Ottoba Cugoano, A Native of Africa* (1787).

[2] For Clarkson the primitive state is neither a war of all against all (Hobbes) nor a trough of sterile peaceful indifference (Rousseau) amounting to 'an arcadian pastoral existence of perfect concord, contentment and mutual love' (Kant 1784: 111-112).

[3] See Kant's criticism of this fiction of the primitive community: 'The original community of land, and with it of things upon it (*communio fundi originaria*), is an idea that has objective (rightfully practical) validity. This kind of community must be sharply distinguished from a *primitive community* (*communio primaeva*), which is a fiction; for a primitive community would have to be one that was *instituted* and arose from a contract by which everyone gave up private possessions and, by uniting his possessions with those of everyone else, transformed them into a collective possession; and history would have to give us proof of such a contract. But it is contradictory to claim that such a procedure is an *original* taking possession and that each man could and should have based his separate possession upon it' (1797: 405).

[4] According to Derrida: '*Majestas* has always been a synonym of sovereignty.' (2005b: 81). Derrida refers to Kant's claim that 'the majesty of the people,' 'the sovereignty of the people,' is 'an absurd expression' (1795: 326). Only a person, or rather a sovereign, can be sovereign.

[5] 'A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors.' (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1252a 30-31, 1988)

[6] Thomas Hobbes warns in *Elements of Law* that in the state of nature not even the simplest contract *would* be honoured unless 'there shall be such power coercive over both the parties, as shall deprive them of their private judgements on this point; then may such covenants be effectual; seeing he that performeth first shall have no reasonable cause to doubt the performance of the other, that may be compelled thereunto' (1640: 159)

[7] 'Here Hobbes constructs his theory of the origin of the state: A representative person or corporation comes into being by way of a covenant between individuals. For its part the individual or corporation elevates those that entered into the covenant to unified person, namely, the state.' (Schmitt 1938: 19)

[8] 'Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none.' (Smith 1776: 771).

[9] See Clarkson's explanation of 'the true reason, why cattle are justly to be estimated as property. For first, the right to empire over brutes, is *natural,* and not *adventitious,* like the right to empire over men. There are, secondly, many and evident signs of the *inferiority* of their nature; and thirdly, their liberty can be bought and sold, because, being void of reason, they cannot be *accountable* for their actions' (1788: 56-57; see 59 and 148-149).

[10] In contrast John Wesley put morality before profit: 'However … I come back to the same point: better no trade, than trade procured by villany [sic]. It is far better to have no wealth, than to gain wealth at the expence [sic] of virtue. Better an honest poverty, than all the riches bought by the tears, and sweat and blood of our fellow-creatures' (1774: 18) 'A man can be under no necessity of degrading himself into a wolf.' (17).

[11] 'Fanaticism is so to speak a pious brazenness and is occasioned by a certain pride and an altogether too great confidence in oneself to come closer to the heavenly natures and to elevate itself by an astonishing flight above the usual and prescribed order.' (Kant 1764: 58)
[12] Hence Clarkson can state in his Preface: 'Nothing can be more clearly shewn, than that an inexhaustible mine of wealth is neglected in *Africa,* for the prosecution of this impious traffick; that, if proper measures were taken, the revenue of this country might be greatly improved, its naval strength increased, its colonies in a more flourishing situation, the planters richer, and a trade, which is now a scene of blood and desolation, converted into one, which might be prosecuted with *advantage* and *honour*' (1788: xii).
[13] See Alfred Rosenberg on the founding of society and a time when 'primal racial impulses dominated:' 'Close followers grouped around individual personalities which then gradually led by necessity to the establishment of laws of social life, and finally … a sedentary kind of rural life ensue[d]' (1930: 135).

References

Image of slave from Google images (V&A collection). White jasper medallion for the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, modeled by William Hackwood, made at Josiah Wedgwood's factory, Etruria, Staffordshire, England, c. 1787. Copyright Victoria and Albert Museum no. 414:1304-1885. https://museumcrush.org/the-18th-century-anti-slavery-brooch-designed-manufactured-and-distributed-by-josiah-wedgwood/

Aristotle *Politics*. In: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Bollingen Series LXXI. Volume 2. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. New Haven: Princeton University Press, 1995, 1986–2129.

Clarkson, Thomas. 1788. *An Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species, Particularly the Africa*. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees and Orme, 1808. https://archive.org/details/essayonslaveryco00clar

Cugoano, Quobna Ottoba 1787. *Thoughts on the Evil and wicked traffic of the slavery and commerce of the human special, humbly submitted to the inhabitants of Great Britain, by Ottoba Cugoano, A Native of Africa*. London.

Derrida, Jacques 2005a [1994]. *The Politics of Friendship*. Translated by George Collins. London: Verso.

---- 2005b [2003]. *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason*. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Francklyn, Gilbert 1789. *An Answer to the Rev. Mr. Clarkson's Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species, particularly the African; In a Series of Letters from a Gentleman in Jamaica to His Friend in London: Wherein many of the Mistakes and Misrepresentations of Mr. Clarkson are pointed out, both with regard to the Manner in which that Commerce is carried on the Africa, and the Treatment of Slaves in the West Indies, shewing, at the same time, the Antiquity, Universality, and Lawfulness of Slavery, as ever having been one of the States and Conditions of Mankind*. London. https://archive.org/details/ananswertorevmr00frangoog

Hobbes, Thomas 1640 [2017]. *Three-Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes's Political Theory: "The Elements of Law", "De Cive", and "Leviathan"*. Edited by Deborah Baumgold. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, Immanuel 1764 [2007]. "Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime." In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 18-62.

---- 1784 [2007]. "Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim." In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 107-120.

---- 1795 [1996]. "Toward Perpetual Peace." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 311–351.

---- 1797 [1996]. "The Metaphysics of Morals." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 353-603.

Rosenberg, Alfred 1930. *The Myth of the Twentieth Century. An Evaluation of the Spiritual-Intellectual Confrontations of Our Age*. https://archive.org/details/TheMythOfThe20thCentury

Schmitt, Carl 1938 [1996]. *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol*. Translated by George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein. London: Greenwood Press.

Smith, Adam 1776 [1994]. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. New York: The Modern Library.

Wesley, John 1774 [1792]. *Thoughts Upon Slavery*. London: G. Paramore. Fifth edition. https://archive.org/details/thoughtsuponslav00wesl

3. The Concept of Race

> Every person by nature is racist.
> —Jon Mills and Januz A. Palinowski,
> *The Ontology of Prejudice*

W.E.B. Du Bois suggested that perhaps it is wrong to speak of race as a concept at all, rather it is 'a group of contradictory forces, facts and tendencies' (1940: 67). To call it a concept is already to grant too much because it implies its usefulness for cognition, its clarity and coherence, and hence its validity. And yet, as Du Bois explains his own development his family lineage, and his awareness of other histories and identities, the power of the race resurfaces. His essay on the 'autobiography of a race concept' shows that the concept of race as genealogy and descent is central not only to his own autobiography, but perhaps to the very idea of progress and development itself.

Race as species unites the human race, whereas race as subspecies differentiates and atomises as much as it promises to unite; casting us 'to sink or swim in this sea of race prejudice' (Du Bois 1920: 203). But can we jettison the idea of race and retain the idea of the human race? The beginnings of an answer can be found by way of a philosophical detour through Immanuel Kant's textual web. Kant stands at the centre of the genealogical and philosophical debate concerning the concept of race. Indeed, the non-debate regarding Kant's racism reveals the fault-lines of liberal human rights discourse that define our present.

Kant

> Those who believe they are surrounded by enemies everywhere … are so often astute at interpreting what others do naturally as aimed against them … in which the mind is held in suspense by means of analogies that are confused with concepts of similar things, and thus the power of imagination, in a play resembling understanding.
> —Immanuel Kant, "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view"

According to Henry Louis Gates, Kant is 'one of the earliest major European philosophers to conflate color with intelligence, a determining relation he posits with dictatorial surety' (1989: 18).[1] The accusation is that Kant contributed to the legitimation of the concept of race, a concept that has had disastrous consequences for humanity. Robert Bernasconi (2001; 2002: 145) agrees that by inventing the concept of race, Kant gave expression to a virulent and theoretically based racism. The sage of Königsberg, the father of both modern moral theory and racial theory, is also a theorist of personhood and sub-personhood (see Mills 1997: 70-72).

Tsenay Serequeberhan concludes that Enlightenment and modernity share 'the trite and bland prejudice that European existence, properly speaking, is true human existence *per se*' (2006: 90). Cultural superiority is normalised. European philosophy, and in particular Kant's philosophical and historical texts, accomplish the replication of the European Enlightenment with racist leanings throughout the globe (see Schönfeld 2000: 123). We can add some local colour to these judgements by recalling that one of the architects of apartheid, D.F. Malan, wrote his MA thesis on Kant (see Giliomee 2003: 365-66; and Korf 2005: 64-67).

One reaction to this criticism has been to ignore it altogether. In response, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze explained that his anthology of racist Enlightenment philosophers sought to counter the avoidance of discussion of Kant's racism by contemporary philosophers. Particularly glaring for Eze was the omission of any entry headed 'race' in Howard Caygill's otherwise admirable *A Kant Dictionary* (see Eze 1997: 1-9).[2] One can, of course, argue that Kant's racist opinions reveal the deficiencies of the man, but not the failings of his philosophy (see Schönfeld 2000: 124).[3] Unfortunately, as we shall see, Kant articulated his thoughts on race in his published writing, and so separating the man from his thought is more tricky than usual.

It is not enough to lament reprehensible texts 'from the pen of he who the West claims was the thinker of human dignity' (David 2003: 11). David Wood (2004: xi) concedes that Kant held views about non- European cultures and peoples that can only be described as racist, but avers that on the whole Kant's was among the most progressive minds of

his age in respect of social and political matters. What his opinions were is undoubtedly relevant to understanding his thought, according to Wood, but we are guaranteed to learn nothing if we approach philosophers with the sole aim of trying to decide which views expressed by them are in agreement with what we have decided beforehand what all people of good will must believe.[4] The accusatory tone and the call to stay ignorant could not be further from Kant's fundamental injunction that we dare to be wise.

Martha Nussbaum (1997: 23) has expressed concern that the values of reason, equality, and human rights that Kant defended are traduced in some quarters as mere ethnocentric vestiges of western imperialism.[5] Remember that cosmopolitan (citizen of the world: *kosmou politês*) means affiliation with rational humanity: 'Recognizing the cogency of the Stoic view of passions gives us a duty: for it tells us that we have great power over racism, sexism and other divisive passions that militate against cosmopolitan humanism, if we will only devote enough attention to the cognitive moral development of the young' (23). Prejudice exists alongside claims for reason and freedom and it is being used to invalidate the Enlightenment project.

The worry is not so much that a negative judgement is being passed on the historical period of the Enlightenment, but rather that it fuels a rejection of the liberal legacy of human rights. The conspiracy against reason and morality is sure to ensure the victory of irrationalism and particularism at the expense of a reason and a politics of principle.[6] The quest for equality in terms of the teleological progression towards a liberal community envisaged as transparent, knowledgeable, inclusive, and tolerant continues. [7] Continues, that is, irrespective of the possibility that such particular universalism is compatible with the system of hierarchies and exclusions that takes the form of racism and sexism (see Balibar and Wallerstein 1991: 9).

For Nussbaum, Kant has a special place in this tradition: 'Kant, more influentially than any other Enlightenment thinker, defended a politics based upon reason rather than patriotism or group sentiment, a politics that was truly universal rather than communitarian, a politics that was active, reformist and optimist' (1997: 3). The irrationalism of what Anthony Appiah terms 'the deformation of rationality in judgement'

(1990: 8) called racism—its mixing of mystagogic vitalism, apocalyptic theosophy and the rationalisation of inequality—distills the forces of superstition and dogmatism that Kant tried to discredit.[8]

Clearly, not only the philosopher is at stake in this controversy. Universalism may well be a feature of economic expansion, but this does not mean that universalism is identical with the system that it propagates.[9] Far from having deserted the imaginations of its users, this idea of race persists, not yet safely stored away in what Kant called 'the archives of human reason' (Kant 1781/7: B732, A704, 623) nor beaten down like a mad dog.

Seeing race as a social construction imposed on biological differences that are not necessarily racial, that race does not have the physical basis that it is assumed to have, is but one step. However, the conceptual infrastructure that facilitates the transition to racism also supports the idea of universal equality and the humanising call for 'faith in the future of the race' (Nardal 2001: 109). Beneath the level ground on which Kant's majestic moral edifices are built, the concept of race leads to 'all sorts of passageways such as moles might have dug, left over from reason's vain but confident treasure hunting, that make every building insecure (B376: 398).

Uncovering the roots of the concept of race involves revisiting Kant's articulation of reason that will frame the concept of race. Race and reason are not unrelated, and the Kantian principles of human equality, rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism are part of this family history.

Reason

> Reason is a kind of feeling.
> —Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*

When Kant introduces his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/7) with its goal of self-knowledge to be achieved through the institution of a court of justice, self-knowledge is bound up with justice. Reason, as the ability to

think, to represent something by concepts, is to be investigated in order to determine what kind of right it can claim to its possessions. But reason itself is bringing the case.

In this litigious space, the grounds of possession are to be exposed by the process of critical reason itself, 'and this not merely by degrees but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws' (Axii, 101; see also Rose 1984, chapter 1). The rights and claims of reason to its titled possessions will be decided by scrutinising the legitimacy of concepts that have 'an entirely different birth certificate than that of an ancestry from experiences' (B119, A87, 221). The 'birthplace' of these concepts must be established, traced all the way to 'their first seeds [*Keimen*] and predispositions [*Andlagen*]' (A66, B91, 202-203).[10] Indeed the architectonic of descent informs the critical philosophy from the very first.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* is concerned with regulative principles for the understanding as part of the division of the faculties (reason, understanding, sensibility, and imagination) and types of judgment (theoretical, practical, aesthetic). Reason concerns our capacity for drawing inferences for we recognise a thing only by means of general concepts. The particular is contingent with respect to the universal because we cognise a thing only by means of general concepts (Kant's analytic universals) which pick out a feature it has in common with other things (see Ginsborg 2009).

Yet we cannot deduce all the characteristics of a particular thing solely from the concepts that apply to it. We need experience and sensibility because '[r]eason is driven by a propensity of its nature to go beyond its use in experience, to venture to the outmost bounds of cognition by means of mere ideas in a pure use, and to find peace only in completion of its circle in a self-subsisting systematic whole' (A797, B825, 673). Pure reason is called before the court of reason in order to remove all those errors that have so far put reason into dissension with itself. The ultimate end of the three questions that arise from human reason (What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?) is moral, and they imply another question: What is man? To borrow Kojin Karatani's (2005: 1) suggestive formulation, the transcendental approach seeks to cast light on the unconscious structure that precedes and shapes

experience.

Kant credits David Hume, one of the geographers of human reason, with having awakened reason to a thorough investigation of its own powers in the wake of scepticism regarding causality. *Critique of Pure Reason*, Chapter one, section one of the Doctrine of Method, addresses Hume's argument that the law of causality arises from experience and habit rather than from necessity; every change has a cause, every event has a preceding (sufficient) cause, but we do not see the connection between them. From the inability of reason to establish the principle of causality as necessary Hume inferred the error of reason's attempt to either move beyond experience or to ground itself on experience.

In response Kant pointed to the active role of principles of the understanding that anticipate experience, the constitutive synthesising of perceptions into experience by *a priori* concepts which function as capacities to receive and assimilate the data of sense experience. Experience is possible only by means of the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions. Hume was wrong in inferring the contingency of the law of causality from the contingency of experience; he confused levels of analysis (see A760, B788, 653).[11]

The critical project involves attending to the divisions and co-implication of understanding and judgement, appearance and reality, mind and matter, nature and experience, necessity and freedom, receptivity and spontaneity. The appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, "On the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection Through the Confusion of the Empirical Use of the Understanding with the Transcendental," explores the confusion that arises from the blurring of levels of enquiry. The result of the critical project should be the co-ordination of the faculties in accordance with their rightful jurisdiction.

It would seem that, as eternal and unchangeable, the laws of reason are, if not carved in stone, then at least pre-set as a point of co-ordination and adjudication. This gives the impression that the task before us is the bringing into line of various claims made in the name of reason, a kind of supervisory and corrective laying out of the routes, byways, and dead ends into which we may be led by the pursuit of reason. Haunted by fear of dispossession, critical philosophy aims at correcting the abuse of reason, keeping an eye on the steps taken by metaphysics, thereby laying

the foundation of metaphysics as a science.

Just as the *Critique of Pure Reason* preserves a gap, and empty place and openness that is the place of reason, Kant's cosmopolitanism underlines the necessity that reason must find the terms by which to include everyone, even those who reject reason (see Martyn 2003: 101). For the highest purpose of nature, which is the development of all the capacities which can be achieved by mankind, is attainable only in society, and more specifically in the society with the greatest freedom (see Caygill 1995: 190-192).

It is in the interest of every rational being to respect what is proper to every other rational being. 'Thus let your opponent speak only reason, and fight him solely with weapons of reason.' (A744, B772, 646) And yet despite such pronouncements, as we have seen, suspicion falls on the objectivity or neutrality of the elevation of reason as the governing principle of knowledge.

From *where* the universality of reason is being announced is hardly neutral since, as Kant himself recognised, philosophy no less than other disciplines is part of an institutional and hence political and economic context. The authority and legitimacy of the sites of the production of texts concerned with the promotion of reason both contaminate and facilitate the cause of enlightenment. Human reason, Kant says, accomplishes nothing in its pure use and even requires discipline to check its extravagances and avoid the deceptions that come from them (B795, B823, 672). Part of this discipline is the function of criticism, across different languages and cultures, that, as Kant would say, is work in progress. 'The objections against the suasions and self-conceit of our purely speculative reason are themselves put forth by the nature of this reason.' (A743, B771, 645-646)

But what if the accusation is more damning? What if, instead of focusing on the abuse of reason, and including Kant and the Enlightenment in that abuse, claiming to know Kant better than he knew himself, we accuse the very principle of reason of being party to injustice? Not reason's improper manipulation, the inevitable corruptions of reason, but rather its essence; even in its proper use, reason favours precisely those not committed to universal freedom and human fulfilment. That self-knowledge masks modernity's pursuit of self-interest, for in the letter

and in spirit enlightenment promotes injustice. Commitment to reason is a prejudice, a source of power and security that enables its proponents to claim the right to police the world in the name of the self-emancipation of humanity.

To stay within Kant's juridical dramaturgy, we can say that it is always others who are hauled before the court of reason and forced to justify themselves in the language of the court and to be at the mercy of the drive for self-knowledge on the part of the court. After all, in this court reason is both judge and witness. Turning Kant's argument for enlightenment against him, we might observe how easy it is to be immature. That is to say, as easy for the enlighteners as it is for those in need of enlightenment. As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno argue in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the *Aufklärung* became a version of the mythology it sought to dispel.

One can respond to this type of argument by pointing out that any challenge to reason must (if it is to be registered as a challenge rather than dismissed as nonsense) be understandable, and so must at some minimal level fulfil the criteria of rationality.[12] At first glance this response sounds less like an answer to the implicit charge of reason as despotism and more like an admission of the criticism that reason pre-emptively dictates the terms on which any challenge to its own authority is to be heard: you must first be recognised as a rational being. Kant's 'let your opponent speak only reason' is both prescriptive and permissive.[13]

However, the real point is that even any outside of reason, like madness, that would present a challenge to the dominion of reason is itself anticipated by reason.[14] Indeed there would be no reason without the possibility of non-reason, which makes it a constitutive possibility (without which the idea of reason would collapse), or a condition of (im)possibility.

One can anticipate again the response that this explanation merely serves to confirm rather than to counter the suspicion of a totalising reason. But this is to miss the critical import of reason being constitutively divided against itself, and therefore always open to disruption and overturning, never closed off and secure once and for all. Hence the repression and interminable insecurity, which needs to be read not only as a sign of the fragility of reason, and so an indication of its

weakness or constructedness, but also as the source of its strength and malleability.

In other words, the vulnerability of reason to unreason, its manipulation by partial and sectarian interests is proof of reason's power. That critics of reason's claims to universality see in the promotion of reason the oppressive generalisation of specific historico-cultural values at the expense of other values and principles is itself proof of the reality of reason's imperative force. Challenging the authority of European thinkers with the claims of reason and moral law preserves the spirit of enlightenment—*Sapere aude!*; dare to be wise!

While the limits of the public use of reason are rendered visible in the academic debate regarding Kant's racism, it is the web of concepts out of which wove the concept of race that sheds light on the present. Far from contributing to an apologia, such contextualisation lifts the veil on the tenacity of the concept of race.

Race

> I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There never was a civilised nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient Germans, the present Tartars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negroe slaves dispersed all over Europe, of which none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; tho' low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica indeed they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.
>
> —David Hume, "Of National Characters"

Emmanuel Eze's *Race and the Enlightenment* includes the above excerpt from David Hume's "Of National Characters."[15] Hume's essay appeared in the 1748 *Three Essays* and *Essays Moral and Political* (3rd edition, Part I, Essay XXI). This footnote, not present in the 1748 edition, was added to the 1753 edition.[16] Hume made minor revisions to the note for the 1777 final edition of his works, but the revision was omitted by his nineteenth century publisher. Oddly it accompanies Hume's vociferous criticism of slavery and may have been part of Hume's strategy of challenging complacency on both sides of an issue (see Asher 2020).[17] What then of Hume's admirer, Immanuel Kant?

In *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764), inspired by Edmund Burke's *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* (1757), Kant refers approvingly to Hume's footnote:

> The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality, even though among the whites some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the world. So fundamental is the difference between these two races of man [*Menschengeschlechtern*], and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities [*Gemüthsfähigkeiten*] as in colour. The religion of fetishes so widespread among them is perhaps a sort of idolatry that sinks as deeply into the trifling as appears to be possible to human nature. A bird's feather, a cow's horn, a conch shell, or any other common object, as soon as it becomes consecrated by a few words, is an object of veneration and of invocation in swearing oaths. The blacks are very vain but in the Negro's way, and so talkative that they must be driven apart from each other with thrashings. (Kant 1764: 110-111)

This passage can be interpreted as Kant arguing for the fundamental difference in mental capacities between the Negro and the White races. A generous interpretation would have that it he is not arguing that they should be treated differently. On the contrary, difference in mental capacities should not undermine the treatment of all peoples as having

equal moral worth. Intellectually deprived individuals should be treated as having equal moral worth.[18]

Yet such an interpretation downplays Kant's positing of a universal difference in 'mental capacities' between races in the first place. There is a world of difference between claiming a difference in mental capacities and a difference in intellectual achievements. The latter may accord with experience (or at least with what Kant gleaned from reading Hume, Peter Kolben, and Georges Louis Leclerc Buffon),[19] however partial and limited. The inference as to capacities, on the other hand, implies judgement as to the nature of the race. Let us look at some other comments by Kant concerning race.

Another notorious passage from *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* intertwines gender and race. I present it here in a longer form than is usual because it has become an important reference point for Kant's racism:

> If we examine the relation of the sexes in these parts of the world, we find that the European alone has found the secret of decorating with so many flowers the sensual charm of a mighty inclination and of interlacing it with so much morality that he has not only extremely elevated its agreeableness but also made it very decorous. The inhabitant of the Orient is of a very false taste in this respect. Since he has no concept of the morally beautiful which can be united with this impulse, he loses even the worth of the sensuous enjoyment, and his harem is a constant source of unrest. He thrives on all sorts of amorous grotesqueries, among which the imaginary jewel is only the foremost, which he seeks to safeguard above all else, whose whole worth consists only in smashing it, and of which one in our part of the world generally entertains much malicious doubt—and yet to whose preservation he makes use of very unjust and often loathsome means. Hence there a woman is always in a prison, whether she may be a maid, or have a barbaric, good-for-nothing and always suspicious husband. In the lands of the black, what better can one expect than what is found prevailing, namely the feminine sex in the deepest slavery? A despairing man is always a strict master over anyone weaker, just as with us that man is always a tyrant in the kitchen who outside his own house hardly dares to look anyone in the face. Of course, Father Labat reports that a Negro carpenter, whom he reproached for haughty treatment toward his wives, answered: "You whites are indeed fools, for first you make great concessions to your wives, and afterward you complain when they drive

> you mad." And it might be that there were something in this which perhaps deserved to be considered; but in short, this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid [*dumm*]. (Kant 1764: 113)

This passage is usually adjudged to be a bad joke, a particularly dumb racist joke.

Still, the black carpenter does not shrink from telling a white man to his face that white men are fools.[20] He validates the judgement that Negroes are haughty to their wives, thereby both confirming and subverting the superiority of white men who cannot control their wives and revert to defensive racism when confronted with that truth. The carpenter's claim to be superior to the white man confirms his inferiority (he confesses his harshness). The superiority of the white man (in terms of gallantry) confirms his inferiority as a man.

Kant can be read as highlighting the operation of prejudice, on the part of the Negro and of himself as narrator. Men, black and white, are indeed united by prejudice against women ('it might be that there were something in this which perhaps deserved to be considered'), and against each other. That white men indulge women is a charge that flatters the white sense of superiority, presaging the dramaturgy of white men saving black women from black men.[21]

Race is the subject of Kant's essays, "Of the Different Human Races" (1775; revised 1777), "Determination of a Concept of a Human Race" (1785), and "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" (1788).[22] Kant's lectures on physical geography (delivered from 1756 to 1796) contain the following claim:

> In the hot countries the human being matures in all aspects earlier, but does not, however, reach the perfection of those in the temperate zones. Humanity is at its greatest perfection in the race of the whites. The yellow Indians do have a meagre talent. The Negroes are far below them and at the lowest point are a part of the American peoples. (Kant 1997b: 63)[23]

In the second volume of *Physical Geography* (1802) Kant rejects the idea (associated with the myth of Ham) of blackness as punishment, but also shares his knowledge of the thick skin of peoples in equatorial climates; when you chastise them it is best to use split bamboo rather than a whip, in order to enable the blood to escape, thus avoiding hematomas and infection (see Krell 2000: 109).[24] "Of the Different Human Races"

conjectures that different skin colours arise from the different precipitants of dissolved iron left in the channels of dermal excretion by the action of varying proportions of heat and humidity in the blood (see Shell 1996: 193).[25]

There is a tension in Kant's writings between the recognition of formal equality between individuals and peoples, and the substantive inequalities that shape individuals and peoples. The concept of race promises to clarify the variety and the unity found within the human species. "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" asks:

> What is a *race*? The word certainly does not belong in any systematic description of nature, so presumably the thing is nowhere to be found in nature. However, the *concept* which this expression designates is nevertheless well established in the reason of every observer of nature who supposes a conjunction of causes placed originally in the line of descent of the genus itself in order to account for the self-transmitted peculiarity that appears in different interbreeding animals but which does not lie in the concept of their genus. (1788a: 40)

The concept of race unites the greatest diversity in generation with the greatest unity of descent. Common ancestry and shared capacities (predispositions) are inferences made from observable differences of morphology and psychology. Kant is here concerned to rebut the argument of George Forster that variety in the human species is solely a product of adaption to climate and environment.[26]

Forster took issue with Kant's theory of race and his ill-informed characterisation of peoples, and, drawing on his own experience, stressed the importance of first-hand observation over speculative generalisation:

> How much trouble has from time immemorial come to pass in the world because we proceeded from definitions in which we placed no mistrust and consequently saw—without knowing why—many things in a predetermined light and deceived ourselves and others. (Forster 1786: 148)

Kant's "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" (1788) answered Forster by arguing that perception and experience were subject to conditions of possibility that must be taken into account if any claim to objectivity is to be secured. Forster's claim that variety in the human species is solely a product of adaption to climate and environment ignores the fact that the influence of climate on inherited traits does not fully explain observable differences. Kant argue in favour of

monogenesis, and that the influence of climate on inherited traits cannot fully explain observable differences.[27]

Kant's explanation of racial difference centres on the hypothesis that nature has equipped human beings with seeds (*Keime*) and natural predispositions (*Anlagen*). That is to say, as Robert Bernasconi (2001: 23; 2006: 73-90) explains, the seeds of all the races were latent from the start in everyone, and the appropriate seed was actualised to serve a purpose that arose from the circumstances. Once certain predispositions or capacities are developed in a people in response to environment, all other predispositions are extinguished entirely.

The dispute with Forster hinged on Kant's claim that the concept of race, whereby variety within the human species attests to a shared origin because of the possibility of interbreeding, is more economical than the positing of a variety of origins. Forster regarded skin colour as an unreliable criterion in the classification of races and, unlike Kant, favoured a polygenetic theory of human origins, the theory then preferred by progressives on account of its anti-clerical bent (see Ackerknecht 1955; Agnew 2003; and Larrimore 2008).

Throughout "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" Kant argues for the essential unity of the human race, and for the influence of heredity in defence of his theory 'of the derivation of the inheritable variety of organic creatures from one and the same *natural genus* (species naturalis. in so far as these creatures are united though their ability to reproduce and could have originated from one common line of descent)' (1788a: 50). Kant is not rejecting Forster's claim for common line of descent, but rather what he sees as superstitious claims for the nature of this unity as involving an inexplicable power. The idea of seeds or potentialities shared by all humans serves as an alternative to Herder's notion of a fundamental, generative force mediating between matter and reason, which Kant considered to a reversion to metaphysics and the mysticism of the world-soul.[28]

It seems that as the methodological debate about biological classification progressed, Kant's universalism unravelled and he opened the door to identifying, on a biological basis, culturally or intellectually static races.[29] For Emmanuel Eze (1995) the textual evidence confirms that Kant encodes the human capacity for reason and talent in terms of

skin colour. Disagreeing with Eze, others point out that although racial biology is a fixed factor for Kant, levels of development are not.

Admittedly Kant believed that white Europeans to be the only race capable of developing themselves and achieving republican institutions and commercial economies. All the other races will have to be somehow brought along by Europe. Hence Kant's approval of the Governor of Mexico disallowing (against the order of the King of Spain) intermarriage between whites and Indians on the grounds that in such mingling the better lose more than the worse gain (see Shell 1996: 387, note 23). That is to say, in Kant's defence all people have some predisposition for the development of culture, even if (due to fixed racial characteristics) they will have to be guided to self-governance and commercial activities by Europeans. Progressive cultural dynamism continues, for the moment, to reside in the white race, and European civilisation will continue to drag the rest of the world behind it (see Hedrick 2003: 262-263).

Kant's baleful 'cognitive incapacity' (Appiah 1990: 8) may indeed be a reaction to a perceived threat to his interests or self-image, the result of poor information or misinterpretation. But such judgement reveals little about the concept of race except that it serves as a vehicle of prejudice. More than crude bias is at work here.

We have seen that for Kant racial categories order human variety in accordance with a certain unity. As the *Critique of Judgement* puts it, the prime concern is what unites humanity:

> the image for the entire kind, hovering between the singular and the multiply varied intuitions of individuals, the image that nature used as the archetype on which it based its productions within any one species, but which does not seem to have attained completely in any one individual. (1790a: §17, 83)

As a concept, race functions as a *representatio communis*, a representation that is common to many things. I compare things and attend to that which they have in common, and I abstract from all other things; the result is a concept through which all these things can be thought.

From reflection one cognises what many things have in common, and afterward one takes away through abstraction that in which they do not agree. One abstracts the use of a concept from the diversity of that which is contained under it. After this comparing, reflecting and abstracting a *representatio communis* remains (see Kant 1992a: 351-353).

From analogy with animal breeding, relations of descent and the action of heredity are presupposed in the idea of unity. As Linnaean taxonomy was based upon shared physical characteristics, so too is Kant's conception of the transmission and development of inherited characteristics guided by phenotypic, observable differences of appearance and behaviour. Adaptability to environment does not explain everything for the white couple in a hot climate does not produce a black baby, even though the parents become tanned in the sun; neither does the black person turn white in a northern climate nor produce white children.

Ideas of heredity and lineage, the inheritance of acquired characteristics, arise from the observation of constancy and continuity and facilitate the leap from inherited physical characteristics to behavioural characteristics. The concept of race gives unity of representation to human variety and enables judgement, the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation.

Race appears to be a regulative concept with which to understand the variety found in nature, a concept that makes sense of this variety in terms of descent. It is an idea that lies behind classification and interrelation in accordance with causality. That is, temporal sequence of appearances subsumed under the concept of an effect in relation to a cause, and appearances subsumed under the concept of substance. As Kant understood it, racial differences call for a purposive account (see Bernasconi 2001: 29).

Kant proposes that all the capacities implanted in a creature by nature are destined to unfold themselves in the course of time. Look at animals, their organs are used and all arrangements attain their end. Man, as the only rational creature on earth, is completely developed in the species rather than the individual (see Kant 1790b). In the "Analytic of Teleological Judgement," first division of the second part of the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant writes of generation and original capacity of selection and construction of a tree in which the possibility of grafting undermines any individual sense of self preservation. Of the organism he notes: 'In such a product nothing is gratuitous, purposeless, or to be attributed to a blind natural mechanism' (1790a: §66, 255).

Kant's example of Tierra del Fuegans, the aborigines of Argentina, takes place in the context of analysing the 'external purposive relations' that tell us what the purpose of a natural thing is:

> We cannot arrive at a categorical purpose in this way because, after all, we cannot see why people should have to exist (a question it might not be so easy to answer if we have in mind, say, the New Hollanders or Fuegians); rather, each such purposive relation rests on a condition that we have to keep putting off: this thing (namely, the existence of thing as a final purpose) is unconditioned and hence lies wholly outside a physicoteleological consideration of the world. But such a thing is not a natural purpose, since it (or its entire species [*Gattung*; race, as in human race]) is not to be regarded as a natural object. (§67, 258)[30]

It is difficult to see the purpose served by some beings (including man) within nature; we need an extra-natural purpose which, as such, lies entirely outside the study of the world on physico-teleological lines. Something that surpasses our teleological cognition of nature is needed if 'the limits of the cognition of (cultural) man' (Spivak 1999: 26) are to be transcended.

Kant's point seems to be that critical philosophy does transcend this limit via attention to the form of purposiveness as the principle of regulative and not constitutive judgement. From this perspective everything in the world is good for something or other, nothing is in vain, and this can be seen when we consider the totality of nature. But at the level of the mechanism of physical causality we cannot determine the end of nature by design for this or that natural thing. At best, Kant can be read as saying that this is what happens if we abandon any appeal to the supersensible; it is impossible to explain why some human beings exist, why human life ever rises above that of the domestic animals they raise.

The concept of race is a unifier of sensory variety whereby evident characteristics are paired with successive states, and causes become reasons. Race is parasitic upon the systematic ordering of concepts in terms of the relation between genera and species. First, diverse particulars are classified as members of a single species, and then distinct species are unified on the basis of common properties into a genus, then different genera into higher genera, etc. The very possibility of concepts as general representations presupposes a system of concepts subordinate

to one another in terms of the relation of genera and species (see Allison 2001: 32-34). Race, as it were, borrows the function of species. Yet species is not exterior to the concept of race either.

Theodore Vial has warned against misreading Kant's concept of teleology, which is 'a subjective regulative concept … Not knowledge, not assumption, but presentiment perhaps' (2016: 52). Teleology is a part of how we look at the world, and for Kant science requires the subjective regulative assumption of intention in the universe. Quoting Kant's "On the Use of the Principle of Teleology," Vial argues that race is a concept of natural purpose not limited to evidence of experience but is tied to "'a purpose determinately given a priori by pure practical reason (in the Idea of the highest good)".' Race for Kant is a matter of subjective taste rather than an objective fact of nature.[31] As Vial sums up:

> One does not experience race in a systematic description of nature. But if we want to move from natural description to natural history (from one damn thing to another to a law, or a narrative with a beginning, middle, and end), if we want to show what is but why and how it must be so, we need to supply a teleological account … Like Kant, we cannot help but frame things in terms of progress.' (Vial 2016: 52-53)

Race is part of the idea of progress, and race is a subjective principle. As a matter to taste, the idea of race is a subjective judgement that gives satisfaction. A judgement of taste, aesthetic, for Kant does not designate anything about the object (i.e., is not a determinate judgement, but a reflective judgement). And yet we speak of race as if race were a quality of the object. It is our mistake and not Kant's, argues Vial, to take race as a determination of objects.

Putting aside whether or not the idea of race can ever be disinterested, it seems that race is indeed like taste in so far as it is implicated in what Derrida terms a 'moral semiotics' (1987: 115). But, unlike beauty, race is tied to progress and race certainly does have a conceptual and determinant representation of an end. The defence of a misunderstood Kant fails to illuminate the forces that inform the concept of race.

Organism

> The very possibility of European modernity as an Idea was the explicit metaphysical negation and theoretical exclusion of Africa and the African, archetypally frozen as 'savage' and 'primitive.'
>
> —Emmanuel Eze, "Modern Western Philosophy and African Colonialism"

It would seem that the concept of race led Kant astray, enabled him to stay at home in provincial prejudice and get intellectually lost at the same time.[32] But why?

If we set aside the tempting, and reversible, hypothesis that Kant was racist because he was European, then aspects of the concept of race that have contributed to its tenacity begin to come into focus. We have seen that race is concerned with origin and development and thus with the history of nature (*Naturgeschichte*). But where does this interest in nature come from, what lays the ground for the emergence of the concept of race?

The idea of development, and regressive as well as progressive dependency, is bound up with the idea of the unity of nature. The latter is a transcendental presupposition in so far as we presuppose that nature does in fact possess this unity.[33] Kant is concerned to understand the purposiveness evident in the ability of an organism to adapt to its environment and to pass on these adaptations unchanged to its descendants.

In so far as race is bound up with causality it is also linked to the concept of time; both the successive order of time grounded in causality, and temporality as pure intuition, the nexus linked to the transcendental imagination. The eighteenth-century birth of the concept of race can only be understood against the background of the debate about the nature of the organism and the rejection of preformationism (the theory that biological phenomena are produced by God, in miniature at the time of Creation).

Preformationism saw the generation of one organism from another as an illusion. The new science of the seventeenth century sought to break with Aristotelian teleology and explain natural phenomena mechanically, without the assumption of a guiding end or purpose, and

extended to the hypothesis that the inorganic matter has the power to organise itself as in crystals, snowflakes. Final causes guide mechanical process (see Kant 1790a: §72-71, 270-277). But what distinguishes mechanical process from organic process, and why was this distinction important for Kant?

Since an organism was understood as something which possessed organs (working instruments), it was important to distinguish between the organism as complex instrument and the machine. The primary goal of created beings is self-realisation. However, the argument that organisms have a self-causing capacity that involves self-maintenance and reproduction does not necessarily distinguish them from more complex machines. Hence the theological resonance of the question of design or construction, and the physical-mechanical necessity under which a thing is possible in terms of efficient causality. Mechanism rules out the question of purposive behaviour, while vitalism mystifies purposive striving.

Kant appears to have rejected the idea of creation by God in favour of natural processes, but he also rejected the fundamental forces of matter alone as sufficient to account for biological phenomena. Organisms may not be produced by design (i.e., natural products), but they appear (to us) as if they are so produced (i.e., artefacts).

Hannah Ginsborg shows how Kant navigates this debate and, in the *Critique of Judgement*, formulates the contradictory idea of a natural end or natural purpose (*Naturzweck*)—a regulative concept that is also a part of nature—to account for the irreducibly formative drive or force (*Bildungstrieb*) observable in biological phenomena. Organisms can be explained by mechanical explanation, but mechanical explanations are insufficient and so we need to appeal to final causes. Hume argued that causal connection cannot be inferred from experience, and Kant responded that causality that unites perception into experience is a condition of experience.

For Kant, causality is a category or pure concept of the understanding, a concept of relation under which all perceptions must first be subsumed before they can serve as judgements of experience.[34] The concept of a natural end (purposiveness without intentionality), contingent lawfulness, involves a contradiction because it posits a

naturally given object as governed by normative constraints. Race forms part of this problematic.

How, Ginsborg asks, can we regard something both as natural, and as manifesting (or failing to manifest) how it *ought* to be, or what *ought* to happen? After all, normativity is part of our natural psychological processes and not a part of nature, for to regard something as if it is designed is no different from regarding it as in fact designed. How can we coherently regard an organism (animal or plant) both as an end and as a natural product?

Ginsborg interprets Kant to be claiming that 'our entitlement to regard particular natural things as purposive, and hence as natural ends, derives from a more general principle belonging to the faculty of judgement, namely that of the purposiveness of nature for judgement' (2009: 465). Kant:

> No human being appreciates *a priori* that there must be a purpose in nature, but we can very well appreciate *a priori* that there must be a connection between causes and effects. Consequently, the use of the teleological principle is, in the consideration of nature, always empirically conditioned. (1788a: 52; see also A547, B575, 540)

Critique of Judgement attempts to clarify these issues. Purposiveness must be thought to entail the abandonment of mechanism for it is tautological to explain the apparent purposiveness of objects by appealing to a case that acts according to purposiveness. Groping for such a cause we stray into the transcendent where reason is seduced to poetic raving.

Yet the principle of purposiveness, when dealing with the products of nature, is a useful heuristic principle for investigating the particular laws of nature. Reason must proceed cautiously and regard nature's power to produce things with a shape that manifests purposiveness as possible through mere mechanism. But the attempt to explain things in mechanical terms must not then exclude the teleological principle:

> For [going to the extreme of explaining everything only mechanically] must make reason fantasize and wander among chimeras of natural powers that are quite inconceivable, just as much as a merely teleological kind of explanation that takes no account whatever of the mechanism of nature made reason rave. (1790a: §78, 296)

Neither the explanation of nature's causality in terms of mechanism nor in terms of purposiveness are free of serious objections. Because they are

mutually exclusive they can all too readily become dogmatic and constitutive principles of determinative judgement for gaining insight into nature. Kant offers an illustration:

> For example, if I assume that a maggot should be regarded as the product of the mere mechanism of matter (i.e., of the restructuring that matter does on its own, once its elements are set free by putrefaction), I cannot then go on to derive the same product from the same matter [now regarded] as a causality that acts in terms of purposes. Conversely, if I assume the maggot is a natural purpose, then I cannot count on there being a mechanical way of producing it and cannot assume this as a constitutive principle for judging how a maggot is possible. (§78, 296-297)

We need a principle that makes it possible to reconcile the mechanical and the teleological principles by which we judge nature. As supersensible and transcendental such a principle cannot be known.

All we can do when confronted with natural beings, whose possibility is inconceivable to us purely in terms of the principle of mechanism, is rely also on teleological principles. At least both principles are probably reconciled in one higher principle that, as the origin of both principles of physical laws and final principles, is itself neither purely mechanistic nor intentional. The possibility that the two types of production might well be linked in one and the same basis is a source of reflective rather than determinative judgement.[35]

Race is entwined with the prickly matter of Kant's terminological distinctions. Key is the idea of purposiveness in so far as the concept entails that capacities are realised in various environments and transmitted to future generations. That is, race is bound up with the idea of a purposive and unified nature that is amenable to our understanding of the purposiveness of nature. The harmonisation of nature with our judgement involves both cognitive power and (contra Kant)[36] the subjective sense of pleasure. Although it seems to be tethered to teleology, purposiveness shares the 'as if' structure of evolution which maintains that organisms act 'as if' they are trying to develop the best organs and survival strategies. Although, in itself, we tend to believe today that the process is purely mechanical and senseless (see Žižek 2006: 238).

For Kant race does not refer to some racial essence, rather it unfolds within the perspective of causation; the necessity of a series leading up to

and beyond a conditioned being. There does not need to be any essence other than human potential (which, of course, might play the role of essence). Race functions by inference and analogy according to the principle that what belongs to the many is so because of a common ground. Eventually, as racism, the concept of race will refer to the conditions of possibility of the entity man, joining together perception and reason, matter and form in the attempt to generate schemata (apprehension-rules), categories and hierarchies, under which to subsume representations.

Race names the ground or cause of its subsequent effect, a necessary and sufficient connection, and becomes itself metaphysical. Analogical inferences yield identity of the ground, the organic technic of nature. The concept of race carries the burden not only of affirming the principle of nature's purposiveness for judgement, for our cognitive faculties, but also vindicating nature's cognisability. Race, it seems, accords both with the subordination of mechanism to teleology and with 'the principle that the perceptual and imaginative activity with which we respond to nature outside of us, while itself a part of nature broadly construed, can also be regarded as *appropriate* (and, on occasion, *inappropriate*) to the natural objects which elicit it through their effects on our sense-organs' (Ginsborg 2009: 466).[37]

In Kantian terms it seems that race functions as a concept of reflective knowledge with a categorical function. As the concept of the form taken by human matter/content, race is the result of the efficient causality shared by all human beings (seeds, predispositions) in accordance with the final cause imposed by nature on human nature. But race is not merely a heuristic means whereby we understand organisms. It foregrounds the abyss of judgement.

Kant distinguishes between two powers of judgement, determinate or reflective. The former goes from the universal to the particular, the latter from the particular to the universal. Reflective judgement, moving from the particular to the universal, looks like an empirical judgement. But reflective judgement does not determine the object, only the mode of reflection concerning it. The concept of the purposiveness of nature belongs to reflective judgement, the subject's power to reflect. Kant further distinguishes two types of inferences of the reflective mode of

judgement, inference through induction and inference through analogy (see 1992b: §82-84, 625-626).

In *Kant's Theory of Taste*, Henry E. Allison addresses Kant's discussion about inferring empirical universals from particulars via induction and analogy. Inference by induction moves from the particular to the universal via the principle that what belongs to many things of a genus belongs to the remaining ones also. Inference by analogy moves from a particular similarity of property to a total similarity of remaining properties.[38] The principle of these inferences is, according to Kant, '*that the many will not agree in one without a common ground, but rather that which belongs to the many in this way will be necessary due to a common ground*' (1992b: §83, 626; and see Allison 2001: 35).

Race appears to be related to the kind of reflective judgement that proceeds by analogy and a common ground. But race also makes an assertion about how objects came to be, and it says something about the structure and constitution of nature. It anticipates or predetermines what the object as such is, and so has a constitutive aspect; gathering to itself the regulative function of reflective judgement as well as the power of constitutive judgement to determine how nature really is. It would seem that the concept of race mediates knowledge of an object and is bound up with our entitlement to think of nature in the normative terms required by natural teleology, and it operates by means of a version of the contradictory idea of a natural end. As a concept based on inheritable characteristics, race comprehends phenomena in accordance with a principle of unity, and, as a teleological judgement, compares what is with what ought to be.

Race, as a concept revealing the unity of representations, is not ingrained in our mode of representation for race is not part of logic, the necessary laws of the understanding and of reason, or the form of thought. But it is linked to the category of causality, an *a priori* concept and form of thought by which we grasp the phenomenal world of nature. Biological species are not, as Linnaeus would have it, aggregates assembled on the basis of a subjectively perceived likeness (see Shell 1996: 194). Race proceeds by inference and analogy which are inseparable from our cognition and the power of judgement. Yet errors for the most part arise from inference and analogy: 'a crutch for the

human understanding' (Kant 1992c: 409) that we cannot do without, even though they lead to mistakes.

This is made explicit in the *Critique of Pure Reason* when race appears in the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic in the context of the critique of human reason's natural propensity to overstep the bounds of reason. Kant is concerned here with the tendency of our reasoning to form hierarchically related concepts, and to move towards ever higher, more inclusive, general principles. Our understanding embeds one inference in an ascending series of inferences forming systematically interrelated concepts. Inference is possible because our concepts stand in hierarchies related as species and genera.

Kant is also concerned with the explanation of the dialectical illusion in all transcendental proofs of the existence of a necessary being. With the existence of a supreme being to give unity and purpose to nature reduced to a matter of faith, what then explains the order and purposiveness observable throughout the world? It is in the wake of these cosmological and theological speculations that the concept of race resurfaces under the heading "On the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason:"

> If I see insightful men in conflict with one other over the characteristics of human beings, animals or plants, or even bodies in the mineral realm, where some, e.g., assume particular characters of people [*Volkscharaktere*] based on their descent or on decisive and hereditary distinctions between families, races [*Rassen*], etc., while others, by contrast, fix their minds of the thought that nature has set up no predispositions at all in this matter, and that all differences rest only on external contingency, then I need only consider the constitution of the object in order to comprehend that it lies too deeply for either of them to be able to speak from an insight into the nature of the object. (A667, B695, 603-604)

Confronted with nature's diversity and unity it is tempting to speculate on the cause, and particularly tempting to speculate on the cause of our own identity and differences as a species. Indeed, our own reason tempts us to speculate in accordance with the transcendental presupposition that 'we simply have to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary (A651, B679, 595). But we cannot yet legitimately claim to have knowledge of the cause of this organisation.

Race, as a classificatory concept, is bound up with the transcendental ideas of unity and substance that overreach experience and so lead us into delusion and deception. Kant compares transcendental illusion to optical illusion; to the sea appearing higher at the centre of the horizon, or the moon seeming larger as it rises (B354, 386). Or like the objects seen behind the surface of a mirror, the illusion of depth behind the mirror's plane is particularly useful if we want to see not only the objects in front of our eyes, but also the objects behind us (A645, B673, 591). One needs to be able to judge correctly.

Judgement

> Humanism administers lessons to 'us' (?)
> —Jean-François Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*

It looks like the concept of race, *qua* concept, has its place in understanding which uses it to judge the totality of humanity (the human race) as the unity of species, and to make distinctions within the components or strands (races) that go to make that unity.

The section of the *Critique of Judgement* entitled "The Reason Why it is Impossible to treat The Concept of a Technic of Nature Dogmatically Is That Natural Purpose Is Inexplicable" distinguishes between the dogmatic and the critical treatment of a concept. Race, as a concept that subsumes natural things under it, would then be determinate and not merely reflective. It is an empirically determined concept that is itself determined in accordance with another concept, the idea of human development. As such, race would fall into the category of a dogmatic concept: 'We treat a concept (even an empirically conditioned one) dogmatically if we consider it as contained under, and determined in accordance with, another concept of the object such that this other concept amounts to a principle of reason' (1790a: §74, 277).

The temptation, as we have seen, is to put the concept of race in the category of subjective prejudice, a category into which the inferences frequently made from the concept certainly deserve to be consigned. Or as Kant puts it: 'We treat a concept merely critically if we consider it only

in relation to our critical power, and hence in relation to the subjective conditions under which we think it, without venturing to decide anything about its object.' The problem, of course, is that the concept of race does indeed venture to decide something about its object. And what is decided under the concept of race is what we have been calling human development or progress, which in turn presumes a direction or purpose in human life—what Kant terms 'the concept of a thing as a natural purpose.'

Such a decision subsumes nature under 'a causality that is conceivable only [as exercised] by reason; this subsumption then allows us to use that [causal] principle in order to judge what experience gives us of that object.' Since we have no definitive proof of the objective reality of a natural purpose, 'the concept is not constitutive for determinative judgement, but merely regulative for reflective judgement' (§74, 278). And so it appears we are back to the possibility of race as implicated in reflective judgement (via natural purposiveness and causality). And to the possibility that the concept of race cannot be dismissed as merely subjective prejudice.

The connection with natural purpose blocks any smooth relegation to dogmatic subjectivism. But then neither does race qualify as a rational principle. Herein lies the abyss of judgement that complicates the concept of race. For the concept of a natural purpose is itself undecidable; whether it has objective reality or whether it is part of how we conceive the world is impossible to decide, 'we have no way of seeing' (§74, 278). '[Therefore,] we do not know whether the concept is an objectively empty one that [we use] merely [for] reasoning (*conceptus ratiocinans*), or is a rational concept, a concept that is a basis for cognition and is confirmed by reason (*conceptus ratiocinatus*).' The conclusion is obvious: because of this undecidability 'we cannot treat this concept dogmatically, for determinative judgement … In other words, the concept is not constitutive for determinate judgement, but merely regulative for reflective judgement.'

The concept of race is linked, or rather feeds off or parasitises, the regulative function of natural purpose for reflective judgement. The dogmatic determinism of race hangs from the thread of the ambiguity of natural purpose.

If the concept of a natural purpose was 'objectively empty' would that not satisfactorily devalue the concept of race? It would not, in the terms we are exploring, drag down the concept of race into the bin of dogmatic subjectivism, but it would nudge it further away from any claim to real objectivity. What Kant has to say about the concept of a thing as a natural purpose has profound implications for the concept of race which concerns 'a *natural product*,' that product being for our purposes man.

A natural product has two apparently contradictory aspects, natural necessity and contingency:

> That [the objective reality] of the concept of a thing as a natural purpose cannot be proved by reason is clear from this: as a concept of a *natural product* it contains natural necessity; and yet, as concept of the same thing as purpose, it contains at the same time a contingency (relative to mere laws of nature) of the form of the object. (§74, 278)

Nature is not a machine, and human beings, like other organisms, are not living machines. Natural necessity contains at the same time a contingency. This is why for determinative judgement which has empirical objects as its object 'the concept of a thing as a natural purpose is transcendent', i.e., no object is encountered which proves the reality of the concept of natural purpose.

For reflective judgement the concept of natural purpose 'may be immanent as concerns objects of experience' and part of how we conceptualise natural products; 'and hence we cannot provide it with the objective reality [needed] for determinative judgement' (§74, 279). Hence the undecidability of the concept of a natural purpose.

At first glance it is tempting to map the concept of race onto this account of natural purposiveness. Do not the mythical, paranoid projected fictions of race dovetail with the 'transcendent,' i.e., unproveable and all-encompassing, aspect of determinative judgement which has empirical objects as its target? How neatly does race fit the criteria of immanence, as when it is claimed that race is simply one of the structures of how we think, and that everyone is by nature a racist? Race as natural purpose, the end and inner essence, would seem to seal the isomorphism.

Clearly such a recoding and intermingling of race and natural purpose is at work in some dealings with race. A perennially exploitable conceptual reserve, or misconception, we might say. Yet the overlay does

not work, not least because the concept of a natural purpose does not arise from taking a subjective principle for a determinative principle. Natural purpose is not what we would like it to be, and neither is race what we would not like natural purpose to be. Kant's argument offers a way out of the dead end of such a diagnosis in a way that avoids the recuperative capacity of the concept of race to always spring up out of its apparent quarantine.

Regarding the productive undecidability of the concept of natural purpose, Geoffrey Bennington (2017: 144-197) poses the questions: By what capacity of judgement do we decide this undecidability? What enables us to see the intertwining of natural necessity and contingency? What enables us to see what 'we have no way of seeing,' a known unknown?

It seems that the over-arching answer involves freedom and necessity, or lawfulness. Bennington suggests that evidence of the autonomy of judgement is, in part, provided by the contradiction between mechanical causality and final causality (natural purposiveness). Mechanical causality meets its limit in organisms apparently subject to final causality. Since final causality or natural purposiveness does not rule out, but rather presupposes as *natural* purpose, contingency and chance are observable in organisms.[39]

We have seen that race grafts onto mechanical causality and natural purposiveness.[40] Often under the guise of mechanical causality (genetics, sociobiology, etc.) the concept of race retains its transcendent aspect which points to the final end of nature (humanity). Whether as human perfectibility (the goal of natural purposiveness), evolution, survival, or trans-humanism as the sublation of the human—all point to the final end of nature. As Kant puts it, 'it must be that reason has a certain suspicion [*Ahnung*: presentiment], or that nature gives us a hint, as it were, that if we use the concept of final causes we could perhaps reach beyond nature and connect nature itself to the highest point in the series of causes' (§72, 271).

Judgement, it seems, is essentially teleological and when race thinking is opposed by an equally teleological speculation regarding the ends of man and nature nothing essential is displaced. The end remains the good of humanity. The anti-race strategy of invoking mechanistic causality

(there is no race gene) appeals to the very mechanical necessity which Kant says undermines the contingency of the human organism and its final end as the realisation of freedom. By a peculiar twist of logic, those arguing for the reality of race are able to point with satisfaction to the verification of mechanical determinism and at the same time offer the possibility of transcendent alternative beyond mere materialism. Exactly who, then, is threatening the dignity and freedom of us humans, etc.?

While Kant certainly distinguishes races (whites, Negroes, Huns and Hindus), he also argues that there is only one human species, not different sub-species. The primary concern is with the *Bestimmung*, determination or destiny, of the species as a whole.[41] The human race is a collective identity secured over time in the concept of race. Which explains in part why it has been argued that, prompted by his revision of his theory of biology, Kant changed his mind on the importance of racial difference (see Kleingeld 2007). However, what is more valuable is the evidence of race accompanying Kant's thinking to the end, and the fact that criticism of the violence of the civilised was accompanied by an unfolding raciology.

In the essay "Toward Perpetual Peace," having sketched the limits of hospitality extended to the stranger and commented that no-one originally has any greater right than anyone else to occupy any particular portion of the earth, Kant writes:

> If we compare with this the *inhospitable* behavior of the civilised, especially commercial, in our part of the world, the injustice they show in *visiting* foreign lands and peoples (which with them is tantamount to *conquering* them) goes to horrifying lengths. When America, the negro counties, the Spice Islands, the Cape, and so forth were discovered, they were, to them, countries belonging to no one, since they counted the inhabitants as nothing. In the East Indies (Hindustan), they brought in foreign soldiers under the pretext of merely proposing to set up trading posts, but with them oppression of the inhabitants, incitement of the various Indian states to widespread wars, famine, rebellions, treachery, and the whole litany of troubles that oppress the human race … and this for powers that make much ado of their piety and, while they drink wrongfulness like water, want to be known as the elect in orthodoxy. (Kant 1795: 329-30)[42]

Violence is one of the means whereby the peoples of the earth have thus entered into a universal community, and Kant highlights the hypocrisy of those who claim a monopoly on civilisation.

Peter Fenves (2003) interprets Kant to be arguing that European rulers may present themselves as the representatives of civilisation, but they are more savage than those whom they treat as such. Kant did not want to introduce the idea of natural differences and so risk deflecting attention from the political equality of those subject to arbitrary decree. According to Fenves (2003: 99), one of the reasons Kant dropped his defence of the concept of race by the time he wrote the *Critique of Judgement* (1790) is that he did not want to bolster the arrogance of European rulers and their apologists. A defence that begs the question of the role of Kant's other major works in shoring up such conceit.

One can trace a certain caution regarding the grading of humans back to Kant's early work. *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755) considers the varieties of life that undoubtedly exist on other solar bodies. Kant speculates that the material composition of beings will get finer and more delicate the further they live away from the sun. Fineness in material composition has as its correlate excellence of thinking and imagination. Indulging pleasant speculations regarding these different inhabitants, Kant notes that '[h]uman nature, which in the scale of being holds, as it were, the middle rung, is located between the two absolute outer limits of perfection, equidistant from both:'

> If the idea of the most sublime classes of sensible creatures living on Jupiter or Saturn provokes the jealousy of human beings and discourages them with the knowledge of their own humble position, a glance at the lower stages brings content and calms them again. The beings on the planets Venus and Mercury are reduced far below the perfection of human nature. What a view worthy of our astonishment! On one side we saw thinking creatures among whom a Greenlander or a Hottentot [*Grönländer oder Hottentotte*] would be a Newton; on the other side we saw people who would admire Newton as if he were an ape [*Affen*].
>
> Superior beings, when of late they saw
> A moral Man unfold all Nature's law,
> Admir'd such wisdom in an earthly shape,
> *And shew'd a NEWTON as we shew an Ape.*
> (Pope) (Kant 1755: 138)

The symbols of intellectual inferiority are non-Europeans subject to European colonisation, who are compared to primates.[43] While there is a hierarchy between different worlds, the planetary nature of density precludes a hierarchy of intelligences on the same planet (see Schönfeld 2000: 123-4). Pope's *Essay on Man*, "Epistle II: Of the Nature and State of Man, With Respect to Himself as an Individual," is invoked to caution against the hubris of man.[44]

As a concept race spans and gathers forces that not only claim to explain facts and tendencies, but which structure our conception of those matters. Descent, lineality, is part of our representation of natural organisms. Sequence and purposiveness—relation (inheritance and subsistence) and causality (dependence and community)—are conditions of the possibility of natural organism. Kant's lesson, however prejudiced and incorrect his own judgements were, is that we need to critically reflect on the perspective through which we experience and judge if we are to avoid systematic distortion.

Conclusion

> "The aliens are not coming—they are already here and they have infiltrated human society while looking human."
>
> —David Icke, "Renegade: The Life Story of David Icke"

It seems that Kant's interest in race was not a pre-critical lapse of judgement. His final writings contain the following passage:

> One can take the classification of organic and living beings further. Not only does the vegetable kingdom exist for the sake of the animal kingdom (and its increase and diversification), but men, as rational beings, exist for the sake of others of a different species (race). The latter stand at a higher level of humanity, either simultaneously [*neiben einander*] (as, for instance, Americans and Europeans) or sequentially [*nach einander*]. For instance, if our globe (having once been dissolved into chaos, but now being organized and regenerating) were to bring forth, by revolutions of the earth, differently organized creatures, which, in turn, gave place to others after their destruction, organic nature could be conceived in terms of different world-epochs, reproducing themselves in different forms, and our earth as

> an organically formed body—not one formed merely mechanically. (Kant 1995: 66-67)

Europeans are superior to Americans, but this superiority is curtailed by the collective prospective inferiority of the human species. But superiority is relative, not absolute, and perhaps transient.

Peter Fenves (2003: 160-169) suggests that human beings, ends-in-themselves from the perspective of practical reason, are a means for transition to another 'species (race)' from the perspective of theoretical reason. We do not exist so that reason can be realised. We exist for another species of the same genus or another race of the same species for whom we make a place. In giving this law of concession to ourselves we, as rational beings, do something that plants and animals cannot do. Now is the time for concession.[45] Human beings exist for the sake of another species of the same genus or another race of the same species, and humankind is a means whose end lies in another, late coming rational being. Until the late comers arrive, we have no way of knowing if they are another species or another race.[46]

Earlier Kant had warned against assuming that we are the only rational creatures or that other rational creatures reason like us. Either assumption substitutes habit for cognition 'in a way similar to animals:' 'For merely because we are not familiar with rational beings other than the human being, we would have a right to assume them to be constituted just as we cognize ourselves to be, i.e., we actually would be familiar with them' (1788b: 146). To assume that other rational beings lack 'a different way of presenting [*Vorstellungsart*: picturing]' is to propose 'that our ignorance would render us greater services for expanding our cognition than any meditation.' The human species is a bridge that disappears as a subject race:

> as if the other race were to arrive on earth, colonize all of the continents, and make their original inhabitants, including Europeans, into a subject race. Slavery is perhaps ruled out, but colonial servitude is not … the image of Europe suddenly colonised by a race that treats its inhabitants as they have treated the inhabitants of other continents. (Fenves 2003: 163)

Human beings must concede their space to other beings for the sake of whom they exist. Global colonial servitude and extra-terrestrial domination are inseparable from the idea of humanity and of progress.

The words that Kant wrote and deleted after the above quotation permit, perhaps, some optimism:

> only although rational creatures nevertheless preferably make a place [*Platz zu machen*] for other, still more perfectly organized ones— not merely [*de*] *facto* (with respect to their political existence) but rather [*de*] *jure* because of their now innately greater specific perfection, so that it would be organized after the earlier ones have conceded them their place [*nachdem die vorige ihnen Platz geräumt haben*], until finally a universal unity [*allgemeine Einheit*] of the final purpose of all organic bodies in a supreme world cause (which here may be called *demiurge*, since it is not here considered from a moral perspective[)] brings forth a complete organization. Earth-globe now now [breaks off]. (quoted in Fenves 2003: 167)[47]

Race resurfaces within the quest for unity and the compatibility between freedom and causality, 'our idea of perfect humanity' (A568, B596, 551), and the destiny of reason. Know the outcome and you'll see the journey.

Notes

[1] The epigram to Gates's *Finding Oprah's Roots: Finding Your Own* reads: 'If a race has no history, if it has no worth-while tradition, it becomes a negligible factor in the thought of the world, and it stands in danger of being exterminated' (2009: ix). The epigram is a quotation from Carter G. Woodson (1926: 239), founder of Negro History Week (now Black History Month in the USA).

[2] One can now add to Eze's list *A Companion to Kant* (2010), edited by Graham Bird, which also does not mention race.

[3] See Judy (1991) for an argument that rejects this nicety. Hill and Boxill (2001) defend Kant. See also Mills (2005); and Larrimore (2008).

[4] If this is the only spirit in which you can read works in the history of philosophy, then both you and the world at large would be better off if you simply remained ignorant of the history of philosophy and did not put on a show of knowing anything about it.' (Wood 2004: xi-xii)

[5] In *Not for Profit. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (2010), Nussbaum links Enlightenment values to the role of the humanities in raising awareness of the structure of argument, and forming capacities for citizenship and respectful action. She does not address the equally important question of whether the current system needs citizenship and respectful action.

[6] In fact the critique has not, so far, thrown the baby out with the bath water: 'All the elements of a solution to the problems of humanity have, at different times, existed in European thought. But Europeans have not carried out in practice the mission which

fell to them, which consisted of bringing their whole weight to bear violently upon these elements, of modifying their arrangement and their nature, of changing them and, finally, of bringing the problem of mankind to an infinitely higher plane' (Fanon 1961: 253).

[7] In terms of intellectual exchange, there seems no more reason than usual to fear the overthrow of reason; see Eze's, *On Reason: Rationality in a World of Cultural Conflict and Racism* (2008).

[8] 'There is no plausibility at all, for example, in the suggestion that such Kantian principles as human equality, rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism are in their content favorable to racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression, and such a thesis needs only to be stated explicitly to discredit itself. But this highly implausible thesis may be put forward by implication if it can be associated with the quite distinct point that *even* a cosmopolitan and universal ethical theory, such as Kant's, can be combined with racist or male-supremacist views in its application.' (Wood 2008: 12)

[9] This is the argument of Patric Colm Hogan's (1993) review of Balibar and Wallerstein's *Race, Nation, Class*.

[10] Careful study of Kant's structuring metaphors would include consideration of the seed analogy: 'It is too bad that it is first possible for us to glimpse the idea in a clearer light and to outline a whole architectonically, in accordance with the ends of reason, only after we have long collected relevant cognitions haphazardly [*rhapsoditisch*] like building materials and worked through them technically with only a hint from an idea lying hidden within us. The systems seemed to have been formed, like maggots [*Gewürme*], by a *generation aequivoca* [spontaneous generation] from the mere confluence of aggregated concepts, garbled at first but complete in time, although they all had their schema, as the original seed, in the mere self-development of reason, and on that account are not merely each articulated for themselves in accordance with an idea but are rather all in turn purposively united with each other as members of a whole in a system of human cognition, and allow an architectonic to all human knowledge, which at the present time, since so much material has already been collected or can be taken from the ruins of collapsed older edifices, would not merely be possible but would not even be very difficult' (A835, B863, 692-693). As we shall see, the idea of seeds is essential to the concept of race.

[11] See also Book 1, Part II, *Critique of Practical Reason*; and *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, Preface and §27-30.

[12] Or in the words of Martha Nussbaum: 'We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect' (1997: 7).

[13] Kant acknowledges the barriers to the universality he is attempting to construct. Reflecting on his taking stock of his building materials and the type of edifice they might compose, he concludes: 'It turned out, of course, that although we had in mind a tower that would reach the heavens, the supply of materials sufficed only for a dwelling

that was just roomy enough for our business on the plane of experience and high enough to survey it; however, that bold undertaking had to fail from lack of material, not to mention the confusion of languages that unavoidably divided the workers over the plan and dispersed them throughout the world, leaving each to build on his own according to his design' (A707, B735, 627).

[14] See Jacques Derrida (1981) and Michel Foucault (1984) for responses to Enlightenment blackmail. Edward Baring (2010) links this debate to the argument that anti- colonial thinkers can only extricate themselves from Europe using European ideas.

[15] Hume's invocation of the parrot has been interpreted as referring to the Cambridge educated Jamaican poet Francis Williams. For a defence of Hume see Valls (2005). See Immerwahr (1992: 482) for the textual history of "an ugly piece of racism that stains Hume's character"; also Palter (1995), Garrett, (2000), Eze (2000), and Morton (2002).

[16] See David Hume, "Of the Populousness of Antient Nations" (1752), in *Essays Moral, Political and Literary*.

[17] Gilles Deleuze comments on the alienation effect of Hume's scepticism: 'His empiricism is a sort of science fiction universe *avant la lettre*. As in science fiction, one has impression of a fictive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, but also the presentiment that this world is already ours, and those creatures, ourselves' (2001: 35).

[18] Lawrence Thomas argues for this interpretation (2004: 235-36). As Todd Hedrick comments: "even if we agree with Kant that judgments regarding the *character* of individuals and judgments about the *moral worth* of persons are analytically distinct modes, it would surely be naïve to believe that, at the level of impure historical reality, the two modes have nothing to do with one another." (2008: 267).

[19] Buffon's *Histoire naturelle générale et particulière* (1749-1788) and other texts disclosed an interwoven network of biological lineages, interconnecting and interweaving with one another in a vast tapestry (see Sloan 1979, and Bernasconi 2001: 16). Buffon's *La dègènèration des animaux* (1766) argued that the white man, who truly represents humanity, has grown progressively blacker in a tropical climate and can recover his original, normal color by returning to the temperate zone. Buffon suggested an experiment whereby a number of blacks would be transported from Senegal to Denmark and kept there in isolation and under observation. It would then become clear how long it would take for such people to turn white, blonde, and blue-eyed (see Isaac 2004: 9-10). Isaac argues that Kant, like Buffon, assumed that racial characteristics are determined by external influences (climate) and then, after many generations become hereditary (i.e., acquired characters became hereditary). Peter Kolben's *Caput Bonae Spei Hodiernum, das ist Vollständige Beschreibung des africanischen Vorgebürges der Guten Hoffnung* (1719) presents a sympathetic portrait of the KhoiKhoi beliefs and customs (see Anne Good 2006). Sigfried Huigen notes that Kant used the abbreviated, second edition of Kolben's work (2009: 57, note 94). In his first chapter, "Kolb's Defence of the 'Hottentots' (1819)," Huigen

shows how Kolben tried to turn around the prejudice that the badness of the Hottentots 'was established a priori' (34). See also Christopher Fox et al (1995). According to Martin Schönfeld Hottentots are KhoiKhoin [sic], Bushmen, "the original inhabitants of South Africa" (200: 122). Kant read about *Bushmänner* in Kolben's account of his travels. John H. Zammito outlines the new understanding of man as a cultural being constituted through historical process which contributed to the vogue for travel literature: 'The key idea was that the *synchronic* dispersal of cultural levels demonstrated by the travel literature mirrored faithfully the *diachronic* evolution of human cultural levels, so that the juxtaposition of the "primitives" (Hottentots or Hurons) with contemporary Europeans told the same story of "civilization" that could be constructed from the sequence of historical cultures from the ancient Fertile Crescent to the *siècle des lumiéres*' (2002: 236).

[20] See Susan Shell (2002) for discussion of the tensions in Kant's theory of moral education revealed by this passage. Kant is drawing on Jean-Baptiste Labat's memoir of the Antilles, *Nouveau Voyage aux isles Françoises de l'Amérique* (1722).

[21] See Gayatri Spivak's (1999: 284-285) discussion of Freud's "A Child is Being Beaten" (1919) in the context of the ideological dissimulation of imperial political economy; and David Kazanjian (2003: 150-155) on Kant

[22] Kant's essays are collected in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History and Education* (2008), edited by Robert B. Louden and Günter Zöller. Kant's "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" is included in *Race*, edited by Robert Bernasconi (2001: 37-56).

[23] See also David Harvey (2000); and Stuart Elden (2009). Consider too Kant's appeal to the scenes of unprovoked cruelty and murder-dramas in New Zealand and the Navigator Islands (Samoa) in part 3 of book 1 of *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793).

[24] Peter Fenves (2003: 91) argues that although throughout the 1770s and 1780s Kant had strenuously argued for skin colour as the principal criterion for distinguishing among the race, ultimately the self has no colour in the Kantian corpus. Fenves also notes that Kant's *Physical Geography* is fraught with textual problems (202, note 10). However, J. Kameron Carter gives the following translation of a private fragment collected in Kant's *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie*: "'All of the races will be stamped out [*Alle racen aussgerottet warden*…; they will undergo an inner rotting or decay leading to their utter eradication] (Americans and Negroes can't rule themselves. They serve therefore only as slaves), but never that of whites. The stubbornness of the Indians in how they use things is at the root of their problem. This is the reason why they do not melt together with whites'" (quoted in Carter 2008: 92).

[25] See the essay by John Mitchell (1744), referred to approvingly by Equiano at the end of chapter one of his *Interesting Narrative*. Mitchell explains skin colour in terms of Newtonian optics and stresses the role of environment: 'so that the black Colour of the Negroes of Africa, instead of being a Curse denounced on them, on account of their

Forefather Ham, as some have idly imagined, is rather a blessing … in that intemperate region' (146). According to Mitchell, it is whites who have 'degenerated', through 'luxurious Customs, or soft and effeminate Lives' (148) from the original 'swarthy' colour of Noah and his sons. Mitchell also shares his research in the thickness of various skins.

[26] Forster's *Noch etwas über die Menschenrassen* (1786) and Kant's relevant texts are included in Mikkelsen (2013).

[27] As Jürgen Goldstein explains: 'Kant wants to understand how reason constitutes the reality with which it is concerned; Forster wants to see the immediate impression defended. Kant is a transcendental philosopher, because he uses experience to examine the condition of possibility; Forster would probably describe himself as a realist' (2019: 96). Forster objected to Kant's '"philosophical jargon":' '"he uses his artificial language to curl up into the most invincible, prickliest form of hounded hedgehog to make you believe you cannot get at him"' (quoted in Goldstein 2029: 100).

[28] See Shell (1996: 200-202), and the biographical information provided by Kuehn (2001: 343-344). Forster's belief in 'the immediate connection between reality and observation' did not preclude what Chunjie Zhang calls '[a]n ambiguity of Forster's epistemology' since he recognised that scientific objectivity is not free of the inevitability of 'subjective and affective interferences in the construction of reality' (2017: 27).

[29] 'Even though he intended merely to outline categories of understanding, his idea of an originally white race was taken as a description of reality and used to support European claims to special closeness to the origin.' (Strack 1996: 299)

[30] See Johann Reinhold Forster on 'the poor inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego': 'Human nature appears nowhere in so debased and wretched a condition, as with these miserable, forlorn, and stupid creatures' (1778: 171). Foster *père* puts this stunted development down to climate and environment (food, exercise, etc.) because "*all mankind, though ever so much varied, are, however, but of one species* ... sprung from the same original stem" (175, italics in original).

[31] 'By reason of its qualitative universality, the logic of taste resembles the logical judgement which, nonetheless, it never is, in all rigor … The judgement of taste relates to a purely formal finality, without concept and without end, without a conceptual and determinant representation of an end' (Derrida 1987: 76)

[32] 'This humanism justifies, at least surreptitiously, the intervention of pragmatic culture and anthropology in the deductions of judgments of taste.' (Derrida 1987: 115)

[33] See Kant (1790c), the first introduction to the *Critique of Judgement* that was not included by Kant in the published text.

[34] However, Dennis Rohatyn (1975) suggests that causality for Kant is not a condition of possibility of experience; rather causality is part of the explanation of the analogies of experience and the production of judgement.

[35] 'We do not merely make the transcendental presupposition that nature as a whole is purposively constructed for our cognitive activities … but rather we also consider

individual objects from the point of view of their purposiveness—(subjectively) for our feelings of pleasure and displeasure in aesthetics and (objectively) for one another in the study of nature ... The subjective purposiveness of nature, that is, the correspondence of nature to our need for order, is a principle of reflective judgement.' (McLaughlin 1990: 3)

[36] See Kant's "First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgement*" for the claim that the concept of perfection as objective purposiveness and the feeling of pleasure have nothing to do with each other (1790c: 417-418).

[37] 'It is right, that is, rationally justified, to presuppose the principle of purposiveness because judgement legislates it to itself as a condition of the possibility of its self-appointed task: the application of logic to nature.' (Allison 2001: 41)

[38] See Allison on Kant's account of the emergence of a schema-like concept and the feeling of pleasure or displeasure that accompanies aesthetic comparison: 'we might think of the understanding as "energized" to grasp the rule that seems to underlie the apprehended content, which, in turn, "inspires" the imagination to exhibit it as fully as possible' (2001: 50).

[39] 'For to the extent that the object in question is found in nature, it must necessarily involve necessity entailed by laws, whereas *qua* natural end it involves contingency with respect to those same laws … The concept of purposive causality does indeed exist objectively (as in human art and technology), as does that of mechanical natural causality; what cannot obtain to such objectivity is the concept of a natural purposive causality, for which such a concept cannot be drawn from experience (by abstraction, as we were just saying) or posited as necessary for an experience to be possible.' (Bennington 2017: 164-5)

[40] 'According to Kant, the nonuniversal characteristics of all other species are "racial," that is to say, subject to hybridization. The existence of variables (or characteristics not invariably inherited) is unique to man and explicable from a "higher standpoint," on the grounds that species devoid of reason, and having the value of "means only," are preformed by nature. Racial differentiation is thus a lingering sign of mankind's affinity with his animal comrades.' (Shell 1996: 386, note 19)

[41] 'Henceforth, the history of the species will be written in the character, not of race (by which mankind was able to survive the geological upheavals of the earliest ages), but variety (by which individuals show their suitability for an affinity of ends).' (Shell 1996: 203)

[42] See also Kant's *Metaphysical Elements of Justice* (1797) for criticism of justifications of predatory colonialism as the veil of injustice that would sanction any means to good ends; no amount of good intentions can wash away the stain of injustice. Kant argues that settlers of inhabited land must not take possession of it either through violence or the exploitation of the ignorance of the indigenes. He rejects the justification that ultimately such dispossession will be for the greater good of mankind or that it will bring culture to primitive peoples. However, Peter Fenves (2003: 42-46) argues that

Kant allows for the establishment of zones outside of the legal order and yet inside the sphere of executive power; provinces or colonies.

[43] Thus David L. Clark sees here a barely displaced allegory of Europe's close encounters with Africa and other equatorial regions of the universe: 'certain fundamental fantasies that will become crucial to the colonial imaginary are being sketched out in these pages ... Is not Kant's hapless Venusian not an uncanny premonition of the woman (re)named the "Hottentot Venus," the southern African called Sarah Baartman' (2001: 258).

[44] See Lovejoy (1964: 194-195) on Kant and Pope; and Fenves (1991: 32-33) on Kant's subversion of Pope.

[45] In the second part of *The Conflict of the Faculties*, under the heading "What Do We *Want* to Know in this Matter?," Kant opens with the argument that the question whether the human race (*Geschlecht*) is constantly progressing should not be confused with the question whether new races of the human being might arise in the future: 'If it is asked whether the human race at large is progressing perpetually toward the better, the important thing is not the natural history of man (Whether new races [*neue Racen*] may arise in the future), but rather his moral history and, more precisely, his history not as a species according to the generic notion (*singulorum*), but as the totality of men united socially on earth and apportioned into peoples (*universorum*)' (1798a: 141).

[46] Elsewhere Fenves notes that Kant, champion of 'the new division of the human race into various races', also advanced 'a tenuous principle of reflective judgement, which ratifies the doctrine that only one race is graced, whereas the rest are not' (2006: 21).

[47] 'In the *Opus postumum* this perspective [i.e., that of the *Critique of Pure Reason*] is reversed, the *focus imaginarius* now being also the principle from which the systematic unity of all the moving forces of matter is thought to emerge.' (Förster 2000: 84).

References

Ackerknecht, Erwin H. 1955. "George Forster, Alexander von Humboldt, and Ethnology." *Isis* 46, no.2 (June): 83-95.

Agnew, Vanessa 2003. "Pacific Island Encounters and the invention of Race." In: *Islands in History and Representation*. Edited by Rod Edmond and Vanessa Smith. London: Routledge, 81-95.

Allison, Henry E. 2001. *Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony 1990. "Racisms." In: *Anatomy of Racism*. Edited by David Theo Goldberg. Indianapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 3-17.

Asher, Kendra 2020. "Interpretations of Hume's Footnote on Race." https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3713919

Balibar, Etienne, and Immanuel Wallerstein 1991. *Race, Nation, Class. Ambiguous Identities.* London: Verso.

Baring, Edward 2010. "Liberalism and the Algerian War: The Case of Jacques Derrida." *Critical Inquiry* 36 (Winter): 239-261.

Bennington, Geoffrey 2017. *Kant on the Frontier: Philosophy, Politics, and the Ends of the Earth*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Bernasconi, Robert 2001. "Who Invented the Concept of Race? Kant's Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race." In: *Race*. Edited by Robert Bernasconi. Malden: Blackwell, 11-36.

---- 2002. "Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism." In: *Philosophers on Race. Critical Essays*. Edited by Julie K. Ward and Tommy Lee Lott. Oxford: Blackwell, 145-166.

---- 2006. "Kant and Blumenbach's polps. A Neglected Chapter in the History of the Concept of Race." In: *The German Invention of Race*. Edited by Sara Eigen and Mark Larrimore. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 73-90.

Carter, J. Kameron 2008. *Race: A Theological Account*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Caygill, Howard 1995. *A Kant Dictionary*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Clark, David L. 2001. "Kant's Aliens. The *Anthropology* and Its Others." *The New Centennial Review* 1, no.2 (Fall): 201-289.

David, Alain 20023. "Negroes." Translated by Kathryn Gines and Mary Beth Mader. In: *Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy*. Edited by Robert Bernasconi with Sybol Cook. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 8-18.

Deleuze, Gilles. 1984 [1963]. *Kant's Critical Philosophy*. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

---- 1989 [1963]. *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*. Translated by Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press.

---- 2001 [1972]. *Pure Immanence: Essays on A life*. Translated by Anne Boyman. New York: Zone Books.

Derrida, Jacques 1981 [1963]. "Cogito and the History of Madness." In: *Writing and Difference*. Translated by Alan Bass. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 31-153.

---- 1987 [1978]. *The Truth in Painting*. Translated by Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Du Bois, W. E. B. 1920. "The Immortal Child." *Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 193-217.

---- 1940 [2000]. *Dusk of Dawn. An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Elden, Stuart. 2009. "Reassessing Kant's Geography." *Journal of Historical Geography* 35, no.1 (January): 3-25.

Eze, Emmanuel 1995. "The Color of Reason: The Idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology." In: *Anthropology and the German Enlightenment: Perspectives on Humanity*. Edited by Katherine M. Faull. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University, 201-241.

---- 1997. "Introduction." *Race and the Enlightenment. A Reader*. Edited by Emmanuel Eze. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1-9.

---- 1998. "Modern Western Philosophy and African Colonialism." In: *African Philosophy: an anthology*. Edited by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze. Oxford: Blackwell, 213-221.
---- 2000. "Hume, Race, and Human Nature." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 61, 4: 691-698.
---- 2008. *On Reason: Rationality in a World of Cultural Conflict and Racism*. Duke University Press.
Fanon, Frantz 1961 [1980]. *Wretched of the Earth*. Translated by Constance Farrington. England: Penguin Books.
Fenves, Peter D. 1991. *A Peculiar Fate. Metaphysics and World-History in Kant*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
---- 2003. *Late Kant. Towards Another Law of the Earth*. London: Routledge.
---- 2006. "What 'Progress' Has Race-Theory Made Since the Times of Leibniz and Wolff?" In: *The German Invention of Race*. Edited by Sara Eigen and Mark Larrimore Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 11-22.
Förster, Eckart 2000. *Kant's Final Synthesis. An Essay on the Opus postumum*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Forster, George 1786. "Something More About the Human Races." In: *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth-Century Writings*. Edited and translated by Jon M. Mikkelsen. New York: State University of New York, 2013, 143-167.
Foucault, Michel 1984. "What is Enlightenment?" Translated by C. Porter. In: *The Foucault reader*. Edited by P. Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 31-50.
Fox, Christopher, Roy Porter, and Robert Wolker (eds) 1995. *Inventing Human Science. Eighteenth-Century Domains*. Berkley: University of California Press.
Garrett, Aaron 2000. "Hume's Revised Racism Revisited." *Hume Studies* 26, no.1 (April): 171-178.
Gates Jr., Henry Louis 1989. *Figures in Black: words, signs, and the "racial" self*. New York: Oxford University Press.
---- 2007. *Finding Oprah's Roots: Finding Your Own*. New York: Crown Publishers.
Gilgen, Peter 2009. "Structures But in Ruins Only. On Kant's History of Reason and the University." *The New Centennial Review* 9, no.2 (Fall): 165-193.
Giliomee, Hermann 2003. *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People*. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
Ginsborg, Hannah 2009. "Kant's Biological Teleology and its Philosophical Significance." In: *A Companion to Kant*. Edited by Graham Bird. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 455-469.
Goldstein, Jürgen 2019 [2015]. *Georg Forster: Voyager, Naturalist, Revolutionary*. Translated by Anne Janusch. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Good, Anne 2006. "The Construction of an Authoritative Text: Peter Kolb's Description of the KhoiKhoi at the Cape of Good Hope in the Eighteenth Century." *Journal of Early Modern History* 10, no.1-2 (May): 61-94.
Harvey, David 2000. "Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils." *Public Culture* 12, no.2: 529-564.

Hedrick, Todd 2008. "Race, Difference, and Anthropology in Kant's Cosmopolitanism." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 46, no.2 (April 2008): 245-268.

Hill Jr., Thomas E., and Bernard Boxill 2001. "Kant and Race." In: *Race and Racism*. Edited by Bernard Boxill. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 448-471.

Hogan, Patric Colm 1993. "Review of Balibar and Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class*." *College Literature* 20, no.2 (June): 227-231.

Huigen, Sigfried 2009. *Knowledge and Colonialism: Eighteenth Century Travellers in South* Africa. Leiden: Brill.

Hume, David 1882. "Of National Characters." In: *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Volume 1*. Edited by T.H. Green and T.H. Grose. London: Spottiswoode and Co., 244-258. https://archive.org/details/essaysmoralpolit01humeuoft/page/n11/mode/2up

Icke, David 2020. "Renegade: The Life Story of David Icke." *Youtube*. RENEGADE : THE LIFE STORY OF DAVID ICKE - YouTube

Immerwahr, John 1992. "Hume's Revised Racism." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 53, no.3 (July-September): 481-486.

Isaac, Benjamin 2004. *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Judy, Ronald 1991. "Kant and the Negro." *SAPINA: Bulletin of the Society for African Philosophy in North America* 8, no.1-2 (January-July).

Kant, Immanuel 1755 [2008]. *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, or, An Essay on the Constitution and the Mechanical Origin of the Entire Structure of the Universe Based on Newtonian Principles*. Translated by Ian Johnston. Arlington: Richer Resources Publications.

---- 1764 [1991]. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*. Translated by John T. Goldthwait. Berkeley: University of California Press.

---- 1781/87 [1998]. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---- 1785 [1996]. "Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 41-108.

---- 1788a [2001]. "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy." In: *Race*, edited by Robert Bernasconi. Malden: Blackwell, 37-56.

---- 1788b [1996]. "Critique of Practical Reason." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 133-271.

---- 1790a [1987]. *Critique of Judgement*. Translated by Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett.

---- 1790b [1987]. "Appendix: Methodology of Teleological Judgement." In: Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*. Translated by Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 301-359.

---- 1790c [1987]. "First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgement*. In: *Critique of Judgement*. Translated by Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 383-441.
---- 1798a [1979]. *The Conflict of the Faculties (Der Streit Der Facultaten)*. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. USA: Abaris Books.
---- 1798b [2007]. "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view." In: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert P. Louden. Translated by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 227-429.
---- 1795 [1996]. "Toward Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 310-351.
---- 1992a. "The Vienna logic. Kant's lectures on logic written by a society of authors." In: *Lectures on Logic*. Edited and translated by J. Michael Young Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 251-377.
---- 1992b. "The Jäsche logic. Immanuel Kant's logic. A manual for lectures." In: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*. Edited and translated by J. Michael Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 521-640.
---- 1992c. "The Herschel Logic (in part)." In: *Lectures on Logic*. Edited and translated by Michael J. Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 381-423.
---- 1995. *Opus postumum* Translated by Eckart Föster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
---- 1997a. *Lectures on Ethics*. Edited by Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind. Translated by Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
---- 1997b. "Physical Geography." In: *Race and the Enlightenment: a Reader*. Edited by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze. Oxford: Blackwell, 58-64.
Karatani, Kojin 2005. *Transcritique. On Kant and Marx*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kazanjian, David 2003. *The Colonizing Trick: National Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kleingeld, Pauline 2007. "Kant's Second Thoughts On Race." *The Philosophical Quarterly* 57: 573-592.
Korff, Lindie 2005. *D.F. Malan: An Intellectual Biography, 1874-1915*. MA Dissertation, University of Johannesburg, http://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za:8080/dspace/bitstream/10210/459/1/D.F.Malan.pdf
Krell, David Farrell 2000. "The Bodies of Black Folk: From Kant and Hegel to Du Bois and Baldwin." *boundary 2* 27, no.3: 103-134.
Kuehn, Manfred 2001. *Immanuel Kant*. Edinburgh: Cambridge University Press.
Larrimore, Mark 2008. "Antinomies of race: diversity and destiny in Kant." *Patterns of Prejudice* 42, no.4-5: 341-363.
Lovejoy, Arthur O. 1964 [1936]. *The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lyotard, Jean-François 1991 [1988]. *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Martyn, David 2003. *Sublime Failures. The Ethics of Kant and Sade*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

McLaughlin, Peter 1990. *Kant's Critique of Teleology in Biological Explanation. Antinomy and Teleology*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Mills, Charles W. 1997. *The Racial Contract*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

---- 2005. "Kant's *Untermenschen*." In: *Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy*. Edited by Andrew Valls. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 169-193.

Mills, Jon, and Januz A. Palinowski 1997. *The Ontology of Prejudice*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Mitchell, John 1744. "An Essay upon the Causes of the Different Colours of People in Different Climates; John Mitchell, M.D. Communicated to the Royal Society by Mr, Peter Collinson, F.R.S." *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* 43 (1744- 1745): 102-150.

Morton, Eric 2002. "Race and Racism in the Works of David Hume." *Journal on African Philosophy* 1, no.1. http://www.africanphilosophy.com/vol1.1/morton.html

Nardal, Paulette 2001. "The Awakening of Race Consciousness." Translated by T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting. In: *Race*. Edited by Robert Bernasconi. Oxford: Blackwell, 107-111.

Nussbaum, Martha 1997. "Kant and stoic cosmopolitanism." *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 5, no.1: 1-25.

---- 2010. *Not for Profit. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Palter, Robert 1995. "Hume and Prejudice." *Hume Studies* 21, no.1: 3-24.

Rohatyn, Dennis 1975. "Kant, Hume and Causality." *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschafttheorie/ Journal for General Philosophy of Science* 6, no.1: 34-36.

Schönfeld, Martin 2000. *The Philosophy of the Young Kant: the pre-critical project*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rose, Gillian 1984. *Dialectic of Nihilism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Serequeberhan, Tsenay. 2006. "The Critique of Eurocentrism." In: *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*. Edited by Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffths, and Helen Tiffin. Oxford: Routledge, 89-94. Second edition.

Shell, Susan Meld 1996. *The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and* Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

---- 2002. "Kant as Propagator: Reflections on 'Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime'." *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 35, no. 3 (Spring): 455-468.

Sloan, Phillip R. 1979. "Buffon, German Biology, and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species." *The British Journal for the History of Science* 12, no. 2 (July, 1979): 109-153.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 1999. *Critique of Postcolonial Reason. Toward A History of the Vanishing Present*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Strack, Thomas 1996. "Philosophical Anthropology on the Eve of Biological Determinism: Immanuel Kant and Georg Forster on the Moral Qualities and Biological Characteristics of the Human Race." *Central European History* 29, no.3: 285-308.

Thomas, Lawrence 2004. "Upside Down Equality: A Response to Kantian Thought." In: *Racism in Mind*. Edited by Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 225-242.

Valls, Andrew 2005. "'A Lousy Empirical Scientist': Reconsidering Hume's Racism." In: *Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy*. Edited by Andrew Valls. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 127-149.

Vial, Theodore 2016. *Modern Religion, Modern Race*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wood, Allen W. 2004. *Kant*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

---- 2008. *Kantian Ethics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Woodson, C.G. 1926. "Negro History Week." *The Journal of Negro History* 11, no.2 (April): 238-242.

Zammito, John H. 2002. *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Zhang**,** Chunjie 2017. *Transculturality and German Discourse in the Age of European Colonialism*. USA: Northwestern University Press.

Žižek, Slavoj. 2006. *The Parallax View*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

The Cape

In March 21st 1775, a young George Forster, future friend of Benjamin Franklin and Alexander von Humboldt, called at the Cape of Good Hope as part of James Cook's second voyage of exploration (1772-1775). Over five weeks as the *Resolution* had its rigging repaired Forster explored Cape Town. His record of Friday, April 7, translates as follows:

> The arrival of the ships draws several inhabitants thence [i.e., from Cape Town] to False bay [sic.], who confine themselves in narrow lodgings, for the sake of enjoying the company of strangers. This peculiar situation affords many favourable opportunities towards forming more intimate connections which, we were told, the strangers seldom neglect, especially as beauty and vivacity are not uncommon at the Cape.
>
> After a stay of three days, we returned to the Cape-Town, where we passed our time in examining the animals at the Company's garden, and searching all the furrier shops, in order to collect an assortment of antelope skin. We were likewise

favoured with a sight of a live *ourang-outang*, or ape, from the island of Java, of that species which has the honour to be adopted as a near relation by several philosophers. This animal was about two feet six inches high, and preferred crawling on all fours, though it could likewise sit and walk upon the hind legs. Its fingers and toes were remarkably long, and its thumbs very short, its belly prominent, and its face, which was as ugly as it can well be imagined, had a nose more resembling the human than that of other monkies. This animal, I am told, has been since brought over to the menagerie of the Prince of Orange, at the Hague. (Forster 1777: 658)



Fig. 6. Painting by Tethart Philipp Christian Haag of an Orang-utan and Springbuck in the menagerie of Willem V in 1777 (Rijksmuseum Paleis Het Loo, Apeldoorn, on semi-permanent loan from Koninklijk Kabinet van Schilderijen (Mauritshuis), The Hague; actual canvas size: 174 × 110.5 cm; photo: Arnold Meine Jansen, Baarn).

(Rookmaaker 1992: 151)

Forster added the following footnote:

> The creature died at the Hague in January 1777; but, through the gross ignorance and canine malice of the keeper, the ablest anatomists in Holland were disappointed in the hope of dissecting it. He cut off its head, in order to prevent them examining the organs of speech; and its hands and feet, to preclude the possibility of comparing the phalanges with the human and other skeletons. When we consider, through whose interest the inspector of that princely collection at the Hague was appointed, we cannot wonder, that he was a stranger to liberality of sentiment. (658)

The keeper was Arnout Vosmaer, the Prince of Orange's director of natural history. Subsequent editors of *A Voyage Around the World* have attributed this remark to Johann Reinhold Forster, George's father. George apologised to and subsequently modified the note to state that the torso was in fact given to Mr. Camper, a famous anatomist, to dissect. That is to say, the specimen was not needlessly wasted. Vosmaer published his acceptance of Forster's apology in *The Monthly Review* and speculated the source of the calumniatory note to be Vosmaer's enemies in Holland (see Meijer 1997a).

Petrus Camper published the results of his anatomical research on the organs of speech in the Orang Outang in *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London* (1779). Camper reported that he examined 'seven Orangs, beside the living one which was sent to His Highness the Prince of Orange' (145). All came from Java by way of the Cape of Good Hope. Camper provided sketches made of the first Orang he dissected in 1770:



(Camper 1779: 158)

Camper defended Vosmaer and gave the history of the Orang which belonged to the Prince of Orange and died in January 1777:

> She died not long afterwards, and was soon cut to pieces by the order of Mr. Vosmaer, to be stuffed for the museum of his Serene Highness the Prince of Orange; but, as this cannot be done without preserving the face, a part of the skull, hands, and feet, it is very evident, that Mr. Vosmaer was obliged to cut off the head and the other extremities, and to destroy the most interesting parts for natural knowledge.
>
> I was very sorry to hear of the fate of this curious and uncommon creature, more especially as I had great reason to flatter myself with the dissection of the entire animal as soon as it was dead.
>
> I need not remind anyone of the particulars mentioned by Mr. Forster in the 2nd volume of Voyage round the World, p.553.; nor of his rather too severe criticism upon the conduct of Mr. Vosmaer, the inspector of the Museum belonging to the hereditary Stadholder of the United Provinces. Mr. Vosmaer had, without doubt, no other intention but to preserve the fresh skin of this uncommon animal stuffed, for the cabinet of his benefactor, and not the least malevolent intention to prevent the dissection of the other parts not necessary to this purpose; for, when, by special order of his Most Serene Highness the Prince of Orange, the remaining trunk was sent to me, I found the organ of voice not in the least hurt, and quite entire, as it is still to my great satisfaction. After having duly examined, dissected, and delineated the *viscera* of the breast and belly, I have put it in melasses, in a fine phial, in order to preserve so valuable a preparation, not only for my museum, but for natural knowledge in general. (Camper 1779: 151-152)[1]

Camper concluded that the organ of speech of the Orang is decidedly different to that of man, and therefore they cannot speak:

> Having dissected the whole organ of voice in the Orang, in apes, and several monkies, I have a right to conclude, that Orangs and apes are not made to modulate the voice like men; for the air passing by the *rima glottidis* is immediately lost in the ventricles or ventricle of the neck, as in apes and monkies, and must consequently return from thence without any force and melody within the throat and mouth of these creatures; and this seems to me the most evident proof of

> the incapacity of Orangs, apes, and monkies, to utter any modulated voice, as indeed they never have been observed to do. (155-156)

At issue here is the uniqueness of speech to humans, and the association of reason and speech (see Johann Reinhold Forster 1778: 172-174). If other animals have similar anatomical features to humans, why can they not speak? Whether one attributes the human speech to divine intervention or to good fortune, the uniqueness of humans and their affinity with other animals is being determined. At stake is the animality of the human as much as the humanity of animals, specifically primates. Camper argued that the physical capacity for articulate speech did not exist for apes, and the gift of speech was purely a matter of anatomy rather than more direct divine intervention (see Meijer 1997b).

That this issue of comparative anatomy and zoological categorisation is not merely an abstract academic matter can be demonstrated by looking at one of the anthropometric drawings produced by Camper on the basis of his researches:



(Camper 1821: 175)

Camper's craniological biometric was taken up by phrenology and 'scientific' racism. Yet Camper himself argued for the unity of the human species, and criticised the attempt to divide humans into exclusive races with uniform characteristics (see Meijers 1999). He underlined the conclusions he thought flowed from his in the lecture "On the Origin and Color of Blacks" delivered in 1764 (published 1772):

> In the year 1758 in Amsterdam I had the opportunity to dissect a black Angolese boy and I found his blood very much like ours and his brains as white, if not whiter. When I dissected this body in public, I examined it in a totally objective way and compared all the parts with the famous description of the Bushman or "Orang-Outang" of the renowned Tyson. I must confess that I found nothing that had more in common with this animal than with a white man; on the contrary, everything was the same as for a white man. You ask, and rightly so, why indeed the comparison with the Bush-man? That is simply, Gentlemen, because there are Philosophers to be found who want to show with some rhetorical flourish that Negroes and Blacks descended from the mingling in olden times of white people with great Apes or Orang-Outangs, which were called Satyrs by the Ancients. (Camper in Meijer 1997b: 6)

Camper's humanism was not sufficient to prevent the appropriation of his work by those addicted to 'the rhetorical flourish.'

Although clearly perceiving what would now be termed systemic racism, he was unable to block the distortion of his basic thesis:

> It has been said occasionally that Cham, because he was cursed by his father Noah, changed in color and became black. Whatever the case may be, it seems quite obvious that all scholars, through their association of a very hateful image with the color black, acted as if a certain well-deserved curse, or wrath of the Divine Supreme Being, were the origin of the unfavorable color: and usually, if not always, this one-sided and absurd account worked in favor of the Whites, because they had devised it themselves and thus had accorded themselves superiority over others of a different color. What kind of an image must the poor Americans have conceived of white people, after being treated by them in such an undeserved, such a cruel and barbaric manner? Will they not believe that the God of heaven and earth changed those brutes, as a permanent sign of his righteous wrath, into white people? This digression causes you to blush, and not without cause. All of us, not only as human beings but as Christians, would wish to be black if we could wash off this sin through such a change in color …You will no longer raise any objections to joining me in holding out the hand of

> brotherhood to Negroes and Blacks, and in recognizing them as true descendants of the first man whom we all recognize as our Father!
>
> I have spoken. (6, 9)

Kant refers approvingly to Camper in his lectures on physical geography, delivered from 1756 to 1796 and published as *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* in 1798.

Notes

[1] See Thomas Burgeland Johnson on 'Vasmaer's [sic] account of an oran-outang presented to the Prince of Orange in the year 1776' (1837: 92) that lived for seven months in Holland. Johnson concludes that 'the ouran-outang is justly entitled to rank next to the Negro in the wonderfully graduated scale of animated nature' (97), and that the unqualified abolition of slavery is an invitation to conflict. Johnson is particularly impressed with the bad behaviour of baboons at the Cape.

References

A View of the Cape of Good Hope, Taken on the Spot, from on Board the "Resolution," Capt Cooke (1775). By William Hodges. *Royal Museums Greenwich*. https://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/13258.html#:~:text=Object%20details%3A%20%20%20Artist%2FMaker%20%20%20Hodges%2C,Taken%20%20...%20%201%20more%20rows%20

Camper, Petrus 1779. "Account of the Organs of Speech of the Orang Outang. By Peter Camper, M.D. Late Professor of Anatomy, &c. in the University of Groningen, and F.R.S. in a Letter to Sir John Pringle, F.R.S." *The Royal Society* 69 (31 December): 139-159. https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rstl.1779.0014

---- 1821. *The works of the late Professor Camper, on the connexion between the science of anatomy and the arts of drawing, painting, statuary, etc.*. Edited by T. Coogan. London: J. Hearne. https://archive.org/details/b22011298

Forster, George 1777. *A Voyage Round the World. Volume 2*. Edited by Nicholas Thomas and Oliver Berghof. Honalulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000.

Forster, Johann Reinhold 1778. *Observations Made During a Voyage Round the World*. Edited by Nicholas Thomas, Harriet Guest, and Michael Dettelbach. Honalulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996.

Johnson, Thomas Burgeland 1837. *Physiological Observations on Mental Susceptibility, to which is added, an Essay on Hereditary instinct, Sympathy, and Fascination*. London: W. Day. https://ia800503.us.archive.org/32/items/physiologicalob00johngoog/physiologicalob00johngoog.pdf

Meijer, Miriam Claude 1997a. Entry on Camper in *History of Physical Anthropology: An Encyclopedia. Volume 1*. Edited by Frank Spencer. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 242-243.

---- 1997b. "Petrus Camper on the Origin and Color of Blacks." *History of Anthropology Newsletter* 24, no.2 (January): 3-9. https://repository.upenn.edu/han/vol24/iss2/3/

---- 1999. *Race and Aesthetics in the Anthropology of Petrus Camper (1722-1789)*. Amsterdam: GA: Rodopi.

Mikkelsen, Jon M. (ed. and trans.) 2013. *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth-Century Writings*. New York: State University of New York.

Rookmaaker, L.C. 1992. "J.N.S. Allamand's additions (1769—1781) to the Nouvelle Edition of Buffon's Histoire Naturelle published in Holland." *Bijdragen tot de Dierkunde* 61, no. 3: 131-162. https://repository.naturalis.nl/pub/504133

4. Liberalism and Empire

> The chief obstacle to the attainment of our end is the fact that our intentions are generally misunderstood.
>
> —Alfred Milner, *England in Egypt*

This chapter concerns the rationale for imperial and colonial, and subsequently, global power. The conceptual and rhetorical building blocks of global political economy include financial management, historical precedent, economic theory, and pedagogical culture. Proponents of the first modern wave of globalisation (1870-1914) identified finance (debt and corruption), technology (expertise), and the development of human rights (civilisation) as major issues. The end point was clear to anyone concerned with the good of humanity.

Alfred Milner's *England in Egypt* (1892) reflects on the veiled protectorate of Egypt. Egypt was *de jure* part of the Ottoman Empire but after 1882 under *de facto* British rule—neither a colony nor a dominion. Milner served as undersecretary of finance in Egypt from 1890-92. 'What has brought Egypt from ruin to solvency, from solvency to financial ease' (1892: viii), according to Milner, has enabled bondholders to see the value of their investments doubled. Determined 'to stamp out corruption' (xxiv), the English are pursuing their business and not their philanthropic interests: 'business of a perfectly straightforward and honourable kind, and possessing the characteristic of all good business, namely, that both the parties concerned are benefited' (xxiv). Sustainable business equals good governance and good order when confronted with **'**the labyrinth of jarring interests, conflicting authorities, and hopelessly disintegrated sovereignty' (1892: 4).

The even-handed British approach is contrasted with the predatory approach of competing powers, specifically France: 'complicated international fetters' (ix) are the 'Gordian knot' (x) that must be cut. The 'stubborn opposition' (xiv) of Egyptian rulers 'that gives the appearance of a genuine national movement' (xv) distinguishes the very people who have the most to gain from the proposed reforms. Lamenting 'the revival of fanatical prejudice consequent of the recent political troubles' (xi), he notes the 'time immemorial' (3) embodied in Egypt, for what we see now extends back millennia: '[t]he fascination of its primeval monuments remains' (2). Present

'social and economic conditions' (4) must be remedied by modernisation. Egypt's 'monstrous' political system—'the anomalies, the intricacies, and the shams with which the Political System of Egypt, in its latest development, positively bristles' (3)—must be reformed. We must not allow the substitution of 'the wolf for the sheep dog as the guardian of the flock' (433). According to Milner's diagnosis Egypt, a place where '[p]aradox seems rooted in the soil' (2), faced two possible courses: either 'acceptance of the helping hand … and their co-operation with us in that work of constructive reform,' or 'persistence in the recent policy of hostility and obstruction—a policy which renders the success of our work under present conditions impossible, and must therefore end in some radical change' (xxi). That change, Milner explains, will certainly not accord with the ideal of national independence and will result in more, and less benign, foreign control. Politicians must not 'misinterpret the situation' (xxii) for the British are committed to Egyptian independence and are working to prepare the Egyptians for independence, a process that can only meet its completion gradually: 'the ingrained evils of some fifteen centuries cannot be eradicated in a decade' (440). Financial swindling may have induced British intervention, but the interest of the bond-holders 'has never been the inspiring motive of our policy. The inspiring, the predominant, motive of that policy, is the welfare of the Egyptian people' (444). Egypt is a place of many contradictions and the Egyptian people must be saved from themselves.[1]

Milner is fulsome in his praise of Sir Evelyn Baring, scion of the Baring banking dynasty and former British Controller-General and Consul-General of Egypt (1883-1907) (*England in Egypt*: 438-440). In 1913 Baring, now the Earl of Cromer, reciprocated, seeing Milner as 'the founder of South African prosperity … whose statesmanlike foresight is now beginning to produce a rich and abundant harvest' ("South Africa," 1913: 255).[2] Baring, as economist and financier, is credited with having restored stability after a revolution and securing 'Egypt's finances, and given her prosperity' (Marsot 1968: 127).

Let us take up the thread of what Evelyn Baring, former Consul-General of Egypt, termed 'the true motives which guide the actions of those who take the leading part' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 1915: 7).

England in Egypt

> And remembering that the return of prosperity to the peoples of the

> Near East began with your [Baring's] administration in Egypt.
> —Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*

Baring's philosophical consideration of imperial power reflects on the paradoxes noted by Milner. It would be difficult to find a more telling distillation of the liberal, developmental imperial project, and its voice can only be heard through a lengthy quotation:

> Lastly, how does the matter stand as regards ourselves? We have endeavoured to be as elastic as the somewhat cast-iron dogmas of Western civilization admit. Speaking from my own experience, I should say that the absence of that social adaptability, in which the French excel, is to some extent compensated in the case of the English by a relatively high degree of administrative and political elasticity. Save in dealing with some exceptionally barbarous practice, such as Sati, we have followed the example of Rome in respecting local customs. Indeed, it may be doubted whether we have not gone too far in this direction, for we have often stereotyped bad customs, and allowed them to assume the force of law. We have not interfered seriously with the practice of infant marriages. Save in respect to slavery, we have left intact the personal law both of Hindoos and Mohammedans—albeit that in both cases the codes were drawn up centuries ago to suit the conditions of primitive societies. But in spite of these, and other illustrations of a like nature which might be cited, do not let us for one moment imagine that we have not been innovators, and, in the eyes of the ordinary conservative Eastern, rash innovators. Freedom of contract, the principle of *caveat emptor*, rigid fixity of fiscal demands, the expropriation of land for non-payment of rent, even the commonplace Western idea that a man must be proved to be guilty of an offence before he can be punished, are almost as great innovations as the principle of representation accompanied by all the electoral paraphernalia of Europe. These divergent habits of thought on economic, juridical, and administrative questions have served to enhance the strength of the very formidable and elemental forces, such as differences of religion, of colour, and of social habits, which are ever tending to sunder the governing race from that which is governed. There has been no thorough fusion, no real assimilation between the British and their alien subjects, and, so far as we can now predict, the future will in this respect be but a repetition of the past. *Fata obstant* [the fates oppose, or, destinies do withstand—Virgil]. The foundations on which the barrier wall of separation is built may be, and, without doubt, to a certain extent are, the result of prejudice rather than of reason; but however little we may like to recognize the fact, they are of so solid a character, they appeal so strongly to instincts and sentiments which lie deep down in the

> hearts of men and women, that for generations to come they will probably defy whatever puny, albeit well-intentioned, efforts may be made to undermine them. (Baring *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 1910: 85-88)

The realisation of individual freedom dovetails with western economic, juridical and administrative forms, and resistance is a matter of prejudice rather than reason. National, and imperial, advantage are enablers and by- products of progress.

Progress can intensify elemental forces. The intensification of these prejudices is a result of the progress made, and an attempt to hinder development.[3] Primordial 'instincts and sentiments which lie deep down in the heart of men and women' will form a barrier that will ensure that the future is 'but a repetition of the past.' The economic, juridical and administrative forms of 'primitive societies' are no longer suited to prospering in the modern world. The new global situation demands radical reform.

Impatience with the tissue of condescension and self-serving prejudice of such formulations regarding 'primitive races' (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism* 75) ought not to distract from what Edward Said in *Orientalism* called 'the intellectual power' (1978: 41) at work. Situating Baring within 'the long-developing core of essential knowledge, knowledge both academic and practical … knowledge about knowledge of Orientals, their race, culture, history, traditions, society and possibilities' (38), Said warns that to see only the rationalisation of colonial domination is to 'underestimate the reservoir of accredited knowledge' (39). The images, figures, and narratives that cannot be relegated to the authoritarian casuistry of some bygone primitive era of grasping imperialism and colonialism. These powerful discursive elements are, Said suggested, at work today; reason enough to revisit the spokesmen of imperialism.[4]

Shorn of overt racial supremacism, the idea of progress is inseparable not only from a historical narrative—from primitive to modern—which is more complicated and tenacious than is often supposed. The historical sense includes consideration of race and the mechanics of domination which, as Said suggests, must not be simply dismissed as prejudice dressed up as reason for then the central integument is left undisturbed. One must attend to distinctions and variegations to identify the infrastructure.[5]

Scepticism directed at claims for 'the dignity of British principles' (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 79) fortuitously coinciding with 'the interests of

civilisation' (39)—'the general interest of Europe and civilisation' (40) and 'the civilising work which Great Britain has undertaken in Egypt' (84)— should not distract from analysis of *how* their own interest coincided with civilisation, or as we would now say with the very survival of humanity. This is no mere rhetorical sleight of hand but rather a powerful and persistent means not only of claiming the moral high ground but also of pre-empting and marginalising opponents and sceptics. The 'so very presentable face of good conscience' (Derrida 1992: 81) is part of a mechanism designed to undermine the capacity to resist.

Reaction to the thesis that 'the broad lines which those reforms must take are traced out by the commonplace requirements of European civilisation' (*Modern Egypt* I, 5) ought not to obscure the basis on which such claims were, and are, made. Consider the claim that slavery and race antipathy were not an integral part of Roman Imperialism:

> My own conjecture—and it is nothing more than a conjecture—is that antipathy based on differences of colour is a plant of comparatively recent growth. It seems probable that it received a great stimulus from the world- discoveries of the fifteenth century. One of the results of those discoveries was to convince the white Christian that he might, not only with profit, but with strict propriety, enslave the black heathen. Towards the middle of the fifteenth century, slaves were regularly imported from Senegambia and the Guinea ... It is true that negro slavery never took root in Europe, but it lasted until within recent times on the further side of the Atlantic, and the fact that the institution of slavery was closely identified in the eyes of all the world with difference of colour must have helped to bring into prominence the idea of white superiority, and thus to foster a race antipathy which, by a very comprehensible association of ideas, was not altogether confined to those coloured races who were enslaved, but was also in some degree extended to those who, as in the case of the Arabs, far from being themselves subject to enslavement, eventually became the most active agents in the enslavement of others.
>
> Under the influence of a benevolent and, in this instance, very laudable humanitarianism, there has been a great reaction during the last century; but I cannot help thinking that even now antipathy based on colour is a much more prominent feature in the government and social relations of the world than was the case in ancient times. There would certainly at first sight appear to be some connection between this circumstance and the recrudescence of slavery, which dates from the fifteenth century. (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 142-143)[6]

The idea of race superiority is not primordial but rather a product of history—a social construction, as we would now say. It seems that the

subjection of subject races rests more on economic and techno-cultural superiority understood as adaptability to the demands of the present historical context. This is why Milner could disparage 'the primitive and untutored instinct of aversion from alien races' ("The Two Empires," 1908: 297). For the time being the burden of guiding others along the path of history, and so empowering them, rests with the white race. This is not a natural but an historical contingency. The remedy for certain problems must not be confused with speculation on its causes.

It seems that the idea of progress, and the necessary stages of development that are its building blocks, can detach from the idea of biological race differentiation.[7] Marketing the empire is not dependent on the claim to racial, biological superiority. Writing about what Baring calls 'paramount races' (*Modern Egypt* I, 5) is of less moment than what is said about development. The thematic centre of regressive racism, conscious or unconscious, can vitiate the need to analyse, leading to what Rey Chow labels 'facilely dismissive judgements' (1998: 12).

Consider the argument of *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* against corruption and for good governance. Referring to 'an administrative system which is honeycombed with corrupt practices' (60) and veiled behind 'vapid moral sentiments' (61), Baring draws a lesson from ancient Rome's sanctioned 'venality' (62):

> But I venture to think that a more reasonable, more correct, and more philosophic view to take is to surmise that the *Pax Romana* was a necessary phase through which the world had to pass before those moralizing influences, which we owe mainly to the Jew and the Teuton, could be brought to bear on the destinies of mankind, and thus usher in a period when the arrested culture and humanity of the Hellene could exert their legitimate influence. (62)[8]

Quoting with approval Sir George Cornewall Lewis on the corruption of the East India Company—"'no civilized government ever existed on the face of this earth which was more corrupt, more perfidious, and more capricious than the East India Company was from 1758 to 1784, when it was placed under Parliamentary control'" (68)—Baring points to Turkey, Egypt and the Congo as other examples of the corruption of the principle of sound government. Economic management rather than race is the foundation of discrimination.

The root of the problem is allowing those who profit and those who rule to become one: 'That principle is that administration and commercial

exploitation should not be entrusted to the same hands' (69). State officials may err but if they are well-paid can have no excuse for bad government and must be punished if they lapse. Commercial agents, however, care nothing for the common good of future well-being and 'must almost of necessity at times neglect the welfare of the subject race in the real or presumed pecuniary interests of their employers' (70).

Singling out the Congo, Baring indicts what we would now call corporatism: 'the system is radically defective and vicious; all the more so because public opinion may not improbably be largely influenced by those who are in the perpetuation of the abuses' (70, note). Although '[a]n Imperial Power naturally expects to derive some benefits for itself from its Imperialism' (41), unbridled venality does not serve that power's long-term interest. Imperial Power and stewardship must not fuse administrative and commercial spheres.

Baring lists 'economic, juridical, and administrative questions' (87) but does not discuss the juridical. This is surprising given that his source for thinking on dependencies is Lewis's *Of the Government of Dependencies* (1841).[9] Lewis's preliminary remarks clarify the distinction between sovereign and executive power in which executive power is divided into two classes, juridical and administrative (1841: 11). A judge executes the law, but administers nothing.

One can speculate that Baring passes over the question of juridical power because the reality is that, in the dependency, the juridical sphere is an extension of the administrative power. The metropolitan norm is not exportable to the empire, at least not immediately. Sovereignty, of course, is not an issue because it rests with the dominant, home country and is tacitly assumed by Baring and articulated by Lewis with extensive ancient and modern examples. According to Lewis: 'The powers of a subordinate legislature are expressly or tacitly delegated to it by the supreme government' (1841: 249).[10]

Although drawing extensively on Lewis for information, Baring omits to mention Lewis's emphatic scepticism regarding the actual separation of powers achieved by functioning governments. The definitive separation of legislative and executive powers 'is not consistent with the practice of any government which has hitherto existed' (41). Could not the same be said of administrative and commercial powers, particularly in dependent and subordinate polities? Put bluntly: How can commercial interests be

challenged by a judiciary and a constrained executive that follows laws made elsewhere?

Baring's representation of the separation of administrative and commercial powers runs up against the symbiosis between regulation and revenue; between administrators' salaries and revenue (usually in the form of tax) dependent upon commercial activity. Where this extraction is not voluntary it must be enforced.[11] Highlighting that 'lurking in the background was a British garrison—the ultimate military sanction' (Vatikiotis 1991: 175) makes the English appear more like Lewis's depiction of the Romans commanding through force and extracting through monopoly:

> It was the general policy of the Romans not to make more changes in a conquered territory than were necessary for the purpose of reducing it to complete subjection. Hence, when they had firmly established its dependence on Rome, by garrisoning all its strong places with Roman legions, and collecting all its public revenues by Roman officers, they were content to allow the ancient law of the country, its religion, and other peculiar institutions of a like nature, to remain untouched. The Romans appear to have adopted this course partly upon reflection and from a conviction of its expediency, and partly from a certain haughty indifference which led them to turn away with contempt from questions about matters not affecting the maintenance of their own authority. (Lewis 1841: 119)

There is of course a considerable difference between 1841, the original date of publication of Lewis's *Of the Government of Dependencies*, and the early twentieth century when Baring was writing. One major difference has little directly to do with questions of racial superiority and inferiority, and it takes us to the heart of the lesson to be learnt from the first modern age of globalisation. One major battle has been fought and won and we live in its wake.

Free Trade

> … because … every other consideration has to give way to this supreme law, the 'categorical imperative' of the Free Trader, that we must not do anything which could by any possibility in the remotest degree benefit the British producer in his competition with the foreigner in our home market. It is from the obsession of this doctrine that the Tariff Reformer wishes to liberate our fiscal policy.
>
> —Alfred Milner, "Tariff Reform"

Lewis's target in *Of the Government of Dependencies* is Adam Smith's argument that the possession of over-seas dependencies increases the chance of war between nations as their commercial interests clash (see Lewis: 243-245). For Baring, writing some sixty years later in "The Government of Subject Races," Adam Smith's influence in England has rapidly declined 'after the great battle of Free Trade had been fought and won' (16).[12]

On the other side of the Free Trade debate—associated with the names of John Bright, Richard Cobden, and William Gladstone—the role of small government was accepted:

> But whatever may have been the faults of that school, and however little its philosophy is capable of affording an answer to many of the complex questions which modern government and society present, it laid fast hold of one unquestionably sound principle. It entertained a deep mistrust of Government interference in the social and economic relations of life. Moreover, it saw, long before the fact became apparent to the rest of the world, that, in spite not only of some outward dissimilarities of methods but even of an instinctive mutual repulsion, despotic bureaucracy was the natural ally of those communistic principles which the economists deemed it their main business in life to combat and condemn. Many regard with some disquietude the frequent concessions which have of late years been made in England to demands for State interference. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the main principle advocated by the economists still holds the field, that individualism is not being crushed out of existence, and that the majority of our countrymen still believe that State interference being an evil, although sometimes admittedly a necessary evil- should be jealously watched and restricted to the minimum amount absolutely necessary in each special case. ("The Government of Subject Races," 16-17)

The role of the State intervening in the market must not interfere with individual (social and economic) freedom. That is why colonialism and imperialism are, initially, best left in the hands of individual companies:

> Our habits: of thought, our past history, and our national character all, therefore, point in the direction of allowing individualism as wide a scope as possible in the work of national expansion. Hence the career of the East India Company and the tendency displayed more recently in Africa to govern through the agency of private companies. On the other hand, it is greatly to be doubted whether the principles, which a wise policy would dictate in the treatment of subject races, will receive their application to so full an extent at the hands of private individuals as would be the case at the hands of the State … More than

> this, State officials, having no interests to serve but those of good government, are more likely to pay regard to the welfare of the subject race than commercial agents, who must necessarily be hampered in their action by the pecuniary interests of their employers. (17-19)[13]

As individual economic actors, companies pursue their own interests (that of their shareholders). The role of the (metropolitan) State is to ensure broader stakeholder interests are heard and to reconcile individual interest and public good. The pecuniary interests of private companies are useful up to a point but must be tempered by the metropolitan State's interest in good government.[14] Free Trade and State oversight are compatible as far as subject races are concerned: 'Indeed, the whole fiscal policy adopted in Egypt since the British occupation in 1888 has been based on distinctly Free Trade principles' ("The International Aspect of Free Trade," 1910: 140; and see "Disraeli," 1912).[15]

Within the imperialist camp the debate regarding Free Trade cut across liberal and conservative wings, and divided liberal imperialists. Milner traced his Free Trade credentials to Bloemfontein, 1903 (see "Unionists and the Empire," 1907: 244) but stressed the need to transcend dogmatism:

> In our complex modern society there is room, no doubt all the room and the need in the world, for individual enterprise and initiative. But there is no room for a policy of *laissez-faire*, of 'go-as-you-please and the devil take the hindmost,' unless you are prepared to have such a mass of 'hindmosts,' such a number of failures as will drag down the whole community to a lower level. In the keen rivalry of nations, in the constant competition between them, from which none can escape (I am not thinking of war; wars might for ever cease, but there would still be competition in peace), one of the things which is going to count most is waste, waste of human power through bad social and industrial arrangements. There is a great silent force always working on the side of those nations which waste least in that respect. ("Imperialism and Social Reform," 1908: 353)

Milner was in favour of protectionist tariffs to privilege products from the empire and to encourage production and employment in the motherland. Unbridled Free Trade could undermine the economy of the home country and unravel the mutual benefits that could weave the empire together.[16]

On the other hand, Baring, an admirer of Louis Mallet,[17] was sceptical of the economic case for protectionism and the lofty ideals of social reform at home and abroad that accompanied it:

> Nevertheless, in spite of the outward contempt with which this Cinderella amongst the sciences is at times treated, political economy has an awkward way of vindicating its own majesty. A sure reward awaits those who, in spite of occasional obloquy and misrepresentation, conform to its leading precepts. A slow but certain Nemesis, as Socialists and Protectionists if, *quod Dis non placeat*, they should ever have their way in this country will eventually learn, dogs the steps of those who violate its leading principles. ("Indian Progress and Taxation," 1913: 195-196; see also "The Fiscal Position in India," 1913)

Free Trade and acceptance of the economic laws of the free market will assert their immutability. Political economy as the interpretation of probability becomes the iron law of necessity.

Free Trade and imperialism are not antithetical: economic self-interest and imperial responsibility converge.[18] This delicate balance cannot be left in amateur hands but demands the attention of experts (see Mitchell 2002). The skills required are necessarily found in the personnel who currently manage aspects of the current system. But the rule of experts does not overcome all pitfalls:

> Unfortunately political or administrative errors cannot be condoned by reason of good intentions …The intentions of the British, as compared with the Roman Government are, however, noteworthy from one point of view, inasmuch as from a correct appreciation of those intentions it is possible to evolve a principle perhaps in some degree calculated to avert the consequences which befell Rome, partly by reason of fiscal errors …The point of departure of the British Government is altogether different. Its intentions are admirable. ("The Government of Subject Races," 37-38)

Resistance to progressive reform comes in part from 'fail[ure] to appreciate the intentions' (45) motivating actions and policy.

The twin pillars of empire are commerce and military power, but the developmental empire must constrain destructive capitalism:

> The Empire depends in a great degree on the strength and efficiency of its army. It thrives on its commerce. But if the soldier and the trader are not kept under some degree of statesmanlike control, they are capable of becoming the most formidable, though unconscious, enemies of the British Empire. ("The Government of Subject Races," 51)

All flowed from the fundamental principle of the liberal imperialist creed: good government is better than self-government (see Marsot 1968: 75). A principle that opened the way to collaboration and the hollowing out of national sovereignty in the name of development.

Was collaboration merely the acknowledgement of the incompetence and/or powerlessness of national government to control the economy for the greater good? Better let the dominant global power manage things. Speaking for those wielding power, Baring counselled against overt displays of dominance, 'showing a preference for a Protectorate as opposed to the assumption of complete sovereignty' (*Abbas II*, xviii). The history of primitive times provides some valuable lessons.

While the Romans were undone by what "The Government of Subject Races" terms 'Barbarous Finance' (36), particularly land tax, it is the failure to communicate intention, or its wilful misinterpretation, that lies at the root of the modern crisis of imperialism.[19] The analogy between Roman and British imperialism is striking:

> The first points of analogy which must strike anyone who endeavours to institute a comparison between Roman and modern—notably British—Imperial policy are that in proceeding from conquest to conquest each step in advance was in ancient, as it has been in modern, times accompanied by misgivings, and was often taken with a reluctance which was by no means feigned; that Rome, equally with the modern expansive Powers, more especially Great Britain and Russia, was impelled onwards by the imperious and irresistible necessity of acquiring defensible frontiers; that the public opinion of the world scoffed 2,000 years ago, as it does now, at the alleged necessity; and that each onward move was attributed to an insatiable lust for an extended dominion. (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 19-20)[20]

Despite such misunderstanding of the causes of expansion, fortunately our intentions are still recognised by potential subjects: 'Is it not clear that they are coming because the Empire means something to them much more than mere government or power? It speaks to them of justice, of righteousness, of mercy, and of truth' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 6).

In his Introduction to Stephen Paget's *For and Against Experiments on Animals* (1912),[21] Baring responds to the charge of 'callous indifference to suffering which were frequently levelled against the experimentalists' ("Experiments on Living Animals," 1912: 238). The imperative of 'progress in medical science' for the good of humanity entails that 'the Vivisectionists, and not their opponents, were the true humanitarians; that they were, under circumstances which rendered them peculiarly liable to misrepresentation, fighting a cause in which not only the whole human race, but also the brute creation, were deeply interested (241, 239). Because 'the pursuit of knowledge in every direction is strewn with the records of false scents' (244)

the anti-vivisectionists have been misleading the public, 'led away by a very natural but, I firmly believe in this case, a misplaced sentiment' (252).[22]

Although some animals may suffer during the trials of experimental vaccinations the overall benefit outweighs the risks. Responsibility to humanity imposes a duty, and hence an ethics and a politics. The idea that the predominance of the strong over the weak is the law of life is

> misapplied Darwinism. The validity of the theory can only be admitted if human beings are in all respects to be assimilated to the brute creation. It involves a complete confusion between a law of Nature and a "law of life." Animals, birds, and insects devour each other because they are obliged to do so in order to live, and because they are not restrained from doing so by any moral or intellectual scruples' ("The German Historians," 1915: 99)

It seems that the 'stern and ruthless logic' ("Subject Races," 43) of the West is intertwined with strategies and rhetoric, feeling, and the principle of reason.

Reiteration of intention and inherent meaning (of actions and words) aims to fix context and meaning not only of action, but also to reframe contexts. The primacy of animating intention is maintained with controlled insistence: 'The fallacy that every Imperialist agent is possessed with an insane desire to enlarge the area of territories painted red on the map of the world is far from being extinct' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 4). Intention as the presence of the origin and imprimatur of identity is tied up with the question of character (*ethos*), and so part of another (auto)biographical narrative chain, what we call personal history, from which we think we can read off inclinations or traits.[23] The rhetorical organisation of attestation of intentional meaning amounts to more than a dramaturgy of sincerity.

The attempt to install a determined regime of interpretation, to cauterise fatal interpretive effractions, pivots on the claim that extenuating circumstances are nothing other than original circumstances. Expository recapitulation clarifies the origin. The real, actual meaning should be obvious to anyone interpreting in good faith. Unfortunately, the exegetical exercise of excluding the validity of certain interpretations, the re-framing of events to shore up an essential meaning before the vicissitude and contingency of interpretation, is necessary.

The reiteration, retransmission of original primitive meaning is also teleological in a double sense: this is what we aimed at, and you, addressee (public, posterity), are the arbiter of meaning (again). Injunction: You must

be conscious of our intention. A teleological and ethical determination dominates this ethics of reading. Putting aside the absurd and all too common spectacle of those benefitting from a system claiming credit for reforming it, the claim to sanity raises the fundamental question of the division between reason and madness. At stake in the imperial project is reason itself versus the interminable misfortune of the mad.[24]

Not only is there the 'power of the authority that sustains the representation' (Caygill 1989: 27) of the duly appointed official speaking and writing on behalf of the government (who in turn represents the people). The role of institutional legitimation is key.[25] The creation of the official humanised persona—'a complex alignment of freedom, production, and judgement' (14)—anchors all mechanisms of persuasion and forensic argumentation and is the transcendental guarantee of credibility. Transcendental because this origin, with its roots in freedom and responsibility, is the pre-requisite of the discourse of justification and morality.

The question of the authorisation of legitimate meaning bolsters and parasitizes an essential humanism that is integral to the imperial and colonial imagination, at least for its proponents. Men, not animals, are the authors of speech acts (see Derrida 1988: 134). There can be no assertion of good conscience without this reserve and destination; no testamentary unity or stake without the origin of action aiming at intended result. Unfortunately, interpretation must navigate 'the vulgar and unworthy views sometimes attributed to British Imperialists' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism." 11).

Hermeneutic problems arise not merely from faulty policy but also from misunderstanding the collective, over-arching intention of the imperial official as 'the prose writer, and still more of the orator, [which] should be to state his facts or to prove his case' ("Translation and Paraphrase," 1913: 56).[26] This is a linguistic problem of 'the fidelity of the translation' ("Lord Curzon's War Poems," 1915: 18), whereby 'the ideas or sentiments which it had been intended to convey have been disfigured' ("Translation and Paraphrase," 55).

This is why Baring's texts on literary aesthetics are not merely subsidiary or peripheral to the mechanics of empire. Not only are meaning and intention touchstones of efficient communication. They, in addition to commerce and military power, are integral to the authority without which administration is ineffective. At once semantic and performative,

efficiency—the reason of empire—is the moral justification for developmental domination and the means to civilisation.[27] Erecting protective barriers against irrational madness, the danger menacing reason, is an index of a more general problematic.

Pedagogy of Culture

> The material interests of the mother-country, important though they be, must be waived aside if they conflict with the interests and aspirations of the dependency. A higher standpoint than any material advantage must be adopted.
>
> —Evelyn Baring, "Lord Curzon's Imperialism"

The financial and military aspects of imperial rule are supplemented by the cultural and the pedagogical. The 'sane imperialism' of the British involves tutelage of backward peoples, and is the better alternative to 'the Prussian dream of world dictatorship' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 3, 12).

Yet the mission of 'rational Imperialists' (5) cannot be achieved without the maintenance of culture and civilisation at home. Central to this ongoing enlightenment is literary education in western literature which must, however, be handled carefully:

> For more than half a century we have, perhaps unavoidably, been teaching English through the medium of English literature, and that literature, in so far as it is historical, may easily be perverted from a disquisition on the advantages of steady progress achieved by a law-abiding nation into one which eulogizes disrespect for authority, and urges on the governed the sacred duty of throwing off the yoke of unpalatable Governors. Neither, of a surety, if we—or the French in Algeria or Tunis—turn to the history of the other great Western nation, is any corrective to be found. Can we be surprised if we reap the harvest which we have ourselves sown? (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 106)

Referring to the Greek and Roman classics and protesting against those who would jettison the classics in favour of more relevant, useful, fields of study, Baring includes himself among those who

> lift up their hands in supplication to scientists, educational experts, and parliamentarians—yea, even to the soulless wire-pullers who would perhaps willingly cast Homer and Sophocles to the dogs in order to win a contested election—and with one voice cry: we are no enemies to science; but in the midst of your utilitarian ideas, we implore you, in the name of both learning and

> common sense, to devise some scheme which will enable the humanities to act as some check on the growing materialism of the age … in taking any new departure let us, therefore, very carefully and deliberately consider how we can best preserve all that is good in our existing system. ("The Future of the Classics," 1913: 310)

Classical literature is the repository of ethico-political value. Aesthetics informs judgement as well as sustaining a sense of historical continuity and identity.[28] It is what saves us, and those who become our responsibility, from 'the humanistic wreck' (309).

The ideal of the imperial mission spreading British principles of freedom, order and justice, and the analogy with Roman imperialism, calls to mind Marlow's meditation from *Heart of Darkness*:[29] The Roman analogy serves to demarcate the modern, English imperial ideal. Motivated by what Baring terms 'a sincere and wholly disinterested desire' ("England and Islam," 1913: 413), the record must be set right. The fate of the British Empire lies in this tangle of intentions and results. Baring concludes his preface to *Modern Egypt* with a quotation from Kipling's wistful "Mandalay" (1890), a gesture to this affective and ideal dimension of globalising imperialism.

Good intentions are not enough—that is the lesson from experience.[30] And yet, as with Milner, *our* good intentions ought to be, if not enough, then at least taken into account when evaluating our actions. Actions that can misfire but not through any malice or selfishness on our part. There is a problem of interpretation which is a problem of context as much as of wilful misinterpretation of proper meaning.[31] If the transparency of our good intentions ought not to be taken at face value, then at least the 'special administrative experience' (*Modern Egypt* I, 4) ought to be taken into account. While to be 'well-intentioned, but certainly misdirected' (22) is not the monopoly of our opponents, our expertise in 'fiscal administration' (14) means that we representatives of 'the logical West' (7) are the lesser of many evils.[32] The core of this competence is familiarity with the logic of finance so as to remedy the suffering caused by 'persistent neglect of economic laws and by reckless administration of the finances of the State' (4). If 'the worry is that 'Egypt would once again degenerate into being the happy hunting- ground of the political and financial adventurer' (*Abbas II*, 84), who is the hunter and who is the hunted?[33]

The 'logical, and very Western' ("Subject Races," 42) project fuses moral sense and fiscal expertise; at once subjective and objective, a matter of feeling

and form. The expertise of colonial legislators is not dependent on colonial knowledge, but on familiarity with the global, external financial system and its web of consequences and possibilities. Wisdom promotes the general good amidst private (parochial, national) interests.[34] Disinterested government, putting utility before self-interest, transforms altruistic desire into moral insight. Trans-political politics resolves refractory factionalism into a higher human level by way of the clearer eye of the outsider who is an insider of the global system. Witness the superior judgement of the governing classes who can see the bigger picture and the governed classes immersed in refractory passions and private interests.[35]

Exactly how this alchemy spanning moral philosophy, politics, and psychology is achieved remains enigmatic. Where does desire end and disinterestedness start? Who decides, and according to what criteria, between responsibility and practicality, sincerity and strategy, private interest and national interest; and between these and humanity, modernity and tradition, finance and people, form and content? Aporia and contradiction remain unresolved. But it was not, and is not, only the judgement of posterity that was at stake for liberal imperialists.

Doubtless Baring, like Milner, was reacting to attacks on his record as colonial administrator.[36] In this theatre of intentions, behind the question of trust, lies the realm of economic laws and its 'somewhat cast-iron dogmas' that dictate the broad lines which reforms must take. European norms are the benchmark by which progress is measured. Recalcitrance, ignorance, and short-sightedness stand in the way. While Baring did not share Milner's visionary enthusiasm for a world-wide state of free citizens emerging from the chrysalis of the British empire,[37] he did share contempt for those who sought to distort the intentions of sane imperialists:

> Still less reliance can be placed on the action of the British Press, which falls a ready victim to the specious arguments advanced by some strategical pseudo Imperialist in high position, or by some fervent acolyte who has learnt at the feet of his master the fatal and facile lesson of how an Empire, built up by statesmen, may be wrecked by the well-intentioned but mistaken measures recommended by specialists to ensure Imperial salvation. ("The Government of Subject Races," 49)

Since a primary medium of communication is the press, the mainstream media can seriously distort and derail any chance of reaching a fair and accurate understanding of problems and their solutions.[38] Both Milner

(former assistant editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*) and Baring were involved in shaping public opinion. Journals and newspapers provided a platform from which to influence politicians and policy, and the reasoning thus disseminated was designed to inform and sway (see Potter 2017; and Shannon 2017).

The South African War of 1899-1902—what Milner called 'a supreme crisis in the history of the Empire' ("Imperial Unity—External Advantages," 1908: 309)—brought the tensions within liberal imperialism to a head.

South Africa

> The storm which has blackened the skies of the world was heralded by a cloud no bigger than a man's hand in South Africa.
>
> —Lionel Curtis, *Civitas Dei*

According to Milner, misunderstanding and distortion led to the Anglo-Boer War. Efficiency, industrial efficiency, was the watchword for South African reconstruction and British social reform. At home and abroad national self-interest and insularity must encompass the bigger, global picture. In a globalising, interconnected world national insularity was not an option. The problem was national preoccupation with 'internal development' such that 'owing to a narrow outlook and false political philosophy' they have 'failed to rise to the conception of what is involved in citizenship of a world-wide state' (Milner, "The Two Empires," 1908, 295). Milner envisioned the British Empire as stepping-stone to 'this world-wide state' ("Conditions of Closer Union," 1908: 361).[39]

The intra-liberal imperial critique of Milner and the Boer War offers lessons regarding the nature and effectiveness of attempts to challenge this version of progress. The arguments and 'the feelings of the Liberal minority during the Boer War' (Murray 1921: 8) shed light on the pitfalls of the liberal anti-imperial position.

Critics of the Second Boer War did not have to embrace the cause of the anti-imperial peasant colonisers-cum-colonised. Confronted with a campaign to demonise critics and mobilise belligerent public opinion, one option was to attack the disinterestedness of those laying claim to it. Francis W. Hirst:

> In our war with the two republics no detail is wanting to complete this picture. We see a fight for gold-fields introduced by gambling. Kaffirs as well as consols fluctuate with every change in its fortunes. Bears and bulls let loose their alternate rumours; and every fresh outpouring of blood is foreshadowed and recorded in a rise or fall of Stock Exchange securities. You have quotations before and after a skirmish, failures and fortunes after a defeat, failures and fortunes after a victory. (1900: 44)

Hirst argues that 'to set the South African conflict in its financial environment' involves appreciating the 'sordid motives' (45) that are not simply expatriated to the colonies but which return home by way of 'an application to metropolitan society of the same methods which had been found effectual in Cape Town' (49).

The colonies are the workshop of tools and strategies of fraud and authoritarianism that come home to roost in the motherland. Indeed 'the trail of the financial serpent' (55) can run smoothly so long as 'the people upon whose will a Government depends runs on blinkers':

> How is a democracy to know or even to suspect that its Ministers are a row of puppets, and that a board of international financiers sitting in Paris or Berlin or London pulls the wires, especially if that same board controls a great part of the press? The acquisition of the Charter, the Matabele War, and the Raid are three extraordinary proofs of the powers wielded by this unsuspected ring and of the modes in which these powers have been exercised. Another is furnished by the rehabilitation of Mr. Rhodes after the Raid. (59)

In the case of the Boer War, strictures regarding the disciplining of private commercial interests were not heeded: 'Vainly had Adam Smith warned British statesmen that exclusive companies are bad for commerce but worse for empires, and vainly had his warnings been written out in the chapter and verse of bitter experience' (49).

Events in South Africa reveal the rot in the system as a whole:

> We all know how insidious are the ways of corruption, how unconsciously motives of private gain may work upon virtuous resolves. One danger can hardly be escaped. The Stock Exchange, acting upon the Company Laws, has placed the ownership of industry and the means of distribution and production upon a basis that is very largely speculative, with results that are often disastrous to the public interest … Take the still blacker case of South African Companies, in which the governing classes of this country had invested so largely. The consciences of these investors are far too easy. Messrs. Rhodes, Beit, Albu, Goerz, and the rest stand between them and their victims. The opulence of Park Lane is squeezed from the compound. The geese that lay golden eggs for

> London society are of a migratory habit, and possess a power Hans Andersen might have envied of changing their plumage and their form. For these ingenuous auriferous geese that waddle through the vulgarized drawing-rooms of London and Parisian seasons are vultures when they flap their wings and sharpen their talons over Kimberley, Johannesburg, and Rhodesia. (115-116)[40]

Those proposing to administer the remedy for corruption are themselves corrupt. Key to advancing their private interests is control of the news media:

> It is not possible to exaggerate the dangers which menace us from these sources … when we find the Empire put in motion by foreigners for foreigners, it is time to counterwork the busy, though unseen, agencies of international finance. By the quiet purchase of half a dozen honest papers with a large circulation, and by a gentle, gradual reversal of their policy, something that looks remarkably like public opinion can be fabricated. When that is done, a free people cannot be said to enjoy freedom of the press. If news is carefully subedited, and then a glowing leader written upon doctored facts, a popular indignation is aroused by atrocities which never took place, and wrong impressions are formed which it is very difficult to erase. (63-64)[41]

The threat comes from "'Financial Imperialism'" and 'the busy, though unseen, agencies of international finance' (63). Public opinion is manipulated by outright lying, half-truths and omission, and the hounding of critics.

Not only is ownership of the media a problem, the compliance of journalists and other public intellectuals means there is no debate and counter-weight. Anyone who wants clarification or an open debate is accused of being pro-Boer.[42] Hirst argues that while the agents of financial imperialism feed shareholders 'by the reduction of black and white wages, by facilitating the importation of niggers, and by introducing some form of compulsory labour' (56), the tentacles of dependency strangle national freedom at home and abroad: 'Long Tom's discharges reverberate in every synagogue of Europe and America' (44).[43]

Gilbert Murray also warned against fake news and the manipulation of the virtues that define the mass of the people at their best. While philanthropy is based on 'primeval instincts,' and while excess of sympathy less destructive than lack of sympathy, the hatred of oppression can lead one 'to believe a tale of wrong without much sifting of evidence:'

> This is dangerous, but it might not do much harm except for one circumstance. Who is it who have the power of telling these tales of wrong and so stirring up the country? Obviously the newspapers—the newspapers which support

> opposite political parties or are the property of rival capitalists. ("National Ideals; Conscious and Unconscious," 1900: 175, 178)

Decrying 'the deplorable tendency of the great newspaper to organize crusades—and very sinister and rash crusades—instead of publishing facts,' Murray diagnosed a failure of liberal values before the juggernaut of crude imperialism:

> What can be the feelings of so able and influential a Liberal as the Editor of the *Daily News* when he sees most English newspapers, and his own among them, filled day after day with statements, no doubt more or less well tested, intended to discredit, by hook or by crook, the whole race of South African Dutch, from reports of individual cruelties to natives, and explanations from adventurous financiers that their deficits are entirely due to bribes paid to the Volksraad, down to third-hand repetitions of what somebody told somebody that Mr. Reitz's brother had said eighteen years ago in a smoking-room? ("Preface," *Liberalism and the Empire,* 1900: xi, vii)[44]

Murray was only too aware that liberal critics of the Boer War were a minority, and that speaking truth to power usually proves powerless.[45]

Criticism of vested interests and conspiratorial elites, manipulation of the news media, and appeals to the morality of national consciousness proved ineffective not merely because of the riposte of paranoia, xenophobia or impractical idealism that deflected criticism. More important was the essential agreement regarding the value of imperialism as civilising mission with dispute centring on the lapse from this ideal. Once again it is the Romans who serve as comparative resource:

> But, when all deductions were made, the Roman Empire meant peace throughout the known world; it meant decent and fairly disinterested government; it protected honest men from thieves and robbers; it punished wrongdoers; it gave effective help to towns wrecked by blizzards or earthquakes, or to provinces where the crops had failed. It spread education and civilized habits; it put down the worst practices of savage superstition. (Murray, "Satanism and World Order," 1919)

Among fellow 'humanists' (309) Baring includes Murray and quotes with approval from *The Rise of the Greek Epic* (1907):

> that Greek literature, in Professor Gilbert Murray's words is 'an embodiment of the progressive spirit, an expression of the struggle of the human soul towards freedom and ennoblement'; and that our young men and women will be, both morally and intellectually, the poorer if they listen to the insidious and deceptive voice of an exaggerated materialism which whispers that amidst the hum of modern machinery and the heated wrangles incident to the perplexing problems

> which arise as the world grows older, the knowledge of a language and a literature which have survived two thousand eight hundred storm-tossed years is 'of no practical use.' (Baring, "The Future of the Classics," 312)

The liberal critics of imperialism shared a commitment to the progressive spirit: human rights, democracy, economic efficiency, and technology (scientific and bureaucratic).[46] But not democracy unreservedly. For Murray these hopes focused on the League of Nations: 'not Democracy but Internationalism' beyond the self-interest of 'sovereign states' (Murray 1918: 28, 27).[47]

The core belief was that, at its best, imperial tutelage could ameliorate the pangs of nation building experienced by western nations. The short-cut to development was to be facilitated and administered by those qualified to have oversight. The accusation of universal self-interest and prognostications of disaster merely confirm the need for experts able to seize the moment. Murray provides an illustration:

> Mere straight-forward self-interest, then, takes us a very long way in the explanation of politics. But obviously not the whole way. There are other instinctive elements … Consider the fowls of the air. A very pretty small bird, the great Tit, when hungry, will lift up its beak, split open its brother's head and proceed to eat his brains. It might then be satisfied, think you? Not at all! It has a moral nature, you must please to remember, which demands to be satisfied as well as the physical. When it has finished its brother's brains, it first gets very angry and pecks the dead body; then it flies off to a tree and exults. What is it angry with and why does it exult? It is angry with the profound wickedness of that brother, in consequence of which it was obliged to kill him: it exults in the thought of its own courage, firmness, justice, moderation, generosity and domestic sweetness. That song is its equivalent—poor innocent thing—of a patriotic leading article in the *Kreuz Zeitung* or the *Daily Telegraph* or the *Petit Journal*. (Murray, "National Ideals; Conscious and Unconscious," 163)

None of this departs in its essentials from the principles laid down by Baring and the need for statesmanlike control of soldier and trader.

In the final analysis, financial profiteering, corruption, mismanagement, etc., were irrelevant compared to the strategic economic and military need to control the Cape of Good Hope and Southern Africa's gold. The trail of bungling and lack of probity did not change the objective context of the emerging world order

Conclusion

> Satanism; the spirit which hates the World Order wherever it exists and seeks to vent its hate without further plan. That is wrong. But this spirit would not have got abroad; it would not have broken loose and grown like seed and spread like pestilence, had not the World Order itself betrayed itself and been false to its principles, and acted towards enemies and subjects in ways which seem to them what the ways of Nero or Domitian seemed to St. John on Patmos.
>
> —Gilbert Murray, "Satanism and World Order"

Writing after the horror of the World War I, Murray criticised those who embrace the sacred cause of hatred and allow loathing of their rulers to blot out reason and self-interest. They must be saved from themselves by the very rulers they demonise. Echoing Baring's diagnosis of 'instincts and sentiments which lie deep down in the hearts of men and women,' Murray argued that the 'spirit of unmixed hatred towards the existing World Order' (215) cannot be allowed to sink the human race.[48] Imperialism and globalisation cannot be wished away, and, whatever its origins and current lapses, there is a responsibility to make the best of it; for our sake and for the sake of those affected by our decisions.

The critics of imperialism lost the argument because a greater threat loomed over them, one that threated their very existence. Those best able to resolve/exploit/enlighten perceptions of the current situation by controlling public debate and discrediting opponents won the day. Such is the crucial factor, irrespective of how the crisis was reached, who is to blame, what could have been different, and so on. Inaction invites catastrophe. Unable to prevent the Great War, the discourse of globalisation re-emerged after World War II in the form of the United Nations and the World Health Organisation (see Hankins 2019).

Looking back at his life, Bertrand Russell passed the following judgment on his friend Murray and their liberal generation:

> We had ventured forth in a frail skiff on calm and sunny seas, but wild tempests were threatening to sink our little bark, and hope grew gradually more difficult and remote. (1960: 209)[49]

Notes

[1] 'This is the latest of Egyptian paradoxes, that those who are most keenly desirous to see us go away, are always doing the very things which are guaranteed to postpone our going till the Greek Kalends.' (Milner, *England in Egypt*, xxv)

[2] See Baring's gentle chiding of Milner's impractical idealism in "Lord Milner and Party" (1913).

[3] Baring also saw Egypt as 'the "Land of Paradox"' ("The Capitulations in Egypt," 1913: 170); and see *Modern Egypt* II, 1908: 127, 291-292. Those who resisted his reforms (in Egypt) were representative of 'conservatism' (*Modern Egypt* II, 161). As regards sanitary reform: 'the conservative instincts of the people, and their indifference to sanitation, constitute and almost insuperable barrier to rapid progress' (512). Yet the primitive is not always a hindrance: 'Moreover, increased contact has often only resulted in the decay of some primitive but highly laudable Eastern virtues, and the assimilation of some very reprehensible Western vices' ("Japan," 1916: 278-279).

[4] 'One obvious reason stems directly from the times we live in and the many resemblances between our present wave of globalization and the previous one in which Lord Cromer was a major participant in the forty years or so before the First World War.' (Owen 2004: vii)

[5] 'This diversity reflected the fact that the British empire had not been assembled according to a centralised, planned programme, but had developed in fits and starts over many years, through the gradual, opportunistic and localised accretion of territory around far-flung bridgeheads.' (Potter 2007: 54-55). See Hannah Arendt on 'Lord Cromer, who in Egypt changed from and ordinary British chargé d'affaires into an imperialist bureaucrat' (1951: 243).

[6] However, 'it is to be observed that pride of race, which usually accompanies the conception of an Imperial policy, was in no degree wanting amongst the Greeks' (Baring, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 9 note).

[7] Roger Owen sees Baring emphasising 'race as a biological category' (2004: 355).

[8] "The Imperialism which Lord Curzon favours is not that of nation-devouring Rome, whose heavy hand, albeit its weight was to some extent tempered by the humanizing influence of Hellas, numbed the intellect and chilled the nascent aspirations of the subject races which fell under her sway. Rather is it a vivifying force on which the populations incorporated into the British Empire may readily graft and develop all that is best in their own national characteristics.' ("Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 10)

[9] On George Cornewall Lewis, son of Sir George Amyand, a Director of the East India Company and owner of a sugar plantation in Grenada, see Seymour et al (1998).

[10] But this is not an automatic transmission between the head and the subordinate. See Lewis on *Third report of the Commissioner of Inquiry into the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice in the West Indies: Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Christopher, and the Virgin Islands* (1827) and the "'considerable obscurity'" surrounding the relation between the laws of the mother country and their application in the colonies: "'The answer generally received in the case of free persons, was, '1st. We acknowledge the common law of England;' but always qualified by 'so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of the colony'" (quoted in Lewis 1841: 199-200).

[11] Baring in 1915: 'The presence of British garrisons in Cairo, Alexandria, and Khartoum unquestionably counts for much in explanation of these very singular political phenomena' (*Abbas II*, xx-xxi). 'If there is one point more than another, which an official and political training of the special kind which I have undergone impresses upon the mind … [it is the importance] of military discipline.' (52) With Britain at war with Turkey, and Egypt being part of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt became a Protectorate in 1915. See Baring (1968: 122, 20) on the demoralising effect of the First Boer War and the dangers arising from the indecision of a weak government.

[12] See Louis Mallet (1891: 113) on Cobden and the ongoing need to fight to entrench Free Trade principles. Mallet warned against making 'ourselves the missionaries of blood and plunder in the heart of Africa … Is England to lead the way in transplanting to another continent the miserable traditions and discredited maxims of the past, to bring Africa into the scale to trim a new balance of power, and there to seek new battle-fields for the nations of Europe to add to the bloody record of their own?' (1891: 117). Southern Africa must not join the trinity 'Ireland, Egypt, and India' (213), the unholy quagmire from which Britain is unable to extricate itself. Niall Ferguson (2003: 283) recounts the detail of Gladstone's (and Disraeli's) interest in Suez Canal shares. For others, Gladstone's liberal policy toward the Boers that resulted in the Pretoria Convention of 1881 which granted limited independence to the Transvaal was in hindsight a mistake. Harry Johnston's *The Gay-Dombeys*: 'They spoke of the Kaffir Market, as it were beginning to be called. Transvaal Gold-fields were making many liberals regret Mr. Gladstone's policy in 1881' (1919: 11). H.G. Wells wrote the preface to Johnston's satire.

[13] Baring's essay "The International Aspects of Free Trade" (1910) refers to J. Shield Nicholson's 'brilliant work' (136), *A Project of Empire: A Critical Study of the Economics of imperialism, with Special Reference to Ideas of Adam Smith* (1909). Baring notes that the advantages of Free Trade are dependent upon Britain's 'marked commercial supremacy' (129). See Marsot (1968: 138).

[14] For Milner while the actions of the South Africa Company are 'impossible to regard with approval,' the extension of Empire by way of private companies is 'a valuable stop-gap' on the way to determining 'the best permanent arrangement' ("Geography and Statecraft," 1907: 233).

[15] According to Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot it was Baring's fiscal success in Egypt that sowed the seeds of rebellion: 'With affluence, the Egyptians acquired assurance, and England's financial policy came to be regarded with hostility' (1968: 139). As one official wrote to Millner: "'we have created a huge Frankenstein and now we must do our best to stifle the monster'" (quoted in Marsot 118).

[16] Milner wrote the approving introduction to *The Elements of Reconstruction* where H.G. Wells argued against 'a merely protective tariff' that would make farmers lazily fat and send up the landowners' rents in a time when it is the bounden duty of everyone to be lean and active' (1916: 51-52). See Milner's statement on 'a nobler Socialism, which so far from springing from "envy, hatred, and all uncharitableness," is born of genuine sympathy … From this point of view the attempt to raise the well-being and efficiency of the more backward of our people—for this is what it all comes to—is not philanthropy: it is business' ("A Political

Ishmaelite," 1906: 160-161). And also his criticism of political economy ("The Two nations," 1912: 500). George Bernard Shaw argued that Milner was no Socialist and, like his Boer opponents, was dominated by the morality of private property 'and so had to argue in the manner of the wolf with the lamb' (1900: 24). See Dutton (1981: 183) on Milner's argument for the importance of private property for social order.

[17] 'He [Sir Louis Mallet] was the best type of the English civil servant; a keen politician but not a political partisan, a trained official without a trace of the bureaucratic element in him, and a man of really liberal aspirations without being carried away by the catchwords which sometimes attach themselves to what, from a party point of view, is called liberal policy in England … Lord Goschen consulted Sir Louis Mallet as to whom he should nominate as Commissioner of the Debt in Egypt. Sir Louis Mallet recommended me.' (Baring, *Modern Egypt* I, 15)

[18] 'He [Baring] could not support Chamberlain's tariff reform program because of his life-long faith in free trade. Nor would he underwrite Lord Milner's plea for the creation of a party of "national efficiency" to combat the harmful influences of the established parties in foreign affairs.' (Tignor 1963: 157; and see Mowat 1973) Gilbert Murray traced the origin of the Peloponnesian War to the 'cruel tariff-war' waged by Athens against Megara ("Aristophanes and the War Party," 1918: 43).

[19] 'The actions and opinions of Lord Curzon, in common with those of all other politicians, are, of course, a very legitimate subject for criticism, but he has a fair right to claim that the motives which dictated those actions and the process of reasoning which led to the formation of those opinions should be taken from his own lips rather than that they should be judged by the light of the interpretation often erroneously placed upon them by hostile or ill-informed critics.' (Baring, "Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 7)

[20] 'The British Empire, like the Roman, was built up by dull men. It may be we shall be ruined by clever ones.' (Wells 1897: 65).

[21] South Africa and Africa feature prominently in Paget's accounts of developing remedies for infectious diseases and parasites. It would seem that the Boer War, and European colonialism in Africa, benefitted medical research, which in turn is a benefit to humanity.

[22] 'Sympathy must, as Lord Curzon very rightly points out, be accompanied by strength, courage, and, above all, by accurate knowledge.' (Baring, "Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 4)

[23] Milner in valedictory mood: 'What I should prefer to be remembered by is the tremendous effort subsequent to the war, not only to repair its ravages, but to restart these colonies on a higher plane of civilisation than they had ever previously attained … And in that connection I should like to say one final word to those—perhaps they are not very many—who are good enough to place confidence in me; I do not mean merely confidence in my good intentions, or in the main drift of my policy, but in the general soundness of my judgment. To them I would say: "If you believe in me, defend my works when I am gone. Defend, more especially, those which are more especially mine. I care for that much more than I do for eulogy, or, indeed, for any personal reward"' ("Johannesburg," 1905: 85).

[24] 'The unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur of the order of reason, that which makes it not just one actual order or structure (a determined historical structure, one structure among other possible ones), is that one cannot speak out against it except by being

for it, that one can protest it only from within it; and within its domain. Reason leaves us only the recourse to stratagems and strategies.' (Derrida 1963: 36)

[25] "'Mind," he began again, lifting one arm from the elbow, the palm of the hand outwards, so that, with his legs folded before him, he had the pose of a Buddha preaching in European clothes and without a lotus-flower—"Mind, none of us would feel exactly like this. What saves us is efficiency—the devotion to efficiency. But these chaps [i.e., the Romans] were not much account, really. They were no colonists; their administration was merely a squeeze, and nothing more, I suspect. They were conquerors, and for that you want only brute force—nothing to boast of, when you have it, since your strength is just an accident arising from the weakness of others. They grabbed what they could get for the sake of what was to be got. It was just robbery with violence, aggravated murder on great scale, and men going at it blind—as is very proper for those who tackle a darkness. The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to ...'" (Conrad 1902: 10)

[26] 'In the long course of our history many mistakes have been made in dealing with subject races, and the line of conduct pursued at various times has often been very erratic. Nevertheless, it would be true to say that, broadly speaking, British policy has been persistently directed towards an endeavour to strengthen political bonds through the medium of attention to material interests. The recent history of Egypt is a case in point.' (Baring, "The French in Algeria," 1913: 253) See Kwame Nkrumah (1965: 212-218).

[27] 'Egypt, it would appear, was to be civilised on a European model.' (Baring, *Modern Egypt* I, 59; and II, 432) However, 'the supreme necessity of efficiency' must be tempered by recognition 'that it is politically wiser to put up with an imperfect reform carried with native consent, rather than to insist on some more perfect measure executed in the teeth of strong-albeit often unreasonable native opposition" (Baring, "The French in Algeria," 261). Baring described himself as a 'mid-Victorian' liberal: 'a school of politicians whose ideas have now been swept into the limbo of forgotten things, the only surviving principles of that age being apparently those associated with a faint and somewhat fantastic cult of the primrose' ("Sir Alfred Lyall," 78). Tory Disraeli's favourite flower was the primrose, and the primrose wreath at Disraeli's funeral was rumoured to be from Queen Victoria. In "Lord Curzon's Imperialism" Lloyd George is patted as 'an impulsive but warm-hearted and courageous demagogue' (2).

[28] Baring argues against imposing the language of the dominant power on its subjects and expecting it to 'serve as a solvent' (*Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 4) binding a national community and its foreign rulers. Those most eager to learn the language of the rulers are motivated by 'self-interest,' and quickly intensify their resentment and complain 'in shrill tones, and, in some cases, not without a certain amount of reason, that the opportunities accorded to him for rising are insufficient' (104).

[29] Conrad's manuscript has after "'They grabbed what they could get for the sake of what was to be got'" the following excised elaboration: "'That's all. The best of them is that they

didn't get up pretty fictions about it. Was there, I wonder, an association on a philanthropic basis to develop Britain, with some third-rate king for a president and solemn old senators discoursing about it approvingly and philosophers with uncombed beards praising it, and men in the market places crying it up. Not much! And that's what I like!'" (1902: 10, footnote).

[30] Baring on the policy of England in the Near East specifically Turkey and the Ottoman Empire: 'All has been in vain. History does not relate a more striking instance of the truth of the old Latin saying that self-deception is the first step on the road to ruin' ("England and Islam," 413). See also "The Ottoman Empire" (1913): 'The blindness displayed by Turkish statesmen to the lessons taught by history, their complete sterility in the domain of political thought, and their inability to adapt themselves and the institutions of their country to the growing requirements of the age, might almost lead an historical student to suppose that they were bent on committing political suicide' (265).

[31] 'Different men are animated by different ideals. All that can be expected of any of us is to remain true to his own. And for my own part I can imagine no higher ideal which can animate the citizens of my country at the present time than that of a great and continuous national life, shared by us with our kinsmen, who have built up new communities in distant parts of the earth, enabling them and us together to uphold our traditional principles of freedom, order and justice, and to discharge with ever increasing efficiency our duty as guardians of the more backward races who have come under our sway.' (Milner, "Introduction," *The Nation and the Empire*, 1913, xlviii) According to Rebecca West, Milner 'had no tie with the efficient of the earth except that he could mimic the way they might behave' (1982: 476).

[32] Consider the 'best type of English civil servant; a keen politician but not a political partisan, a trained official without a trace of the bureaucratic element in him, and a man of really liberal aspirations without being carried away by the catchwords which sometimes attach themselves to what, from the party point of view, is called liberal policy in England' (*Modern Egypt* I, 15).

[33] Lord Rosebery to Cromer, March 9, 1894: "'We have gone through many stormy times together, and I have long come to the conclusion that you are a good man to go tiger- hunting with'" (quoted in *Abbas II*, 64). Lord Rosebery is identified with what Baring approvingly terms 'the school of Liberal Imperialism' (30). Marsot describes Roseberry as 'a confirmed imperialist' (1968, 103).

[34] 'It is not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty's Government which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at all. It is the unprogressiveness, I will not say retrogressiveness, of the Government of the Transvaal, and its deep suspicion of the intentions of Great Britain, which causes it to devote its whole attention to imaginary external dangers, when every impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers which threaten it are internal.' (Milner, "Graaff Reinet," 1898: 10) The Boer leaders are deceiving their people into a 'hopeless resistance' ("Cape Town," 1900: 30).

[35] 'I could give numerous instances, which are within my own experience, to show how readily young men fresh from the English schools or universities adapt themselves to new surroundings and speedily identify themselves with the interests of the people over whom

they are called to rule.' (Baring, "Lord Curzon's Imperialism," 12-13) See Gilmour (1994: 27-28) on the Oxford Balliol men (including Milner and Baring) and the influence of Benjamin Jowett. Aldrich (2020) tracks Baring's son in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising.

[36] 'The average annual value of British exports to Egypt, which was £3,000,000 in 1880-84, had risen by painfully slow degrees to £3,500,000 in 1890-94. It is calculated that the British taxpayer has spent about £40,000,000 on Egypt and the Soudan. Never have desert lands been more thoroughly manured by more competent hands.' (Hirst, 1900: 73).

[37] Milner's narrative moves from 'Imperial federation' ("The Two Empires,"1908, 293) in which members of the British Empire are 'the citizens of a world-wide state' ("Imperial Unity—Internal Benefits," 1908: 314) to 'the free peoples of a world-wide state' ("Imperialism and Social Reform," 1908, 354): 'I mean a real Empire State with its necessary concomitant, an Empire citizenship.' ("Empire Citizenship," 1912: 487)

[38] 'The pubic often seize on some incident which strikes the popular imagination, or idealise the character of some individual whose action excites sympathy of admiration … A series of myths cluster round the original idea or statement … All that happens is that an incorrect fact or a faulty conclusion is graven into the tablets from which future historians must draw their sources of information.' (Baring, *Modern Egypt* I, 3)

[39] 'The epoch of expansion is pretty nearly past, but there remains before us a great work of development and consolidation' (Milner, "Unionists and the Empire," 1907: 238). Baring, more sanguine than the messianic Milner, ends his introduction to the first collection of his political and literary essays with a quotation from Dryden's *Aureng-zebe* (1675), a play set in India: "'Trust on, and think to-morrow will repay,/To-morrow's falser than the former day'" ("Translation and Paraphrase," 73).

[40] 'When Sir Alfred Milner overruled the wishes of the responsible Governments of Cape Colony and Natal, he deserted the traditions of Liberalism, and he involved South Africa in the worst of all wars—a war of races. It must be the task of Liberals to see that the talk about drawing the Empire more closely together is not to be made a pretext for suffocating the autonomy of our colonies.' (Hammond 1900: 209) George Bernard Shaw: 'Theoretically, they [Boers] should be internationalized, not British-Imperialized; but until the Federation of the World becomes an accomplished fact, we must accept the most responsible Imperial federations available as a substitute for it' (1900: 24).

[41] 'The press and the politicians who forced the pace with Outlander grievances, suzerainty, or the Dutch conspiracy, have kept it up with a native policy, securing thus that firm co-operation of business and philanthropy which is the distinctive note of British Imperialism. The two motives are commonly fused in some vague phrase about the necessity of securing to black races "the dignity of labour" or of "protecting them from the vices of civilization".' (Hobson, 1901: 133) See Cain (2002).

[42] See Hobson (1901: 11, 127) on Olive Schreiner being blocked by certain magazines, and the 'coarse brutality' meted out to Cronwright Schreiner by the press. 'More important still, they saw these men buying not for commercial but for propagandist purposes, the most important organs of the press in the colony, and establishing at great expense new organs of revolutionary agitation in Johannesburg; they saw public opinion throughout South Africa poisoned by the mendacity of this unscrupulous press, visibly operated in collusion so as to

arouse public passion and to drive the British imperial policy towards a catastrophe.' (Hobson, 1900: 26)

[43] Noting the 'anti-Jewish comments which disfigured the radical literature' (182), Donal Lowry remarks that, '[f]ollowing in Hobson's footsteps, Hirst's analysis took a frankly anti-semitic turn' (2002: 180).

[44] Silas Modiri Molema (1920: 262) quotes with approval Murray's address delivered at the opening meeting of the Conference on Nationalities and Subject Races, Westminster, June 23, 1910, appealing for a more self-critical approach to empire. Murray's liberal credentials can be seen in his Introduction to Norman Leys, *Kenya* (1924). See also the Preface to John Hobbis Harris, *Slavery or "Sacred Trust"* (1926), and his comments on Liebknecht and warm appreciation of Ghandi's work in South Africa ("The Soul as It Is and How to Deal with It," 1918: 148). Murray was friend and ally of Jan Smuts. See Jean Smith (1960), an advisor for H.G. Wells's *Outline of History*, on Murray.

[45] See Professor Murray's disapproval of Milner's sloppy knowledge of one aspect of the Greek classics ("The Exploitation of inferior Races in Ancient and Modern Times: An Imperial Labour Question with a Historical Parallel," 1900: 123). Murray's translation of *The Trojan Women* (1905) was designed to draw a parallel between the suffering of the Boers and the Trojans. Simon Perris notes that 'Murray and his wife donated £100—a not insignificant sum in 1901—to the Boer Women and Children's Clothing Fund' (2010/2011: 429). See Caedel, (2007). Murray wrote the Preface to William Archer's *The Great Analysis*, a book that 'came to me like a spring in the desert' (in Archer 1912: vi).

[46] See Murray's defence of the classics in "Religio Grammatici: The Religion of a 'Man of Letters'" (1918). Is this text the model for T.S. Eliot's better known "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919)?

[47] See De Madariaga (1960). Murray contributed to H.G. Wells's *The Idea of the League of Nations* (1919). See also Lenin on "'*the dream of idealistic politicians, the United States of the civilized world*,'" the early twentieth century revolt of the Hereros in South West Germany, and the uprising of the Hottentots (1968: 684, 682).

[48] H.G. Wells also made the case for the end of the War as an opportunity to institute 'the proper plan for national efficiency' (1916: 105) and 'Imperial reorganization' (88). This involved political and economic reorganization on the national and the global level.

[49] George Orwell was more damning: 'Where this age differs from those immediately preceding it is that a liberal intelligentsia is lacking … like all liberals he [Russell] is better at pointing out what is desirable than at explaining how to achieve it … Underlying this is the idea that common sense always wins in the end. And yet the peculiar horror of the present moment is that we cannot be sure that this is so. It is quite possible that we are descending into an age in which two and two will make five when the Leader says so' (1939: np.).

References

Aldrich, Harriet 2019 [2020]. "Oxford and Colonial Atrocities: the Mau Mau Rebellion." *Uncomfortable Oxford*. December 8.

https://www.uncomfortableoxford.co.uk/post/oxford-and-colonial-atrocities-the-mau-mau-rebellion
Archer, William 1912. *The Great Analysis: A Plea for a Rational World Order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Arendt, Hannah 1951 [2004]. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Schocken Books.
Bell, Gertrude Lowthian 1911. *Amurath to Amurath*. London: William Heinemann.
Baring, Evelyn [Lord Cromer] 1908. *Modern Egypt. Volumes 1 and 2*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916. https://archive.org/details/modernegypt00crom
---- 1908. "The Government of Subject Races—*The Edinburgh Review*, January." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1913, 3-53. https://archive.org/details/politicalandlite17320gut
---- 1910. *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. https://archive.org/details/ancientmodernimp00cromrich
---- 1910. "The International Aspects of Free Trade—Antwerp, August." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. 127-140.
---- 1912. "Experiments on Living Animals—March 27." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. Second Series. Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1914. 237-153. https://archive.org/details/politicalandlite00cromiala
---- 1912. "Disraeli—*Spectator*—November, 1913." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. Macmillan and Co., Limited. 177-203.
---- 1913. "The Future of the Classics—*Spectator*, January 24." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. 307-316.
---- 1913. "Lord Milner and Party—*Spectator*, May 24." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. 237-249.
---- 1913. "The French in Algeria—*Spectator*, May 31, 1913." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. 250-263
---- 1913. "The Ottoman Empire—*Spectator*, June 14." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. 264-276.
---- 1913. "Translation and Paraphrase—*The Edinburgh Review*, July," In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. Second Series. 54-73.
---- 1913. "The Capitulations in Egypt—*The Nineteenth Century and After*, July." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. 156-174.
---- 1913. "Sir Alfred Lyall—*Quarterly Review*, July." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. 77-103.
---- 1913. "The Fiscal Position in India—*Spectator*, July 19." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. 327-339.
---- 1913. "England and Islam—*Spectator*, August 23." In: *Political and Literary Essays 1908-1913*. First Series. 407-415
---- 1913. "Indian Progress and Taxation—*Quarterly Review*, October." In: *Political and Literary Essays*. Second Series. 192-205.
---- 1913. "South Africa—*Spectator*, November 29." In *Political and Literary Essays*. Second Series. 254-260
---- 1915. *Abbas II*. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited.

https://archive.org/details/abbasii00cromuoft
---- 1915. "Lord Curzon's Imperialism—May 17." *Political and Literary Essays*. Third Series. London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1916, 1-14. https://archive.org/details/politicalliterar00cromiala
---- 1915. "Lord Curzon's War Poems—*Spectator*, July 17." In: *Political and Literary Essays*. Third Series. 5-22.
---- 1915. "The German Historians—*Spectator*, October 16." In: *Political and Literary Essays*. Third Series. 91-101.
---- 1916. "Japan—*Spectator*, February 12." In: *Political and Literary Essays*. Third Series. 278-286.
Caedel, Martin 2007. "Gilbert Murray and International Politics." In: *Gilbert Murray Reassessed: Hellenism, Theatre, and International Politics*. Edited by Christopher Stray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 217-237.
Cain, P.J. 2002. "British Radicalism, the South African Crisis, and the Origins of the Theory of Financial Imperialism." In: *The Impact of the South African War*. Edited by David Omissi and Andrew S. Thompson. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 173-193.
Caygill, Howard 1989. *The Art of Judgement*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Chow, Rey 1998. *Ethics After Idealism; Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Conrad, Joseph 1902 [1988]. *Heart of Darkness*. Edited by Robert Kimbrough. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
Curtis, Lionel 1938. *Civitas Dei: The Commonwealth of God*. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited.
De Madariaga, Salvador 1960. "Gilbert Murray and the League." In: Gilbert Murray, *An Unfinished Autobiography*. *With contributions by his friends*. Edited by Jean Smith and Arnold Toynbee. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 76-197.
Derrida, Jacques 1981 [1963]. "Cogito and the History of Madness." In: *Writing and Difference*. Translated by Alan Bass. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 31-63.
---- 1988. "Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion." In: *Limited Inc*. Translated by Samuel Weber. Evanston Il: Northwestern University Press, 111-160.
--- 1992. *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe*. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Dutton, D.J. 1981. "The Unionist Party and Social Policy 1906-1914." *The Historical Journal* 24 no. 4 (December.): 871-884.
Ferguson, Niall 2003. *Empire: the Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*. New York: Basic Books.
Gilmour, David 1994 [2006]. *Curzon: Imperial Statesman*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Hammond, J.L. 1900. "Colonial and Foreign Policy." *Liberalism and the Empire. Three Essays*. Edited by Francis W. Hirst, Gilbert Murray, and J.L. Hammond. London: R. Brimley Johnson, 158-211.
Hankins, Gabriel 2019. *Interwar Modernism and the Liberal World Order: Offices, Institutions, and Aesthetics after 1919*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hirst, Francis W. 1900. "Imperialism and Finance." *Liberalism and the Empire. Three Essays*. Edited by Francis W. Hirst, Gilbert Murray, and J.L. Hammond. London: R. Brimley Johnson, 1-117.

Hobson, J.A. 1900. *Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa*. New York: Tucker Publishing Company https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_UD5FAAAAYAAJ

---- 1901. *The Psychology of Jingoism*. London: Grant Richards. https://ia800206.us.archive.org/33/items/psychologyofjing00hobsuoft/psychologyofjing00hobsuoft.pdf

Johnston, Sir Harry 1919. *The Gay-Dombeys. A Novel*. New York: The Macmillan Company. https://archive.org/details/cu31924013631399

Lenin, V.I. 1968. *Collected Works, Volume 39, Notes on Imperialism*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Lewis, George Cornewall 1841 [1891]. *An Essay on the Government of Dependencies*. Oxford: Clarendon Press,

Lowry, Donal 2002. "'The World no Bigger than a Kraal': the South African War and International Opinion in the first Age of 'Globalization.'" In: *The Impact of the South African War*. Edited by David Omissi and Andrew S. Thompson. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 268-288.

Mallet, Sir Louis 1891. *Free Exchange. Papers on political and economical subjects including chapters on the law of value and unearned increment*. Edited by Bernard Mallet. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Trübner and Co. Ltd. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.174632/page/n5/mode/2up

Marsot, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid 1968. *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Milner, Alfred (Lord) 1892 [1894]. *England in Egypt*. London: Edward Arnold. https://archive.org/details/englandinegypt03milngoog

---- 1898. "Graaff Reinet—March 3." In: *The Nation and the Empire*. London: Constable and Company, 1913, 6-12. https://ia802700.us.archive.org/14/items/nationempirebein00miln/nationempirebein00miln.pdf

---- 1900. "Cape Town—December 11." In: *The Nation and the Empire*, 28-32.

---- 1905. "Johannesburg—March 31." In: *The Nation and the Empire*, 77-90.

---- 1906. "A Political Ishmaelite—Wolverhampton, December 17." In: *The Nation and the Empire*, 152-163.

---- 1907. "Tariff Reform—Tunbridge Wells, October 24." In: *The Nation and the Empire*, 195-209.

---- 1907. "Geography and Statecraft—Edinburgh, November 13." In: *The Nation and the Empire*, 218-233.

---- 1907. "Unionists and the Empire—Edinburgh, November 15." In: *The Nation and the Empire*, 234-243.

---- 1908. "The Two Empires—Royal Colonial Institute, June 16." In: *The Nation and the Empire*, 289-300

---- 1908. "Imperial Unity—External Advantages—The Canadian Club, Vancouver, October 9." In: *The Nation and the Empire*, 302-310.
---- 1908. "Imperialism and Social Reform—Women's Canadian Club, Montreal, November 2." In: *The Nation and the Empire*, 352-358.
---- 1908. "Conditions of Closer Union—The Canadian Club, Montreal, November 3." *The Nation and the Empire*, 359-365.
---- 1912. "The Two Nations—East London, December 9." In: *The Nation and the Empire*, 494-500.
Mitchell, Timothy 2002. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Molema, S.M. 1920. *The Bantu Past and Present: An Ethnographical and Historical Study of the Native Races of South Africa*. Edinburgh: W. Green and Son.
Mowat, R.C. 1973. "From Liberalism to Imperialism: The Case of Egypt 1875-1887." *The Historical Journal* 16, no. 1 (March): 109-124.
Murray, Gilbert 1900. "The Exploitation of inferior Races in Ancient and Modern Times: An Imperial Labour Question with a Historical Parallel." In: *Liberalism and The Empire. Three Essays*. Edited by Francis W. Hirst, Gilbert Murray, and J.L. Hammond. London: R. Brimley Johnson, 118-158.
---- 1900. "National Ideals; Conscious and Unconscious— October." In: *Tradition and Progress*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922, 160-182. https://archive.org/details/traditionprogres00murriala
---- 1918. *The League of Nations and the Democratic Idea*. London: Oxford University Press. https://archive.org/details/leagueofnationsd00murriala
---- 1918. "Aristophanes and the War Party—January." In: *Tradition and Progress*, 31-55.
---- 1918. "Religio Grammatici: The Religion of a 'Man of Letters'— January 8." In: *Tradition and Progress*, 11-30.
---- 1918. "The Soul as It Is and How To Deal with It— January." In: *Tradition and Progress*, 142-159.
---- 1919. "Satanism and World Order." In: *Tradition and Progress*, 202–221.
---- 1921. "Preface." *Essays and Addresses*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 7-8.
Nkrumah, Kwame 1965. *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage Of Imperialism*. New York: International Publishers.
Orwell, George 1939. "Review of Russell's *Power: A New Social Analysis*." *Adelphi* (January). https://www.lehman.cuny.edu/faculty/rcarey/BRSQ/06may.orwell.htm
Owen, Roger 2004. *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perris, Simon 2010/2011. "'The Kingdom of Heaven Within Us': Inner (World) Peace in Gilbert Murray's Trojan Women." *Comparative Drama* 44/45, no. 1 (Winter/Spring): 423-440.
Potter, Simon J. 2007. "Empire, Cultures and Identities in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Britain." *History Compass* 5, no. 1: 51–71.

---- 2017. "Journalism and Empire in an English-reading World: The *Review of Reviews*." In: *Journalism and the Periodical Press in Nineteenth-Century Britain*. Edited by Joanne Shattock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 281-298.

Russell, Bertrand 1960. "A Fifty-Six Year Friendship." In: Gilbert Murray, *An Unfinished Autobiography. With contributions by his friends*. Edited by Jean Smith and Arnold Toynbee. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 205-211.

Said, Edward W. 1978 [1995]. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. London: Penguin Books.

Seymour, Susanne, Stephen Daniels and Charles Watkins 1998. "Estate and Empire: Sir George Cornewall's management of Moccas, Herefordshire and La Taste, Grenada, 1771-1819." *Journal of Historical Geography* 24, no.3: 313-51.

Shannon, M.L. 2017. "Colonial Networks and the Periodical Marketplace." In: *Journalism and the Periodical Press in Nineteenth-Century Britain*. Edited by Joanne Shattock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 203-233.

Shaw, George Bernard 1900. *Fabianism and the Empire: A Manifesto by the Fabian Society*. London: Grant Richards.

Smith, Jean 1960. "The Committee for Intellectual Cooperation in Gilbert Murray's Papers." In: Gilbert Murray, *An Unfinished Autobiography. With contributions by his friends*. Edited by Jean Smith and Arnold Toynbee. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 198-204.

Tignor, Robert L. 1963. "Lord Cromer: Practitioner and Philosopher of Imperialism." *Journal of British Studies* 2, no. 2 (May): 142-159.

Vatikiotis, P.J. 1991. *Egypt: From Muhammed Ali to Mubarak*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Fourth edition.

Wells, H.G. 1897. *Certain Personal Matters*. London: T. Fisher Unwin. https://archive.org/details/certainpersonal02wellgoog/page/n11/mode/2up

---- 1916. *The Elements of Reconstruction. A Series of Articles Contributed in July and August 1916 to The Times*. London: Nisbet and Co. Ltd.

---- 1920. *The Outline of History, Being a Plain History of Life and Mankind*. New York: The Macmillan Company. https://archive.org/details/OutlineOfHistory

West, Rebecca 1982 [2000]. "Letter to Mary and Gordon Height." *Selected Letters of Rebecca West*. Edited by Bonnie Kime Scott. New Haven: Yale University Press, 476-477.

Capitalism and Colonialism

This image is from Rudyard Kipling's 1909 *A Song of the English*. The original 1893 publication of Kipling's poems in the *English Illustrated Magazine* was not accompanied by this illustration.

It is this picture that opens Klas Rönnbäck and Oscar Broberg's 2019 book, *Capitalism and Colonialism: The Return on British Investments in Africa 1869-1969*. A few pages later the following epigraph adorns chapter one:

> *Snatched and bartered oft from hand to hand,*
> *I dream my dream, by rock and heath and pine,*
> *Of Empire to the northward. Ay, one land*
> *From Lion's Head to Line!*
> "The Song of the Cities: Cape Town,"

from *A Song of the English* (1893)

Rönnbäck and Broberg comment:

> Looking at the picture alone, we are unable to determine who the victims might have been, but Kipling's poem clearly laments the English who died for the sake of the British Empire. Kipling, in contrast, shed few tears for all the others who suffered and died as a consequence of British imperialism. (2019: 4)[1]

Readers of *Capitalism and Colonialism* are not informed that the lion illustration by W. Heath Robinson is from "The Song of the Dead" in the 1909 edition of *A Song of the English*, and not from the 1893 *English Illustrated Magazine* which has only the poetry.

Kipling's words 'On the sand-drift—on the veld-side—in the fern-scrub we lay' in the original 1893 version of "The Song of the Dead" might refer to the attrition of colonisation. Given the date, they might specifically refer to the First Boer War of 1880-1881. By 1909 these lines and the image of the lions could be used to refer to the Second Boer War of 1899-1902. At this time lamenting the English who died for the sake of the British Empire could also involve promoting a climate of reconciliation between Boer and Briton preceding the Union of South Africa in 1910. Kipling's poems "General Joubert," "South Africa," and even "The Lesson" collected in *The Five Nations* (1903), attempt to address the white wounds left by the war.[2]

Capitalism and Colonialism tracks the importance of South Africa for investors on the London stock market. There was a substantial difference between the 1893 and 1909 for investors in South African companies listed on the London exchange. During the global mining boom of 1886-1899 the annual return for the total South African portfolio listed in London was 12.2 per cent, and the mining sector delivered an 'extraordinary' (43) average of 16.0 per cent per year.[3] In contrast, the first two decades of the twentieth century saw the average return of -0.9 per cent for the mining sector, with an average of -2.8 per year for gold mining. The exception was Premier Diamond Mine (30 per cent per year). By 1909 the mining boom was over.

May 1893, the date on which "A Song of the English" appeared in *The English Illustrated Magazine*, was when financial panic hit the United States. By this time the run on gold caused by the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Argentina had already wiped out Kipling's savings. Kipling's bank, The New Oriental Banking Company, had made bad investments. Hearing about the unfolding crisis in Tokyo, Kipling wrote that he felt 'like a rabbit in a stoppered warren' (1892: 62).

What is known as The Baring Crisis of the early 1890s was a result of the collapse of the boom in Argentine securities which began in 1887. An observer reported: 'During this period British investments became interested to large amounts in South African gold mining enterprises and in large undertakings for the construction and development of public works in the Argentine Republic and in Australia' (Stevens 1894: 120). The South African mining boom masked the unfolding crisis in which Argentina's financial agent in Europe, Baring Brothers & Co., faced insolvency. Small investors like Kipling paid the price.[4] "A Song of the English" may have originally reflected this crisis of imperial finance and the first great modern bailout.

As for South Africa in the opening decades of the twentieth century, the international Gold Standard put a ceiling on the gold price and inflation reduced South African mining profits. Still, between 1884 and 1911 Britain's investments in South Africa jumped from £34 million to £351 million (see Hart and Padayachee 2013: 64). 1919 saw a temporary dramatic boost in the gold price and the struggle to reduce production costs by replacing 5000 skilled white workers with lower-paid black workers lowered the total wage bill of the gold companies to 20 per cent. This also produced the Rand Revolt of 1921. The victory of the mine owners ensured that the return on investment in the major South African gold companies 'skyrocketed' (Rönnbäck and Broberg, 260).

The fall of the Gold Standard in the early 1930s resulted in long-term upward movement of the gold price: 'With the gold companies as locomotives, the interwar years developed into an industrial take-off for South Africa' (262). While the gold companies yielded an average of 11 per cent to their investors between 1920 and 1939, the diamond companies yielded only 0.6 per cent. Rönnbäck and Broberg conclude: 'There is nonetheless no easily discernible relationship between the discrimination of the black population and the return on investment in South Africa' (271).

It seems that other factors such as market volatility, monopoly and monoposy practices, war, pandemic, currency fluctuations), institutional changes, and external shocks all influenced the return on investment in South Africa. Despite the Native Land Act of 1913, and the coercive labour relations in the settler colonies, *Capitalism and Colonialism* concludes 'there is no pattern of higher return on investment in settler colonies compared to non-settler colonies' (327). The return on investment in settler and non-settler colonies was similar (12-14 per cent per year) in the final decades of the nineteenth

century, and in the first decade of the twentieth century settler colonies decreased to 3 per cent compared to 5 per cent of non-settler colonies.

Egypt is key to the convergence of rate of return in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Although classed as a non-settler colony, Egypt's profitability for investors on the British stock exchange raised the average rate of return for settler colonies. The Suez Canal Company made a major contribution to the aggregated financial return of the settler colonies. The return to profitability of Egypt followed from imperial intervention. Worries over the security of British investments in a potentially bankrupt Egypt led to the British government purchasing shares in the Suez Canal Company and the imposition of Dual Control (1876). Britain's intervention could now be presented as protecting (its own) property rather than interfering with the property of others. Private British interests coincided with imperial national interest. The military occupation of Egypt in 1882 was accompanied by a renewed rally in stock prices that stabilised by 1884 and boosted returns on investment in the country (311-317).

The financial stabilisation of Egypt by Alfred Milner and Evelyn Baring secured British strategic and trade interests as well as the rights of investors on the London stock market. The same outcome was envisaged by those anticipating the outcome of the Boer War of 1899-1902, another 'leading example of finance-driven imperialism' (Rönnbäck and Broberg 2019: 341). The Boer War was a massive transfer of wealth from public coffers to private investors:

> When peace was finally declared on 31 May 1902, investors in South African gold companies [listed on the London Stock Exchange] had earned a nominal accumulated return on investment of 64 per cent relative to September 1899, that is, prior to the outbreak of the war. Investors in South African financial companies (heavily involved directly and indirectly in the mining business) made even larger gains, earning a nominal return on their investments of 100 per cent relative to the pre-war level of September 1899. Given the low rate of inflation in these years, the average real annual rate of return translated into 8 per cent per year for South African gold-mining companies and 17 per cent per year for investments in South African finance companies. These private gains came at an enormous cost to the British Treasury, which had to foot the £217 million bill for the massive military intervention as well as to more than 20,000 dead British soldiers. (Rönnbäck and Broberg 2019: 320)

Capitalism and Colonialism reports that by the 1930s 'investments in the settler colonies developed strongly, with an average rate of return of 9 per cent per

year' while the non-settler colonies deteriorated to 'a real rate of return of 1 per cent per year on average during the 1930s and decreasing to -2 per cent per year on average during the 1940s' (334).

Decisively from the 1940s onwards, the accumulated return on investment for settler and non-settler colonies started to diverge: 'It does not seem far-fetched to conclude that this divergence, at least partially, was associated with the more widespread and intensified coercion of the labour force developing in both South Africa and Rhodesia during that period' (327).'

The story that emerges when the unit of investigation is the return on British investments in South Africa is that the racial compact of 1910 eventually paid off. Martin Legassick and David Hemson complete the picture:

> In the 1960s, the input of foreign capital into South Africa amounted to a flood: from £1,500 million in 1959, the total trebled in a decade': In the post-Sharpeville era of fascism in South Africa, foreign capital reaped the rewards of massive increases in output and high profit rates. Balthazer Vorster, appointed Minister of Justice in 1961, was the coordinator of the campaign of repression, torture, incarceration and murder. When he became Prime Minister, in 1966, he was greeted by the Rand Club, the social gathering place of big capital in South Africa, with a warmth never offered to any other Prime Minister since 1948. ("Foreign Investment and the Reproduction of Racial Capitalism in South Africa," 8)

Notes

[1] See H.G. Wells on Kipling's endorsement of the self-righteous bullying of "'the gang in possession" (1920: 959). See also Kipling on *Uncle Remus*: 'a new book about rabbits and foxes and turtles and niggers' published 'when Cetshwayo lived in the Melbury Road, Arab Pasha in Egypt' (1924: 143). In 1882, following his defeat at Ulundi, Cetshwayo travelled to London. The Egyptian uprising led by Urabi Pasha was defeated by Garnet Wolsey, vanquisher of the Bapedi paramount Sekhukhune.

[2] According to T.S. Eliot, Kipling was not unaware of the faults of British rule, 'its commercialism, exploitation and neglect:' 'it is simply that he believed the British Empire to be a good thing, that he wished to set before his readers an ideal of what it should be, but he was acutely aware of the difficulty of even approximating to this ideal, and of the perpetual danger of falling away from even such a standard as might be attained' (1941: 29). Eliot saw something 'alien about Kipling, like a visitor from another planet' (28) and 'his reflections on the Boer War are more admonitory than laudatory' (29). See Melissa Free (2016).

[3] "'I hate that kind of thing. The gold grubbers and diamond bagmen! But it's part of the march onward. We must have money, you know.'" (Gissing 1897: 14) See also Davenport-Hines and Van Helten (1986).

[4] 'A period of very cheap money followed upon the "Baring Crisis" of 1890, during which the output of gold in the Transvaal and the silver panic in America caused money to pour into London for investment … Trade was not active; money was shy of industrial investment both in England and abroad; and it was a profitable transaction to buy Consols [Bonds] yielding 2¾ per cent. with money borrowed from the bankers at ½ to ¾ per cent.' (Mallet 1913: 213) Baring Brothers was reborn as Baring Brothers & Co., Ltd. In 1995 Barings Bank collapsed as a result of speculation by a futures dealer, Nick Leeson (see Banerjee 2016).

References

Image from the 1909 *A Song of the English* reproduced by Rönnbäck and Broberg is from © The Sharp Collection/Mary Evans Picture Library.

Banerjee, Asha 2016. "The First Modern Bailout: The Barings Crisis of 1890 and the Bank of England." Thesis. Columbia University. https://history.columbia.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/20/2016/06/Banerjee_Thesis.pdf

Davenport-Hines, Richard, and Jean-Jacques Van Helten 1986. **"**Edgar Vincent, Viscount D'Abernon, and the Eastern Investment Company in London, Constantinople and Johannesburg." In: *Speculators and Patriots: Essays in Business Biography*. Edited by R.T.P. Davenport-Hines. London: Frank Cass, 33-58.

Eliot, T.S. 1941 [1963]. "Rudyard Kipling." In: *A Choice of Kipling's Verse*. London: Faber and Faber, 5-36.

Gissing, George 1897. *The Whirlpool*. London: Lawrence and Bullen, Ltd. https://archive.org/details/whirlpool00giss

Hart, Keith, and Vishnu Padayachee 2013. "A history of South African capitalism in national and global perspective." *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa* 81/82: 55-85.

Kipling, Rudyard 1892. *Letters of Travel, 1892-1913*. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1920.

----1893. "A Song of the English." In: *English Illustrated Magazine* 10, no. 116 (May): 533-538. https://archive.org/details/sim_english-illustrated-magazine_1893-04_10_115

----1909. *A Song of the English*. Illustrated by W. Heath Robinson. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company. https://archive.org/details/songofenglish00kipl

----1924 [1999]. "The United Idolaters." In: *The Complete Stalky and Co.* Edited by Isabel Quigly. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 140-154.

Legassick, Martin, and David Hemson 1976. "Foreign Investment and the Reproduction of Racial Capitalism in South Africa." *Anti-Apartheid Movement*. London. Foreign Investment and the Reproduction of Racial Capitalism in South Africa by Martin Legassick and David Hemson | South African History Online (sahistory.org.za)

Mallet, Bernard 1913. *British Budgets, 1887-88 to 1912-13*. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.227384

Rönnbäck, Klas, and Oscar Broberg 2019. *Capitalism and Colonialism: The Return on British Investments in Africa 1869-1969*. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stevens, Albert C. 1894. "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Panic in the United States in 1893." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (January): 117-148.

5. H.G. Wells and South Africa

> The spirit of the plantation broods over all these lands. The Negro in America differs only from his subjugated brother in South Africa or Kenya Colony in the fact that he also, like his white master, is an immigrant. The situation in Africa and America adjusts itself therefore towards parallel conditions, the chief variation being in the relative proportions of the two races and the details of the methods by which black labour is made to serve white ends.
>
> —H.G. Wells, *The Open Conspiracy: What are We to Do with Our Lives?*

H.G. Wells's exploration of the idea of alien invasion and world government was influenced by his analysis of colonial South Africa. What Wells termed 'the chastening experience of the Boer War' (1914: 23) coupled with the inevitable 'black revolt in South Africa' (1933a: 156) prefigured the coming global conflict.

Wells's brother, Fred, served in South Africa during the Second Boer War (1899–1902) and subsequently opened Wells's Drapery Store in Johannesburg. His daughter and her husband also visited South Africa, Anna Jane lecturing in economic history at the University of the Witwatersrand. Criticising the bullying imperialism of Kipling, Wells compared the machinations that produced the Boer War with the mismanagement of Ireland, the 'two open sores of irreconcilable wrong' (1920: 424; see 467; xiv). His interest in South Africa included both Boer Wars (see Wells 1894a: 22) and informed his understanding of spirit of British imperialism:

> If the continually irritated sore of the Majuba defeat permitted the country to be rushed into the needless, toilsome and costly conquest of the Boer republics in South Africa, the strain of that adventure produced a sufficient reaction towards decency and justice to reinstate the Liberal Party in power, and to undo the worst of that mischief by the creation of a South African confederation. (1920: 464; and see 1904: 87: 1919)[1]

South Africa remained symptomatic of the inter-imperial competitive scramble for industrial and economic advantage—a cryptogram of the past and a

warning about the likely future. As the narrator of *The New Machiavelli* puts it: 'The end of the Boer War was so recent that that blessed word "efficiency" echoed still in people's minds and thoughts' (1910: 154).[2]

The importance of South Africa for Wells has been noted see (Magubane 1996, x–xi; and Parry 2004: 150).[3] Less explored is Wells's vision of world government as an attempt to escape the bloody history epitomised by South Africa: '"We want no more hate in South Africa"' (Wells 1917: 193). Revisiting Wells's texts sheds light on contemporary arguments about global apartheid and the prospect of the enslavement of humanity. Is South Africa an image of the past or of the future?

In particular, his fictional texts, and the masks of authority that mark his non-fictional texts, provide a dialectical distillation of the debate about world government. This has an intimate connection with a model and narrative of development that will find its confirmation in the colonies. In turn, this template will include colonialism as alien invasion and planetary domination.

World State

> We are waking up to the fact that a planned world-state governing the complex of human activities for the common good, however difficult to attain, has become imperative, and that until it is achieved, the history of the race must be now inevitably a record of catastrophic convulsions shot with mere glimpses and phases of temporary good luck. We are, as a species, caught in an irreversible process.
>
> —H.G. Wells, *Experiment in Autobiography*

Wells's *Experiment in Autobiography* argues for 'the inevitability of a comprehensive world-state, overriding the sovereign governments of the present time' (1934: 209; and see 214–215). Only the world-state is able to protect human rights from the predations of capitalism the authoritarian state, and effectively contain the destructive tendencies of human nature.

His 1940 publication *The Rights of Man, or What Are We Fighting For?* anticipated the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and influenced Jan Smuts's preamble to that document.[4] In his activism, with all its grandiose grousing, Wells saw himself as doggedly realistic, determined not to fall into the fatal idealism of conservatism and radicalism alike, nor into the trough of self-congratulatory but ineffectual reformism.

As explained in *The Outline of History,* before the 'modern World State' can begin there may be

> tragic economic struggles, grim grapplings, of race with race and class with class. It may be that private enterprise will refuse to learn the lesson of service without some quite catastrophic revolution, and that a phase of confiscation and amateurish socialistic government lies before us. (1920: 14, 504; and see 435–437).[5]

What was clear to Wells was that the two-hundred-year age of sovereign nation states was at an end.

A World State must emerge from the infrastructure of the declining British Empire. In 1914 he concluded that the new empire must be held together by 'unity of language and purpose and outlook' (1914: 39) rather than financial entanglements or more open coercion of the present system. Independence within a family of nations will utilise the interconnections formed on the basis of entrepreneurial adventurism and power politics.[6] In 1921, looking back on the dystopian vision of *The Sleeper Awakes*, written in a 'remote and comparatively happy year, 1898,' Wells concluded that such a world could never exist. He believed that 'the class of rich financiers and industrial organisers' were 'quite incapable of world-wide constructive plans or generous combined action:'

> The great city of this story is no more than a nightmare of Capitalism triumphant, a nightmare that was dreamt nearly a quarter of a century ago. It is a fantastic possibility no longer possible. Much evil may be in store for mankind, but to this immense, grim organisation of servitude, our race will never come. (1921a: np.)

The new century called for a new world order.

Socialism based on 'a resentful consciousness in the appropriated masses of social disintegration' (Wells 1920: 114) provoked by the uncontrolled concentration of property in a few hands correctly identified the problem, but not the solution. Global Marxist revolution cannot be the answer.[7] Indeed Bolshevism has brought the logical and sensible idea of socialism into disrepute. *The Shape of Things to Come* diagnosed Marx's chief fault as 'his insane hatred of the middle classes (bourgeoisie)' (Wells 1933a: 140).[8]

Existing socialism represents the sacrifice of socialism's 'constructive power for militant intensity' in 'the chill of Bolshevik presumption and Bolshevik failure … this open bankruptcy of a great creative impulse … a victory for reaction' (Wells 1923a: 368). Although that project has failed, there is still hope because 'the Phoenix of Revolution flames down to ashes only to be born again' (368). The ideal lives on in what Wells touts as the Open

Conspiracy which begins as a movement of discussion, explanation and propaganda and is 'not so much a socialism as a more comprehensive offspring that has eaten and assimilated whatever was digestible of its socialist forbears [sic]' (Wells 1933b: 172).

What is to be avoided, according to *The Open Conspiracy*, is socialism's demonisation of private ownership and the simplification of economic processes 'to the crudity of nursery toys, and the intricate interplay of will and desire in enterprise, normal employment and direction, in questions of ownership, wages, credit, and money … reduced to a childish fable of surplus value wickedly appropriated' (1933b: 72). Although bound to be described as a continuation of imperialism and regarded as criminal—'and may have to take grotesque and dangerous forms under the now decaying traditions of national competition'—, '[a]ll the weight of the Open Conspiracy will be on the side of world order and against that sort of local independence which holds back its subject people from citizenship of the world' (86).[9]

Initially, Wells envisioned the Open Conspiracy as propelled by education rather than revolution and centred on

> the question whether the social revolution is, in its extremity, necessary, whether it is necessary to overthrow one economic system completely before the new one can begin. I believe that through a vast sustained educational campaign the existing Capitalist system can be *civilised* into a Collectivist world system; Lenin on the other hand tied himself years ago to the Marxist dogmas of the inevitable class war, the downfall of Capitalist order as a prelude to reconstruction, the proletarian dictatorship, and so forth. (1920: 163)[10]

In his 1934 interview with Stalin, Wells argued for reformism along the lines of Roosevelt's new deal that (he hoped) would eventually abolish the financial oligarchy. Stalin pointed out that concessions privileging Rockefeller (an organiser) over Morgan (a parasite) merely guaranteed the preservation of the economic basis of capitalism. In this interview Wells the reformist deprecates the achievements of the Chartists while Stalin the dictator defends the democratic advances of nineteenth century liberalism.[11]

Still, for Wells the 'socialist world-state' meant 'an adequately implemented Liberal Socialism' (1934: 667–668). Neither violent revolution nor ineffective reform, but revolutionary reform is the answer. However, 1940 saw Wells, under the heading "Socialism Unavoidable," arguing against reform of the current capitalist system: 'We have to confront Eastern-spirited collectivism with Western-spirited collectivism ... That full and open-eyed collectivisation

which … is the only alternative to the complete degeneration of our species' (1940a: 45, 106).

Like other proposals for world peace, Wells's analysis provoked disdain. Christopher Caudwell (1938: 22) criticised Wells's '*petit bourgeois* reverence for the big bourgeois—the Roosevelt, the far-seeing capitalist visualised as a *Samurai*,' and his utopian dream of the imminent redeemer who will arrive after the complete collapse of the system. Caudwell argued that because Wells lacked necessary faith in the redemptive historical role of the proletariat the change he desired could only come from within the bourgeois class. George Orwell identified the essence of the problem:

> All sensible men for decades past have been substantially in agreement with what Mr. Wells says; but the sensible men have no power and, in too many cases, no disposition to sacrifice themselves. Hitler is a criminal lunatic, and Hitler has an army of millions of men, aeroplanes in thousands, tanks in tens of thousands. For his sake a great nation has been willing to overwork itself for six years and then to fight for two years more, whereas for the common-sense, essentially hedonistic world-view which Mr. Wells puts forward, hardly a human creature is willing to shed a pint of blood. (1941: 93)[12]

Campaigning for international human rights, Wells was derided by the British Foreign Office in 1940 as "'a somewhat senile, half-extinct prophet … much better kept at home'" (quoted in Lauren 2011: 155–156; see also Forster in Trilling 1965: 173).

However, the criticism of Wells was not simply a by-product of *realpolitik* and World War II. In "Mr Wells and the Giants," G.K. Chesterton observed that 'Mr Wells exists at present in a gay and exhilarating progress of conservatism,' and pointed to the Boer War as evidence against the identification of world government with perpetual peace:

> For this defiance of the status quo, this constant effort to alter the existing balance, this premature challenge to the powerful, is the whole nature and inmost secret of the psychological adventure that is called man. It is his strength to disdain strength ... [it] is "the policy of Majuba." (Chesterton 1905: 76, 91)[13]

The human tendency to thwart any imperious, over-arching authority will militate against world government. As Chesterton put it in "Wells and the World State," the proposition that 'men must abandon patriotism or they will be murdered by science' (1922a: 230) will always be resisted. Wells's advocacy of world government is a symptom of his turn to conservatism, for the global government will in reality be nothing other than the United States of the World.[14] The argument that the world state will be more benign than other

states is wishful thinking at best, historically ignorant, and illogical: 'This argument amounts to saying, first that the World State will be needed because it is strong, and then that it may safely be weak because it will not be needed' (233).

For Chesterton, South Africa provided evidence against the World State.[15] However, one can also argue that what Chesterton calls Wells's turn to conservatism and world government—what we would now call, among other things, globalisation—was constructed on a sustained interpretation of events at the southern peninsula of Africa.

Reconstruction and Development

> "Africa," said some visitors, but others, less travelled or more imaginative, said, "This might be in some other planet, in Mars or in the Moon."
>
> —H.G. Wells, *Meanwhile (The Picture of a Lady)*

The Passionate Friends recounts the adventures of Stratton, one of Milner's Kindergarten tasked with reconstructing South Africa after the Anglo-Boer War. Having 'won Milner's good opinion … he was anxious for me to go on working in relation to the labor difficulty that rose now more and more into prominence behind the agricultural re-settlement' (1913: 119).

Stratton sees through to the heart of reconstruction: '[for] the first time in my life I was really looking at the social fundamental of Labor:'

> There were, I began to recognize, two sides to civilization; one traditional, immemorial, universal, the side of the homestead, the side I had been seeing and restoring; and there was another, ancient, too, but never universal, as old at least as the mines of Syracuse and the building of the pyramids, the side that came into view when I emerged from the dusty station and sighted the squat shanties and slender chimneys of Johannesburg, that uprooted side of social life, that accumulation of toilers divorced from the soil, which is Industrialism and Labor and which carries such people as ourselves, and whatever significance and possibilities we have, as an elephant carries its rider. (1913: 120)

By 1913 South Africa was the largest producer of gold in the world and it revealed a profound truth:

> It was all so nakedly plain there. On the one hand was the primordial, on the other the rankly new. The farm on the veld stood on the veld, a thing of the veld,

> a thing rooted and established there and nowhere else. The dusty, crude, brick-field desolation of the Rand on the other hand did not really belong with any particularity to South Africa at all. It was one with our camps and armies. It was part of something else, something still bigger: a monstrous shadowy arm had thrust out from Europe and torn open this country, erected these chimneys, piled these heaps—and sent the ration-tins and cartridge-cases to follow them. It was gigantic kindred with that ancient predecessor which had built the walls of Zimbabwe. And this hungry, impatient demand for myriads of toilers, this threatening inundation of black or brown or yellow bond-serfs was just the natural voice of this colossal system to which I belonged, which had brought me hither, and which I now perceived I did not even begin to understand. (122–123)[16]

The key question was economic development that would ultimately benefit all, and those best able to move the economy along that path were white (and British).[17] For the present, black or brown or yellow bond-serfs were to supply the labour. For the liberal imperialist '[h]ere in the great ugly mine-scarred basin of the Rand' (120) the traditional, immemorial, universal homestead and the ancient accumulation of toilers divorced from the soil are the two sides of civilisation. Progress and development are shot through with primitive times. What Stratton sees in South Africa is a variation of what Wells in *The Outline of History* calls 'this new wealth of industrial capital,' 'the small cultivators and peasants, ruined and dislodged by the Enclosure Act' (1920: 378), indicative of English development. This narrative of development away from the primordial homestead is part of a global process concerning

> the type of household which has prevailed in human communities since Neolithic days, which still prevails to-day in India, China, and the Far East, but which in the west is rapidly giving ground before a state and municipal organization of education and a large-scale industrialism within which an amount of individual detachment and freedom is possible, such as these great households never knew. (1920: 181)

The narrator of *The Passionate Friends* also glimpses the connection between the primordial homestead and the rankly new industry. The natural voice of this colossal system is labour, today as it was for that ancient predecessor who had built the walls of Zimbabwe. The primordial and the rankly new are not simply antithetical.

According to South African historians, the homestead conceived as a stable (universal) social reality, the basic unit of economic production and social reproduction anchored outside of modernisation, is a myth (see Morris

1976 and 1987; and Marks and Trapido 1979). An important myth of settler ideology for the primordial right of the household society presupposes nothing less than the ownership of land as the basis of independence and freedom.[18] This conceit is shared by Wells's Milnerite narrator.

By the end of the year that saw the publication of *The Passionate Friends*, the piece of social South African engineering that was the 1913 Native Land Act attempted to reduce, in the name of development, competition by African peasant producers and extrude labour onto the market. South African primitive accumulation and agricultural development took place within a context shaped by industrial capital that was already finance capital (see Keegan 1990: 207). There is no agricultural production beyond the reach of the market, and development can take the form of internal colonialism.

The idea of the primordial farm distinct from rankly new industry was itself an ideological secretion of the system that enabled the criticism of industrial finance capitalism from within its shelter; part of the broader movement of the world system.[19] Wells shows the New Imperialists of the British Empire as old fashioned colonists imposing an alien and alienating global power on both the colonists and their victims.[20] Only they cannot see their plans for improvement for what they truly are. Given that such experts are the elite who guide primordial progress, how can World Government possibly overcome the ills of the past?[21] Is the future to be the repetition of the past?

The importance of South Africa to the criticism of liberal imperialism comes into sharp focus in *The Research Magnificent*. Omniscient narrator, White, tells the story of William Porphyry Benham who ends his intellectual world tour in South Africa contemplating prejudice, including race-hatred, national suspicion, religious sectarianism, and class hatred. The novel concludes with Benham in Johannesburg during the strike of 1913.

Once taken up with the dream of a world state—'Imperialism without noble imagination, it seemed to him, was simply nationalism with megalomania.' (1915: 347)—Benham recalls his cosmopolitans travels. His journey has included Russia in 1906 (preferable to the discipline of Berlin), and defence of the victims of a pogrom in Kiev (and their eventual attack upon him), increasing interest in race that drew him to India and the Swadeshi movement (where he challenges caste sensitivities), then to China ("'mix Chinese culture with American enterprise and you will have made a new lead for mankind'" (489)), and America where he visited

Tuskeegee and Atlanta. Researching race and racial cultures led him to Haiti, drawn by his reading of Hesketh Pritchard's *Where Black Rules White*, where he is attacked for defending a youth from being beaten by a policeman.[22]

Although Benham came to South Africa to meet his friend White and to see into the question of Indian immigration, the labour trouble on the Rand envelops him. Initially as a spectator ensconced in smoking room of the Sherborough Hotel the disturbance is of little interest, and according to the newspapers it is a technical matter of the recognition of Trade Union officials. His elevated idealism concerning an open conspiracy proclaiming the Republic of Mankind keeps the white miners' struggle in the street at a distance until the tempo of violence increases. Following the protesters from Market Square, Benham comments on the futility of the struggle before him:

> "It's such a plain job they have here, too—a new city, the simplest indus-tries, freedom from war, everything to make a good life for men, prosperity, glorious sunshine, a kind of happiness in the air. And mismanagement, fear, indulgence, jealousy, prejudice, stupidity, poison it all. A squabble about working on a Saturday afternoon, a squabble embittered by this universal shadow of miner's phthisis that the masters were too incapable or too mean to prevent." (1915a: 498)

The mouthpiece of the mine owners, the *Star* newspaper office, is set alight. Benham embraces detachment and resigns himself to not seeing any significant change in his own lifetime.

The next day the attack on the Rand Club commences while Benham and White are at lunch in the dining-room of the Sherborough, debating the faults on both side of the labour dispute. A disdainful but fascinated Benham joins the crowd that faces the soldiers. After firing once in the air the troops shoot the strike leader. A disbelieving Benham is shot in the second volley. The spectator lamenting stupidity and inefficiency becomes a victim.[23] Benham's *The Research Magnificent*, 'was just, White decided, a proliferation. A vast proliferation' (266). There can be no bystander in the vortex of history.

If colonialism and reconstruction afford a distillation of development what shape must global development take? What will break the cycle of conflict and complacency? What might the future look like?

Men Like Gods

> "These are panic measures. The pestilence is only in its opening stage. Everything is just beginning. Trust me."
>
> —H.G. Wells, *Men Like Gods*

The liberal protagonist of *Men Like Gods* has lost faith in the League of Nations and fears 'some sort of financial and economic crisis' (1923a: 193). Transported from 1921 into a parallel dimension, he and his companions find themselves in an advanced civilisation that has overcome the problems that beset us. The place the visitors name Utopia has come from the same dark place that mires earthlings. They learn that the prerequisite of escaping the Age of Confusion was 'the beginnings of world-wide political unity,' for only then could 'world resources and world production' (349) be known and organised.

The disorders and indignities of the Age of Confusion included '[a]n overwhelming system of debt, a swarm of creditors, morally incapable of helpful renunciation, crushed out all fresh initiative' (229–230). Politics was the bridge 'towards international charity and the liberation of their economic life from a network of pretences, dishonesties and impostures' (368). Politics has led the way out of politics, but only by way of the criminalisation of lying, and commitment to 'Free Discussion and Criticism' (348).[24] In Utopia reason rules: '*Our education is our government*' (235).

Utopia's transformative agenda has produced one planetary state, decentralised and dispersed to the point of invisibility, rather than a free union of states. Our government is our education. The end result is a high-tech Spartan Utopia run along anarchistic socialist lines, reaping the fruits of discriminating eugenics (directive breeding): 'There had not been even a general admixture of races. On Utopia as on earth there had been dusky and brown people and they remained distinct. The various races mingled socially but did not interbreed very much' (341). As separate as the fingers, and yet as united the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.

With money abolished and production organised, technocracy and 'no central government' (225) combine economic efficiency with economic dependency: 'The transmission is wireless' and '[e]very one was indexed and noted' (345). All is well until visitors from earth arrive:

> For more than twenty centuries the Utopians had had the completest freedom from infectious and contagious disease of all sorts. Not only had the graver

> epidemic fevers and all sorts of skin diseases gone out of the lives of animals and men, but all the minor infections of colds, coughs, influenzas and the like had also been mastered and ended. By isolation, by the control of carriers, and so forth, the fatal germs had been cornered and obliged to die out ... Utopia was even less prepared for the coming of these disease germs than for the coming of the Earthlings who brought them. (283–284)[25]

Amidst the epidemic some of the earthlings see the possibility of utilising their immunity to subjugate Utopia: "'we must consider ourselves a colony, a garrison'" (299).

Not all of the potential colonists agree, primarily because of the perceived asymmetry of power: "'We are like a handful of Hottentots in a showman's van at Earl's Court, planning the conquest of London'" (295).[26] But it seems that for us humans every crisis is an opportunity in disguise.[27]

The small farms epitomised by South Africa under reconstruction that featured so prominently in *The Passionate Friends* are gone. Now it is 'as if the whole place were a garden' (213). Significantly, the only view of Utopian agriculture is from a distance, an elevated 'parapet' (367), and there is no mention of colonisation in Utopian history. If colonisation ever happened, it has been forgotten, and is not even a footnote to history. It arrives, as it were, in the minds of the earthlings.

It would seem at first sight as if the history condensed in South Africa is erased, buried in the Great Confusion, and superseded by politico-technological progress. Utopian labour is invisible and rendered frictionless in the mist of 'universal gracious amenity' (369) facilitated by the substitution of large-scale business.[28] The economic system that facilitated industrial progress has given birth to 'a perfected landscape' (366): 'The ages of economic disputes and experiments had come to an end; the right way to do things had been found' (287).[29]

A heavy price was paid for Utopia and it is maintained by vigilant defences. Guarded by Utopians 'in gas masks' (291), in '[t]he shadow of the great epidemic' (283) the earthlings are flown to their isolation at Quarantine Crag:

> They crossed a rather thickly inhabited, very delightful-looking coastal belt and came over what was evidently a rainless desert country, given over to mining and to vast engineering operations ... For a time the Earthlings were flying over enormous heaps of slaggy accumulations, great mountains of them, that seemed to be derived from a huge well-like excavation that went down into the earth to an unknown depth. A tremendous thunder of machinery came out of this pit and much smoke. Here there were crowds of workers and they seemed to be living in

> camps among the debris. Evidently the workers came to this place merely for spells of work; there were no signs of homes. (291)

Through Wells's focaliser, Barnstaple, the liberal news-paper editor, we see that 'people could work and struggle for loveliness' (286): 'He had always thought of Utopia as a tranquillity with everything settled for good.' (287). The possibility that Utopia is built on exploitative labour is glimpsed fleetingly by the well-meaning liberal. It is after all, the earthlings who name the place Utopia.

The Wellsian gravedigger of the old world order does not remain totally invisible, submerged in a mixture of processes and proclivities, veiled under the final result of an administered anarchistic society with privacy without private property 'in all but very personal things' (226).[30] The rankly new has not shed its primordial origin. The Utopians explain the violence necessary transcend violence:

> The old order gave small rewards to the schoolmaster, but its dominant types were too busy with the struggle for wealth and power to take much heed of teaching: it was left to any man or woman who would give thought and labour without much hope of tangible rewards, to shape the world anew in the minds of the young. And they did so shape it. In a world ruled ostensibly by adventurer politicians, in a world where men came to power through floundering business enterprises and financial cunning, it was presently being taught and understood that extensive private property was socially a nuisance, and that the state could not do its work properly nor education produce its proper results, side by side with a class of irresponsible rich people. For, by their very nature, they assailed, they corrupted, they undermined every state undertaking; their flaunting existences distorted and disguised all the values of life. They had to go, for the good of the race. (233–234)

Education is the key.[31] And so is depopulation. In the Last Age of Confusion the population of Utopia reached two billion but was reduced to two hundred and fifty million (88% reduction): 'the maximum population that could live a fully developed life upon the surface of Utopia. But now with increasing resources the population was being increased' (229). In time, without proper organisation, and lacking any fatal diseases, Utopia might have to administer another culling in the name of sustainability.

The problem with overpopulation was that people 'swamped every effort the intelligent minority could do to educate a significant proportion of them to meet the demands of the new and still rapidly changing conditions of life' (229):

> Upon this festering, excessive mass of population disasters descended at last like wasps upon a heap of rotting fruit. It was its natural, inevitable destiny. A war that affected nearly the whole planet dislocated its flimsy financial system and most of its economic machinery beyond any possibility of repair. Civil wars and clumsily conceived attempts at social revolution continued the disorganization. A series of years of bad weather accentuated the general shortage. The exploiting adventurers, too stupid to realize what had happened, continued to cheat and hoodwink the commonalty and burke any rally of honest men, as wasps will continue to eat even after their bodies have been cut away. The effort to make passed out of Utopian life, triumphantly superseded by the effort to get. Production dwindled down towards the vanishing point. Accumulated wealth vanished. An overwhelming system of debt, a swarm of creditors, morally incapable of helpful renunciation, crushed out all fresh initiative. (230)

We earthlings recognise the story of our own present told as history. After the attempted coup, the earthlings are ejected from Utopia: "'We might end by exterminating you'" (359), they are told. Clearly the world is not to be set right by debate or education alone.

Although the liberal Barnstaple feels like 'a totally illiterate Gold Coast negro trying to master thermo-electricity' (1923a: 338), he draws the lesson from the history of Utopia that confusion and conflict facilitate progress. Wells's fiction suggests the inevitability of general human suffering: "'Yours are Age of Confusion Minds, trained to conflict, trained to insecurity and secret self-seeking'" (252). This 'view-point' (366) of transcendence, the leap into the future, with its calculus of necessary suffering, with its 'tanks and terraces' (369),[32] is the inner core of the progressive perspective:

> The jewel on the reptile's head that had brought Utopia out of the confusions of human life, was curiosity, the play impulse, prolonged and expanded in adult life into an insatiable appetite for knowledge and an habitual creative urgency. (342)

Wells provides an internal critique of liberalism's mixture of idealism and ruthless self-interest.[33]

When Barnstaple returns to earth he muses on the time it will take for the recognisably human values exemplified on Utopia to be realised here. He does not register, or does not care about, the recognisable forms of domination he has seen on Utopia. The blueprint for the transformation of human society involves unity, acculturation, centralisation under the wise gaze of an elite willing to bring about 'the high austere Utopian life that lies before us' (286). Meanwhile, here amid 'the tormented atmosphere of earth' (365) with psychological manipulation based on fear, Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik

conspiracies lurking in every shadow, newspapers peddle '[o]bvious lies about the Chinese' (375) and others. The murder of innocents continues, in the wake of Bloody Sunday Ireland's civil war festers, labour strikes rage, and the great drought of 1921 augments the mood of financial despondency. Accusations of scaremongering and complacency fly, and the central problem intensifies: 'the increased dreadfulness of modern weapons was making the separate sovereignty of nations too dangerous to endure' (232). How will earthlings overcome their Age of Chaos?

Conclusion

In *The Common Sense of War and Peace: World Revolution or War Unending*, with his foreboding of regressive teleology confirmed, Wells reflected on his preoccupations from *The Time Machine* onwards. The sense of imminent catastrophe has only intensified and 'we are in the presence of one single world system which is breaking down' (Wells 1940b: 26).[34] Our world system is rudderless and the impetus towards the necessary world government is diverted into the familiar channels of national domination and imperial rivalry. Wells is careful to settle scores with those who have caricatured him as an alarmist and censored him for advocating transformation. Invariably, he recalls, his adversaries have been wealthy and connected, proponents of 'downward class hatred' (39). They use their influence over the media to stifle freedom of speech, often indirectly through well-meaning intermediaries: 'The real and dangerous discontent was from above' (37).

It is, he warns, a situation that is unlikely to change when the media of enlightenment and education remain captured. In the midst of war, Wells sends a message to the future: 'You see what happened to the hopes of my generation and you see what may happen to yours' (123).

Notes

[1] "'Our States and Empires are still the rawest sketches of what order will some day be," I said, and so I came to tell him the story of earthly War ... of invasions and massacres ... I went on to describe a Maxim gun in action and what I could imagine of the battle of Colenso.' (Wells 1901: 246-248) The British defeat by the Boers, led by Louis Botha, on 15th December 1899, was part of the British Black Week (Magersfontein, Stormberg and Colenso). Casualties at Colenso were: British 143 killed, 756 wounded and 220 captured; Boers eight killed and 30

wounded.

[2] According to Dutton, the efficiency in the air after the Boer War 'smacked of organisational autocracy' (1981: 875). See Searle (2202).

[3] See Wells (1896) on Olive Schreiner's *The Story of an African Farm*; Goldberg (2009); Toye (2008); and Somos (2011). According to Hankins, Wells constructed 'a position beyond the liberal imperialism of his day' (2019: 70) See also Cole (2020); and Semmel (1960: 76-82).

[4] Wells thought that Smuts was partly responsible for the imposition of dangerously intolerable reparation demands upon Germany after World War I (see Van der Poel 1973a: 94; and Parsons, 1983). For his part, writing in 1937, Smuts saw Wells as an impractical idealist with little understanding of the constraints under which politicians make decisions (see Van der Poel 1973b: 67). See also Burgers (1992: 464–468); Dubow (2008); and Gravett (2015). 'Smuts is one of the best-read men I have met. He seems to know something about everything. He ranges from Joseph Conrad to Kant, from Booker Washington to Tolstoi.' (Marcosson 1921: 41)

[5] 'The idea of the world state, the universal kingdom of righteousness of which every living soul shall be a citizen, was already in the world two thousand years ago never more to leave it.' (Wells 1920: 366) See Bell (2018); and Wagar (1961). According to Olivier (1918: 5), the cause of the current trouble was the breakdown of a central authority.

[6] Rider Haggard noted in his diary of November 19, 1921: 'Yesterday I went to town to be the principal guest at the dinner of the Delphian Coterie, where the subject for consideration was "Quo Vadis—or the Empire a century hence?". There was a large and enthusiastic audience of a very intelligent order, gathered to welcome my fellow guest, Dean Inge, and myself. Before I spoke the Secretary read out the following remarkable and to my mind most mischievous letter from Mr. H.G. Wells: 'I regret very much that I cannot attend your gathering tonight. I hope and believe that one hundred years hence there will be no British Empire. Either it will have played its part in the development of civilisation and have changed into and given place to a much larger union of free states, or it will have become a danger and a nuisance to mankind, and have followed German Imperialism and Roman Imperialism to the dust heap' (1980: 231-232). 'The age of "expansion," the age of European "empires" is near its end.' (Wells 1916: 239) Compare Condorcet (1795: 128–129); and see Konda (2019: 149–160) on the role of Cecil Rhodes and the Round Table.

[7] 'Marx seems never to have distinguished clearly between restrictive and productive possessions, which nowadays we recognize as a difference of fundamental importance. Exploitation for profit and strangulation for dominance, the radical son and the conservative father, were all one to him ... he betrayed no conception whatever of the real psychology of economic activities, and he had no sense of the intricate organization of motives needed if the coarse incentive of profit was to be superseded.' (Wells 1933a: 47)

[8] *The World of William Clissold* accuses Marx of being the prime mover in the destruction of Socialism, turning it into 'an outlet of passionate expression for the inferiority complex of the disinherited' (Wells 1926a: 158; and see Hyde 1956). Marx moved away from the 'the simple, essential idea of socialism, which is the abolition of private property in anything but what a man has earned or made' (Wells 1908a: 53). And nationalisation? 'While private adventurers control the political life of the state, it is ridiculous to think of the state taking over collective economic interests from private adventurers' (Wells 1920: 436). Wells described himself as a

moderate socialist who looks 'not so much to the abolition of property as to the abolition of inheritance' (Wells 1904: 400).

[9] 'The attempt of Mr. Wells to make America a sort of model for the federation of all the free nations of the earth, though it is international in intention, is really as narrowly national, in the bad sense, as the desire of Mr. Kipling to cover the world with British Imperialism, or of Professor Treitshke to cover it with Prussian Pan-Germanism' (Chesterton 1922b: 234) Claude McKay: 'I said I always thought of Kipling as the bugler of empire, and that perhaps Wells was the sub-officer' (1937: 125).

[10] "'My country Right or Wrong, the Church, the Party, the Masses, the Proletariat. Our imaginations hang on some such Big Brother idea almost to the end.'" (Wells 1937: 174) See Wells (1910: 83). On the disciples of Marx: 'His [Marx's] proclaimed "social jehad" [sic], the class war … simplified the psychology of the immense variety of people, from master-engineers to stock-jobbers and company promoters whom he lumped together as Capitalists, by supposing it to be purely acquisitive. He made his "Capitalists" all of one sort and his "Workers" all of one sort' (Wells 1926a: 188, 169–170). Wells describes his character Clissold as 'a specimen of modern liberalism, using liberalism in its broadest sense' (i). Clissold's father has 'a place in Durban' (224). 'The International of the Workers, in spite of its more explicit organisation, is even now an altogether less substantial affair than the Business-International.' (1926b: 623)

[11] See Stalin (1934: 29–31, 41–42); and Wells (1939: 205–206; and 88). 'It is not that Marx was profoundly wise, but that our economic system has been stupid, selfish, wasteful, and anarchistic.' (Wells 1921b: 86). Wells (1941) compared the Communist Party to the Catholic Church, and argued that Marx imposed an orthodoxy upon the socialist impulse, infecting it with his own conceit, jealousy and arrogance. See Diment (2019).

[12] On the other side of the political spectrum, in 1941 antisemite Ezra Pound lambasted "'those who listen to H.G. chubby Wells and the liberal stooges'" (Pound 1978: 20; and see 185).

[13] My friend Wouter Jordaan reminds me that the First Boer War's Battle of Majuba Hill, February 27, 1881, yielded the following result: British 92 killed, 134 wounded, 59 captured; Boers 1 killed, 5 wounded. Wells writes that the British also "'remembered Majuba'" (Wells 1940a: 12).

[14] *The World Brain* (1938) has Wells arguing for reconstruction and the steady development of a loyal civil service to his American audience. Wells came to reject the idea of international federalism based on the model of the USA: 'The "democracies" of the world are to get together upon a sort of enlargement of the Federal Constitution of the United States (which produced one of the bloodiest civil wars in all history) and then all will be well with us' (Wells 1940a: 89). Are we to incorporate all Western aligned states, even those undemocratic ones? For example, 'the Union of South Africa is a particularly bad and dangerous case of race tyranny' (92).

[15] As for Chesterton's own monsters: 'When I was a child I have stared at the darkness until the whole black bulk of it turned into one negro giant taller than heaven' (Chesterton 1909a: 313). And on South Africa: 'What could be better than to have all the fun of discovering South Africa without the disgusting necessity of landing there?' (1909b: 13).

[16] Milner promised that there was "'no question of the black population ever becoming a danger to the supremacy of the whites'" (quoted in Marlowe 1976: 187). It seems that the importation of Chinese labour into South Africa was considered by the Chamber of Mines as early as 1898. Post Boer-war plans were shaped by the experience of the USA, Canada, and Australia but the main local consideration was the attitude of the Transvaal whites to the Indians in their midst and the determination of Milner to prevent the emergence of a white proletariat in the Transvaal. 'On March 21 [1904], Henry Campbell-Bannerman moved a vote of censure on Mr. Balfour's government. The subsequent debate was vigorous. The government had promised smiling homes for British families in the Transvaal as soon as the "semi-barbarous civilization and effete government of the Boers" had been swept away. They were now faced with the fiasco of having conquered a country which they could not colonize.' (Campbell 1932: 182). Conservative Balfour replied to the jibe that he was in favour of importing servile labour by pointing out that it was Liberal Ministers who had been responsible for the introduction of Indian laborers into the West Indies.

[17] For the troubled Mr Brumley in *The Wife of Sir Isaac Harman* the 'acute disillusionments that arose out of the Boer War' meant that '[t]he first decade of the twentieth century was for the English a decade of badly sprained optimism. Our Empire was nearly beaten by a handful of farmers amidst the jeering contempt of the whole world—and we felt it acutely for several years' (Wells 1915b: 292–293).

[18] Lenin on the theory of non-capitalist agriculture in a capitalist society: 'It is no exaggeration to say that this theory is an illusion, a dream, under which the whole of bourgeois society is labouring' (Lenin 1964: 18). In his conversations with Lenin, Wells concurs that '[t]he peasant method of life was to be fought and beaten in detail, first here and then there' (Wells 1932: 180). The peasant 'is the basis of the old order and a misfit and anachronism in the new ... Essentially the modernization of food production means the supersession of this small localized self-directing cultivator, peasant or peasant-like' (177, 179).

[19] 'In breaking down the pre-capitalist framework of society, capitalism thus broke not only barriers that impeded its progress but also flying buttresses that prevented its collapse. That process, impressive in its relentless necessity, was not merely a matter of removing institutional deadwood, but of removing partners of the capitalist stratum, symbiosis with whom was an essential element of the capitalist schema.' (Schumpeter 1942: 139) See Wallerstein (2000: 244); Schwarz (2011); and Johnson (2012).

[20] See Wells (1930: 76–77; and 1908b: 28). 'The British Empire in his [Lord Edensoke's] eyes was a fine machine for utilising the racial instincts of the serviceable British peoples for the enforcement of contracts and the protection of invested capital throughout the world. If they did not, as a general rule, get very much out of it in spite of their serviceableness that was their affair.' (Wells 1927: 245–246)

[21] 'The first most obvious danger of Africa is the militarization of the black. General Smuts has pointed this out plainly. The negro makes a good soldier; he is hardy, he stands the sea, and he stands cold. (There was a negro [Mathew Henson] in the little party which reached the North Pole.) It is absolutely essential to the peace of the world that there should be no arming of the negroes beyond the minimum necessary for the policing of Africa.' (Wells 1918a: 42) 'A bacterium that may kill you or me in some novel and disgusting way may even now be developing in some Congo muck-heap. So here is the need for another Commission to look

after the Health of Africa.' (44). This is part of Wells's case for the League of Nations Health Organisation which was set up in 1923 and incorporated into the World Health Organization in 1948 (see Borowy 2009).

[22] "'[T]he Boers are, undoubtedly, white. They came from Europe in the first place, and took the land from the Africans. Now the English are taking the land from the Boers.'" (Hesketh 1900: 69

[23] Others in the real world were more perceptive: 'Thus in the early part of 1922, this "white South Africa" was put to a test … The forces of the state and those of the white workers were in battle, wounding and killing each other, while the latter insisted on a brutal slaughter of the innocent black men and women who had shown no hostile attitude to the white miners' (Kadalie 1924: 40)

[24] *The New World Order*: '(a) outright world-socialism scientifically planned and directed, plus (b) a sustained insistence upon law, law based on a fuller, more jealously conceived restatement of the personal Rights of Man, plus (c) the completest freedom of speech, criticism and publication, and a sedulous expansion of the education organisation to the demands of the new order' (1940a: 119).

[25] 'Animals may survive by devastation. They may also survive by carrying some disease in a mitigated form that will exterminate other species. No need to outshine or defeat a more energetic race. They may waste or stink out of existence.' (Wells 1923b: 171) For the classic and all too familiar imagery of disease see Book 2 of Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (1954: 123–127). In *The Outline of History* Wells refers to the plague of Athens in the context of the death of Pericles.

[26] Wells's racism is often interwoven with that of his narrating dramatis personae: 'Hundreds of deeply preoccupied Negroes pranced and flung themselves about in the Southern Sunshine in search of a real Martian Newstep' (Wells 1937: 137). Compare "The Lord of the Dynamos" (1894) with Kafka's "In the Penal Colony" (1919): 'Then the black grasped him again, putting a curly head against his chest, and they swayed and panted as it seemed for an age or so. Then the scientific manager was impelled to catch a black ear in his teeth and bite furiously. The black yelled hideously' (Wells 1894b: 211). Later Wells declared: 'Suppose we drop that old cant about politically immature peoples' (1940a: 95).

[27] Mr Rupert Catskill, the would-be colonial putschist of Utopia, was identified as Winston Churchill, of whom Wells wrote in December 1944: 'The British Prime Minister's mind is dull only in its phases of relaxation, but it is now plainly in a phase of extreme reaction, entirely preoccupied with the petty enterprises of his own antiquated career. His ideology, picked up in the garrison life of India, on the reefs of South Africa, the maternal home and the conversation of wealthy Conservative households, is a pitiful jumble of incoherent nonsense' (quoted in Wagar 1964: 366).

[28] 'The development both of extensive proprietary companies and of government departments with economic functions has been a matter of the last few centuries, the development, that is to say, of communal, more or less impersonal ownership, and it is only through these developments that the idea of organized collectivity of proprietorship has become credible.' (Wells 1933b: 34)

[29] "'I must confess," he [Mr. Cecil Burleigh the great Conservative leader] said, "that I am most interested in the peculiar form of Anarchism which seems to prevail here. Unless I

misunderstand you completely every man attends to his own business as the servant of the state. I take it you have—you must correct me if I am wrong—a great number of people concerned in the production and distribution and preparation of food; they inquire, I assume, into the needs of the world, they satisfy them and they are a law unto themselves in their way of doing it".' (Wells 1923a: 227)

[30] 'There was hope and dismay everywhere in the world in 1919 ... There might actually be a world government which wouldn't so much "broaden out" from existing governments, as push them aside and eat them up ... And equally there might really be a new sort of economic life coming into existence. We might find ourselves positive, participating shareholders in a one world business, and all our individualism gone ... Population might really be stanched and controlled. It was no dream. It was hard for most people to decide whether this was to be treated as a mighty dawn or the glare of the last conflagration … We were living in a period of panic and short views both ways.' (Wells 1927: 304–306)

[31] Wells has one of his pro-imperialist characters claim that colonial education provides a model of what can be achieved: '"What is education in England up to, anyhow? In Uganda we knew what we were doing. The Old native tradition was breaking up"' (Wells 1918b: 218). 'The British Empire, I said, had to be the precursor of a world-state or nothing … Its essential unity must be a unity of great ideas embodied in English speech and literature.' (Wells 1934: 652) See Leonard Woolf (1920: 101).

[32] Wells means water tanks as in 'great tanks of gleaming water' (1923a: 333) as seen from the 'parapet' (367) above, but the slippage from irrigation of fortification is revealing.

[33] Wells was well aware of the weakness in his own plan for world government: 'Mr. Sempack left his politics and economics; the sure hope of the One World State and the One World Business floating benevolently in their mental skies … '"We have got clear to the conception of a possible world peace, a world economic system, a common currency, and unparalleled freedoms, growths and liberties"' (1927: 38, 191). This meta-fictional aspect makes the fictions self-critical analyses of real politics, just as real politics is riddled with imagination and fictional scenarios.

[34] In the midst of war Wells concluded: '*It is not necessary to destroy existing governments as such*. The idea of a federal world does not involve the creation of a common world government resembling the sovereign governments of the present time, pushing them aside and taking their place like a conqueror. It does not threaten in the least the racial and cultural distinctions of mankind' (Wells 1940b: 99).

References

Bell, D. 2018. "Founding the World State: H.G. Wells on Empire and the English-Speaking Peoples." *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 4 (December): 867–879.

Borowy, Iris 2009. *Coming to Terms with World Health: The League of Nations Health Organisation 1921-1946*. Oxford: Peter Lang.

Brown, F. 1954. "Sentry." *Two Timer*. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/29948/29948-h/29948-h.htm

Burgers, J. H. 1992. 'The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century." *Human Rights Quarterly* 14, no. 4 (November): 447–477. http://humanrightsinitiative.ucdavis.edu/files/2012/10/burgerroadtosf.pdf

Campbell, P. Crawford 1923. *Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries Within The British Empire*. London: P.S. King and Son, Ltd. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.90706

Caudwell, C. 1938. *Studies in a Dying Culture*. London: John Lane, The Bodley Head. https://ia801306.us.archive.org/10/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.182674/2015.182674.Studies-In-A-Dying-Culture.pdf

Chesterton, G.K. 1905. "Mr Wells and the Giants." In: *Heretics*. New York: John Lane Company, 68-91.

---- 1909a [2000]. "The Red Angel." *On Lying in Bed and Other Essays*. Edited by Alberto Manguel. Canada: Bayeaux Arts, 312–315. E-Book.

---- 1909b. *Orthodoxy*. London: John Lane, The Bodley Head.

---- 1922a. "Wells and the World State." In: *What I Saw in America*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 226-242.

---- 1922b. "The Future of Democracy." In: *What I Saw in America*, 284-297.

Cole, S. 2020. *Inventing Tomorrow: H.G. Wells and the Twentieth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Condorcet 1795 [2012]. "The Sketch." In: *Condorcet: Political Writings*. Edited by Steven Lukes and Nadia Urbinati. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-147.

Diment, G. 2019. *H.G. Wells and All Things Russian*. EPUB: Anthem Press.

Dubow, S. 2008. "Smuts, the United Nations and the Rhetoric of Race and Rights." *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 1: 43–72. http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/03%20Dubow-%20Smuts%20and%20the%20UN.pdf

Dutton, D.J. 1981. "The Unionist Party and Social Policy 1906-1914." *The Historical Journal* 24, no. 4 (December): 871-884.

Goldberg, J. 2009 [2007]. *Liberal Fascism; The Secret History of the American Left, from Mussolini to the Politics of Change*. New York: Random House, Inc.

Gravett, W.H. 2015. "To Save Succeeding Generations form the Scourge of War: Jan Christian Smuts (1870–1950) and the Genesis of International Organisation and Human Rights." Doctoral Thesis. University of Pretoria. https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/52402/Gravett_Save_2015.pdf;sequence=1

Haggard, H.R. 1980. *The Private Diaries of Sir H. Rider Haggard, 1914–1925*. Edited by D.S. Higgins. New York: Stein and Day.

Hankins, G. 2019. *Interwar Modernism and the Liberal World Order: Offices, Institutions, and Aesthetics After 1919*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hesketh, Pritchard 1900. *Where Black Rules White: A Journey Across and About Haiti.* New York: Books for Libraries Press,

Hobson, J.A. 1900. *The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects*. London: James Nisbet and Co. https://archive.org/details/warinsouthafrica00hobsuoft

Hyde, W.J. 1956. "The Socialism of H.G. Wells in the Early Twentieth Century." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 17, no. 2 (April): 217–234.

Johnson, David 2012. *Imagining the Cape: History, Literature, and the South African Nation*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Kadalie, Clements 1924 [2022]. "The native African workers, backed by race consciousness." *'I see You:' The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa, 1919-1930*. Edited by David Johnson and Henry Dee. Cape Town: Historical Publications South Africa, 39-40.

Keegan, T. 1990. "Primitive accumulation and class formation in the making of Agrarian capitalism in South Africa." *Collected Seminar Papers. Institute of Commonwealth Studies* 40: 198–211.

Lauren, P.G. 2011 [2003]. *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Lenin, V.I. 1964. "Data on Development of Capitalism in Agriculture." *Collected Works, December 1917-July 1916*. London and Moscow: Lawrence and Wishart/Progress Publishers, 13–100.

Magubane, B. 1996. *The Making of a Racist State: British Imperialism and the Union of South Africa, 1875–1910*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press Inc.

Marcosson, I.F. 1921. *An African Adventure*. New York: John Lane Company.

Marks, S., and S. Trapido 1979. "Lord Milner and the South African State." *History Workshop* 8 (Autumn): 50–80.

Marlowe, J. 1976. *Milner. Apostle of Empire. A Life of Alfred George the Right Honourable Viscount Milner of St James's and Cape Town, KG, GCB, GCMG (1854–1925)*. London: Hamish Hamilton.

McKay, C. 1937 [1970]. *A Long Way from Home*. New York: Harvest.

Milner, A. 1913. *The Nation and Empire: being a collection of speeches and addresses*. London: Constable and Company. https://archive.org/details/nationempirebein00miln/page/n8/mode/2up

Morris, M. 1976. "The Development of Capitalism in South African Agriculture: class struggle in the countryside." *Economy and Society* 5, no. 5: 292–243.

---- 1987. "Social History and the Transition to Capitalism in the South African Countryside." *Africa Perspective* 5–6: 7–24.

Nelson**,** R.F. 2014 [1963]. "Eight O'Clock in the Morning." In: *The Ninth Science Fiction Megapack*. Edited by A.C. Clarke and Kristine Kathryn Rusch. Maryland: Wildside Press LLC, 289–293. ebook.

Olivier, S. 1918. *The League of Nations and Primitive Peoples*. London: Oxford University Press. https://archive.org/details/leagueofnationsp00oliv/page/1

Orwell, George 1941 [1951]. "Wells, Hitler and the World State." In: *Critical Essays*. London: Secker and Warburg, 92–98.

Parry, B. 2004. *Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique*. London: Routledge.

Parsons, R.W.K. 1983. "Keynes and South Africa." *South African Journal of Economics* 51, no. 3 (September): 280–290.

Pound, E. 1978. "(#5 (December 7, 1941) Those Parentheses." In: *"Ezra Pound Speaking." Radio Speeches of World War II*. Edited by L.W. Doob. London: Greenwood Press, 20–22.

Rieder, J. 2008. *Colonialism and the Emergence of Science Fiction*. Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942 [2003]. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. London: Routledge.

Schwarz, Bill 2011. *The White Man's World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, Geoffrey 2002. "'National Efficiency' and the 'Lessons' of the War." In: *The Impact of the South African War*. Edited by David Omissi and Andrew S. Thompson. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 194-211.
Semmel, B. 1960. *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895–1914*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Somos, M. 2011. "'A Century of Hate and Coarse Thinking:' anti-Machiavellian Machiavellianism in H.G. Wells' *The New Machiavelli*." *History of European Ideas* 37, no. 2: 137–152.
Stalin, J.V. 1934 [1978]. "Marxism Versus Liberalism. An Interview with H.G. Wells." *Works. Volume 14. 1934–1940*. England: Red Star Press Ltd., 21–44. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1934/07/23.htm
Thucydides 1954. *The Peloponnesian War*. Translated by Rex Warner. London: Penguin Books.
Toye, R. 2008. "H.G. Wells and the New Liberalism." *Twentieth Century British History* 19, 2: 156–185. https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10871/9426
Trilling, L. 1965 [1943]. *E.M. Forster*. New York: New Directions.
Van der Poel, J. (ed) 1973a. *Selections from the Smuts Papers: Volume 5, September 1919–November 1934*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
---- 1973b. *Selections from the Smuts Papers: Volume 6, December 1934–August 1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wagar, W.W. 1961. *H.G. Wells and the World State*. New Haven: Yate University Press.
Wallerstein, I. (with Joan Smith) 2000 [1992]. "Households as an Institution of the World-Economy." In: *The Essential Wallerstein*. New York: The New Press, 234–252.
Wells, H.G. 1894a [1898]. "Aepyornis Island.' *Thirty Strange Stories*. New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 15–33. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/59774/59774-h/59774-h.htm
---- 1894b [1904]. "The Lord of the Dynamos." *The Stolen Bacilli and Other Stories*. London: Methuen and Co., 192–213.
---- 1895 [1995]. *The Time Machine*. New Delhi: UBS Publishers.
---- 1896. *The Wheels of Chance. A Bicycling Idyll*. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1264/1264-h/1264-h.htm
---- 1898 [2012]. *The War of the Worlds*. UK: Penguin Books.
---- 1901 [1958]. *The First Men in the Moon*. London: Collins,
---- 1902 [1901]. *Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress Upon Human Life and Thought*. London: Chapman and Hall. Fourth edition. https://ia800302.us.archive.org/32/items/anticipationsofr00welluoft/anticipationsofr00welluoft.pdf
---- 1904 [1903]. *Mankind in the Making*. London: Chapman and Hall. Fourth edition. https://archive.org/details/mankindinmaking00welluoft
---- 1905. *A Modern Utopia*. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons. https://archive.org/details/modernutopia00welluoft
---- 1908a. *This Misery of Boots*. Boston: The Ball Publishing Co. https://archive.org/details/thismiseryofboot00well

---- 1908b. *The War in the Air, and Particularly How Mr. Bert Smallways Fared While it Lasted*. London: George Bell and Sons.
---- 1910. *The New Machiavelli. The New Machiavelli and The Food of the Gods*. London: Odhams Press, nd., 5-326.
---- 1913. *The Passionate Friends*. USA: Harper and Brothers. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/30340/30340-h/30340-h.htm
---- 1914. *An Englishman Looks at the World: Being a Series of Unrestrained Remarks upon Contemporary Matters*. London: Cassell and Company, Ltd.
---- 1915a. *The Research Magnificent*. In: *Kipps and The Research Magnificent*. London: Odhams Press Limited, 259–503.
---- 1915b. *The Wife of Sir Isaac Harman*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
---- 1916. *What is Coming: A European Forecast*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
---- 1917. *The Soul of a Bishop*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
---- 1918a. *In the Fourth Year: Anticipations of a World Peace*. London: Chatto and Windus. http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10291/pg10291.html
---- 1918b. *Joan and Peter. The Story of an Education. Joan and Peter* and *The Country of the Blind*. London: Odhams Press Limited. 1–463.
---- 1919. "The Idea of a League of Nations." *The Atlantic* (January). https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1919/01/the-idea-of-a-league-of-nations/306270/
---- 1920. *The Outline of History, Being a Plain History of Life and Mankind*. New York: The Macmillan Company. https://archive.org/details/OutlineOfHistory
---- 1921a [1910]. *The Sleeper Awakes*. In: *The Sleeper Awakes and Men Like Gods*. London: Odhams Press Limited, 1-184.
---- 1921b. *Russia in the Shadows*. New York: George H. Doran Company. https://archive.org/details/russiainshadows00wellgoog
---- 1922. *Washington and the Riddle of Peace*. New York: The Macmillan Company. https://archive.org/details/washingtonandri01wellgoog
---- 1923a. *Men Like Gods*. In: *The Sleeper Awakes and Men Like Gods*. London: Odhams Press Limited, nd., 185–356.
---- 1923b. *Mr. Blettsworthy on Rampole Island*. London: Ernest Benn Limited.
---- 1926a [1972]. *The World of William Clissold. A Novel at a New Angle. Volume 1*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
---- 1926b *The World of William Clissold. Volume 2*. London: Ernest Benn Ltd., The Colonial Library. https://ia802605.us.archive.org/25/items/worldofwilliamcl031093mbp/worldofwilliamcl031093mbp.pdf
---- 1927. *Meanwhile (The Picture of a Lady)*. New York: George H. Doran Company.
---- 1930. *The Autocracy of Mr. Parham. His Remarkable Adventures in the Changing World*. London: William Heinemann Ltd.
---- 1932. *The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind*. London: Heinemann.
---- 1933a. *The Shape of Things to Come. The Ultimate Revolution*. London: Hutchinson and Co. The Shape Of Things To Come : Wells,h.g. : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

---- 1933b [1928]. *The Open Conspiracy: What are We to Do with Our Lives?* Dumfries and Galloway: Anodos Books. Also available at: The Open Conspiracy (gutenberg.net.au)
---- 1934 [1967]. *Experiment in Autobiography. Discoveries and Conclusions of a Very Ordinary Brain (Since 1866)*. New York: J.B. Lippincott. http://gutenberg.ca/ebooks/wellshg-autobiography/wellshg-autobiography-00-h-dir/wellshg-autobiography-00-h.html
---- 1937. *Star-Begotten. A Biological Fantasia.* New York: The Viking Press. https://archive.org/details/WellsH.G.StarBegotten1937
---- 1938. *The World Brain*. London: Methuen and Co. http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks13/1303731h.html
---- 1939. *The Fate of Man*. New York: Alliance Book Corporation, Longman Green and Co. https://archive.org/details/fateofman013812mbp
---- 1940a. *The New World Order. Whether it is attainable, how it can be attained, and what sort of world a world at peace will have to* be. London: Secker and Warburg. https://archive.org/details/TheNewWorldOrder
---- 1940b [2016]. *The Common Sense of War and Peace: World Revolution or War Unending*. Read Books Ltd.
---- 1941. *Guide to the New World: A Handbook of Constructive World Revolution*. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. WellsGuide.pdf
---- 1964. "Winston Churchill." In: *H.G. Wells: Journalism and Prophecy 1893-1946*. Edited by W. Warren Wagar. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 353–367. https://archive.org/details/journalismprophe00well/mode/2up
Woolf, Leonard 1920. *Economic Imperialism*. London: The Swarthmore Press Ltd.

Alien Invasion

According to H.G. Wells, the original idea for *The War of the Worlds* (1898) was suggested by his youngest brother Frank during a walk in the peaceful Surrey countryside:

> "Suppose some beings from another planet were to drop out of the sky suddenly," said Frank, "and began laying about them here!" Perhaps we had been talking of the discovery of Tasmania by the Europeans—a frightful disaster for the native Tasmanians! I forget. But that was the point of departure. (quoted in Clarke 1992: 84)[1]

The influence of *The War of the Worlds*, serialised April-December 1897, on Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* is evident in Marlow's claim that he believed in the myth of Kurtz "'in the same way one of you might imagine there are

inhabitants on the planet Mars'" (1902: 29).[2] The theme of reversed colonialism also features in Wells's *The Sleeper Awakes* where a populist dictator uses African police to oppress the English masses: "'They are useful," said Ostrog. "They are fine loyal brutes, with no wash of ideas in their heads—such as our rabble has'" (1921: 136). The brutality of colonialism returns home. *The First Men in the Moon* (1901) recounts the failed attempt to subjugate the aliens on the moon.

The connection between colonialism and alien invasion has an identifiable literary bloodline that includes Edgar Rice Burroughs's visitors from Mars.[3] The John Carter of Mars series (1912-1964) includes a visit to Jupiter, and on Mars the hero of pioneer stock and former Confederate soldier encounters warring groups battling over scarce resources on an environmentally hostile "'dying planet'" (Burroughs 1917: n.p.).

In this literary genealogy race is definitive, as when Alexander Bogdanov has Martians weigh up the options regarding Earth and the problem with colonisation: "'Deep racial hatred and fear that we would seize more territory would unite all the people of Earth in wars against us'" (1908: 112). The alternative is to exterminate the humans. Alexei Tolstoi has humans landing on Mars where they find traces of Africa:

> Los burned half his matches examining the curious mask. Shortly before his departure from the Earth, he had seen photographs of similar masks, discovered among ruins of giant cities on the Niger, in the part of Africa where signs of an extinct culture suggested a race mysteriously vanished. (1923: 42)

It seems that Mars was colonised by terrestrial Atlantians who enslaved the indigenes and built the canals visible from Earth (see Husserl 1901/2: 184). Back on earth, Tolstoi credits Africans with founding civilisation.[4]

Mathatha Tsedu's South African short story "Forced Landing" enters this tradition by rewriting both *The War of the Worlds* and *Heart of Darkness* in terms of colonialism and apartheid. It begins:

> It was in the year 2561 that a cruising missile from Mars on its way to Saturnus was forced to make an emergency landing on Jupiter because of food shortages aboard. Contrary to popular belief that Martians are intelligent, on that specific journey—which was their first on that route—they had made a fatal mistake. (Tsedu 1980: 69)

Tsedu's story of an attempted Martian invasion relays how in the recent past the Anazian population of Jupiter read a book found on the moon recounting the colonisation of a place called Azania by visitors who renamed the country

Safrika. The Anazians 'believed the book was a warning to them not to extend their hospitality to strangers of colour' (71). Safrika as metonym of global take-over.

The visitors from Mars, 'aliens' (69), are welcomed in good faith but soon reveal themselves to be 'conspiring to colonise the whole country and subject it to the unjust philosophy of capitalism' (71). The Martians are promptly executed and colonisation thwarted. The Anazian people celebrate the rescue of their country 'from being clawed by the mercenaries of capitalism and cosmic neo-colonialism' (72).[5] The visitors were after all on their way to Saturn (♄), named after the Roman god of agriculture and wealth.[6] The colonial process of land annexation, labour exploitation and resource extraction was avoided, at least on Jupiter, home to 'the most sublime classes of sensible creatures,' according to Kant (1755: 138).

Tsedu's colonising Martians miscalculated the resistance of those slated to be exploited—'they had made a fatal mistake' (69)—for the Anazians were on their guard against strangers 'of colour' (71). The horror of colonial warfare is nipped in the bud because of a text from the past. As with *The War of the Worlds*, humanity (represented by the Jovians) survives to live another day.[7]

Wells has one of his characters say that the weakness of *The War of the Worlds* was overestimating the enemy: "'The only impossible thing in the story was to imagine that the Martians would be fools enough to try anything of the sort'" (Wells 1937: 62). In *Last and first Men: A Story of the Near and Far Future* (1930) Olaf Stapledon foresaw the return of wiser Martians over-running South Africa.

Tsedu's hopeful anti-colonial rewriting is built on the conceit of alien foolishness, and the arrogance of those presuming to control the situation. "Forced Landing" emphasises the presence of collaborators—proxies for Bantustan leaders—willing to participate in the destruction of their own people. The normal colonialist perspective as expressed in *The Time Machine*—"'Conceive the tale of London which a negro, fresh from Central Africa, would take back to his tribe!'" (1895: 41)—is reconceived as the tale of colonisation told by its (potential) victims. Colonialism teaches the lesson of vigilant self-defence and world coordination.

The anti-apartheid "Forced Landing" overwrites the alibi of the developmental state with the narrative of colonial domination and resource extraction. There is something mechanical about this propensity for domination, a necessity that calls for vigilance since the suspension of morality

in the interest of self-interest is sadly predictable. As Wells wrote in *The War of the Worlds*:

> And before we judge of them [the Martians] too harshly we must remember what ruthless and utter destruction our own species has wrought, not only upon animals, such as the vanished bison and the dodo, but upon its inferior races. The Tasmanians, in spite of their human likeness, were entirely swept out of existence in a war of extermination waged by European immigrants, in the space of fifty years. Are we such apostles of mercy as to complain if the Martians warred in the same spirit? (1898: 5)[8]

Colonialism as alien invasion, alien invasion as colonialism: this popular culture formula captures more than the fear of retribution as the principle of survival of the fittest is turned on its adherents. How does it feel to be right?

"Forced Landing" drives home the point of an irrefutable history: self-defence is obligatory and violence its own justification for enforced counter-measures are a matter of self-preservation. World government makes possible concerted, unanimous reaction to the colonisers. Written at the high-point of the struggle against apartheid, the pre-condition of repelling colonialism is the world state. Centralised, coordinated executive power in the right hands is necessary to counter a global, existential threat. 'Jupiter, the custodian of violence [*Gewalt*],' as Kant (1795: 116) reminds us. The anti-colonial world order must, like its original colonising model, involve internal coercion without which there is no internal order and no capacity to resist:

> "We've been barking up the wrong tree. These reds—Moscow—Bernard Shaw—New Dealers—Atheists—Protocols of Zion, all of that—mere agents. It's Mars that is after us. Listen to him. Mars! What are we to do about it? What are we to do?" … "Let the Reds fade out. *Martians!* People will hate them from the word Go!" (Wells 1937: 143–144, 150)

At the planetary level, decolonisation requires internal as well as external enemies.

In *Star-Begotten. A Biological Fantasia*, Wells has his characters discuss more than the weakness of *The War of the Worlds* (stupid Martians and/or stupid author), and the merits of Stapledon's *Last and First Men*. The concern is that this time the Martians "'have been experimenting in human genetics. Suppose they have been trying to alter mankind in some way, through the human genes'" (75). The alien colonists and their collaborators are already among us, experimenting with human augmentation for their own ends. Some humans do not even know that they are working towards their own enslavement.

Notes

[1] See Rieder on '[t]he Wellsian strategy [of] reversal of positions [coloniser-colonised] that stays entirely within the framework of the colonial gaze and the anachronism of anthropological difference, but also highlights their critical potential' (2008: 10).

[2] Colonialist conspiracy theory: "'I knew once a Scotch sailmaker who was certain, dead sure, there were people in Mars. If you asked him for some idea how they looked and behaved, he would get shy and mutter something about 'walking on all fours.' If you as much as smiled, he would—though a man of sixty—offer to fight you'" (Conrad 1902: 29).

[3] "'Its [Martian] commander in his heroic fight against the pull of the sun had managed to fall within the grip of Jupiter and was, when last heard from, far out in the great void between that planet and Mars".' (Burroughs 1923: 32)

[4] "'The original founders of the [Earth] City of a Hundred Golden Gates were African Negroes of the Zemze tribe. They deemed themselves to be the junior branch of a black race which in the dimmest antiquity populated the gigantic continent of Gwandan, now lying at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean. Its survivors had broken up into numerous tribes. Many of them had become savages. But the memory of their great past was treasured by the Negroes.'" (Tolstoi 1923: 69)

[5] 'The evil of capitalism consists in its alienation of the fruit of labour from those who with the toil of their body and the sweat of their brow produce this fruit. This aspect of capitalism makes it irreconcilable with those basic principles which animate the traditional African society. Capitalism is unjust; in our newly independent countries it is not only too complicated to be workable, it is also alien.' (Nkrumah 1970: 76)

[6] 'Think of the Roman Empire! A little circle of light surrounded by vague infinitudes of menacing darkness. There we had a spirited experiment toward a world-order, which failed for several good reasons, but mainly for lack of isolation. The position of the Orbis Romanus was like that which we should now occupy if we had every reason to anticipate being "snowed under" by swarms of Martian, Saturnian, and Uranian invaders.' (Archer 1912: 53-54)

[7] 'These germs of disease have taken toll of humanity since the beginning of things—taken toll of our prehumen ancestors since life began here. But by virtue of this natural selection of our kind we have developed resisting-power; to no germs do we succumb without a struggle ... But there are no bacteria on Mars, and directly these invaders arrived, directly they drank and fed, our microscopic allies began to work their overthrow ... It was inevitable. By the toll of a million deaths man has bought his birthright of the earth, and it is his against all comers; it would still be his were the Martians ten times as mighty as they are. For neither do men live nor die in vain.' (Wells 2012: 176–177) See Robert Potter (1892). Ray Bradbury's "—And the moon be still as bright" (1948) has the Martians destroyed by disease brought by human colonists.

[8] In the sequel to *The War of the Worlds*, Stephen Baxter's *The Massacre of Mankind* (2015), the Martians target Durban. See also Byrne (2004/5: 522–525); Weaver (2010: 99–114) on indigenous Australian use of the apocalyptic to register colonialism; and Smith on 'the very vibrant tradition of Bengali SF that precedes even the novels of H.G. Wells' (2012: 700).

References

Image of Cape Town by Kyle Mijlof. Photograph of Lenticular Clouds over Cape Town. *abc7news.com*, November 12, 2015. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-10/lenticular-ufo-clouds-over-cape-town-and-other-weird-formations/6926526

Archer, William 1912. *The Great Analysis: A Plea for a Rational World Order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. https://archive.org/details/greatanalysisap00murrgoog

Clarke, I.F. 1992. *Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars, 1793–1984*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Revised edition.

Bogdanov, A. 1908 [1984]. *Red Star*. Edited by L.H. Graham and Richard Stites. Translated by C. Rougle. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Burroughs, Edgar Rice 1917. *A Princess of Mars*. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/62/62-h/62-h.htm

---- 1923 [1981]. *The Moon* Maid. USA: Ace. http://www.gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0601501h.html

Byrne, D. 2004/5. "Science Fiction in South Africa." *Proceedings of the Modern Language Association of America* 119, no. 3 (January): 522–525.

Conrad, Joseph 1902 [1988]. *Heart of Darkness*. Edited by Robert Kimbrough. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Husserl, E. 1901/2 [2001]. *Logical Investigations. Volume 1*. Translated by J.N. Findlay. New York: Routledge.

Kant, Immanuel 1755 [2008]. *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, or, An Essay on the Constitution and the Mechanical Origin of the Entire Structure of the Universe Based on Newtonian Principles*. Translated by Ian Johnston. Arlington: Richer Resources Publications.

---- 1795 [1991]. "Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch." In: *Kant. Political Writings*. Edited by Hans Reiss and translated by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 93-130. Enlarged edition.

Nkrumah, Kwame 1970. *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonization*. United States: Monthly Review Press.

Potter, R. 1982. *The Germ Growers. An Australian Story of Adventure and Mysteries*. London: Hutchinson and Co. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/60312/60312-h/60312-h.htm

Rieder, J. 2008. *Colonialism and the Emergence of Science Fiction*. Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.

Smith, E. D. 2012. *Globalization, Utopia, and Postcolonial Science Fiction*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stapledon, O. 1930 [1999]. *Last and first Men: A Story of the Near and Far Future*. London: Millennium. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/Last_and_First_Men.pdf

Tolstoi, A. 1923 [1950]. *Aelita*. Translated by L. Flaxman. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House.

Tsedu, M. 1980. "Forced Landing." In: *Forced Landing. Africa South: Contemporary Writings*. Edited by Mothobi Mutloatse. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 69–72.

Weaver, R. 2010. "'Smudged, Distorted and Hidden:' Apocalypse as Protest in Indigenous Speculative Science Fiction." In: *Science Fiction, Imperialism and the Third World. Essays on Postcolonial Literature and Film*. Edited by E. Hoagland and R. Sarwal. London: McFarland and Company, Inc., 99–114.

Wells, H. G. 1895 [1995]. *The Time Machine*. New Delhi: UBS Publishers.

---- 1898 [2012]. *The War of the Worlds*. UK: Penguin Books.

---- 1921 [1910]. *The Sleeper Awakes*. In: *The Sleeper Awakes and Men Like Gods*. London: Odhams Press Limited.

---- 1937. *Star-Begotten. A Biological Fantasia*. New York: The Viking Press. https://archive.org/details/WellsH.G.StarBegotten1937

6. Time Machine

> The process begins by identifying forces of change in the world, then combining those forces in different ways to create a set of diverse stories—or scenarios—about how the future could evolve.
>
> —Rockefeller Foundation, "Scenarios for the Future Of Technology and International Development Area"

We could have stopped here with the question of primitive times, poised at the fork in the road, one way pointed towards inevitable progress and the other towards impending disaster. Except that it now seems clear that the two are intertwined and there is no simple bifurcation—which is not to say that irrevocable turning points haven't happened and are not happening. Cutting that knot, making a stand and aligning oneself, is a decision with its own risks and opportunities. All the available evidence must be sifted before that commitment is made, and that takes time.

We have been tracking what H.G. Wells called his "'fantasias of possibility'" in which 'each one takes some great creative tendency, or group of tendencies, and develops its possible consequences in the future' (1921: np.). This speculative, imaginative exploration of the future is part of the public use of reason. Documents enacting scenario planning are central to the public use of reason. According to The Rockefeller Foundation, scenario planning exercises are part of 'a creative process … explor[ing], through narrative, events and dynamics that might alter, inhibit, or enhance current trends, often in surprising ways' (2010).

Indeed, such texts 'are thoughtful hypotheses that allow us to imagine, and then to rehearse, different strategies for how to be more prepared for the future—or more ambitiously, how to help shape better futures ourselves' (9). The 'process of creating narratives about the future' (4) is the product of thinking 'creatively and rigorously' (6) about creativity and innovation. Such an exercise is also a performative and imaginative act, inventing tomorrow. Hypotheses are interpretations, and the world must be interpreted before it can be changed.

The art of interpretation, turning possibilities into probabilities, signals the political lineage of the following simulations. Narrating a range of 'plausible' (9) future possibilities is at once a descriptive and a prescriptive exercise melding fiction and likelihood: 'Engaging Your Imagination' (11). It is also, as we shall see, a normative and regulative pedagogical-political process as well as an aesthetic genre. This new paradigm of political discourse returns us to the past by way of an imaginary future.

Human Augmentation

> Using scenarios offers the possibility to describe many different possible and plausible futures.
>
> —DCDC, *Human Augmentation–The Dawn of a New Paradigm. A strategic implications project*

The authors of *Human Augmentation–The Dawn of a New Paradigm. A strategic implications project* (May 2021) are the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), a department within the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the German Bundeswehr Office for Defence Planning (BODP). While this text is different to the historical, literary and philosophical texts we have looked at in previous chapters it is no less political. Many of the subjects we have been considering converge here.

I propose to take up the (conditional) offer implicit in the claim that 'scenario analysis can be used to test assumptions about the future or even find and warn against critical developments' (DCDC 2021: 74). The stakes of this exercise in imagination are perhaps not immediately obvious, but it takes us to the heart of primitive times. Ostensibly concerned with soldiers or military personnel, this document drifts into social and moral theory.

The first notable thing about this publication is the statement of authorship. Or rather, we should say, the disclaimer of authorial responsibility:

> Disclaimer
>
> The content of this publication does not represent the official policy or strategy of the UK government or that of the UK's Ministry of Defence (MOD). Furthermore, the analysis and findings do not represent the official policy or strategy of the countries contributing to the project. It does, however, represent the view of the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), a department within the UK MOD, and Bundeswehr Office for Defence Planning

> (BODP), a department within the German Federal Ministry of Defence. It is based on combining current knowledge and wisdom from subject matter experts with assessments of potential progress in technologies 30 years out supporting deliberations and deductions for future humans and society.

Despite bearing the insignia of the UK's Ministry of Defence, we are assured that nothing contained in the document is official policy. The official status of the document appears to be that it is not official. Or rather, it is semi-official since it represents the view of a department within both the UK MOD and the German BODP—which raises the question of the politico-juridical status of the DCDC. Is it both British and German, although it claims not to speak for either national government? Is the document offering advice to both British and German defence departments? Or does it have no connection, despite the MOD insignia and the statement of filiation? If it is simply an internal discussion document (which it never claims to be) why is it published on the UK government publications site?

The text is signed by Major General Wolfgang Gaebelein and Major General Darrell Amison CBE, and initialled by the latter.[1] Although the Ministry of Defence is responsible for administering the defence policy of Her Majesty's Government, this publication's opening claim is that it does not represent the official policy or strategy of the UK government. Yet under the subheading "Copyright' we read: 'This publication is UK Ministry of Defence © Crown copyright (2021).'

It seems that, according to Wikipedia, crown copyright applies '[w]here a work is made by Her Majesty or by an officer or servant of the Crown in the course of his duties.' A Ministry of Defence document initialled by a servant of the Crown is claims not to be official government policy. Authority figures, but with the link to government policy disavowed. Attenuation of the link to government policy proves a cover for invention but, as we shall see, this link is never entirely surrendered.

Consider the following declaration regarding authorisation:

> Authorisation
>
> The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) is responsible for publishing strategic trends, joint concepts and doctrine. If you wish to quote our publications as reference material in other work, you should confirm with our editors whether the particular publication and amendment state remains authoritative. We welcome your comments on factual accuracy or amendment proposals. Please send them to: DCDC, Ministry of Defence Shrivenham,

> Swindon, Wiltshire, SN6 8RF E-mail: DCDC-DocEds@mod.gov.uk Telephone: 01793 31 4216/4220

The signature designating a singular historical reference is incorporated into the defensive head of the body politic. A gesture that empties the current text of individual responsibility and defers authority while claiming it. Inviting comment, the right of deflection is reserved. Problems of responsibility and intentionality arise before we get to the communication proper. A few comments on this invitation to comment.

The attenuation of accountability that frames this text is certainly defensive, as one might expect from the Ministry of Defence (even if it does not represent the views of that ministry). But the implied reader is of equal interest. The inaugural guarded precautions presume an indulgent, trusting reader willing to take at face value an official government document. A reader who is non-combative is from the first engagement met with what might be termed a guarded, even combative attitude on the part of the implied author(s). In this asymmetrical communicative exchange the friend/enemy distinction is weighted to the latter. One can trace this construction of limited liability or deniability to either insecurity or authoritarianism, perhaps both.

Either way it is a strange way to 'enable a multidisciplinary conversation' (11) and suggests a document that is designed not to be critically engaged with. Or rather, it is to be read in the most telegraphic sense of signals and directions, but not interpreted critically. There is sharp divide between formulation and reception:

> A very important advantage of scenario analysis is the possible involvement of decision-makers and stakeholders in the scenario process. This promotes a high level of understanding for the various possible future developments and achieves a high commitment to the actual work. (DCDC, 74)

The narrative form, the genre (from *genus*: family, kind), is potentially inclusive at the point of production but the destination narrows down the ideal reader. Presumably 'decision-makers' is not quite a solecism but really means *important* decision-makers, consequential people whose decisions matter (i.e., carry authority, and are authorised).[2]

The language of business indicative of what is inadequately termed the military-industrial complex and its 'stakeholders' by definition does not include the general public (who might be thought to have an interest in their own security and well-being), although they are ostensibly the readers and ultimate beneficiaries. The important thing is that it can be claimed it was offered to be

read, that input and conversation were invited (if not facilitated). Why else would it be posted on the government website?

It seems that the general public is and is not the addressee of this text that invites participation and filters and mutes at the same time. The public are at once onlookers and recipients of the decisions taken by participants in the techno-military-biomedical-industrial complex. While military decisions are—beyond a certain point—necessarily immune to direct democratic intervention, something else is happening in this text. We shall see that this conceptual distinction cordons off the public as spectators, potential victims and potential enemies, and raw material. The public is extrinsic and yet central to the decision-makers and stakeholders concerned to control the set of diverse stories about how the future could evolve. This politics of reading and writing, of language, and the world picture it presents is noteworthy for a number of reasons.

In the context of the present study we are back to Thomas Clarkson's account of primitive times. The claim that *Human Augmentation* is 'based on combining current knowledge and wisdom' recalls Clarkson's '*wisdom*, *justice*, *prudence*, and *virtue*' (1788: 53). These are the qualities that Clarkson listed as belonging to the authoritative individual distinguished by 'authority or rank' and 'pre-eminence' (51), and we are certainly concerned with military and bureaucratic ranking here. More importantly, the primacy of the defensive structuring of society which requires the 'important sacrifice' (52) of individual and collective freedom sets the scene for a political axiomatic keen to disavow politics. In the realm of what Clarkson described as that general knowledge of subordination and liberty, and the grand principles of preservation and defence, questions of power or pre-eminence and authority and subordination are inescapable.

The keystone of Clarkson's anti-slavery argument was that 'magistratical pre-eminence' (1788: 51) is necessary for laying down the law and protecting property. Security of property and person only arise if defence against outside threat is maintained. Clarkson relays the version of this story that has the arrangement based on consent rather than coercion. 'Magistratical' signifies *magisterium*, the authority which provides correct interpretation, clarifying doctrine and/or the administration of law. *Magister* can denote a public functionary, teacher, or craftsman; and, of course, a master who has power over another.

The historical-conceptual parable claiming that those who have power over us must have it granted by our consent can now be upgraded. The argument against the sustainability of the violent seizure of power can be completed. In so far as the threat of violence—the external threat to the community—is ever-present, and so not merely external or contingent, it is a permanent origin. As necessary condition of society, the violence from outside has its counterpart in internal violence.[3] The violent exclusion of violence from story and concept of society betrays the work of coerced consent required to found and maintain the order and organisation necessary for self-preservation. The documents before us value compliance over consent and free speech.

It should come as no surprise that a recognisable model of human development that includes 'the grand principles of preservation and defence' is reproduced by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. Concepts such as 'the human' and technology are as integral to dogmatic statements of principles and beliefs. In military terms tactical doctrine concerns theoretical discourse concerned with the relationship between concept and reality, with testing the logic of our thinking. It is essentially a philosophical exercise in imagination.

Are we not here witnessing an exercise in teaching authority, for it is precisely the official status or ritualised performance of these official/unofficial texts that is at issue. Which is nothing less than a question of representation denoted by the root *officialis* (attendant to a magistrate or law officer). Authority and authorisation, duty, fabrication (*facer*), production, technology, truth, and the capacity to resist—are all at stake.

Let us return to the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, a think tank floating ideas, and examine which ideas are selected and how they are presented. Observe the following passage:

> Thinking of the person as a platform and understanding our people at an individual level is fundamental to successful human augmentation. Industrial Age warfare saw people as interchangeable components of military units or the material with which to operate the platforms—vehicles, aircraft and ships. These platforms are routinely monitored and analysed but it is remarkable that our ability to understand our most critical capability—the human—is so under-researched. Successful application of human augmentation demands a more sophisticated approach to understanding our people and their capabilities. Defining the key elements of the 'human platform'—physical, psychological and social—provides a conceptual baseline to enable a multidisciplinary conversation. (DCDC, 11; underlining added)

This passage is considered by its authors to be important enough to repeat almost in its entirety:

> Central to the approach of this project is the idea that each person must be understood at the individual level. Successful application of human augmentation demands a more sophisticated approach to understanding our people and a way of achieving this is to define the key elements that collectively represent the human platform; these are physical, psychological and social in nature. It is recognized that it is impossible to neatly separate the human into three distinct areas and that this model is a conscious oversimplification. (19)

The immediate difference between the two passages is the omission of the underlined sentences regarding 'people as interchangeable components of military units', and the disappearance of scare quotes around 'human platform.' The implication is that 'our ability to understand our most critical capability—the human' will be enhanced by the document. With the military-bio-technological beachhead to the humanities established, ethical and political logic can be mobilised. After all: 'War is, by its nature, a human endeavour' (21).

Putting aside the question of why 'conscious oversimplification' has been embraced, and the inclusiveness of 'our people' posited as unproblematic, one can wonder about the compatibility between the central idea 'that each person must be understood at the individual level' and 'the key elements that collectively represent the human platform.' We are back, if ever we left it, to the intricate relationship between the individual and the collective. And with the capacity to resist understood 'as the sum of material means along with the moral will to resist the enemy' (Caygill 2013: 16),

'Platform' can mean a computing operating system, hardware and software, on which other technologies are run. It can also mean policy or programme, in the sense of a party-political platform, scheme, ground-plan or design. The first passage above indicates most clearly in what sense 'platform' is used: 'the material with which to operate the platforms—vehicles, aircraft and ships.' Personnel are materiel, equipment, and instrumentalisation of the human signifies the meaning of platform as design. It should come as no surprise that this view of 'the human,' both individual and collective, will extend by definition from the field of military discourse. At once stating 'current knowledge and wisdom from subject matter experts,' and feeling out the opposition/enemy, the target audience is us. The document is itself a vehicle involved in manoeuvres.[4]

The most significant doctrinal operation is pedagogical and involves the acknowledgement that 'The most significant challenges, however, are ethical and social in nature' (29). Beyond the military application of technological advances in neuroscience and cybernetics, lies the ultimate horizon of interpretation, the globalised world:

> There may be a moral obligation to augment humans where it promotes well-being … The notion of moral enhancement may require using human augmentation in the future. Our moral psychologies evolved when our actions only affected our immediate environment, but recent advances in technology mean that actions can have almost immediate global consequences. Our moral tendencies to look after our kin and immediate future may no longer be fit for the modern, interconnected world. (47; underlining added)

In this narrative of development, what Equiano called the familial, 'tender connexions' of our immediate environment have been supplanted by a planetary context. Recent developments in technology have changed the moral universe itself. This story of development begs a number of questions.

What or who obligates? On whom does the obligation fall? On 'decision-makers and stakeholders' in the private sector and the State? What is one to make of 'the notion of moral enhancement'? Will human augmentation/prosthesis increase morality? What exactly is meant by 'morality' here?

Usually understood as referring to principles of right and wrong, here morality is condensed into a psychological thumbnail sketch of how 'Our moral psychologies evolved;' a genetic, historical hypothesis that postulates that our moral psychologies are not initially formed by 'our immediate environment.' The drive here is to stress a movement away from a prior state, an evolving behavioural momentum. The concept of morality is clarified:

> There are universal aspects of morality that underpin the basic functioning of all societies, but their interpretation varies. The idea of helping your family and group, respecting others' possessions and returning favours are deep-rooted altruistic tenets that helped our ancestors form successful social groups. But behind these factors are a myriad of local factors and interpretations, hence concepts of morality vary across cultures. (45)

Does the interpretation of universal aspects of morality that underpin the basic functioning of all societies vary or do their universal aspects vary? Whose interpretation varies? Do the members of different societies interpret the universal aspects of morality differently?

The final sentence of the above paragraph suggests that the universal aspects of morality that underpin the basic functioning of all societies are indeed matters of interpretation; 'a myriad of local factors and interpretations.' And this includes, of course, that of the DCDC itself regarding the functioning of all societies.

What concept of morality is being advanced here when morality is functional to survival which requires the formation of 'successful social groups'? This interpretation of morality is fundamentally historical:

> Throughout history the number of entities that have moral 'value' has been growing: a trend known as the 'expanding moral circle.' People of different nationality, ethnicity, gender, religion and sexual orientation, even animals, are increasingly 'in the circle' as moral perspectives change. The information revolution—from print press to tweet—is also accelerating the speed and scale of moral change as different behaviours and attitudes become normalised through exposure. (45)[5]

Morality, it seems, is changed by 'behaviours and attitudes' which are normalised through exposure, and conditioned through repetition as reinforcement. Morality is malleable.

Such a conception of morality has its own history and context, its own local factors and interpretations, disciplinary network, and academic-institutional genealogy. Evolutionary psychology is the product of a particular culture and epistemological environment rooted in theories of adaptive behaviour and natural selection. Individual morality is a matter of behavioural psychology and social norms. The basis for this interpretation is a methodological tenet: 'The terms "morality" and "ethics" are used interchangeably here. Some disciplines use ethics to refer to societal codes or principles, and morality to refer to an individual's own moral beliefs, but this distinction is not used in this publication' (DCDC, 45, note 23).

However, 'morality' and 'ethics' are not used interchangeably, and it is ethics understood as societal codes or principles that is dominant.[6] Individual morality is subordinated to the collective, ethical norms. Since the overriding ethical imperative is competitive advantage (survival) morality is secondary: 'changes to morality are often caused by legislative changes' (46). As are ethics, if they get in the way: 'Defence, however, cannot wait for ethics to change before engaging with human augmentation, we must be in the conversation from the outset to inform the debate and understand how ethical views are evolving' (45-46). The concept (and practice) of defence asserts its right to

participate and grasp how ethical views are evolving, presumably because those views may diverge from, or even undermine, defence which, as such, is a meta-ethical imperative. It is also a political claim to transcend politics (and ethics) by maintaining the survival of society.

What conception of politics is contained in the phrase 'Our moral tendencies to look after our kin and immediate future may no longer be fit for the modern, interconnected world' (47)?

Setting aside the question of whether or not 'Our moral tendencies' were ever limited to 'our kin,' the appearance of this category confirms the operationality of an ethico-political discourse. Kin can refer to family, race, stock (*genos*; also gender or sex, and rank) and its presence links this document to central texts of the western tradition of political thought.

Recall that Aristotle's *Politics* opens with argument that the family is prior in terms of 'growth and origin,' a natural association, on which the subsequent village ('a colony from the family'), community and state are built (1252a24, 1986; 1252b18-19, 1987). The power relations of the family include man and woman, and slave. This natural progression towards 'self-sufficiency' realised in the state shows 'that man is by nature a political animal' (1253a3-4, 1987). Movement away, or rather growth, from the family is thus the most classical political gesture. This archeo-teleological narrative is also reversible from the point of view of logic for 'the state is by nature prior to the family and the individual' (1253a19, 1988); not just because the state provides the conditions (primarily security) necessary for the family (*oikos*) (see Bennington 2017: 14-27).

According to Aristotle, the power relations of the family, between men and animals, and masters and slaves are based on authority and subordination and "this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind" (1254b14-15, 1990). Homeland security is the precondition of security of the home, and Aristotle discusses weapons and violence. In addition, since things are defined by their function, we can see that the natural progression of association leads from the first from family to the state where man achieves individual as well as communal independence (*autarkia*), and administration of justice is realised. This classical version of moral enhancement throws into relief some of the interesting twists that this conceptual reserve takes today.

Firstly, it comes as no surprise that the argument of *Human Augmentation* stands in a tradition that is identifiable, culturally specific, as is the idea of culture (*nomos*) and its specificity. From its inception, supposing we grant

Aristotle's texts that privilege, the realm of kin and consanguinity and filiation is seen as originary and such primitive associations marks the beginning of the move away from the primitive. Recall that for Aristotle the umbilical link between equality of birth (*isogonía*) into equality of rights (*isonomía*) is never broken and it feeds into the notion of filiation and brotherhood associated with the nation (*natio*: birth, origin, stock, race: *ethnos*). The question of the basis of association—common ancestry, language, allegiance—is critical for the viability of community. Independence is economic and military, and generation via gender difference is at the heart of household economy and the economy of the polis breeding producers and consumers and soldiers.

Of necessity, given this seniority of this sedimented tradition, *Human Augmentation* also touches on gender and reproduction: 'People of different nationality, ethnicity, gender, religion and sexual orientation, even animals, are increasingly 'in the circle' as moral perspectives change.' 'Foetuses are already screened for an array of diseases' (DCDC, 47) and genetic engineering is key to human enhancement. The only other time women feature in this text is:

Societies may seek to gainfully employ the elderly, but this could impact on the young and jobless

Life extension. People are living longer, putting stress on health, social and economic systems.[38] Human augmentation may exacerbate this issue by helping people to live even longer or it may alleviate pressure by improving health and productivity in old age. Most industrialised societies will face this challenge in the coming decades and Japan is at the forefront. Japan's strategy has been to focus investment on medical technologies such as regenerative medicine and cell therapy and to keep the elderly in the workforce, reducing pressure on health and social care – the areas where human augmentation could have a significant impact. Even if significant life extension remains elusive, it is likely that human augmentation will increase the number of years lived in good health, with huge implications for society.[39] Societies may seek to gainfully employ the elderly, but this could impact on the young and jobless; will the elderly be seen to take more than their 'fair share' of resources and opportunities?

(DCDC, 59)

The possibility of a gerontological drain on the community is imaged as a frivolously happy old woman. But this image and its text is anything but accidental. Rather it illustrates the inner core of the world view, the ideology or horizon of expectations, framing the various scenarios.

Gender is tacked onto the subject of an aging population. This generic grandmother image is used to underline a central presupposition. Shutterstock gives this stereotype portrait the tag 'Concepts of seniority' and the concept floated here is longevity leading to parasitism. Where there is gender there is economics (resources). The either/or choice that may be faced is repeated when the meaning of the phrase 'Societies may gainfully seek to employ the elderly, but this could impact on the young and the jobless' is clarified as 'Societies may gainfully seek to employ the elderly, but this could impact on the young and the jobless: will the elderly be seen to take more than their 'fair share' of resources and opportunities?'

Such a casuistic argument and its prodding bias reveal more than callousness, underlined rather than concealed by the veil of the hypothetical. The claim to be moving beyond our immediate environment, 'family or group' (kin) carves out an identifiable track and moral psychology, and possible practical consequences. The concept of the elderly as useless mouths is enlisted, registered and deflected onto 'the young and jobless.' Under the scientific guise of efficiency and neutrality a familiar logic is affirmed.[7] From the point of view of economics, which now takes the place of mechanical causality, and with purposiveness narrowed down to survival, what is such a person good for? What are we to make of this appeal to prejudice? According to Aristotle, rhetoric turns on what seems plausible to the audience, and plausibility is tied to what an audience believes to be true. The conditionality of 'may' and 'almost' in this passage and throughout the document (and 'possible,' 'might,' 'could' and 'perhaps') is a rhetorical ruse.[8] Its purpose is to veil assertion of probability over possibility; to shield problematic propositions from the need for proof. Provisionality of judgement conceals the delimitation of alternatives and criteria of selection. Why are these particular possibilities presented and not others, and why these examples? Is the old woman a less inflammatory example than an impoverished child wherein the saving grace of potential is severely curtailed? It is not merely that the claim that 'Using scenarios offers the possibility to describe many different possible and plausible futures' (74) also offers the possibility of not realising such a possibility. The only thing that is tentative about this document is the insistent and

regimented deflection and peddling of stock concepts and doctrines; the regurgitation of hackneyed tropes mixing with an insistent claim to be confronting an unprecedented situation. This strategy has implications for the covert ethico-political agenda being advanced. Images and scenarios are being implanted, brutal possibilities disseminated as likelihoods, and passed out to the public, if not as cordials, then as remedies.[9] What if the 'what if' logic of scenario planning contained a moralising tendency, a reader-affective nudge toward imagining certain possibilities to the exclusion of others?[10] According to Aristotle, a probable impossibility is always preferable to an impossible possibility (*Poetics* 1460a26, 2337), and similitude rests on shared assumptions about reality. That this rationality, shared by the imitator and the audience, is cultivated is what we shall now attempt to verify.

Under the heading 'Scenario–Dark clouds in the evolution of human enhancement' we read:

> The adoption and development of human augmentation technologies was characterised by three major technological steps that happened in parallel in both the West and in the East from 2020 until today. The first disruptive step was the development of enhanced DNA modification technology in around 2035 which led to increased investment in research and development and growth in the human augmentation market. The second disruptive step, which occurred around 2040 was related to the development in artificial intelligence. The third disruptive step around 2045, saw the development of, what was in effect, a universal vaccine for all diseases. This led to global acceptance of human augmentation. (DCDC, 81)

Remember that the scenarios are, fictionally at least, retrospective: 'to explore implications out to 2050' (8). What has (fictionally) happened is merely what might happen (in the near future), that is, a probable possibility given what we know about the present. The future scenario is anchored in the interpretation of the present. Like Wells's futuristic fiction, our future is viewed retrospectively. Predictive power is intertwined with the sense of inevitability as what might have been becomes what was. The openness and freedom of the present is circumscribed by grim necessity that has a determining genetic component.[11]

Apart from when the past is invoked to attest to the malleability of morality, the past is barely mentioned. Or if it is mentioned it is consigned to redundancy, and in one case (the only case of an historic predecessor) the protagonist serves as a useful example of a familiar mode of idiocy. That person is Immanuel Kant who was not as clever as he thought:

> The history of vaccinations demonstrates how proven, and seemingly uncontroversial human augmentation technologies can take many years to become globally effective and accepted by societies. The discovery of the smallpox vaccine at the end of the 18th Century saved millions of lives but was condemned by some of the world's leading thinkers. Emanuel [sic.] Kant, for example, warned that humans would be infected with 'animal brutality' in the vaccine process, which used secretions from cowpox to provide immunity. Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the vaccine, it took 130 years for smallpox to be officially eradicated in 1979. (DCDC, 46)

Kant refers to the smallpox vaccine in *The Metaphysics of Morals* under the heading "Casuistical questions:"

> Anyone who decides to be vaccinated against smallpox puts his life in danger, even though he does it *in order to preserve his life;* and, insofar as he himself brings on the disease that endangers his life, he is in a far more doubtful situation, as far as the law of duty is concerned, than is the sailor, who at least does not arouse the storm to which he entrusts himself. Is smallpox inoculation, then, permitted? (1797: 548)

Kant is pointing to the risk of smallpox vaccination and the relative departure from duty to the moral law represented by voluntary vaccination. If suicide is murder, as it for Kant, then to endanger one's life by choosing vaccination is to be responsible for an action that departs from 'Man's duty to himself as an animal being' which 'is to preserve himself' (564).

Kant's concluding question—Is smallpox inoculation, then, permitted?—appears to be rhetorical. It is part of the other questions Kant raises, such as: Is it right to kill oneself to save one's country? Is martyrdom heroism? Is it morally permissible to kill oneself to avoid an unjust sentence of death? The point seems to be that such actions, however understandable, are not in strict accord with duty to oneself. One cannot claim the moral high-ground.

To my knowledge Kant didn't say or write anything equivalent to 'animal brutality' in relation to vaccination. It seems likely that the authors of *Human Augmentation* at the UK Ministry of Defence are confusing Kant with his student, Marcus Herz who did object to compulsory smallpox vaccination. Herz referred to *Brutalimpfung*, brutish inoculation, and appealed to Kant's formulation of the moral finality of man: a doctor has no right to put an individual patient at risk for the general good. While Herz's *über die Brutalimpfung und deren Vergleichung mit der humanen* (*On Brutish Inoculation and its Comparison with the Humane*, 1801) argues against infecting humans with cowpox, it does not seem that he was opposed to inoculation itself. It was the

shift from variolation to vaccination, bovine material instead of human material, that was cause for concern.

The only other occasion on which I can see that Kant refers to vaccination is one of his posthumously published notes. Responding to a query regarding his comment regarding smallpox vaccination in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant argues that only states with small of diminishing populations will need the 'germ [*Keim*]' of the smallpox vaccine (Kant 1922: 498). Natural increase in population will cancel out the fatalities from the disease.[12] Smallpox is not a threat to the survival of nation states nor the human race. Presumably the question of the morality of getting vaccinated for the sake of protecting others from infection would depend on proof that vaccination prevented contagion, or at least that lethal infection and transmission correlates with unvaccination. Ideally, long term vaccine efficacy needs to be verified. According to Andreas-Holger Maehle: 'Kant himself regarded smallpox inoculation as morally questionable, although he was apparently ready to accept it, if it was made obligatory by the state' (1995: 217).[13]

The DCDC's erroneous use of the example of Kant and smallpox is designed to drive home the point about vaccine resistance, to shape your judgement in the present about the present.[14] The Ministry of Defence authors' eagerness to place Kant in the anti-vaxxer camp indicates the brutal teleology of their own ostensibly conjectural discourse. It is appropriate that Kant features in a text concerned with moral qualities and biological characteristics. And if it is surprising to see the sage of Königsberg hauled before a fictional pandemic preparedness tribunal, what is more telling is the blurring of medical countermeasures with military countermeasures. This conjunction has an immediate ancestor in another scenario document.

Echo Chamber

> POSSIBLE FUTURE IN 2025: THE "ECHO CHAMBER" UNBRIDLED GLOBAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION COUPLED WITH SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION AND SELF-AFFIRMING WORLDVIEWS
>
> —JHCHS, *The Spars Pandemic 2025-2028. A Futuristic Scenario for Public Health Risk Communicators*

The Spars Pandemic 2025-2028. A Futuristic Scenario for Public Health Risk Communicators (2017) is authored by The Johns Hopkins Centre for Health Security. This document's 'scenario matrix' is another imaginative exercise that presents a futuristic narrative.

In 2025 a novel coronavirus emerges from Southeast Asia. With flulike symptoms and an extended incubation period (seven to ten days) compared to its latent period (four to five days), infected persons could spread the virus for up to nearly a week before showing symptoms of the disease themselves:

> Through August 2026, anti-vaccinators, Muslims, and African Americans remained largely isolated from one another. By early September, however, continued anger over EHR [Electronic Health Records] use and growing concern over Corovax's side effects spurred these once-disparate groups to join forces with the alternative medicine proponents … Japan's refusal to accept Corovax was widely covered in the international media. (JHCHS 2017: 46)

By 2027 adverse effects from the vaccine were amplified by social media, and health authorities were 'caught off guard by the new round of negative publicity':

> They were pressured by the public and media to award compensation to those claiming long-term effects from Corovax despite having no data to support these claims. Displaying a fundamental misunderstanding of scientific research, many demanded proof that the vaccines did not cause long-term effects. (61)

The Johns Hopkins Centre for Health Security conclude that demanding 'proof that the vaccines did not cause long-term effects' displays 'a fundamental misunderstanding of scientific research:'

> A widespread social media movement led primarily by outspoken parents of affected children, coupled with widespread distrust of "big pharma," supported the narrative that the development of SPARS MCMs [Medical Countermeasures] was unnecessary and driven by a few profit-seeking individuals. Conspiracy theories also proliferated across social media, suggesting that the virus had been purposely created and introduced to the population by drug companies or that it had escaped from a government lab secretly testing bioweapons. (65)

For the Johns Hopkins authors, anti-vaccination resistance to the 2015 measles outbreak rather than smallpox is the example of fundamental misunderstanding among sections of the public. A mental health security issue, one might say, concerning hostile or ill-informed critics. The point made by *Human Augmentation* regarding the proverbial gullible populace susceptible to disinformation has a discernible lineage. Infowars best describes this conjuncture.

In these scenarios enemies are not simply outside the borders, but rather are inside the domestic space, and the biomedical battle lines are drawn. This involves erasing the past, except in so far as it bolsters the current fight.

The history of predecessors meditating on military strategy, techno-political possibilities and threats, etc., is too long to mention and too well known to summarise here, and would include Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Schmitt, Mao, etc., and Kant, not least because of his reflection on the impossibility of perpetual peace. For Thomas Hobbes, self-defence is the first natural right. It seems that today there is no need to engage with the various articulations and decomposable and specific contextual intricacies of those who have written on the same topic. Whatever else changes, the threat of annihilation and subjection is a constant origin.

Such willed textual and historical amnesia, such resolute presentism and conscious oversimplification, signal dependence on these ancestors. That the traditional is erased and framed out indicates not only a profound teleological intent to stress the unprecedented nature of the current threat—which is itself a repetitive rhetorical trope of such texts—but also what has been called 'the law of the ultimate conformity of the law to the origin' (de Man 1979: 81). For the sake of brevity let us refer to the origin as the paradigmatic war of all against all. At once more than a historical hypothesis, it is the very condition of history and its presiding reality: it was and it is, and will be. Axiomatic and irrevocable, this dogma is not open to question and has the authority of nature: 'In such a system, history and interpretation coincide, the common principle that mediates between them being the genetic concept of totalization' (81). Modernity as diagnosis of one's present is an attempt at self-definition for the purpose of orientation.

Apparently fixed on the future, such texts are transfixed by the gaze of posterity from the future made possible by winners (and losers), where those who have survived because of our resolute sacrifice owe us a debt. This prospective vindication calls for a decision, what must be done, that is ethical or more precisely ethico-biological. We are in the presence of the man of action who forgets everything in order to do something and technological man as an incarnation of modernity.[15] Relying on differences to produce identities is integral to the campaign for unity as the pre-requisite for effective historical action.

The generative power of origination inseparable from the political appeal to decisiveness is linked to the generative power of technology. The concept

of nature as self-production is now anthropomorphised and subject to human will. The natural substance or organic life is now at our disposal. But it is also a threat, the working of death, which can be used against us. This means that ethics is not really the ultimately determining factor. *Human Augmentation* explains:

> The imperative to use human augmentation may ultimately not be dictated by any explicit ethical argument, but by national interest. Countries may need to develop human augmentation or risk surrendering influence, prosperity and security to those who do. This possibility is encapsulated by investment in artificial intelligence and gene editing. (DCDC, 47)

This clarifies and resolves the tension highlighted in the Foreword:

> Our understanding of the technical, ethical, legal and societal implications of these technologies will be decisive in how transformative they prove to be for Defence. Our potential adversaries will not be governed by the same ethical and legal considerations that we are, and they are already developing human augmentation capabilities. Our key challenge will be establishing advantage in this field without compromising the values and freedoms that underpin our way of life.

Our understanding of the technical, ethical, legal and societal implications of these technologies is ultimately irrelevant if it gives the advantage to our adversaries. Ethical superiority is at once presumed and relegated to a dangerous conceit, a vulnerability. Not exactly beyond good and evil, but certainly on the side of necessity; and justifiable so in light of our ethical and legal superiority, upon which, however, we must not rely.

Any temptation to caricature such anti-Blimpism must be tempered by the undoubted force of the logic mobilised. Recall Hobbes:

> To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no Injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. (1651: 85)

Hobbes was writing during civil war to redefine the nature of state power and the mutual relation between protection and obedience.[16] The obedience of citizens is predicated on being provided with security by the state. Hobbes also goes out of his way to stress the supersedence of that time when 'men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another … And as small families did then; so now do cities and kingdoms which are but greater families (for their own security)' (111). The same applies, of course, to nations.

It is no coincidence that on his first page Hobbes characterises Leviathan as an artificial being, an *animal artificiale*, an *automaton*, or a *machine*. As machine-like, the state is concerned with '*salus populi* (the people's safety)' (7). The right of necessity is affirmed by the necessity of the right to self-defence. The state is obligated to act under constraint that may not be legal for necessity of survival precedes, de jure and de facto, legality.[17] Necessity grounds law, and thus right, because the foundation of the state is itself not lawful. Before the law, temporally and logically, those sworn to uphold the law also have a duty that can render them outlaws whereby they appear regressive or primitive. This is the secret of the state, its origin and its self-contradictory perpetuation. Social cohesion is there only in the brute history of domination of the weak by the stronger.[18]

What appears to be happening today is that the professed weakness of the nation states vis-à-vis private corporations serves a number of requirements of governmentality. First, consider *Human Augmentation*'s profession of weakness:

> Economic forces will have a strong influence on human augmentation development and they may not be in the best interests of society. The private sector can employ more resources and have greater organisational agility than state institutions, meaning that they will remain at the cutting edge of human augmentation research. Enhancements will be highly profitable, and companies are likely to focus on human augmentation that is lucrative, rather than that which is of most benefit to humanity. The tension between states, societies and market forces is nothing new, but the consequences of mismanagement could be more severe in the case of powerful human augmentation technologies.
>
> (DCDC, 14)

The protectors of the national security are hamstrung by the power of private companies.[19] The system to be defended breeds its own vulnerability: 'The private sector invests more in research and development and has greater organisational agility than state institutions, meaning it can employ the best researchers to stay at the cutting edge of human augmentation research' (57).

Economic necessity is the overriding necessity that dictates room for manoeuvre. The private sector is the originator of technological innovation. Under the heading "Scenario—Globalised world, national tensions:" 'Nevertheless, human augmentation technology is very expensive and it is created and controlled by private organisations beyond the reach and control of the governments' (81).

Behind the fiction of authority is dependency on the private sector. Is the secret of national security that there really is no secret except the open secret

of capitulation to non-state, unelected actors? 'Similarly, enormous funds are being invested in gene editing by countries with citizens who are more accepting of the technology. Countries that invest in artificial intelligence and gene editing now are likely to reap significant returns.' (47) What ensures the loyalty of the private sector on which so much depends, etc.? And where do the enormous funds invested come from? From the private sector itself, or the state effectively subsidising companies and investors on the behalf of its citizens who 'profit' in terms of security from the synergy of 'public and private sector' (71)? Other questions multiply regarding this slavish self-presentation, but I would like to make one observation.

Are we not here looking at a double manoeuvre and rhetorical sleight of hand? The premise of international rivalry, the basic principle behind national security and the professed telos and source of authorial authority and legitimacy, serves as a bridge to what might appear to be its opposite. The elite scenario players, the nation's defenders, reveal their hand by way of a two-pronged attack:

> The need to use human augmentation may ultimately be dictated by national interest. Countries may need to develop and use human augmentation or risk surrendering influence, prosperity and security to those who will. National regulations dictating the pace and scope of scientific research reflect societal views, particularly in democracies that are more sensitive to public opinion. The future of human augmentation should not, however, be decided by ethicists or public opinion, although both will be important voices; rather, governments will need to develop a clear policy position that maximises the use of human augmentation in support of prosperity, safety and security, without undermining our values. (DCDC, 13)

We have noted the recurrent concern with ethical or democratic matters—'our way of life' (48)—and the susceptibility of 'public attitudes' (41) to fundamental misunderstanding.[20] This internal suspicion dovetails with a second element contained by the spectacle of national competitiveness. Nowhere is it mentioned, but that does not mean that its presence does not exert a pull on the key threads of the SPARS scenario.

Locked into nationalist rivalry—what Kant called a state of nature among nations like a state of nature among individuals[21]—beholden to the private sector (with no guarantee of their patriotism), the spectre of trans-national capitalism (the global private sector) points to one destination. If the private sector is trans-national, who then can control or profit from it? Presumably any equally global institution. Such an organisation ought to have the well-

being of each nation as a priority, but we know that the ideal yields to sectional interests.[22]

In this scenario national self-interest is best served by alignment with global power that reflects and interacts with the global capital that ultimately controls technological innovation. The narrative of national security has formed a bridge to world government. National security, and the sovereignty of those fundamental misunderstanders, is to be surrendered to a global elite in whose image the present authors model themselves. The jargon of self-preservation wrapped in the flag of national security transmutes statism into world statism. Again, under the sway of emergency measures to secure the ruling order, the question arises: Which (or whose) order? The one accountable to the people or the one ruled by experts emancipated from the tyranny of the random majority of a national parliament?

The purportedly new paradigm seems, if not exactly uncanny, despite all the talk of innovation and the unprecedented, then mundane in its predictability. Viewed through the lens of colonialism, a sense of déjà vu intensifies. When the disciplinary gaze is trained on one's own people, the psychological profile of the comprador elite collaborating with the colonisers suggests itself. Closer to rhetoric's concern with psychology and judgement, a course is plotted: from the behaviourist reduction of morality to 'behaviours and attitudes,' to the spectre of generational competition over limited resources, from the inconvenience of 'ethicist or public opinion' to the prevalence of 'fundamental misunderstanding.' The people must be saved from themselves.

Ritual genuflection to 'our values,' which may in fact be a source of weakness, signals that the topic of the military application of human augmentation has overflowed the frame of military doctrine.[23] . We are in the realm of moral philosophy, or better still, moral anthropology and the destiny of the human race. A race determined by internal divisions and progressive and regressive forces and protagonists; the state of nature (and politics) as the war of all against all.

What, then, is the purpose of such texts and their scenarios? It seems that the rationale is training through imaginations, the rehearsal of responses to possible situations, whereby simulation hones behaviour:

> The following narrative comprises a futuristic scenario that illustrates communication dilemmas concerning medical countermeasures (MCMs) that could plausibly emerge in the not-so-distant future. Its purpose is to prompt

> users, both individually and in discussion with others, to imagine the dynamic and oftentimes conflicted circumstances in which communication around emergency MCM development, distribution, and uptake takes place. While engaged with a rigorous simulated health emergency, scenario readers have the opportunity to mentally "rehearse" responses while also weighing the implications of their actions. At the same time, readers have a chance to consider what potential measures implemented in today's environment might avert comparable communication dilemmas or classes of dilemmas in the future. (JHCHS)

In so far as this involves increasing the probability of certain interpretations and certain judgements and action, the examples and scenarios are devices to shape behaviour. As Aristotle notes in *Rhetoric to Alexander*: 'It is a probability when one's hearers have examples [*paradigmata*] in their own minds of what is being said' (1428a27, 2283).

It is tempting to conclude that the extension of instrumentality from the military conception of personnel and equipment to society and ultimately the world that frames 'a whole range of possible futures, from the perfect utopia to the disastrous dystopia' (JHCHS, 80) may be the disease rather than the cure. But what of the inexorable movement of increasing technological dependency? We are, after all, a species caught in an irreversible process and no amount of moral finger wagging will change that reality.

Advancing Digital Agency

> The world is experiencing something of a mistrust pandemic when it comes to people's engagement with the data ecosystem. This global "trust gap" or "trust deficit" is a barrier to economic growth, digital innovation and social cohesion.
>
> —World Economic Forum, *Advancing Digital Agency: The Power of Data Intermediaries INSIGHT REPORT*

These generic discursive features are to the fore in *Advancing Digital Agency: The Power of Data Intermediaries INSIGHT REPORT* (February 2022) by the World Economic Forum (WEF). Once more the question of authorship stands guard at the opening of this text.[24] In place of a Disclaimer we now have a Preface that issues a disclaimer:

Disclaimer

> This document is published by the World Economic Forum as a contribution to a project, insight area or interaction. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are a result of a collaborative process facilitated and endorsed by the World Economic Forum but whose results do not necessarily represent the views of the World Economic Forum, nor the entirety of its Members, Partners or other stakeholders. (WEF 2022: 2)

Published by, but not necessarily representative of, the views of the World Economic Forum; nor, for that matter, of its Members, Partners or other stakeholders. Whatever differences and distinctions distinguish the organisation from the entirely of its Members, or the category of Partners from lower case stakeholders remain implicit. But none of their views are necessarily represented. Nor are the views of the World Economic Forum.

Whose views, then, might be represented? What then of the 'Lead Author' Anne Josephine Flanagan (Data Policy and Governance Lead, World Economic Forum) and the twenty-four 'Task Force on Data Intermediaries (Co-authors)' listed on page 41? A list that does not include Sheila Warren (Deputy Head, Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution Network) listed on page 42 under 'Acknowledgements,' although she is mentioned (and pictured) as co-author of the Preface along with Anne-Josephine Flanagan. Organisational titles suggest, if not Membership or Partnership, then employee status or at least affiliation.

However, it would be a mistake to attribute meaning and intention to even these authors. Under the subtitle "Towards Trusted Digital Agency" the Preface concludes with the following words:

> Finally, although any views expressed do not represent the views of any individual taskforce member or their organizations, we invite you to join us on this journey of exploration as we unearth and build a picture of where consensus may or may not lie in unleashing the power of data intermediaries leading to trusted digital agency – and where and when these types of policies could potentially be deployed. (3)

We have noted such attenuation of authorship and blurring of responsibility, this hedging and limiting of liability, as a deflective heuristic and politico-legal strategy; a *technê* or technique designed to achieve a definite end. It is an invention (*ergon*) often found in legal documents and distinctive of corporate reports. And, of course, the World Economic Forum is a private company with no public mandate. This is made clear in the Disclaimer:

>

> photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system. (2)

A strange and forbidding caveat with which to stamp the invitation 'to join us on this journey of exploration.' And somewhat in tension with the following profession of intention issued under the heading "Assumptions:" 'Indeed, it is intended that this paper be made available to contribute to future work by others in this space' (8).

No reproduction or transmission of this paper allowed. Perhaps the answer to this inconsistency lies in the meaning of 'others in this space,' which may not include everyone in the public space. 'This space,' presumably the space of public debate, has restrictions. Indeed, that 'this space' or forum (*agora*) is limited to those who share certain assumptions may be the operative, unstated assumption here. The *forum* in World Economic Forum is a private club, reserved for members (and certified guests) only.

At once an insight into the political-rhetorical structure at work, this framing is a mechanism designed to shape the reception and circulation of the text. That is, the problems identified and the solutions offered are packaged to avoid or pre-empt certain readings and possible challenges. Possibility is repackaged as probability. The mix of various elements indicative of this argumentative scheme (*topos*) and simulation can begin to be disaggregated. We shall see that the rhetorical goal of this exercise is the classic one of eliciting empathy.

The "Executive summary"[25] provides an overview of the insight report. A summary rather than an abstract, it is formally a representation of the report that follows, its main point and findings, in the language of its target audience. It is designed to save busy executives the time it would take to read the full document. In terms of such a protocol, how the problem is stated is of the greatest importance for if readers agree with the framing of the problem, they are likely to agree with the solution. Hence the following categorical exordium:

> The challenge
> Everyone is familiar with the paradigm of going online and clicking on terms and conditions they don't understand (or take time to read). No one knows (nor follows) what happens to their data. This status quo creates a reliance on companies to be responsible but can lead to mistrust in the data ecosystem as a whole. Further, mistrust between people and technology becomes amplified the more complex the data ecosystem becomes over time. (WEF 2022: 4)

The inclusive example of the ignorant or inattentive reader appeals to a common experience or opinion (*doxa*). A generalisation that covers particular

experiences has as its corollary an epistemological conclusion: ignorance leads to ignorance for 'no one knows (nor follows) what happens to their data.' Such is the existing state of affairs. At best they (we?) simply don't have the time, are too busy or occupied; too diligent to be diligent and too hard working to do this work. Just like the generic, corporate audience for whom the Executive Summary is designed.

This time misreading is counter-productive and creates 'reliance on companies,' a dependency on the responsibility of companies. The problem with this trust or confidence is that it 'can lead to mistrust.' Who is responsible for such mistrust? Presumably, one might reasonably conclude, the companies who have failed to live up to the trust placed in them. Yet there is no mention here of failure of duty or accountability, the flouting of an obligation, on the part of companies. Rather, pervasive 'mistrust between people and technology' is identified as the challenge:

> Where once people had screens to navigate, new ambient data collection methods with their many benefits create nervousness and resignation when people don't have the full picture. In some cases, individuals may opt out of interacting with technologies that would be of huge benefit to their lives. But what if it were possible to outsource these decision points to a trusted agent acting on an individual's or even a group's behalf?

The challenge boils down to 'nervousness and resignation' on the part of individuals who decide not to use technologies 'that would be of huge benefit to their lives.' Not the misuse of data by irresponsible companies, but the subsequent mistrust and withdrawal from technologies is the problem. People must be saved from the choices they make 'when people don't have the full picture.' Lack of information is the cause of uninformed choices, according to those who presumably have the full picture.

The crucial issue is what can be done about it, that is, the need 'to outsource these decision points.' The challenge contains the solution: delegate decisions regarding data privacy to a (responsible) 'trusted agent.' If people have the full picture then they will not be nervous and resigned, at once apprehensive and passive, actively resigned. The act of disengaging from technology is the same as succumbing to fear and submissiveness, trapped in a self-affirming world view. Such an activity is—when the full picture is taken into account—nothing less than dangerous inactivity. And yet it presents an opportunity:

> The opportunity

> Now that screenless technology is a part of everyday life, there is an opportunity to rethink the human-technology interaction paradigm and reposition the debate to focus on roles and responsibilities beyond the person. How can the use of data intermediaries help people navigate technologies and data ecosystem models without losing sight of what it means to be human, in terms of agency and expectations? How can people think beyond that given that, as they move towards the complexity of screenless metaverse issues, their understanding of "humanness" is transforming? Data intermediaries—especially digital agents—represent a new policy lever through and around which individuals can potentially navigate the challenges of the growing data ecosystem.

Paradigm in 'the human-technology interaction paradigm' means something more than example, and is closer to idea, model, or plan. Perhaps a set of coordinates or decision points for orientation in thinking; a programme or machine for turning possibilities into probabilities.

Indeed, the appeal to paradigms seems to be paradigmatic of such generic rhetorical exercises. As is the appeal for trust:

> This report seeks to shed light on an alternative method of mediated human–technology interaction whereby data appears to travel seamlessly from people to technology in a human-centric[26] and, crucially, trusted manner. By communicating shared incentives, establishing reputation or receiving third-party verification, as well as having assurance structures to mitigate risk to both the intermediary and the rights holders, data intermediaries can increase trust between people and the technology they interact with.

Predictably the WEF puts itself forward as a facilitator of third-party verification of data intermediaries, and an honest broker between public and private entities:

> The solution
>
> This report explores the opportunities and risks of data intermediaries and, specifically, third-party digital agents. From data trusts to trusted digital agency, the report paints a picture of a world that is more empathetic to people and to companies, providing greater certainty for data sharing as a foundation for innovation through the introduction of a trusted third party. Crucially, it suggests levers of action for both the public and private sector to ensure a future-proof digital policy environment that allows for the seamless and trusted movement of data between people and the technology that serves them. (underlining added)[27]

Why the world needs to be more empathetic to companies is not made explicit but is everywhere implied as the WEF positions itself between the private and the public sector. Recall that by 2001 fifty-three of the world's hundred largest economies were corporations and only forty-seven were nations (see Stites

2003). The impotence of nation states is a matter of economics rather than democratic consensus. As users of 'lever of action,' activity is on the side of WEF working for the common good, making a positive difference, rather than nervous and resigned individuals or groups who disadvantage themselves and the rest of us.

Dissent or scepticism is recoded as mental imbalance or neurosis; antisocial torpor, hopelessness, depression—a lack of rational capacity. Such lack of common sense threatens everyone's general prosperity and security:

> Effective trustworthy data intermediaries, which opt in or out on behalf of people, might ease the subjective need for strict legislation in specific industries and for specific use cases and instead allow for a more harmonized and holistic approach with multiple applications. (32)

Lest, that is, under-performers pull the data eco-system towards under-achievement, a sub-optimum outcome that is bad for everyone, etc. Our innovations become, in the eyes of reactionary conservatives, rash innovations. The conservative instincts of the people, and their indifference to the general good, constitute and almost insuperable barrier to rapid progress.

The pose of honest intermediary, despite the WEF being an NGO lobby group for corporations, is key to a text making the case for honest intermediaries.[28] Begging the question of why people do not trust big tech (i.e., they have not shown themselves to be trustworthy), the problem is located in the behaviour of people and governments.

> What if there was a better way? What if you could outsource the decision-making fatigue to a trustworthy third party? What if you could pre-consent to your preferences so that you did not need to continuously opt-in? What if technology allowed you to outsource your decision-making even further—to a digitally automated agent, potentially using artificial intelligence (AI), which could actively make those decisions for you? All such scenarios require the enlisting of an intermediary. (7)

'Pre-permissioning using digital identity' (12) based on 'a decentralized exchange system such as blockchain' (30) 'then can be the key to unlocking a less ethically concerning but arguably equally impactful scenario as an AI-enabled digital agent' (24). Take, for example, 'so-called vaccine passports … whereby the trusted data intermediary verifies that the data subject is vaccinated but does not share any other information.' 'This avoids unwanted secondary effects of the establishment sharing the data any further,' such as mistrust, etc. 'However, at a collective level, vaccine data is an incredible public health asset.'

Vaccine passports are, of course, legislated by governments. But the technology that made the digital ID possible was the result of innovation in the private sector, however heavily subsidised out of public funds:

> Standards:
> The private sector has a crucial role to play in the adoption of standards: what industry as a whole uses ultimately becomes endorsed at a systemic level. A government, in turn, may endorse it later, either explicitly or implicitly; at the very least standards are passively tolerated. (36)

It is the private sector that innovates, despite constraints, and governments that endorse, 'either explicitly or implicitly.' Which appears to mean that governments follow the market and passively tolerate its standards. This passivity, or secondariness, is what people and governments share.

What could go wrong is that people may find 'that they have or perceive to have reduced spectrum of choices or agency. This is due to the echo chamber effect of group think' (37). Setting aside the (unintended?) echo of the *SPARS Pandemic* document's criticism of self-affirming world views, the way out offers opportunities:

> On the flip slide, a lot could go right:
> —A balance of control for *any* user to understand the decision they are making as to voluntarily providing their data or withholding it, thanks to their understanding of the policy of the application and the accountability of the host company OR the scaling of the user's permission sets according to skill set on understanding technology. (37)

A lot rides on the understanding of the user. Non-compliance or resistance is recast as a matter of perception (rather than knowledge or understanding); subjective rather than objective. As Aristotle puts it in book seven of *Nicomachean Ethics*, such people are guilty of incontinence (*akrasia*); lack of mastery of their emotions. The echo chamber of group think signals misinformation, a psychological phenomenon of conformity of interpretation and decision-making.[29] Self-deception is the first step on the road to ruin whereby certain subjective limitations and hindrances threaten to pull us all down.

Balance of control to understand suggests that the control may not be unconditional and may need to be balanced. Balanced by whom (or what)? The understanding of the decision you are making as to voluntarily providing your data or withholding it will be determined by your understanding of the policy of the application and the accountability of the host company or the scaling of the user's permission sets according to skill set on understanding technology.

Who, then, will assess such understanding? And what is it to 'scale', i.e., calibrate or reset, 'the user's permission sets according to skill set on understanding technology'?

If you do not understand the technology, then your permission sets—the range of your freedom to make decisions—will be measured in accordance with your understanding of technology. Your understanding will be measured by *our* understanding of your (and our) understanding of technology. Only our understanding is not open to question. If your decisions are not satisfactory, then clearly you do not understand, and therefore 'your permission sets' must be modified.[30] Your consent has been informed. Ethics (the possibilities of individual agency) effectively reduced to a taxonomy of behavioural reflexes or compulsions, and resistance reduced to nativist distrust.

Such behavioural insights could only originate in group think. A peculiar mixture of evasion and dogmatism that, setting aside issues of literary competence and bad editing, reveals an all too familiar agenda. Predictably, the qualification and effective negation of autonomy is followed by a ringing endorsement of democratic participation: 'In developing the rules of the game for trusted data intermediaries … it is the voice and presence of the people that matter most' (38). But again, the participatory ethos is qualified and attenuated in another ritual genuflection:

> It is only by listening—to people to understand their experience and desires—to scholars who can isolate commonalities between models, and of course to governments who aim for evidence-based policy-making from a unique vantage point—that it is possible to start to understand the rich tapestry of the implications of data intermediaries, especially trusted digital agents, in different scenarios. (38)

The division of labour is clarified: evidence is produced by private businesses, scholars analyse models, and governments determine policy 'from a unique vantage point.' A vantage-point that is presumably neither that of private business nor academia. That the vantage-point is supposed, in a democracy, to be reflective of 'the people's voice' is left unstated.

This ellipsis fulfils a statement made earlier in the document regarding the relative roles of businesses and governments:

> Driven by the recognition of the importance of the data economy, it is clear that many governments understand the significance of making data available for innovation; at the same time, policy ambitions to promote data sharing are coming to light. However, because that often involves the sharing of personal data, data protection and privacy issues continue to be important. But data

> protection and privacy are highly evolved areas of policy-making, so it will be interesting to see how policy in the area of trusted data intermediaries evolves to take account of this tension. (17)

Governments are 'driven' by evolving circumstances to recognise the importance of making personal data available to the sector that innovates, the private sector. The government's role is to provide information for businesses to innovate with, and which will then come back to benefit government (and society). That is, if governments do not contribute to the constraint that impedes business innovation. Since that constraint can only originate in 'policy-making,' it is at the level of legal regulation that the virtuous circle of growth and innovation can be impeded. And *Advancing Digital Agency* is explicitly concerned with policy, and thus with politics, despite the note of impatience with governments. Policy as 'the policy of the application and the accountability of the host company' (37) is still policy.

Thus, a document purportedly concerned with data privacy policy and regulation locates data privacy and regulation, in so far as it is determined by governments, as a problem: 'the subjective need for strict legislation' (32). A problem concerning the balance between individual rights and the data economy that the authors invite us to view with interest, as if it were a curiosity or its outcome a foregone conclusion.

From this perspective, the real tension is between 'data sharing' and 'data protection and privacy;' that is, governments sharing data with non-governmental organisations. The actions of some governments can 'stifle innovation' (16) by tending to the side of people and their subjective perception which may be based on a misunderstanding of technology and the regulative framework.[31] Democratic accountability may be a constraint.[32]

We are here once more in the presence of a deliberative (or political) argument concerned with exhortation and dissuasion about future events—aiming to impress on the audience what is advantageous and what is harmful. Scenarios deploy conventions instituted by performative acts in texts that are mechanisms of self-formation. Imagined worlds are not, it seems, merely imaginary.[33] The figural dimensions of such texts are brutally real. What is being policed is nothing less than an exclusive interpretive community with real-life exclusions. Reason is at stake, for the rational scholar is all of us where the public use of reason is concerned for all enjoy the unrestricted freedom to make one's own reason and speak in one's own person (see Kant 1784).

Your choice, assuming you do not identify with those who make socially undesirable choices, is no choice. History, progress, technology, survival etc., have already made the decision for you. Texts as pedagogical devices concerned with the art of invention and technology of the self have brought us a long way from celebrating creativity and imagination to demonising dissent and dictating coordination. The set of diverse stories in circulation must be vetted and controlled. But isn't that just what the situation demands?

Conclusion

> Finally, the use of a data intermediary, to overcome the limitations of notice and consent, does not do away with the core components of notice and consent but merely displaces them.
>
> —World Economic Forum, *The Power of Data Intermediaries INSIGHT REPORT*

With individual rights curtailed, and the presence of 'trusted intermediaries,' such as fact checkers, to whom decisions regarding truthfulness and freedom of expression have been outsourced, plus a delinquent corporate media falling in line, one might think that the tensions referred to above have been resolved.

We are far removed from empathy and impartiality of judgement, at some remove from military and medical strategies, and appear to have wandered into the territory of demagoguery. Generalising the doctrine of the centrality of the survival instinct in human development, one can wonder if it extends to organisations and their personnel, and their thoughtful hypotheses. What is abandoned is any caution regarding the grading of human beings in terms of character traits and the profiling of types capable of dragging us all back to primitive times. Prognostications of the future are a technic for shaping the present in which similitude and emotion shape behaviour and judgement.

Scenarios working under the principle of the law of concession combine imagination and understanding with the aim of shaping judgement. Shaping the future also involves reinterpreting the past in a way that erases revolutionary struggles against oppression. Practical usefulness and historical necessity are anchored by the transcendent force of progress and development. Predictions are designed to produce and experience that may guide concepts and behaviour and the injunction *sink or swim!* is eminently political, and must be quarantined from any direct contact with government

policy. Such political distancing—again, the most political manoeuvre of deniability—is part of the DNA of social engineering. An aesthetic operation that is integral to *realpolitik* secures the claim to be beyond ideology and performs that most ideological act of domination and scapegoating.

The conception of technology aimed at controlling internal as well as external enemies, combined with the obsession with surveillance and biometric and financial centralisation, recalls the colonial matrix. Emergency measures signal a system that emerged from the combination of 'the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system, and the system of protection. These methods depend in part on brute force, for instance in the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation' (Marx 1867: 915). Officials with their knowledge about knowledge about your culture, history, traditions, society, and possibilities make the necessary decisions. The tendency of bio-technological scenarios to interpret humans as essentially biological code can slide from bios to animality: humans are hackable animals. The brute animality that habituates the mind to slavery, causing a certain class of humans to be viewed in a despicable light and as greatly inferior to the human species, is a constant threat. In this inhospitable world, Equiano's natural, familial connections violated by slavery are superseded by that most natural connection, the survival instinct.[34] Are you future-ready?

Texts that invite misreading and/or vociferous rejection pre-emptively position potential critics as those who do not understand or those who react subjectively and emotionally. Both are at once personal failings and an objective danger to other people and to the well-being of the polity. The truth of our subjectivity is revealed, and the aesthetic power of judgement that constitutes enlightenment proper foreclosed.

The genetic conception of humans, concerned with origin and descent (*genos*), is dominated by the teleological principle of perfectibility and its corollary the survival instinct, an irreducibly formative drive or force observable in living things. Beyond mechanical explanation, genetic engineering accounts for the connection between cause and effect, illuminating what has happened, what is happening, and what will (and ought) to happen. Scenarios, fantasias of possibility, reveal the normative mode of the latter, which like all normative arguments originates in psychological

processes. It is this latter subjective element that is defensively projected onto others under the pretext of self-preservation, a concept whose affective narcissistic birthplace is certain.

When hope takes the form of tomorrow's authoritarianism today, the protocols of a communicative strategy designed to curtail communication begin to replicate. Debate and consultation and consent are precisely what are to be constrained and managed along the lines of an open conspiracy directed against agents of degeneration. Past and future converge in the modern interconnected world distinguished by the genetic concept of totalisation. How long before a definitive environmental factor and/or genetic predisposition will be found to account for such recidivism that must submit to development as the law of concession/expendability applied to this dying out race?

With biotechnology in the form of genetic engineering the 'telos of technology' (Kenny 2021: 134) becomes natural purposiveness, legislated with all the authority that inevitability and universality demand. The final end as the realisation of freedom involves unfreedom, sacrifice and subjection as dictated by the condition of freedom and survival of the human race as final cause. Genetics as the transmission of inherited characteristics includes metaphysical concepts that 'make reason fantasize and wonder among chimeras' (Kant 1790: §78, 296). Under the heading of the determination or destiny of humanity, the seeds of the concept of race are preserved. What are such people good for?

Notes

[1] 'Major-General Darrell Amison, Director of the United Kingdom's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, provided an overview of the main drivers of insecurity … He also pointed to climate change and sustainability as cross-cutting, amplifying threats that interact with one another. "We need to think of societal resilience in a much broader sense than simply defence resilience," said Amison.' (SIPRI 2021)

[2] This conception of participation is important enough to trigger repetition: 'If used in the initial stages of policy formulation or when developing long-term corporate strategies, scenario analysis can have a significant impact on decision-making. The method provides a set of plausible and possible futures for which decision-makers should consider [sic.]. It is also useful as a tool for confronting decision-makers and stakeholders with alternative futures which they should make plans for. Engaging stakeholders and decision-makers in the

scenario analysis process can generate commitment for the projects, save time and produce more useable results' (DCDC, 74)

[3] See Aristotle on '[what] share insolence and avarice have in creating revolutions:' 'When magistrates are insolent and grasping they conspire against one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power. Making their gains either at the expense of individuals or of the public' (*Politics*, 1302b5-10, 2068).

[4] 'Such is what all governmental policies on modern science and culture attempt when they try—and how could they do otherwise?—to program invention. The aleatory margin that they seek to integrate remains homogeneous with calculation, within the order of the calculable; it devolves from a probabilistic quantification and still resides, we might say, in the same order and in the order of the same. An order where there is no absolute surprise, the order of what I will call the invention of the same.' (Derrida 1987: 39) See Cassidy (2020).

[5] The reference to the phrase 'expanding moral circle' is given in a footnote as: 'Singer, P., (2011) *The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress*' (DCDC, 45, note 26). The original title of Singer's book was *The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology* (1981). Singer: 'So it may seem that if we want to discuss human ethics we must shift our attention from biological theories of human nature to particular cultures and the factors that have led them to develop their own particular ethical codes. Yet while the diversity of ethics is indisputable, there are common elements underlying this diversity. Moreover, some of these common elements are so closely parallel to the forms of altruism observable in other social animals that they render implausible attempts to deny that human ethics has its origin in evolved patterns of behavior among social animals' (2011: 29).

[6] 'Ethics will be a critical aspect when considering whether to adopt human augmentation, but national interest will also inform, and may even fundamentally shape, the moral calculation. There is likely to be a fine balance between upholding the ethics that underpin our way of life and avoiding ceding an unassailable national advantage to our adversaries.' (DCDC, 48)

[7] According to psychologists, educationalists and an economist: 'the finding that people with higher levels in Emotionality/Neuroticism reported more worries and risks fits meta-analytic results linking Emotionality to various domains of insecurity or Neuroticism to anxiety … With regard to age, there were different patterns across criteria. In line with the fact that older people are actually more likely to suffer from COVID-19 health-wise, older people reported more risks concerning their own health, close others, and society. With regard to their work/study life, however, younger people reported a higher tendency of perceiving COVID-19 as a risk, arguably due to their greater susceptibility to a potential economic recession due to the pandemic' (Zettler et al 2020: 307).

[8] According to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, probability is not evidence and is often based on similarity, moving from what is familiar to what is less familiar. His example is that of a leader asking for a bodyguard, which indicates a general principle: 'that a man who asks for a bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot' (1357b36-1358a1, 2158).

[9] Aristotle explains that probabilities, likelihoods, are plausible because they resemble truths (realities); there is a perceived similarity, likeness, between what is plausible and what is true. But what is plausible and what is true are not necessarily the same thing (see *Rhetoric to Alexander*, 1428a27, 2283).

[10] Such modality of judgement is what Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason* calls assertoric. expressing only logical possibility that can be false and yet, if taken problematically, can lead to truth '(like the designation of a false path among the number of all those one can take)' (1788: B101, 209).

[11] According to Robert Ulin (2001: 44-45), functional anthropology, informed by instrumental rationality, produced knowledge that was technically utilisable. It worked together with the goal of indirect rule as the application of Durkheimian sociology to the requirements of colonial administration.

[12] In his account of the work of Edward Jenner, Stefan Riedel (2005) notes that although 2% to 3% of variolated persons died from the disease, became the source of another epidemic, or suffered from diseases (e.g., tuberculosis and syphilis) transmitted by the procedure itself, the fatality rate for the naturally contracted disease was 14%. Jenner was specifically interested in natural immunity. In 1771 Jenner curated the objects from Cook's first voyage, and declined an invitation to go with Cook on his second voyage.

[13] Martin Davies (1995, 138-139) points out that Kant paid no attention to Herz's writings. Peter Fenves speculates that 'Kant's surprising contempt for his former student and apparent friend … has something to do with his ambivalence toward the Jews-Palestinians, which seemed to have intensified with age' (2003: 185). Fenves claims that Kant changed his name from Emanuel to Immanuel to distance himself from the Jews of his day. This possibility makes all the more poignant Herz's gratitude to Kant expressed in a letter of 1770: 'It is you alone that I must thank for my change of fortune, and to you alone am I indebted for what I am; without you I would still be like so many of my kinsmen, pursuing a life chained to the wagon of prejudices, a life no better than that of any animal' (in Kant 1990: 109-110).

[14] As Kant put it in *Critique of Practical Reason*, such pedagogical devices seek to 'make objectively practical reason *subjectively* practical as well' (1788: 261). Examples are condensed into images that give rise to maxims and 'this machinery, these leading strings' (262) can enlighten or manipulate, sometimes both.

[15] 'But it is not proposed that the professors, or rather investigators, should refashion the world—only that they should provide the men of action with a scheme, a forecast, a chart of the waters of the future, which should save them from battling with irresistible currents, running on shoals, or drifting hopelessly into whirlpools of blood … The object is precisely to correct the blindness of the Real-Politicians' (Archer 1912: 116).

[16] 'Hobbes himself had experienced this truth in the terrible times of civil war, because then all legitimate and normative illusions with which men like to deceive themselves regarding political realities in periods of untroubled security vanish.' (Schmitt 1927: 52)

[17] Locke's Second Treatise of Government addresses the 'power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it': 'nay, 'tis fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government, *viz.* that as much as may be, all the members of the society are to be preserved' (1689: 198, 197). 'The secret of the law is that necessity knows no law, whereas all law must know necessity.' (Bennington 2017: 142)

[18] 'The world of Eloi and Morlocks is revealed first as devolutionary and then as one of predator and prey, of *homo homini lupus*. This must have a political, not merely a biological

significance. No society, Wells is saying, can escape the brutish aspects of human nature defined by classical bourgeois rationalists such as Machiavelli and Hobbes.' (Parrinder 1976: 272)

[19] 'The state, in other words, continues to dominate and organise society. But the source of its authority ceases to be distinct from those who exercise that authority. It is no longer conditioned by the existence of a prior source of authority relayed by mediating institutions like the church, the commune, the corporation, and the family, but instead emerges spontaneously out of the acts and leadership of those who lead the state.' (Drolet 2013: 42; see also Brown 2010: 25)

[20] 'Successfully exploiting human augmentation will require Defence, and society, to face up to uncomfortable ethical and legal dilemmas. So far, Defence organisations in liberal democracies have adopted a "wait and see" approach, choosing to let ethical debate and technical developments play out. This passive stance will cede momentum to our adversaries and cause Defence to miss opportunities to improve the well-being and effectiveness of our Armed Forces.' (DCDC) 'Thanks to the factor of self-preservation, which has blown itself up into totality, the following happens: what man is anyway once more becomes his goal.' (Adorno 1973: 37)

[21] 'Since a state of nature among nations, like a state of nature among individual men, is a condition that one ought to leave in order to enter a lawful condition, before this happens any rights of nations, and anything external that is mine or yours that states can acquire or retain by war, are merely provisional. Only in a universal association of states (analogous to that by which a people becomes a state) can rights come to hold conclusively and a true condition of peace come about.' (Kant 1797: 487, §61)

[22] 'National security properly refers to the relationship of the state to its environment, and becomes profoundly confused to the extent that the state is insecure within itself. In other words, the concept of national security can only be applied sensibly to the external side of the state's Hobbesian security functions. Unless the internal dimension is relatively stable as a prior condition, the image of the state as a referent object for security fades into a meaningless blur.' (Buzan 1983: 69)

[23] Recall Kant's criticism in "Toward Perpetual Peace" of the political moralists who insistently point to the predictable mechanical behavior of people as evidence that moral goals are mere habit or custom: 'such a pernicious theory itself produces the trouble it predicts, throwing human beings into one class with other living machines, which need only be aware that they are not free in order to become, in their own judgement, the most miserable of all beings in the world' (1795: 345).

[24] This report has two, possibly three, titles. The Internet address reads "Advancing towards Digital Agency," the title page reads *Advancing Digital Agency: The Power of Data Intermediaries INSIGHT REPORT*, and the footer on page two reads *Advancing towards Digital Agency: The Role of Trusted Data Intermediaries*.

[25] According to Lauren Brodsky (nd.) of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government Communications Program: 'An executive summary is a concise document, demonstrating the problem, findings and recommendation of a longer policy report … [in which] the writing is concise and clear.'

[26] 'Autonomy and agency are core tenets of human-centricity and fit in with the aims of restoring trust to human–technology interaction.' (WEF, 18)

[27] 'A data trust is a repeatable framework of agreements based on trust or contract law, allowing data rights holders to delegate control of their data to a trustee.' (WEF, 14)

[28] 'Liability: Under certain limited circumstances it may be appropriate to establish a special regime for reduced liability for those entities that voluntarily accept the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and confidentiality vis-à-vis their customers or patrons, and adhere to strict human-centric criteria.' (WEF, 35)

[29] 'Humans, often suffering from self-control problems, are simply following other Humans. Inertia, procrastination, and imitation often drive our behavior.' (Thaler and Sunstein 2008: 239 note) See Aristotle, chapter four of *The Poetics*, on the human instinct for imitation.

[30] 'For instance, empathic behaviors (e.g., social trust and social responsibility) were associated with greater adherence to measures such as isolation, hygiene, and less hoarding, while individualism was associated with less social distancing and hoarding. Studies also suggested that people with higher levels on dark triad traits (machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and lower levels of agreeableness were less likely to accept restrictions and comply with isolation measures. These traits are frequently referred to as antisocial traits, as they are typically present in people diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder.' (Miguel et al 2021: 1) This essay is published by PubMed which was developed and is maintained by the National Center for Biotechnology Information, at the U.S. National Library of Medicine, located at the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

[31] 'We found that the way people perceived the situation explained more variance in compliance than personality traits which is in accordance with the hypothesis that strong situations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, leave less room for dispositional tendencies in predicting behaviors than situational cues. Moreover, people scoring low on agreeableness and high on aspects of the Dark Triad traits (i.e., Machiavellianism, psychopathy Factor 1, and narcissistic rivalry) were less likely to comply with the restrictions.' (Zajenkowskia et al 2020)

[32] Those who dissent are diagnosed as manifesting antisocial 'Dark Triad Traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy)' (Nowak et al 2020). However, 'communal narcissists helped in more ways because they were motivated by concern for others' (Freis et al 2022). And other psychologists 'found that individuals reporting high levels of antisociality engage in fewer social distancing measures: they report leaving their homes more frequently (p=.016) and standing closer to others while outside' (O'Connell et al 2020). The present and previous note consist of journal articles published by Elsevier. The parent company of Elsevier is the RELX Group: 'a global provider of information-based analytics and decision tools for professional and business customers, enabling them to make better decisions, get better results and be more productive' (RELX 2022). RELX is involved in digital agency authentication and 'has helped US agencies, especially during the continuing pandemic, shift from identity verification to authentication. Front-end identity authentication is central to how the government dispenses hundreds of billions of dollars in entitlements, stimulus, benefits and contracts to people and businesses' (15).

[33] 'The [2021 Tabletop Exercise] scenario portrayed a deadly, global pandemic involving an unusual strain of monkeypox virus that emerged in the fictional nation of Brinia and spread

globally over 18 months. Ultimately, the exercise scenario revealed that the initial outbreak was caused by a terrorist attack using a pathogen engineered in a laboratory with inadequate biosafety and biosecurity provisions and weak oversight. By the end of the exercise, the fictional pandemic resulted in more than three billion cases and 270 million fatalities worldwide.' (Yassif et al 2021:6) See Happi et al (2022).

[34] 'Sometimes it seems as if modern humanity is rushing headlong toward this goal of producing itself technologically. If humanity achieves this, it will have exploded itself, i.e., its essence qua subjectivity, into thin air, into a region where the absolutely meaningless is valued as the one and only "meaning" and where preserving this value appears as the human "domination" of the globe. "Subjectivity" is not overcome in this way but merely "tranquilized" in the "eternal progress" of a Chinese-like "constancy" [Konstanz]' (Heidegger 1939: 197). Derrida (2021: 33) speculates that Heidegger's interpretation of modern technology was influenced by his awareness of research and findings in genetics and zoology.

References

Archer, William 1912. *The Great Analysis: A Plea for a Rational World Order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. The Great Analysis: A Plea for a Rational World-order : William Archer , Gilbert Murray : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Aristotle. *Poetics*. In: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Bollingen Series LXXI. Volume 2. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. New Haven, CT: Princeton University Press, 1995, 2316- 2340.

---- *Politics*. In: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Bollingen Series LXXI. Volume 2. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, 1986–2129.

---- *Rhetoric*. In: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Bollingen Series LXXI. Volume 2. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, 2152-2269.

---- *Rhetoric to Alexander*. In: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Bollingen Series LXXI. Volume 2. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, 2270-2315.

Bennington, Geoffrey 2017. *Kant on the Frontier: Philosophy, Politics, and the Ends of the Earth*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Buzan, Barry 1983. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in a Post-Cold War Era*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.

Brodsky, Laura N. nd. "How to Write an Executive Summary." Harvard Kennedy School of Government. how_to_write_an_exex_summ_to_use_4_18_18.pdf (harvard.edu)

Brown, Wendy 2010. *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*. New York: Zone Books.

Cassidy, Kerry Lynn 2020. *Rebel Gene: Secret Space and the Future of Humanity*. www.projectcamelot.tv

Caygill, Howard 2013. *On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance*. London: Bloomsbury.

Davies, Martin L. 1995. *Identity or History: Marcus Herz and the End of the Enlightenment*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

DCDC (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre) 2021. Human Augmentation—The Dawn of a New Paradigm. A strategic implications project. Gov.UK. May 31. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-augmentation-the-dawn-of-a- new-paradigm

De Man, Paul 1979. *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust*. London Yale University Press.

Derrida, Jacques 1987 [2007]. *Psyche. Inventions of the Other. Volume 1*. Edited by Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg. Translated by Catherine Porter. California: Stanford University Press.

---- 2021. "A Conversation with Jacques Derrida about Heidegger." *Oxford Literary Review* 43, no. 1 (July 2021): 1-61.

Drolet, Jean-François 2013. "Nietzsche, Kant, the democratic state, and war." *Review of International Studies* 39, no.1 (January): 25-47.

Fenves, Peter 2003. *Late Kant: Towards Another Law of the Earth*. London: Routledge.

Freis, Stephanie D., and Amy B. Brunell 2022. "Narcissistic motivations to help during the COVID-19 quarantine." *Personality and Individual Differences* 194. *ScienceDirect.com* Narcissistic motivations to help during the COVID-19 quarantine - ScienceDirect

Happi, Christian et al 2022. "Urgent need for a non-discriminatory and non-stigmatizing nomenclature for monkeypox virus." June 10. https://virological.org/t/urgent-need-for-a-non-discriminatory-and-non-stigmatizing- nomenclature-for-monkeypox-virus/853

Heidegger, Martin 1939 [1998]. "On the Essence and Concept o f φύσις in Aristotle Physics *B*, 1." In: *Pathmarks*. Edited by William McNeill and translated by Thomas Sheehan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 183-230.

Hobbes, Thomas 1996. [1651] *Leviathan*. Edited by J.C.A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

JHCHS (The Johns Hopkins Centre for Health Security) 2017. *The Spars Pandemic 2025-2028. A Futuristic Scenario for Public Health Risk Communicators*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/Center-projects/completed-projects/spars-pandemic-scenario.html

Kant, Immanuel 1781/87 [1998]. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

---- 1784.[1996]. "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 11–22.

---- 1788 [1996]. "Critique of Practical Reason." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 133-271.

---- 1790 [1987]. *Critique of Judgement*. Translated by Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett.

---- 1795 [1996]. "Toward Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 310-351.

---- 1797 [1996]. "The Metaphysics of Morals." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 353-603.

---- 1922. *Kant's Briefwechsel. Band IV, Anmerkungen und Register. Collected Works. Volume 13*. Kant's Briefwechsel. Band IV, Anmerkungen und Register : Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

---- 1990. "Marcus Herz. Letter to Immanuel Kant, September 11, 1770." In: Immanuel Kant, *Correspondence*. Edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kenny, Bridget 2021. "The New 'Arcadia'? Racial Capitalism, Technological Histories, and the 'Utopian' Future of Labour." In: *The Fourth Industrial Revolution: A Sociological Critique*. Edited by Trevor Ngwane and Malehoko Tshoaedi. Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 133-146.

Locke, John 1689 [1993]. *Two Treatises of Government*. Edited by Mark Goldie. London: J.M. Dent.

Maehle, Andreas-Holger 1995. "Conflicting Attitudes towards Inoculation in Enlightenment Germany." In: *Medicine in the Enlightenment*. Edited by Roy Porter. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 198-222.

Marx, Karl 1867 [1976]. *Capital. A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1*. Translated by Ben Fowkes. London: Penguin Books and New Left Review.

Miguel, Fabiano Koich, Gisele Magarotto Machado, Giselle Pianowski and Lucas de Francisco Carvalho 2021. "Compliance with containment measures to the COVID-19 pandemic over time: Do antisocial traits matter?" *Personality and Individual Differences* 168 (January 1). *PsyArXiv Preprints*. PsyArXiv Preprints | The role of personality in COVID-19 related perceptions, evaluations, and behaviors: Findings across five samples, nine traits, and 17 criteria

Nowak, Bartłomiej, Pawel Brzóska, Jarosław Piotrowski, Constantine Sedikides, Magdalena Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Peter K. Jonason 2020. "Adaptive and maladaptive behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic: The roles of Dark Triad traits, collective narcissism, and health beliefs." *National Library of Medicine. PubMed. Elsevier*, July 15.
Adaptive and maladaptive behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic: The roles of Dark Triad traits, collective narcissism, and health beliefs - PubMed (nih.gov)

O'Connell, K., K. Berluti, S.A. Rhoads and A. Marsh 2020. "Reduced social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic is associated with antisocial behaviors in an online United States sample." *PsyArXiv Preprints*.
PsyArXiv Preprints | Reduced social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic is associated with antisocial behaviors in an online United States sample

Parrinder, P. 1976. "*News from Nowhere*, *The Time Machine*, and the Break-Up of Classical Realism." *Science-Fiction Studies* 3: 65–274.

Riedel, Stefan 2005. "Edward Jenner and the history of smallpox and vaccination."
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1200696/

RELX 2022. *Annual Reports and Financial Statements, 2021*. relx-2021-annual-report.pdf

Rockefeller Foundation 2010. "Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development Area."
Scenarios For The Future Of Technology and International Development (2010) AND The Spars Pandemic 2025-2028 - A Futuristic Scenario for Public Health Risk Communications (2017) : Rockefeller;GBN;Johns Hopkins School ; Emily K. Brunson ; Tara Kirk Sell ; Gigi Kwik Gronvall ; Matthew P. Shearer ; Sanjana Ravi ; Hannah Chandler - PDF : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Schmitt, Carl 1927 [2007]. *The Concept of the Political*. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.
Singer, Peter 2011. *The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2021. "2021 Stockholm Security Conference opens, a human-centric approach to addressing complex battlefields." *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (SIPRI). November 8. https://sipri.org/
Stites, Tom 2003. "How Corporations Became Persons." *UUWorld*. May/June. https://www.uuworld.org/articles/how-corporations-became-persons
Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein 2008. *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Ulin, Robert 2001. *Understanding Cultures: Perspectives in Anthropology and Sociology*. London: Wiley Blackwell. Second edition.
WEF (World Economic Forum) 2022. *Advancing Digital Agency: The Power of Data Intermediaries INSIGHT* REPORT. February. WEF_Advancing_towards_Digital_Agency_2022.pdf
Wells, H.G. 1921 [1910]. *The Sleeper Awakes*. In: *The Sleeper Awakes and Men Like Gods*. London: Odhams Press Limited.
Yassif, Jaime M., Kevin P. O'Prey and Christopher R. Isaac 2021. *Strengthening Global Systems to Prevent and Respond to High-Consequence Biological Threats. Results from the 2021 Tabletop Exercise Conducted in Partnership with the Munich Security Conference*. *Nuclear Threat Initiative*. https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/NTI_Paper_BIO-TTX_Final.pdf
Zajenkowskia, Marcin, Peter K. Jonason, Maria Leniarska and Zuzanna Kozakiewicza 2020. "Who complies with the restrictions to reduce the spread of COVID-19?: Personality and perceptions of the COVID-19 situation." *Personality and Individual Differences* 166 (June). *PubMed. Elsevier*. Who complies with the restrictions to reduce the spread of COVID-19?: Personality and perceptions of the COVID-19 situation - PubMed (nih.gov)
Zettler, I., C. Schild, L. Lilleholt and R. Böhm 2020. "Individual differences in accepting personal restrictions to fight the COVID-19 pandemic: Results from a Danish adult sample." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 13, no. 1: 299-310. *PsyArXiv Preprints*. PsyArXiv Preprints | The role of personality in COVID-19 related perceptions, evaluations, and behaviors: Findings across five samples, nine traits, and 17 criteria

Suppressio Veri



\

It is not unusual for vaccination to be the vector of bitter controversy. When there is unclear information and general distrust and secrecy, confusion reigns (see Camero 2021).

In this scenario the unvaccinated are blamed for outbreaks and vaccine hesitancy characterised as selfish and irrational. Amid accusations of statistical fallacies and exaggeration of deaths, one doesn't have to look far for reasons to dissent. Firstly, one is forced to rely on unverified official statistics:

> As an example of the number of cases occurring all over the country, Mr. Charles Fox, a medical man residing at Cardiff, has published fifty-six cases of illness following vaccination, of which seventeen resulted in death … Among those who survived, several were permanently injured in health, and some were crippled for life … And if one medical man can record such a mass of injury and disease in which vaccination was the palpable starting-point and certainly a contributory cause, what must be the total mass of unrecorded suffering throughout the whole country? Considering this and other evidence, together with the admitted and very natural concealment by the doctors concerned, "to save vaccination from reproach" … is sufficient to demonstrate … that … both doctors and Government officials, however highly placed, however, however eminent, are utterly untrustworthy … Let this always be remembered in any discussion of the question. The facts and figures of the medical profession, and of Government officials, in regard to the question of vaccination, must never be accepted without verification. And when we consider that these misstatements, and concealments,

> and denials of injury … we are driven to the conclusion those responsible for these reckless misstatements and their terrible results, thoughtlessly and ignorantly, but none the less certainly, have been guilty of a crime against liberty, against health, and against humanity. (19-21)

Secondly, critical engagement is demonised:

> Why this effort at secrecy in such a matter if there is nothing to hide? Surely it is to the public interest that official statistics should be made as correct as possible; and private persons who go to much trouble and expense in order to correct errors should be welcomed as public benefactors and assisted in every way, not treated as impertinent intruders on official privacy, as is too frequently the case. (27)

Thirdly, rational debate is disfigured by callous moralising:

> So late as 1892 (Jan. 16) the *Lancet* declared in a leading article : "No one need die of small-pox; indeed, no one need have it unless he likes—that is to say, he can be absolutely protected by vaccination once repeated." (90, note 1)

These quotations are from Alfred Russel Wallace's *Vaccination a Delusion; its penal enforcement a crime proved by the official evidence of the reports of the Royal Commission*, published in London in 1898. Wallace, who was credited by Darwin with formulating the theory of evolution, and notorious for suggesting Darwin use Herbert Spencer's term 'survival of the fittest,' was writing about the nineteenth-century legislation of the compulsory smallpox vaccination.[1]

With variolation prohibited in England in 1840, by 1871 compulsion was backed up by monitoring and sanctions for refusing the vaccine. After a couple of decades of vaccination outbreaks, with milder symptoms, began to occur among the vaccinated: 'Hence a new disease arises—"small-pox of the vaccinated" ("varioloid," "hornpox," &c.)' (Edwardes 1902: 51). The era of revaccination began and lead to the recommendation that a second vaccination be given at the age of twelve.[2]

Wallace focused his criticism on the misleading and partial statistics issued by the Government, arguing that there was a lack of oversight and an inbuilt tendency to bias on the part of government officials and doctors that rendered statistics suspect even before they could be used as the basis of interpretation. Wallace lamented that 'such *suppressio veri* is no new thing' (1898: 18) when mistakes are being covered up in the hope that they will be ultimately buried by claims to have succeeded. The cost of that success will (hopefully) be forgotten, as people will want to move forward and not revisit what cannot be changed.

In response Wallace carefully sifted official documents and revealed inconsistencies and contradictions. Often the sample groups were too small, lacked a control group, monitoring and testing practices inadequate, or figures represented as misleading averages. He stressed the importance of environmental factors in causing epidemics. Lack of information, as well as inadequately tested vaccines, fuelled delusions and stifled debate.[3] The burden of proof rests with those subjecting healthy people to a medical procedure. Professions of good intentions and expert knowledge are not enough.

Looking back on the history of smallpox, medical historian Stanley Williamson concludes:

> The phenomenon continued to remain inexplicable until the complexities of the body's immune system began to be unravelled early in the twentieth century, but in the absence of any understanding or even a plausible explanation of the physiological process on which the whole moral justification for compulsory vaccination depended, the medical profession, with the wholehearted backing of the legislature, pressed on cheerfully and relentlessly, with results summarized years later [in 1962] by a former Director of the Public Health Authority [Sir Graham S. Wilson]: 'Smallpox vaccine has probably been followed by more complications and been responsible for more deaths than any other vaccine. The practice of vaccination was carried on for about a hundred years before the nature and causation of its attendant risks began to be appreciated.' (2007: 195-196)

Smallpox has been eradicated by vaccines with serious side effects in only 1% to 2% of recipients. Although modern smallpox vaccinations are not without risk—a one in a million fatality—they have been replaced with safer non-replicating virus vaccines. These are a far cry from the hurried, experimental procedure that so troubled Wallace and which few people now remember (see Henderson 2009; and Christiansen 2020).

Challenging those with a monopoly on information and who control the gathering, recording, and verification of data and certification of competence presents its own problems. Outside of the institutions of legitimation, dependent on the public use of reason with its obstacles and sinuousities, the challenge to free and open debate is a weapon of the weak, but a vital and telling one. Requiring incontrovertible evidence reinforces inequality because the powerful in a dominant position are not to be granted the presumption of innocence.[4] Such a presumption (equity) in an unequal fight reinforces asymmetry of power and provokes a feeling for justice. Appealing to legality alone, and disregarding this feeling, discredits the law (though people still follow it) which is merely the machinery of its police.

Today the very success of smallpox vaccination forms the basis of the most recent threat: "'You say, OK, what if a bioterrorist brought smallpox to ten airports?'" (Gates in Clarke 2021).

Notes

[1] 'His [Equiano's] son [Sancho], who is expert in bibliography, became assistant librarian to Sir Joseph Banks, and is also secretary to the commission for vaccination.' (Gregoire 1808: 129) See also Armistead (1848: 239).

[2] 'The Third Lesson of the Great Epidemic [1870-75] … The most impressive lesson of all was in the fact that in a severe epidemic once-vaccination in infancy did not prevent numerous attacks and numerous deaths amongst the vaccinated in a well vaccinated country as far as vaccination in infancy is concerned—like Bavaria, where practically the whole population was once-vaccinated … "It only showed" (said Dr. Koch before the German Commission of 1884, of which he was a member) "that the vaccination which we formerly had was insufficient, and that it must he made complete by revaccination." And Dr. von Kerchensteiner: "that is the very reason why we introduced compulsory revaccination."' (Edwardes 1902: 83-84)

[3] Edwardes notes of the early strong opposition to vaccination: 'After a year or two, and especially when small-pox began to attack successfully vaccinated persons, vaccination encountered the bitterest opposition in England … The abuse of vaccination was scurrilous in the highest degree; it was said that a new generation was growing up with bovine proclivities in general, and pictures were made of children with horns growing out of their heads' (1902: 44). Edwardes provides the counter-argument to Wallace's critique of the Royal Commission (1902: 114-134). See Webers (2010); Heberden (1818: 396-7); and Carpenter (2010) chapter 5.

[4] "We didn't understand that it's a fairly low fatality rate and that it's a disease mainly in the elderly, kind of like flu is, although a bit different than that." (Gates 2022) See Fauci (2020); and Clarke (2021). See Stefan Oelrich (2021), member of the Board of Management of Bayer AG and head of the Pharmaceuticals Division, on vaccines as gene therapies.

References

Picture of Corona Virus. Gov.UK. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/image_data/file/97727/s960_COVID_960x640.jpg

Armistead, Wilson 1848. *A Tribute to the Negro: being a vindication of the moral, intellectual, and religious capabilities of the coloured portion of mankind; with particular reference to the African race*. Manchester: William Irwin.https://archive.org/details/tributefornegrob00armi

Camero, Katie 2021. "Why did CDC change its definition for 'vaccine'? Agency explains move as skeptics lurk." *Miami Herald*, September 27. Why did CDC change definition for 'vaccine'? Agency explains | Miami Herald

Carpenter, Mary Wilson 2010. *Health, Medicine, and Society in Victorian England*. California: Praeger.

Christensen, Jen 2020. "Past Vaccine Disasters Show Why Rushing vaccine would be 'colossally stupid'." *CNN*, September 1. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/01/health/eua-coronavirus-vaccine-history/index.html

Clarke, Aubrey 2021. "Bill Gates Tells WHO to Do 'Germ Games' to Prevent Another Pandemic, Smallpox Outbreak." *sciencetimes.com*. November 4. https://www.sciencetimes.com/articles/34332/20211104/bill-gates-tells-who-to-do-germ-games-to-prevent-another-pandemic-including-smallpox.htm

Clarke, Christopher A. 2021. *Dispatches from the Vaccine Wars: Fighting for Human Freedom During the Great Reset*. New York: Skyehorse Publishing.

Davies, Martin L. 1995. *Identity or History: Marcus Herz and the End of the Enlightenment*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Edwardes, Edward J. 1902. *A Concise History of Small-Pox and Vaccination in Europe*. London: H. K. Lewis.

Fauci, Anthony S., H. Clifford Lane and Robert R. Redfield 2020. "Covid-19—Navigating the Unchartered." *New England Journal of Medicine*, March 26. https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2002387

Gates, Bill 2022. "Bill Gates explains COVID is 'kind of like the flu,' and vaccines are 'imperfect'." *Daily Wire News. Youtube*, May 9. Bill Gates explains COVID is 'kind of like the flu,' and vaccines are 'imperfect' - YouTube

Gregoire, Henri 1808 [1996]. *On the Cultural Achievement of Negroes*. Translated by Thomas Cassirer and François Brière. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. https://archive.org/details/onculturalachiev00greg/page/104/mode/2up?q=equiano

Henderson, D.A. 2009. *Smallpox: The Death of a Disease*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

Heberden, William 1818. *Commentary on the History and Cure of Diseases*. Boston: Wells and Lilly. https://archive.org/details/2556044R.nlm.nih.gov

Oelrich, Stefan 2021. "Speech by Stephan Oelrich (World Health Summit [24/12] 2021)." *European Commission, Speech Repository*. https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/sr/speech/speech-stefan-oelrich-world-health-summit-2021

Wallace, Alfred Russel 1898. *Vaccination a Delusion. Its Penal Enforcement a Crime. Proved in the Evidence of the Official Reports to the Royal Commission*. London: Swann Sonnenschein and Co. https://archive.org/details/b21356336

Webers, Thomas P. 2010. "Alfred Russel Wallace and the Antivaccination Movement in Victorian England." *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 16, no.4 (April). *Centres for Disease Control and Prevention*. https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/16/4/09-0434_article

Williamson, Stanley 2007. *The Vaccination Controversy: The Rise, Reign and Fall of Compulsory Vaccination for Smallpox*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Conclusion

> A World Order which shirked all unpopularity
> would be an absurdity.
> —Gilbert Murray, "Satanism and World Order"

The coordinates of colonialism as world unification provide a cognitive map for globalisation with humans as standing reserve, a resource to be used or discarded, subject to alien intention. Universalise the core principle of colonialism (resource extraction; expendable natives) and you arrive at alien invasion and world domination. As Wells has one of his characters say, "'humanity undergoes—dehumanization'" (1937: 89). The hypothesis of an organised and coordinating conspiracy cuts through the loaded explanations of the coercive choice architecture, effectively outlawing a free press and free speech. Depredations commence and retaliation follows until you become a portion of the established system, leaving absolute power in the hands of the very men who most benefitted from the suffering: "'They are experimenting with human mutations'" (79).

Echoing Wells's science fictions, the ghost of colonialism haunts those feeling powerless before technology and its controllers. As Zulu Shaman Credo Mutwa (2004) put it, if the dictators (Chitauri) are not even human, who controls the controllers? Has the open conspiracy mutated into an anti-human agenda that recalls the logic of colonial economy? If colonialism is the way of history, why should our future be any different from the past? Who (or what) would want to enslave humanity and destroy the world economy: 'A sort of massacre of small and independent businesses' (Wells 1940a: 73)?[1]

One can dismiss such a vision of the developmental world state as the product of reactionary conservatism. But it is worth noting that the projection of the non-human antagonist is eminently rational, according to Kant (1788: 19), and accords with the possibility that reason is not limited to human beings. To assume anything else is to presume that we are the only rational creatures or that other rational creatures reason like us. It is to substitute habit for cognition, and to think like an animal.

According to the reptilian hypothesis, they are rational but anti-human, and their rationality seems psychopathic from our point of view. The prospect of our expendability confirms the psychopathology of those lacking empathy

and remorse. The lizard theory, grounded on the colonialist norm, does not appear so irrational. Indeed, the Kantian scenario of alien invasion and colonial subjection gives this fringe theory an enlightenment pedigree. The race consciousness necessary for resistance takes the form of human race consciousness.

There is an obvious problem with the colonial scenario. Seeing oneself in the position of the colonised might entail sympathy with the victims of colonialism. It also vindicates colonialism in so far as the framework of colonial relations is naturalised and the categorical imperative is: colonise or be colonised! But it does preserve the perspective of a surplus population confronting dispossession rather than proletarianization; the colonial core of the voracious system. A reminder that primitive or originary accumulation as accumulation through dispossession is an ongoing process rather than a unique even (see Read 2002, and Vogl 2017). Politics and aesthetics intersect when planetary domination and control by alien interests display the telos of the concept of race—survival, progress, development—applied to the human race.

Whether or not alien invasion is a guilt fantasy of the beneficiaries of colonialism is less important than its potential as a self-confirming prophecy. Registering an alien, dehumanising agenda can slide into a reactive dehumanising agenda, but it also captures globalisation as internal colonialism and class war. (That is, until contact with extra-terrestrials is confirmed to reinforce the necessity of world government and further divide any opposition.) Recall that in Wells's cosmopolitanism with a vengeance all the weight of the Open Conspiracy was to be 'on the side of world order and against that sort of local independence which holds back its subject people from citizenship of the world' (1933a: 86). A responsible world directorate serves the common ends of humanity.[2]

A conspiracy-driven dictator may be necessary: "He ended war for ever. He did. He rationalised property and money. He inaugurated the Age of Plenty. He reconstructed world education";' but, ultimately, he too will become '[j]ust a memorial of reptilian energy, vestiges of a slobber in the mud' (Wells 1939: 440).[3] If fear of the 'progressive enslavement of the race' (1933b: 46) is the preserve of a fringe reaction, it is not without precedent. In the words of the Haitian Creole translation of *The Time Machine*: "'Ou ka imajine ki jan tout kalm

mwen disparèt. Brutes yo ti fèmen sou mwen'" (Wells nd.: np.).[4] Picture yourself as the hunted animal contemplating its predators.

We may not need aliens or lizards to explain how ideology works, but the prevalence of censorship and misinformation signal a power struggle:

> "But now we are beginning to realise that, for any revolution to succeed, there must be this core of special intelligence, of enlightened fanatics, so to speak, whose minds are liberated enough to imagine a new order ... the specialised backbone." (Wells 1940c: 73)

Then as now everything hinges on the distinction between international control, world government, and colonisation of the lifeworld. Who controls the controllers? Who would want to institute 'a new world money' (Wells 1940d: 177) or cashless society that will undermine national sovereignty?

If '[i]t's time for a Great Reset of capitalism' (Schwab 2020), and the firm cooperation of business and philanthropy, can it come about without increased dependency on the nation state? And to whom shall the state, as vanishing mediator, be beholden? Is debt to lead to subjection and even slavery? To save democracy, do we not need a few good dictators willing to strengthen political bonds through material interests?[5] Who will cauterize the labyrinth of jarring interests, conflicting authorities, and hopelessly disintegrated sovereignty?

The blindness displayed by statesmen, their complete sterility in the domain of political thought, their inability to adapt themselves and the institutions of their country to the growing requirements of the age, might lead one to believe they are bent on political suicide. If nation states cannot sustain their populations and their governments remain intransigent, clinging to power, the people must be appealed to directly. True global democracy will replace the destructive competitiveness of national self-interest:

> Countless people … will hate the new world order, be rendered unhappy by frustration of their passions and ambitions through its advent and will die protesting against it. (Wells1940a: 170)

The elite, including academics, journalists, etc., will identify themselves with 'a greater world order, a vast New Peace of universal opportunity and fulfilment, unfolding before mankind' (Wells 1940c: 2).

Imagine a willingness to criticise capitalism, and even hinder certain sections from functioning at all as part of taking a principled stance (against environmental degradation, exploitative labour practices, planetary disaster, etc.), so long as return on investment is assured even at the expense of some parts of the system.[6] Others are to blame for the persistent neglect of economic laws and the reckless administration of the

finances of the state. According to the self-appointed thought leaders of transnational capitalism it is time not only to repair the ravages of development, but to restart the world on a higher plane of civilisation than it has ever attained.

The scenario of the old society decomposing from top to bottom has capital accumulation shedding 'the conflicting sovereign states and all the bad old traditions' (Wells 1940c: 60). Then expropriation of the national producers will be justified because present economic growth is fingered as the cause of an existential threat. Economic activity will be regulated from outside via compulsory digital IDs and cashless central bank digital currencies, according to the needs of the global system and the toxic activity of individuals constrained accordingly. Capital accumulation, efficiency, and development will result in crisis resolution as human universality finally takes the concrete form of digital agency and the global citizen. With wireless transmission, the right way to do things has been found—as the global healthy emergency has demonstrated (see Chussodovsky 2022; and Zelenko 2022).

At the beginning it seemed that there was a huge gravitational force that could be felt, skewing public discourse, making you look for a corresponding object out there somewhere. Today, when the interests at play are out in the open, the pattern of coincidences tells a familiar story of carefully prepared pitfalls and traps. In such a context of free-floating anxiety, if you are not paranoid then you are asleep or not paying attention.

Even pointing out this scenario, testing assumptions about the future and warning against critical developments, plays into the hands of those who think they are in control when imagining the enormity of the transformation produces a sense of helplessness. Concern about wolves guarding the flock that takes the form of active dissent testifies to cogntive and self-control problems. The tendency to reduce economics to a childish fable of value wickedly appropriated speaks for itself, as anyone interpreting in good faith can see. The transitional suffering of the poor and the vulnerable—beginning with the elderly, the sick, and children—is a price that must be paid in order to avoid greater catastrophe.[7]

Every bifurcation keeps the juggernaut moving, the calculation of hesitancy and delay in the face of vehement exasperation the essential lubricant. Then you will be labelled as prone to react subjectively and emotionally, with no consideration for the greater good.[8] Fear of being a superfluous population tolerated through administered grace is proof of nervous instability. The only remedy is pre-permissioned compliance under the tutelage of a trusted third party overseer:

> "That *Pax Mundi* will not be any sort of repressive peace. Why should it be? At a certain stage in the—in the mental treatment of our world, there may have to be a certain amount of fighting and killing, police hunts for would-be dictators and gangsters, and so forth, but I doubt if intelligences more and more able to control the genes will need to eliminate undesirable types by force." (Wells 1937: 190)

Caught in a dilemma that has been anticipated to neutralise or demonise enemies, even as you protest the rules of engagement you will alienate rather than persuade. Always one step behind self-confirming logic whereby your opposition/dissent confirms the very scenario you are objecting to. Out of the humanistic wreck, and the not unprecedented failure of liberal values, the backbone of specialists consolidates world order.

Freed of the miserable traditions and discredited maxims of the past, transformation will be administered by those who have proved their metal by prospering in the current system and understand the measures that must be taken to achieve 'an efficient and beneficent world system' (Wells 1940a: 170). If trust in our honest brokers, who have fused moral sense and fiscal expertise, is not forthcoming then compulsion may, unfortunately, be necessary. Pleading for fairness and transparency in the face of the dispensers of progress will be, as Wells put it in *The New World Order*, 'as vain and unproductive as the bleating of lost sheep' (102).

Early in the morning, with everybody indexed and noted, the storm that swept all into the limbo of forgotten things will itself be forgotten. Alternatively, when the tide turns collaborators and fellow travellers face a reckoning, and the dead and the injured will not be forgotten.

Notes

[1] Albert Bourla (CEO of Pfizer): "'The first week we met in January of [2019] in California to set up the goals for the next five years. And one of the goals was that by 2023 we will reduce the people who cannot afford our medicines by fifty percent. I think today this dream is becoming a reality.'" Klaus Schwab: "'So it's really a purpose driven company.'" (Bourla 2022) See Vanden Bossche (2022). And Swart 202); Planting (2022); and Chutel (2022) for the South African story.

[2] 'While the pandemic acclimatised the world to lockdowns, normalised the acceptance of experimental medications, precipitated the greatest transfer of wealth to corporations by decimating SMEs and adjusted the muscle memory of workforce operations in preparation for a cybernetic future, an additional vector was required to accelerate the economic collapse before nations can "Build Back Better" … Therefore, the nation state model is gradually being upended by a global technocracy consisting of an unelected consortium of leaders of industry,

central banking oligarchs and private financial institutions, most of which are predominantly non-state corporate actors attempting to restructure global governance and enlist themselves in the global decision-making process.' (Special Correspondent 2022) See Bilderberg (2022). "'Nobody will be safe if not everybody is vaccinated.'" (Schwab 2022)

[3] For antisemite Nesta H. Webster, Wells's World State played into the hands of the Illuminati (Webster 1924: 336). See Wells's inside exploration of antisemitism in *The Holy Terror* (1939). For his part, Wells (1940b: 42–49) argued that conspiracy theorists like Webster are important and must be read and debated, not merely dismissed.

[4] "'You may imagine how all my calm vanished. The little brutes were close upon me.'" (Wells 1895: 81) Like the colonised, we are left with 'a sense of dethronement, a persuasion that I was no longer a master, but an animal among animals, under the Martian heel. With us it would be as with them, to lurk and watch, to run and hide; the fear and empire of man had passed away' (Wells 1898: 151). See Harari (2022); Guzman (2022); and Yeadon (2022).

[5] 'It isn't that they are opposed to democracy per se. It is simply that personal freedoms—protecting minorities, freedom to travel or to order any book from abroad, etc.—and efficient governance matter more to them than the ability to vote every few years.' (Kaplan 2022) See Viganò (2022); and Gates (2022).

[6] 'The World Health Organization (WHO) is moving to create an international Pandemic Treaty which could impose more restrictive and legally binding pandemic policies among its 194 member nations, essentially given the WHO the power to preempt the national sovereignty of member States, and by implication, the civil liberties and health rights of the world's citizens.' (Ji 2022) See Farage and Rigby (2022); Weinstein and Heying (2022); and Icke (2022). 'This avoidance of fundamental criticism is one of the greatest dangers to any general human understanding.' (Wells 1940a: 49)

[7] 'In searching for a new enemy to unite us, we came up with the idea that pollution, the threat of global warming, water shortages, famine and the like would fit the bill. In their totality and in their interactions these phenomena do constitute a common threat which demands the solidarity of all peoples. But in designating them as the enemy, we fall into the trap about which we have already warned, namely mistaking symptoms for causes. All these dangers are caused by human intervention and it is only through changed attitudes and behaviour that they can be overcome. The real enemy, then, is humanity itself.' (King and Schneider 1991: 115)

[8] 'Liberty is meaningless where the right to utter one's thoughts and opinions has ceased to exist ... Slavery cannot tolerate free speech.' (Douglass 1860: 75-76)

References

Adachi, Ken 2021. "Dr Noack Killed 4 Days After Posting this Vid on How Graphene Hydroxide Nano-Razors Destroy Body." *Educate-Yorself.org*. November 29. Dr Noack Killed 4 Days After Posting This Vid on How Graphene Hydroxide Nano-razors Destroy Body (bitchute.com)

Bilderberg 2022. "Bilderberg Meetings." Homepage (bilderbergmeetings.org)

Bourla, Albert 2022. "Davos Annual Meeting 2022—Conversation with Albert Bourla, CEO of Pfizer—Original." *World Economic Forum*. *Youtube*, May 25.

https://www.weforum.org/videos/davos-annual-meeting-2022-conversation-with-albert-bourla-ceo-of-pfizer-original

Chussodovky, Michel 2022. "The Shanghai 'COVID Zero Tolerance Mandate.'. Engineered Depression of China's Economy?" *Global Research*, July 12. https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-shanghai-covid-zero-tolerance-mandate-engineered-depression-of-chinas-economy/5786334

Chutel, Lynsey 2022. "Africa's First Covid-19 Vaccine Factory Hasn't Received a Single Order." *The New York Times*, May 12. Africa's First Covid-19 Vaccine Factory Has Not Received a Single Order - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

Douglass, Frederick 1860 [2013]. "A Plea for Free Speech in Boston." *Great Speeches by Frederick Douglass*. Edited by James Daley. New York: Dover Publications Inc., 74-77.

Farage, Emma, and Jennifer Rigby 2022. "Africa objects to U.S. push to reform health rules at WHO assembly." *Reuters*, May 25. https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/africa-objects-us-push-reform-health-rules-who-assembly-2022-05-24/

Gates, Bill 2022. *How to Prevent the Next Pandemic*. New York: Alfred K. Knopf.

Guzman, Timothy Alexander 2022. "The Cult of Globalism: The Great Reset and Its 'Final Solution' for 'Useless People'." *Global Research*, June 29. https://www.globalresearch.ca/cult-globalism-great-reset-final-solution-useless-people/5784969

Harari, Yuval Noah 2022. "Humans are hackable animals." *Youtube*, March 14. "Humans are hackable animals" - Yuval Noah Harari - Bing video

Icke, David 2022. "They're Not Done With Covid Yet." *David Icke.com*. April 8. They're Not Done With 'Covid' Yet – David Icke – David Icke

Ji, Sayer 2022. "The WHO's New Pandemic Treaty: A 'New Global Public Health World Order' Power Grab?" *EarthNewspaper*, April 14. The WHO's New Pandemic Treaty: A "New Global Public Health World Order" Power Grab? by Sayer Ji – EarthNewspaper.com – All The Honest News Fit To Publish

Kant, Immanuel 1788 [1996]. "Critique of Practical Reason." In: *Practical Philosophy*. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 133-271.

Kaplan, Robert D. 2022. "To Save Democracy, We Need a Few Good Dictators." *Bloomberg*, April 1. Russia-Ukraine War: To Save Global Democracy Sign Up a Few Good Dictators - Bloomberg

King, Alexander, and Bertrand Schneider 1991. *The First Global Revolution: A Report by the Council of The Club Rome*. New York: Pantheon Books. King And Schneider The First Global Revolution PDF : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Mutwa, Credo 2004. "David Icke & Credo Mutwa—The Reptilian Agenda (Part 1)." *Youtube*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4apWOUNOx64

Planting, Sasha 2022. "Where to now for Aspen after vaccine facility sits idle?" *Business Maverick. Daily Maverick*, May 30. Where to now for Aspen after vaccine facility sits idle... (dailymaverick.co.za)

Read, Jason 2002. "Primitive Accumulation: The Aleatory Foundation of Capitalism." *Rethinking Marxism* 14, no.2 (June): 24-49.

Schwab, K. 2020. "It's time for a Great Reset of Capitalism." *Mail and Guardian*, June 3.

https://mg.co.za/coronavirus-essentials/2020-06-03-its-time-for-a-greatreset-of-capitalism/
---- 2022, "Klaus Schwab—'Nobody Will be Safe if Not Everybody is Vaccinated.'" Klaus Schwab: "Nobody Will Be Safe if Not Everybody is Vaccinated" (brandnewtube.com)
Special Correspondent 2022. "The Great Reset Phase 2: War." *WinterOak.org*. March 9. The Great Reset Phase 2: War | winter oak
Swart, Nadya 2021. "Covid-19 vaccines—the raging debate after Dr Susan Vosloo's controversial video." *Biznews*, August 17. https://www.biznews.com/undictated/2021/08/17/covid-19-vaccines-vosloo
Vanden Bossche, Geert 2022. "An expert virologist predicts a severe summer COVID disease and hospitalizations." *Youtube*, May 19. An expert viroligist predicts a severe summer of COVID disease and hospitalizations - YouTube
Viganò, Carla Maria 2022. "English translation of the interview released by Archbishop Carlo Maria Viganò to Dr. Armando Manocchia for channel TV 'Canale Italia'." *Scribd.com*. April 2. Vigano on Canale Italia 2 April 2022 | PDF | Catholic Church | Pope Francis (scribd.com)
Vogl, Jospeh 2017 [2015]. *The Ascendancy of Finance*. Translated by Simon Garnett. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Webster, N.H. 1924. *Secret Societies and Subversive Movements*. London: Boswell Printing and Publishing Co., Ltd. https://archive.org/details/SecretSocietiesAndSubversiveMovementsNestaHelenWebster
Weinstein, Bret, and Heather Heying 2022. "128th DarkHorse Podcast Livestream: Life, Death, and Meaning." *Youtube*, May 28. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JUrjiIP5u0E
Wells, H.G. 1895 [1995]. *The Time Machine*. New Delhi: UBS Publishers.
---- 1898 [2012]. *The War of the Worlds*. UK: Penguin Books.
---- 1933a [1928]. *The Open Conspiracy: What are We to Do with Our Lives?* Dumfries and Galloway: Anodos Books. Also available at: The Open Conspiracy (gutenberg.net.au)
---- 1933b [1935]. *The Shape of Things to Come. The Ultimate Revolution*. London: Hutchinson and Co. The Shape Of Things To Come : Wells,h.g. : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive
---- 1937. *Star-Begotten. A Biological Fantasia*. New York: The Viking Press. https://archive.org/details/WellsH.G.StarBegotten1937
---- 1939. *The Holy Terror*. London: Michael Joseph. http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0608211h.html
---- 1940a. *The New World Order. Whether it is Attainable, How it Can be Attained, and What Sort of World a World at Peace will have to be*. London: Secker and Warburg. https://archive.org/details/TheNewWorldOrder
---- 1940b [2016]. *The Common Sense of War and Peace: World Revolution or War Unending*. Read Books Ltd.
---- 1940c. *All Aboard for Ararat*. London: Secker and Warburg. https://ia802904.us.archive.org/13/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.158780/2015. 158780.
---- nd. *Machin Nan Tan*. UK: Lightening Source.

Yeadon, Mike 2022. "The Covid Lies. Working Draft." *Global Research*, April 10. https://www.globalresearch.ca/covid-lies/5778646

Zelenko, Vladimir 2022. "Dr. Zelenko: Exposing the Evils of Medical Tyranny, the World Economic Forum & The Great Reset Agenda." *Banned.Video*, May 30. https://banned.video/watch?id=6294c8a93300592e34c62fee

Selected Name Index

About the Author

Shane Moran is the author of *Representing Bushmen: South Africa and the Origin of Language* (Rochester University Press, 2011) and *Resistance: Sol Plaatje and South Africa* (Lexington Books, 2021). He teaches at the University of Fort Hare, South Africa.

SHANE MORAN
Author of
Representing Bushmen **(2009)**
and
Resistance **(2021)**

PHILOSOPHY • LITERATURE • POLITICS

ISBN 978-0-6397-0950-5