21st Century Geo-political Discourses on India’s Diaspora: Global Perspectives

AND

Current Trends in Postgraduate Research in the Social Sciences
* Alternation is an international journal which publishes interdisciplinary contributions in the fields of the Arts and Humanities in Southern Africa.

* Prior to publication, each publication in Alternation is reviewed by at least two independent peer reviewers.

* Alternation is indexed in The Index to South African Periodicals (ISAP) and hosted online on the UKZN platform, on OJS, and by EBSCO.

* Alternation is published every semester. Special editions may be published p.a.

* Alternation was accredited in 1996.

**EDITOR**

Johannes A. Smit (UKZN)

**ASSOCIATE EDITOR**

Nobuhle P. Hlongwa (UKZN)

**ASSISTANT EDITOR**

Denzil Chetty; ASSISTANT EDITOR: Beverly Vencatsamy

**Alternation Editorial Committee**

Catherine Addison (UNIZUL); Nyna Amin (UKZN); Urmilla Bob (UKZN); Denzil Chetty (UNISA); Rubby Dhunpath (UKZN); Judith Lütge Coullie (UCanterbury); Brian Fulela (UKZN); Nobuhle Hlongwa (UKZN); Rembrandt Klopper (UKZN/UNISA); Sadhana Manik (UKZN); Jabulani Mkhize (UFH); Nhlanhla Mkhize (UKZN); Sikhumbuzo Mgadi (UJ); Shane Moran (UFH); Thabo Msibi (UKZN); Maheshvari Naidu (UKZN); Thengani Harold Ngwenya (DUT); Johannes A. Smit (UKZN); Graham Stewart (DUT); Beverley Vencatsamy (UKZN)

**Alternation Research Board**

Salim Akojee (Nottingham, UK); Robert Balfour (North-West University, SA); Lesiba Baloyi (Sefako Makgatho Health Sciences University, SA); Jaco Beyer ( Pretoria, SA); Stephen Bigger (Worcester, SA); Victor M.H. Borden (Indiana, USA); Vivienne Bozalek (UWC, SA); Renato Bulcau de Moraes (Paulista, Brazil); Ezra Chitando (Zimbabwe); Hamish Coates (Melbourne, Aus); Ampie Coetzee (UWC, SA); Scarlett Cornelissen (Stellenbosch, SA); Chats Devroop (UKZN, SA); Simon During (Melbourne, AUS); Farid Esack (UJ, SA); Noel Gough (La Trobe University, Aus); Rosalind J.I. Hackett (Tennessee, USA); Jeanne-Marie Jackson (Johns Hopkins, USA); Tony Jackson (Skyline College, Oakland, NZ); Russell H. Kaschula (Rhodes, SA); Langa Khumalo (UKZN, SA); Elmar Lehmann (Duisberg-Essen, Germany); Janine Lewis (Tshwane University of Technology, SA); Sam Lubbe (Milpark, SA); Sibusiso Masondo (UKZN, SA); Stephan Meyer (Basel, Switzerland); Suriamurthee Moonsamy Maistry (UKZN, SA); Pholoho Morojele (UKZN, SA); Herbert Moyo (UKZN, SA); Wade Nobles (San Francisco State, USA); Maurice Joseph Nutt (Xavier, University of Louisiana, USA); Francis B. Nyamnjoh (UCT, SA); Beatrice Okeyere-Manu (UKZN, SA); Bert Olivier (Free State University, SA); Charles O’Neill (British University in Egypt); Vivian Ojong (UKZN, SA); Kriben Pillay (UKZN, SA); Kathleen Pithouse-Morgan (UKZN, SA); Julia Preece (DUT, SA); Geo Quinot (Stellenbosch, SA); Lesibana J. Rafapa (UNISA, SA); Auwais Rafudeen (UNISA, SA); Mogobe Ramose (Sefako Makgatho Health Sciences University, SA); Erhard Reckwitz (Duisberg-Essen, Germany); Dan Remenyi (UWC/ Dublin); Cornelia Roux (Stellenbosch, SA); Hemduth Rugbeer (UNIZUL, SA); Michael Samuel (UKZN, SA); Federico Settler (UKZN, SA); Anand Singh (UKZN, SA); Lilian C. Siwila (UKZN, SA); Tholene Sodi (Limpopo, SA); Crain Soudien (HSRC, SA); Lesley Stainbank (UKZN/ DUT, SA); Kamilla Swart (American University, Dubai); Nisbert T. Taringa (Zimbabwe); Wilfred Isioma Ukpera (UJ, SA); Goolam Vahed (UKZN, SA); Gina Wisker (Brighton, UK)

**COVER**

Tea picker in Mauritius. Photo by Sultan Khan

**CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS**

The Editor: Alternation, Univ. of KwaZulu-Natal, Priv. Bag X10, Dalbridge, 4041, DURBAN, South Africa; Tel: +27-(0)31-260-7303; Fax: +27-(0)31-260-7286; Web: http://alternation.ukzn.ac.za

e-mail: smitj@ukzn.ac.za; Hlongwan1@ukzn.ac.za; chettd@unisa.ac.za; vencatsamyb@ukzn.ac.za

Print ISSN: 1023-1757; Electronic ISSN: 2519-5476

Copyright Reserved: Alternation
21st Century Geo-political Discourses on India’s Diaspora: Global Perspectives

Guest Editor
Nirmala Gopal

2017

CSSALL
Durban
Acknowledgement of Reviewers

We wish to acknowledge the participation of the following reviewers in the production of this issue of Alternation.

21st Century Geo-political Discourses on India’s Diaspora: Global Perspectives Reviewers

Rajendra Chetty, Literacy Development & Poverty, Cape Peninsula University of Technology
Ashwin Desai, Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Jayanathan Govender, Industrial, Organization and Labour Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Nirmala Gopal, Criminology, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Pierre Gottschlich, Political Science, University of Rostock
Kalpana Hiralal, Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Sultan Khan, Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Pratap Penumala Kumar – Religion, Philosophy & Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Bobby Luthra Sinha, Scientific Commission of Migration, Basel
Fatima Mukkadam, Political studies, University of the Witwatersrand
Sagie Narsiah, Social Policy, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal
Lia Rodriguez, Social Sciences, University of Palermo
Pragna Rugunanan, Sociology, University of Johannesburg
Amit Shankar Saha, English Studies, Seacom Skills University
Anand Singh, Anthropology, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Ramson Shakti, Education and Social Sciences, Cape Peninsula University of Technology
Lindy Stiebel, English Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal
ARTICLES

Nirmala Gopal  Editorial: 21st Century Geo-political Discourses on India’s Diaspora: A Global Perspective ................................................................. 1
Rajendra Chetty  Critical Identity and Ethical Consciousness in the South African Diaspora ................................................................. 6
Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed  The Guptas, the Public Protector’s Report and Capital Accumulation in South Africa ........................................ 26
Bobby Luthra Sinha  Indian Diaspora Policy and the ‘International Triad’ – Of Voices and Visions beyond Pragmatism ........................................ 50
Nirmala Gopal and Bonita Marimuthu  The ‘Politics’ of South African Indian Identity: Real or Imagined ...................................................... 76
Fatima Mukaddam  The Institution of Marriage: A Case Study on Social Pressures Surrounding Marriage in Muslim Indian Communities in Johannesburg .................................................. 107
Rajendra Chetty and Kasturi Behari-Leak  Fatima Meer’s ‘Train from Hyderabad’: Diaspora, Social Justice, Gender and Political Interventions ........ 127
Susan Julia Chaud  India and Trinidad & Tobago: Diaspora Building and Diaspora Integration – Implications for Emigration States .................. 143
Pragna Rugunanan  ‘Fitting In’: Social Cohesion among Skilled Migrant Indian Women and Host Diasporic Communities in South Africa ........................................ 170
Bettina Pahlen and Lindy Stiebel  Revisiting Grey Street: The Grey Street Writers Trail in the Context of Urban Regeneration ......................... 197
Kalpana Hiralal  Women in Anti-Colonial and Nationalist Movements: A Comparative Study of India and South Africa .................................. 233
Contributors ........................................................................................................ 255

Kalpana Hiralal and Sultan Khan  Editorial: Current Trends in Post-graduate Research in the Social Sciences .................................................. 263
K. Gopalan  Forced Relocations, Memory and Nostalgia amongst Indian South Africans in Post-Apartheid South Africa ........................................ 270
Divane Nzima  Channelling Migrant Remittances from South Africa to Zimbabwe: Opportunities and Obstacles ........................................ 294
Shabnam Shaik  HIV/ AIDS and Muslims in South Africa: The ‘Untouchable’ Disease .............................................................................. 314
Contributors ........................................................................................................ 367

PRINT CONNECTION  Tel (031) 202-7766; 202-7766
Editorial: 21st Century Geo-political Discourses on India’s Diaspora: Global Perspectives

Nirmala Gopal

Diaspora studies endeavours to understand and describe transnational experiences of migration within an inter-disciplinary perspective among fields as diverse as literature and cultural studies, economics, anthropology, and sociology. Scholarly studies of migrations, as is present in diaspora criticism, are not, and cannot be, a system of ordered and forced rules or critical regulations. The fluctuating nature of the material, and the constantly changing quality of international evidence and private awareness, mean there cannot be and should not be any single, coherently determined method of diaspora inquiry. This means that diaspora studies, is, by its very nature, quite diverse, theoretically, as well as methodologically. As such, diaspora criticism is by its historic, literary, media and legal nature a delta of interrelated critical streams that flow out from the multiple impressions, experiences, sufferings and memories of displaced persons, willing migrants and emigrants, and often, desperate refugees. From within the Indian diaspora legacy in particular, there is a wide array and multiplicity of documented empirical experiences, literary representations, and critical scholarly analyses, interpretations and reflections available in a plethora of published materials such as books and academic journals. The first part of this journal issue of *Alternation* makes an addition to this constantly growing corpus of materials, especially from a number of South African perspectives.

The journal begins with an article by Rajendra Chetty that focuses on British imperialist rulers who aimed to prove the ethnic pre-eminence of their race. In response, indentured labourers arriving in Natal as part of the Indian diaspora established and developed their own ethical standpoint. By analysing historic and literary data, it is possible to trace the emergence of a critical identity and ethical consciousness which were shaped by the experiences of the
South African Indian diaspora community in South Africa. The nature of this identity is historically significant and adds to the variable identities and ethical value systems of the country as a whole. Chetty also argues, that, in itself, this identity and the values it fosters, are also of considerable value in nurturing critical literacy and socialist consciousness for countering current social challenges related to various manifestations of racism and materialist indifference.

Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed, in their research, critically analyse the relationship between South African President Zuma and his family, and arguably the country’s richest Indian family, the Gupta family. This relationship has made persistent headlines throughout 2016 and 2017. The family, who arrived in South Africa from India in 1993, are accused of being involved in the removal and appointment of Government Ministers as well as the Directors of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) such as Transnet, Eskom, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and South African Airways (SAA). This article examines the allegedly improper relationship between the Zumas and Guptas. The analysis of this relationship also allows the probing of key socio-political issues more than two decades after South Africa’s independence. Some of the issues are the place of Indians in the South African political economy, corruption, Black Economic Empowerment, White Monopoly Capital, and the role of Indian capital in Africa.

This is followed by Bobby Luthra Sinha’s article that analyses the nature of the Diaspora policy present in India’s foreign policy and how it articulates with international relations. From being distantly neutral and adopting diplomatic routes of concern for Indian origin people abroad during its early post-Independence outlook, India’s Diaspora policies have turned volte-face by shifting to the foreground of its global profiling in more recent times. Three important agents responsible for this role reversal are represented by the forces of globalisation, transnational geopolitics and Diasporization, acting in tandem with each other. Referring to these three as the, ‘International Triad’, she employs this term and these concepts as heuristic tools in her analyses and interpretation. She shows that Indian Diasporas have come a long way, emerging as not only key drivers in development efforts but also in strengthening bilateral ties between host and home nations as other diasporas do. Her two main questions in this regard are: how do members of various Indian Diasporas assess the ‘everyday’ of this diaspora – home nation relationship, and, conversely, how responsive and compassionate is India to
the qualitative expectations of its Diaspora?

Nirmala Gopal and Bonita Marimuthu’s paper explores how South African Indians, as a diverse diaspora community, construct their identity. Their paper employs a qualitative methodology and research design, and examine the perceptions of three generations of South African Indians on identity construction. Participant responses are captured qualitatively with some responses represented graphically. Findings, although not generalizable, concludes with the voices of respondents showing clearly a hybrid identity model that informs South African Indian identity. Data for this paper was produced from 21 face to face interviews with three generations of South African Indians in the Metropolitan Area of Durban.

Fathima Mukkaddam’s research shows society’s focus on marriage in most if not all communities. This is manifested in social media, television, almost every movie, novels, children’s story books, conversations and the internet in forms of online articles and blogs, which emphasize a pressure on women to get married or have a companion. This paper discusses the institution of marriage and the societal pressures surrounding matrimony amongst members of the Muslim Indian community in Johannesburg. In this article, she shows how marriage is regarded as a necessary condition, especially for a Muslim Indian woman’s constructive and participatory role/ identity in society. The significance of marriage can be seen to be embedded within Islamic practices. However, this dogmatic view of marriage does not explain the pressures placed on individuals to get married. Islam advocates for fate and trust in God, therefore it can be argued these pressures are socially constructed as opposed to religiously inflicted. This article uses feminist methodological tools and theoretical perspectives in an attempt to debunk the role of patriarchy in the socio-cultural construction of the institution of marriage in modern society. The article is set as a case study which included semi-structured interviews. It concludes that unmarried women feel ‘judged’ and ‘scrutinized’ because of their marital status.

Rajendra Chetty and Kasturi Beharie-Leak’s article examine Fatima Meer’s memoir, *Prison Diary: One Hundred and Thirteen Days, 1976* (2001), and the short story ‘Train to Hyderabad’ (Meer 2010). Theoretically, they analyse the symbolisation of women’s isolation under male scrutiny, male rage at female autonomy, and the compulsion to gag female critique of male government, whether domestic, provincial or national. Behind the historical fact of colonial pseudo-slavery, termed indenture, which was not gender-
specific, lies the surviving, wide-spread and less-recognised phenomenon of female subjugation which may be termed female indenture. This reading of ‘Train to Hyderabad’ re-enacts a liberatory process: freeing the text in a way which reflects Meer’s own scripting of her work in a pattern of self-denial and socialist concern for the oppressed, about her.

Susan Chand’s piece discusses how India had influenced the community life of people of Indian origin in Trinidad and Tobago long before diplomatic relations commenced between the two nations in 1948. The paper historically examines India’s influence on the construction of community life and bilateral relations between India and Trinidad & Tobago during and post-Indian indentureship, spanning over 170 years. The paper draws from the written accounts by historians, government officials and scholars on the policies applied to the indentureship system, abolition, and bilateral relations between the two nations. Interviews of prominent persons from the East Indian community are integrated to provide contemporary perspectives on outreach strategies launched by the Indian High Commission in Trinidad and Tobago. The successes and challenges of the outreach activities in a multi-ethnic milieu like Trinidad and Tobago are also examined. The major findings indicate that cultural frames were employed by the indentured laborers to re-create India from their memories and were integrated into their community life. Policies during indentureship pushed them to develop close communal ties with all within the Indian community. Policies and resolutions to abolish indentureship underwent a long process. Current outreach strategies by the Indian High Commission are vibrant and inclusive of all ethnic groups.

In her article, Pragna Rugunanan focusses on migration which she argues has traditionally been seen as a primarily a male domain, particularly in developing countries. However, global practices have increased the visibility of women migrants such that the feminisation and irregularisation of migration has led to new flows of transnational migrant movements particularly to South Africa. This article further draws attention to the growth of south-south migration, specifically focusing on Indian migrant women, as accompanying their professional spouses migrating to South Africa. Set within a social cohesion framework, the paper examines how the women attempt to find a ‘fit’ in a socially diverse society where distrust, exclusion and racism still prevail. The paper is based on exploratory research using qualitative interviews conducted with married Indian women. The paper examines the reasons for their migration, their choice to migrate specifically to South Africa,
perceptions of South Africa, their sense of inclusion, and estimates to what degree they have developed a sense of belonging to the country. Preliminary findings show that the migrants find South Africans very tolerant, but keep to themselves, and that the fear of crime, amongst others, impedes integration.

Bettina Pahlen and Lindy Stiebel’s article emerges from joint research by scholars in South Africa and Germany on a literary trail devised in 2006 by the research project KwaZulu-Natal Literary Tourism. This urban trail, set in a historically Indian-occupied area of Durban, highlights writers who lived in and wrote about the related area. Coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the Grey Street Writers’ Trail in 2015, the literary trail was the focus of an MA dissertation by Bettina Pahlen on the relationship between the literature trail and ongoing urban renewal activity in the quarter.

Kalpana Hiralal’s work focuses on women who have been at the forefront of global nationalist movements. In Latin America, Asia and Africa colonialism and its subjugation of men and women inevitably led to the rise of nationalistic fervour. In both South Africa and India women were at the forefront of the struggle against colonialism and later, apartheid, challenging gender roles and creating new spaces for their political activism. This article examines the role of women in the nationalist struggle in South Africa and India within a comparative perspective. She argues that women’s political participation in different geographical settings were shaped and defined by class, gender, religion, ethnicity and race. Hence women’s experiences within global nationalistic struggles cannot be homogenised but must be viewed through multiple lenses. This article contributes to narratives on gender and nationalism and how regional and continental histories shape and define women’s participation.

Acknowledgement: The editor of this issue of Alternation wishes to extend her thanks to the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIHSS), for funding the administrative support for the editing of the issue.

Nirmala Gopal
Criminology and Forensic Studies
College of Humanities
University of KwaZulu-Natal
gopal@ukzn.ac.za
Critical Identity and Ethical Consciousness in the South African Indian Diaspora

Rajendra Chetty

Abstract
British imperialist rulers aimed to prove the *ethnic* pre-eminence of their race. In response, indentured labourers arriving in Natal as part of the Indian diaspora established and developed their own *ethical* standpoint. By analysing historical and literary elements, it is possible to trace the emergence of a critical identity and ethical consciousness which were shaped by the experiences of the South African Indian diaspora community. Such identity is memorable and transferable to the country as a whole, and of considerable value in nurturing social/ist consciousness for countering current challenges of racism and materialist indifference. This paper falls into two broad sections, the first deals with the history and context of South African Indian diasporic writings; the second section deals with diaspora identity.

Keywords: South African Indian; ethics; ethnicity; diaspora; identity

Introduction

The administration of this [African] quarter of the British Empire cannot be conducted on the principle of self-government as that phrase is understood by white men. It must be more or less in the nature of an autocracy which leaves with rulers full responsibility for the prosperity of the ruled. The administration of India, where this aspect of the
question has long been appreciated, is among the successes of which the British people, is most justly proud. The work done by England in Egypt is another proof of our capacity for autocratic rule (Lady Lugard\(^1\) 2012:1).

The British felt they had a duty to govern which was born out of their stifling sense of racial superiority, amply evidenced by Lady Lugard’s (also known as Flora Shaw) statement above. Indian immigrants to Natal conflicted, almost at once, with the British government that promised to employ them fairly yet regarded them as no more than a dispensable commodity. This conflict grew for half a century until Mohandas Gandhi mobilised the Indian community in South Africa to resist oppressive laws. Britain’s assumption of ethnic superiority was confronted directly by Gandhi’s ethical standpoint. Gandhi’s personal probity and public articulation of civil rights prevailed against the British administration not only in Natal and South Africa but in India as well. The following generation of his community in South Africa had to face an even more draconian form of racism, that of apartheid. His values were assimilated so thoroughly, and his wisdom inflected so deeply within the psyche of the Indian community that his political heirs lived to witness the collapse of that morally bankrupt regime.

Significantly, over the past twenty years, that is after liberation, several substantial works have emerged, which deal with the history and literature of the Indian struggle in South Africa and they include Fatima Meer’s autobiography, *Fatima Meer: memories of love and struggle* (2017) and Monty Naicker’s biography, *Between Reason and Treason* (2010). In 2007 Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed published the landmark volume, *Inside Indenture, A South African Story, 1860-1914*. In 2004, the collection of critical essays by Rajendra Chetty and Pier Paulo Piciucco, *Indias Abroad, The Diaspora Writes Back* appeared. The appearance of these narratives is in many ways a final, if somewhat belated, acknowledgement of a people’s fight for civil rights and cultural recognition. This paper seeks, albeit in miniature, to highlight the intrepid resilience of a community that steadfastly opposed injustice under the British Empire and apartheid government, and in so doing crystallized a critical identity which is of great value in fostering democratic

\(^1\) Flora Shaw is the wife of Sir Frederick Lugard, British colonial administrator of West Africa from 1895.
and egalitarian principles nationally. Ellapen (2017) notes that the return to the indentureship experience in cultural production disrupts the linear progressive narrative of the post-apartheid nation by revealing how the traumas of the past resonate in the present and opens up questions around racial formations, memory, history, and national identity.

**Diaspora and Indenture**

Many who left India for Natal in South Africa in the nineteenth century did so as indentured labourers or girmityas. The ‘passenger Indians’, generally the merchant class, paid their passage. Vahed and Desai (2007) relate the history of three women labourers whose resilience typifies key aspects of Indian diaspora identity formation. The account of the women who arrived in Natal from India in 1902 is an example of the resourcefulness of human beings when pressed under the yoke of social discrimination on two counts; being women and being Indian during the British, male-dominated Raj. Mangah (94570) arrived from Vizagapatam in August 1902 with two adult women, Gurrama (94571) and Botchi Auki (94567) and her three children. Their migrant numbers were painted on boards held up before each labourer for their identity photograph. The numbers are a clear indication of the attempt to reduce the person to an object which was the purpose of the imperial indenture scheme. But these women soon proved their subjectivity and reclaimed their individuality. Many Indians were attracted to the five-year term of indenture by the beguiling advertisements posted in their homeland: little of which was true. The British had been unable to force the proud Zulus to work and their spears were still dripping with British blood as the aftermath of the victory at Isandlawana where over 1500 British soldiers succumbed to the Zulu warriors. Britain turned to India, the crown of the empire, as a source of cheap labour. The indenture scheme was in fact border-line slavery. Before joining the scheme, Botchi and her party had written ahead to friends. She had discovered it was essential to be assigned to one of the few humanely run farms and not one of the cruel establishments; of which there were many. When arriving in Durban, the party of women resisted allocation by officials. They remained adamant in the face of threats to send them back. Eventually, the Colonial Secretary himself intervened: they were allowed to join the relatives they wrote to originally on Barrow Green Farm in Port Shepstone. This ensured their safety and well-being. Desai and Vahed put it succinctly: ‘Clearly there were
Indians with sufficient *nous* to work the system to their advantage’ (2007: 49).

Another example of the foundational elements of diaspora identity in South Africa is that of Rabos Bee (Indenture number 2397) who arrived in Natal from Madras in January 1864. In 1867 she married Goolam Hoosen and joined the Natal Government Railways as a clerk earning a salary of two pounds five shillings a month. She bought property in Victoria Street, Alice Street and Field Street. She opened and ran various businesses and by 1900 was the wealthiest businesswoman in Durban. She went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1902. At the time of her death in 1916 she was worth ten thousand pounds. She had lived and prospered by her wits; successfully overcoming the disadvantages of her situation in the white-run Empire (Desai & Vahed 2007:82).

Indian resistance at the sugar plantations of Reynolds brothers is another example of a growing political consciousness amongst the Indian community. The grand colonial mansion of Lynton Hall was the palatial home of the sugar baron Charlie Reynolds. His cruelty and inhumanity to the indentured workers on his vast estates meant he had the benefit of virtual slave labour with which to build up his empire of farms. Reynolds Brothers became the largest sugar producer in Natal. But labourers on his estates were not helpless victims. They created an underground network of informers who made the beatings and killings on the estate public knowledge. Little by little, the indentured labourers won the attention of the authorities until a formal enquiry was made into conditions at Lynton Hall estates. Charlie Reynolds was finally given an ultimatum in terms of the enquiry: no more labourers would be allowed to work on his lands as long as he was there. Charlie was effectively exiled. His brother took over. The patience, endurance and resilience of the indentured won the day. It was a turning-point for the history of Natal and crucial proof of the Foucauldian double-sidedness of any power relation. The subaltern had spoken, been heard and triumphed. Desai and Vahed write: ‘The indentured, far from allowing the authorities to mould them into submissive instruments of labour, found many creative ways to resist, subvert, and even escape the system’ (Desai & Vahed 2007:144). The ethical had conquered the ethnic. Desai and Vahed have been careful to emphasize that these immigrants were not made by the history of their receptive country but were instead the makers of a central, if not core, element of what would become the new nation of the New South Africa. The nature of an ethical identity formed through such
political trials is of great value in creating a climate of political accountability today.

Diasporic Narratives
The geographical diversity of the Indian diaspora has been shaped against the backdrop of the historical forces of colonialism, nationalism and neo-liberal globalisation (Hegde & Sahoo 2017:1) Diaspora literature functions in a multitude of ways: historical record, a writing out of pain for the author, a way of understanding for the reader, a refraction of the hopefulness, the loss as well as expected gains, ambitions and fears. It helps to have such drastic changes expressed in words. Literature of the diaspora can heal by description and empathetic narratives just as it can explain to those outside the trauma of leaving, what it is to forfeit so much materially, existentially and emotionally. Voluntary or involuntary exile, willing departure or lachrymose farewell: all are the larger demarcations of saying goodbye, not knowing or being home, remembering and gradually forgetting. Recording and dramatizing such leaving is often the function of diasporic writing; narratives of diasporic struggle assuage the pain. Between generations there is an intimate history which evolves in the continuum of the unconscious mind, a private inheritance articulated from grandparent who bravely faced the new country, to recipient progeny who treasure the character of forebears as foundational model for the construction of their own identity. ‘History’ therefore functions in various ways in diaspora recollection: in the sense of historical record (annal), interpreted history (politicised record) and private domestic chronicle (identity formation). All three of these eddying currents interflow and rejoin each other in the ways of a veined corpus. Fictional writing of a diaspora is organic in this sense of a whole body with strongly interconnected public and private historical inflows.

In The Vintage Book of South African Indian Writing (Chetty 2010), for instance, many of the texts represented are overtly narrative yet covertly historical records, familial and cultural maps of radically re-shaped genetic continua. Such fictional accounts often relay a moment of severe re-casting of place, character and culture to form a new amalgam of identity. It is important to be sensitive to this re-shaping of private and communal consciousness in the process of editing. Writing ranges from the intensely fictional, through the socially mimetic, to the demonstrably political: the first is least time-bound and
time-specific whereas the last is discernibly contained within an exact time-frame (an annal).

Indentured Indian labour in Natal was not only assigned to the sugar plantations, but also to coal mines. There was such extensive ill-treatment and neglect at the mines that the whisperings of satyagrahis (passive resisters) were quickly taken up. Women bravely spread the word: they threw a match to the tinder-box created by exploitative mine-owners. All histories are subjective; it is a narrative in its own way, by means of selection of detail and inevitable bias, so, conversely, fictional representation of diaspora periods can seldom be pure fiction but will be interlocked in historical reality. Because diaspora fiction, by definition, frequently chronicles traumatic, dramatic periods in people’s histories, it is often time-specific in the more acknowledged sense of history. This paper-thin division between fiction and history can create a blurred area between private-consciousness and public fact. This indeterminacy is what draws so many to the genre.

Within this context of history as fiction and vice versa, short stories such as ‘Grandmother’s Feet’, by Raazamah Pillay (2010), can be assessed. This particular story is complementary to the miners’ strike as well as an independent work of art. The child in the story is third-generation diaspora, innocent of her privilege; she asks naively about her grandmother’s splayed feet. ‘Why is your small toe facing the other way, Ouwa?’ the little girl asks. This is not only the voice of a concerned relative but of one who is ignorant of the sacrifice of the first generation. Pillay’s (2010) treatment of this question is on a knife-edge. If she dwells too long on the injustice of the coal-mines, she could easily turn the work of art into a harangue. Depicting self-pity may obscure the bravery which could both inspire readers from within the community and define it to the outside world. Too many tears will not assist close family or extended family to build a constructive identity. Pillay tells of how the great load of coal fell on Ouwa’s feet. She does so with enough life-like pain to make the old woman’s suffering vivid. Yet she retains sufficient sense of the migrant’s resilience to make the matriarch a role-model for her grandchildren. The tale is rooted in events of a particular time and is thus history. But, by its fictional nimbus, it encapsulates the plight of diasporas of many times and places. Pillay secures the sense of reparation, of survival and successful resilience, by ending her story with the epigram of the building

2 ‘Ouwa’ is Telegu for grandmother.
prowess of Nainah (Ouwa’s husband). Pillay tells of the stone buildings left as a proof of Nainah’s skill when he worked in Estcourt. His stone-masonry skills meant that there was a permanent tribute to him, and his people, in the town. This strength and craftsmanship translate the talents and resolve of one into the virtues of a community who did not collapse in misery but built, quite literally, a new place and meaning of place for themselves.

Because diaspora fiction is often liminally situated between fiction and historical account, sited within the interstices of angry expostulation, crumpled resignation, the definite and the indefinable, it may, at its most articulate, be not only extremely specific but also allusive, resonant and elusive. So Sita Gandhi’s (2010) ‘My Childhood at Phoenix Settlement’ begins with a precise date and place, a local habitation and a name, but imaginatively calls up the spirit of her grandfather, the Jain warrior of individual and universal liberty; his private discipline was the key to freedom of the self and all. The story begins with the exact, the annal: ‘I was born on 19th of October 1928’ (Gandhi 2010:149). But it ends with the world of sacrifice, self-restraint and idealism: ‘My father and his brothers had no carefree childhood and as a young man he was left alone here with the burden of his father’s ideals on his young shoulders’ (Gandhi 2010:158). At the start of the story, Sita Gandhi the narrator is the annalist, the family archivist as well as the spiritual purveyor of virtue and self-restraint. The spirit of Mahatma Gandhi, the good man, is almost at once re-kindled: ‘My father was the only one left to run the Settlement as my Grandfather had wished it to be run as a non-money making place, to serve the Indian community. My father did so and he lived and died a poor man. Had he chosen he could have been a rich farmer or a rich printing press owner, but he chose to live as his father wished’ (Gandhi 2010:149).

This desire for productive and virtuous community was a reality in the hundred-acre farm called the Settlement in Phoenix, Natal. It was a place of peace and honest collaboration – an Eden of sorts. It was in terrible contrast to Lynton Hall: the embodiment of the deceit and deceitfulness of the imperialist where profit was the defining end that justified the most inhumane means. Gandhi’s collective farm housed the printing press for the newspaper Indian Opinion: it could not have been further removed from the exploitation and indifferent cruelty of the coal mines and sugar fields of Natal.

The memoir of Mohambry Naicker (2010) who was accused in the 1956 Treason Trial has a chapter entitled ‘In the footsteps of the Mahatma’. At this point, literature and history meet. A personal record of trauma holds
particular meaning for diaspora writing. There is a sense in which third and fourth generation beneficiaries need, and want, to know how their founder endured so much: whether it was a grandmother’s crushed feet or an imprisoned paterfamilias. Naicker tells of how he answered the call of Gandhi to join the struggle: not this time against imperialist notions of ethnic pre-eminence but against quasi-Nazi attempts to prove white superiority: ‘It was the voice of Mahatma Gandhi calling for action. Without any preparation, without any experience, without the slightest hesitation, I threw myself into the battle’ (Naicker 2010:164). It was the conflict of ethnic versus ethical priorities. Naicker records the important moment of meeting Gandhi himself:

His teachings had become part and parcel of my life. His autobiography had been my Bible. We were ushered in his room by Mridula Sarabhai. Gandhiji was sitting cross-legged with the spinning-wheel in front of him. We had come to meet the Father of the Indian Nation, and the welcome we received was naturally that of a dear father to his affectionate children (Naicker 2010:165).

True to form, Gandhi challenges his visitors to ethical endurance; the self-discipline that forms the core of his ethical warfare. They are asked if they would spend the night sleeping out of doors and join him for early morning prayers. But they are unable to rise at four in the morning and slept through instead (Naicker 2010:166).

Indias Abroad – The Diaspora Writes Back
The perspective of those analysing Indian diasporic fiction outside South Africa helps to create a larger, more comprehensible framework in which to review South African Indian history and fiction examined so far. A wider lens enables the reader to recognize familiar patterns. The bewilderment experienced by Natal Indian immigrant-workers has been repeated countlessly in the pain endured by other voyagers, exiles, emigrants or racial victims. The literary analyst of diasporic writing outside South Africa identifies patterns and significances in global narratives which focus on domestic annals and fictional representations. International perspectives and wider theoretical viewpoints can link South African texts to those of other countries in order to create an objective context. The question then arises as to the degree to which the analyst
of the writer, or the writer of the experience of leaving, stresses the plight or prowess, the lament or the encouraging voice of resilience, or both.

Jaspal Singh’s (2010) article, ‘The Indian diaspora in Burma’, is an example of the analysis of diasporic writing from outside South Africa as opposed to the South African texts examined so far. This provides a useful vantage point for viewing such texts as those of Sita Gandhi (2010) or Mohambry Naicker (2010). In her essay, Singh undertakes a critical analysis of Amitav Ghosh’s *The Glass Palace* (2002) and Mira Kamdar’s *Motiba’s tattoos* (2002). In Ghosh’s story, Dolly, a Burmese woman, is married to Rajkumar, a Bengali. Dinu (their son) was shouted at on the streets: they called him Zerbadi – which is a swear word for people who are half Indian, half Burmese (Singh 2010:53). Uma, an Indian woman from Calcutta, experiences intolerance while traveling around the country. – ‘Everywhere she went she would see signs of a widening rift between Indians and their Burmese neighbours. Amongst students and nationalists and agitation was under way to separate Burma’s administration from that of British India’ (2010:53).

Similar to Singh’s (2010) essay is Ahmed’s (2004:70) discussion of Ghosh’s *The Shadow Lines* (1988) where she quotes from Blunkett who ‘can tell British Asians, more or less with impunity, that they should find marriage partners only from within Britain and that they should speak English in the home’ (2004:73). Such racism crushes any attempt to appreciate the ‘new’ country as part of a global identity: to compensate for the loss of a single historically-rooted identity. Any hoped-for compensation of cosmopolitan being or world traveller is lost. Rushdie’s dream of an international migrant is dashed by such bigots as Blunkett who crudely prescribes assimilation and proscribes bringing in any more ‘of them’. Romantic ideas, and ideals, of synthesizing old and new identities, of enriching both former and present lands, of growing into a global citizen, are all foreclosed.

Literature of the diaspora can heal or at least relieve pain. Both writer and reader can be healed by the process of writing out hurt just as reader, immigrant or local resident, can be relieved by gaining greater understanding, by reading a verbalized, written version of immigrants’ hardship. By speaking of Blunkett and letting others know about such racial prejudice, the writer, the analyst and the literary protagonist can claim to articulate injustice and thus exercise their resilience in the most essential way – they speak of it.

Rushdie articulates the condition of the migrant eloquently in *Imaginary Homelands* (1992), an essay which has become the *locus classicus*
of the diasporic state – ‘it’s my present that is foreign, and … the past is home albeit a lost home in a lost city in the mists of lost time’ (1992:9). As the migrant/exile attempts to reclaim the lost home through the double filter of time and migration, the motherland that is remembered is no longer the one that was left behind, nor an invented one, but an imagined one:

But if we do look back we must also do so in the knowledge … that our physical alienation from India almost inevitably means that we will not be capable of reclaiming precisely the things that were lost; that we will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary homelands, Indias of the mind. (Rushdie 1992:10)

In similar vein, the protagonist Rita, in Vassanji’s *The Book of Secrets* notes that the ‘past matters, that’s why we need to bury it sometimes. We have to forget to be able to start again’ (1994:298). Rita makes the happiness she does not find. She acknowledges the past yet is prepared to stay its call upon the present. This preparedness is the cunning of survival rather than the purist’s martyrdom on the altar of emotional truth. ‘Burying the past’ rings out as a mantra for so many of the valiant South African Indian women who knew they had to bury the past and endure present pain in order to secure a future for their children.

**Diaspora Identity**

Ronnie Govender draws attention to the issue of negotiating the past, integrating painful memory and vibrant present, in terms of the crucial matter of identity:

What was in the forefront was the problem of getting to grips with the cognizance of who Indians were. Were not ‘Indians’, first and foremost, South Africans? Were they acting in a way that seemed to indicate that they did not consider themselves true South Africans? (2008:20)

Indian villagers brought to South Africa have struggled to claim citizenship and identity, recognition and appreciation in this country for over 150 years
Rajendra Chetty
despite extraordinary contributions to the structure and establishment of the nation. The agony of such injustice and the pain of claiming citizenship are at the heart of Govender’s writings.

In ‘Identity and belonging in Post-Apartheid South Africa: The Case of Indian South Africans’, Vahed and Desai point out some of the sociological dangers facing the country:

1994 denoted the de-territorialisation of old apartheid racial identities. Race separateness was no longer codified in law and common citizenship was meant to glue all into a South African ‘nation’… The present conjuncture opens possibilities to debate issues of identity and belonging. If access to resources continues to be defined exclusively by race then one can expect increasing frustration on the part of the poors who will most likely be susceptible to racial and ethnic overtures (2010:3).

The search for belonging, or as Fatima Meer puts it in her 2003 speech at the Diaspora Conference held in India, the longing for belonging, is a core concern of Govender’s (2008) thought. His writings reflect the pain, anxiety and urgent desire that alternate in the search for home. The individual and collective odysseys of Indian migrants to South Africa span three centuries and include heartache, anger, injustice and joy by turns. The human need to belong, to call a place home, to associate freely with the beauty of a place and country, to identify fully, is fundamental to human beings yet has been denied to South African Indians in hurtful ways. Many hoped that the end of their five years of indenture would bring them freedom, or that the fall of the British empire would bring liberation, or the independence of India improve things somehow, or the end of apartheid herald universal franchise as well as tolerance. But well after these milestones came and went, matters may have improved in some aspects but the resistance and negativity remain in print and in voice despite the new constitution. The writings of Govender (2008) revivify the suffering of such reversal and rejection but his spirit of hope never flags. He forever holds out the banner of individual worth and final recognition. At the end of the play, ‘The Lahnee’s Pleasure’ (Govender 1992) the stranger demarcates an area of independent thought free from the cringing subservience required by white imperialists.

Humiliation and ill-treatment marked indentured Indian lives from the
moment of arrival in South Africa. The initial wrongs and attitudes of dislike have been documented right from the start on sugar estates such as Lynton Hall where English ladies minced through rose garden oblivious to labourers who expired in the canefields beyond or who clipped the pretty lawns they trod. Yet the sustained resentment of Zulus towards Indians is less regarded and generally avoided as too sensitive, not politically correct. So Edward Ramsamy in 2007 states, in a sanguine account of early Indian-Zulu relations, that ‘Gandhi’s settlement in Phoenix was in close proximity to the African population, and that Gandhi’s contact with ANC’s Langalibalele Dube led to a rejection of any feeling of racial superiority and increased his respect for the African people’ (Ramsamy 2007:477). In the same year, 2007, however, Heather Hughes points out that Gandhiji’s respect for Dube and readiness to learn from him were not returned by Dube:

Almost from the first issue of Ilanga, Dube made regular pronouncements about Indians (and allowed others to do the same). An item headed ‘The Indian invasion’ noted that ‘we know by sad experience how beneath our very eyes our children’s bread is taken by these Asiatics: how whatever little earnings we derive from Europeans, go to swell the purses of these strangers, with whom we seem obliged to trade ...’ (Hughes 2007:54).

Dube’s animosity is a disappointing attitude: his lack of receptivity dulls initiatives for reconciliation and hope of healing. Some may defend Dube by saying that such dark sentiments of racist resentment are time-bound: that such attitudes might not be seen today. Hughes suggests that the missionary station which schooled Dube may well have been the main cause of anti-Indian sentiment:

Perhaps the strongest anti-Indianism of all, however, was to be found at the Inanda mission station. The missionary in charge there from the 1840s to the 1870s was Daniel Lindley, in many ways no more liberal and tolerant than his missionary peers. A product of American Midwest religious revivalism, he was an anti-slavery republican, deeply committed to the upliftment of his African ‘parishioners’. Yet on the issue of Indian immigration, he was less than liberal and
tolerant: ‘the great majority of these imported labourers will never return to their native land … they are indescribably wicked, and seem to me hopelessly lost, now and forever …. I look upon these Indians as a growing cloud on our social horizon’. Other Inanda missionaries felt similarly (Hughes 2007:162).

The implications of Dube’s vitriol for Indian settlers in South Africa are profound: such newly arrived immigrants to Africa had enough of a struggle to find an identity and meaning in a strange land without feeling unwanted and unwelcome.

Another great name in the firmament of leading minds and spirits in South Africa’s history is Jan Smuts. As a founding member of the League of Nations, visionary of holism, universal co-operation and agreement, the Boer commando who was prepared to work for Empire and the greater good, might have been expected to regard Indian labourers with kindness and understanding given their contribution to the country’s prosperity and cultural wealth. Yet such is Smuts’s view of Indians in Africa:

South Africa is a little epic of European civilization on a dark continent. India is threatening this noble experiment with her vast millions …. All along the east coast of Africa from Mombasa to Durban, and ultimately to Cape Town they are invading, infiltrating, penetrating in all sorts of devious ways to reverse the role which we have thought our destiny (Marks 2000:216).

Smuts really does believe what he was told: that his white ancestors were bringing European civilization as a bright gift to a dark continent. He actually thinks of white people valiantly engaged in a noble experiment. He even considers the task of white settlement to be a destiny. The language he uses to describe Indian encroachment is telling at many levels. The word ‘penetrating’ has undoubted sexual connotations and signals many stereotypes of the insidious oriental threatening virgin white territory; land or womenfolk. A number of offensive patriarchal occidental prejudices are betrayed here. Edward Said’s (1978) characterization of Western white attitudes is enacted in Smuts’s view of Indian/orientals being devious vis-a-vis Anglo-Saxons and/or Christian men who are presumed to be uniformly straightforward, open and
honest. Sub-consciously Smuts says more about Smuts and white folk generally than he does about Indians.

Govender contrasts Smuts’s myopia with Gandhi’s generosity of spirit:

Gandhi made a pair of sandals for his jailor, General Smuts. Was that not a far more powerful cultural statement than the dogged perpetuation of ethnicity on the oppressor’s terms, under the guise of cultural survival? (2008:24).

It would be reassuring of the process of democratization if instances of negativity and ignorance such as exhibited by Smuts had waned. Regrettably, however, anti-Indian feeling and hate-speech continues unabated.

This thread of Indo-African tension was brought into the public domain in 2002 when playwright Mbongeni Ngema’s 2002 song in Zulu, ‘AmaNdiya’ (‘Indian’), attacked Indians for their alleged unwillingness to accept Africans as equals, for resisting change, being interested only in making money, and being exploitative. He protested the presence of post-1994 migrants from India and Pakistan and urged the ‘strong men’ of the Zulu nation to stand up to Indians. Lyrics such as ‘we are faced with hardship and poverty because everything was taken by the Indians, but they turn around and exploit us’ and ‘Indians are abusive to Black people, being more racist than Whites’, sounded a clear warning to Indians (Vahed & Desai 2010:3).

From every side therefore, Zulu, English or Afrikaans, Indians were neither welcomed nor welcome. Recent remarks suggest the climate has not changed significantly. South African Indians have had to claw any rights they possess from ungracious hands.

Gopal, Khan and Singh, in their research into the nature of identity amongst today’s Indian South African youth note that:

Notwithstanding the disruption of their belief system through Western teaching modalities in the disguise of modernity, Hindus re-
invigorated their sense of religious identity by reconstructing their religious spaces through associational life under trying circumstances. In the post-apartheid South Africa, with the re-integration of the country on the global stage, contact with their ancestral land enjoyed resurgence (2014:29).

With regard to Christian identity, John Arun writes of the influence of missionaries on Indians:

It is important to observe some common experiences and issues faced by both Indians and ethnic South Africans during colonialism in South Africa. Both communities suffered injustices from the colonials. They came from poor and oppressed backgrounds. Both faced humiliations, as Indians were called ‘Coolies’ and Africans ‘Kaffirs’. They both have undergone fear, dehumanisation, hunger and insult. They both carry the ‘wounds’ of past humiliations. Faith in Jesus Christ to a very great extent has helped them in healing their wounds. Today they are more competent to understand the wounds of their people. They are required together to play their role as the ‘wounded healers’ in the society (Arun 2007:255).

There are several worrying issues in this appeal for Indians to be wounded healers. The call for both groups to act as wounded healers is a serious difficulty. Why should anyone accept being ‘wounded’ as if that wounding is a fair part of life? There seems to be far too little sense of outrage at wrongs done. Even worse is the following statement in which Arun (2007) infers that thousands of Indians have chosen to convert not out of a profound sense of Jesus’s love but as a means of gaining social respectability in another social forum. Concern with respectability rather than the passion for living out a deeply felt Love seems theologically questionable:

For Indian converts from depressed communities, conversion was a way forward for a new and a better future. The new future for them had to do with the discovery of a new social structure, which could provide them a new identity, self-respect and a new socio-spiritual world view. The motives of conversion for Indian converts can be
understood as their need for a new respectable identity and an appropriate socio-spiritual worldview in which their generation could grow with dignity. However it is important to note that the depressed people took this route as per their own choice and accepted western culture as a new respectable identity over against their old caste identity in Hinduism (Arun 2007: 174).

The disrespect paid to Hinduism and lack of spiritual sensitivity align closely with the fear of difference and suspicion of the unknown seen earlier in missionary ignorance that nurtures Smuts’s hatred of otherness. In fact Indians, in presenting another way of thinking and living comprise a catalyst for change and deeper understanding in South Africa. Immigrants who bring new ideas and challenge native habits of thought are a gift to the landscape and culture of a new country.

If Christianity has a poor groundwork for identity formation and dreams of egalitarianism are uncertain, many young Indian South Africans resort to images of glamour and superficiality alive in Bollywood. Older generation Indians are strongly opposed to young South Africans modelling their identity on a mode of internationalism, or Bollywoodism or the rootless diaspora. The transformational quality of Govender’s (2008) theatre is meant to impact on the sense of being and identity of the audience. Authentic identity for a South African audience signifies for Govender (2008) a heightened social and private awareness of the individual and his or her role and duty in society; the many ways in which the individual can transform society for the better – towards justice and probity, self-reliance. Govender (2008) wishes individuals to be active citizens who contribute to the society about them; not passive replicas of a fictitious and finally corrosive place of imaginary bling and super-romance called Bollywood. Nevertheless, Bollywood has had a profound effect on the diaspora, especially among youth, globally. In Lourenco’s (2017) study of Bollywood in Portugal, she noted that watching Hindi movies and copying dancing practices played an important role in the construction of alternative cultural identities:

The passion for Bollywood is integrated in the urban culture of ethnic consumption, together with a general interest in India. The idea of remediation, however, suggests the processes of cultural circulation and globalization as generators of people able to make cultural
appropriations in accordance with their personal goals, thereby creating mediated cultural references. (Lourenco 2017:190)

The hope is that South Africa may provide an alternative and authentic identity for diaspora descendants from India. Brad Cibane raises interesting questions on the status of Indians in South Africa today.

There are two facts to consider. The first fact is that Gandhi’s propaganda regarding Indians and Africans was not unique. Many Indians believed they should be treated better than Africans. The successive racist regimes in South Africa between 1860 and 1994 further entrenched this prejudice. The second fact is that while the apartheid system favoured Indians over Africans, it did not improve the lives of all Indians. Indians got better homes, better schools, better jobs but they were subject to similar economic, political and social prejudices (Cibane 2013).

Although Cibane may soften the terms of debate with his recognition of ‘similar conditions’, his claim that Indians thought themselves better than Africans or that they were favoured over Africans under apartheid are important points to consider. If one looks at the tri-cameral parliament as an example, Indians and Coloureds were favoured by the Apartheid regime over black people as part of the Afrikaner racist strategy to divide the populace along racial lines.

Imraan Buccus (2010) writes with remarkable clarity of the current predicament of South African youth. Buccus shows that the fight for equality is ongoing: not an achieved situation of permanent peace, sweetness and light:

It’s not clear how the non-racialism cultivated in the Black Consciousness and trade union movements can be returned to the fore of civic life in contemporary South Africa. It still exists, of course, in the commitment, lives and work of many individuals. And it certainly still exists in some social movement politics. But the only thing that really seems to bind South Africans together these days is consumerism and the worship of bling. Consumerism can tie the children of the elites together, but for the majority who are not rich the culture of bling only compounds their sense of marginality and even
Critical Identity and Ethical Consciousness

desperation. The fact that so many young people are desperate is a real threat to nation building. There is always a grave risk that this desperation can be exploited by ethnic entrepreneurs hiding their fundamental complicity with racism behind the languages of culture, minority rights or even, on occasion, the left (Buccus 2010).

Conclusion
South Africans generally, and specifically those descended from indentured or passenger Indians, face a stark choice today: between the world of Lynton Hall or that communal ideal of Gandhi’s Phoenix Settlement; between materialism, Bollywood, bling or an inner probity; between ethnicity or ethics; mindless consumerism or critical independence of thought. Diaspora writing such as Ronnie Govender’s ‘The Lahnee’s Pleasure’ makes the implications of such a choice plain. Both in the prose version and the original play script Govender contrasts the white life of sterile and loveless privilege in the characters of the owners of the hotel with the world of labour, justice and probity on the ‘other side of the bar’. Pursuit of money, status and bling lead to the fraudulent, meaningless lives of those lahnees portrayed in his play. A commitment to an ethical life of sharing, political awareness and self-examination creates a continuum with the finest elements of the Indian diaspora’s past: community and development of an authentic individual. The history of South African Indians leaves a unique legacy of strident political activism and critical thinking just as the writings reflect lives of self-sacrifice, ingenuity and resilience. Within the broad review of Indian diaspora records, that of South Africa stands out as a testament to remarkable ethical resistance and critical identity. Solutions to the current challenges of how to resolve interracial animosity and promote democracy may well be found by reflecting on the history and writings of the Indian diaspora, by identifying and replicating such ethical consciousness and critical literacy in schools and universities. This is the unfinished business of South African history.

References
Rajendra Chetty


---

Rajendra Chetty
Literacy Development & Poverty
Cape Peninsula University of Technology
chettyr@cput.ac.za
The Guptas, the Public Protector’s Report and Capital Accumulation in South Africa

Ashwin Desai
Goolam Vahed

Abstract
The relationship between South African President Jacob Zuma and his family, and the Guptas, possibly the richest family of Indian origin at present in South Africa, has made persistent national and increasingly international headlines in the media over the past few years. The Gupta family, who arrived in South Africa from India just prior to the country’s first non-racial democratic elections in 1994, are accused of colluding with Zuma in the removal and appointment of government ministers, as well as the directors of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in order to secure lucrative state contracts. This article examines the allegedly corrupt relationship between the Zumas and the Guptas to probe key issues in post-apartheid South African society: corruption, state capture, inequality, class formation, Black Economic Empowerment, and White Monopoly Capital. It argues that corruption has negative consequences such as creating despondency amongst the populace leading to capital flight and creating the possibilities for state capture as well as further deepening inequality.

Keywords: Apartheid, Gupta, Zuma, Black Economic Empowerment, White Monopoly Capital, Social Cohesion.

The lexicon of South African English has been constantly transformed by the inclusion of words from the Afrikaans language, and phrases from the Indian sub-continent, as well as by some words and phrases from local African languages. When this potpourri of ‘English’ is spoken at a rapid pace, even an English
The Guptas, the Public Protector’s Report and Capital Accumulation

speaking foreigner could easily get lost as sentences are trespassed with local inflections (Mesthrie 2010). Like its relationship with Empire, sometimes seeking its protection, while at others trying to maim its soldiers in bloody battles, South Africans of all colours have always played around with the tutelage and language of colonial imposition. Arguably, the most beguiling of new words to enter the South African dictionary in recent times is ‘Zupta’. Used sparingly in the first years after Jacob Zuma became South African president in 2009, it has now become part of normal-speak in the country’s conversation.

The genesis of this word lies in the close relationship between the Gupta family, who arrived from India in 1993 and the family of Zuma. How are we to interpret this word? Does it signify a highpoint of Afro-Indian relations, where these families have become so intertwined that they can be identified by a single word, and point to broader cooperation between Africans and Indians, or does it suggest that Zuma and his family sit atop a shady consortium whose main corrupters are the Gupta family, and where this relationship serves to aggravate already negative African perceptions of Indians as exploiters?

This article provides a theoretical framework that examines the relationship between corruption, state capture, inequality, and populism. It then focuses on the Guptas’ arrival into South Africa and their increased involvement with the family of current South African president Jacob Zuma and through these political connections, in the economy itself. The third part of the article examines the South African Public Protector’s State Capture Report and public reaction to that report; and the final part reflects on the debates generated over such issues as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and White Monopoly Capital (WMC).

The article is mainly based on our observations of contemporary South African politics, analysing events as they unfolded, newspapers and online reports, and the official report of the Public Protector on allegations of State Capture. We hope in this way to produce a thematic / textual analysis of media reports, research and investigations to examine allegations of corruption and state capture in South Africa, and its impact on the wider society. We are aware that there are deep divisions in South African politics and that this applies equally to the media. Media diversity, we believe, is key to a vibrant democracy and we have factored in the biases of media outlets in our analyses.

**Corruption, State Capture, and Inequality**
There is a growing international literature on corruption, and specifically its
relationship to state capture, inequality and the rise of populism. According to Philip (2001), a case of corruption occurs when ‘a public official (A), acting for personal gain, violates the norms of public office and harms the interests of the public (B) to benefit a third party (C) who rewards A for access to goods or services which C would not otherwise obtain.’ Transparency International ranked South Africa 64 out of 176 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. This may seem reasonable but the country has regressed from 2001 when it was ranked 38. According to José Ugaz, Chair of Transparency International, ‘in too many countries, people are deprived of their most basic needs and go to bed hungry every night because of corruption, while the powerful and corrupt enjoy lavish lifestyles with impunity.’ Ugaz argues that societies with high levels of corruption are marked by unequal distribution of power and wealth, with the masses sometimes ‘turning to populist leaders who promise to break the cycle of corruption and privilege’ (Transparency International 2016). South Africa certainly fits this profile and it is one of the most unequal societies in the world.

Corruption, and even perceptions of it, can lead to despondency and cause people to be sceptical about calls to engage in philanthropy when they see leaders extracting profits for themselves (Hodess, Banfied & Wolfe 2001: 303). It may also lead to capital flight as those who are benefiting from corrupt practices may seek to invest money out of the country in order to avoid being caught out, while others may legitimately take their money out for fear of the consequences of an unstable economic climate. This may have a direct impact on the economy. Le and Rishi (2007: 323) concluded that ‘corruption does have a positive and significant impact on capital flight…. Capital flight and corruption are some of the main causes of the poverty in the South. Without capital flight and corruption the debt crisis would not exist in its current form.’ Corruption may also have a direct impact on the economy in that key political leaders may get drawn into long and costly legal matters, tying up valuable state resources. The many years that South African president Jacob Zuma has spent fighting legal battles and his struggles against key state institutions are testimony to this.

This article is specifically concerned with one of the most direct and serious consequences of corruption, namely, state capture. The World Bank (2000) first coined this term to refer to the situation in those countries that were part of the former Soviet Republic where in the transition from communism, small groups of people used the state to enrich themselves. They came to be
known as ‘oligarchs’. In Latin America, the focus was on the role of drug lords
in corrupting the state (Crabtree & Durand 2017: 1). Philip (2001) defines state
capture as ‘the domination of state institutions by individuals or groups in
pursuit of their private interests.’ Lugon-Moulin (2017) states that state capture
occurs when business or ruling elites ‘manipulate policy formation and
influence the emerging rules of the game (including laws and economic
regulations) to their own advantage.’ According to Edwards (2017), private
individuals manipulate the laws and government bureaucracy in instances of
state capture, which may not necessarily be illegal, but is aimed at influencing
state policies and laws in their favour. Lugon-Moulin (2017) alerts us to the
fact that in examining state capture we should focus on the ‘types of institutions
subject to capture (Legislative, Executive, Judiciary, regulatory agencies,
public works ministries) and the types of actors actively seeking to capture
(large private firms, political leaders, high ranking officials, interest groups).’

Two broad explanations of state capture are dominant in the social
sciences; one that sees state capture as a deviation from the ‘correct’ path which
can be rectified through institutional reform; and another that argues that
corporations influence political leadership to ensure that legislation helps them
to maximise profit (Crabtree & Durand 2017: 2). As long ago as 1956, C.
Wright Mills, the American sociologist, argued in The Political Elite that
political, military, and economic elites share a common world view, and that
power in society rested in the centralisation of authority within these elites. It
is this second form of analysis, also termed ‘political capture’, that is applicable
to the South African case. Crabtree and Durand (2017: 3) further argue that
this form of capture does not have to involve corruption and that it flourishes
primarily because ‘state institutions lack accountability and civil society [is]
constituted in such a way as to be unable to provide a counter-weight to
corporate influence.’

Against this background of the existing literature it is our contention
that what distinguishes state capture from ordinary corruption is the capacity
of a private interest to intrude in state affairs to the point of directly determining
state policy. This is not the stuff of lobbying or bribing officials to obtain
contracts for work that is both needed and properly decided upon. The private
actor is enabled to directly determine policy such that ‘captured’ members of
the executive champion projects and steer budgetary allocations towards these
private actors. The state does not simply get ripped off, it is controlled.

Bhorat et al. (2017) usefully put the allegation as follows: The Gupta-
Zuma alliance, comprising a relatively small network of companies and individuals holds a ‘symbiotic relationship between the constitutional and shadow state together’ (Bhorat et al. 2017: 61). Performed efficiently, the capture of a state occurs quite openly through the exercise of legal and administrative decision-making. The effective decision has, however, already been made in the shadows. Such a decision is solely responsive to private financial interests and it is the task of the executive to either dress it up as proper policy or ward off any legal challenges to it.

**Zuptanomics**

Despite being in the country for over two decades, the Gupta family literally zoomed into the consciousness of South Africans in April 2013 when they were allowed to use the South African Air Force Base at Waterkloof to land a plane load of 217 guests from India who were attending a family wedding at the exclusive Sun City holiday resort, located roughly 160 kilometres away in the Pilanesberg area in the North West Province. Television cameras captured the blue light brigade standing to attention at the airport and escorting the guests to Sun City (Mataboge 2013). Leaked e-mails in 2017 revealed that public funds were in fact laundered from a project in the Free State Province via Dubai to pay for this showcase wedding (AmaBhungane 2017).

As the sirens and blazing lights swept their way to Sun City, one would have not been remiss to think that a foreign Head of State had arrived. Questions were raised and fingers pointed to the President. But blame was laid at the door of a functionary, Bruce Koloane, the chief of state protocol at the Department of International Relations. He was demoted to liaison officer for allegedly using Zuma’s name to illegally authorise the landing of the plane. And as is often the story-line in South Africa, Koloane was appointed South Africa’s ambassador to the Netherlands in August 2014 (Mandla 2014).

The South African media dubbed the incident ‘Guptagate’ and public sentiment began to stiffen against the closely bonded families. The Gupta brothers, Ajay, Atul and Rajesh, came to South Africa in 1993 from the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. South Africa was on the cusp of non-racial democratic rule and was opening up to the outside world. The political transition created a void which resulted in porous borders and a lack of internal controls. The first to arrive was Atul, the middle brother and public face of the

The family’s beginnings were inauspicious. They opened a shoe store in 1994 in Johannesburg, which failed. Another business, Correct Marketing, was opened and the name of these holdings was changed to Sahara in 1997, after Saharanpur, their home town. Sahara came to include Shiva Uranium and JIC mining services. The Guptas remained behind the scenes but forged links with the Zumases, cabinet ministers and, crucially, decision makers in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). They came to public notice in 2010 when they became involved in a ‘dubious potential iron-ore mining deal’ that saw them, with government help, acquire part of the mining rights to an iron ore mine. Their friendship with government ministers like Malusi Gigaba and Naledi Pandor came into the open, while family members accompanied President Zuma on his first state visit to India in 2010 (Pillay 2013).

Verashini Pillay, then editor-in-chief of the Mail & Guardian newspaper, was in India at the time covering the 150th commemoration of the arrival of the indentured migrants in Natal. She recounted that when she spoke to Indian journalists about the Guptas, no one had heard of them or the Sahara group. Pillay concluded that,

whoever the Guptas had become in South Africa was a far cry from what they had been in India…. The contrast between the life the tight-knit Hindu family had in Saharanpur and their local bling lifestyle is stark: their father, after all, was a humble store owner who worked his way up, leading to the brothers sometimes being referred to unkindly as nouveau riche by their more moneyed Indian counterparts (Pillay 2013).

Kalim Rajab (2013), an occasional public commentator, noted that during this 2010 trip to India, Zuma made it clear to potential investors in South Africa that ‘the suitable way of channelling it would be through the Gupta family. I’m not sure if there are any historical precedents for such a blatant (and downright dodgy) show of support of an administration towards politically connected businessmen.’

The Guptas’ allegedly first met Jacob Zuma in 2003. They subsequently employed his wife Bongi Ngema-Zuma as communications
officer; while his daughter Duduzile and son Duduzane were appointed directors of a number of Gupta companies at different times. Sahara Holdings came to include mining, aviation and technology. They also helped bring the lucrative Indian Premier League (IPL) cricket tournament to South Africa in 2009 when there were security concerns in India. After Zuma’s trip to India in 2010, the Guptas’ started a pro-African National Congress (ANC) newspaper, *New Age*, in 2010 and in late 2013, soon after the Waterkloof scandal, Duduzane Zuma teamed up with the Guptas to launch ANN7 a pro-ANC 24-hour television news channel (Saul & Bond 2014: 222).

One of the most serious allegations against the family was that they played a pivotal role in determining South African cabinet appointments. The most public of these accusations was made by then Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas, who alleged that he was offered a ministerial position by the Guptas preceding the dismissal of then Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015. Jonas rejected the offer and Zuma appointed Des Van Rooyen as Finance Minister. This proved disastrous as billions were wiped off the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and the South African rand went into free fall against major currencies. Zuma was forced by members of his own party to backtrack and replace his appointment with former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. A former ANC MP Vytjie Mentor and Themba Maseko, a former head of the Government Communications Information System, also claimed to have been offered ministerial posts by the Guptas (*Mail & Guardian* 16 March 2016).

The Guptas’ influence and reach into South African society is deep, to the extent that journalist Ranjeni Munsamy wrote in the *Daily Maverick* that the ‘Gupta family has effectively usurped the function of the ANC deployment committee’ (17 March 2016). The term ‘state capture’ was coined to describe the Guptas’ *modus operandi* and quickly became part of South African everyday political language. Public pressure forced the ANC to launch an investigation into state capture in March 2016 but this investigation was dropped two months later when ANC Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe announced that the party had only received one written submission on the matter. Munsamy wrote that the ‘Guptas can now resume working their political connections and influencing state and ANC processes under full political cover’ (*Daily Maverick* 1 June 2016). The negative public perceptions surrounding these links led to South Africa’s four major banks and an international auditing firm, KPMG, severing their business dealings with Gup-
The Guptas, the Public Protector’s Report and Capital Accumulation

ta-owned firms in April 2016 (Cropley 2016). Thus, writes Chutel (2016), what,

could have been another inspiring immigrant story … is now met with deep skepticism and open anger by South Africans who see the Gupta family’s ascent as symbolic of all that is rotten in local politics…. Rather than a bootstraps success story, the family’s close relationship with embattled president Jacob Zuma has made them the target of political lashings and satirical cartoons.

The Public Protector’s Report
South Africa has a vibrant opposition and civil society that has used a variety of methods from legal challenges to mass protests to challenge the Zuptas.

The opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) party requested the Office of the Public Protector to conduct an investigation into allegations of state capture by the Gupta family. More specifically, it called for an investigation into whether Jonas and Mentor had been offered jobs by the Guptas, whether the state had unduly enriched the Gupta family in its allocation of contracts, and whether Zuma violated the Executive Members’ Ethics Act (Nicolson 2016a). Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, undertook an investigation into ‘alleged improper and unethical conduct’ by Zuma and other state functionaries with regard to the involvement of the Guptas in the appointment and removal of ministers and directors of SOEs (Madonsela 2016).

Madonsela complained of a lack of resources from the state to complete the investigation and in particular a lack of cooperation from Zuma. ANC MPs also tried to muddy Madonsela’s reputation by suggesting that she was allied to the DA and was a spy for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). On the eve of her departure from office on 14 October 2016, Madonsela submitted her 355-page report to the Speaker of the National Assembly (Parliament) for ‘safekeeping’. While the Speaker was required to place the report before members of the National Assembly, she chose to return it to the Office of the Public Protector. It was only made public on 2 November 2016 because Zuma and Co-operative Governance Minister Des van Rooyen tried to get the courts to block the report. Van Rooyen withdrew his application on 21 October while Zuma withdrew his bid for an interdict against the report on 2 November, in the midst of the Pretoria High Court sitting.
The report alleged what the media, public, and opposition political parties had speculated all along; the Guptas wielded immense political clout, benefited economically through official connections to secure lucrative state contracts and private loans, and were involved in shady mining deals involving, coal, uranium, gold, platinum, diamonds, and iron ore (Madonsela 2016). Amongst the Public Protector’s findings were that Zuma improperly and in violation of the Executive Ethics Code, allowed his son Duduzane and members of the Gupta family to be involved in the process of removal and appointment of the Minister of Finance in December 2015; Deputy Minister Jonas was offered a job by the Gupta family in exchange for extending favours to their family business;¹ that the Guptas were allegedly involved in the awarding of large contracts by Eskom, the state-owned electricity utility;² Zuma improperly used his position or information entrusted to him to give preferential treatment to businesses owned by the Gupta family and his son Duduzane Zuma in the award of state contracts, business financing, and trading licences; Government advertising was deliberately channelled to the Guptas’ newspaper, the New Age; and television channel ANN7; and that Zuma may have been in breach of his legal duties in failing to investigate these matters or

¹ Jonas told the Public Protector that he had been offered 600m South African rand (around $44m as calculated in November 2016) by Ajay Gupta to agree to be appointed finance minister and use his position to replace some of the executives in the National Treasury who were a ‘stumbling block’ to the Gupta family’s business ambitions. Jonas declined the offer. Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene was replaced by Van Rooyen, then a little known backbencher. The report stated that Van Rooyen had spent a considerable amount of time with the Guptas and was near their Saxonwold, Johannesburg, residence many times, including on the day before he was announced as Minister.

² Between 2 August 2015 and 22 March 2016, Eskom CEO Brain Molefe called Ajay Gupta 44 times while Ajay called Molefe 14 times. The Public Protector’s Report stated that Eskom’s awarding of a coal contract to Tegeta was irregular and that the Eskom board was improperly appointed. Molefe initially tried to laugh off these suggestions, stating that he visited a shebeen in the area. However, public pressure forced him to resign in December 2016. In true Zuma-fashion, he was back in the limelight when the ANC appointed him an MP in February 2017. He served a short stint and was then brought back to Eskom as CEO. After a public outcry he was removed.
The Guptas, the Public Protector’s Report and Capital Accumulation

act against wrongdoings.

The report called for a judicial commission into the allegations and for it to be ‘adequately resourced’ and presided over by a judge selected by the Chief Justice. This suggested that the Public Protector had no faith in the partiality of a commission chosen by the President. The Public Protector ordered that the commission report back within 180 days of its appointment. Amongst issues flagged in the report for further investigation were: how the South African Broadcasting Commission (SABC), a public broadcaster, began charging government departments to act as conduits for them to reach the public, a service it had previously offered for free, and splitting this new stream of revenue with a Gupta-owned newspaper; the relationship between the state-owned weapons company Denel and its Gupta-linked supplier, VR Laser Services; state-owned Transnet’s many large payments to the financial advisory companies Regiments Capital and Trillian, which had clear Gupta links and helped the family to pay for a coal mine; state-owned airline South African Airways’ (SAA) spending on the Gupta-owned New Age newspaper, including buying millions of copies of the publication; Eskom’s contracts with a Gupta-owned coal mine to supply its Majuba power station; whether Zuma sanctioned the actions of his mining minister, Mosebenzi Zwane, who used his official position to ‘unfairly and unduly influence’ a contract for Zuma’s son at the expense of the state; loans from the Industrial Development Corporation to finance Gupta enterprises; and the awarding of mining licences to Gupta companies.

In December 2016, Zuma mounted a legal challenge against the remedial action recommended by the report, arguing that it was his constitutional prerogative to appoint the leader of the commission and not that of the Chief Justice. Bantu Holomisa, leader of the United Democratic Movement (UDM) party, tweeted, sarcastically: ‘the main suspect Zuma goes to court to demand that he personally appoints a Commission to investigate himself. Joke!’ This matter had not been resolved at the time of writing (August 2017) and it is unclear when, if ever, the commission will see the light of day. As Greg Nicolson (2016b) noted, the ANC will do everything possible to ‘buy time, postpone, delay, defer, defuse, deny, confuse.’

During May and June, around 30 000 emails connected to the Guptas were leaked into the public domain, and can be viewed on the Daily Maverick website (https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/). They confirmed some of what the Public Protector’s report alleged, and pointed to the involvement of a vast
number of individuals and businesses, ranging from state utility Eskom, to the ANC Youth League, Mining Minister Mosebenzi Zwane, Communications Minister, Ayanda Dlodlo, Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba, and Co-operative Governance Minister Des van Rooyen.

What are we to make of allegations of state capture?

State Capture or a Challenge to White Monopoly Capital?
In their defence, the Zuptas argue that the attacks on them stem from the fact that they represent a challenge to white capital and a class structure shaped historically under white minority rule. This argument is supported by some adherents to the Black Consciousness philosophy and Africanists. Andile Mngxitama, founder member of the Black First Land First movement (BLF) argued that the fundamental contradiction in South Africa is that ‘white monopoly capitalism renders the black majority powerless.’ He added that, Zuma’s association with the Guptas was a deliberate ‘strategy (on his part) to look more towards the East’ since the ‘colonial state’ that the ANC inherited could not be transformed because the constitution has entrenched white power. Zuma is thus seeking to empower black people through ‘parallel processes’, which has angered white capital because the Guptas have secured lucrative mega projects, thus beating them at their own game (Mngxitama 2016).

Mngxitama argued that there was a parallel between the Zuptas and the era of white minority rule in South Africa when white capital ‘was created with the direct support of the state.’ Yet, when a political settlement was being negotiated in South Africa, white monopoly capital was not asked to ‘account for their wealth, created from the super-exploitation and dispossession of blacks.’ The attack on the Guptas was a ‘proxy war … to distract the angry youth from the real enemy’, white capital, ‘which continues with business as usual.’ Mngxitama further stated that calls for the Guptas to leave South Africa were, dangerous as it involves the demagogic mobilisation of anti-Indian stereotypes and feeds into xenophobic tropes to organise the most backward sentiments in society and deflect attention from the real source of the South African problem, which is white capital created from colonialism and apartheid (Mngxitama 2016).
This line of argument has also been proffered by top ANC members. When the DA sponsored a vote of no confidence in Zuma in parliament in August 2016 the then Minister of Home Affairs and subsequent Minister of Finance, Malusi Gigaba, rose full of righteous indignation:

> The truth is that there is a bitter struggle in South Africa between the former oppressors and those whom they oppressed, for the right and power to determine the political direction of this country as well as ownership of its economic resources…. Our extensive mineral wealth and the prospective nuclear power station in South Africa lie at the heart of the regime-change offensive we are subjected to. Accepting this agenda and not opposing it to the very death will be our biggest folly …. There will be no retreat; there will be no surrender from us (quoted in Thamm 2016).

Mngxitama is correct in claiming that the coming to power of the National Party (NP) in 1948 saw the inauguration of volkskapitalisme, or people’s capitalism primarily in favour of white Afrikaners (O’Meara 1983). An Afrikaner bourgeoisie was nurtured by the state which ‘shaped the business environment directly through parastatals in rail and air transport, iron and steel, electricity, and telecommunications,’ while introducing laws to ‘protect the living standards of white voters, and to promote domestic industry’ (Nattrass and Seekings 2010: 5). While there was general upliftment of the white population, the commanding heights of the economy remained in the hands of an exclusive monopoly. Thus, the mining-based giant Anglo-American company controlled 44 per cent of the entire capitalisation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and the top five corporate groups together controlled 84 per cent of the JSE in 1994 (Nattrass & Seekings 2010: 5).

In response to this line of attack by Mngxitama and Gigaba, an editorial in the African Communist (2016) argued that there are differences between the Guptas and old white capital. While accepting that the problem of capitalism was much deeper than the machinations of the Guptas, and that all capitalists were ‘hostile’ to the working class, it made a distinction between the Guptas and Afrikaner businessmen like Johann Rupert and Koos Bekker:

> The Gupta family, arriving in South Africa in the mid-1990s, has been entirely parasitic for their wealth accumulation on corrupting parts of
the post-apartheid state. The Ruperts and Bekkers, part of the so-called Stellenbosch mafia, appear to have some degree of commitment to South Africa, presumably both for wealth preservation and sentimental cultural reasons. The Ruperts and Bekkers repatriate some of their considerable global earnings back into South Africa. By contrast, the Gupta family is reputed to be shipping its ill-acquired wealth post-haste out of the country to Dubai in anticipation of a loss of political influence in the near-term.

It also subsequently emerged that the Guptas had employed British public relations firm Bell Pottinger. The firm developed a social media campaign to divert attention from the Guptas’ involvement in state capture by emphasising the role of white monopoly capital in the South African economy. Bell Pottinger came up with slogans such as #endeconomicapartheid, while besmirching journalists, politicians, and government officials who were exposing Gupta-linked corruption. The company also drafted some of the inflammatory speeches made by the ANC Youth League. The DA submitted a formal complaint with the UK-based public relations industry body that, by acting unethically, Bell Pottinger had manipulated public opinion to create racial divisions in South Africa. In July 2017, days before it was due to appear before the Public Relations Communications Association and the Chartered Institute of Public Relations, Bell Pottinger issued a public apology to South Africans for the racial tensions it had fomented in the country and dismissed the lead partner involved in the South African business (Thamm 2017).

One of the ironies of Mngxitama and Gigaba’s comments is that it was by virtue of the ANC’s embracing neoliberalism in the mid-1990s that ‘the power and wealth of the white-controlled capitalist sector was enhanced by its integration into the power structures of the American oriented neoliberal global economy’ (Terreblanche 2012: 34). Terreblanche (2012: 35) adds that since the democratic transition in 1994, inequality has increased in South Africa, in part because of the ANC government’s ‘misguided and myopic initiatives’ which ‘have given strong preference to black elite formation and to promoting the interests of local and foreign corporations while it has shamelessly neglected the impoverished black majority.’

At the time of non-racial democratic rule the ANC beat a quick retreat from ‘the Freedom Charter’s promise to nationalise banks, mines and monopolies’ (Bundy 2014: 33). Nelson Mandela, the country’s first president,
The Guptas, the Public Protector’s Report and Capital Accumulation

returned from Davos, Switzerland, in 1992 to announce to his closest aides: ‘Chaps, we have to choose. We either keep nationalisation and get no investment, or we modify our own attitude and get investment’ (Sampson 1999: 435). Liberalisation and globalisation have increased inequality globally, not just in South Africa. As Crabtree and Durand (2017: 12) point out, these economic changes ‘have had a profound impact on the balance of political power within economies … and in their relative patterns of distribution.’ They add that in many instances,

a circularity becomes marked, with political capture influencing patterns of unequal distribution (of wealth as well as income), leading in turn to greater inequalities in the distribution of power and thus further contributing to the phenomenon of capture.

Embracing neoliberalism did not mean that it was business as usual under the ANC government. The Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy was to act as a Trojan horse in challenging white monopoly capital. In practical terms, this would translate into nurturing a black bourgeoisie, with Thabo Mbeki holding that its ‘presence within our economy and society will be part of the process of the deracialisation of the economy and society’ (Macdonald 2004: 648). BEE has echoes of Volkskapitalisme; the use of state power to facilitate capital accumulation. As MacDonald (2004: 647-48) points out:

Some of the means the NP used to build the Afrikaner bourgeoisie were notorious, of course, but in addition to blatant racism, also boosted Afrikaner-owned businesses through state contracts, subsidies, jawboning, and pressure on English speaking capital to sell subsidiaries to Afrikaners. By similar means, for similar reasons, the ANC is building an African bourgeoisie (MacDonald 2004: 647-88).

In principle there appears to be little wrong in BEE as a means to change the structure of the social classes in post-apartheid South Africa. But, as Nattrass and Seekings (2010: 8) observe, the way in which BEE has worked has meant that …,

many members of the new black corporate elite are very well connected politically, to the extent that the ANC itself has had to
respond to criticisms of the ‘revolving door’ between political or bureaucratic leadership and the corporate world.... The underside of the close relationship between political and economic elites is the tawdry story of corruption, as revealed in case after case of abuse in tender processes (Nattrass & Seekings 2010: 8).

As Chipkin (2017) explains it, following the ANC’s 2007 conference in Polokwane, the Zuma faction wanted to transform the economy, and was of the opinion that the formal ‘rules of the game’ were too heavily stacked in favour of entrenched classes. He argues that, the problem with the Zuma government’s model of transformation is that it focuses on the state and not the economy. The annual value of goods and services resulting from the outsourcing of core government functions stands at around R500 billion. ‘Essentially’, he writes, ‘the government has become a massive, tender-generating machine.’ Government procurement is used to empower black businesses. While the aim may be noble - to displace white-owned or managed businesses – Chipkin believes that this strategy is unworkable because ‘the politicisation of procurement in the name of radical economic transformation frequently brings it into conflict with service-delivery mandates.’ The public service has been witness to purging as a result of who gets which tender. Some municipalities have become dysfunctional in the process and are unable to deliver services. This is reflected in crises over health and education, for example, where apartheid era inequalities are replicated. There are no policies in place to effect the structural reforms necessary to transform the economy to create jobs, radically transform it, and reduce unemployment and inequality.

The African Communist (2016) editorial made another relevant point about the Guptas, arguing that in order to ‘advance a second radical phase of the national democratic revolution’ in South Africa, a professional National Treasury and South African Revenue Service (SARS) were essential. However, this does not suit the ‘parasitic’ agenda of the Guptas who need to weaken such institutions in order to capture and loot the state. Whatever their other faults, Afrikaner capitalists, the editorial went on, ‘for both sentimental and wealth preservation reasons, would like to see an effective Treasury and SARS capable of staving off a South African economic meltdown.’ The Zuma faction in government has effectively taken control of at least four key South African institutions, the finance ministry (by removing Pravin Gordhan and putting Malusi Gigaba in place), the state prosecutor (with the appointment of
Shaun Abrahams as head of the National Prosecuting Authority), the public protector (Busisiwe Mkhwebane), and SARS (whose head, Tom Moyane is a Zuma ally).

**Zuma and the Discontents**

Despite continuing support from significant sectors of the ANC, Zuma’s position has been weakened by the release of Public Protectors’ Report, coming as it did in the immediate aftermath of the ANC’s poor performance in the August 2016 local government elections, when its share of the vote fell to 55 per cent (the first time since 1994 that it had dropped below 60 per cent) and the party lost control of the country’s economic hub, Pretoria and Johannesburg and a black majority city, Nelson Mandela Bay. Leading ANC stalwarts began to speak on this issue. Former Robben Island prisoner Ahmed Kathrada called on the ANC to address public concerns relating to Zuma’s relationship with the Gupta family, while the ANC’s political ally, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), called on the president to distance himself from them (Grootes 2016).

Zuma was also publicly pilloried. South African artist Ayanda Mabulu exhibited a painting portraying him performing an act of anilingus on Atul Gupta in the cockpit of an airplane against a backdrop of the ANC flag (Feltam 2016). At the funeral service for ANC stalwart, the Reverend Makhenkesi Stofile in late August 2016, attended by around 10 000 people, including ANC top brass, former foreign affairs director-general Sipho Pityana called on Zuma to resign. He hoped that the funeral would be a ‘turning point’ to rid the ANC of corruption and nepotism so that the party could return to its ‘former glory’ (George 2016). Former president Thabo Mbeki wrote to Zuma on 1 November 2016 calling on him to hold talks with the 101 ANC ‘veterans’ who publicly expressed concerns about Zuma’s leadership and the crisis facing the country because of his alleged links with the Guptas (The Citizen 3 November 2016).

Kathrada penned a damning letter to Zuma on 2 April 2016, in which, amongst other things, he said that he was breaking his position of never speaking publically about his differences with ‘my leaders and my organisation’ because of the dire circumstances in which the ANC and country found itself. He added that the position of president required the respect of all South Africans. Kathrada asked, ‘bluntly, if not arrogantly, in the face of such persistently
widespread criticism, condemnation and demand, is it asking too much to express the hope that you will choose the correct way that is gaining momentum, to consider stepping down?’

Despite this criticism, Zuma felt emboldened enough to fire Gordhan at the end of March 2017. The Finance Minister was in London to meet with potential investors when Zuma instructed him to return home and announced shortly before midnight on 30 March 2017 that Malusi Gigaba, the former Home Affairs minister, was replacing him. Muller (2017) believes that Gordhan’s sacking was due to his determination ‘to safeguard the fiscus against irresponsible and corrupt activities.’ Likewise, Rossouw is of the opinion that Zuma was ‘hellbent on replacing (Gordhan) with appointments that would allow looting of the national purse’ (Rossouw 2017). On the other hand, Zuma allies mounted attacks on Gordhan with Zuma’s son Edward calling him a ‘White Monopoly Capital stooge’ in an open letter in July 2017.

Zuma would likely have fired Gordhan earlier were it not for the death of Ahmed Kathrada on 28 March. Kathrada reportedly instructed his family that the president was not to speak at his funeral (Fihlani 2017). Zuma did not attend the funeral service but high ranking ANC leaders like Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary General Gwede Mantashe, and former presidents Thabo Mbeki and Kgalema Motlanthe did. Motlanthe was given a standing ovation for his eulogy, which included a powerful critique of Zuma. He said that it would be ‘disingenuous’ to pay tribute to Kathrada while ignoring the fact that he had been ‘deeply disturbed by the current post-apartheid failure of politics.’ Motlanthe quoted extensively from Kathrada’s letter and warned that the ANC ‘itself may disappear off the face of the earth if it fails to embrace the culture of self-reflection from time to time concerning its character and inner soul as a governing party’ (Fihlani 2017). While Mantashe and Ramaphosa both stated that they opposed the firing of Gordhan, they did not resign or openly support a motion against Zuma as this carries the risk of leaving them in the political wilderness (Calland 2017).

Both the opposition DA and EFF political parties have annually tabled motions of no confidence in Zuma. These have not succeeded because ANC members are in the majority in parliament. Opposition parties were of the view that many were opposed to Zuma but fearful of the consequences of opening voting against him and would do so in a secret ballot. National Assembly Speaker Baleka Mbete argued that she had no authority to hold a secret ballot. The UDM brought an action against the speaker and the Constitutional Court
ruled on 22 June 2017 that it was up to Mbete to decide for or against a secret ballot. The vote was held on 8 August 2017, and Zuma narrowly survived the secret ballot, with 177 MPs voting for him to be removed and 198 voting for him to stay. There were nine abstentions. This was a close call as the ANC has 249 MPs in the house. It is estimated that 26 members of Zuma’s party voted against him. While the ANC celebrated this as a victory, it was described in more than one quarter as a pyrrhic one. The ANC is divided as never before and the opposition parties are resurgent. With the 2019 elections looming, it is in danger of losing its majority (Calland 2017).

Concluding Remarks: The Guptas and Race in South Africa
Many South Africans believe that the country is at a tipping point as civil society, an active opposition, an independent judiciary, and a relatively free press have sought to bring the Zuptas to book while Zuma and his allies have sought to consolidate control of key state institutions. Zuma’s response is to tighten his grip on the state including its security apparatus.

Over the past two decades, the Guptas’ wealth has been built on the back of political connections, providing grist to the mill of crony capitalism and ‘sharp’ Indian business practices. They have thus far survived and prospered because of their links to President Zuma whose own family and political allies appear to have benefited enormously from this relationship. Towards the end of August 2016, with intense pressure on the family, the Guptas announced that they were divesting from the country. This was an apparent volte face, as Atul Gupta told BBC 4 radio in an interview broadcast on 3 August 2017 that the family had no intention of leaving: ‘I want to stay in South Africa forever. I love this country... I’m proudly South African and I respect all my fellow South Africans. I’m a live example of financial liberation and I’m playing my part.’

Whatever happens, their legacy will be Zuptas, shorthand for the shady relationships between Indian business interests and African political chiefs who wield political clout.

The Guptas’ activities have consequences for race relations in the post-apartheid moment. While they used Bell Pottinger to foment racial tensions between black and white, ironically, their activities may be contributing to tensions between African and Indian by feeding into already existing negative stereotypes of Indians in many parts of Africa, and especially in the province
of KwaZulu-Natal where, as much as they have also collaborated, historically, Indians and Africans have had tense relationships. Negative perceptions of the role of Indian capital extend beyond South Africa to other countries on the continent. Historically, tensions in Afro-Indian relations have existed in South Africa as well as Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Kenya as Indians were accused of not integrating into local societies and of not investing in the countries in which they lived.

At a broader level, allegations about state capture have exacerbated political tensions in South Africa. The ANC is divided and its two main alliance partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and COSATU have both demanded that Zuma resign. This is taking place against a backdrop of elections for the President of the ANC in December 2017. The two leading candidates are Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Zuma’s former wife and apparently in the Zupta camp, and Cyril Ramaphosa, an extremely wealthy rich beneficiary of BEE. Whoever wins will inherit a weakened ANC and a resurgent opposition in the form of the centrist DA and the left-wing EFF. In some quarters this political uncertainty is seen as positive as it allows debate about the future of the country whose outcomes are not still dominated by one political party. Others worry that the eroding of the ANC as the centre of power will exacerbate turmoil and jeopardise the stability needed to attract investment and stimulate economic growth. At a theoretical level the Zupta phenomenon stimulates us to take seriously the fact that in a constitutional democracy, a shadow state can operate not in conflict but in conjunction with it.

In the no-confidence debate, opposition parties hammered home the message that this was a vote of no confidence in President Gupta. Despite the hyperbole, the ability of the Guptas to accumulate capital and power in such a short time is remarkable. Zuma’s ability to survive scandal after scandal is arguably even more remarkable.

References


Ahmed Kathrada Foundation 2015. Kathrada Foundation in Equality Court


The Guptas, the Public Protector’s Report and Capital Accumulation

August 2016.)


Ashwin Desai
Department of Sociology
University of Johannesburg
Kingsway Campus
Johannesburg
ashdesail@gmail.com

Goolam Vahed
History
School of Social Sciences
University of KwaZulu-Natal
vahed@ukzn.ac.za
Indian Diaspora Policy and the ‘International Triad’ – Of Voices and Visions beyond Pragmatism

Bobby Luthra Sinha

Abstract
This work aims to explore and problematize India’s discourses on its Diaspora policy vis-à-vis the reflections and experiences of actors on the ground. Historically, the Indian state has been known to project a founding and pioneering discourse on Diaspora closely connected and inter-twined with its foreign policy. Nonetheless, in its international outlook just as India continues to change and evolve over time, so do its Diaspora discourses and practices as per the needs of its foreign policy. From being distantly neutral and adopting diplomatic routes of concern for Indian origin people abroad during its early post-Independence outlook, India’s Diaspora policies have turned volte-face by shifting to the foreground of its global profiling in more recent times. Three important agents responsible for this role reversal are represented by the forces of globalisation, transnational geopolitics and Diasporization, acting in tandem with each other. Referring to these three as the, ‘International Triad’, (a term I employ as a heuristic tool), I undertake a qualitative analysis through review of literature, primary data including newspapers and ethnographic interviews conducted by me. It is clear that in its pro-active positioning and emerging Diaspora relations, India is no different from many other countries. Conversely, Indian Diasporas too have come a long way, emerging as not only key drivers in development efforts but also in strengthening bilateral ties between host and home nations as other diasporas do. No longer bereft of voice and rights, as much as in previous political contexts, the PIO and Diaspora communities stand on firmer ground while interacting with their home countries and ancestral homelands. However some vulnerabilities and status
issues may still remain open despite the prismatic implications of the International Triad. The questions that therefore arise are: how do members of various Indian Diasporas assess the ‘everyday’ of this emerging relationship? Conversely, how responsive and compassionate is India to the qualitative expectations of its Diaspora?

Keywords: Indian origin Migrants, International Triad, Globalization, Geopolitical dynamics, Diasporization and Indian Diaspora policy

Part I Introduction - Themes, Qualitative Methodology and a Hermeneutic Tool

Migrants of Indian Origin, Globalization and Diasporization

In this study, I focus on Diasporization and its associated dynamics with respect to, primarily, India’s diaspora and foreign policy as well as the corresponding transformations in global geo-political and economic spaces. Next, while retaining a critical focus on India’s changing policies towards its Diaspora in recent times, I take into account how Indian Diaspora has correspondingly become attractive for many a state policies bordering the frontier of foreign affairs, as opposed to compulsions of politics in the imperial-colonial eras (Mahajani 1976: 2). For building on my arguments and analysis, I propose an analytical category, namely, ‘International Triad’ to refer to the three forces of globalisation, geo-politics and Diasporization acting in tandem with each other. Finally, casting an emic gaze inside this International Triad, employing qualitative research methods, I sift out issues and themes that are raised at the everyday point of contact between the state and Indian origin migrants.

World statistics on migration demonstrate how Diasporas have converted into a rapidly proliferating genre of life. The new UN dataset, ‘Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision’, shows that the number of international migrants has grown faster than the world’s population. As a result, the share of migrants in the global population reached 3.3 per cent in 2015, up from 2.8 per cent in 2000. There are, however, considerable differences between large regions of the world. In Europe, Northern America and Oceania, international migrants account for at least 10 per cent of the total population. By contrast, in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, fewer than 2 per cent of the population are international migrants.
However, despite the different statistics and trends, both in the western as well as the eastern contexts, the geopolitical movement and importance of the Diaspora has been growing rapidly. For instance, UN data of 2015 shows that 244 million people, or 3.3 per cent of the world's population, lived outside their country of origin (UNFPA: http://www.unfpa.org/migration). India too has a long history of migration and one of the largest migrant communities in the world. As per UN (2016) findings, sixteen million people from India were living outside of their country, thus making the Indian Diaspora the largest in the world.

**Changing Global, Geo-political Connotations of Diaspora and Diasporization**

Writings on Diaspora make clear how the concept has gained traction in multiple settings and for many groups defined linguistically, genetically, ethnically, nationally, or in terms of their religious affiliation. However, unlike in the past, when for centuries the word Diaspora stood defined as dispersal or persecution (Brown 2006: 3-4; Kokot et al. 2004; Brah 1996), the term now denotes a plurality and network of memories, practices, communities, powers, futures and aspirations not confined to one place, rather endowed with transnational connotations. Not describable only by transnationalism (Voigt-Graf 2005), *per se*, Diaspora remains subtly and crucially distinct from it. Where diaspora is concerned with intangible socio-cultural identity construction through processes of migration, transnationalism predominantly relates to socio-economic relationships grounded in recurring cross-border movements (Kokot et al. 2004). The convergence/interchange of the terms ‘Diaspora’ and ‘transnationalism’ (Olwig 2004: 55) often occurs as globalising processes have precipitated an ‘intensified and deepened cultural, economic, political and institutional interconnectedness and interdependency that has developed between corporations, communities and states, particularly since the 1970s’ (Walton-Roberts 2004:54).

Two aspects need to be sifted out. Owing to transnationalism, Indian origin people and migrants may be often clubbed in the same category but they do not pertain so. Next, India, that has had one of the world’s most diverse and complex migration histories, is as much face to face with the escalating dynamics of globalisation, transnational geopolitics as both its Diaspora and Indian origin communities are. Ethnic Indians have established communities
Indian Diaspora Policy and the ‘International Triad’

on every continent as well as on islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific and Indian oceans since the 19th century. The composition of flows has evolved concomitant with time, changing from mainly indentured labour in far-flung colonies to post-war labour for British industry to high-skilled professionals in North America and low-skilled workers in the Middle East. In addition, ethnic Indians in countries like Kenya and Suriname have migrated to other countries, a movement often termed as, ‘secondary migration’ (Naujoks 2009).

In light of its vast spread and reach, while scholars have argued the case of a ‘global Indian Diaspora’, nonetheless, viewing the Indian Diaspora\(^1\) as any homogenous entity is (Friesen 2008: 46) nothing short of problematic. In this respect, Singh (2003: 4-5) makes an important point, ‘what possibly distinguishes the Indian diaspora from its counterparts is its extreme heterogeneity, diversity and in some cases, a persistent localism – a plurality’. Furthermore, since 1990s, with the development of air transportation, communications, web technologies and networking, the physical limitations of distance are increasingly eliminated. This has rendered Diasporas more close knit than before and made it easier for them to exercise their collective identities from one place into another. Globalisation of services and opportunities in this respect has promoted a certain geo-spatial dynamics which also leads to unleashing different kinds of transnational spaces which conglomerations such as Diasporas have known how to break through (Chen & Collins 2014) and use for their purposes of reaching out to the homeland. The changing world has not spared the Indian diasporas who are more proximal to each other, virtually and really than ever before.

Age of ‘Diasporization’ and Diasporas as ‘Third Force’
The above mentioned interplay of global communications, information and

\(^1\) Some works assert that the term "Indian diaspora" (Naujoks 2009) refers to all persons of Indian descent/origin living outside India, as long as they preserve some major Indian ethno-cultural practices. Only people of Pakistan and Bangladesh are excluded from this term since those countries were part of the larger British India before 1947 and thus constitute a special case. A common distinction with regard to ethnic Indians outside India, often referred to as overseas Indians, is made between non-resident Indians (NRIs), who hold Indian citizenship, and persons of Indian origin (PIOs), who do not.
mobility flows of our current age including the Internet, influence Diaspora consciousness as they open new possibilities wherein immigrants and their descendants can maintain closer ties with their homeland or ancestral countries. In this way, has taken shape a phenomenon that, in his book, ‘Political Demography’, Ellipses Paris (2007) calls ‘Diasporization’. That is to say that yesteryear immigrants communities with various histories have become informed Diasporas of today and aspire to play greater roles than were earlier perceived of them. Besides, a newer aspiring class of migrants imparts an economic and political performance oriented entry point to the idea of Diasporas in a globalised world.

Dumont (GRFD Newsletter 2013) argues that there is a growing need to understand the importance of studying the geopolitical role of Diasporas/migrants in contexts of globalisation. Diasporas can be viewed as a viable ‘third actor’ in geopolitical relations. Diasporization has meant that the Indian Diaspora (considering its communicative functionality and transnational affiliations to both the home as well as the host countries) has emerged as almost a viable non-state actor, in recent times\(^2\). With the advancement of Diasporization amidst globalizing economies and changing transnational geopolitics, states and policy makers have not hesitated to reckon with the power of connectivity and discursivity of this, ‘third force’. This force influences the attitudes and aspirations of the home country, experiences conflicts and cooperation with its host societies, and contributes to the functioning of the international networks which are central to our world (Sigona 2015).

**Methodology and the Use of a Hermeneutical Tool**

Where a growing Diasporization is significant of intensifying socioeconomic, political and cultural ties with their origin countries (Kuschminder & Hercog 2011), yet this does not connote the end of the story. Newer developments have not only, not erased earlier issues and considerations completely but have also

---

\(^2\) On the emergence of Global state and non-state actors in various internationally relevant governance and policy related domains and areas as well as their implications see, Conor Kelsey and Coolidge (2013); Hirst and Thompson (1996); Bayly (2004); Held and McGrew, with David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (1999).
given rise to newer ones, a few of which this paper elaborates. It goes without saying those ancestral pasts, images of the home country and its silted memories (Connerton 1989) continue to live in through the corporeal collective consciousness and praxis of a Diaspora (Cohen, Story & Moon 2015). Nevertheless the actual point of contact may have a separate political feel to it. Whether in the shape of journeys back to the ancestral homeland or growing interactions/encounters with its representatives, policy makers and officials in the host country (or elsewhere), newer terrains of problems necessitate a newer outlook towards solutions within this International Triad.

To make a thick anthropological contribution towards that end, my paper was therefore conceived with collection and analysis of both emic and etic data (Agar 1982 & 1996; Russel 2002; Geertz 1973). I have used both primary (field based) and secondary sources (published) ranging from interviews, field work, newspaper articles, reports and statistical data. My interactions with the members of diverse Indian origin migrants and Diasporas in Argentina, Austria, Ghana, Germany, South Africa and Switzerland over five years from 2011 to 2016 have served as the background of this research and the analytical terminologies forwarded through it, such as, the ‘International Triad’. Further, I found it useful to define the migrant actors that I interviewed as, ‘Indian origin Migrants’ as they came from a variety of backgrounds such as highly skilled and knowledge migrants to semi-skilled labour and secondary migrants, besides pertaining to diverse categories of migrants spanning both from the contemporary (old and new) well as the historical Indian Diaspora while others clearly belonged to the PIO communities.

My data undermined the need to explore with ethnographic criticality, the day to day interactive zones or formal spaces of contact wherein the Indian state and Diasporas encounter each other. Hence I extend the term, ‘International Triad’ as a hermeneutic tool. The main goal of Hermeneutic approach is to explore and analyse the lifeworld (see Lebenswelt in Habermas 1990a and 1990b; Britannica and Merriam Webster).

Part II Implications of the ‘International Triad’ -
Globalisation, Transnational Geopolitics and Diasporization
In this part, I elaborate how the Diaspora reaches out to India even as the country makes a move to spruce up its foreign policy as per the forces of
Diasporization and transnational geo-politics in a globalised era. Geographical markets, globalisation with increased competition and on top of all management of global mobility (The Deloitte Strategic Moves Survey of 2012) are key to understanding how integrated world markets, networks and technologies have all lead migrants students, professionals and families to form intriguing agents of change (Deloitte 2013). Observing from within the lens of the above stated developments, contemporary and historical migrants embody at least two kinds of changes:

First, yesteryear’s Diasporas (historical groups of migrants such as the indentured labour and their descendants) have become pro-actively assertive and organised in their identities and emerging roles just as the states of their host societies come of age. Second, newer Diasporas have emerged to claim more economic and political spaces within host societies. Together these two changes have begun to form an assertive threshold for globalisation, transnational geo-politics and Diasporization, even it may be as ‘returnees’ or when belonging to smaller regions of the world³. Diasporas, big or small; historical or contemporary, are increasingly shaping national and international priorities in fields that matter to them (Luthra Sinha 2014), such as reaching out to their home countries or ancestral homelands, now that they have more voice in their own soil

Correspondingly, post liberalisation in 1990s, Diasporas for countries as India have become more special than before (Parmeswaran 2015). In effect, several policy statements made by Prime Minister Nehru in the forties and the fifties in and outside Parliament contained the basic principles to govern India’s attitude vis-a-vis the Indians overseas (Mohan 2015) through the contours of its foreign policy doctrines. He maintained that the overseas Indians should decide whether they would continue to ‘remain Indian nationals or adopt the

³ Conway and Potter (2007) in their research regarding return migrants to the Caribbean islands assert that, ‘for many contemporary small island societies undergoing rapid change and transformation, modernisation, and integration into the wider global economy, today’s younger and more youthful return migrants are no longer an ineffective demographic cohort. Despite their numerically small size, many are demonstrating they can be influential “agents of change”. No longer mere returning retirees, they are more diverse, in terms of age, life-course transitions, class and gendered social positions, family networks, and migration histories’.
Indian Diaspora Policy and the ‘International Triad’

nationality of the country of their domicile’; ‘If they opted for the former’, he stated, ‘all that they could claim abroad was most favoured alien treatment’ (Sahadevan 1995: 4). Nehru added: ‘certainly, we do not like any country to ill-treat Indian nationals or to give them a place which is lower than that of others’ (Parekh 1993: 10); ‘If they opted for the latter’ (i.e. foreign nationality), he maintained, ‘They should be given all rights of citizenship. India's connection with them will be cultural and not political’ (Leonard 1999 103).

Significantly, the Nehruvian (idealist) principles by and large continued to govern India's approach towards the Indians overseas even after his death (Mathews 2001: 5). Encouraged to integrate with host cultures, they fought for the liberation of their adopted lands. It was in the post-cold war years when India’s international outlook and foreign policy staged a volt face. Liberalisation and globalisation became the new pragmatic space in which many nations and cultures encountered each other internationally, including India and its Diaspora. Post-liberalisation, India changed tracks from and began to dovetail its policies and expectations towards the Indian Diaspora as per changing time. New structures and institutions were put in place to aid the transition from the Nehruvian idealism of a bygone era to the pragmatism of the contemporary times. Indian Diasporas were also turning a new leaf in this phase. They demonstrated spectacular success in their chosen professions and careers while at the same time retained their emotional, cultural and spiritual links with India. This evoked reciprocal chords and curiosities in the hearts of Indian people as well (see Brown 2006; Blunt 2007; Brah 1996; Chaturvedi 2007). Leading to the creation of strategic know-hows and imaginaries the Indian origin migrants and communities have been building on, competing in as well as completing, what I refer to here as the, ‘International triad’ consisting of globalisation, transnational geopolitics and Diasporization acting in juxtaposition with each other.

Drawing from the active support and increasing interactions with the Diaspora communities, the Government of India High Level Committee (MEA Website: HLC 2000) Report, in its final recommendations suggested the formation of an organisation on the lines of the Planning Commission to look after the affairs of the Overseas Indians. However the then Prime Minister of India decided to have a full-fledged Ministry of Overseas Affairs headed by Minister of state with independent charge to deal with affairs related to Overseas Indians (MEA 2004). Foreign policy gestures from India towards overseas Indians acquiescently indicated how these groups were seen as a
valuable bridge of understanding between India and their country of domicile (Bhat & Sahoo 2000).

Qualitatively, Indian government stresses ethnicity to court the Diaspora, as well as relies for its propagation through its changed nationality law, which in 1987 shifted from *jus solis* (nationality based on country of birth) to *jus sanguinis* (nationality based on parentage) (Lum 2012; BJP News Report 28th and 29th December 1999), thus sealing the deal in favour of Diasporization by the close of the 20th Century. Though certain hiccups arise while delivering its policy in practice at the cutting edge of mutual contact, India promises to sensitise its government structures, bureaucracies and staff time and again. The High Level Committee (HLC, MEA Website: 2000) for instance, recommended prioritization in assisting the setting up of Special Economic Zones exclusively for projects emanating from NRIs and PIO. Establishment of a fast track mechanism in dealing with complaints and grievances keeping in view the high incidents of fraudulent practice vis-à-vis NRI bank accounts (refer to, HLC Report 2002: Chapter 38) was also lobbied for.

Policy-wise, initiatives to engage the Diaspora have multiplied at both the central government and state level, way more than in the beginning of India’s independent status in 1947 (Mohan 2015). At the national level, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA: http://www.moia.gov.in/showinfo1.asp?linkid=133), established in 2004, conceived a number of special programmes for overseas Indians. The primary task of the MOIA was to connect the Indian diaspora with its motherland. On grounds that substantial work of the MOIA is performed by the Indian missions abroad, recently, the decision has been taken by the Government of India to merge it with the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs). As a result the PBD (Pravasi Bharatiya Divas), which used to be a flagship event of the MOIA was celebrated instead by the MEA on January 9, 2016 (see TOI: 8 January 2016 for details).

The extent to which the Indian origin migrant communities and globalisation are intertwined (see Boyle 2009) is exposed by the burgeoning relationship that Indian government has developed/strives to develop with the Indian origin migrants. Since the early 1990s the Indian government became increasingly aware of and involved with its Diaspora, formalising its

---

4 Initially called the Ministry of Non-Resident Indians’ Affairs, its rapid name change within a year of its inception reflected the desire of India to tap the resources of its entire Diaspora, and not just Indian nationals resident abroad.
commitment and connection through a series of policies (Voigt-Graf 2005; Sahoo 2006). What is being witnessed therefore is how the International Triad has steadily led India towards a strong convergence of its Diaspora policy and foreign policy placating, in the process the embedded role of Diaspora in foreign affairs (Muni 2009).

Part III Bottlenecks and an Etic Detour: A ‘Realism’, post-Realism?

*How Realistically does India Woo its Diaspora?*

The beginning of India’s foreign policy and the Nehruvian take on Diaspora and Indian origin communities was part of the country’s idealism, as I have mentioned earlier. Those were the days of Non-Alignment and Panchseel. However the contemporary pragmatic approach to policy and Diaspora is often criticised as materialistic and opulent, even though the post-cold war realism is welcomed by many (Miller & De Estrada 2017). India’s current Foreign secretary (quoted in Parmeswaran 2015) opines that as of now India has made five ‘innovations’ in the way it has been using the tools of statecraft to further a proactive foreign policy through techniques as building of narratives; lexicon and imagery; soft power; the link between foreign policy and national development, and finally the Indian Diaspora. Narendera Modi, the current Indian Prime Minister announced new measures aimed at transforming India into the ‘land of dreams’ for diasporic investors (Mandhana 2014) soon after taking oath. In doing so, he continued to build upon shifts in the Government of India’s Diaspora and PIO policies. These envisage structural economic reform with the (re)making of overseas Indian populations into a de-territorialised global citizenry (Raj 2015 as quoted in Dickinson 2015.) However, in terms of politicking and trade relations, even though there has been positive change, a number of problems persist.

*First*, there is often a perception that the Indian government gives

---

5 A ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy implies a rejection of India’s earlier reliance on Nehruvian ‘idealism’ or ‘moral posturing’ and instead a focus on extension of power and material interests. Many argue that ‘idealism’, that was indelibly associated with the premiership of Jawaharlal Nehru, led to major foreign policy failures as well as the entrenchment of redundant policies.
greater importance to the more affluent sections of the Diaspora, consisting of business houses and those with white collar jobs. A few such problems have been articulated by Diasporas (see Luthra Sinha 2014) through the Pravsi Bharatiya Associations (Association of PIO or/and Non-Resident Indians). The next problem with India’s Diaspora policy that is on a quantitative fast track, is that while NRIs are given attention, individuals who migrated from India generations ago, also known as persons of Indian origin as in their respective countries, i.e the PIO may only feel partially involved and represented in such an association (Maini & Ramaswamy 2014). Finally, viewing the Indian Diaspora as a predominantly strategic asset and a means (Roy & Banerjee: 2007; Kapoor 2003; Gordon and Gupta: 2004; Wei: 2005), depicts an etic bias rooted in a distantly structured policy of development and (BJP) ideology (Miller & De Estrada 2017).

The innuendo is that even when India woos its various Diasporas/Indian origin people as a strategic asset and a means\(^6\) without touching upon an identity and soft power politics, the path needs to be chartered in more universal tones and practices of affiliation. Undoubtedly, the Indian Diaspora’s remittances (highest in the world) in the past have been of vital assistance to Indian foreign exchange reserves. The challenge now is to go to the next stage — of harnessing not just financial but also intellectual capital, opines Singh (2017) who prescribes that for this to happen India needs to adopt a non-jingoistic and secular tone. The emic thrust of the Diaspora and PIO communities itself, as I analyse in the next sections, differs as they also anticipate a growing qualitative association with India, over and above business relations or ‘homeland tours’.

\(^6\) It is not surprising that from earlier association of fragmented and dispersed entities in search for a homeland whether in memories or culture or territorial desires, Diasporas are now conceptually and in the realm of practice somewhat different. They not only search but also build a transnationally relevant form of ‘meeting’ their homelands in creative exchanges. Diasporas are now a means, sought by their homeland. The convergence of the terms diaspora and transnationalism, though two different concepts has come about because of globalising processes particularly since the 1970’s (Walton-Roberts 2004; Kokot et al. 2004).
Part IV Indian Origin Migrants and Communities: Voices, Visions and Vulnerabilities

From the above discussion it is clear that the International Triad of globalisation, transnational geo-politics and Diasporization has India steadfastly in its grip, at both the ends: The country is undergoing an explicit ‘Diaspora moment’ diplomatically. Indian origin migrants and Diasporas in turn are riding high on the wave of ‘home-bound’ or ‘ancestral motherland’ oriented investments, ventures and remittances and relationships. The willing participation and demands of the Indian Diaspora w.r.t to trade opportunities, and provisions being accorded to them by the GOI since the close of the 20th Century strengthen the emic imaginary towards their country of origin/ancestral homeland, as the case may be. A critical reading of India’s engagement with its Diasporas through the lens of the international triad reveals some pitfalls and patches alongside positivity. As far as opportunities and breaking of the barriers is concerned both India and its Diaspora have begun to weave a new interactive ground. Qualitatively speaking, in the Indian context, for instance, these group have not only promoted the formation of transnational spaces (see Luthra Sinha: 2013) and global networking (Luthra Sinha 2014) but also created various kinds of discursive dialogues in the process (Luthra Sinha 2015).

Beneath a labyrinth of positive developments, also lie some uncomfortable questions and memories. How challenging could it be for India to avert an elitist bias or go beyond a samosa diplomacy at the cutting edge of mutual encounters?, for instance,- are two common questions that Indian origin people I interviewed (Interviews and interactions overs email and in person 2011-2016) in Argentina, Germany, Ghana, South Africa and Switzerland typically postulate upon.

In the same breath they point out how for them, it’s a matter of pride to be able to contribute as a non-passive part of India’s soft power appeal. Yet various explicit and implicit challenges in the mutual relationship remain. The IYDs (International Yoga Day that the BJP Government has introduced as its selling strategy) still has no clear significance: Not all Indians/Indian origin abroad get attracted towards or practice yoga, so who/what is this for? What is being sold or stated here? A package of health; ideology; or tradition? No one seems to be sure at the receiving end (also see the analysis, in Miller & de Estrada 2017).
Dealing with memories and repercussions of the erstwhile Diaspora policies that bolstered isolation once upon a time represented an internal challenge for the Indian Diaspora and migrants of Indian origin. But now, as many of my informants clearly stated, there seems to be value in that idealist approach. Barring the ones in countries where a struggle for basic rights is still being fought, Diasporas are comfortably integrated with their host destinations or/and new homelands. The exploitation and ill-treatment of Indian workers in the Gulf countries has always been a cause of concern in India’s relationship with those countries. Yet the Diasporas themselves or India can intervene cautiously and only to an extent. Even though phenomena such as the coming to life of an International Triad has bestowed the power of critical dialogue between home and host countries, the Diaspora’s have a succinct reckoning of the fact that current homelands remain the active ground where their identities (including, ‘Indian-ness’) and loyalties acquire the day to day meaning they yearn for (World Bank Data 2008 and Economic Times 2008).

Part V An Emic beyond Pragmatism
The PIO and Indian Diaspora communities have multiple historical origins, producing heterogeneous maize of geographical credentials. Migrations from India to South Africa, for instance took place from diverse regional backgrounds. One feature of this geographical complexity is the resulting multiplicity of South African Indians’ religious and vernacular composition (variants of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity; and Tamil, Telugu, Gujarati, Hindi and Arabic linguistic communities). The Indian-origin population numbers some 1.3 million and stands approximately at 2.6% of the South African population (Statistics South Africa 2010; Ginwala 1985). Furthermore, South African Indians lost contact with family, kin and specific geographical origins in India as a result of the longevity of apartheid and diplomatic isolation, the conditions of sea-passage and indenture. They dealt with a host of local challenges upon arrival in South Africa (Landy et al., 2004 & Ebr-Valley 2001), which was for them the soil that they eventually claimed as their own.

Consequently, an ongoing sense of cautiousness over identity based isolation and minority issues led, at least early on, to outright resistance against MOIA Diaspora outreach practices. The extent to which Indians should consider themselves part of an Indian Diaspora and linked symbolically and materially to India as a diasporic homeland became a highly uptight subject of
debate (Dickinson 2015). Fatima Meer, in a speech at the 2003 Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, contested the idea that Indians in South Africa should feel part of a larger Indian Diaspora: ‘[Diaspora] is a word I abhor … We, Indian South Africans, have had to struggle hard to claim our South African-ness and that is something that we jealously guard. We are not a Diaspora of India in South Africa because we claimed South Africa for our own’ (Meer 2003).

Can India Move beyond the Apathetic Assumptions that Surface behind its Staff Officialdom and Red Tape?

This was another question that my -informants in South Africa and other countries such as Argentina, Austria, Ghana and Switzerland would ask on grounds of anonymity. Looking from India with a distant gaze, yes, all people of Indian origin are PIO or NRI or settled or yet struggling Diasporas. But mirroring the perspective from the Diaspora and PIO gaze itself, paints a different picture. It is this that the Diasporization aspires to bring out in the emic everyday encounter between state (representatives of India) and society (the diaspora and PIO actors). Every kind of Indian migrant community needs a nuanced response of place and time\(^7\). While some need a closer recognition and protection from India (for recent evacuation operations, see Xavier 2017), others are already at a stage of well-established life worlds and identities. Some overseas Indians or PIO groups or individuals maintain a careful political distance from their ancestral homeland; others may strive to come closer.

One aspect that is remarked upon singularly and runs common in every interaction and open ended interview (10 each in Argentina, Austria, Germany, Ghana, Switzerland) that this author conducted concerns the unfriendly and haughty manner in which Indian Diplomatic and consular staff conducts itself while serving in their official capacities. Behind the opulence of its grandiose policy declarations and diaspora perceptions, lies a dark area of high-handedness and bureaucratic weight throwing in Indian Embassies, High Commissions and Consulates overseas.

Actors across the Indian Diaspora communities in Argentina, Austria, Germany, Ghana, South Africa and Switzerland echo the same sentiment. A

\(^7\) For example, Singh (2010) points out the continued use of the term ‘Indian expatriate’ in recent South African political speeches even though most PIOs were born in South Africa and consider it their home.
Bobby Luthra Sinha

regular experience shared with this researcher was that there were blatant malpractices, and discourteous attitudes to queries, needs and problem solving in the performance of everyday consular or diplomatic tasks. From covert demands of ‘palm-greasing’ (especially while processing OCI renewals or grant of Visa requests) to not answering the phones in official hours, the list is endless. The high diplomacy of the MEA in wooing the elite and commercial Diaspora falls flat in a plethora of low diplomatic practices while disposing off workload concerning the common man or (Chandra 2017) those with no ‘approach’ or ‘connection’. It is therefore not surprising that in 2015, Press Trust of India spoke of complaints against 43 officials of Indian diplomatic missions in 17 countries who were facing a variety of charges including corruption and dereliction of duty (Dawn 2015).

Contrasting the above stated lacunae with India’s actual policy manoeuvres brings us to an incredible gap between presentation and reality. Diaspora is an entity full of charm, on paper at least. No state visit abroad seems to be now complete without validating and reiterating India’s inclination to pursue its Diaspora. In his state visit to the United States, PM Modi asked Indian origin people in America to participate in India's development, saying their contribution was part of his vision for a ‘people's movement for development’, modelled, as he said, ‘on Mahatma Gandhi's mass movement for freedom from British rule’ (see Mandhana 2014). Outlining his image of India, he promised to ‘fix’ the things that have long frustrated Indians living abroad, from unclean streets to unending official paperwork. He announced visa relaxations that would allow members of the community to travel to India more easily.

Can Modi, however, ‘Fix’, the Qualitative Relationship between Representative Officials and the Diaspora?

Phrased in foreign policy terminology, the question would be that as India fast-tracks it’s Diaspora, PIO and overseas Indians related procedures, why in the first line of contact (the everyday sphere) does this clientele remain an aggrieved lot? Usual complaints vis-a-vis the functioning of Indian Diplomatic offices relate to poor condition of the visitors’ waiting areas, harassment of applicants by calling for uncalled-for documents, procrastination, non-availability of exact amount as change to pay passport/visa fees, refusal to attest
documents, rude behaviour by reception/security/consular staff, delays in processing of passport/visa applications, fraudulent issue of passports, unfair termination of services of local staff, financial irregularities, service staff related problems and sexual harassment (*Indian Express* 18 September 2016).

For instance, difficulty in connecting through telephones as phone calls take long to get answered is a general day to day complaint; even the hierarchical and conceited behaviour of high ranking Indian officials in High Commissions and Embassies abroad is a regular grudge among the Diaspora actors. Many Indian origin people narrate how delay and raising of hurdles in paperwork constitutes one of the major problems in the daily zone of contact. Upon a request for sharing experiences, the actor informants sent me in hordes of anecdotes and incidents compiled in emails. In such an ironical situation, Diasporization of the foreign policy may indeed seem like a fairy tale phenomenon.

Aggrieved Diaspora actors state that many an embassy staff adopts a biased attitude while assessing the needs and aspirations of the Diaspora towards their homeland. Even while delivering simple administrative services, these officials operate with a punishing attitude that the overseas Indians are not to be ‘trusted’ for they had ‘left’ the country of their origin to explore greener pastures elsewhere. The pain of many such experiences is relegated, when officials explain how, Diasporas perpetually bicker amongst them and remain divided (Interviews with High Commission Officials in Buenos Aires August 2013; Durban January 2014).

It is also not uncommon to find many Indian Embassy/High Commission officials brandishing their position of power and prejudice to state that overseas Indians only approach the missions in pursuit of calculated, material gains (data based on group discussions with PIO, NRIs, and Expatriate communities). However, going by the number of cultural, religious, philanthropic and socially relevant activities (reminiscent of India) which are undertaken by the Indian Diasporas in the aforementioned countries, these sweeping generalisations are certainly discriminatory and farfetched

---

8 These are some findings based on author’s field work on changing relations between India and its Diaspora taken up in Argentina, Austria, Ghana, Germany, South Africa, and Switzerland. Data shared pertains to information taken on grounds of anonymity from Indian communities living in Accra, Basel, Bern, Buenos Aires, Durban, Loerrach, and Vienna between 2011-2016.
assumptions. Homepages and web links of Overseas Indian organisations and of all kinds of Indian origin migrants embody a zealously cultural inclination. Moreover, an archaic and bureaucratic world-view certainly does not add any feather in the cap of the current government, which continuing the trend of past two decades, is diligently and busily wooing the Indian Diasporas internationally. On the contrary, it just shows how much work needs to be done on the ground (which is the precise point of everyday contact between India and its Diaspora) by the Government of India. Diplomatic and non-diplomatic India based staff, who operate with the air of, ‘self-recruited custodians of mother India’ may do well to understand while they remain honourable representatives of their country, Diasporas and PIO do share and have complex claims to the same homeland as them.

It is not surprising therefore that complaints about diplomatic and non-diplomatic staff at times go on to acquire an official tone. MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) received serious complaints against 23 India-based employees in embassies abroad in the last 10 years, with officials recalled to India in four cases. These are further corroborated through evidence coming in from many other countries: For instance, in 2012, six complaints were acknowledged in total, against Indian missions in UK, Zambia, Kenya and Mauritius. This increased to 10 in 2013. There was, however, a big jump in 2014 - with 27 cases of complaints (Indian Express September 2016). With a government that has made Diaspora outreach as a key foreign policy objective, such incidents and instances remain an eyesore. Nonetheless, Indian Embassies and High Commissions have made special attention to engage with the expat community over the recent years with a strong focus on substantive issues (Economic Times 29 June 2015). One of them relates to tapping into Diaspora aspirations rather than looking at the overseas Indian’s

---

9 The highest number of five complaints each, were against the Indian missions of UK and Madagascar, with three each against embassies in Kazakhstan and Kenya. Indian missions with two complaints only were in Botswana and Mali. Last year, in 2015, there were single complaints filed against Indian embassies in Afghanistan, Austria, Italy, Japan, Morocco, Netherlands and Thailand. Even if all these complaints do not pertain to a Diaspora- GOI interaction zone or the quotidian everyday exclusively, they do substantiate the overt and covert voices of NRI and PIO communities on the basis of which this the research design and data collection for this paper was formulated and undertaken.
as distance, faraway people who/ whose ancestors had left the country. Thus we see how owing to the emergence of the Diasporas as a third force between the realms of foreign policies as well as transnational trade relations, there is a closer interaction between the state, markets and overseas Indians. In such a socially networked support system that rests in and completes the International Triad, both advantages and disadvantages have undoubtedly become visibly operational as taken up in the discussion above.

Part VI Summing up
In a world of multiple and overlapping jurisdictions and allegiances, of cascading cultural and economic differences and mergers, India’s mutually communicative and interactive build up with its Diaspora’s brings on the following insights.

Firstly, by injecting newer meanings into the greys between state and non-state actors, it does seem very likely that the Diasporas in general will continue to make the world polity and economy polycentric and transnational. The creation of a mutually accessibly discursive space between the multiple actors further implies that the words and actions of one actor directly influence the powers and positions of the other and vice-versa. Thus creating a tight, mutually addressed juxta-positional prism of a variety of actors.

Secondly, the Indian case, in particular, helps in understanding how globalising state and foreign policies need and make use of their various Diasporas innovatively. It also shows how formal structures and actors have opportunities to pioneer policies as much as respond with expertise to path breaking emergent and contingent situations with non-state actors. It is up to India to linger behind or straddle onto the International Triad with an eye on quality and quantity, both.

Thirdly, this juxtaposition of state and non-state actors completes an intensely competitive and three dimensional discursive field, that I have referred to as the ‘International Triad’ in this paper. This space then, full of systems and meanings may represent, reflect upon, follow, reject or even replicate domains of dialogue both old and new. Additionally, imitating and inspired from Diasporas and various streams of migrants, this International Triad as a space becomes replete with systems of memories and aspirations, both ‘here’ and ‘there’ as well as of ‘then’ and ‘now’.

Lastly, it can be detailed that while states are the opening point for
analysing world politics, they are no longer the single most important one. The growth of non-state actors in the International Triad has meant more diversity in potential players and partners. The proliferation of actors that are legitimately representing stakeholders and contributing concretely to contemporary global problem-solving means that we may have come a long way from the state-centric model of traditional international relations and politics.

Taking the above analysis into consideration, Diasporization certainly represents a broadening of horizons. But as a word of caution, India needs to take the current dynamics on with a pinch of salt. A hyped, homogenised engagement with Diasporas and PIO could be self-limiting and jeopardising for foreign policies and migrant peoples. As I analyse in this paper, any intent in homogenizing the meanings of Diaspora to any fixed notion could leave a room open for contestations, bilateral friction and claim making on both (home and host) ends.

On the contrary, construction of mutually meaningful discursive politics could bring on a liberating international dynamic. It is well known that Indian Diasporas not only conceive material interactions with their homeland, but also construct their imaginaries around it through their life-world of silted memories, expectations and cultural denominations. Moreover, locally in their adopted/new homelands too, Indian Diasporas have gone on to enact socio-political (qualitative and identity based) and economic (quantitative and trade based) roles much beyond their ancestral/original homeland related selves. In doing so, the Indian Diaspora demonstrates the creation of pathways for the ‘glocal’ to merge and emerge in transnational spaces. If India can tap, traverse through and balance the qualitative implications of Diaspora with its quantitative ones, it could very well emerge as an artful negotiator of the International Triad and a role model for world politics.

Acknowledgements: I am very grateful for group discussion opportunities and spaces provided by People of Indian origin, PIO Associations/groups, Expatriate organisations and Diaspora Forums in Argentina, Austria, Ghana, Germany, Switzerland and South Africa. Special thanks to key informants in Accra, Bern, Basel, Zurich, Laussane, Lucern, Buenos Aires, Durban, Cape Town, Loerrach, Klein Wasser Tal and Vienna. I am grateful too, to students, professionals, business entrepreneurs, traders and self-employed people, for
sharing their views on status-, labour- and mobility-related issues and experiences with India-based officials abroad.

References
Brittanica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/life-world. (Accessed on 29 August 2017.)
Bobby Luthra Sinha


Ginwala, F. 1985. Indian South Africans. London: MRG (Minorities Rights...
Indian Diaspora Policy and the ‘International Triad’


Indian Express 2016. MEA Reply in LS on Complaints against Employees in Indian Missions Abroad.


Bobby Luthra Sinha

Lum, K. 2012. India’s Engagement with its Diaspora in Comparative Perspective with China. CARIM- India AS2012/01 Policy Brief, Italy: European University Institute.
Muni, S.D. 2009. *India’s Foreign Policy. The Democracy Dimension.* New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.
Miller, M.C. & K.S. de Estrada 2017. Pragmatism in Indian Foreign Policy:
*Miriam Webster.* Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lifeworld. (Accessed on 29 August 2017.)
MOIA. Available at: http://www.moia.gov.in/showinfo1.asp?linkid=133. (Accessed on 4 October 2016.)
Bobby Luthra Sinha


Bobby Luthra Sinha
University of Basel
Switzerland
bobbyluthra@gmail.com
The ‘Politics’ of South African Indian Identity: Real or Imagined

Nirmala Gopal
Bonita Adele Marimuthu

Abstract
Bhana (2001) and Landy, Maharaj and Mainet-Valleix (2004) argue that people of Indian origin have lost much of their ancestral legacy as they became South Africans over the last 140 years. Using a largely qualitative lens this paper explores whether Indian cultural identifiers influence South African Indian identity and concludes with the voices of respondents showing a hybrid cultural model instead of an exclusively Indian identity model. The hybrid model is informed by especially second and third generation respondents’ exposure to Western and African influences. Data for this paper were produced from 21 face to face interviews with three generations of South African Indians in the Metropolitan Area of Durban.

Keywords: Diaspora, Indian, Identity, South Africa

Introduction
In today's global world of movement our personal identities are changing. So, ‘where is my ‘home’?’ and ‘what is my ‘identity’?’ have become essential questions in one's life (Bandyapadhyay 2008). These are questions that resonate with the Indian diaspora in South Africa which dates back to the arrival of the first Indians to South Africa. Indian immigrants to South Africa in the late nineteenth-century were distinct from the Black African population as well as the ruling white settler elite in terms of their origins, motivations, belief systems, customs, and practices (Gopal, Khan & Singh 2013) or in other words their identity. The community considered ‘Indian’ in South Africa today
The ‘Politics’ of South African Indian Identity

has its roots in labour migration; the semi-forced scheme of indenture under British government in India and the colony of Natal from 1860 onwards. In the period 1860 to 1911, a total of 152,184 indentured workers were transported to Natal from the Madras Presidency (today’s Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh states) and the Bengal Presidency (from what are today’s states of Bihar and especially Uttar Pradesh) (Dhupelia-Mesthrie 2007; Mesthrie 2006; Hiralal 2013). The Indian diaspora, was caused by the British desire for an alternate source of cheap labour after the abolition of slavery. Large mercenary scale immigration of Indian men and women began; to various parts of the globe under British colonial control such as South Africa, Mauritius, Surinam, the Caribbean, Fiji and East Africa (Hiralal 2003; Gautam 2013; Desai & Vahed 2013).

The first Indians to South Africa, referred to as indentured Indians, arrived on 16 November 1860 in the ship SS Truro with 342 indentured Indians on board. Between 1860-1861, a further five ships transported a sum total of 1,360 men and women (Sulliman 1997). According to the India Ministry of External Affairs (2000) and Mesthrie (2006) these labourers were the first of the 152,184 ‘human cargo’ shipped to the shores of Durban. Indians in the late nineteenth century came from various backgrounds involving differences in language and culture. Indentured Indians from the North differed in terms of their cultural practices from those of the South. Cultural practices of the North and South were rooted in Hinduism, but differed in matters of detail (Mesthrie 2007). Modi (2010), concurs that Indians in the diaspora are heterogeneous in terms of religion, caste, linguistic groups, ethnic origins, language spoken, cultural practices and the place of origin. Even for Mesthrie (2007) the original composition of Indians included a Hindu majority, a small proportion of Muslims and even smaller number of converts to Christianity. Morris (1968:105) (quoted in Modi 2010) argues that despite their divergence, identity as ‘Indians’ is derived from their identification ‘... with the common country of origin and from cultures that were closer to each other than to those of other racial sections’.

Landy, Maharaj and Mainet-Valleix (2004) and Raman (2004) assert that although South African Indians can be broadly categorised into two main categories, the ‘old diaspora’ and the ‘new diaspora’, ‘it is dangerous to pose too much of a dichotomy between “indentured workers” on the one hand and “merchants” on the other, especially since at the conclusion of their contracts, “many indentured workers found employment in industry; some became
white-collar workers and small-scale traders”. A few decades later, after the system of indenture was abolished in 1917, the ex-indentured stayed on as ‘free labourers’ alongside the ‘free passengers’ or traders (Modi 2010; Mesthrie 2000:10 - 11; Pachai 1971:6 - 7). Chetty’s 1991 study significantly points to how the Indianness of the trader was distinct from the Indianness of the worker (Chetty 1991). Despite the harsh working conditions, of the 143 000 Indians that came to Natal, only 27 000 returned home when the system of indenture was abolished. By 1936, the number of Indians rose to 219 925, of whom about half were born in South Africa (D’Souza 2008:36). Experiences in South Africa distilled a core sense of Indianness, a kind of unity in diversity (Mesthrie 2007).

In contemporary South African society, around 80% of the 1.2 million Indians live in KwaZulu-Natal, with the major concentration in Durban, where the majority of the indentured Indians and their descendants settled. The majority lived in the densely populated apartheid townships of Chatsworth and Phoenix. Chatsworth was established in line with the Group Areas Act, when the city Council resolved in 1962 to close down the Magazine Barracks and transfer residents to sub-economic housing in Chatsworth, mainly in Westcliff and Croftdene, with a small number in Bayview. Smaller towns such as Tongaat, Mount Edgecombe, Stanger, and Umzinto along the north and south coasts, as well as in Pietermaritzburg, the capital of KwaZulu-Natal, and in the midlands and northern Natal towns of Ladysmith, Newcastle, Dundee, and Glenco catered for the growing Indian population (Desai & Vahed 2013). Around the late seventies Phoenix (a township north of Durban) was established to accommodate increasing numbers of working class Indians.

South African Indianness
The spatial settlement and social reproduction of the Indian Diaspora in South Africa is a consequence of apartheid segregationist policies such as the notorious Group Areas Act that enforced racial divisions through forced removals and settlement (Gopal, Singh & Khan 2013). This did not distract SAI’s from maintaining their Indian identity. Important aspects of South African ‘Indianness’ took root through a dialogue with events in India. The idea of India and ‘homeland’ were important components of ‘sense of identity and belonging’. As a way of continuing the ‘connection,’ the surplus wealth from traders and indentured Indians was sent back ‘home’ to their fam-
ilies and villages (Bhana & Brain 1990).

Around the mid 1920’s Indian identity in South Africa was strongly influenced by the growth of the nationalist movement in India, which helped formulate ideas of Indian subjectivity, and an association with ‘others’ in scattered geographical locations. During this time the Natal Indian Congress was established in 1894. The National Indian Congress (NIC) was largely modelled on the Indian National Congress, whose primary purpose was to ‘keep India alive to Indian South Africans was established in 1894.

In the 1940’s state legislation directed against Indians increasingly undermined their right to citizenship (Raman 2004). In wider society, Indians were collectively regarded as ‘coolies’ or as constituting the ‘Asiatic menace’, a term which encompassed ideas of disease, economic competition, and struggles over social space. Given these factors, Indians were largely thrown back on themselves, and had little choice but to form some loose sense of ‘community’, however fragile and contentious that might have been at times.

The idea of a free independent India, as well as the intervention of its politicians on their behalf at particular junctures, helped negotiate the tension between belonging and alienation that many Indians experienced in South Africa. This complex relationship with India can be traced back to the time of the first migrations of Indians to South Africa, during which time Gandhi set about developing a ‘new kind of Indian’, embedded in ideas of India’s ancient cultural heritage. Raman (2004) suggests that, ‘The growth of the independence movement in India had an enormous influence on Indians in South Africa, both in terms of their own formulations of identity, and in the ways that they fought for political recognition there’. In addition, during his stay in South Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Gandhi deliberately set out to create a ‘new kind of Indian’ built on the idea of an ancient Indian cultural heritage, these findings have also been supported by Landy, Maharaj and Mainet-Valleix (2004).

The Diaspora
Religion as a discursive field of Indian identity which included inviting Indian religious figures to South Africa, kept India alive in people’s minds, but also had a much wider significance (Vahed 1997). Bhana and Vahed (2005) in their book entitled ‘Gandhi South African ‘Indian’ Cultural and Religious
Orientation’ point to Gandhi’s approach based on ‘Indianness’ that he used to create alliances and cultivate the leadership of various Indian organisations across language, religious and caste divisions. Gandhi shaped the cultural and religious orientation of South African Indians. For Indian South Africans, cultural transformations gave rise to a particular form of hybridity, based on an identity that was not fixed, but a point of identification, an act of becoming in relation to Blacks and Whites. A complex interaction with India helped to shape the political and social identity of Indians in South Africa. The notion of the ‘Motherland’ became a potent symbol of ‘Indianness’ invoked by the young radical intelligentsia (e.g. Dadoo, Goonam Naidoo, Monty Naicker) as well as other sections of the Indian community in the 1940s. In his research on the influence of Bollywood movies in the Indian diaspora's identity construction and notions of home and tourism behaviour to India Bandyapadhyay’s, findings revealed that the Indian diaspora's imagination of India is strongly informed by Bollywood movies. His findings further demonstrated nuances in different generations of the Indian diaspora reasons for travelling to India. The first generation's nostalgia arises from watching Bollywood movies, and as a result, creates a motivation to travel to India. The second generation travel to India mainly to experience the new ‘modern’ country, portrayed in contemporary Bollywood movies. The first generation, who have never seen India before are motivated by Bollywood movies that enable them to romanticise their homeland and create an urge to visit (Bandyapadhyay 2008).

Fanon (1986) and Bhabha (1994) observed that colonialism produces its own particular forms of hybrid identity. Dhupelia-Mesthrie (2005) discusses Bhana and Vahed’s research agenda that focusses on ‘activities that signified values transplanted from India’ underpinned by the notion that ‘immigrant communities recreate the worlds they leave behind in their new environments’.

Diaspora studies have questioned the essentialist notions of identities: religious, gendered and ethnic, and the enduring ‘myth of return’ (Hardill & Raghuram 1998:255) to the ‘ancestral homeland’ among immigrants (Klein 1987:68; Hole 2005). Similarly, Gautam 2013 argues ‘The individual as the carrier of cultural baggage transports it into new cultural surroundings where he sorts out his experience and adapts himself in a new country’. In her analysis of Gujarati Hindu women in Sweden and the United Kingdom, Hole argues that ‘the homeland’ conjures up nostalgic memories of the ‘better past’ to which they long to return. She states that:
‘Their shared experiences and backgrounds also make a sharable desire of return … they are longing to return’. This ‘urge to return to their homeland’ means that these women will ‘never truly settle’ and therefore are ‘neither here nor there’ (Hole 2005:324). Researching the issue of Indian languages in South Africa Sooklal (1991) observes that during the 1990’s few opportunities existed for mastering Indian languages and scriptures: Indian languages were marginalised in the school curriculum.

The indentured and their descendants instituted a range of customs, traditions, beliefs and values in Natal. These were inherited and transplanted from India, yet refashioned in a fluid and complex process. ‘It is not unusual, given this rich religious history that the Hindu community has come to occupy a significant place among the minority religious groups in South Africa’ (Desai & Vahed 2012. When the first Indians migrated to South Africa they brought the intrinsic values and images of temples with them (Bridjraj 1998; Maharaj 2012; Sookrajh 2012; South African Hindu Maha Sabha 2012). In the early days of indenture a small temple or shrine was set in a yard under the shade of some trees or near a river. With the passage of time, these temples began to assume greater dimension in structure and construction when local groups combined and pooled their resources. By the beginning of the 20th century elaborate structures, ‘replicas of the architecture of temples of the Motherland’, dotted the South African landscape. The formation of the South African Hindu Maha Sabha as the national synod representing the cultural and religious aspirations of the South Africa’s Hindu community was the brainchild of an outstanding Sannyasin (monk) Swami Shankaranandaji Maharaj who visited South Africa at the invitation of the Arya Samaj movement in Natal.

Hoffmeyer (1995) asserts that during the apartheid era, westernisation amongst the South African Indian diaspora of all faith groups was a source of emancipation from their religious belief system. Radhakrishnan (2008) maintains that ‘Recent literature on the Indian diaspora has identified a ‘paradox’ regarding the ‘homogeneity’ and ‘heterogeneity’ of its communities networked around the world’. Scholars such as Anderson (1983) and Werbner (2002) have developed theoretical concepts regarding the Indian Diaspora, such as ‘Imagined Diaspora’ i.e. an imagined cultural and structural boundary of ethnic contestation where the community is seen as transnational homogeneous group. The concept was earlier used in defining the imagined community (Anderson 1991).
The image of India as a sacred homeland of parents and forefathers is based on shared memories. India today presents a different image for the new generation of PIOs. Roy (2002) adds that migrants preserve their ties to their homeland through their preservation of, and participation in, traditional customs and rituals of consumption. He further adds that expatriates are adamant and passionate about such habits as motherland eating habits (Reading Communities and Culniray communities: The Gastropoetics of the South Asian Diaspora, Parama Roy: 2002). With reference to the Indian diaspora, Sanghvi and Hodges (2012) perceive it as diverse; comprising of a host of ‘languages, religions, and ethnicities, making it difficult to combine them into one homogenous group’. Gautam (2013) compares various Diasporas and their relations to their countries of origin. He believes that the idea of an Indian Diaspora as a transnational social community/group can be compared with that of the Jewish Diaspora. He adds that in the Polish diaspora, loyalty to the fatherland (Poland) plays an emotional role. He maintains however, that ‘to the second and third generation of Indians in Europe, the image of India is ambiguous’. It is not based on the notion of birthplace, citizenship and patriotism. Instead it is based on collective imagination of India. Desai and Vahed (2010) in their study on Indian identities augment the notion of ties with the homeland by asserting, ‘It has become popular to visit India in search of “roots” even among those who are not certain where their ancestors originated and the search is usually in vain’. They further contend that participants who traced roots indicate ‘this was not so much to seriously re-link to the homeland but to satisfy a desire to see where their ancestors hailed from’.

Using the Indo-Canadian diaspora as a case study, Singh and Singh (2014) Diaspora, Political Action, and Identity: A Case Study of Canada's Indian Diaspora) offer a political notion of the Diaspora. They maintain that ‘the political activity of diasporic subjects is complex, revealing a heterogeneous identity that cannot be determined by categorical assumptions’.

Indians in the late nineteenth century came from various backgrounds involving differences in language and culture (Mesthrie 2007). Mesthrie adds ‘Indians became one of the most multilingual communities in South Africa in the first half of the twentieth century’.

Broeder, Extra and Maartens (ND) in their research on rhetoric and facts about multilingualism in South Africa, with a focus on KwaZulu-Natal and the metropolitan area of Durban argued that ‘Indian languages are rarely conceived as core values of culture by Indian South Africans, at least in terms
of communicative use. Most Indian South Africans speak English at home. However, for many of them, Indian languages hold symbolic value’. Prah (2007) in a review on the language question in South Africa with respect to the challenges, which face the issue of the promotion of indigenous languages maintained, ‘given its rich cultural mix, which should be a source of economic social and cultural strength, South Africa, like all the other former colonial countries of the continent is still yoked with the burden of language and cultural colonialism’. Sagacious multiculturalism will permit the celebration of all South Africa’s languages and cultures and should allow cross-fertilization and inter-penetration of individuals and groups across cultural and linguistic boundaries. But even then, democracy requires the pre-eminence of the cultures and languages of the majorities. In her research entitled ‘From “ghetto” to mainstream: Bollywood in South Africa’ Ebrahim (2008) purports ‘Most South Africans coming from Tamil- and Telegu-speaking (i.e. South Indian) backgrounds seem eager to consume vocal South Indian dissident view. Any perceived imitativeness of Hollywood does not its South African fans; on the contrary, most cite its ‘wholesomeness’ (usually referring to Bollywood’s lack of explicit sex and excessive violence) as being distinctive from Hollywood. North Americans may deem Bollywood an most South Africans regardless of so-called ‘authenticity’.

**Anti-Indian Sentiment**

During the apartheid dispensation South Africans Indians were in limbo in terms of their political status. In the current (democratic) dispensation they feel alienated probably because of the ‘anti-Indian’ resentment which is said to be on the rise (News 24 - 8 July 2014). News 24 expands the debate by explaining ‘The so called African-Indian acrimony can be traced back to the 1950s. In 1949, public rioting against Indians engulfed the city of Durban and its surrounds, even threatening to spread to Mahatma Gandhi’s experimental ashram of non-violence in Phoenix. In 1951, a young Nelson Mandela wrote of his personal doubts and those of his fellow African nationalists towards South African Indians’. Adding to the debate on the anti-Indian sentiment is a newspaper by Patel (Opinion 02 Aug 2017) where she contends, ‘In KwaZulu Natal (KZN), a ‘In KwaZulu Natal (KZN), a group calling itself Mazibuye African Forum has called for the ‘liberation of KwaZulu-Natal from Indians’.
Additionally Patel reminds readers of playwright Mbongeni Ngema’s song ‘AmaNdiya’ (‘Indian’) that purportedly ‘promoted hate in sweeping, emotive language against Indians as a race’.

**Identity Framework**

Fearon (1999) argues that identity is ‘people’s concepts of who they are, of what sort of people they are, and how they relate to others’ (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 2) and national identity describes that condition in which a mass of people have made the same identification with national symbols – have internalised the symbols of the nation ...’ (Bloom 1990: 52). Motyl (2010) adds that identity, while malleable, is malleable only within limits. If identity changes, it does so only over time and in response to both external stimuli and internal realignments. However some elements of identity, those designated as biological, do not change. Motyl expands on the notion of identity ‘Identity is situational, but rooted in certain intrinsic characteristics that are not situational’.

In terms of social identity the Social identity theory specifically explains social identity as a person's knowledge that he or she belongs to a social category or group (Hogg & Abrams 1988). A social group is a set of individuals who hold a common social identification or view themselves as members of the same social category. Lewis (2012) holds that Social identity is one of the recent theories of inter-group bias. He further explains that ‘It refers to the desire of individuals to strive to maintain some perceived superior distinctiveness conferred by membership within an in-group – distinctiveness that enables the in-group to compare more favourably with out groups’. Tong and Chang (2008) draw attention to Dweck’s theoretical framework which suggests that individuals might differ in their beliefs concerning how much social identities are fixed and enduring aspects of the self. Tong and Wang refer to this group as Group Entity Belief (GEB). Tong and Wang distinguishes as individuals who feel that the part of them that is defined by their social groups is basically an inalienable part of who they are and would only vary marginally over the long term or even not change at all. This group has a long term attachment with each other which will always remain an essential part of their self-definition.

In a social transaction, shared identity compensates for loss of indivi-
duality on the expectation that the other will reciprocate. What the individual gets in return for relinquishing individuality has been characterized as a type of empowerment, where group identity counterbalances the threat of the power of dominant forces (Drury, Cocking, Baele, Hanson & Rapley 2005) (quoted in Lewis 2012). One way in which people make sense of their complex social world is through social categorization, perceiving themselves and the people they meet as members of social categories (e.g. men vs. women; Europeans vs. Americans) (Derks, Stedehouder Ito 2015). These researchers further maintain that Social categorization induces people to think of themselves as group members (Tajfel & Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987) and is the starting point for a wide range of positive and negative intergroup phenomena (e.g. social identity, intragroup helping, prejudice, stereotype threat).

Methodology
MacMillan and Schumacher (2001:166) define a research design as ‘plan for selecting subjects, research sites, and data collection procedures to answer the research question(s)’. The research design for this study will be of a quantitative nature. Data for this study were produced through face-to-face interviews with 21 respondents located in Durban, Kwa-Zulu Natal. The primary aim of this study is not to understand individual constructions but instead discursive views through which Indian South Africans give meaning to ‘Indianness’. Respondents were selected through snowball sampling and availability across the greater Durban area. There were 10 males aged between 31 and 76 years, and 11 females aged between 21 and 86 (Refer to Table 1 below). Interviews were conducted at a mutually arranged venue and each interview lasted on average one hour. All interviews were conducted in English. Since participation in the study was dependent on availability and willingness, the study unintentionally excluded those with divergent approaches or experiences. Questions were facilitated by a structured interview schedule which focused on issues regarding their identity. Interviews took a conversational form with all participants sharing information with great enthusiasm. The first section of the schedule contained open ended questions and the second closed ended questions.

Using a working model of thematic analysis (Gopal & Marimuthu 2015) the data were analyzed through a systematic procedure, which began by
searching through the interviews conducted with respondents for repeated patterns of meaning in describing and understanding South African Indian identity. In the second part of the analysis, codes were produced which highlighted potential patterns. ‘A coding framework represents the operations by which qualitative data is broken down, conceptualized and put back together in new ways, it is considered as the central process by which theories are derived from data sets’ (De Vos 2005:340). First each interview was coded, and these codes were matched across the twenty seven interviews. The next step-involved production of a thematic map where themes were refined in relation to the data from all respondents. Graphs reflecting the closed ended responses follow the thematic analysis.

Results and Discussion
Seven themes that arose concerning identity formation, are now discussed for each of the three generations (see appendix 1 for respondents’ profiles) Generation 1 biography, defined as those born between 1934 and 1954. Generation 2 biography defined as those born between 1955 and 1975 and generation 3 biography defined as those born between 1976 and 1996. All generation 1 participants have the prefix A, generation 2 participants have the prefix B and generation 3 participants have the prefix C. This is followed by results of the closed ended questions, and a synthesis of the findings.

The Seven Main Themes for Identity
Theme 1: Characteristics that Define Indian Culture and Identity
Generation 1 namely A1, A4, A5, A6 and A7 explained, ‘it is our mannerisms, values and religious practices and the type of food that we eat, morals, trustworthiness and the type of clothing we wear’ while A2 and A3 added, ‘heritage’.

B1 explained it is, ‘My birth from Indian parents and my childhood lessons and upbringing in an Indian home in South Africa. The religious celebrations and rituals that I participate in are of Indian origin’. B2 commented differently ‘I look Indian according to people ( from comments when I travel) but I don’t consider myself Indian apart from a small segment of religion and some food options. I enjoy breyani does that make me Indian? I don’t think so- the same
with prayer if I’m near a church I go in and Pray to Christ, does that make me Christian- I don’t think so. However, strangely with the recent Anti-Indian sentiment in KZN, I have started to question how others see me’.

**B7** maintained, ‘My genetic make-up, religion, food, culture, music, general characteristics and accent characterizes me as Indian’. **B1** asserted, ‘I do not consider myself as India’s Indian. I am first a South African and the Indian that I am is just by way of birthright. The difference is that an Indian of India is a true Indian, speaking the respective dialect and practicing actively their religion and culture. I am not an Indian and so I have been exposed to the Indian way of life but I am a South African with Indian heritage but not a true practicing Indian’.

**C4**’s response showed a hybrid identity, ‘it is my values, morals, family life and lifestyle passed on from generation to generation that is a pivotal aspect of defining me as an Indian. However at the same time my South African heritage and exposure to different cultures and lifestyles in my country of birth has developed me into an integrated identity that embodies the traits of both being proudly South African and Indian’. As far as **C5** is concerned, ‘it is an element of religion combined with a strong family/ community that is important in defining one’s Indian identity’.

The above responses while indicating some similarities between the generations also highlighted some differences in views. Dweck’s theoretical framework which suggests that individuals might differ in their beliefs concerning how much social identities are fixed and enduring aspects of the self. Tong and Wang refer to this group as Group Entity Belief (GEB) supports these above findings. However, generation 1 was largely complementary in their views. Some dissenting perspectives were noted in generations 2 and 3, which is understandable. The stereotype that all South African Indians identify as Indians rather than South Africans has been challenged by some of the responses noted above.

**Theme 2: Differences between South African Indian Culture and Culture Practised in the sub-Continent (India)**

**A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5** professed ‘we are more modern…. we tend to do things
in a big way’ while A6 and A7 maintained (and) ‘we follow our culture strictly .... We spend lots of money to do prayers and festivals etc’.

B2’s response was ‘Firstly, I don’t think that we can homogenize either the sub-continent of India or the city of Durban for that matter. I actually don’t think I have anything in common with practices in India. I’ve been there twice (not because I wanted to but because of family wishes) and I’ve spent well over a month and maybe Diwali is the only common feature of significance, we don’t in Durban pray excessively like people do in India (they have a ‘mandir’ on every street like London has a pub on every street), or share their obsession with Bollywood movies. Most importantly, I think that men in South Africa treat women better than the men in India regardless of a woman’s age (I have seen women with children building roads and climbing precarious ladders on building sites without protection, and men not giving up their seats to old women on buses and trains- appalling).’

For B3 the differences are minimal while for B4 ‘South Africa tends to be very ethnically focused --- in India people are very relaxed and accepting of other dialects and beliefs. Our prayer also tends to be very long when compared to how prayers are performed in India. In India weddings are arranged very quickly whilst in SA it tends to be based on the availability of venues’. B5 identified a material difference such as ‘Durbanites have the influence of Western ideology and are keen on e.g. glamorous weddings unlike India’. B4 affirmed, ‘In Durban people are very dogmatic and tend to look at issues along ethnic lines as opposed to looking at matters objectively. I have found that prayers in India tend to be performed much quicker, as opposed to SA, where our prayers can be very long. In SA we have weddings during the day, whilst it is common practice for weddings to occur at night in India. B5’s view was, ‘I am of the opinion that the practice of Hinduism in India is a way of life as opposed to it being a fraction of our lifestyle in South Africa’.

C2 asserted, ‘Indians in South Africa and Indians in India dress differently, South Africa takes on a more western style, and rituals are performed differently, in order to suit people’s lifestyle’. C3 maintained, ‘The tendency to follow a vegetarian diet in India is much stronger than in South Africa. Furthermore, the commitment to religion is stronger for people from India’.
C4 claimed, ‘I think we have evolved from the subcontinent practises to adapt to our own unique Durban cultural practises to a certain degree but still ultimately embodying the subcontinent’s main principles. Religion and religious festivals in Durban have been tailored to be practiced in a manner that is respectful of South African Laws and practices, as well as religious tolerance of other races and religions. Cuisine has also been adapted and Durban has its own identity and uniqueness in terms of cuisine, language, culture, dress and lifestyle’.

Commenting on entertainment and dress sense C4 maintained, ‘The gap has narrowed as India itself has started a transformation from a more conservative standpoint to be a bit more liberal and adventurous with integrating western dress sense with eastern style’. C4 was of the opinion that with respect to the status of women ‘transformation on the sub-continent has a long way to go in comparison to South African Indians where women are more liberal, career-orientated and independent’.

C2 believes ‘Indians in India wear more traditional Indian clothing, while Indians in South Africa dress more like western society does. Rituals are followed to the T in India, while in South Africa; they are shortened to accommodate people’s busy lifestyles. South African Indians speak English, whereas Indians in India speak their mother tongue language’.

C3 shared the following, ‘Indians in South Africa have been exposed to many different cultures and experiences since arriving from India. These influences have caused South African Indians to stray from their heritage’. C5 noted ‘The subcontinent of India- its people- I feel pay particular attention to practicing and adhering to their religion on a daily basis. The South African society I feel, does not hold the element of religion with such importance in their daily life’.

Responses to the theme above evinced some strong views on differences between South African Indian culture and culture practised in the sub-continent (India). Particularly respondents commented on the length of religious rituals, meanings attached to weddings and dress code. Interestingly all generations in one way or the other recognizes the influence of western culture on South African Indian culture. Some respondents highlighted the strides South Africa has made in gender transformation when compared to India. Modi (2010),
concurs with the above findings and suggests that Indians in the diaspora are heterogeneous in terms of religion, caste, linguistic groups, ethnic origins, language spoken, cultural practices and the place of origin.

Theme 3: How Do you Feel about Indian Languages not Being Included as One of South Africa’s 11 languages?

A1, A4, A5, A6 and A7 expressed despondency, ‘it is important to include all racially represented languages’. A2 added, ‘at least some schools offer it as a subject’.

B1 mentioned, ‘I think that is fair. I do speak Zulu and Afrikaans fluently’. B2 explained, ‘I think that if you look at the small percentage of Indians in the SA population, then it makes perfect numerical sense for it not to be included as there are so many Indian languages. I think what is more important is if you define yourself as Indian and want to learn the language, it should not matter whether or not it’s “official”’.

For B4, ‘I do not believe that it is relevant to SA’. While B5 was aggrieved, on the basis of ‘not being a truly democratic reflection of the people of the country’. B6 responded that the ‘language question is complex and contested. Indian languages must be supported and developed by the respective communities and organizations interested in languages. However, the use of the various Indian languages in the public and political space is not established. Additionally, the number of people speaking the various Indian languages does not warrant them being classified as official languages. An official language has wide-ranging implications for the political, social and educational processes’. B7 felt that ‘it should be included for official recognition and propagation’.

Clearly, the views expressed on the inclusion of Indian languages as part of South Africa’s official languages is a contested one. While generation 1 was unanimous of its inclusion, generation 2 agreed that for practical reasons it does not make complete sense. Generation 3 all agreed that Indian languages should not be part of South Africa’s official languages. However researching the issue of Indian languages in South Africa Sooklal (1991) observes that
during the 1990’s few opportunities existed for mastering Indian languages and scriptures: Indian languages were marginalised in the school curriculum.

**Theme 4: In Terms of Indian Cultural Activities, Participants were Asked what Activities they Participate in. They were also Asked Where and When they Participate**

Here all Generation 1 respondents spoke of participating in cultural activities such as ‘Prayers and festivals at home and temples such as Umgeni Road, Mt Edgecombe and Greenwood Park temples as well as other temples close to home’.

**B1** and **B2** had the following to say, ‘Nothing really, except the annual Deepavali festival’. **B3** and **B7** ‘participate in most religious activities within the locality of their homes’. For **B4** it was, ‘Watching Indian TV, and listening to Lotus FM’. **B5** ‘participates in Festivals, fasts, prayers and ceremonies in our homes or designated venues of worship. **B6** explained, ‘I attend some organized cultural events like Deepavali and devotional activities at temples in Malabar in Port Elizabeth and Mount Edgecombe in Durban respectively’

**C1, C4,** and **C5** explained, ‘Religious practices, auspicious prayers during the applicable periods as set out by the religious calendar which are deemed socially respectful mainly at home’. For **C2, C6** and **C7** ‘We celebrate festivals on the Indian calendar, e.g. Diwali, on the auspicious date stated on the calendar, at home or at the temples’ and **C3** mentioned, ‘I attend weddings and funerals outside my residence. Within my residence, I participate in any prayer that is taking place. At home and at the venues that they are taking place’.

All three generations participate almost equally in Indian cultural activities either in the home or in public spaces like temples. These results are supported by social identity theory suggests that a social group is a set of individuals who hold a common social identification or view themselves as members of the same social category. Lewis (2012) further explains that ‘It refers to the desire of individuals to strive to maintain some perceived superior distinctiveness conferred by membership within an in-group – distinctiveness that enables the
in-group to compare more favourably with out groups’, this was evident in the results.

**Theme 5: With Respect to Indian Music, Respondents were Asked If and Why They Listen to Indian Music**

A1, A2, A3, A5 listen to Indian music because it reinforces ‘religious ideals through religious and devotional songs’ while A4, A6 and A7 ‘listen to Indian music because they enjoy Indian music’.

B1 and B2 responded, ‘No they do not listen to Indian music’. B3 stated, ‘Yes, it is good to listen to’. B4 affirmed, ‘Yes, I listen to Lotus FM and enjoy the music’. B5 maintained, ‘Yes, Classical Indian music is an art form and helps to maintain the element of language continuity’. For B6 it was, ‘Yes, I do not understand any of Indian languages but I do play them in my car and some religious music at home’. While B7 mentioned, ‘yes, by preference’.

C1 reported, ‘Yes I was brought up speaking the language and enjoy the various compositions’. C2 mentioned ‘Yes, Some of the lyrics have meaning and I can relate to them’ C4 and C7 explained ‘Yes, I love the vibrancy and colourfulness of the musical beats as well as the western fusion with eastern music and I listen to all types of music’. C5 agreed, ‘Yes, I enjoy listening to Indian music because it gives me a chance to remember the memories it is linked with. Also, I feel that it is an important element that connects to the Indian community while C3 and C6 responded ‘No I do not listen to Indian Music’.

Generation 1 unanimously confirmed that they listen to Indian music. Some generation 2 and 3 respondents do not listen to Indian music. The diversity in views has some resonance with Hoffmeyer (1995) who asserts that during the apartheid era, westernisation amongst the South African Indian diaspora of all faith groups was a source of emancipation from their religious belief system (probably includes music).
Theme 6: The Images that Came to Mind When Thinking about India

For generation 1 respondents images that came to mind were ‘The Indian flag…. Taj Mahal ‘Indira Ghandhi…. Mahathma Ghandhi’ and ‘religion’.

B2 mentioned, ‘Filth and squalor, a population who do not value their heritage-’. B3, B4 and B7 explained, ‘Religion, spirituality Home, family and tradition’. For B5 it was, ‘Bollywood, poverty, colorful arts and crafts’ while for B6 it was ‘Diversity, religion, color, crowds, architecture, wisdom, knowledge, poverty and suffering is what comes to mind when they think about India’.

C1 explained that the images that come to mind when you he thinks of India are’ Arthi (prayer) at the Ganges, rural Indian women clad in sarees and dots, cow’ and C5 mentioned the ‘high level of poverty and unemployment, a patriarchal society and exceptionally religious’ and for C7 it was ‘Temples and Taj Mahal’.

Generation one responses appear sentimental and positive. Hogg and Abrams (1988, 2) suggested that ‘national identity is the condition in which a mass of people have made the same identification with national symbols or have internalised the symbols of the nation …’ as demonstrated in these findings in this group. However the results of the younger generation also support that of Motyl (2010), who denotes that identity, while malleable, is malleable only within limits and identity changes, it does so only over time and in response to both external stimuli and internal realignments. However, views from generation 2 ranged from positive to being quite critical of India. Generation 3 responses are interesting in that it is mostly positive although one would have expected this generation to be more critical and negative in their images.

Theme 7: South African Indians’ Feeling of Connectedness to India

As expressed in the following sentiments A1 claimed, ‘Yes there is a feeling of connection to India’ and described this connection as ‘our traditions have emanated from India so there will always be a connection’. For A2, A3, A5 and A7, it was ‘yes, we are able to converse in our mother tongue easily, A4’s
response was ‘Yes, I think this connection comes from our inherited rituals’ while A4 believed ‘yes there is a connection through ‘religion and India as our Mother country’.

B1 and B6 explained, ‘We share heritage and culture. B2 responded, I feel I have nothing in common with Indians in India. B3, B5 and B7 maintained, religious, practices, language and food while B4 maintained ‘openness,’ C2, C4 and C7 maintained ‘Religious beliefs; practices, language, customs, morals and values and C3 and C6 explained ‘Apart from both being Indian, I have nothing in common with Indians in India’ while C5 responded ‘the levels of commonalties between myself and Indians from India are considerably low’.

Again, one notices generation 1 and their ‘loyalty’ to their home country. They still feel a connection as they have expressed in their responses. Generation 2 and is divided with some respondents expressing a connection and others not feeling connected. Thus correlating back to the social identity theory of Tong and Chang (2008) who draw attention to Dweck’s theoretical framework which suggests that individuals might differ in their beliefs concerning how much social identities are fixed and enduring aspects of the self. Tong and Wang referred to this group as Group Entity Belief (GEB). Tong and Wang distinguishes as individuals who feel that the part of them that is defined by their social groups is basically an inalienable part of who they are and would only vary marginally over the long term or even not change at all. This group has a long term attachment with each other which will always remain an essential part of their self-definition. Nonetheless diaspora studies have questioned the essentialist notions of identities: religious, gendered and ethnic, and the enduring ‘myth of return’ (Hardill & Raghuram 1998:255) to the ‘ancestral homeland’ among immigrants (Klein 1987:68; Hole 2005).

**Closed Ended Questions**
The following graphical representations are responses generated from closed ended questions for which responses were asked. There were six closed ended questions in total.
Figure 1 below shows that all of generation two, 3 generation 1 and 6 generation three respondents see South Africa as home while 4 generation one and 2 generation three see India as home. These responses largely concur with other diaspora studies that have questioned the essentialist notions of identities: religious, gendered and ethnic, and the enduring ‘myth of return’ (Hardill & Raghuram 1998:255) to the ‘ancestral homeland’ among immigrants (Klein 1987:68; Hole 2005). In his research on the influence of Bollywood movies in the Indian diaspora's identity construction and notions of home and tourism behaviour to India Bandyapadhyay’s, findings revealed that the Indian diaspora's imagination of India is strongly informed by Bollywood movies. His findings further demonstrated nuances in different generations of the Indian diaspora reasons for travelling to India. The first generation's nostalgia arises from watching Bollywood movies, and as a result, creates a motivation to travel to India. The second generation travel to India mainly to experience the new ‘modern’ country, portrayed in contemporary Bollywood movies. The first generation, who have never seen India before are motivated by Bollywood movies that enable them to romanticise their homeland and create an urge to visit (Bandyapadhyay’s, 2008).

**Which is home to you: South Africa or India?**

![Bar chart showing responses to the question of which is home to them: South Africa or India.](image)

**Figure 1: Respondents showing if South Africa or India is home.**
Do you speak any of the Indian languages?

Figure 2.1: Respondents showing if they speak any Indian languages.

Do you think it is necessary to speak any Indian languages?

Figure 2.2: Respondents showing if it is necessary to speak an Indian language
Figure 2.1 above displays that all generation 1 respondents speak an Indian language and think it is necessary while less than half of generations 2 and 3 speak an Indian language and don’t think it is necessary (See Figure 2.2 above). Radhakrishnan (2008) maintains that ‘Recent literature on the Indian diaspora has identified a ‘paradox’ regarding the ‘homogeneity’ and ‘heterogeneity’ of its communities networked around the world’. Scholars such as Anderson (1983) and Werbner (2002) have developed theoretical concepts regarding the Indian Diaspora, such as ‘Imagined Diaspora’ i.e. an imagined cultural and structural boundary of ethnic contestation where the community is seen as transnational homogeneous group. The concept was earlier used in defining the imagined community (Anderson 1991). Specifically on Indian languages Mesthrie (2007) argues, ‘Indians in the late nineteenth century came from various backgrounds involving differences in language and culture’ (Mesthrie 2007). Mesthrie adds ‘Indians became one of the most multilingual communities in South Africa in the first half of the twentieth century’. Obviously, given its rich cultural mix, which should be a source of economic social and cultural strength, South Africa, like all the other former colonial countries of the continent is still yoked with the burden of language and cultural colonialism. Sagacious multiculturalism will permit the celebration of all South Africa’s languages and cultures and should allow cross-fertilization and inter-penetration of individuals and groups across cultural and linguistic boundaries. But even then, democracy requires the pre-eminence of the cultures and languages of the majorities.

In Figure 3 below, most generation 2’s feel secure as an ‘Indian’ in the current dispensation while most of generation 3 do not feel secure. With generation 2’s there is almost a 50 – 50 split between those who do and those who do not feel secure in the current dispensation. Insecurities experienced by the various generations probably have its roots in South Africa’s historical political discourse. During the apartheid dispensation South African Indians were in limbo in terms of their political status. In the current (democratic) dispensation they feel alienated probably because of the ‘anti-Indian’ resentment which is said to be on the rise (News 24 - 8 July 2014). News 24 expands the debate by explaining ‘The so called African-Indian acrimony can be traced back to the 1950s. In 1949, public rioting against Indians engulfed the city of Durban and its surrounds, even threatening to spread to Mahatma Gandhi’s experimental ashram of non-violence in Phoenix. In 1951, a young
Nirmala Gopal & Bonita Adele Marimuthu

Nelson Mandela wrote of his personal doubts and those of his fellow African nationalists towards South African Indians’.

**Do you feel secure as an ‘Indian’ in the current dispensation?**

![Figure 3: Respondents showing feelings of secureness as an Indian in the current dispensation](image)

Adding to the debate on the anti-Indian sentiment is a newspaper article by Patel (*Opinion* 02 Aug 2017) where she contends that, ‘In KwaZulu Natal (KZN), a group calling itself Mazibuye African Forum has called for the ‘liberation of KwaZulu-Natal from Indians’. Additionally Patel reminds readers of playwright Mbongeni Ngema’s song ‘AmaNdiya’ (‘Indian’) that purportedly ‘promoted hate in sweeping, emotive language against Indians as a race’.
Have you tried to trace your ancestral roots?

Figure 4: Respondents showing if they have traced their ancestral roots

Figure 4 above shows the majority of generations 1 and 3 have tried to trace their ancestral roots while the majority of generation 2 has not tried to do so. The image of India as a sacred homeland of parents and forefathers is based on shared memories. India today presents a different image for the new generation of PIOs. Roy (2002) adds that migrants preserve their ties to their homeland through their preservation of, and participation in, traditional customs and rituals of consumption. Desai and Vahed (2010) in their study on Indian identities augment the notion of ties with the homeland by asserting, ‘It has become popular to visit India in search of ‘roots’ even among those who are not certain where their ancestors originated and the search is usually in vain. They further contend that participants who traced roots indicate ‘this was not so much to seriously re-link to the homeland but to satisfy a desire to see where their ancestors hailed from’.
Synthesis of Findings

The findings show similarities across three generations with respect to characteristics that define Indian culture and identity. For example all three generations spoke of ‘our mannerisms, values and religious practices and the type of food that we eat, morals, trustworthiness and the type of clothing we wear’. Upbringing in an Indian home in South Africa as well as DNA (genes). G3 added the notion of an ‘integrated identity …’ but at the same time my South African heritage and exposure to different cultures and lifestyles in my country of birth has developed me in to an integrated identity that embodies the traits of both being proudly South African and Indian’. Respondents were then asked how local Indian culture (practiced in Durban) differs from the Indian culture practiced in the subcontinent of India. All three generations agreed that religion takes a more serious form in India than in South Africa. The three generations agreed that Durban Indians have adapted cultural practices in line with western influences for example (A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5) included ‘we are more modern…. (B5)…… ‘Durban has incurred the influence of Western ideology and is keen on e.g. glamorous weddings unlike India’. I am of the opinion that the practice of Hinduism in India is a way of life as opposed to it being a fraction of our lifestyle in South Africa……and C4- I think we have evolved from the subcontinent practises to adapt to our own unique Durban culture practises to a certain degree but still ultimately embodying the subcontinent main principles of culture practise in India. Religion and religious festivals have been tailored to be practised in a manner that is respectful of South African Laws and practises, as well a religious tolerance from other races and religions.

(C4) ……. - Cuisine has also been adapted and Durban has its own identity and uniqueness in terms of cuisine, language, culture, dress and lifestyle

(C3) ……. - Indians in South Africa have been exposed to many different cultures and experiences since arriving from India. These influences have caused South African Indians to stray from their heritage.

While there was consensus from all generations that the exclusion of Indian languages as one of the 11 official South African languages was not really significant generation 2 had some respondents who advocated for its inclusion
for example…… B5 was ‘aggrieved, on the basis of it not being a truly
democratic reflection of the people of the country’. B6 responded that the
language question is complex and contested. Indian languages must be
supported and developed by the respective communities and organizations
interested in languages. However, the use of the various Indian languages in
the public and political space is not established. Additionally, the number of
people speaking the various Indian languages does not warrant them being
classified as official languages. An official language has wide ranging
implications for the political, social and educational processes. B7 felt that ‘it
should be included for official recognition and propagation’.

All three generations participate in similar cultural activities such as praying at
home, or in various temples and celebrating Diwali and other auspicious
festivals.

With respect to Indian music again all three generations listen to this type of
music although Generation three provided greater depth in their reasons for
example C2 mentioned ‘Yes, Some of the lyrics have meaning and I can relate
to them’ C4 and C7 explained ‘Yes, I love the vibrancy and colourfulness of
the musical beats as well as the western fusion with eastern music and I listen
to all types of music’C5- Yes, I enjoy listening to Indian music because it gives
me a chance to remember the memories it is linked with. Also, I feel that it is
an important element that connects to the Indian community.

Generations 1 and 2 and 3 feel that the only commonalities with India are
language, food and religion. Generation 3 however feel that these are
‘cosmetic’ commonalities.

The images that came to mind when thinking about India for all three
generations were ‘the Indian flag…. taj mahal , ‘Indira Ghandhi…. Mahathma
Ghandhi’ ‘religion,’; poverty, Bollywood.

With respect to feeling connected to India, Generation 1 felt connected through
Indian tradition and religious rituals Generation 2 felt connected through ‘a
spiritual, cultural and traditional connection with India’. While generation 3
felt connected through their forefathers, religion and cultural practices but at
the same time acknowledging the South African influence in shaping their identity

**Conclusion**
The findings although not generalizable demonstrates Indian identity has various meanings to the participants in the study. To some it means following Indian rituals, customs and traditions. For others it means being part of Indian heritage. For yet others it means having originated in India through lineage. However claiming Indian identity is not necessarily consistent amongst the three generations of respondents as discussed in the findings. South African Indians show willingness to continue Indian traditions and religious but claim to have adapted these according to some western (South African) influence. One strong recommendation of this study is to conduct a larger study exploring South African Indian Identity in depth. Although SA Indians practise various Indian traditions, customs and rituals they do not believe they belong to India suggesting a lack of objective Indian nationalism. We can therefore expect that interpretation of Indian identity will remain subjective and varied.

**Acknowledgement:** This article constitutes one of the outcomes of the research project on this topic, funded by the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences.

**References**


Malila, V. 2013. *A Baseline Study of Youth Identity, the Media and the Public Sphere in South Africa*. Pre-publication. Grahamstown: Rhodes University.

Landy, F., B. Maharaj & H. Mainet-Valleix 2004. *Are People of Indian Origin (PIO) ‘Indian’? A Case Study of South Africa*. Available at:
https://www.academia.edu/21496651/Are_people_of_Indian_originPIO_Indian_A_case_study_of_South_Africa. (Accessed on 21 November 2017.)


Appendix 1: Demographic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of interviewee</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Linguistic Group</th>
<th>Generation Since Arrival in South Africa</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A5)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>1\textsuperscript{st}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A6)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>1\textsuperscript{st}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A7)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>1\textsuperscript{st}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>3\textsuperscript{rd}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>3\textsuperscript{rd}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Telegu</td>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>4\textsuperscript{th}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>4\textsuperscript{th}</td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Telegu</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Telegu</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nirmala Gopal  
Criminology and Forensic Studies  
College of Humanities  
University of KwaZulu-Natal  
gopal@ukzn.ac.za

Bonita Marimuthu  
Criminology and Forensic Studies  
College of Humanities  
University of KwaZulu-Natal  
marimuthub@ukzn.ac.za
The Institution of Marriage:  
A Case Study on Social Pressures Surrounding Marriage in Muslim Indian Communities in Johannesburg

Fatima Mukaddam

Abstract:
There is an undoubted societal focus on marriage in many, if not all, communities. This is manifested in social media, television, almost every movie, novels, children’s storybooks, conversations and the internet in forms of online articles and blogs, which emphasize a pressure on women to get married or have a companion. This paper discusses the institution of marriage and the societal pressures surrounding matrimony amongst members of the Muslim Indian community in Johannesburg. In this paper, I illustrate that marriage is a necessary condition, especially for a Muslim Indian woman’s constructive and participatory role/identity in society. The significance of marriage can be seen to be embedded within Islamic practices. However, this dogmatic view of marriage does not explain the pressures placed on individuals to get married. Islam advocates for fate and trust in God, therefore it can be argued these pressures are socially constructed as opposed to religiously inflicted. This article uses feminist methodological tools and theories in an attempt to debunk the role of patriarchy in modern society. The paper is set as a case study that conducted semi-structured interviews. It concludes that unmarried women feel ‘judged’ and ‘scrutinized’ because of their marital status.

Keywords: Marriage, Islam, Indian, Women, Societal Pressures, Johannesburg
Introduction
In 2012, an article was published in the campus newspaper of the University of the Witwatersrand, titled ‘Becoming an honest woman’ by Sakeena Suliman (2012:7). The article discussed the pressures Muslim Indian women face with regards to matrimony in a light, humorous yet thought-provoking manner. In the article, Suliman (2012:7) discussed why she dreaded attending weddings and said that in her early 20’s she was asked by guests ‘When are you getting married?’ In her late 20s the question was replaced with ‘Don’t worry you’re next my darling’ and in her early 30’s the questions and comments were replaced with a look. Most poignantly, she discussed the fact that she was constantly referred to as a ‘girl’, and said that ‘no matter how old you are, if you [are] unmarried and Indian, you [are] a girl … you are only regarded as a woman once you [are] married’ (Suliman 2012:7). She adds:

[Y]ou will only be a somebody until a man says you are. You must not become too independent because apparently, men want you to depend on them. You are only worthy of respect until a man chooses you. We’re still being told that we can’t stand on our own. Marriage should be … about companionship. Not a race for acceptance.

These words resonated with me and the article was an inspiration to write a paper on the pressures and constant focus on matrimony. I am a twenty-six-year-old single Muslim Indian woman. Ever since I matriculated the first piece of advice an uncle gave was: ‘You better find someone in the first year [of university], or else you [will] get left on the shelf’. Many years later I am seen as ‘at the back of the shelf, collecting dust, if not almost off the shelf’. Similar interactions with other family members and within social networks (such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram) and in my various experiences I have noticed that almost always there is an association between femininity¹ and marriage.

---

¹ Femininity is a societal construct which refers to ‘the quality of being feminine; womanliness’ (Simpson & Weiner 1989). To be a feminine woman can be defined as ‘having qualities traditionally ascribed to women, as sensitive or gentleness; pertaining to a woman or girl’ (Simpson & Weiner 1989).
Social Pressures Surrounding Marriage in Muslim Indian Communities

Generally, in many patriarchal² and hetero-normative groups in South Africa and globally, the idea of two people coming together either in the union of marriage or in a courtship manner is extremely pervasive. This is represented in popular culture, reflecting a normative understanding of how men and women should live their lives and consequently, how they should not. From this, it can be deduced that marriage is an important concept and the pressures to get married or have a partner is felt by all, especially women. Using this as a starting point I wanted to deconstruct this connection and learn how different people understand it.

My research questions looked at the societal pressures which regulate the social practice of marriage in Muslim Indian communities in Johannesburg. It asked whether there is a pressure on both men and women to get married and how individuals experience this pressure. Lastly, it looked at whose perspective is a marriage a necessary condition for a Muslim Indian individual’s constructive and participatory identity in society.

It was challenging to find scholars who speak directly to the topic of exploring the societal pressures to get married in Muslim Indian communities in Johannesburg. There is however, substantial literature on marriage and marital politics globally, particularly in Muslim communities. A great deal of this literature pays attention to gender politics and the practice of marriage. This literature is valuable when thinking about marital politics, culture, religion as well as the aspect of pressure and how this pressure is perceived and plays out.

Popular culture artifacts, such as internet articles and novels³ were used as an archive for the research as it framed the approach. These additional

---

² For the purpose of this study, a patriarchal society refers to a society where men have the main authority over their families. Patriarchy refers to the privilege of men and the subordination of women. Waltby as cited in Shilling (1991:30) discusses patriarchy as ‘cultural rules provide women and men with gendered norms concerning ranges of acceptable behaviour, participation and aspirations’.

³ Popular culture artefacts include: Courting Samira by Amal Awad, I want to get married by Ghada Abdel Aal, It Isn’t Easy For A Single Muslim Girl (a live segment played on Huffington Post Live. The segment created a dialogue between five Muslim women who spoke about their experiences of being single at the age of 30 and the pressures to find a spouse. See also
sources contextualised the research, which was based on primarily interviews and scholarly literature. I use arguments and sources from individuals who experience this pressure. Because there are public concerns and international debate around marriage in Muslim communities, this double approach was strength in both topic and research.

**Methodology**
The methodology lay within the fields of feminist theory and discourse analysis. The paper began with the objective of locating it within feminist knowledge production. The notion of feminist knowledge production influences not only the approaches to collecting and bringing the material together, but also to the lens through which one analyses that material (Mukaddam 2015:17). Feminist methodology was developed ‘in an attempt to challenge and provide an alternative method to mainstream research’ (Ducet as cited in Birch 2012:11). Birch (2012:11) further elaborates that feminist methodologies were developed by women of colour in an attempt to move away from views dominated by white, Western men who claimed to be universal.

Thus, feminist methodologies and knowledge production aim to disrupt dominant, hetero-normative and patriarchal discourses (Mukaddam 2015:17). Jane Flax argues that ‘insofar as women have been part of all societies; our thinking cannot be free from cultural-bound modes of self-understanding’ (Flax 1987:626). Patriarchy has shaped society in such a way that ‘man’ is viewed as the norm and ‘woman’ is viewed as the deviant’ (Mukaddam 2015:17). Consequently, feminist theory is an attempt to analyse ‘how one thinks of, or does not think of, or avoids thinking of gender’ (Flax 1987:627).

The methods for this research were qualitative and grounded in a feminist theoretical and empirical approach. It best suited the research as it discussed the perceptions of people who were understood as being part of a particular community, culture, and religion. Interviews were held with five

men and five women aged between 19 and 32 from the Muslim Indian community in Johannesburg. The interviews were guided by a questionnaire that urged participants to discuss their understanding of marriage, and how it related to Islamic values and beliefs. Semi-structured interviews provided the opportunity to probe into certain themes that were useful to the study and brought up by the respondents. Three interviewees were originally from “farm towns” in South Africa and were studying and residing in Johannesburg. This was an interesting aspect as these interviewees relayed the experiences from both their hometowns and the city; which added another layer to the research. The interviewees were of the same religion, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, educational experience, nationality and socio-economic class. They were all from middle-class families.

Snowball sampling was used to find interview subjects to ensure that I did not interview people whom I knew. Instead, I was introduced to the interviewees by referral. My first respondent was found via a social media, Twitter. Upon viewing a tweet that was shared, a message was sent to the individual on Twitter informing them about who I am and requesting their email address. Thereafter, a formal electronic invitation was sent outlining the research topic and requesting an interview. This initiated the referral process. It is also a reason why all of the interviewees came from the same background – which is a limitation on snowball sampling. All of the respondents’ identities are anonymous, as some interviewees were open and felt more comfortable speaking from an anonymous point of view.

Marriage in Islam
It is important to discuss the role and emphasis Islam places on marriage. An investigation of the Qur’an and its stance on marriage was required as all of

---

4 I use the word ‘farm town’ to describe the small towns three interviewees are from as they themselves refer to their home towns as ‘farm towns’. However, they moved to Johannesburg from their tertiary education and are settled in Johannesburg.

5 Twitter is a public social platform wherein individuals who might not have necessarily encountered each other beyond an electronic medium are able to interact.
the interviewees regarded the Qur’an as divine law. This was helpful in creating a theoretical understanding of the issues that were raised and it created a framework that allowed a space to interpret social interactions.

Islam places immense importance on marriage. Sherif (as cited in Hassouneh-Phillips 2001:931) argues that ‘throughout the Islamic world, marriage is at the heart of social and religious life’. The reason marriage is of significance is due to the fact that marriage is seen as ‘the basis of society’ (Hassouneh-Phillips 2001:932). In his work, Abdul-Rauf (1993:1) quotes God’s assumed pleasure with marriage by citing from the Qur’an:

Marriage is my recommended custom. Whosoever turns away from my recommended custom is turning away from me. Get married so you multiply. I shall indeed be proud of your multitude on the Day of Resurrection. … O you young people, men, and women! Whosoever can bear the burden of marriage, let him or her get married. It [marriage] is indeed contentment to the eye and a protection to the modest parts. When one is married, he secures half of his religion. It is believed that whoever marries completes half of his/her Imaan, meaning, his/her faith is half perfect. When questioning each interviewee on the importance of marriage in Islam all interviewees referred to marriage as ‘completing half of one’s Imaan’. This was their only answer regarding why marriage is important. However, marriage is important for a number of reasons as well. First, it is an approved form for sexual activity to take place. Because dating and extra-marital relations are prohibited in Islam, men and women are socialized from an early age to find a spouse so that sexual activity may only take place between a husband and wife (Hassouneh-Phillips 2001:931-932 and Doi 1984:115). Secondly, marriage is important for procreation purposes. Abdul-Rauf (1993:1) describes procreation as a ‘paramount advantage of marriage’ as a couple is contributing to the human race through legitimate means. Lastly, Islam is not merely a religion regarding the performance of rituals, Islam is a way of life and Muslims are encouraged to remember God in all that they do and say. From this, it can be deduced that marriage itself can be seen as a form of Ibadah (Doi 1984:116).

It is believed that whoever marries completes half of his/her Imaan, meaning, his/her faith is half perfect. When questioning each interviewee on the importance of marriage in Islam all interviewees referred to marriage as ‘completing half of one’s Imaan’. This was their only answer regarding why marriage is important. However, marriage is important for a number of reasons as well. First, it is an approved form for sexual activity to take place. Because dating and extra-marital relations are prohibited in Islam, men and women are socialized from an early age to find a spouse so that sexual activity may only take place between a husband and wife (Hassouneh-Phillips 2001:931-932 and Doi 1984:115). Secondly, marriage is important for procreation purposes. Abdul-Rauf (1993:1) describes procreation as a ‘paramount advantage of marriage’ as a couple is contributing to the human race through legitimate means. Lastly, Islam is not merely a religion regarding the performance of rituals, Islam is a way of life and Muslims are encouraged to remember God in all that they do and say. From this, it can be deduced that marriage itself can be seen as a form of Ibadah (Doi 1984:116).

The preceding part of this section will discuss the Islamic views on finding a spouse. Cunningham et al. as cited in Suleman (2011:19) argues that ‘all societies place certain restrictions on the choice of sexual and marriage
partners’. They use the concepts of endogamy and exogamy to explain the choices of marriage partners. Endogamy refers to individuals who marry someone within their own group; which includes a language, culture, and religious similarity. Busby and Loyer-Carlson as cited in Suleman (2011:19) believe that if individuals choose spouses that come from different cultural or religious backgrounds, a strain could be placed on family relations. It could also result in the spouse having difficulty being accepted by the family because they are different. Using the definitions of endogamy and exogamy, one is able to gain an understanding of how Muslims are advised to choose their spouses (Suleman 2011:19). It should be mentioned this view is especially specific in Muslim Indian communities is Johannesburg. According to Islam, Muslims have to marry each other. An interpretation of the Qur’an (1:221) taken from Dawood (2004) says:

Do not marry women (idolaters), unless they commit themselves to *Allah* until they believe, a slave woman who believes is better than an unbelieving woman, even though she allures you. Nor marry (your girls) to unbelievers until they believe, a man slave who believes is better than an unbeliever, even though he allures you. Unbelievers do (but) beckon you to the Fire. But *Allah* beckons by His Grace to the Garden of Bliss and forgiveness and makes his signs clear to mankind: that they may celebrate His praise.

From the above, it can be seen that an Islamic marriage is an example of an endogamous marriage as Muslims cannot marry individuals who do not believe in God or those individuals who are idol worshippers (Suleman 2011:20). The second aspect an individual should look for is cultural and mental/educational compatibility, as these result in an understanding and mutual respect between the couple (Akbar n.d.:120). The moral character of the individual should also be taken into consideration. The Prophet Muhammad said that it is best to marry that person who is pious (Akbar n.d.:120). Therefore, it can be argued that one should marry an individual who is good and kind in nature and personality.

---

As can be seen, marriage is viewed as a necessity and important for all Muslims as it completes half of one’s *Imaan* and it is a legitimate channel within which sexual acts can occur. In addition, it is important for procreation, is viewed as a form of *Ibadah*, and is a means for companionship (Abdul-Rauf 1993:2). When looking for a spouse an individual should look for religion, similarity in culture, mental/educational compatibility and lastly moral character.

**Pressures to Get Married**

This section seeks to discuss the pressures that are placed on men and women to get married and whether it is the same for both men and women. Suliman’s (2012:7) article alludes to the notion of there being a greater pressure placed on women to get married as opposed to the pressure placed on men. This is not to say that men do not experience pressure, however, they experience it differently as opposed to women. When conducting this research, Suliman’s (2012:7) article was given to all interviewees to read. All ten interviewees agreed with the general sentiments of the article, yet, their understanding varied. For the purpose of this paper, marriage refers to a heterosexual, monogamous marriage as this view was discussed by the respondents. It is also the general view of marriage the Muslim Indian community in Johannesburg practices.

The interviewees agreed that indeed there is a pressure to get married; however, two interviewees believed the pressure is the same for both men and women, whilst the other eight believed there is a greater pressure placed on women. An interviewee, IC (12 June 2013) spoke about men and women experiencing the pressure differently as men are viewed as ‘providers’ and ‘women are seen as caregivers and what better way to fulfill that role than by getting married?’ (IC, 12 June 2013). However, she believes that:

> as Indians, it is more of a pressure because society has made it the next step after getting educated. My black and white friends do not face the same pressures; they all get married after being financially stable and being more experienced in life. I guess religion also plays a part to an extent because for us … marriage completes your faith (IC, 12 June 2013).
Two other women interviewees spoke about women experiencing pressure at a greater degree as opposed to men. An interviewee said:

In Indian society, if you’re not married … and if you’re a woman, then it’s automatically assumed there must be something wrong with you … Indian women almost need to be married to be taken seriously. If you’re not married you’re immediately judged. … I most definitely don’t think it’s an issue or pressure in other races as much as it is with Indian Muslims. Taking away the element that it’s considered half our Imaan, the Indian society, in general, puts a lot of emphasis on marriage when compared to other races and ethnicities. Unmarried women in other cultures are subjected to far less judgment than we are (AS, 19 May 2013).

As stated above eight of the respondents echoed the same sentiments as AS (19 May 2013). Some of the men went further to suggest the pressure begins in high school and escalates after Matric. All of the respondents argued there is a stigma attached to unmarried women especially as the woman gets older. However, this is not unique to just Muslim Indian communities but to Muslim women globally, and perhaps women in general. Patriarchy has manifested itself in such a way that women feel ‘anxiety about remaining single and report pressure from family members and others to marry and have children’ (Blakemore et al. 2005:327). In addition, like argued by the respondents’ society perceives unmarried women as being ‘deficient’ (Blakemore et al 2005:327). Therefore, a critical look at societal structures and values needs to take place.

Another aspect that was discussed in great detail was that marriage fulfills half of one’s Imaan. However, the respondents believed the pressure and stress on marriage are more socially related as opposed to religiously related. Their reasoning lies in the fact that Muslims are taught to believe in fate as it is the principle aspect of faith in God and Islamic belief. Muslims believe that God has already written out when and to whom one will get married to and if one believes this to be true then there would be no need for this constant pressure as an individual will get married when he/she is destined to.

It should be mentioned that nine interviewees resolved the pressure to get married is more socially constructed due to the cultural heritage of Indian
people. Their reasons being the ancestors of Indian people in South Africa, come from India; therefore many have been indoctrinated and socialised with some of the ideals that were practiced upon when their forbearers lived there. Even though Muslim Indians living in South Africa and some have not visited India for years if at all, many of those ideals are still practiced by them today as it is a hegemonic discourse. Adila Abusharaf (2006) explains the cultural/religious binary by arguing that:

[S]tudies have shown that religion influences gender relations and outcomes, but the effects of specific religious affiliations vary, due to different interpretations and obligations of codes of conduct in cultural settings (Abusharaf 2006:716).

From the above, it can be understood that even though Islam places an immense importance on marriage, cultural and social interpretations on the importance of marriage have taken prevalence. If Muslim Indians focused on Islamic principles it would be realised that trust should be placed in God as no one has control over when one will get married. This analysis ‘has established that old traditions have become accepted as religious simply because they are persistent. It is fundamentally important to note that some of these practices are based on cultural norms’ (Haeri cited in Abusharaf 2006:722).

Where Does One Find a Suitable Spouse?

Samoosa Run

The *Samoosa Run* is an alternate form of an arranged marriage in that the man and woman both agree to it and at any point either may refuse to marry the

---

7 It is called the samoosa run because usually the first snacks Indians serve when visiting their home are samoosas. Samoosas are triangular pastries filled with a savoury filling, which are usually fried or baked. The filling is made with either potatoes, onions, lentils, lamb, beef or chicken. To add flavour to the filling spices, coriander, and mint are added. ‘They are a popular appetizer or snack in the Indian Subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Southwest Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Mediterranean, the Horn of Africa, North Africa and South Africa. The samosa has been a popular snack in the
other. If there is a single man or woman in a household someone (either one of the parents, a family member or friend) will suggest the two individuals meet. It begins ‘with parents and relatives making it known that they are seeking suitors for their children’ (Al-Johar 2005:564). The meeting will usually take place at the woman’s home and thereafter the two individuals will speak in an effort to learn more about each other; if they like each other and think they are compatible, they will inform their parents and the marriage will be arranged.

AS (19 May 2013) a woman interviewee shares her views on the samoosa run; she would prefer this method as opposed to ‘falling in love, Western nonsense’ (AS, 19 May 2013). She further argues:

Someone would … suggest it to my parents and then first they would tell me if I am interested in the idea of marriage … he would come home and if I like him then it would be my choice. So even if they really liked him and I don’t like him at all then I wouldn’t get married to him. The first meeting would ideally be with the parents. And then obviously communication like WhatsApp and calling. … I’d pray and then whatever I feel after that, like put it in God’s hand rather than my own, because I trust Him, more than I do myself. And then if we do get married if I feel it’s the right thing to do after I pray (AS, 19 May 2013).

The above quote has vital information, first, she is describing that it is not a must that a woman gets married to the man who is brought to her house. Thus, there is a choice from both the man and woman. Secondly, she speaks about praying to God and if he is the right man for her she will know through her prayer. The prayer the respondent is referring to is Istikhaara Namaaz.

It should be mentioned the decision to call the woman back is solely up to the man, this is described as the general unspoken rule of the samoosa run. Even if the woman felt she was not her usual self or felt slightly drawn to the man and would like to meet him again she is not allowed to contact him at all. None of the respondents could say for sure what would happen if the

woman contacted the man but the general sentiments were ‘it would be bad’, as it is seen as unacceptable and the woman would probably be seen as ‘forward’. Haeri, as cited in Abusharaf (2006), proposes that the tensions between religion and culture are an outcome of the restrictions placed on female agency. Patriarchal understandings of religion and culture place constraints and scrutiny on women and their behaviour.

The difference between the samoosa run and a generic view of an arranged marriage is that a samoosa run is the introduction of two single people looking to get married or are of a marriageable age. Once they are introduced they then decide whether to take it further or not. Whereas, an arranged marriage is a marriage formed by the individual’s parents or another family member often without the explicit consent of the couple involved.

**Arranged Marriages**

Three respondents said their parents’ marriage took place via an arranged marriage. There is a general assumption that arranged marriages have a history in Indian communities especially with those who are 50 years of age and above. This assumption can be seen as an interviewee NC (4 June 2013) speaks about her grandparent’s marriage arguing:

> With my father’s family, his parents were born in India, in the same gham, and their marriage was like, like my father’s father immigrated to South Africa and then his mother was just shipped over and my grandfather just had a picture of my grandmother and it was like the Nikah was already made, he just had to look for her on the ship and was like oh you’re my wife (NC, June 4).

An arranged marriage is generally understood as a man’s family asking the woman’s family for their daughter’s hand in marriage ‘marrying someone whom their parents, relatives, or family friends had found for them’ (Al-Johar 8)

---

8 Forward in this sense refers to the woman acting out of turn and is not conservative. She may also be viewed as ‘easy’ in terms of partaking in sexual activity. The man is responsible for contacting the woman and he has all the decision making power.
In some instances, the bride and groom only meet on the wedding day. They could meet once or twice before the wedding either at the woman’s home or at a chaperoned meeting. ‘Meeting the proposed groom before marriage appears to be the norm for brides entering arranged marriages’ (Al-Johar 2005:562-565).

SS (16 June 2013), a 32-year-old woman shared her views on arranged marriages. She says that when she was in her early 20’s she had a desire for a fairy-tale, falling in love romance; but now that she is older her views have shifted. She further adds:

Now I think it’s just about meeting the right person and being ok with marrying that person and if love happens to come afterward it’s ok. ‘Arranged’ marriages aren’t loveless marriages. The two people involved just happened to fall in love after they tied the knot. There are many cases where people who were in love, married and they weren’t able to make the marriage work (SS, 16 June 2013).

**Love Marriages**

There is a divide on the notion of love marriages. A love marriage is a marriage in which one finds his/her own partner. Four interviewees would prefer what Al-Johar (2005) describes as a ‘self-initiated Islamic marriage’ as opposed to a love marriage in the Western sense; that is the man and woman meet, fall in love, the court for a period of time and then settle down.

A self-initiated Islamic marriage is a marriage wherein the man and woman find each other on their own yet do not court. Al-Johar (2005:567) describes this as ‘meeting and choosing spouses and then following Islamic prescriptions … Initially encountering their future spouses independent of family and relatives’. They are friends and on knowing they want to get married, usually after performing *Istikhaara Namaaz*, they inform their parents about each other (Al-Johar 2005:568). Thereafter, the families meet each other and a proposal and wedding follow. Two interviewees speak about the manner in which a self-initiated Islamic marriage functions within their understanding. NC (4 June 2013) argues that she does not want to have a relationship with the person but rather know that he is the one and they will get married when they are both ready for marriage. She explains:
I would first want to like the guy and we both have a discussion and we mutually agree that we both like each other and then decide if a relationship suits us or not. But I wouldn’t want a relationship. So I would just prefer where you and the guy just know you like each other and you know when the time is right to get married then he’ll come home and he proposes and you get married (NC, 4 June 2013).

NC’s views are further supported by IC (12 June 2013) who says that her parents’ marriage was based on a love marriage and she would prefer something similar, yet not the same. She explains:

A marriage like my parents because they got to choose who makes them happy. Just like you know what page we’re on, I mean we’ve all been through a dating experience at some point but you realize it doesn’t really work out that way, because you don’t want to get too familiar with the person but you just want to know that when you come to certain life points and you want to make certain decisions you want to know that you can both be on the same page and challenge each other to be better than what you are.

[Interviewer says: one of my interviewees doesn’t want to date anyone, she wants to know that she likes this guy and he likes her and when they’re ready for marriage then they will get married].

To this IC responds ‘I think it’s better that way … I think that’s good because you don’t have to spend long hours with someone to see where things are going. A lot of the time like certain questions you ask them and the answers they give can tell you all you need to know. Also, it saves you from doing wrong by being unmarried and with another person, in terms of Islam (IC, 12 June 2013).

From the above discussion, it can be deduced that there is divided opinion in the Muslim Indian community in Johannesburg when it comes to methods of finding a suitable spouse. The reason for this divide could be: on the one hand there are institutions such as religion which act as a guiding force and stipulates how one should live their life. Yet, on the other hand living in a Westernised and globalised world, exposes individuals to various forms of living. This puts pressure on Muslim Indian individuals to find a balance that suits them best. For some, this includes courting and self-initiated marriages,
whereas, for others, it means following Islam strictly and to the best of their ability.

**Marrying Non-Muslims and Non-Indians: Limits of Choice**

Suliman’s (2012:7) article does not address certain tensions, one of which is the issue of marrying a non-Indian. In the interviews marrying a non-Indian was a controversial issue. All of the interviewees except two said that they would marry a non-Indian. Of those eight, seven said that they would marry a black person, however, noted that it would not be readily accepted, if at all, by their families and it would be a challenge to get married. This can be seen by AS (19 May 2013) who said:

> I really don’t see the problem with that … I think that his character matters more and in the end, that’s just like a husband who allows me to live ideally as a Muslim. … if he’s not Indian [it’s fine] a lot of the revert brothers [AS is referring to non-Indians who have converted to Islam] I’ve met are even better Muslims than what we are so I don’t see any problem. But then again my parents would come into it and Islam demands that you treat your parents with the utmost of respect and I don’t know if they would be open to those ideas. So it would be, if I were faced with this situation I would just pray and hope for the best (AS, 19 May 2013).

One interviewee said that he would marry a non-Indian but is selective of race. Another said his parents would be open to the idea of an inter-racial marriage, however, bringing home a black ‘girl’ would not be accepted. From the interviewees as well as my social interactions it can be argued that race is an important factor when considering a spouse. From the responses, there seem to be elements of racism or racialism within the Muslim Indian community. The word racialism was used by one of the interviewee who said that it would be hard for the two cultures and families to join together as marriage is not just a union of two people but the coming together of two families. He further added that he is not racist but racialist. IC (12 June 2013) speaks about marrying a non-Indian including a black man as well as the alleged racism within the Muslim Indian community. She argued:
Ya, I would [referring to marrying a non-Indian including a black man], but like at the same time you have to think of the repercussions it has … that’s exactly where the pressure comes in because for me it would be a free choice and I’d do it but then at the end of the day … what will my parents say, what will my family say, how would the future be in terms of that. For some people it would be ok to date a white guy but then if it’s a black guy then it’s different, so there are lots of factors that play into that decision, you can’t just make the decision based on how you feel; which is what I find really sad because how can you even change that when society is being … brought up in a like in a tunnel almost … I don’t know about my dad but maybe my mother, she says that as long as the guy is Muslim it’s ok. But at the end of the day, the extended family would be a bit hard to break through and like that would make it very hard because we’re a close family (IC, 12 June 2013).

Given that this research is conducted in South Africa, it is important to contextualise the issue of racism and prejudice that exists within the Muslim Indian community in Johannesburg. South Africa is a country that has been deeply affected by the social engineering of apartheid and the racial categorisation that this produced, and that continues to be used today. The reason for this is pre-1994; South Africa was an apartheid state which racially categorised and segregated individuals based on their race. In addition, racial segregation was not introduced by the apartheid system alone yet dates back to colonial rule and their construction of race and racial differences.

Another important point that should be mentioned is the notion of gham that was spoken about by two respondents and to an extent is quite prevalent in the Muslim Indian community. The notion of caste limits choice even further, not only must your spouse be Muslim and Indian but in some instances or families, he/she must also come from the same gham as you.

Al-Johar (2005) speaks to this in her work *Muslim Marriages in America: Reflecting New Identities* when she addresses the case of a Pakistani man who desired to marry a Pakistani woman but she was from a different linguistic background and it was a struggle. Although the couple married Al-Johar (2005) explains that ‘she and her husband were both Pakistani, they had different linguistic backgrounds, Yazeed was an Urdu-speaker whose parents had moved to Pakistan from India and she was not an Urdu-speaker’ (Al-Johar
Social Pressures Surrounding Marriage in Muslim Indian Communities

This problem is similar to the problems faced by some individuals in the Muslim Indian community. NC (4 June 2014) describes this as:

Like you *memon* you have to marry *memon*; you *surtee* you have to marry *surtee*; you *alipor* you have to marry *alipor, memon akni, surtee biryani*, like how can you even make your taste buds be like caste. … it’s so silly. My mum’s parents, were both born in South Africa, so it’s like you know if my father has this whole thing like if he has to say something about caste then I would understand, because his parents were both born in the same village and married to the same, so I would understand from his perspective. But like with my mother I just wouldn’t because they were born in South Africa like we’re all South Africans, not Indian nationality, we are South African nationality.

The frustrations from the above quote are clearly visible – the respondent is clearly unhappy with the restrictions placed on men and women and views them as feeble and irrelevant. The notion of marrying someone from the same race and *gham* as you is contradictory to Islamic beliefs and principles. This idea was inherited from Indian custom as the ancestral lineage links to India as discussed in earlier. ‘A person is not allowed to discriminate on the basis of class, ethnicity, and race when choosing a marital partner … it upsets a social order that preaches unity amongst Muslims’ (Jaylarnie as cited in Suleman 2011:22).

**Conclusion**

This paper has been set as a case study which discussed the institution of marriage. It has shown that marriage is a necessary condition, especially for a

---

9 Memon, Surtee, Alipor are all different *ghams* (villages) in India that South African Indian Muslims’ ancestors come from.

10 *Akni and Biryani* are rice-based dishes made from various spices. The rice, spices and fish, chicken, mutton, steak or vegetables are cooked together to form one dish. This is usually accompanied by a special yoghurt made with mint, coriander and chillies or and onion, tomato and cucumber salad.
Muslim Indian woman’s participatory role in society. The interviews have indicated that unmarried women feel ‘judged’ and ‘scrutinised’ because of their marital status. In addition, the interviewees argued the older one becomes, individuals are ‘looked down on’ as members of society assume there is something wrong with them because they are unmarried.

The study took into account the article by Sakeena Suliman (2012:7) to establish the framework for identification of the underlying problem. The significance of marriage can be seen as embedded within Islamic practices. The interviewees often quoted ‘marriage is half of one’s faith’ to justify the importance of marriage. However, this dogmatic view of marriage does not explain the pressures placed on individuals to get married. The primary research question aimed to give insight into which societal pressures regulate the social practice of marriage in Muslim Indian communities in Johannesburg. The paper has depicted that there is pressure on both men and women to get married, however, the pressure experienced by women far outweighs the pressure experienced by men.

From the perspective of society, marriage is an obligatory condition for a Muslim Indian individual’s constructive and participatory identity in society. The pressures to get married can be associated with Islam to a certain extent, however, Islam advocates for fate and trust in God. Therefore, it can be argued that these pressures are socially constructed by using religion as a tool to guilt men and women especially into living their lives in a specific manner. Lastly, this paper has demonstrated the manner in which the conditions for marriage are restricted in Muslim Indian communities in Johannesburg by discussing the issues of race and gham. These issues are restrictions placed on an individual with regards to whom one may or may not marry. It expresses to young individuals that they are allowed to marry anyone as long as the person’s identity fits within the specific, stipulated parameters.

From a qualitative research point of view, I would suggest a wider and more extensive study of this topic could also yield positive research on this topic. In addition, I would suggest further research into the discourses surrounding sex and sexual relations before marriage. It would be interesting to understand in what way, sex and sexual relations before marriage are viewed as taboo in Muslim Indian communities or in Muslim communities as a whole. This research noted that sexual relations outside of marriage are prohibited in Islam, yet, one interviewee said that due to the world we are living in ‘these things could happen before marriage and one should be open-minded’ (SV, 20
August 2013). The nature of honour societies is interesting especially when attempting to discover what would happen to an individual who has had sexual cohabitation before marriage.

In conclusion, society needs to award agency to men and women in the same manner. The Muslim Indian community in Johannesburg should not view women as only ‘single women that can’t be recognized because she doesn’t have a male partner’ (MAO 3 July 2013). The life of a woman is not merely ‘about marriage and about trying to get married [nor is it a life where] everything else doesn’t really matter, there are so many other more important things’ (ZM, 4 June 2013). Whilst Islam says that both men and women should get married early, it is important they find a partner that satisfies the functions of a marriage. There is a disjuncture of Muslim Indian pressure and Islamic views. What one should avoid is falling for the pressures as this can act as a barrier to finding a partner or choosing the wrong partner in an attempt to abide by societal expectations.

Glossary
- **Gham** – Caste. Individuals who belong or ancestors are from a certain village in India.
- **Ibadah** – Worship
- **Istikhaara Namaaz** – A prayer asking Allah Ta’ala for guidance and goodness in the decision one wishes to pursue.
- **Imaan** – Faith
- **Nikah** – An Islamic marriage ceremony
- **Qur’an** – The central religious text of Islam
- **Shariah** – Islamic Law
- **Sunnah** – The recorded life of the Prophet Muhammad. It refers to the words spoken, actions done and likes of the Prophet Muhammad.
- **Taqdeer** – Fate

**Reference List:**


Fatima Mukaddam
University of the Witwatersrand and
Swiss - South Africa Joint Research Programme (SSAJRP)
Fatima.mukaddam@gmail.com
Fatima Meer’s ‘Train from Hyderabad’: Diaspora, Social Justice, Gender and Political Intervention

Rajendra Chetty
Kasturi Behari-Leak

Abstract
Fatima Meer’s memoir, Prison Diary: One Hundred and Thirteen Days, 1976 (2001), and the short story ‘Train to Hyderabad’ (Meer 2010) as an anthologised entity drawn from it, symbolise women’s isolation under male scrutiny, male rage at female autonomy and the compulsion to gag female critique of male government whether domestic, provincial or national. Behind the historical fact of colonial pseudo-slavery termed indenture, which was not gender-specific, lies the surviving, wide-spread and less-recognised phenomenon of female subjugation which may be termed female indenture. This reading of ‘Train to Hyderabad’ re-enacts a liberatory process: freeing the text in a way which reflects Meer’s own scripting of her work in a pattern of self-denial and socialist concern for the oppressed about her.

Keywords: Fatima Meer; diaspora; social justice; feminism; indenture; apartheid; socialism

Introduction
Fatima Meer’s short story, ‘Train to Hyderabad’ (2010) is an extract from her Prison Diary (2001). The appearance of ‘Train to Hyderabad’ in The Vintage Book of South African Indian writing (Chetty 2010) provides it with a specific context and set of meanings. First, few texts by South African Indian writers were encouraged for publication under colonial/apartheid regimes. This publication accords a fresh, democratic context to Meer’s tale. Second, this
short story, taken from Meer’s *Prison Diary* (2001), necessarily invokes Meer’s larger *oeuvre* and its significances. Third, ‘Train to Hyderabad’ recalls peer texts in the collection and exists in some sense with and within them as a whole. The introduction to the volume itself has an immediate intertextual exchange with the text under consideration: In his story, ‘Ratunya Mochi’, which also appears in *The Vintage Book of South African Indian writings* (2010), Ashwin Desai describes an example of the arrival in Durban of a young Indian woman. There are therefore two journeys concerning Hyderabad: Ratunya Mochi leaves Hyderabad in a ‘forced journey’ to South Africa and Meer, a respected sociologist, is on a visit to a conference in Hyderabad. The travels of these two women, though many years apart, are intertwined in various ways and intertextually linked at several levels. One of these being, how, the Indian Diaspora as a whole with its vast body of experiences, sufferings and adaptations, forms the much larger context of Mochi’s and Meer’s separate journeys.

The trials and tribulations of women were often at the centre of Meer’s concerns, and she repeatedly focused on black women as a potential radical subjectivity (Desai 2010). In South Africa, discernible patterns of patriarchal hegemony were reified over a period of three centuries through mechanisms of colonial and apartheid structures in systems such as indentured labour and legislated racial segregation. Both systems have much in common structurally: both share the common element of white male colonial construction. Prerogatives of such patriarchy are frequently manifested in phallocentric displays of power, dominance, wealth or privilege: egocentric or vertical aspiration which neglects horizontal/democratic issues of care and compassion. Womanist impulses, by contrast, countermand systems of male dominance in particular and solipsistic male intentions generally. Horizontal attitudes of community concern, social responsibility and public well-being are propagated *ipso facto* according to modes of thought evidenced in such thinkers as Olive Schreiner, Virginia Woolf or Fatima Meer. Schreiner exposes Rhodes’s male greed and self-interest in her much-neglected tract ‘Trooper Peter Halket of Mashonaland’ (1897). In *To the Lighthouse* (1927) Woolf’s anatomy of female concern for community is registered in Mrs Ramsay’s bouef-en-daube dinner-party and in contrast to Mr Ramsay’s egocentric concern with his writing career. His predatory sexual appetite is imaged in the ‘brass beak’. The lighthouse itself is one of the most enduring emblems of male phallic aspiration and psychological dominance. *The Mis-Trial of Andrew*
Zondo: A Sociological Insight (1998) by Meer is a ground-breaking exposure of miscarriage of justice due to male-constructed legalities that fail to account for the social dimensions of the dehumanising strictures and their effect upon an individual of colour under apartheid laws. It is essential to realise how few women prisoners record their experiences in prison. Nagel (2008) points out that:

In most prison narratives women get relegated to the roles of stoic, heroic mothers … However, all over Africa, rather than being passive bystanders, women also engaged in their own revolutionary struggles … Yet few women write about their own ordeal. South African prison literature is an exception to this trend, as Fatima Meer, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, Emma Mashinini, Ellen Kuzwayo, Ruth First and others engaged in autobiographical writings. (2008: 75)

Agency and Political Intervention

Contestation of social and national resources occurs in the ineluctable conflict of purpose between vertical elements of male self-aggrandisement and female desire to nurture community in all fields. Confrontation between female life-force and male power-force causes agents of hegemonic male structures to fear, suspect and punish women’s refusal to respect the margins of male-invented social systems. Male dominance, when expressed in colonial exploitation or racial segregation, attempts to silence, isolate and humiliate the subaltern female. Writing by women, and especially black women in South Africa, was consequently policed: the voices of women critical of white male control were muffled by various means of censorship, ridicule or partisan neglect. Meer’s Prison Diary (2001), and the extract ‘Train to Hyderabad’ (2010) as an anthologised entity drawn from it, symbolise women’s isolation under male scrutiny, male rage at female autonomy and the compulsion to gag female critique of male government whether domestic, provincial or national. Behind the historical fact of colonial pseudo-slavery termed indenture, which was not gender-specific, lies the surviving, wide-spread and less-recognised phenomenon of female subjugation which may be termed female indenture. The purpose of this reading of Meer’s, ‘Train to Hyderabad’ is to re-enact a liberatory process: freeing it in a way which reflects her own scripting of the
texts in a pattern of self-denial and socialist concern for the oppressed about her.

Meer diminishes the significance of her own writing but celebrates its existence in the reader’s mind and actions in society. Procedures whereby a ‘primary’ text is released from its textual coherence or autonomy by means of continuous contextualisation and intertextual corroboration to the point that ‘it’ (the text) disappears, is consonant with Meer’s socialist concern to lose herself in the agency of political intervention. This denial of self in the greater cause of social justice is at one with much of Phyllis Naidoo’s (2007) writing which deliberately erases ecriture in a desire to achieve community; an egalitarian ideal radically opposed in its Marxist vision to the logocentric, phallocentric regime of materialist paternalistic hegemonies. By floating the ‘text’ on a raft of contextual and intertextual associative meanings, conventions of enclosure may be deconstructed or dissolved in order to recuperate Meer’s concern for public disclosure of the myriad horizontal, womanist imperatives that rendered her life and thought socially responsible and nationally admirable. In this process the ‘short story’ ‘Train to Hyderabad’ dissolves in terms of peer texts, such as those by Ronnie Govender (2002) or Phyllis Naidoo (2002). By dissolving the ‘short story’ or rather excerpt from her Prison Diary in the course of such comparisons, broader, intertextual palimpsests are revealed in the overall liberation of author and diary.

Between the staccato style of Naidoo and the limpid habit of Meer’s prose, there is much work to be done in recognising the rhetorical devices and skill of the two prison narratives. Meer’s ‘Train to Hyderabad’, journeying out of her Prison Diary and snaking back in again is the proverbial ‘nested’ text, a story- within-a-story, juxtaposing the author’s constructed memories of the temporal, spatial and visual spaces in Hyderabad with the in situ confined space of political incarceration in the Johannesburg prison. Although Prison Diary is boundaried by the four walls of her cell, Meer breaks the ‘fourth wall’ between writer and reader through vignettes such as the ‘Train to Hyderabad’, which create an inter-subjective platform for multiple others to take the stage as it were:

Vesta butted into my narrative, shocked (2010: 83).

Beyond engaging with both stories in a temporal capsule, Meer also creates a spatial capsule in Prison Diary which acts as a container for her narratives to breathe and live. This space, which is not ‘black or white’ but ‘black and white’
invokes a ‘third space’ (Bhabha 1994) which enables new possibilities between the container and the contained, displacing the histories that constitute it (Bhabha 1994: 211).

In this third space of social, political and cultural possibilities, Meer’s ‘Train to Hyderabad’ works as an under labourer for the very thing she is attempting to dissemble: black women as subjects of overt sexism, patriarchy, racism and classism under apartheid. Meer, as protagonist extraordinaire, demonstrates an immense ability to engage her subjects in the discursive space of the text by re-affirming or disrupting the essentialist ways that gendered roles are inscribed by social meaning (Butler 1990). By allowing Vesta into her narrative, she invites a critique of her own positionality and her choices. Through Vesta, the reader is nudged to question his or her own actions that reinforce or perpetuate these gendered roles.

... Vesta was aghast and I was aghast at myself.

As she ‘performs’ her train journey for her fellow inmates, she invites them, not just to listen passively but to participate in her narrative, which they do, even if this results in judgement of her choices regarding her son:

... You must have been crazy. You need to have your head examined (83).

Meer’s journey is inflected at several levels by Ratunya Mochi’s (Desai 1996) travels: historically, socially, financially, politically and, finally, from a feminist perspective. Mochi associates Meer with the particular pattern of indentured labour to South Africa as well as the larger global diaspora caused by British imperialist strategies. Mochi’s poverty and suffering reference the Gandhian/Tolstoyan elements of Meer’s own consciousness and writings. Lastly, both women are joined by the bonds of all mothers and sisters who wish for education, health and prosperity for their families which exist in a patriarchal universe of male ostentation, brutality and self-importance. The treatment of women as chattels or part of a male-dominated empire binds these two women and their lives in a unique way. The walls of Meer’s cell are the concrete manifestation of such dominance just as the fading body of Mochi, shipped to an alien shore, is evidence of women made objects and exchanged by men in a global sale of ‘other’ people by colonialism. In either situation, of
Fatima Meer’s ‘Train from Hyderabad’

colonial or apartheid origin, men such as Rhodes or Verwoerd devised complex political schemes to advantage their own race and gender and disadvantage women, especially those not of a white skin colour. The assumptions behind such control of women encrypt the role of men as thinkers, scholars or social engineers and that of women as useful servants. The most directive and determinative context of Meer’s excerpt is rightly the refutation of male privilege: her woman’s diary chronicling the effects and affect of incarceration by men who disapprove strongly of women thinking, speaking or writing.

Incarceration and Injustice
Meer’s Prison Diary tells of phallic subjection and female reprisal at many levels. Lydia, a woman incarcerated with Meer, killed her badly behaved husband. Lydia’s revolt against an imperious male runs parallel to Meer’s minute replies to male control, or the continual attempt to enforce it. Meer’s own painting on the cover of Prison Diary presents a wall and dominant phallic tower contrasted against the waving green of female life in the beautiful tree that Meer glimpses and gasps for each day (Mdluli 2010). Disobedient women, those who do not or will not conform to the male will, are, historically, immured. Richardson’s (1962) Clarissa, writing first-person in her diary, is the classic study of the female asserting first-person subjectivity and independent will which provokes and insults men. Meer is walled in too and similarly asserts her autonomy by means of her prison diary. Mochi’s entire life, like Clarissa’s, is doomed in the same way by male dominance.Indenture applies not only to a white male-devised colonial system but to a primal male desire or urgency to subject all women to a system of forced labour and sexual exploitation which benefits men, and white men, in particular. The pain of displacement, illness, immurement and systematic humiliation appear in the suffering of all three women; yet their resistance and courage repudiate all such attempts as effectively as Lydia’s hoe was used to kill her husband. They defy indenture, domestic, intellectual or historical. In Women in the apartheid society (1985), Meer writes:

In a society where the fundamental criterion for discrimination is race, it is unreal to consider the position of the one sex in isolation of the other. The enjoyment of the privileges of apartheid by white women differs only marginally from that of white men: likewise, while black
women suffer more than black men from the violations of their rights, the violations are gross in respect to both. It is this reality that accounts for the very peripheral impact of feminism on South Africa (1985:1).

In the light of Meer’s statement, female indenture, whether designating domestic enslavement, marital rape or professional underpayment is a valid term. Intellectual and psychological subordination constitute possibly the most pernicious and fundamental form of female indenture. ‘Train to Hyderabad’ portrays this subjection dramatically as soon as the context of Meer’s *Prison Diary* is invoked. The story of the train to Hyderabad, the fall of her young son from it and their recovery as a family exists within a prison diary. Meer is relating the incident from within a cell in her 113 day stay in prison in 1976, one of the most riotous years in South African black resistance to the white regime. She is narrating it to a group of fellow inmates including her fellow activist, Vesta. The invocation and consideration of the text within this context sharply highlights the issue of female intellectual/psychological immurement. The story itself laments a nearly tragic accident yet the journey is a celebration of Meer’s intellectual and emotional fulfilment. She has at last been allowed to participate in an international forum and permitted a visa to travel to India after it being denied several times. She is accompanied by her family. This journey is the acknowledgement of a woman. Yet the text is imprisoned within the diary of a prisoner whose work is still neglected/imprisoned. This incarceration of the text and its author reflects the larger walling in of her community within an oppressive, political hegemony. Ironically, voices remain silenced within the larger new post-1994 South Africa despite the role women played in creating it. The figure of Meer once free in her motherland, recognised and fulfilled, now huddled in a cell, is emblematic of female indenture in all its manifestations.

Meer painted scenes from the period of her incarceration. Her drawings have recently been shown in a major exhibition in Durban. Meer had to hide her drawings and materials: using toilet paper and secreted inks. In this defiance and resourcefulness she joined the ranks of many legendary fighter-writers such as Kenya’s Ngugi. Williams (2016) remarks in a recent interview with Ngugi: ‘But even prison did not stop him from writing. Using toilet paper, he wrote Citaani Muthaiabaini (later translated into English as *Devil on the Cross*)’ (2016: 92). Meer’s own drawing of the many bricks that wall her in signifies much of the male desire to control women (‘protect’ in male-speak).
A dominant phallic tower, like Woolf’s (1927) lighthouse, looms over the scene, re-iterating male attempts to govern the ungovernable female. The blue sky and fresh leaves of Meer’s beloved tree recall freedom, not only from a particular, ignorant and racist regime but the assertion of female autonomy, the right to achieve, express independent thought and question society openly. The journeys of two women, Mochi and Meer, embody the life-journeys of many women seeking to escape the prison walls of male-architected society; men who fear women’s vivacity, love of life and commitment to its sacred values.

Meer occupies a unique position in the social structure of her ancestral land. She still speaks Gujarati, her mother tongue, yet she is foreign in other ways. In the excerpt she discovers her son has fallen from the train and calls out, in the language of her motherland, ‘Mera baccha! Mera baccha! Train se gier jaya’ (2010: 120) but she is no longer a part of any particular stratum of Indian society. This anomalous situation is exacerbated by Meer’s authority and authoritative status. She and her family are educated and prosperous South Africans.

Her claims upon the best medical practitioners of the day go unquestioned: ‘Their advice was that we should take the evening train to Madras and have Rashid seen to by India’s renowned neuro-surgeon, Professor Ramamurti, who also attended to the President of India’ (2010:122). We suspect that this privilege would not have been accorded to every villager around Hyderabad. Meer’s status could only have been established in the first place by her parents’ travelling on the same journey that Mochi took from a small village out across the ‘kala pani’ (black waters) to a distant, unknown place. Meer’s return journey is a part of both voyages out. The meanings of this short story are therefore complex and highly significant of the many ironies and contradictions of the diaspora condition.

Meer’s identity as upper-class is registered early on in her account of the trip from Hyderabad:

The children and my sister Gorie joined me in Hyderabad, where I had attended the All India Sociology Conference, and we took a train from there to Madras. We had our own coupe, separated from the other compartments, with its own toilet and washbasin. The only door in the coupe opened out onto the station platform (2010:119).

The privacy of the coupe alerts us at once to the financial exclusivity marked
out by Meer. Her intellectual pre-eminence is established by attendance at an international conference. Meer distinguishes between the vendors and herself: she is the well-to-do purchaser and not a servant anxious to sell to any white colonial in a carriage. This elite returnee is the occupant of a full suite with a door opening directly onto the platform; not into a common passageway. Similarly, she uses the elevated term ‘attire’ to describe her matched nightwear. The emblem of her comfort and difference from the impoverished state of her forebears is her handbag: ‘I asked the attendant to go back to the train and return with my handbag. I would need money’ (2010:121). Local Indians find the phenomenon of well-to-do South African Indians curious: ‘They were quite clearly intrigued by us’ (op. cit., 122). It would be interesting to question Meer’s train journey in Hyderabad with regard to its alignment to Gandhian prerogatives, as she is considered one of the earlier Gandhian scholars in South Africa.

Gandhi’s home in South Africa was called Tolstoy Farm: by his own admission, few other thinkers had as great an influence on his thought as that of Tolstoy, the Christian anarchist. Tolstoy’s Letter to a Hindu, sent to the revolutionary, Tarak Nath Das, in 1908, provides a startling synthesis of pacifist principles from Hindu and New Testament sources. Love alone, both men believed, could dissolve the bonds of enmity which enslaved human beings. Belief in such egalitarian ideals was evidenced in the early socialist ambitions of the post-independence government in India: such as the nationalising of banks. Meer’s own writings on Gandhi include the highly-acclaimed Apprenticeship of a Mahatma (1970). Her knowledge of Gandhian principles was extensive: in fact the extent of her familiarity with them appears at first to be at odds with a luxury trip through India. It seems equally out of place with the journeys of extreme pain made by villagers such as Mochi. Meer’s book about the Indian diaspora, Portrait of South African Indians (1969) demonstrates her knowledge of liminal slavery and seems to render her indulgence on the train even less coherent.

The central incident of the text, her son’s fall from the train, seems to deepen the incongruity of a social activist and Gandhian disciple relishing bourgeois privilege. Meer unaccountably allows her son Rashid to sit at the open doorway of the coupe with his legs dangling out over the edge. Her only defence for the irresponsible, and potentially fatal, action is that, first, ‘Indians were travelling like that all the time, travelling on top of the train and hanging from the doors of the train’ (2010:120). Second, she felt that ‘Rashid was so
Fatima Meer’s ‘Train from Hyderabad’

happy. I thought I shouldn’t spoil his pleasure’ (*ibid.*). Meer wishes to live out the egalitarian ideal by letting her son do the same as ordinary Indians do all the time: travelling on top of trains or hanging from the doors. Similarly, and in line with Tolstoyan/Gandhian ideals, she wishes for individual happiness: so she does not wish to break into her son’s moment of joy. Yet the terrible truth which Meer may be hinting at is that she cannot be at one with the proletariat; however attractive this identification with universal brotherhood may appear. She and her family have become middle-class: the smug antithesis of the Trotkeyist student that Meer once was.

The short story changes entirely when considered as a narrative told to entertain fellow female inmates in prison. Meer’s prison friend, Vesta, enjoys hearing the family drama: ‘Vesta butted into my narrative. You must have been crazy. You need having your head examined’ (*ibid.*). To which Meer replies, with her customarily disarming candour, ‘I agree with you. I was stark mad’ (*ibid.*) Meer’s presence in prison, her writing from there, and her establishment of a caring community with other prisoners within the high walls, testifies to her probity and reconstructs an ethically coherent tale. Buntman points out that Meer’s *Diary* shows her respect and concern for the habits of community, even in prison:

... this memoir records exuberance more than suffering, pleasure as well as pain, delight as well as denial. Meer’s five months in detention caused fear and worry as well as disruption, inconvenience, and expense for her, her husband and family, friends, and fellow activists. They were times of deprivation and of course her detention was completely unjustified under any meaningful rule of law. And yet Meer’s account stresses the sense of community, friendship, solidarity, shared food, and the love of family and friends as much as, and arguably more, than she does the inherent injustices, indignities, and sheer unfairness detention occasioned (Buntman 2005:664).

Stanley (2003) differs from Buntman (2005). In a review of Meer’s *Prison Diary* (2001) and Suttner’s *Inside Apartheid’s Prison* (2001), Stanley regards both diarists as privileged:

Details of prisoners’ experiences are frequently disregarded in favour of official rhetoric of punishment, ‘crime’ and justice. The neutrali-
sation of prisoner voices is a practice undertaken across space and time; however, its intensity increases under state repression. These two books, detailing the experiences of individual confinement under South African apartheid, demonstrate the personal and political costs of human rights struggle and the consequences of resistance to the state. Both books are written from a privileged perspective, by academics who have the availability of skills and material circumstances to write and find a publisher. As such, they are books to be read alongside accounts from those whose lives and experiences are commonly ignored (Stanley 2003:333).

Meer is concerned about the gross injustices in apartheid South Africa, and especially among women. The difficulty with Stanley’s (2003) view of the privileged Meer is that it fails to account for the general neglect of South African Indian writing and of South African Indian women’s work in particular. Stanley seems to ignore the fact that Meer demonstrates humility and community during her time in jail. It must be asked whether the lot of Indian women in South Africa at that time could be considered ‘privileged’ in any real sense.

The moment of madness, allowing her son to dangle his legs from a moving train, almost cost her son’s life and creates the central theatre of the story: hurricane lamps leading women across railway tracks in the dead of night to find an injured boy from South Africa; ambulances, hospitals and professors of medicine called to attend. Rashid recovers and the train of life moves on at its proper pace. Yet something in Meer’s too ready admission of maternal insanity causes the reader to hesitate before condemning this social activist as a troubled fraud or bourgeois hypocrite. Meer the narrator seems to suggest the ineluctable strain between these poles of the human condition just as Meer the mother and activist in the tale seems to mourn the collision of them. The reality of incarceration allows the personae of Meer as narrator and Meer as activist to slip past each at several crucial points. This deft, fluid structuring reflects Meer’s love of life’s uncertainty and perils, the risks that freedom brings. The polarity between ethical/political concerns is not dogmatically resolved but illuminated by fictional exploration.

The inconclusive nature of this excerpt is consciously crafted within a womanist paradigm which mirrors Meer’s perceptions of life in many ways. She refuses to be cornered by male determinacy. Her thinking is constantly
Fatima Meer’s ‘Train from Hyderabad’

adjusted by the human concerns of the moment. Between the poles of flux and stasis, her energy and wisdom favour the former. The indeterminate nature of her conclusion points to a fundamental questioning of knowledge, the knowability of things:

Vesta listened enthralled by our adventure, but at the end of it she said she couldn’t get over the fact that I allowed my son to sit in the doorway of the coupe. ‘How could you?’ she asked, and I admitted I could not understand it either (2010:124).

Meer refuses to account for herself and bathos is used to sabotage any crisis of conscience, over-zealous critic or melodramatic action in the plot. At the critical moment of discovery, when it is found that her son has fallen from the train, Meer is told to reach for the emergency chain to stop the train: she reaches instead for the chain to the toilet – another kind of emergency. As a socialist, Meer’s refusal to submit to crisis is registered repeatedly by her commitment to the everyday, the mundane business of life. She is after all, like her sister in arms Phyllis Naidoo, a hard-boiled socialist. Her final line to the short story under analysis here is a typical inversion of any thrill of adventure or the sort of privilege that Stanley (2003:333) points to. Bathos brings us back to the socialist concerns for daily life: ‘The bucket was used liberally throughout the night’ (2010: 124).

Conclusion
Meer’s Prison Diary (2001), like Phyllis Naidoo’s (2010) account of her ten days in Central Prison in Durban, chronicles the experience of incarceration. Both pieces are highly politicised and exist in the literary continuum of struggle writing and prison writing both in South Africa and internationally: wherever political detainees are held without warrant or just cause, or tortured. Naidoo’s record of prison life and wrongful detention is as much about herself as it is about Bobby Sands, Oscar Wilde or inmates of Guantanamo Bay or Bergen-Belsen. It is a quintessential prison text.

Whosoever opened the door usually had an endless number of keys and you heard them all the time whenever a door was opened or closed. It was always the noise of those keys that you heard while washing,
eating, and sometimes while sleeping. You were awakened with those keys, you were locked in with those keys, and they protruded into your thoughts, work and sleep. Keys, keys, keys (Naidoo 2010:125).

The cumulative rhetorical force of the passage gains in momentum from the full syntactical structures at the start to the single bursts of repeated nouns. ‘Keys, keys, keys’ mimics not only the jangling sound of keys but also suggests the obsessive drive to control, the ius dominandi that jangles in the heads of those in charge of the keys. Naidoo (2010) encapsulates this manic fascination with control of the other, the exotic or the different in the superbly crafted climactic force of her rhetoric.

The marginalisation, however, of texts such as Naidoo’s and Meer’s does not occlude their power to demonstrate that textual meaning cannot be controlled in the same way as political prisoners. Meaning defies textual imprisonment because it is not some abstract quality residing in the text; rather, it depends on the context, situation, conventions, and social and political relations evoked by the text. The writer and audience come together and inform one another (Denzin 2001), opening up generative and relational possibilities for the reader to engage with textual meanings in ways that transcend the confines of literary pages. The agency accorded to both text and reader is what made/makes struggle and protest writing a force to contend with.

The social conventions that naturalise and normalise cultural identity are disrupted by Meer’s choices on the train which are deemed deviant of her gendered role as mother, social activist, and comrade. This interplay of positioning, displacement and re-positioning invites the reader to critically reconsider self-inflicted or ascribed boundaries that make us complicit in reproducing social and cultural inequalities, reminiscent of male freedom fighters in conflict with their own embodiment and enactment of patriarchy and paternalism.

Similarly, the psychology of writing in prison, the many cross-currents of horror and expiation afforded by writing, merit close scrutiny and re-formulate the nature of the texts separately and together. The systematic exclusion of black writings was twofold; founded on racist ideas of superiority and fear of printing or supporting protest literature. The attempt to silence these writings, however, simply means their beauty and probity is more pronounced than if they had been as freely aired as Coetzee’s (1980) texts. The fact that apartheid authorities failed to silence these texts changes their reception today.
and, consequently, their meaning. All of these contextual and intertextual tides float the individual texts and alter their currency in significant ways.

Sustaining many of the distinctive similarities between Meer and Naidoo is a gritty, acerbic woman’s wit, a kind of female endurance humour which is quite different from the salty, male anger of Govender (2002). There is little outrage in Meer or Naidoo, although there is every reason for it. Instead, there is a slow pity for the dullness and sadness of racist stupidity. In both writers there is an observable sorority which resists the more retrograde instincts of patriarchal hegemony. ‘Fatima had a strong sense of women’s power. In Chatsworth she inspired women, telling them that they would have to take the lead, that the men were cowards. She told them in the liberation struggle women were one step ahead of the men. It was said with a twinkle in her eye and a rare naughtiness’ (Desai 2010:123).

Meer’s writing gains a particular identity from its correspondence with the feminist stridency of this resilient sisterhood.

**References**


Rajendra Chetty
Literacy Development & Poverty
Cape Peninsula University of Technology
chettyr@cput.ac.za
Fatima Meer’s ‘Train from Hyderabad’

Kasturi Behari-Leak
Centre for Innovation in Learning and Teaching in CHED
University of Cape Town
kasturi.behari-leak@uct.ac.za
India and Trinidad & Tobago: Diaspora Building and Diaspora Integration – Implications for Emigration States

Susan Julia Chand

Abstract
India had influenced the community life of people of Indian origin in Trinidad & Tobago long before diplomatic relations commenced between the two nations in 1948. This paper is an attempt to provide a historical description of the state-diaspora relations between India and Trinidad & Tobago during and post indentureship. The paper draws from the written accounts by historians, government officials and scholars on the policies applied to the indentureship system, abolition, and bilateral relations between the two nations. Gamlen’s (2008) two diaspora mechanisms are employed to demonstrate the state-diaspora relations. The major findings indicate that the early Indian migrants developed mechanisms to cultivate a diaspora identity based on their collectively created vision of ‘an imagined India’. Additionally, diaspora building and diaspora integration in post indentureship through numerous cultural exchange programs and educational opportunities for Indo-Trinidadians and Indian nationals have been top-most in forging diplomatic relations between the two nations. In the final analysis, there is a need for a more in-depth analysis of Gamlen’s diaspora mechanisms and the model of emigration state typology and how these can apply to the Indian diasporas in the Caribbean.

Keywords: diaspora mechanisms, indentureship, Indian Diaspora, nation-diaspora relations, emigration
Introduction

India and the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago have enjoyed vibrant bilateral relations for over 70 years since the establishment of the Indian Mission in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO’s capital city in Port of Spain in July 1948. It was one of India’s first diplomatic relations established in the Caribbean region following its Independence from British rule. However, according to the Special Report on India and Trinidad & Tobago (2014:8),

The relationship between India and Trinidad & Tobago started on 30 May 1845, when the first ship 'Fatel Razack' carrying 225 indentured workers from India reached the shores of Trinidad, then a British colony. Their numbers increased with the subsequent arrival of more ships from India. The descendants of those workers, now in their fifth generation are part and parcel of the economic, political and social fabric of the country. They have maintained their traditional Indian cultural and religious customs. The presence of a substantial population of Indian origin (the largest ethnic group) has contributed greatly to bilateral relations between the two countries.

On August 6, 1962, soon after TRINIDAD & TOBAGO’s Independence, India’s first High Commissioner was appointed and in the same year, TRINIDAD & TOBAGO opened their High Commission in New Delhi.

Located about 14 kilometers north of Venezuela in South America, TRINIDAD & TOBAGO displays an interesting landscape of a culturally diverse and mixed population. The current population is 1,328,019 comprising mainly East Indians (35.4%) and Africans (34.2%). Other ethnic groups exist in small percentages like Caucasian (0.59%), Chinese (0.30%), Indigenous (0.11%), Syrian/Lebanese (0.08%), Portuguese (0.06%) and other ethnic groups (0.17%) (Trinidad & Tobago 2011 Population and Housing Census Demographic Report 2012: 2, 5). The East Indians (as they are now called) are descendants of Indentured laborers that were brought to work in the sugar plantations from India under the British regime during the period 1845 - 1917.

The present paper discusses the state-diaspora relations between India and Trinidad & Tobago along two time periods: during indentureship and post indentureship. The first segment of the paper focuses on community life during indentureship and prior to the establishment of the Indian Mission in Trinidad...
India and Trinidad & Tobago: Diaspora Building and Diaspora Integration

The paper contextualizes community life of ‘imagined India’ that the early migrants carried with them in their memories. It also deals with British policies governing the period of indentureship and the role of the Indian National Congress and Mahatma Gandhi in the abolition of indentureship in the Caribbean. The second segment of the paper focuses on the role of the Indian High Commission in promoting bilateral relations between the two nations: India and Trinidad & Tobago. The paper attempts to provide an understanding of the strong influence the nation-state (India) has on its diasporic community in a small island state of Trinidad & Tobago. As a result, the nationals of Trinidad & Tobago of Indian origin have kept alive their cultural and religious traditions for over 170 years.

Theoretical Framework

The present study employs Gamlen’s (2008: 842) proposition of diaspora engagement policies or ‘diasporic mechanisms’. He proposes that the state-diaspora relations are normal form of political organization, which has been overlooked by modern geopolitical thinkers. He further elucidates in this view that every immigrant is also an emigrant with ties to a society and state of origin. Sending states can influence these ties beyond their territorial coercive powers through mechanisms that protrude beyond their borders and operate on a transnational scale within global politics. In this context, state is defined as ‘an institutional complex claiming sovereignty for itself as the supreme political authority within a defined territory for whose governance it is responsible’ (Hay & Lister 2006:5). The term ‘diasporas’ are conceptualized as ‘dispersion to two or more locations; ongoing orientation towards a homeland’; and group boundary maintenance over time (Brubaker 2005; Butler 2001). A number of studies have debated on the definition of ‘diaspora’ and shifting paradigms and contemporary perspectives (Mitchell 1997; Clifford 1997; Cohen 1997; Gilroy 2000; Shackleton 2008; Baubock 2010; Alexander 2017) but limited space will not permit discussion those perspectives in this segment.

In his study, Gamlen uses ‘state’ as institutional complexes to relate to extra-territorial populations, or ‘diasporas’ (2008: 842). The two mechanisms employed by Gamlen are: 1) ‘diaspora building’ mechanisms which cultivate new diaspora communities and recognize existing ones; and 2) ‘diaspora integration’ mechanisms that draw resident and non-resident citizens into a
‘web of rights and obligations’ as propounded by Bhagwati (2003). In the present study, I attempt to apply both diaspora building and diaspora integration mechanisms to describe cultural bonding and preservation of Indian culture and traditions prior to and after the state-diaspora relations were established between India and the Indian diaspora in Trinidad & Tobago.

**Diaspora Building Mechanisms Prior to the Establishment of the Indian Mission**

As suggested by Gamlen (2008: 843), some diaspora building mechanisms cultivate diasporic identities and community structures, while others formally recognize (or reify) existing diaspora communities. He discusses two sub-function under diaspora building mechanisms: cultivating a diaspora and recognizing a diaspora.

**Cultivating a Diaspora**

In the absence of any diplomatic posts during the indentureship, the early Indian migrants to Trinidad & Tobago created mechanisms of survival in the alien land. The Indian migrants to the Caribbean and to Trinidad & Tobago in particular, were not devoid of ‘inherited traditions and accumulated custom’ (Parmasad 1999: 67-68). They brought their rich cultural heritage both in tangible (religious texts) and intangible forms (cultural beliefs, values) (Mahabir & Chand 2015:2). The tangible cultural heritage the indentured laborers carried with them were wrapped up in a *Jahaji* bundle. The Dictionary of the English/Creole of Trinidad & Tobago (2008: 459), defines it as ‘the bundle of belongings carried by indentured laborers sailing to Trinidad from India on *Jahaji*’ [or boat]. Samaroo (2015:129) elucidates that the indentured laborers or *girmityas* were allowed one piece of luggage namely a large triangular cloth called the ‘*Jahaji Bandal*’.

In this bundle they brought the two major forms of spiritual sustenance, namely the Holy *Qur’an* and the Tulisadas *Ramayan*. In the remaining space they had a few pieces of clothing as well as the all-important seeds and cuttings which could survive the long crossings.
These changed the landscape of the Caribbean. Mohabir (2015: para 9), alludes that, ‘The jahajis and jahajins brought intangibles, such as cultural and religious practice, myths, and stories’. The intangibles were embodied in the oral traditions of the indentured laborers and were religiously passed on from one generation to the next.

The rich Indian cultural heritage of the indentured laborers was preserved and survived the oppression and exploitations of British plantation owners, harsh living conditions in the barracks, and the ridicules of their African neighbors for over 170 years (Murali 2015:9)

**Formation of Mini India in Trinidad**

The Indian indentured laborers who arrived in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO were from various religious groups, castes, economic class and geographical regions in India. About 85% of the indentured laborers, particularly to Guyana (238,909) and Trinidad & Tobago (147,592), were Hindus, 15% were Muslims and 0.1% were Christians (Vertovec 2000:44, Jain 1993: 23). Among Hindus, the various castes included Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, Bhumihars, Rajputs and Thakurs, as well as farmers, Ahirs [cowherders], artisans, fishermen and boatmen. Low-caste migrants were Chamaras and Sudras who came mainly from South India (Mohanty 2014: 86, Clarke 2013: 20, Naidu 2007, Jayaram 2006). About 90% of the indentured laborers came from the states of Bihar, Oudh, Orissa, United Providences [Uttar Pradesh & Uttarakhand today], Central Provinces and Bengal, small proportions were from Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Kashmir, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra (Wood 1968; Brereton 1985:21; Edmonds & Gonzalez 2010:178). There were persons from the tribal areas in Bihar and Bengal, known as ‘hill coolies’ (Jha 1985: 1). Emigrants were also from Nepal and Afghanistan (Edmonds & Gonzalez, 2010). According to Edmonds & Gonzalez (2010:178), ‘a miniature of India and also of Sub-Continent was re-created in Trinidad’.

**Kinship and Bonding**

The earliest bonding among the Indian laborers took place aboard on the first ship, Fatel Rozack to the shores of Trinidad. To survive the treacherous journey over the seas [referred to as kala pani or dark waters], to the unknown foreign land, laborers from all strata [caste, religion, class and ethnicity] found solace
in each other’s company and established brotherly bonds that came to be known as *Jahaji bhai* [Ship brotherhood] (Mohanty 2014: 61-62; Dabydeen & Samaroo; 1987). The bond of brotherhood extended further as the laborers, both men and women toiled together in sugar plantations under the British colonizers (Mohanty 2014: 62; Vertovec 2000). Indentured laborers began to form new kinship networks even before they arrived in Trinidad. Close relationships formed on shipboards were maintained for years, even generations, to the extent that in practice the indentured laborers would not allow their children to marry each other. They helped each other to find spouses for their children in separate villages as their relatives did in India (*Encyclopedia of World Cultures* 1996).

**Social Life and Religious Festivals**

As indentured labourers settled in the communities, they recalled how their evenings were spent in their native villages in India. They journeyed down memory lane to recall the festivals they had celebrated. Having no access to a Hindu or Islamic calendar, they observed the seasons and celebrated the major Hindu festivals like *Phagwa* [Festival of Colours] and *Divali* [Festival of Lights], Eid and Hosay.

Socio-cultural life of Hindus: Since early 1860s, Hindus in Trinidad have been celebrating religious festivals such as *Divali, Navratri, Phagwa, Shiv-ratri, Kartik,* and *Ganga Dhaara* (Edmonds & Gonzalez 2010: 179; Mahabir & Chand 2015: 3). The times and seasons for the festivals were observed in nature. For example the blossoming of the poui trees [*Tabebuia serratifolia*] were seen as the beginning of *Phagwa*, which corresponded with spring in India (March – April) (Mahabir & Chand 2016: 5). Similarly, the time and season for *Dusshera* [burning of the demi god by the Hindu god *Rama*] and *Divali* were determined. According to Jagessar Ganesh (2007),

> going to the bamboo patch and doing prayers and such things before we cut was an important memory of his childhood. Because the bamboo cannot be cut during *Pitri Paksh* (the memorial period of remembrance of the departed souls), which comes before *Dussehra*, and thus it has to be cut some three or four weeks before *Ramleela* (Riggio 2010: 127).
Divali was therefore celebrated 14 days after Dussehra, according to the account given in *Ramayana*. An outstanding phenomenon emerging in the community was the staging of open-air theatre *Ramlila* depicting the story of Rama which culminated in *Dussehra*. The earliest documented record of *Ramlila* in Trinidad can be traced back to 1880 in Dow Village, California, and has an unbroken history of over 135 years of performance (Riggio 2010: 126).

Amidst the difficult working conditions, Indians sought comfort in their religious and cultural practices. Workers came together during the evenings and weekends at organized activities like wrestling matches, stick fighting, playing of traditional games (*kabaddi, guli danda, luha/lohar, eka buka*), singing of *bhajans* [devotional hymns], *alhas* [narratives] and reading from the *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* (Mohanty 2014:72, Edmonds and Gonzalez: 2010: 179-180, Mahabir: 2007) which some migrants would have brought along. Plantation owners allowed Hindus to practice their religion on the sugar estates (Naidu 2007).

Firepass, a South Indian ritual that included walking over hot coals [was banned 20 years later by the Government].

Socio-cultural life of the Muslims: *Hosay*, a street festival commemorating the martyrdom of Husyn (grandson of Mohammed) were celebrated by the Indian Muslims. Even though *Hosay* was a Muslim festival, it became a major Indian religious festival in Trinidad.

**Subsistence and Commercial Activities**

According to Samaroo (2015: 130), when the Indians completed their indentured labor, thousands reverted to their original occupations [weaving, pottery, herding, barbers, iron and gold smiths, and the like] thus adding to the skills-base of their colonies. However, most of the East Indians after the indentureship, in the rural areas continued to work on sugar estates; some found work in cocoa estates while others supported themselves through fishing and ‘crab-catching’, particularly those living close to the Caroni Swamp. By 1873, East Indians were cultivating wet rice and paddy fields were prominent from Caroni Swamp to the edges of Oropouche Lagoon providing one-sixth of the local consumption (Brereton 1985: 27-28; Wood 1968: 276; Niehoff & Niehoff 1960: 31). Most East Indians were familiar with growing wet rice as it was one of the staple crops in India. Other crops grown were all kinds of provisions,
varieties of peas and beans and green vegetables. The East Indians’ love for agriculture gave rise to a vibrant peasant class, an important contribution to the economic life of TRINIDAD & TOBAGO. They were granted 5-10 acres of Crown lands between 1869 and 1880 in lieu of free passage to India (Brereton 1985: 27-28; Vertovec 1992: 20). They soon formed their own villages, building houses, engaging in agriculture, and re-creating the same environment as they had in India.

By early 1900s, the East Indians became one of the largest land owning classes in the country. Thus, encouraged by their ownership of ‘a piece of Trinidad’ they began the task of building a society in their new land (Gooptar 2015: 213).

**Educational Endeavours**

East Indians regarded education as highly desirable. However, their children were not admitted to schools run by the Christians unless they were converted to Christianity. Hindus and Muslims were not granted permission to run their own schools. A vast majority of the children of the indentured laborers stayed home or worked in the plantations. Canadian Missionaries intervened and provided education through Presbyterian schools to the children of East Indian descent and thereby played a critical role in uplifting the social status of the East Indians (Brereton 1985: 28-29; Doodnath 1983: 40-41) in a African-dominated society. Those who became doctors, lawyers, and school teachers were held in great respect. Dr. John Morton was the first Canadian Missionary to propose to the then Governor Hamilton Gordon a scheme with special privileges for Indian education. The first Canadian Missionary School (today known as Presbyterian schools) was opened in March 29, 1868 with 14 Indian children in Iere village (Doodnath 1983: 41).

It was in 1950s that Hindu sponsored schools were opened through the efforts of Badase Sagan Maharaj who became the founder of Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha (SDMS). Extended visits during this period by Indian missionaries (known as the ‘Swamis’) resulted in an increased interest in Hinduism on the part of many young men; at the same time, the new schools built by the Maha Sabha introduced the teaching of Hindi and Sanskrit along with customary Western secular subjects (Encyclopedia of World Cultures 1996; Campbell 1985: 119).
Similarly, the Muslim community established ‘maktabs’ [elementary schools] and ‘madrasas’ [centers of learning whether school, college or university established for teaching of Islam] where mouvlis [Islamic scholar] and imams [worship leader of a mosque of a Muslim community] imparted learning in Urdu and Arabic. The Village Mosque as a centre of community activity dates back to 1860s.

Through these channels of education, elements of Indian culture were kept alive.

**Marriage**

Until 1946 marriages performed by Hindu priests were not legally recognized neither Muslim marriages before 1930s, by the Trinidad & Tobago law (Jha 1985:2). They were not registered with the District Registrar and therefore their children were considered as illegitimate in the eyes of the law. For Indians, the religious ceremony was considered more legitimate than the civil registration of marriage (Brereton 1985: 20).

**Co-existence of Religious Groups**

Religion has always been central to Indian life. As D.N. Vidyarthi put it (from ‘130 Years - Challenge and Transition’),

> Whatever else our ancestors might have left behind them as they embarked on their great adventure, they did not neglect to transplant their religious customs and traditions. The crucible of immigration, however, was happily responsible for the removal of much that elsewhere made for the unnatural stratification of community life (Kirpalani et al.: 1945: para 1).

Since the earlier days of indentureship and thereafter, East Indians of varied religious, cultural and regional groups co-existed harmoniously. In the 1930s, just fifteen years short of the 100th anniversary of the commencement of Indian indentureship, L.F. Seukaran, politician and later elder statesman, remarked:

> Here, fortunately for us, Hindu, Muslim and Christian Indians enjoy unfettered social intercourse. There is much tolerance of one another’s
religious viewpoint and practices, and even among the various religious groupings, sectarian differences do not seem to cut deeply into social relationships (Kirpalani et al.: 1945: para 2).

In 1931, the Indian population stood at 138,667, made up of Hindus (94,125), Christians (23,183), Mohammedans (20,747), Buddhist (119), Parsi (278) and others (215) (ibid: para 3).

**Media**
The first Indian movie that came to Trinidad was Bala Joban in 1935. Though rated as an average in India, this movie attracted East Indians from every corner to watch the first Indian motion picture in Trinidad. For the first time they felt connected to their motherland, India after being cut off for 90 years. According to Gooptar (2015: 219),

> To a people who were starved of things Indians who pined for India, who had created an imagined India and sought to re-create among themselves the India that they had left behind, the coming of this new Indian spectacle in 1935 was like ‘India coming to them in Trinidad’ or ‘a slice of India’ greeting them.

They were ecstatic about the clothing, jewelry, kitchen utensils, musical instruments and Hindi language depicted in the movie as those were similar to their own that were preserved and inherited from their fore-parents. As Indian movies continued to arrive in Trinidad, the East Indians drew parallels between their local cultural frames and those seen in the movies, particularly the portrayal of arranged marriages, the Panchayat system, gender and caste/class issues, patriotism, and the like. Through the Indian movies, the East Indians reinforced their cultural identities and value systems and kept alive the ‘imagined India’ in their memories. Beginning in 1938 and through 1940s, Indian movie-inspired singing competitions, orchestra bands, dance groups and new genre of music (Chutney) emerged in the island.

In sum, the local East Indians linked culture they saw in the Indian movies to their traditional local cultural and religious experiences in
the settlement and created new identity markers (Gooptar 2015: 226-7).

**Rise of Political Leaders**

Prior to and following the abolition of indentureship, there was a rise in social activists and political leaders. According to Cudjoe (2010), by the 1890s, the East Indians moved from the estates to the newly established villages and began forming a political force in the island. In 1897, the East Indian National Association of Trinidad was formed and later became one of the major Indian political organizations during the early twentieth century defending the interests of the East Indians in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO. During this period, the East Indians participated in mayoral politics in San Fernando and in the movement for constitutional change. They reconstructed the panchayat, one of the traditional Indian social institutions for challenging political activities in the country.

In 1925, the first elective legislature was established in Trinidad & Tobago. Although the East Indians were against the elected system their fears turned out to be ill-founded. At the first election one Indian member, Sarran Teelucksingh was selected. In 1928, Teelucksingh was joined by two other Indian members, F. E.M. Hosein (St. George) and T. Roodal (St. Patrick). Roodal, a leading member of Cipriani’s Workingmen’s Association, brought a substantial section of the Indian working class into the labor movement with him. Eventually, Roodal emerged as an important leader in the Indian community. Adrian Reinzi, a fourth Indian was elected to the Legislative Council in 1938. An important leader in the society, Reinzi worked with Tubal Uriah ‘Buzz’ Bulte and the labor movement to advance the causes of both the East Indian and labour (Cudjoe 2010; *Encyclopedia of World Cultures* 1996; Samaroo 1985: 83-86).

In summary, according to Gamlen (2008), maintaining national culture abroad is one way of cultivating diasporic identity. In case of the Indian indentured labourers in Trinidad & Tobago, national culture was expressed through their social, cultural, religious, educational, and political organizations that were derived from the values they had internalized in their homeland and re-constructed in the foreign land.
Recognizing the Diaspora Prior to the Establishment of Indian Mission in Trinidad & Tobago

According to Gamlen (2008: 844), states have various mechanisms for recognizing (reifying) diaspora communities. Formally recognizing diaspora communities involves dedicated bureaucratic structures. However, in the absence of Indian diplomatic post in Trinidad & Tobago, most of the time British policies governed the indentured labourers.

British Policies and East Indians

Evidently, the East Indians adhering to their cultural values and practices engendered resentment from the Africans and the plantation owners. In the environment of mid-19th century, where adoption of European culture and Christian ethic were norms, the East Indians holding on to their language, dress, religion and their profound philosophical attachment to the motherland (Dharti Mata) were viewed as ‘adverse influence which has to be met and dealt with’ (Samaroo 1985: 80). The physical and cultural differences were so visible that accentuated the isolation of the East Indians from the rest of the society. Jha (1976) and Samaroo (1979) observed that the hostility from the wider society forced the East Indians to form their own kindred organizations to look after their own interests. They also arranged regular visits by Indian missionaries and scholars, imported Indian films from the thirties that generally identified with problems in the sub-continent (as cited in Samaroo 1985: 80).

The Official British policy, on the other hand, contributed much to the confusion about the role of the East Indians whether to adopt a ‘pluralist’ or a ‘consensualist’ approach to the group in question. Officially, the colonial government conveyed clearly that their policy was a consensualist one and that East Indians were not separate but part and parcel of the larger West Indian society. They should therefore be given no encouragement to operate separately or to look to India for the alleviation of their problem (Samaroo 1985: 80). In 1938, the Colonial Office advisers demonstrated their stand for a consensualist approach by strongly opposing the demand by the Government of India (G.O.I) that a British Indian Civil servant be sent with the Moyne Commission to safeguard the interests of the East Indians in the Caribbean. Again, in 1941, The Colonial Office advised that both the India Office in
London and the Government of India in Delhi should be discouraged from the view that they had to be consulted before the institution of measures which would affect Caribbean East Indians. The Indian Officials were to encourage East Indian populations to consider as part of the general population and not as off-shoots of India (Rogers 1941; cited in Samroo 1985: 82). This directive was put forth to deal with situations where the East Indians were requesting for intervention from the government to resolve issues relating to Hindu and Muslim marriage laws and financial assistance to Hindus or Muslims who wished to open their own schools.

Towards Abolition of Indian Indentureship in Trinidad & Tobago

In January 1920, the system of bonded labor or indentured labor in all the British colonies was abolished following series of agitation led by Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa from 1885 onwards. In an article published in the local newspaper, the Guardian, commemorating 100 years of abolition of indentured labor in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO, author Mahase (2017: 4) notes:

the decision to stop the shipping of labourers to Trinidad came from outside of the island. The Trinidad planters had little or no involvement in the entire abolition process. This was actually the result of massive protests against the labour scheme which started in the late 1800s by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in Natal.

The move towards abolition of Indian Indentureship was a long drawn historical process that underwent numerous obstacles put forth by both arms of the government, the British Imperial Government and the Government of India. One of the key players in facilitating the process was the Indian National Congress (I.N.C.) founded in 1885 as a reaction to the repressive and exploitative policies of the British colonial states. It was an organized expression of Indian nationalism in the country.

The hardships, exploitation and abuse of indentured labourers in Trinidad & Tobago under the British regime drew the attention of the Government of India through the agitation led by Mahatma Gandhi and initiative taken by the INC. The human rights of the Indian diaspora in Trinidad
& Tobago and world-wide were accorded recognition and liberation from indentureship.

**Diaspora Building and Diaspora Integration during Post-Indentureship in Trinidad & Tobago**

Historically, India and Trinidad & Tobago have been in contact for over 170 years although formal diplomatic relations were established in 1962. Both countries share certain common features that they could identify with: both were colonized by the British; both nations gained independence from British rule; both possess diverse natural and large economic resources; both are members of the Commonwealth of Nations, G-77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); and lastly, they are ethnically heterogeneous in composition. Although, Indian diaspora in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO is considered as a single largest ethnic group in the country, in reality there exists multi-ethnic groups within the diaspora mostly based on religious affiliations (Hindus, Muslims or Christians). Also included in the diaspora are the recent migrants and Non-residents of India (NRIs). There are about 600 families (1800 people) of NRI who are engaged in medicine, academia, business, law and other professions (Diplomat Special Report: 2014: 8, High Commission of India 2017) for over the last 30 years or more.

**Diaspora Building**

*Cultivating a Diaspora: Promoting Cultural Ties and Educational Opportunities*

The Indian High Commission in Trinidad & Tobago has been instrumental in cultivating cultural ties and opening educational opportunities through a number of initiatives and signing of bilateral agreements in the areas of cultural cooperation, cultural exchange programmes, science and technology, technical cooperation, agricultural research and education during the period 1985 to 2015.

The Mission has been engaged in active cultural diplomacy through its Cultural Wing, Mahatma Gandhi Institute of Cultural Cooperation (MGICC), established in 1997 under a Bilateral Cultural Exchange Programme. It promotes art and culture both at the Government and Non-Governmental levels.
through cultural and teaching activities in Indian classical music and dance. Currently, the Institute has 3 Indian-based teachers in vocal music, tabla and Bharatanatyam dance and one local Yoga teacher who conducts classes over the weekends. Furthermore, the Institute collaborates with several socio-cultural and educational institutions in teaching of music and dance, thereby providing greater awareness of India’s composite cultural heritage. It conducts the monthly ‘Kala Sandhya’ lectures and workshops and also offers annual scholarships under Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR)’s General Cultural Scholarship Scheme.

Another notable area has been the collaboration with the ICCR, chairs for Hindi and Contemporary Indian Studies with the regional university, University of West Indies (UWI) in 2012 for the period of 3-5 years. Two professors from India were deputed in these departments in UWI. During their tenure of service, they organized a series of seminars, workshops and conferences in which the academicians from local universities participated and presented papers on related disciplines. World Hindi Conference, International Hindi Conference and Hindi Kavi Samellan were conducted under the area of Hindi.

Ayurveda and Traditional Indian Medicines is another area that the Indian High Commission has been widely promoting. Even though MoUs have been signed in 2012 between Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and UWI with setting up of a chair, and opening of a center for information on Ayurveda, no report on any research on Ayurvedic Sciences or activities of the department have been published in the public domain so far. However, a number of scholarships are advertised through the Indian High Commission’s website inviting on an annual basis, students interested to pursue undergraduate/post graduate/PhD programmes in Ayurveda, Yoga, Unnani, Sidda and Homeopathy (AYUSH), Scholarship programme for Diaspora children (People of Indian Origin and Non-resident Indians) to pursue undergraduate courses in Indian Universities or Institutes (except in Medical and related courses) both professional and non-professional courses (High Commission of India 2017).

The Government of India (GOI) offers scholarships and assistance to TRINIDAD & TOBAGO under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme, ICCR scholarships, Know India Programme (IP), and deputation of experts from India. The ITEC programme focuses on capacity building and human resource development in 161 developing nations.
around the world since 1964. In TRINIDAD & TOBAGO, 40 slots are offered every year for scholars to be trained under this programme. During the last 7 years, about 143 scholars have been trained in India under this programme (Special Report India and Trinidad & Tobago 2014: 9). This is about 51% of the total slots offered each year, that means about 49% of the slots are not utilized. According to Badri-Maharaj (2017), the relative lack of success of the ITEC. Scholarship Program in the L.C region may be attributed to diplomatic shortcomings. Started in 1964, this program offers over 8000 scholarships globally. Unlike Africa and Asia, India’s ITEC slots allocated to the region are significantly underutilized. For example out of 638 slots allocated to the region in 2013-2014, only 393 were utilized. This has been true of the situation in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO.

On the other hand, during the past 10 years, 16 participants under the ICCR scholarship programmes and 112 young members of the Indian Diaspora under the KIP programme have visited India till date. One can find detailed information on the scholarship programmes under ICCR at the High Commission’s website which are advertised for every academic year. However, these have not attracted significant number of scholars to apply and make use of the opportunity to study in India. The scholarships advertised are the General Scholarship Scheme inviting students of Trinidad & Tobago for undergraduate, postgraduate degrees and doctoral research in a wide range of disciplines,

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO have over 201 secondary schools, 3 prominent universities and over 10 recognized and accredited tertiary institutions with close to 60% of the country’s 1.3 million population (census) as the student population (Trinidad & Tobago 2011 Population and Housing Census Demographic Report: 2012: 18). Hence, with robust marketing strategies, candidates for ICCR scholarships can be increased from the wealth of student population provided by TRINIDAD & TOBAGO.

**Humanitarian Services, Conferences and Publications**
The Indian High Commission has been engaged in community work through health camps, Health rallies and promotion of World Yoga Day as well as render support to organizations like Sisters of Charity in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO. As one browses through the High Commission’s website and Facebook, a number of events have been listed and displayed in the photo
India and Trinidad & Tobago: Diaspora Building and Diaspora Integration

gallery. Noteworthy has been the hosting of conferences on ‘Modern time and Ancient wisdom’ (2014), and ‘The Relevance of Swami Vivekananda’ (2015), co-hosting conferences on ‘Indian Diaspora in the Caribbean’ in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO (2010, 2015, 2017) and Grenada (2016), hosting Diwali celebrations at the National Council of Indian Culture center, Hindi Day celebrations, ITEC day, Gandhi Jayanti, India’s Independence and Republic Day celebrations, Annual convocation ceremony of MG.CC and hosting numerous cultural programmes across the country.

The Indian High Commission has to its credit a number of publications both in print as well as digital and online. Some of the latest publications have been ‘Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist: Special Report’ (2014 & 2016) and ‘India in the Caribbean: Socio-Cultural Moorings of Diaspora’ (2015) initiated and coordinated by the former High Commissioner, Gauri Shankar Gupta. The High Commission has an in-house Library open to the public with a wide variety of collections ranging from cultural biographies to newspapers and magazines, documentary and feature films.

**Recognizing the Diaspora**

**Diplomatic Visits**

There have been a number of diplomatic visits by the high ranking officials of India and TRINIDAD & TOBAGO. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1968 was the first Prime Minister to visit at the invitation of the Government of TRINIDAD & TOBAGO. A cultural pageant was organized at her reception at Port of Spain. A large number of people of Indian origin (PIOs) had gathered to affirm their kinship bond with India. Industrial potential and diversification of economy were discussed between the two leaders and TRINIDAD & TOBAGO was offered technical assistance under ITEC programme (MEA Report 1968-69: 1967:49). After a gap of 30 years, visits were made by the former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vijpayee (1999) and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who led a high level delegation for the Common Wealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) Summit in November 2009. From TRINIDAD & TOBAGO, the Prime Minister Basdeo Panday was invited as a Chief Guest on the occasion of India’s Republic Day (1997) and Prime Minister Kamla Persad Bissessar (2012) paid a State visit to India. During the visit a number of agreements and MOUs were signed in the areas of Bilateral Air Services agreement, Technical Cooperation Agreement on Education,
Cultural Exchanges and cooperation in the field of Traditional Medicine (Special Report India and Trinidad & Tobago 2014: 9, High Commission of India 2017). Both the former Prime Ministers’ visits were seen as leaning more towards cultural and kinship ties in connecting to one’s ancestral roots.

Participation in Joint Commission Meeting (JCM)
The first meeting of the India-TRINIDAD & TOBAGO Joint Commission Meeting was held in New Delhi in November 2011. Areas of discussion included Science & Technology, air transport, agriculture, SMEs, education, healthcare, tech. co-operation, energy and trade. There has not been another one since then.

Participation in Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD)
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas is organized to mark the expatriates’ contribution in the development of India. PBD is held every year on January 9 (since 2003) commemorating Mahatma Gandhi’s return to India from South Africa, in 1915. These conventions provide a platform to the overseas Indian community to engage with the government and people of India for mutually beneficial activities, discuss key issues concerning Indian Diaspora, and network among the overseas Indian community residing in various parts of the world (Ministry of External Affairs: 2017). During the event, individuals of exceptional merit are honoured with the prestigious Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award (PBSA) to appreciate their role in India’s growth. The recipients of PBSA have been the Former Prime Minister of Basdeo Panday (2005), National Council of Indian Culture (NCIC) (2008), former Prime Minister Kamal Persad Bissessar (2012) and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Winston Dookeran (2017) (High Commission of India 2017).

Economic and Commercial Relations
It is true that TRINIDAD & TOBAGO is one of the ‘gateway’ countries (others being Guyana and Suriname) in the Caribbean that India could with the right policies, some innovation and diplomatic initiative use as springboard for greater involvement in the region, particularly in the Latin America. Along this line, Badri-Maharaj (2017 noted that one of the major success stories of the
last decade has been the significant increase in trade ties between India and the Latin America- Caribbean (LAC) region. To illustrate his point he cited Rengaraj Viswanathan, former Ambassador and expert in Latin American politics, market and culture, as stating that

India's trade with Venezuela ($12.24 billion) and Brazil ($11.36 billion) in 2014-15 was more than its trade with Sri Lanka ($7.4 billion), Bangladesh ($7 billion), Thailand ($9.3 billion) and Vietnam ($9.2 billion) as well as with traditional partners France ($9.4 billion) and the Netherlands ($8.7 billion).

Viswanathan (2005: 114), also noted that the Indian pharma companies have successfully been established as well as achievements in information technology in these countries have enhanced the image of India. Thus,

there are more opportunities for medium and small countries and companies of LAC region to provide greater opportunities for India since Chinese companies go for large markets and volumes.

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO provides good opportunities to exporters from India to access the Caribbean region and beyond. There is potential for growth of bilateral trades in textiles, garments, pharmaceuticals, energy, machinery and petro-chemicals, agriculture, Information Technology and Film & Music Industry (High Commission of India 2017).

Indian Arrival Day Celebrations
One of the event celebrated extra-territorially is the Indian Arrival Day by the people of Indian origin in different parts of the Caribbean on different days. In Trinidad & Tobago, May 30 is proclaimed as the Indian Arrival day and a national holiday since 1994. The day is commemorated with prayers, speeches, songs, music, dances and plays in communal and public places. The reenactment of the landing of the first boat-load of Indian migrants are displayed at various beaches. The citizens are encouraged to display old photographs and artifacts relevant to the history of the Indians in the Caribbean (Mahabir 2017). This annual event exhibit sentiments of the young generations
as they pay their homage to their forefathers. It is also a time to reflect on their connectedness with their homeland.

**Diaspora Integration**
According to Gamlen (2008: 844), diaspora integration examines the rights that the origin states extend to diasporas and the obligations they attempt to extract from them. Gamlen propounds that the mixture of generosity and appeals to patriotism that states make towards diasporas are not simply a strategy in a game between separate players, but rather a form of sovereignty claim of state over citizen-one that operates through consent rather than coercion.

The present paper discusses the above diaspora mechanism under four areas: establishment of forums (we-feeling), consular services, avoidance of double taxation, and emergency and relief services provided by the Mission.

**Establishment of Forums under Auspices of the Mission**
Forums established by the Mission bring the Indian nationals and family members living in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO together for humanitarian service and social events. The Forum of Indian Nationals in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO (FINTT) is one of such forum that was launched on 17 September 2011. The Know India Youth-Trinidad & Tobago (KIYTT) is another forum formed in October 2011 particularly to interact with the participants in the Know India Programme (KIP) in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO. KIYTT carries out activities such as organizing cultural programmes, talk shows on TV channels, highlighting developments in different sectors in India and community activities. Indian Alumni Association of Trinidad & Tobago (IAATT) constitutes of scholars and other professions who have either studied or trained in India. Currently, there are no updates on the activities of the above mentioned forums in the public domain.

KIYTT has been actively promoting various schemes of the Government of India meant for them such as the OCI scheme, Know India Programme (KIP), Tracing the Roots Programme, Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC) and Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award. The Mission Provides regular and prompt consular services to the Non-resident
Indian community residing in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO and other concurrently accredited countries (High Commission of India 2017).

Avoidance of Double Taxation
India and Trinidad & Tobago have signed a treaty on avoidance of double taxation for the NRIs working in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO since 1999.

Consular Services
The Government of Trinidad & Tobago has waived visa requirements for Indian nationals visiting TRINIDAD & TOBAGO for tourism and business purposes for a period of three months. The Government of India has approved e-Tourist Visa for TRINIDAD & TOBAGO citizens. Furthermore, the High Commission’s website has all relevant updated information for the application of PIO cards and the application for Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) cards. Currently, all PIO cards are being replaced by OCI cards (High Commission of India 2017).

Emergency and Relief Operations
The Indian High Commission is committed to provide relief services to the Indian nationals in case of emergency or natural disasters. A recent example is seen where the Mission evacuated nine Indian nationals from Dominica where hurricane devastated the country.

Final Analysis
The paper began by examining Gamlen’s (2008: 841) proposition of diaspora engagement policies or diaspora mechanisms, namely diaspora building and diaspora integration during and post Indian indentureship in Trinidad & Tobago. Additionally, the paper described the state-diaspora relations between India and the Indian diaspora in Trinidad & Tobago during the same period of time. Gamlen posited that contrary to the popular notions on state-diaspora relations as abnormal (Anderson 1992; Agnew 2003; Van Hear, Pieke &
Vertovec 2004; Schiller 2005; De Haas 2006 as cited in Gamlen 2008: 841), it is normal for states to have a variety of diaspora mechanisms be it diaspora building or diaspora integration, to protrude their borders and impact on a variety of extra-territorial groups.

Gamlen (2008: 852) proposed a model to gauge the engagement or disengagement between the state – diaspora relations. His model demonstrates a typology of emigration states (see Figure 1.1. According to his model, a state may have diaspora building mechanisms which include attempts to coordinate policies with a diaspora dimension; or diaspora integration mechanism which include many state policies with diaspora dimensions. However, there rarely is a situation where both or neither diaspora mechanisms exist. When both mechanisms exist, then the state-diaspora are said to be engaged whereas, when both the mechanisms are absent, a state of disengagement exists. In a situation where one of the mechanisms is present, the condition is either ‘paper only’ or ‘incoherent’. When applied to the state-diaspora relations between Indians and Trinidad & Tobago, it can be seen that a number of policies have been directed by the state to promote diaspora building mechanisms through cultural, religious and educational programmes aimed at both Indo-Trinidadians and NRIs. Diaspora integration mechanisms are limited to consular services to citizens of TRINIDAD & TOBAGO and NRIs and relief operations exclusively to NRIs. However, we cannot draw conclusions on the engagement or disengagement situation between state-diaspora relations in the context of India-TRINIDAD & TOBAGO relations based merely on the description attempted in this paper. This study was exploratory in nature and more in-depth analysis of Gamlen’s model/proposition should be conducted to arrive as what he perceived as ‘emigration states’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diaspora Integration Mechanisms (Rights and Obligations)</th>
<th>Diaspora Building Mechanisms (Diasporic identities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.1: Typology of Emigration states (Gamlen 2008: 852).
Conclusion

East Indians in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO are proud of their rich cultural heritage and of their ancestral homeland, India. Almost all of India’s efforts have been focused on cultural activities, in which the Indian diplomatic mission has had good success. The Indian Mission in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO should advertise scholarship opportunities to all citizens of TRINIDAD & TOBAGO and not only limit to Indo-Trinidadians to increase remittances from this nation through educational opportunities of studying abroad and internship programmes. India as a nation-state should also engage in more favorable diaspora integration policies for Indian nationals in TRINIDAD & TOBAGO such as providing opportunities to participate in electoral processes remotely. However, it is time that India should no longer be in muted relations with Trinidad & Tobago. India should consider pooling the Caribbean countries like Trinidad & Tobago, Guyana and Suriname with the largest concentration of people of Indian origin and be more pro-active in economic investments, particularly in the areas of agriculture and natural resources that these countries are known for.

References


India and Trinidad & Tobago: Diaspora Building and Diaspora Integration


Jha, J.C. 1985. The Indian Heritage to India. In La Guerre, J. (ed.): From Calcutta to Caroni. Trinidad & Tobago: University of the West Indies.


Susan Julia Chand


Susan Julia Chand
Directorate of Research and Innovation, and
Anthropology
School of Social Sciences
University of the Southern Caribbean (USC), Trinidad
susan.chand@gmail.com
‘Fitting In’: Social Cohesion among Skilled Migrant Indian Women and Host Diasporic Communities in South Africa

Pragna Rugunanan

Abstract
Migration has traditionally been seen as a primarily male domain, particularly in developing countries. However, global practices have increased the visibility of women migrants such that the feminisation and irregularisation of migration has led to new flows of transnational migrant movements, particularly to South Africa. Attention is drawn to the growth of South-South migration, specifically focusing on Indian migrant women, as accompanying their professional spouses migrating to South Africa. Set within a social cohesion framework, this paper examines how the women attempt to find a ‘fit’ in a socially diverse society where distrust, exclusion and racism still prevail. This investigation is based on exploratory research using qualitative interviews conducted with married Indian women. The focus of this paper examines the reasons for their migration, their choice to migrate specifically to South Africa, perceptions of South Africa, their sense of inclusion and observes if they develop a sense of belonging to the country. Preliminary findings show that the migrants find South Africans very tolerant, but keep to themselves as the fear of crime impedes integration.

Keywords: Family migration, gender, skilled migration, social cohesion, Indian women, migrant communities

1 Introduction
Post-1994, South Africa has become an attractive destination for many migrants in the South. The Green Paper on International Migration (Depart-
Social Cohesion among Skilled Migrant Indian Women

The Department of Home Affairs (2016:6) confirms that South Africa continues to receive high volumes of migrants from all over the world, with the figure increasing in 2011 from 12 million to 14 million in 2014. The total percentage of Indian arrivals to South Africa in 2015 was 1%. Besides traditional forms of labour migration, political and economic refugees, asylum seekers, other forms of migration such as retirement, mobility in search of better lifestyles, repeat and circular migration, has grown steadily. One of the reasons for this is the potential for growth in South Africa. The history of apartheid has created a distinctive skills shortage in the country such that after twenty three years of democracy, the country is still battling to fill. Skilled migration is considered one of the more ‘acceptable’ (Raghuram 2004) forms of migration and celebrated as ‘professional mobility’ (Butt 2014), compared to unskilled migration which is viewed in a negative light.

The intensification of migration worldwide has resulted in family systems evolving such that transnational families are an important characteristic of globalisation and migration. Roos (2013:147) shows that in highly skilled professions such as engineering and information and communication technology sector, the transnational family is ‘a new trend’ amongst India’s growing middle class. India’s liberal migration policy supports the temporary migration of highly skilled workers, giving rise to a growing middle class that is enticed by career-based mobility (Manohar 2013; Mani 2009; Roos 2013). A substantial body of literature has examined the relationship between gender and international migration, yet little attention has been given to the gendered experiences of highly skilled migrant women (Butt 2014; Meares 2010; Raghuram 2004; Yeoh & Willis 2005).

In the bulk of the migration literature, women are cast as appendages to male migrants, as ‘losers’ within the patriarchal system (Raghuram 2004). A further gap in migration studies is the vacuum in research on family-linked migration among the highly skilled (Raghuram 2004; Roos 2013). In addition, skilled migration from India, in the information and communication technology and engineering sectors, is routed particularly to the United States of America (USA) as the preferred choice. South Africa has now grown as an attractive alternate migration destination. Family reunification migration from India, where highly skilled wives migrate to join men, has been given little attention in the migration literature in South Africa. This paper seeks to examine the concept of social cohesion and how migrant families, in particular skilled Indian migrant women, negotiate a ‘fit’ and a semblance of belonging.
The concept of social cohesion gained prominence in South Africa after the 2008 and more recent 2015, xenophobic attacks. In his 2009 State of the Nation Address, President Zuma emphasised the concepts of ‘unity in diversity’, ‘developing a shared value system’ and the ‘spirit of community solidarity’ as building blocks of social cohesion (Struwig et al. 2013:1). At the National Social Cohesion Summit in 2012, the Department of Arts and Culture stated that social cohesion was based on key pillars – diversity, inclusiveness, access and values (Mail and Guardian 13 July 2012). As migration related diversity has grown in South Africa, one way of developing social cohesion is through understanding how temporary migrant communities experience a sense of belonging in South Africa.

The point of departure for this paper is from the perspective of accompanying spouses, that is, Indian females who accompanied their professional husbands, who were working on temporary and permanent permits, in South Africa. I explore the experiences of these women, who are professional and semi-skilled, as they navigate settlement and integration into a culturally diverse society, one that is struggling to define what social cohesion means to South Africa. Framed within the context of social cohesion, this paper examines the reason for migration, their choice to migrate specifically to South Africa, and seeks to understand how migrant communities develop a sense of belonging to South Africa.

2 Literature Review
Globally, migration is on the increase with the number of international migrants, that is people living outside of the country they were born in, reaching 244 million in 2015 (United Nations 2016). This figure includes 20 million refugees. Migration is set to intensify and dominate with South to South migration flows increasing instead of migration to the developed countries in the Global North. While Asian migration is a world-wide phenomenon (Haque 2005; Sarwal 2012), statistics from the United Nations (2016) reveal that between 2000 and 2015, Asia contributed more international

---

1 Defining the South remains contentious, problems associated with its ‘definition, distinctiveness, political construction and chronology’ (Bakewell 2009:2).
migrants than any other region, with more than fifty percent of all international migrants being born in Asia. Significant to this paper, is that in 2015, 16 million Indian nationals were living outside of their country (United Nations 2016).

The accelerated movement of people across the globe has implications for both, the host and home economies, communities, families and societies. Traditional migration theories studied the migrant as an individual, either as an emigrant or immigrant, with attention given to the countries of immigration (Faist et al. 2013). Scholars advocating a transnational approach to migration argued that migrants and their families continue to be part of their families’ economic, socio-cultural and religious practices of the country of origin while also settling into those of their country of choice (Faist 2000; Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Levitt 2001; Portes et al. 1999). These authors assert that migrants have multiple attachments and should be understood as being part of two interconnecting worlds, where they forge and maintain ‘multi-stranded social relations’ linking host and home communities (Basch et al. 1994:6).

The increase in South to South migration demonstrates a gradual shift in the economic centre from West to East and from North to South characterised by the ‘Shifting [of] Wealth’ (OECD 2012: n.p.), resulting in the creation of new ‘geographies of growth’. South Africa is an example of a developing country in the South. As a young democracy and culturally diverse society, social cohesion is paramount in maintaining its status as the largest economy on the African continent portraying the image of a socially inclusive society. Recent downturns in the economy, spiralling unemployment, a rising black middle class, xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals and turmoil in the education and service sectors have railroaded some of the transformative effects of democracy. Supporting this view, Struwig et al. (2013:2) states that some of the barriers in building social cohesion are ‘institutionalised racism, ‘class divisions, social fragmentation, language, spatial exclusion, sexism unemployment; crime, corruption, unequal experiences of the law and moral decline’.

One solution to building a socially cohesive society is by integrating migrant communities into its fold. The link between migration and social cohesion has been given little attention in the broader literature; more emphasis has been given to diversity and social cohesion. The lack of a precise definition of social cohesion opens up the concept to various interpretations. In South Africa, Struwig et al. (2013) developed a social cohesion barometer to inform policy and develop a conceptual framework on social cohesion. Other
definitions involve notions of ‘solidarity’ and ‘togetherness’ and common indicators include measures of trust and shared social norms. Developing a more inclusive society necessitates the inclusion of trust.

Putnam’s (2000) widely cited work shows that general trust in people, trust in other ethnicities and even trust in people who are similar is significantly reduced in ethnically diverse communities. Putnam (2000) argues that ethnic minorities tend to ‘hunker down’ and withdraw from social life. Schaeffer (2011:2-3) presents four arguments as to why ethnically divided communities are less cohesive. First, we identify with others who are similar to us, but are prejudiced towards other ethnicities reducing levels of trust and willingness to integrate. Second, we associate with people like ourselves, tending towards ethnic enclaves; implying that in diverse neighbourhoods, people rarely integrate and miss opportunities for interaction. Third, the more diverse a population is ethnically, the greater the possibility of difference in ideas and agreements. Fourth, ethnic diversity brings diversity in language, making it harder to promote commonality. These arguments are not without contention and Schaeffer (2011) acknowledges this critique.

Studies by Alesina and La Ferrara (2008) and Delhey and Newton (2005) suggest that increasing social diversity has adverse effects on social cohesion and in diverse societies, generalised trust becomes difficult to implement and results in a loss of sense of community. For Stolle (2002) generalised trust is a good indicator for social cohesion. Much of the North American literature’s point of departure is that diversity leads to less cohesive societies (Hooge et al. 2007). However, Hooge et al. (2007) also point out that the literature based on the relation between social diversity and social cohesion is problematic as it is mostly based on American society, which has particular race relations. The USA is an atypical Western society and other aspects of the social cohesion construct remain untapped. Hooge et al.’s (2007:16) study on social cohesion in European societies revealed that foreigners living in countries where they were given extensive voting rights at an early stage of immigration were more trusting of nationals. They also suggest that ‘high-trust societies’ paid attention to the rights of minorities much earlier, were oriented towards equality, and have egalitarian policies in place to integrate minorities into everyday life which breaks down ‘tension and distrust’ between social groups (Hooge et al. 2007:16).

In summary, the concept of social cohesion remains elusive and lacks a universally agreed definition. Common indicators of social cohesion across
research include ‘solidarity’ and ‘togetherness’ and include measures of ‘trust and social norms’ (Demireva 2015:2). In South Africa, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative’s (IDASA) project on migration and social cohesion, emphasised integration rather than social cohesion (Williams n.d.). Jane Jenson (1998), the Canadian social theorist, was the first to elaborate on indicators measuring a socially cohesive society where all groups have a ‘sense of belonging, participation, inclusion, recognition and legitimacy’. These measures resonate most consistently with the findings of this study.

3 Linking Social Cohesion and Migration

Walton-Roberts (2004:363) emphasises that literature on global migration is concerned with the sphere of production where the experiences of the single male migrant worker are given prominence and underplay the social production aspect of the family involving the family, the spouse and the community. This argument coheres with the bulk of the research on migration in the twentieth century which largely ignored the role of women as migrants (Morokvasic 1984), paying little attention to the women and families left behind (Boyd & Grieco 2003). Even when women became more visible in migrant research, they were typecast as ‘trailing spouses’ (Raghuram 2004) and appendages to their counterparts who are viewed in the traditional role as the head of household because they are males. Mahler and Pessar (2001) recognised how gender was embedded in the very fabric of migration processes and structures and are fortified in transnational social spaces.

In examining the visibility and invisibility of migrant women in migration literature Piper (2010), argued that discrepancies occurred in how the geographic boundaries of Asia, South to North and South to South are defined. While women are recognised as ‘accompanying their spouses’, official statistics are void of their status as independent migrants. Migrant women dominate in labour markets labelled as ‘feminised domains’ such as health care, domestic work, prostitution, entertainment and manufacturing (Lutz 2010; Piper 2010). The nature of this work is characterised by low wages, low status, minimal occupational mobility and security with little chance of collective organisation (Ramirez & Hondagneu-Sotelo 2009). By implication, the visibility of women in these sectors and the meaningful use of statistics remain questionable at best.

Research shows that women view out-migration as some form of per-
sonal and economic freedom, as an escape from familial and marriage responsibilities (Dannecker 2007; Piper 2008), from unwanted marriages and abusive spouses and relationships (Kofman et al. 2000; Krummel 2012; Piper 2010). Feminist theorists (Kofman 1999; Morokvasic 1984; Piper 2008;) redirected the lens of migration research which viewed women as victims of the ‘multiple gendered dimensions’ towards migrant women’s agency and empowerment. This body of literature gives importance to agency by pinpointing the manner in which women make decisions and plan for their families’ future well-being (Jinnah 2013; Rugunanan & Smit 2011).

Evidence shows how patriarchal norms and culture of the home country continue to shape women’s understanding of their own identities. Marriage is considered central to the lives of Indians, and a rite of passage which determines ones ‘gendered location’ and the ‘organisation of one’s life’ (Manohar 2013:195). Women, who move as accompanying spouses, cast off their careers to focus on their domesticated role with an emphasis on the needs of children in the host country (Yeoh & Willis 2002). The choice of having to give up their careers in some cases is not considered unusual as these women have already subjected themselves to a form of patriarchy in the family of orientation when agreeing to arranged marriages. Manohar (2013: 195) reminds us of the pressure placed on ‘conforming to heteronormativity’ norms of marriage and motherhood among Indian women which results in a ‘fulfilled women’, reinforcing Mahler and Pessar (2001) notion of the gendered hierarchies of power. Furthermore, the prospect of forsaking their careers is not unwelcomed by the women as they concentrate on their family’s integration and ‘fit’ in a foreign country.

While a greater emphasis in the literature has been given to gender and international migration, fewer studies have paid attention to the gendered experiences of highly skilled migrant women. Research on the migration experiences of skilled women suggests varying views: some indicate that it negatively affected their careers (Hardill 2002; Man 2004; Suto 2009); leading o downward occupational mobility and a movement away from their professional life towards the family and home (Meares 2010) or to a re-domestication of women (Yeoh & Willis 2005). The focus of this paper is on the international migration experiences of skilled women who follow their husbands, regarded as professional elites, to South Africa. The women experience an intensification of domestic responsibilities or become ‘re-domesticated’ while choosing to put the needs of their family first and
integrating into a culturally diverse country, which is not their first choice of destination. The Household Strategy Model deposits power in the household and decision making structures inclusive of men and women while combining structuralism with household analysis (Chant 1992). Male labour migration, however, is seen as an economic strategy that is encouraged by these governments and is a direct result of the labour market demands of the destination countries. When family members migrate sequentially, the male is usually the first to go, with women more likely to follow as the accompanying spouse. The extent to which women have some influence on the decision to migrate is given attention here.

4 Research Methods
This paper is an extension of research conducted by Huynh et al. (2013) on Chinese and Indian women migration to South Africa. The study, although small and exploratory, was unique in that it investigated two migration streams from Asian countries to Africa. South Africa attracts the largest inflow of Chinese and Indian migrants on the continent (Huynh et al. 2013). The primary aim was to examine their motivations for migration and to juxtapose the experiences of Chinese and Indian women in South Africa. During fieldwork for that study as a co-researcher, I became aware of a group of Indian women migrants in Gauteng who had accompanied their spouses to South Africa.

This study is framed within a social constructionist paradigm which explores how meaning is created and how social members experience and understand their world (Creswell 2009). It adopted a qualitative approach to understand the personal experiences of married Indian women that have migrated to South Africa. As an exploratory study, a qualitative approach allows for greater flexibility with participants to probe certain issues and gain clarity where needed. A set of ten interviews with married Indian female nationals were conducted in Johannesburg. The sample is based on middle-class, highly skilled and semi-skilled Indian women who have migrated to South Africa as co-dependents. The interviews were collected during September 2012 to April 2013. Most of these participants were located in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg, in close proximity to their husband’s places of employment and established private schools.

The participants were sourced through a research associate who is a South African Indian married to an Indian national. Through their business
network, the research associate was able to access the research participants for this study. The sampling method was purposive as specific criteria were selected for the participants. Snowball sampling was also used as Indian women are less publicly visible (Rugunanan 2016). The wives had mostly postgraduate degrees and could easily communicate in English, except for two of the participants. These two interviews were conducted in Gujarati and translated into English by myself. The interviews were conducted in a manner that allowed flexibility on the part of the interviewer as well as the participant and took place either at the homes of the participants or at a place of their choosing.

A semi-structured interview guide was used to probe issues around the decision to migrate, choice of destination, family relationships in the country of origin, the role of children, remittances, working experiences in India and South Africa, domestic labour in both countries, integration into South Africa, and interrogating their sense of belonging to South Africa. Data analysis was iterative, it involved a first reading of the hand written field notes and listening to the audio-taped interviews, which were transcribed by the researcher. The data was analysed using Nvivo 11 Pro software which is used to organise and analyse unstructured qualitative data. An excel sheet was created in which certain demographic and background information was captured for each person interviewed. The excel sheet was then used to write the demographics section of the analysis. In Nvivo all the interviews and the excel sheet were imported. All the interviews were given a specific case node, which was linked to the excel sheet wherein themes were identified using Nvivo. The participants were informed of their right to withdraw from the study, were assured of anonymity through the use of pseudonyms, and gave permission for their interviews to be recorded.

5 Discussion of Findings
Contrary to the traditional view of ‘trailing spouses’ or as ‘dependents’ as categorised in the migration literature (Yeoh & Willis 2005; Raghuram 2004) one needs to pay closer attention to the role of skilled women in migration processes. The issue of skilled women migrating has grown in importance in recent decades given the increase in migration globally (Butt 2013; Roos 2013). The wives migrated as co-dependents as their husbands were sent by their companies to work in South Africa for a contract period. Their ages
ranged from 25 to 47 years. The educational background varied from one participant who has a diploma in hairdressing, five participants with bachelor degrees and four participants with post graduate degrees. The duration that the participants have lived in South Africa (at the time of the interview) ranged from just two months to 25 years. Six of the participants have lived in South Africa for between 0-5 years and the remaining four participants have lived in South Africa for between 9-25 years.

All ten participants were married in India. Most of the women were married in their 20s, while one was married at the age of 31. All of the women were married through arranged marriages, although the degree of freedom that the women had in choosing their partner varied. At the time of the interviews seven of the women had children. Five of the women are currently working in South Africa while five are not working. Two people hold South African citizenship and two have residence permits in South Africa. The other six participants had varied permits: one was on a study permit, two were on a spousal permits and three indicated that they held work permits. The discussion that follows first examines the decision to migrate, followed by exploring the women’s perceptions of South Africa which includes settling into neighbourhoods and their impediments to integration. Thereafter, the indicators of social cohesion such as social inclusion, tolerance for others, the role of voluntary associations and how migrant communities develop a sense of belonging to South Africa is interrogated.

5.1 The Decision to Migrate

Migration literature has given prominence to the male migrant as head of the household and the view of skilled international migrants being presented as highly mobile males with little attention given to family left behind. Although the males in this sample were skilled, the women were not lacking in skills or simply accepting of circumstances as indicated by their purposeful choice of spouse selection. Arya was quite specific about her choice of husband to her father; she wanted to marry a non-resident Indian (NRI) – and welcomed the opportunity to go abroad purely for economic reasons (e.a.). Her husband had already been working for a company that was starting expansions into developing countries before a post in South Africa became available. Upon enquiring from colleagues about the salary scale and type of environment, they then made the decision to come to South Africa. She says: ‘Everyone told him
that it is very nice, you will save a lot unless [you] are hell bent on blowing [your] salary. Because it was an English speaking country we came’. Two important points are significant here, one is the economic factor and secondly the choice of an English speaking country. Arya adds that the employing company provides better pay for those working outside of India and makes provision for improved facilities for staff in a foreign country. All of the women indicated that they followed their husbands to South Africa, in some cases forsaking good positions to abide by the dictates of tradition and custom of marriage. There was no question in any of the women’s minds that they would remain behind in India, to pursue their own careers or for familial reasons. Most of the women, however, were less enthusiastic about the choice of South Africa as a destination, partly due to misinformation and lack of knowledge about South Africa.

Structuration theories (Wright 1995) recognise that migrants have some power to decide how to react to labour market demands and trends. The majority of the participants in this study indicated that they wanted to migrate out for economic reasons, preferably to Northern countries such as the USA; South Africa was not often their first choice of destination. The findings from the study support the Household Strategy Model (Chant 1992), which suggests that even when men were the primary agents of migration, the women choose to accompany their spouses even though it meant giving up lucrative employment positions. While the women may have had little input on the decision to migrate as their husbands had accepted offers for work in South Africa, the choice to work in developed countries and earn a substantially higher income provided the opportunity to increase their social mobility in the home country upon their return. Sacrificing short term goals, such as family networks for long term ones, supports Butt’s (2014:8) view that migrants have a ‘wider range of choices’ and are making their decisions within ‘highly social personal spaces’, indicating strategic decision making on the side of the migrants.

5.2 Perceptions of South Africa
Many of the participants had a very narrow and naïve view of South Africa. Some were under the impression that South Africa was underdeveloped, with no proper infrastructure and animals roaming the streets, supporting the views of participants in Huynh’s et al. (2013) research. Their experiences have,
Social Cohesion among Skilled Migrant Indian Women

however, been to the contrary. Prior to Arya and her husband making the decision to come to South Africa, they enquired from expatriates working in the country about their views on South Africa and received positive feedback. In contrast, Chetna compared to Arya, had a very narrow view of life in South Africa. She imagined that animals were still roaming the streets and thought it was under-developed and lacking in proper infrastructure. It was quite a surprise for her to come to a modern, developed country with proper roads and infrastructure, unlike ‘the roads of India and poor driving habits of motorists there’.

Deepa was always keen to travel, but South Africa, as a destination, was not on her radar. When she searched the internet for information about South Africa, she found the commentary negative and very disconcerting. She says that when she came here, she realised that crime was not as bad as portrayed in the media; however one had to take necessary precautions. Chanda also had similar negative perceptions of South Africa. Her initial view was ‘oh South Africa, why not some other country?’ Her husband reassured her that, in fact, life in South Africa was quite similar to the USA and everything would be fine albeit the concerns about security. Chanda was anxious that the information technology sector was not as highly developed as the USA. She says: ‘I never thought that South Africa will be underdeveloped. I know that it is developing country and [now] compared to India it is much more developed’.

Settling In

Most of the participants in the study lived in the upmarket areas of the north of Johannesburg such as Sandton, Douglasdale, and Bryanston. In most cases the accommodation was organised by the company concerned. For the first two years of living in the complex, Arya and her family were the only Indian family living there. Speaking about the rest of its residents, she says: ‘everyone is fine, everyone is in their own world. We do not have any one-to-one interactions with anyone’. Although one resident did make an attempt; she was originally from Kenya (which has a large Indian population), but the common ancestry of having a Gujarati mother and a Greek father and the fact that she studied in Bombay, prompted this woman to reach out and make her acquaintance to Arya and her family. Otherwise, they were generally left to themselves until fellow Indian nationals working in the same company as her husband arrived. She mentioned that the Indian women, as a group, became quite friendly and used
to celebrate traditional Indian festivals such as *karwar chor* (a fast that Indian women undertake for their husbands). Another participant, Chetna, shares that in the complex they were staying in, had a number of local South African Indians residing there. There was, however, little contact between these groups. On the whole, there appears to be little contact between the participants and their neighbours. One participant explains ‘we don’t mingle; the neighbours don’t mingle so much’. While some participants explained they did know their neighbours, the amount of contact sounded fairly limited. Comments such as ‘we do, I mean I do know my neighbours, you know. We kinda say ‘hi, how are you?’’ show that while there is a level of friendliness there does not appear to be much contact beyond the occasional greeting. One woman went as far as saying that there was ‘absolutely no interaction’ between her and the neighbours and another explained ‘neighbours… we hardly meet neighbours because they always in[doors]’.

It was interesting to note that there appears to be more contact when the neighbours are Indian, whether these are South African nationals or Indian nationals. One participant explained: ‘Indians will be more inviting. They can invite you home more easily, compared to your next door neighbour who is white or black. From India, they would be more hospitable. I don’t know. It’s just human nature that we tend to attract towards the same race group you know’. The connection to Indian nationals appears to be stronger than to other people in the neighbourhoods. One woman even went so far as to link the presence of South African Indians to her feeling of home ‘Lenasia is the land of Indians so you feel a little more of being at home’. Comparing the interaction that people have with their neighbours in South Africa to neighbours in India one participant explained ‘no, in India it is overly social. There are times when you want your space and you don’t get it. You will definitely be friends with your neighbours or at least some communication’.

**Impeding Mobility**

One of the indicators of the breakdown of social cohesion is the fear of crime. Literature shows that the fear of crime can have an adverse impact on social cohesion (Jackson 2004; Roberts 2010). Many of the participants choose not to go out on their own during the day because they were forewarned about the high crime rates in the city. While the company does provide a pool car for use by the wives, this is done on a rotational basis. Arya said her husband had
cautioned her about walking on her own to the malls. Chetna says that while it is relatively safe to walk on the roads in India, here she was forbidden to walk alone to the mall, which she found very isolating. Deepa lives in Sandton which is in close proximity to places of work and leisure. Something unusual for her was the lack of people walking about, going about their daily tasks; this was in sharp contrast to Mumbai, which is bustling with the continuous movement of people. Chanda also laments the lack of freedom to move around by herself or even just to go out walking at night. India provides this kind of safety that is not easily found in South Africa.

Together with crime, the lack of a safe and reliable transport system impeded the mobility of the participants the most. These factors further hamper the integration of the participants and led to them withdrawing into personal networks and ethnic enclaves. The participants felt isolated in the neighbourhoods into which they had settled. There appears to be little contact between the participants and their neighbours, beyond perfunctionary formalities. While there was more contact and a willingness to interact with Indian nationals because of the similarity in language and background, there was some attempt to interact with South African Indians, but interaction across racial lines appeared limited. These findings are similar to Rugunanan’s (2016) view of insularity among migrant groups and Pillay (2008) also commented that communities showed ‘increased fragmentation’ rather than a tendency towards integration. The IDASA project on Social Cohesion (Williams n.d.) came to similar findings that living together in the same neighbourhoods does not result in integration, instead it requires a commitment to policies and programmes that involve the participation of both migrants and citizens in building a socially inclusive society.

5.3 A Sense of Inclusion

One of the ways of developing integration and feeling a sense of belonging to a country is by accessing food and condiments of the home country. Chetna says that she had difficulty adjusting to South African food and even the spices used by local South Africans Indians compared unfavourably with those found in the home country. Chetna visits Fordsburg, a popular suburb near Johannesburg, which has a large migrant population from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan (Rugunanan 2016). Merchants in the suburb source spices and products from these countries to cater to a growing South Asian migrant
community. Another popular place frequented for products from the home country is a previously designated ‘Indian’ area under the apartheid government, that is, Laudium based in Pretoria. Kavisha says that ‘you feel like you are in India and everything is available’. Kavisha is quite content with South Africa, saying that they had had little problems with regard to food, given the rise in the popularity of Indian restaurants. With the increase in Indian nationals making their way to South Africa post 1994, Kavisha states that one could have ‘real’ Indian food because the restaurant owner is from India, together with most of his staff. Kavisha’s experiences must be treated with caution as she has been living in South Africa for sixteen years; her husband is a successful business man with companies in South Africa and India, and thus her privileged position provides a different experience for her. Although Deepa strongly identifies with India as her home, some sense of familiarity abounds when she visits Durban and Lenasia, which has large settlements of South African Indian residents. Since 2000, streams of migrants from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan have chosen to settle in previously designated ‘Indian’ areas (Rugunanan 2016). Part of the familiarity is in accessing ‘Indian’ food which is readily found in these areas. In her words ‘when you go to other countries it is like a mission’. Even more exciting for her was the availability of both North and South Indian spices. She says that in some cities, particularly in North India, it is difficult to find South Indian spices, and similarly so in South India, where North Indian spices are scarce; but in the South African shops, one could easily find spices from both the regions of India.

Developing a sense of inclusion and integration into a country takes place when a sense of familiarity develops. This is especially relevant when familiar foods and spices of the home country can be found. Given that South Africa has a long standing historical relationship with India, and an established second and third generation South African Indian population, makes provision for traditional Indian herbs and spices. However, a sense of the familiar cannot replace the longing for home and family. Butt (2014) states that one of the most challenging aspects of migration is the loss of valued family networks. For these participants, a longing for home is exacerbated by the lack of family in South Africa. All of the participants expressed a strong longing for their family members left behind. This was even more acute during significant festivals indicating the importance of family networks for new migrant communities. Deepa says that while she misses India, the country she was born and raised in,
the void created by the absence of her family is even more heart rendering. This feeling is most acute during celebratory festivals, and especially so during the auspicious celebration of Diwali. Even close friendship networks cannot replace family during holidays and important festivals.

Veena shares similar sentiments of longing for her family back in the home country. She is adamant, however, that she cannot return home without her husband, saying ‘I am married, I have to be with my husband’. Although she would much rather prefer to return to India, she feels leaving him in South Africa would go against her values of tradition, custom and marriage. Veena does not have a sense of belonging to South Africa as she says: ‘It is not my country. Because my family is [in India], everything is there. So I miss India more’. Similar to Veena, Chetna corroborates that the absence of family members and relatives has left a gap that cannot be filled by her husband’s extended circle of friends, with whom they frequently socialise. The friendship circle cannot replace the familial affections that a family provides. Chetna is, however, committed to staying in South Africa because of her husband, and like Veena, feels that she does not have much choice in the matter. The pressure to conform to the heteronormative norms of marriage and motherhood among Indian women, places undue stress on the women to obey traditional practices, reinforcing the gendered hierarchies of power (Mahler & Pessar 200; Manohar 2013).

A sense of inclusion is also created when there is tolerance regarding differences, or what Jensen (1998) terms as acceptance/rejection by members in society. An overriding theme that kept appearing in the interviews is one of tolerance and friendliness. When the participants compared their experiences of South Africa to India, they found South Africans to be accommodating and more tolerant of each other. In India, there appears to be intense competition and those that do not have the requisite skills or language are made to feel excluded in society.

5.4 Tolerance for Others

Arya makes the significant comment that South Africans are ‘dramatically tolerant of different types of people. In India, people are not so tolerant. When I came here my son could not speak in English, at no point did his teachers make him feel uneasy. It’s not like that in India. If you go from one part [of the country] to another and you will become uneasy’. Even though she recognises
that different races in South Africa tend to socialise with their own groups and that even people from India ‘have their own thing in South Africa’, she still finds that people are very tolerant. Unlike in India, which she argues is not even a nation in the true sense of the word, it is one region, under one constitution, one government, but consists of ‘different languages, very different ethnicities and the differences are very, very vital’. While all of this gets brushed under ‘one country’, the tensions are real and manifest everywhere. For Arya, there is a distinct lack of tolerance in India, such that someone from a different region will be made to feel like an outsider, even within their own country.

Arya mentions that people are polite in South Africa and mindful of other people’s boundaries. Compared to India, people are not like that; they will intentionally step over boundaries to hurt other people’s feelings. This mindfulness was something that she appreciated about living in South Africa. Bhindu also finds South Africans tolerant, especially black people, whom she describes as ‘very nice persons’. She uses the taxi service regularly in Lenasia to and from her workplace and finds that ‘if you treat someone with respect, they will in turn respect you back’. This has been her experience in using public transport, in particular, the black taxi industry, alluding to Arya’s view that South Africans are very tolerant. Chetna reinforces this view by saying that South Africa is a welcoming country. She found it quite strange that her husband would greet the person manning the toll booth. She says ‘in India, you would not say hello to a strange person. Here everybody smiles at you and they say hello. Just say hello. That itself brings a smile to your face. I have never seen that in India’.

Kavisha also confirms the view of tolerance ‘the people have a lot of tolerance towards each other and it’s a good nation and they have harmony within themselves. So many races and groups of people are here. They learn each other’s culture and their way of living in harmony with each other. I don’t see any problem as you see it’. Most importantly, being in South Africa has taught her patience and to be tolerant of other races. It has also taught her the values of being kind, humble and gentle. Arya agrees that South Africa is a welcoming country; she says that there is no ‘insider’ ‘outsider’ feeling as in Australia, where tensions between local Australians and Indian nationals have increased. She mentions that many Indian students were attacked in Australia and were told not to speak in Hindi, their home language. South Africa, however, is tolerant of different languages. In contrast, Chetna relates that she
had a terrible experience whilst working under a white colleague who disrespected her and spoke ill of her in front of colleagues. This created a sense of distrust in Chetna towards white people.

The views of the participants resonated quite strongly with me. Viewing South Africans from the perspective of migrants and appreciating that, as a society, we are quite tolerant lends credence to creating a more socially inclusive and cohesive society. According to Struwig et al. (2013) tolerant societies are viewed as progressive and cohesive when there is little discrimination. South Africa is fraught with discrimination and yet these migrants perceive South Africans as being very tolerant. However, even though the participants viewed South Africans as very tolerant, the migrants preferred not to integrate into broader society. Many of the participants tended to be involved in ethnic associations or religious groups of the home country. They preferred to remain in ethnic groups where similarity of language and cultural practices provided a sense of familiarity for the women. The importance of social networks and the value and meaning these networks have for the women in providing a sense of social solidarity cannot be underestimated.

5.5 Voluntary Associations

Arya mentions that trying to describe the Indian national community is a misconception as the word ‘Indian’ alone is so large. The Indian nationals living here have their own separate associations and these are based on region as well, for example there is a Bengali Association, a Marathi Mandal and the Uthar Bhar Seva Samaj to name a few. But Arya also belongs to the company network associated with her husband’s work which, for example, assists with the organisation of employee’s children’s birthday parties or farewell parties for members returning to India. She also belongs to the ladies group in the complex they reside. Chetna belongs to a Kerala based church in Pretoria. Every three years a priest from the host church in Kerala will come and stay in South Africa. The priest travels around South Africa tending to his congregation in Cape Town, East London and Johannesburg. The priest also conducts services in the Malayalam language. The fact that a priest is brought in every three years attests to a growing concentration of migrants from Kerala in South Africa and the preservation of cultural and religious practices.

Chanda says she is part of a voluntary charity association called India
Care made up of Indian nationals who oversee the remodelling and development of schools. She says the organisation is run by people from India who are settled in South Africa, some for over 30 years. Sonal says that they are part of the Keralite community and estimates that they have over 500 members. She says they are spread across Southern Africa and from the north of Venda to South Africa. They are also found in Uganda, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia.

Arya mentions that although there are eight families in Johannesburg and five more in Pretoria, working for the same company, this does not imply a strong bonding between these members. On the contrary, there is a tension between these groups which seems to stem from the regions that each family originates. It, therefore, appears that tensions from the home country seem to follow the families into the destination countries. Bhindu concurred with the sentiments of Arya, saying that she prefers not to have friends or associations with Indian nationals as they were jealous of those that were making a living here. Thus she prefers to keep to herself and mind her own business. The reason for her reticence is that when she did assist in helping a fellow Indian national, the young woman ended up taking Bhindu’s job from her.

**5.6 Sense of Belonging to South Africa**

Time appears to influence the sense of belonging that participants have. For example Arya explained ‘last December when we were going back to India for our annual holiday, I [felt very strange]. I was feeling as if I am leaving my home and going somewhere. [Living in South Africa] for four years is quite a long time’. Although Chetna had been in South Africa for five years, she does not have a sense of belonging to South Africa. She explained ‘maybe it’s because [we] do not have relatives here. My husband’s parents also retired and moved back to India’. She further explained ‘we move around with my husband’s friends [quite a bit], but it is not the same as having your relatives or parents here’. Although Chetna indicates she that has a say in the decision to stay or return to India, her decision is ultimately guided by her husband’s preference.

For the participants who have only lived in South Africa for five years or less, the feeling of home appears to be quite different. Most of the participants wanted to return to India in the future. When asking them whether they planned to stay in South Africa or return to India many explained they
Social Cohesion among Skilled Migrant Indian Women

would return to India in the future. From comments such as ‘I am going back. [When] I have enough money [then] I will go home but I will not stay here’ it also becomes clear that economic reasons exist as to why these women (and/or their families) decided to leave India and come to South Africa. Upon asking one of the participants if they had any sense of belonging in South Africa she was quick to respond ‘no’. The reason for wanting to return home is linked to the theme of longing for family. She is not alone in mentioning the connection between home or belonging and family, supported by the view ‘because my family is there [in India], everything is there. So I miss India more’.

For those participants that have lived in South Africa for longer than nine years, Sonal developed a sense of belonging to South Africa, and says ‘I would officially say that my home country is South Africa, because I have grown up mostly here. I am very comfortable here even when I go to India, I feel like a foreigner because I have never really been brought up there’. While feeling a sense of belonging to South Africa, she also identifies with her home country, especially culturally, in the ‘ways we do things … respectful of the way we carry ourselves and the way we dress and the way we interact with people’ deriding the western influences on Indian people. Reshma was entertaining doubts about whether she still identifies with her home country. Living for almost ten years in South Africa, the hue of India has changed somewhat, ‘things have changed so much in India. It doesn’t even seem like it is the same India’. Having been married for almost ten years, she has spent the majority of her time in South Africa with her husband. She says ‘when you are married that is when your life changes first. Wherever you settle that feels more like your home’. She hopes to make South Africa her permanent home one day.

Chanda indicated that she still identified with India as her home country, but she also feels a sense of belonging to South Africa as she is earning money here and paying taxes, thus she feels some sort of belonging. She does not think that South Africa could ever be her home one day, as their plans were motivated by economic factors and they intend to migrate to another country before returning to settle in India at a later stage. Kavisha, having been in South Africa for sixteen years, says South Africa is a different nation since its population constitutes a significant proportion of second and third generation Indians. While she considers South Africa as her home and feels a sense of belonging to it, she is still building a house in Mumbai and will be travelling between the countries. As her husband’s company is currently operational in
South Africa, they prefer to be based here at the moment. Their movements to and fro are dictated by the economic needs of their business enterprises. The views of the participants varied in what constituted a sense of belonging to South Africa. The length of time is a determining factor in the lives of the migrants. The element of return migration and transnational migration are also themes that emanated from the participants and areas for future research.

6 Conclusions

This paper begins to touch on the extent to which migrant diversity impacts social cohesion in the South African context. This paper examined the views of skilled Indian migrant women who accompanied their spouses, who were working on temporary and permanent permits to South Africa. The study makes a contribution by focusing on skilled women migrants, largely ignored in the broader migration literature. The women, skilled in their own right, comply to heteronormative norms of marriage and motherhood, while navigating the terrain of a new, socially diverse country. Couched within the context of social cohesion, this paper explored their reasons for migrating to South Africa, their experiences of settling in and to understand how migrant communities felt a sense of belonging and ‘fit’ in socially and culturally diverse contexts in South Africa.

The definition for social cohesion for this study includes factors such as a sense of belonging, participation, inclusion, recognition and legitimacy (Jenson 1998). The participants of this study, while feeling some sense of belonging to the country, also preferred not to participate in the broader society. When they choose to participate, they did so within the safety of their ethnic groups. Language, culture and a fear of crime were some of the determinants that impeded trust and full participation in society. The participants were, however, unanimous about how tolerant South Africans were and basic social factors like acknowledging and greeting people made an impression on them. Migrants view South Africans as socially cohesive when comparing their experiences to life back in India. The participants also preferred to volunteer and participate within their ethnic organisations, be it religious, cultural or even contributing to nation building in South Africa. Participants mentioned that these organisations were divided regionally and sometimes the tensions of the home country impacted on associations in South Africa and could affect broader integration into society. Overall, the migrant
Social Cohesion among Skilled Migrant Indian Women

communities seemed to ‘hunker down’ and remain within their ethnic circle to ease the longing for home and find a ‘fit’ within their communities. This however, impedes their integration into the broader society and creates a sense of distrust towards them. However, migrants working and living longer than five years in South Africa begin to develop a sense of belonging and legitimacy to the country.

The role of Indian migrant communities is under-researched within the South African context. The experiences of skilled and semi-skilled migrant women are even more under-researched in the broader migration literature. Once married, the women succumb to traditional cultural practices of regarding the male as the head of the household. Although it appears that the women have little choice in the decision to migrate and forsake lucrative employment, they choose to follow their husbands to South Africa. The women are, however, not averse to temporarily migrating if this will increase their social mobility back in the home country. Thus, migration is not simply a rational economic decision made by one person; it is a purposeful strategic economic decision made by both spouses based on the economic well-being of their long term future. The theme of return migration emanating from the participants is an indicator of their strategic choices in the decision to migrate.

References
Pragna Rugunanan


Mani, S. 2009. High Skilled Migration from India: An Analysis of its Economic Implications. Centre for Development Studies (CDS). Available at:


Williams, V. n.d. Migration and Social Cohesion. South Africa: IDASA and SAMP.


Pragna Rugunanan
Department of Sociology
University of Johannesburg
prugunanan@uj.ac.za
Revisiting Grey Street: The Grey Street Writers Trail in the Context of Urban Regeneration

Bettina Pahlen
Lindy Stiebel

Abstract
This paper emerges from joint research by scholars in South Africa and Germany on a literary trail devised in 2006 by the research project KwaZulu-Natal Literary Tourism. This urban trail, set in a historically Indian-occupied area of Durban, highlights writers who lived in and wrote about it. Coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the Grey Street Writers’ Trail in 2015, the literary trail was the focus of an MA dissertation by Bettina Pahlen on the relationship between the literature trail and ongoing urban renewal activity in the quarter.

The research suggests that the Grey Street Writers trail represents a narrative of what trail designers, guides and authors consider meaningful about a place. Participant's engagement with this trail narrative shows its potential to change the perception of the area under regeneration. Informed by the work of Michel de Certeau (walking the city), Hubert Zapf (literature as cultural ecology), Throgmorton (storytelling in urban planning) and Edward Relph (placemaking, sense of place), this paper investigates factors limiting the trail’s contribution to urban regeneration in the Casbah. The questions asked by this paper is first, how the literary trail draws on and is impacted by experiences of urban renewal, and secondly, how the influence of the literary trail narrative on trail participants is limited by design and modified during implementation.

Keywords: cultural heritage, literary trail, urban renewal, Grey Street, Durban
Revisiting Grey Street
This paper draws on research led by Lindy Stiebel at KZN Literary Tourism and field research done by Bettina Pahlen between June and August 2015 for a Masters thesis (MA Urban Culture, Society and Space) at the University of Duisburg-Essen on the Grey Street Writers trail in Durban, South Africa. This literary heritage trail (see http://www.literarytourism.co.za) was set up by the KZN Literary Tourism research project in 2006. Research on literary heritage trails, as a transdisciplinary area of study, draws on theory from the fields of literary and cultural studies, urban sociology, urban design, social psychology, planning, architecture, archaeology, history and philosophy. The research done may inform the development of participatory spatial knowledge models, community building, placemaking, urban regeneration and tourism.

Literary Trails as Planning Narratives and their Meaning for Regeneration Efforts
The purpose of a process of structured viewing in urban planning is the creation of a meaningful vision of how a place could be in the future (cf. Throgmorton

1 KZN Literary Tourism is an academic research project led, since 2002, by Lindy Stiebel, Professor emeritus within the English Department of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Receiving a five-year grant from the National Research Foundation, the project's objectives were to create a database of writers, to produce a ‘literary tourist map of the province’ and ‘documentary films on selected, representative writers aimed at literature students and literary tourists alike’ (Stiebel 2004). The result was a website on which the research database was presented and linked to an interactive map. At the time of writing, KZN Literary Tourism continues to be run for the purpose of academic research (cf. Interview Stiebel L. 2015) with the various trails running on request. The KZN Literary Tourism project remains an academic research project and continues to provide a platform for research on writers and literary trails in KwaZulu-Natal. In the recent past, the Grey Street Writers trail was run as part of this project (cf. interview Stiebel), mainly for University of KwaZulu-Natal students studying literary tourism, and also for adult education groups, such as the Jewish Adult Education group Limmud, for small conference groups and occasional tourists who find the tour online.
The Grey Street Writers Trail in the Context of Urban Regeneration

2003, 127). The planning story is only successful as far as elements and argumentation of the proposal resonate with stakeholders’ perceptions. Allowing distinct points of view to inform the planning story increases the chances that potential dissonances will be within limits of what is considered acceptable deviation from the norm. The vision therefore should be informed by a range of perspectives for it to be acceptable to stakeholders. Planners have to adopt distinct points of view and draw upon the imagery and rhythm of language [in combination with planning tools] to express a preferred attitude toward the situation and its characters (Ibid).

As a type of ‘planning story’, a literary trail can be said to ‘unavoidably shape the [stakeholder]’s attention’ (Throgmorton 2003: 127) in a normative way. The initial process of selection in the design and implementation of the literary trails a normative potential, as much as the perspectives informing the ‘literary trail’ or ‘planning story’ as presented and perceived on the ground. Literary trails can contribute to generative development plans in the process of formulating a vision of what should be regenerated, providing a vision at least partially based on what has been perceived by trail designers and authors and guides (themselves partially reflecting sentiments of their social networks) as characteristic, meaningful and valuable about the Grey Street Casbah.

In general, three main perspectives, shaped by the type of research done and methodology, inform the trail’s representation of the Grey Street Casbah. First, the trail is a result of what the designers of the trail considered to be meaningful in literature connected to the area. Second, the excerpts of literature presented on the Grey Street Writers trail draw attention to what makes places meaningful in the eyes of the writers. Third, the delivery of the trail design by the trail guide gives further insight into what is considered meaningful, taking into account trail design, client’s interests and the daily changing urban context.

However, even the resulting imaginary shaped by these three dominant perspectives may not necessarily be the imaginary perceived by individual participants. Prior knowledge and the degree of resonance between trail and personal imaginaries and acceptability of dissonances. Prior knowledge may be drawn, for example, from encyclopaedias, pictures, books, newspapers or hearsay, which is remembered during the experience of a site visit. The immediacy of street life perceived and the narratives are filtered through and
compared with the existing layers of webs of previously accumulated and interlinked information. The purpose of this filtering process on the part of the participant is, however, to confirm prior knowledge, and not necessarily reconfigure it (cf. Mann 1997).

The success of the ‘planning story’ of the Grey Street Writers trail strongly depends on the ability of the trail to mediate, to explain and to guide perception and interpretation of experiences with regard to negotiating the strength and number of dissonances between the prior knowledge of participants and the newly perceived narrative of the trail. The acceptability of new imaginaries is possibly increased further by allowing for the opportunity to validate stories and gain experience through interaction with and exposure to the environment quasi independently. Dissonances within the realm of acceptability have the potential to modify the participant’s preformed imaginaries of a place to a certain extent; to ‘push the envelope’.

Urban culture may be defined as the,

artistic, performative, literary or medial cultural expression, with a use of semiotic resources in urban contexts […] that can be seen to react to key urban challenges but also actively […] shapes] perceptions and thus [can also be seen as] socially productive (Gurr in Szczekall 2010: 245).

This ‘socially productive’ momentum can be used as a resource to inform plans of action by architects, urban designers, and the community of stakeholders of a place. To analyse the effect and structure of this expression of urban culture - the guided, area-based literary trail - the concept of mediacy provides a suitable framework to analyse the impact of constituent parameters of the Grey Street Writers trail on participants. The theoretical framework is put to work on the literary trail and how it may modify the perception of the Casbah.

**Grey Street Writers amid Regeneration Projects**
The Warwick Junction Precinct (white circle), in which the Grey Street Casbah (white polygon) is located continues to be generally perceived as a territory lacking safety despite ongoing regeneration efforts since the end of apartheid, when laws prohibiting free movement of people through urban spaces were
abolished. This structural and legal change created great uncertainty in the population and the municipality as to people’s right to access city spaces they had previously frequented, or had been prohibited from entering, such as the markets around Durban’s central business district. Architect Jonathan Edkins recalls ‘There was a great sense of “Do I belong in this space, is it for me? [...] Am I allowed to use it? Is it safe?”’ (Interview Edkins 2015). Socio-economic spaces (street stalls and shops) became contested, initially violently as the municipality grappled with the question of how to approach their management differently. Since then, suitable approaches were developed (cf. Interview Edkins, J. 2015) and the historic buildings, streets, pavements and markets largely re-appropriated by symbiotic networks of ‘informal’ (e.g. street vendors, cardboard collectors, car washers, trolley pushers) and ‘formal’ economies (e.g. shop owners), which contextualize the Grey Street Writers trail.

The Grey Street Writers\(^2\) literary trail (red line: the path taken during the examined trail run), is the first of the walking trails created by KZN Literary Tourism. In terms of location for an area-based walking trail, research indicated that

\(^2\) Created in cooperation with Niall McNulty, for some years Stiebel’s research assistant. It was the first area-based walking trail of a series of area-based literary trails.
Grey Street was a good [choice] because, it’s walkable, and there is a whole cluster of writers that were associated historically with that area (Interview Stiebel 2015).

When planning the trail KZN Literary Tourism
demarcated quite a tight space, taking in much of the main social and political sites […], certainly those that are linked to our writers (Ibid).

Grey Street (yellow line on map), officially renamed Dr. Yusuf Dadoo Street, lies within the ‘Warwick Junction Precinct’ (Rosenberg et al. 2013, red and white circles on map) and has historically strong connections to other streets of this precinct. Commonly, the name ‘Grey Street’ is seen to identify an entire area ‘much bigger than just the main street that runs through it’ (Interview Stiebel 2015), and is referred to as the Grey Street Casbah (cf. Interviews Madressa Arcade 2015, white dotted polygon on map).

The literary trail is constructed around the engagement of selected writers with experiences of living in the Casbah. It features selected works by Phyllis Naidoo, Dr Goonam, Fatima Meer, Aziz Hassim, Mariam Akabor, Ravi Govender and Imraan Coovadia, who write based on socio-economic realities, as well as of experiences of resistance movements against socio-economic segregation, indentured labour and apartheid laws. A major focus of ongoing regeneration efforts in the precinct is the informal service and retail sector with its strategic transport and shopping hub along Warwick Avenue, reaching into the neighbouring Grey Street, Beatrice Street and AK Mansion areas in the east, the Duchene and the DUT campus area in the west. By providing structured insight into aspects of an area under regeneration and deemed meaningful in the past and present, the Grey Street Writers trail carries the potential to mediate and change preconceived urban imaginaries associated with this area, making the trail potentially relevant to regeneration efforts.

Post-apartheid Urban Regeneration of Grey Street and Sense of Place
The contemporary pattern of urban regeneration in Durban’s Central Business District started with the building of the International Convention Centre in the
The Grey Street Writers Trail in the Context of Urban Regeneration

early nineties. The experience gathered there in community-led generative planning led to the founding of ITRUMP and subsequently informed work being done on the ‘Warwick, Grey Street and Albert Park’ area. The approach proved very successful for Warwick. However, efforts in Grey Street and Albert Park were hampered by several post-apartheid infrastructure developments, as well as changes in political leadership and the style of urban management of the municipality around 2005 in the lead up to the 2010 World Cup. Edkins explains that ‘Grey Street was seen as part of the [same designated planning] area, but it has a distinct character. […] Experiencing Grey Street was not the same as the experience around [Warwick] station’ (Interview Edkins 2015), reasons for which can be found in the Casbah’s history.

The Indian community in Durban, dating back to the British system of indentured labour, invested substantial amounts of money and effort into building educational facilities to serve their population on the north-western side of the railway tracks (cf. Rosenberg et al. 2013, 35). In time, the Grey Street Casbah, a result of racialized spatial constraints, first of legalized segregation and then systematic apartheid policy, was the most concentrated Indian commercial area in South Africa. A strong relationship between the more mixed-residential and business-centred eastern side of the railway tracks (Grey Street and Beatrice Street areas, also known as the Casbah) and the more residential and educational western side of the railway tracks, was literally built, connected via the markets (cf. Rosenberg et al. 2013: 130-156).

In the 1960s, the Grey Street Casbah was recognised to lie within the borders of Albert Street, the Railways Reserve, West Street, Broad Street, Pine Street, Grey Street, Commercial Road, Warwick Avenue and Mitchell Road (cf. Rosenberg et al. 2013: 35).

Of the 418 properties in this area, 95% were Indian-owned and 97 percent Indian occupied, comprising 130 light industries, 90 wholesalers, 30 restaurants, six luxury cinemas, 125 professionals (mostly doctors and attorneys), a Technical College, churches, a temple, mosques and the Victoria Street Market with 300 Indian stalls (Rosenberg et al. 2013: 35).
Lying at its heart,

The old, traditional Grey Street area was characterized by jewellery makers, goldsmiths living above their businesses [in] very small buildings and offices, very high value. Making good incomes. A little enclave the way the cities probably should work (Interview Edkins 2015).

In 1969 the Department of Planning began to consider re-zoning the area to ‘White’, a process which would last twenty years. While these plans met with broad resistance, they had already substantially changed the character of the area. The long period of uncertainty had severely inhibited investments in infrastructure maintenance and probably initiated the slow deterioration of the area. In 1973 the area was still designated Indian, but for commercial use only, meaning ‘12 000 residents had to vacate the area’ (Rosenberg et al. 2013: 35). The disintegration accelerated in the early nineties, when substantial ‘changes to the road system’ (Interview Edkins 2015) were made (cf. Rosenberg et al. 2013: 35). The construction of an additional bridge, a widening of streets - making a large number of them one-way, and ‘the introduction of the bus depots in that area [meant] streets which had been peopled streets [were not trafficked as much as they had been before] while others were trafficked to such an extent [that the remaining] little enclaves couldn’t survive. […] People actually didn’t want to live in that kind of environment’ (Interview Edkins 2015). Many people who had the money moved to other areas of Durban (cf. Ibid). The integrity of that environment depended on ‘very delicate relationships between people, their work, their modes of transport, the street, the schools, all of those things which were there. Once you pull one of them out there’s an imbalance’ (Ibid).

Prior to the FIFA World Cup 2010, the deteriorating precinct became the target of commercial and political speculation that would further impact upon the informal sector, the urban heritage of the area, as well as housing through plans for a new mall on the site of the Early Morning Market and Berea Station, latter of which borders on the Grey Street Casbah and can be seen on the trail from a distance. ‘The development of this new mall […] was] pushed hard by the city manager. […] It was projected that this was for the better of the people on the ground’ (Interview Edkins 2015). The strategy involved ‘[…] traders in the Early Morning Market […] being characterized as ‘Indian’ and a
minority who were running the show, stopping progress which would benefit the street traders and commuters [....] subjecting [black traders] to poverty’ (Ibid). The picture was polemical, oversimplified, but politically useful. Extensive resistance by businesses, market vendors, architects and urban planners alike led to the suspension of plans for the mall.

Currently, a new plan for a mall in the area bears an acute problem, identified by Edkins, in that it ‘affects the Badsha Peer area [....] the whole roofed area’ (Interview Edkins 2015). The Badsha Peer shrine is dedicated to Durban’s most important Islamic saint and is located on Durban’s oldest cemetery, across the road from the Mosque and the Cathedral next to Berea Station. The roofed space between the station and the cemetery where the shrine is located,

used to be a road. Richard [Dobson (ITRUMP; Asiye eTafuleni)] was responsible for the roofing [.... and for the] negotiations which led to it being shared: Once a year it’s cleared for the ceremony and the rest of the year they use the area to benefit the local population [as a marketplace] (Ibid).

While everything is being done by the architect involved to accommodate the existing system of formal and informal economies, Edkins fears that once the new plans for the mall become public, there will be resistance. Another factor inhibiting regeneration efforts is the lack of potent heritage protection laws protecting areas and buildings of heritage value: the constellation of decaying buildings in the inner city and the general shortage of affordable housing is resulting in unused or condemned buildings are occupied illegally (cf. Interview Edkins 2015). Finally, the northern edge of Durban’s bay will be regenerated based on ecological principles with the aim of reconnecting the inner city with the bay, and bringing the beachfront into the inner city (cf. Interview Edkins 2015), which is hoped to encourage people to go shopping in the Casbah.

Within this context of contestation, memories of the quality of life before and during these profound changes to society and the urban infrastructure, together with experiences of contesting approaches to regeneration (infrastructure-led versus socio-ecological) may explain the number of writers who have chosen to write nostalgically (but also critically) about the 1950s-60s Grey Street (Hassim & Govender), or a younger
generation of authors (Akabor & Coovadia) that has more recently tried to trace the remaining elements of that earlier time in today’s setting. Similarly, the history and spirit of resistance movements that characterized the area inspired another set of authors to write less nostalgic political non-fiction (Meer & Naidoo), which is of relevance again in the midst of current challenges to the regenerating socio-economic fabric of the Casbah.

**Urban Regeneration and the Development of a Critical Sense of Place**

The greatest potential for the Grey Street area, according to Architect Jonathan Edkins, is to regenerate is as an area of character, to try and build on the current potential of the lanes, the small spaces and markets which give it a real sense of place. Sense of place is crucial for understanding how literary trails carry the potential to transform perceptions and contribute to urban regeneration by addressing perceived safety concerns associated with visiting the Casbah. According to Edward Relph, sense of place is commonly understood to be ‘an intersubjective feeling, an innate faculty [for distinguishing and appreciating places … that pulls together and arranges information from the senses of sight, smell, touch, hearing, and also calls on memory and imagination… and] ‘is possessed in some degree by everyone and recognizable to others who live elsewhere’ (Relph, http://www.placeness.com/sense-of-place-an-overview/). This innate ability to sense place, can be enhanced through critical attention to what makes places distinctive, how they have changed and how they might be changed. As a critical approach to an appreciation of the distinctive personalities of different environments, the critical enhancement of sense of place is an aspect of education in Geography, Architecture, Landscape Architecture, and Urban Design (Relph http://www.placeness.com/sense-of-place-an-overview/).

A literary trail is one of many ways to draw attention to the distinctiveness of the Casbah as it is and was, the progress made in regenerating the area, providing insight into challenges being tackled, thereby contributing to balancing perceptions of the place.
The process of altering a bad reputation of an area for the better is a slow one. It generally demands that many people are given the opportunity to repeatedly gather positive experiences in interaction with people and places within the regenerating context (cf. Mann 1997: 195). This includes the opportunity to reflect upon these experiences within the context, as part of a group, with added information and a professional guide (cf. Ibid 191-198). This allows for engagement with the environment necessary to enhance people’s ability to develop a more critical sense place (cf. Relph) through a relational exploration of the Casbah (cf. De Certeau). Taking people into regenerating areas and walking, sitting and talking with people without occasioning negative experiences is a first, often most sensitive, step in the process. A literary trail, such as the examined Grey Street Writers trail, could be a way to overcome the initial hurdle to addressing the negative attitudes towards the Casbah.

Prerequisites for such a literary trail are already existing: a relatively safe regenerating urban environment, a body of literature connected to the place, research on the connection between place, literature, authors and history, trained guides, as well as tourists, such as literary heritage enthusiasts, or simply the curious. The group setting potentially decreases apprehensions felt, creating a sense of group cohesion and ‘safety in numbers’. In a group containing people accustomed to the environment, as well as those new to it - as will be shown in the trail run examined in this article - the more familiar contribute to the mediation done by the tour guide and moderate spontaneous reactions to unfamiliar impressions by explanation and example. The social status and reputation of the guide within the community (or shopping precinct) being toured is of vital to the success of the trail, as this influences the interaction with shop-keepers and street vendors, as much as the degree to which the trail’s presence is at least tolerated by the people living and working in the Casbah.

**Literary Functions of the Grey Street Writers Trail**
The Grey Street Writers trail provides an opportunity to visit a place linked to the Indian diasporic experience, using literature as a lens. The trail,

in essence links such sites together and is inevitably a construct: in
effect a strung-together narrative linking places sequentially in an environment which may in fact have had a far less seamless coexistence with the writer (Stiebel 2010: 6).

Making reference to Robinson and Andersen, there is ‘a desire in trails’ for a sequence that makes ‘sense’: [T]he tourist trail gives order (often an artificial order) to a sequence of locations, which are selected for inclusion in the trail because together they will make sense, form a whole (Ibid).

The construction of the ‘sense’ or meaningfulness of a literary trail results from a planning process that entails the identification and construction of links between writers, writings and place - physically and on the level of content. Planned stops along the trail, filled with historical or literary input, combined with the sensory input of walking or driving inform and guide the process. As observed during the trail run, a group of trail participants provides the opportunity to talk or think about events with the guide and other members of the group as they are experienced, thereby immediately gaining a more nuanced understanding of what is perceived. Understanding generally increases familiarity, sharpens the ability to interpret the actions and events in the urban surroundings, thus providing visitors the opportunity to gain a new sense of orientation and belonging in the city. In this respect, the focus on the preservation of authenticity is a strength of the Grey Street Writers trail, enabling visitors the chance to compare the narrated sense of a place with what they experience in the present.

This process can be likened to an urban designer’s processes of analysis and synthesis: drawing connections between fragments of knowledge gleaned from interviews, workshops, visits to archives, as much as locations marked on a map. One category of information per map layer structures the information gathered. Superimposing layers in any particular sequence allows the planner to experiment with a variety of viewing patterns and thus become aware of specific connections between layers that need to be viewed in a certain sequence and combination to make sense. This so-called ‘structured viewing’ which the trail then exposes the participants to, enables a purposeful association of meaningful elements. This part of the planning process stands at the beginning of the creation of a literary trail and may be termed
‘emplotment’, a constitutive part of placemaking (cf. Project for Public Spaces), if one understands ‘place’ as ‘space to which meaning has been attached’ (Carter 1994). The underlying argumentative reasoning for a certain sequence may be referred to as the planner’s ‘story’ (cf. Throgmorton 2003: 127; Meyer 2008: 60). Both are constitutive parts of a planner’s narrative, the narrative here being the Grey Street Writers trail.

**Literary Trail Mediacy and its Transformative Potential**

Drawing on the concepts of space and Michel de Certeau’s relational understanding of the city and the agency of people in the concept of ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’, Gurr proposes the ‘relational category of mediacy as an additional heuristic tool for the systematization of urban cultural practices’ (Gurr in Szczechall 2010: 246).

Among the many possible factors influencing mediacy, the mode of transport chosen to physically move from one place to the next along the trail is the most powerful. The experience of driving a car through a part of the city is very different from walking the route. The car are shields from the elements. Exposure to sensory stimulants multiplies as soon as one steps out of the car. The speed at which you move through space impacts the amount of information your senses can access. Alexander Schmidt mentions that ‘When walking, a substantially greater amount of minute details are perceived, compared to travelling at 25 km/h, with the bicycle or 50 km/h or 100 km/h with the car’ (Bucksch & Schneider 2014: 304-305, own translation).

Just as driving, walking is a ‘process of appropriation of the topographical system’ (Bridge & Watson 2002: 386). If one understands place, as defined by Carter et al. (1993: xii), as ‘space to which meaning has been ascribed’, then walking is a relational act of physically ascribing meaning to space. De Certeau (1980), speaks of walking as ‘a space of enunciation’ (in Bridge and Watson (2002: 387) a term which allows for the articulation of meaning based on spatial relations between walker and physical infrastructure, making walking a ‘spatial acting-out of the place’ (Ibid). As a walker, you introduce yourself as a new spatial point of reference and as one moves, one constantly reconfigures the properties and dimensions. This ‘implies [logical/causal] relations among differentiated positions, that is, among pragmatic ‘contracts’ in the form of movements’ (Bridge & Watson 2002: 386-
Walking is thus understood to be a creative act, changing the perceived configuration of the perceived meaning or ‘sense’ of the place. This relational understanding of space and place is key to the concept of mediacy (cf. Gurr 2010) and placemaking.

Walkability refers to the extent to which this space can be appropriated or ‘articulated’ by any given pedestrian. Immediately obvious is that higher levels of mediacy can be achieved by car than on foot, but that there is a level of intersection between the highest levels of mediacy on foot and the lowest levels of mediacy by car. Regarding elevation, at the Nicol Square parkade where the trail has a stop, participants were not at street level, but physically removed by elevation from direct immersion in street-life. A category for distance above ground thus needed to be introduced, since the distancing effect of elevation, which is similar to that in the car, is of a distinctly different quality due to the changed vantage point.

Important to note is that there is a continuum between mediacy and immediacy, and that these levels change from person to person depending on prior knowledge and general interest in literature and history compared to street life. Further modifying factors may be the quality of delivery of literature readings, choice and length of readings. Due to the higher level of symbolism of literary excerpts, the level of defamiliarization is higher that with reports of historical facts. A high level of mental mediacy might be achieved by perceiving a story that allows the audience to imagine, to create pictures of actions and events being narrated on the basis of preformed experiences and knowledge.

Mediacy is described as the level of direct ‘confrontation of geometrically exact and technologically functional forms with the human body and to re-semanticize and re-perspectivize the urban space through the contrast of living and ‘non-living’ built environment’ (cf. Gurr 2010: 370, own translation), as done, for example, with specific urban sports such as ‘[p]arcours’ (Ibid 370). These make unmitigated use of physical structures, physically confront, question and probe the properties, possibilities and boundaries of architecture, which for our purposes represents a mediacy of zero.

The level of mediacy on the trail generally does not drop to this level because walking and interaction on the trail implies the introduction of intermediaries (physical, cognitive), which interferes with the direct exposure to the environment and can be achieved through increasing the physical
distance (proximity, exposure modified by mode of transport), cognitive input (readings, interactions within the group and with people outside) distracting from the individual sensory perception of the environment. A guide to the abbreviations and its effect of the mediacy graph of the trail is shown by the tables below\(^3\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIE-Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>M-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FNG</td>
<td>foot-none-ground</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNA</td>
<td>foot-none-above</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGG</td>
<td>foot-general-ground</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGA</td>
<td>foot-general-above</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>foot-reading-ground</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.FRA</td>
<td>foot-reading-above</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNG</td>
<td>bicycle-none-ground</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNA</td>
<td>bicycle-none-above</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGG</td>
<td>bicycle-general-ground</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGA</td>
<td>bicycle-general-above</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRG</td>
<td>bicycle-reading-ground</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.BRA</td>
<td>bicycle-reading-above</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNG</td>
<td>car-none-ground</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>car-none-above</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGG</td>
<td>car-general-ground</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGA</td>
<td>car-general-above</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRG</td>
<td>car-reading-ground</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.CRA</td>
<td>car-reading-above</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediacy Value</th>
<th>Transport mode</th>
<th>Information type</th>
<th>Elevation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>car</td>
<td>reading (art)</td>
<td>above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>bicycle</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>foot</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>.-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model of Trail Mediacy Parameters: transport mode, information type and elevation above ground (Data and Graph: Pahlen 2015)

The model developed for estimating the levels of mediacy during the literary trail experience primarily focused on the mode of transport chosen (T), the type

---

\(^3\) While the Grey Street Writers trail did not make use of bicycles, this mode of transport has been included in the graph below to demonstrate that an intermediate level of mediacy can be achieved and emphasize the intersection between levels of mediacy on foot and by car.
of information provided (I) and elevation (E) in relation to ground level, based on theoretical insights. The resulting cumulated value was called the Mediacy Value (M) of a specific stop on the trail. The model proves useful for the explanation of the dynamics of a trail’s functions to further differentiate mediacy, extending the concept beyond the physical, to include social and mental forms of reconfiguring one’s knowledge and definition of a place.

Moments of low mediacy enable first-hand insight into the socio-economic importance of the way numerous (in-)formal networks function together and the specific sense of place. Moments of high mediacy provide room for reflection, informed by literature, historical facts or observant conversation. This theoretically allows for creativity and restructuring of preconceptions with what has just been experienced⁴.

**Analysis of the Grey Street Writers Trail**

To investigate the catalytic potential of the Grey Street Writers trail, the effect of modes of transport and the parameter of elevation in cultural practices will be examined with regard to its effect on participants. While the Grey Street Writers trail can itself be regarded as such an urban cultural practice, created and it is embedded in Durban’s urban environment, the Casbah, itself teeming with cultural practices that provide contemporary points of reference for the trail’s literary content, inspired by past specificities of the place. The map below provides an overview of the trail run.

Overall, the trail leads through the busiest parts of the Casbah, changing from car-based to pedestrian mode of travel. The majority of stops were covered on foot, with few readings in the midst of street-life. Most readings took place in the car, or generally in enclosed spaces where it was generally quieter and the group of around ten would be less of a disruption to businesses. In two cases the guide added a stop to the trail, to show what she perceived as relevant for a more balanced perception of the contemporary Casbah in relation to literature.

⁴ Also see work by Joy Sather-Wagstaff ‘Making Polysense of the world’ in Heritage, Affect and Emotion: Politics, Practices and Infrastructures, 1/7/2016.
The Grey Street Writers Trail in the Context of Urban Regeneration

The graph below offers the visualisation of the mediacy of the trail run, followed by a detailed account of how these values were derived from the trail experience informed by theoretical considerations and examples from literature that informs the readings.

The beginning to the Grey Street Trail experience was in the main parking-lot of the Memorial Tower Building at the Howard College of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (FNG 1). Participants were greeted by Shiney Bright, the accredited guide. Ms Bright pointed out features of the trail on the pamphlet, especially the route that would be taken, referring to the map on the trail pamphlet and the writers (FGG2). The trail pamphlet follows the same design format as the others developed by KZN Literary Tourism: in appearance, the desired look is that of a book dustjacket with ‘typewriter’ lettering, running red dots like ellipses, further reading suggested on the back,

---

5 The M-value in the graph is shown in red and black to differentiate the phases of the trail done on foot and within the car.
a map of the stops, and contact details supplied plus sponsors’ logos. The cover photograph of a Grey Street scene in the 1960s in sepia captures a bygone moment and signals both that this trail is a heritage project, and also that it is this version of Grey Street to which nearly all the selected writers nostalgically or otherwise return in their writing. The trail pamphlet is divided into three sections in common with all the other trails developed – short biographies of selected writers, a brief history of the area, and then places to visit on the walking tour.

As the mode of transport changed from foot to car, the level of mediacy increased to (CNG 3), the lowest level of mediacy for the private transport. Public transport would have modified the level of mediacy as it would imply more direct contact with people going about their daily business and not part of the literary trail group, lowering mediacy to that of a pedestrian. The route taken from the university to Grey Street avoided the use of the fly-overs,
The Grey Street Writers Trail in the Context of Urban Regeneration

driving along Old Dutch Road, ML Sultan Road, onto Mitchel Road and entering Dr Yusuf Dadoo Street (New name of Grey Street) from the north. The factor of elevation was low throughout this approach, and the general level of mediacy was CNG 3. On the way, Ms Bright drew attention to sites of interest, such as the ML Sultan College (DUT) and St. Anthony’s Church, increasing the level of mediacy to CGG 4 at these points in time.

Turning into the northern end of Grey Street, the first stop was the former Thokoza Women’s Hostel, where a brief introduction was made concerning the history of the hostel (CGG 4) and an excerpt of Mariam Akabor’s novel Flat 9 was read with reference to A.K. Mansions as this part of Grey Street has a number of apartment buildings (CRG 5). At this and the next three stops, all participants and Ms Bright remained seated in the car. Between stops the level of mediacy dropped back to CNG 3.

The second stop was two streets down in front of the Methodist Church, looking at the building of the old Shah Jehan cinema, with a reading from Ravi Govender’s Down Memory Lane relating to the Shah Jehan (CRG 5). The story was first contextualized by the history of the high number of cinemas in the area at one point and the outstanding recreational and social role they played (CGG 4). The contextualization increased mediacy to 4, while the literature reading further increased it to 5.

At the third stop, buildings of interest, such as the Indian Art Deco buildings and the characteristic colonnades of the buildings in the Grey Street area (CGG4) were pointed our and a reading given from Mariam Akabor’s Flat 9 relating to the imaginary place of the corner shop café (CRG 5). From there the group was driven down Grey Street to the Nicol Square parkade. On the way, participants had time to speak amongst themselves, take pictures or ask questions relating to the streets, buildings and people they were seeing along Grey Street. Mediacy varied between 3 and 4.

Upon arriving at Nicol Square parkade, the mini-bus was driven to the second storey and parked on the western side, which offers an elevated view of Grey Street (CNA 4) and echoes observations by De Certeau of the ordering effect of perceiving the city from above. Remaining seated in the car, Ms Bright drew attention to the fact that the parkade stood on the site of what was dubbed ‘Red Square’, a site of numerous demonstrations against Apartheid legislation (CGA 5). Still seated in the car, an excerpt was read from Fatima Meer’s book Passive Resistance related directly to Red Square, which increased mediacy to 6 (CRA), the highest level of mediacy. Similar accounts
are given as the group proceeds on foot, the pause in readings and the change in transport lowering the general level of mediacy to FNG 2, still on the second level of the parkade. From the vantage point offered, the southern border of Grey Street was pointed out by Ms Bright, which passed south of the Nicol Square parkade. Attention was drawn to architectural features of buildings on either side of the parkade and the fact that arcades exist, allowing pedestrians to pass through the building blocks almost up to the railway tracks in the north of the Casbah, increasing mediacy to FGA 3. Street life, consisting of pedestrians and street vendors as much as flows of cars alternating with pedestrians at crossings could be observed and participants had a clear view of the Juma Masjid, the Ajmeri and Madressa Arcades, the Congress Hall, Emmanuel Cathedral as well as the fly-overs or bridges leading the highway into the central business district (FNA 2). At these occasions, the trail itself remembers the past and confronts the present, literally. Stops within sight of the Nicol Square parkade situated on the location of Red Square are landmarks of anti-apartheid struggle together with the Congress Hall bought by Gandhi and where the NIC held its meetings; the Madressa Arcade built in 1927 is still lined with little shops whose wares spill onto the pavement; and the Emmanuel Cathedral under the leadership of Denis Hurley. The Juma Mosque is described in *The Lotus People* as

… the magnificent and architecturally famous Juma Mosque, with its minarets and many domes ... it was a landmark for both the local residents and the out of town visitors. Adjoining the mosque, fronting on to Cathedral Road and directly opposite the historic Emmanuel Cathedral were a row of cottages that had been consolidated into a large unit that served as a madressah for Muslim children (168).

Such specific and intimate place-naming links to de Certeau’s famous essay ‘Walking in the City’ (1984) already mentioned where he describes how it is not necessarily the city planners but the *walkers* of a city that ‘give their shape to spaces. They weave places together’. So do all the writers of Grey Street - they describe in walker’s detail their lives in Grey Street, crisscrossing roads, taking short cuts through alleys, weaving domestic patterns of familiarity. From Dr Goonam who remembers how ‘[t]o reach our schools, Tamil and English, we had to cross Grey Street, the one was in Cross Street, the other in Prince Edward Street... (1991: 14); to Phyllis Naidoo’s specific
The Grey Street Writers Trail in the Context of Urban Regeneration

address: ‘The office of Phyllis Naidoo and Archie Gumede was on the seventh floor of CNR House, Cross Street, Durban’ (2002: 18); to Coovadia’s Ismet who ‘wander[s] over to Queen Street, on the Field Street corner’ to buy cigarettes (2001:161); to Akabor’s characters Zohra Bibi and her servant Princess who ‘walked into Ultra Fresh Grocers, which was situated on the corner of Grey Street and Fountain Lane’ (2006: 47); all are mentally traversing and remembering lived spatial patterns in clear geographic detail over a period of many decades. By walking this area, the writers have got to know this place and therefore their own place in the world - this claiming of intimacy they pass on to their characters or their own histories. By repeating these patterns in writing about these same places, they retain their significance in the collective memory. Even the ‘fictional’ trail stops mentioned at the beginning of the trail are based on real places - the Corner Shop Café and AK Mansions in Akabor’s Flat 9 are based on Haribol’s Superette on the corner of Grey and Lorne Streets, and Afzal Building, 292 Grey Street respectively. This ‘mini-India’ of old Grey Street, though nowadays more multiracial, delapidated and less cohesive, provides the focus for the contemporary writers featured on the trail. By presenting their accounts, their significance in collective memory is potentially perpetuated and critically perceived through their juxtaposition with the contemporary experience. Here is Hassim on the Casbah:

In the late forties Grey Street, and the roads bisecting it, were a miniature replica of a major city in India. Rows of neat double-storied buildings consisting of stores on the ground floor and residential flats above, stretched from one end of the road to the other.... The Casbah, as it was often referred to, was inhabited almost exclusively by Indians, with a fair sprinkling of coloureds. It was owned and developed in its entirety, and from its inception almost a hundred years before, by Indians who had automatically settled within its confines before spreading out into the suburbs. It was a vibrant and energetic community that was representative of the second and third generations of the early settlers (2002: 168-9).

And, Akabor on the sedimented layers of generational living in Grey Street: Uncle Imoo’s café was situated at the corner of Grey and Lorne Street.
His grandfather was the initial owner of the then tearoom a century ago. The Corner Café Shop was home to the many factory workers in the area; the housewives, especially the lazy ones who didn’t feel like cooking; the school children who didn’t like what their mothers packed them for lunch, as well as passers-by (2006: 14).

In essence, what is in operation here is what Middleton and Edwards call collective remembering; in their view ‘collective remembering is essential to the identity and integrity of a community’ (1990: 10). Boym, who differentiates between restorative (focus on nostos, return home) and reflective (focus on algia, the longing and loss) kinds of nostalgia, would term this reflective nostalgia. In Akabor there is a recognition that the time of Uncle Imoo’s café is over, never to return, but in the detail with which she recalls the café lies the remembering, the reflective nostalgia:

‘Remember the ole days? When Ma used to send us to Victoria Street market early in the morning to buy the freshest vegetables and fruit?’
‘How Ossie always used to eat something on the way home! Especially the fruit!’ Everybody laughed. ‘And how we used to watch movies in Shah Jehan every week? Do you know how your father used to like Dimple Kapadia? Everyone knew he watched Bobby more than ten times at the movies!’ (2006: 103).

Such collective remembering by the contemporary writers mentioned above is important for establishing a sense of history and, above all, a sense of belonging to a place, even one now changed. Such belonging comes hard won after years of marginalisation by the apartheid government. Mamet observes how ‘through fiction, Coovadia records and re-centres the collective memories of the old Indian diasporas, establishing counter-memories’ (2008: 87) that resist earlier attempts at erasure. Even when Hassim in The Lotus People laments the changes in the area, that very act is an act of remembering and thus recovery:

The street’s changing .... Look around you. There was a time you could spot half a dozen scotens with one sweep of your eyes. Not anymore. And the cinemas - the Vic, the Royal, the Avalon - all no more than a memory. What happened to Dhanjeees Fruiterers, Victoria Furniture
The Grey Street Writers Trail in the Context of Urban Regeneration

Mart, Kapitans, that noisy Royal Tinsmith Company ... hell, buddy, I could go on forever (2002: 511).

The roof of the Victoria Street Market can be seen from this vantage point distance, it is a re-creation of the original one destroyed by fire, whilst across the road is the fish market. The various markets of the area are a central focus of the writers, and trail. Walking down the narrow stairs of the parkade, the group was led through the arcade located on the ground floor and out the northern exit of the building towards the fifth stop on this trail, the Fabric World and Bridal Center (FNG 1). The process of changing mode of transit from car to walking and decreasing elevation changed the level of mediacy from 6 in the car, to 1 at the bottom of the stairs.

At this point of the trail, the main topics were Durban as a hub of the textile industry, the fact that all designs winning prizes at the fashion show of the Durban July, an international Horse Race held annually on the first weekend of July at Greyville Racecourse, were made of fabric bought in this shop (FGG 2). The group was given the opportunity to ask questions and explore the extensive selection of bridal gowns, fabrics and accessories (FNG 1).

The next stop was on the corner opposite the Juma Mosque, where Ms Bright drew attention to the fact that it was the first mosque on Grey Street, the biggest in Durban, and at one point, the biggest in South Africa (FGG 2). On the way to the crossing, the group was led half-way into two further arcades in the buildings opposite the Nicol Square parkade and introduced to a street vendor who was selling avocados, as well as oranges and bananas, and a selection of other items on the side of the pavement. Mediacy wavered between FNG 1 and FGG 2. After crossing the street, a reading was done at the entrance of the Madressa Arcade from Aziz Hassim’s book The Lotus People, in which the character of this arcade during the 1950s-60s was described (FRG 3). No readings were done from this point forward until reaching the take-away restaurant Little Gujarat at the end of the trail.

Features of the current arcade were explained, especially the goods sold, such as the Lobola shop which sold items, including blankets, necessary in Zulu custom for negotiating the bride price (lobola). This held mediacy at a level of around 2 (FGG). Walking through the arcade, frequent stops were made to talk to shop owners and introduce the trail participants who were free to engage in light conversation with the shopkeepers, reducing mediacy to 1.
Bettina Pahlen & Lindy Stiebel

(FNG) for an extended period of time for those who did engage. Reaching the end of the Madressa Arcade, the group was taken into a shop selling meat and innards for a dish called Shisa Nyama, meaning grilled meat, explanations increasing mediacy (FGG 2).

Crossing the road, the group’s attention was drawn to the Catholic Emmanuel Cathedral and the adjoining Dennis Hurley Center and the role played by Dennis Hurley in the resistance movements. Additionally, the peaceful coexistence and tradition of collaboration between church and mosque was emphasized along with the prevalence of charitable work done and the number of trusts in the area; level of mediacy remained at FGG 2. After going inside the Cathedral, the group walked back out of the compound and across Dennis Hurley Street into the Fish and Meat Market, decreasing mediacy to FNG 1. Before going into the market, attention was drawn toward the Mahatma Ghandi Library, which housed a substantial amount of law books before they were moved to Howard College and provided unique access to these books and an adequate study area to many African law students during Apartheid; level of mediacy increased to FGG 2.

Inside the Fish and Meat Market a small selection of fish could be seen, numerous stalls were empty but anything from chicken, sheep’s heads and washed or unwashed innards could be bought, which provided participants sufficient material to talk about, and represents a low level of mediacy between FNG 1 to FGG 2 due to the intensity of attention and direct engagement with the environment being walked through. From the Fish and Meat Market the group passed by a fruit vendor, where Ms Bright bought some bananas, which she offered to the group to try (FNG 1).

In Victoria Street market, the first stop was a spice shop, where the owner introduced the group to his knowledge on the properties, uses, quality and price of spices available. As this meant direct interaction with the shopkeeper, the level of mediacy was very low, at FGG 1, because the porosity of FGG 2 increased dramatically due to a change in narrator from guide to shopkeeper for the duration of the visit to the spice shop.

The group then proceeded along the passages of the indoor-market, again being introduced to selected shop owners, making time for some small-talk between trail participants and the shopkeepers (FNG 1). While the market has two levels and is rather extensive, only a part of the ground floor was visited. The group was led out the back and down a few steps and past stalls selling diverse utensils for administering traditional African medicine that
could be bought in neighbouring stalls, which gave further opportunity to talk about what could be seen and how it was used within the group (FNG 1).

The path of the trail now departed from the route set down on the trail pamphlet. This decision by the guide shows the agency that influences the delivery of the trail design, and alters the experience of the literary trail by including contemporary features that do not prominently feature in selected writings. The group crossed a busy street to the Bridge Market, commonly referred to as the Muthi Market (FNG 1), which is stop 10 on the trail map. Here, the vast variety of parts of indigenous plants and animals was on display, all constituting part of the pharmacy of traditional African medicine. Walking through the market, Ms Bright encouraged the group to always greet the people encountered in Zulu, as a sign of respect. She also pointed out and asked about various plants and some uses (FGG 1-2). At the top end of the bridge, the group could see part of the Early Morning Market and were informed of its history (FGG 2), but did not cross over the foot bridge. Instead, the group turned around and proceeded to the Music Bridge adjoining the Herb Market, under the bridge and out back across the road past the Victoria Street Market (FNG 1). Ms Bright mentioned further markets that take place in the area at different days of the week, such as the Bead Market (FGG 2). One could argue that the additional experience balances the selected literary depictions of the area.

The rest of the route took the group through some alleyways characterized by refurbished art deco house facades and onto Dr Goonam Street to Little Gujarat restaurant - food being the great carrier of diaspora, culture and ‘home’ that it is the world over. On arriving in Durban, Ismet and Khateja from The Wedding

for four days ... lived on bunny chows from the café on Victoria Street: loaves with their insides scooped out and replaced with a steaming dollop of curry, meat, fat butter beans, and potato coins (2001: 157).

At this old established and always busy eatery, tired literary tourists can try out a bunny chow, a Durban adaptation of ‘curry to go’. In the restaurant the group, as in the novel, is provided with an opportunity to sample an assortment of Indian food, ranging from chili bites to samoosa and more vegetarian delicacies, and provided with refreshments. The reading given at this last stop (11) was from Imraan Coovadies novel The Wedding, in which food is of major importance, for handling marriage discord. The level of mediacy increased to
FRG 3 during the reading, quickly returning to (FNG 1) as participants sampled the food. This is an apt end to the trail: the bunny chow, after all, is a potent reminder of people who came from afar, who stayed on and adapted to local conditions, and who wrote about a place called Grey Street. The level of mediacy was continually low, between 1 and 2, implying high levels of interaction, exposure and proximity at ground level during this time. After this stop, the group was led past the construction site of the Ghandi Museum, onto Grey Street and back to Nicol Square parkade (FNG 1), where the Grey Street Writers trail ended (FNA 2).

This extensive analysis shows how the literary trail may be considered a frame narrative, both physically and on the level of content, into which literature and history related to the Grey Street Casbah are embedded. A narrative consists of story, plot and discourse. Trails have a strong physical mode of emplotment, localizing and positioning themselves and embedded stories within a concrete time/space relation via the physical path or pattern of movement of actors (guide and participants) through a geographic location (cf. Wrana 2014: 298-299). The trail’s activities, such as walking and driving, performing readings, or interacting socially, are used to facilitate the sequence of events on the trail, but can also be understood as tools of emplotment, as much as speech, as they bear the potential to influence what is perceived as causally or logically connected sequence of events.

Sensory exposure to the Casbah and its street life proceeded sensitively on the Trail, beginning with a high level of mediacy (from the car to walking). This allowed some time to grow accustomed to the initially overwhelming street life as the level of mediacy decreases and then alternates, following the careful combination and sequencing of works of Grey Street writers, history and knowledge of architecture and, most importantly, the encounters with the people along the trail and the stories they have to tell.

To interpret the graph, increasing the level of differentiation of mediacy to describe social mediacy in addition to the physical might be helpful. In one case, where a shopkeeper succeeded in decreasing the level of mediacy (see Victoria Street Market LTS 9) without physical proximity increasing. In comparison to explanations by the guide, who is perceived by group members to belong to the social entity of the trail group and therefore less to the surrounding social fabric, the explanations provided by shopkeepers or vendors allowed for immersion in the social context beyond the group through verbal exchanges. Initially, the group was, ‘extended’ or ‘opened’ by introduction to
the social context of the shop owner, facilitating direct social exchange between the group and a member of the social context, which can be described as social immersion, or a greater amount of social immediacy. It cannot be described as physical immediacy, since no substantial amount of physical proximity was increased, except perhaps in the case of persons buying spices in the end. However, proximity in terms of social affiliation is of a different quality to physical proximity (family members communicating via an online communication platform may physically be hundreds of kilometres away), and social mediacy is a question of whether the person giving information primarily belongs to the social group of the trail, or that of the context of the trail, where people providing information are not paid by participants, guide or the project for their contribution.

In theoretical terms, literary trails make skilful use of effects of de pragmatization afforded by literary works. A level of

*de pragmatization:* i.e. [...] the suspension of direct referentiality and immediate purpose [of stories told], [...] enables the aestheticising distancing of real-world experiences and at the same time makes possible their imaginative exploration (Zapf 2001 in Grabe 2001: 87).

Stories told during the literary trails are metaphors, abstracted versions or real-life experiences with which to reassess real-world experiences. The partially fictive nature of places featured in writing (e.g. the imaginary corner café in Mariam Akabor’s *Flat 9*) highlights the constructedness of both the trail and the perceived context, and draws attention to the actual process of perception, the limits of its reliability and the malleability of ‘reality’. This can be a slightly unsettling experience. Varying degrees of unsettling experiences facilitate, or inhibit, the receptiveness to new discourses, lines of argumentation and insights previously disregarded. The pauses in narration with opportunity for unmediated exploration, as much as the suspension of direct reference to reality, are also key to preventing the immediate dismissal of new concepts. It encourages the imagination of an individual to actively look for parallels in personal experience and reconnect ‘abstract cultural realities to concrete life processes’ (Ibid 88) thus building a structure of reasoning that increases the degree of acceptability of this new piece of information.

Trail runs are of temporary physical existence compared to the relative duration of existence of historical buildings, sites, and the knowledge and
stories that may be associated with them. The latter two may remain transitive until ‘fixed’ in media, and still, may not be perceived to be associated with physical structures one may pass everyday. Literary trails provide this combination, going beyond the historical by the reading of a selection of short, literary narrative plots directly associated with the physical environment, intermittently at specific locations along the trail. Literary heritage and physical context serve as mutual anchors of memory and as mutual amplifiers of (actually or creatively) associated urban imaginaries and experiences.

The Grey Street Writers trail itself exhibits literary functions mentioned in Hubert Zapf’s theory of literature as cultural ecology. Mediation of these experiences through a guide potentially enables a rational processing of the experiences. This transformative creative process catalysed by the Grey Street Writers trail is potent if the abstractions recognizably represent repressed discourses, by which the trail gains a re-integrative function. Further, if it represents and critically balances ‘typical deficits, contradictions and deformations in prevailing political, economic, ideological and utilitarian systems of civilisatory power’ (Zapf 2001 in Grabes 2001: 93) by which the trail provides a cultural-critical metadiscourse. Moreover, if prevailing systems of power are confronted with abstract cultural realities that add further categories ‘to the available cultural self-interpretation’ in the form of ‘a holistic-pluralistic approach that focuses specifically on [what is] marginalized, neglected or repressed by these systemic realities, and articulates what otherwise remains unarticulated’ (Ibid) by its choice of literature, for example, the trail expands the extent of what can be imagined possible within a given cultural context, thereby engaging in an imaginative counter-discourse.

Reception of the Grey Street Writers Trail
Key to the success of literary trails with diverse audiences (not all participants are literary enthusiasts) is that the level of mediacy alternates between high and low levels. Low levels are characterized by direct interaction with the built environment in the midst of street life during a physical walk through the city. The phases of higher mediacy allow time for reflection to take place, necessary for learning/transformation processes, as well as lower mediacy for phases of exploration and engagement to test new attitudes. The chronology and type of information, the balance between mediacy and immediacy, as well as the
character of the organized randomness of street life encountered during the trail experience are paramount to the success of the mental restructuring process. These factors can be influenced by the trail design and the guide only to a certain extent. A plethora of actions by urban practitioners in urban regeneration and the general public, which construct the trail’s physical and social context as perceived by trail participants, lie outside the influence of trail designers. This highlights the high degree of dependence of a trail’s effect on its socio-spatial context.

Even though half seldom visit the Casbah due to more convenient access to services close to their homes, most participants saw no reason to avoid the area. Participants visit this part of the city mainly for the food found there, the taxi rank and the inner city as a destination in itself. For those who did mention avoiding the area prior to doing the trail, as much as for those familiar with it, the literary trail facilitated new, exciting and perception-changing experiences. It also reminded participants of childhood memories and family connections to the socio-economic fabric around Grey Street. This shows that the literary trail had a profound effect on participants with a high level of prior knowledge of the area, as much as on participants with little prior knowledge of this part of the city. In one case, this knowledge came from stories shared within their family about experiences of the markets of Grey Street and Warwick in the past. In another case, it derived from personal experience of everyday life in the markets, due to family relations to traders. These insights were shared on location between members of the trail participants during conversation. Both indicate a deep understanding of the place. The level of emotional attachment to the area is high in both cases, indicating that the economy of Grey Street area impacts on the lives, families and histories and memories of people in Durban, and that changes in Grey Street reach further than the actual traders in the area, into vast socio-economic networks in various localities across the city.

Highlights of the trail were said to be the interactions with people, the local food, followed closely by the readings and history provided. Half the participants suggested visiting the interior of the Juma Masjid and providing more readings. While some continued to regard the Muthi market critically, most considered it to be mainly an economic cornerstone of the area after the trail. The Juma Mosque and the Emmanuel Cathedral are perceived as an unusual example of mutual support between Muslims and Christians in current everyday life, as well as being fine examples of cultural heritage architecture.
Together with the markets of Warwick, Victoria Street Market, Madressa Arcade and the colonnades of the buildings along Grey Street/Dr Yusuf Dadoo Street, the Mosque and Cathedral were deemed most important for the unique (in)formal African-Indian character of the Casbah after the trail.

One participant refers directly to an experience resulting from a low level of social mediacy and direct interaction with shopkeepers along the trail, suggesting that this social grouping is as important to the trail experience as the readings, allowing insight into the ‘lives and perspectives’ (cf. Questionnaire T4) of today’s shopkeepers and residents. At this point, the facilitating role of the trail guide bridged the social distance between members of the group and shop owners or street vendors. Even if participants may pass street vendors in very close proximity, the social distance might still be enormous and communication based solely on the intention to buy/sell something. Shopkeepers along the Madressa Arcade as well as in the Victoria Street market observed that safety is the single most important factor for the viability of business on Grey Street, given the dependence of shops on pedestrians and tourists.

The perception of safety within the Casbah after the trail run was surprisingly shown not to correlate necessarily with perceived cleanliness, the reputation or noisiness of the place. A participant, largely unfamiliar with the area, remarked,

It was wonderful to feel part of the buzz of an urban, cosmopolitan African inner city. I would not normally enter this area on my own due to fears of being mugged. I now realise that it is safer and friendlier than I originally thought. I particularly enjoyed the way the guide read from the texts by the Grey Street writers - it gave a sense of the spirit of the place both past and present (Questionnaire T2).

Statements highlight the potential to address the fear of entering certain physical and social urban spaces and changing it into a sense of familiarity through the literary trail. It might also indicate that participants recognized the irrationality of their fear in a guided group context, resulting in a positive literary trail experience. The fact that ‘feeling part of the buzz’ and ‘safer than originally thought’ is mentioned by this participant may indicate the trail was successful in providing enough room for positive mutual experiences in the
regenerating environment, resulting in a small change of attitude, and perhaps a more balanced sense of place.

In effect, the Grey Street Writers trail is a complex form of cultural production creating alternating levels of mediacy. The factors influencing the levels of mediacy are purposefully combined to form a highly mediated, yet perpetually unique trail experience for each individual. The questions of ‘who’ delivers what kind of information, in which setting, and with which type of transport is crucial for modifying the levels of mediacy by design. Perceived levels of mediacy can differ from person to person depending on their specific interests and attention spans.

**Limits of Influence**

The literary trail itself intentionally impacts on the area physically, socially and economically to a small extent, due to the subsistence approach to running the trail (run on demand, not for profit, just to cover costs) and is not marketed aggressively. Any added economic impact depends on the willingness of trail participants to spend their money in the Casbah. The core advantage of the academic nature of the trail is its contribution to preserving the everyday routines of the Grey Street Casbah. Based on its dynamic resilience over the past decade and renewed interest in the Grey Street Writers trail, it will probably continue to exist in the future.

Urban regeneration is a determining factor for the existence of the trail in the future. Amongst other factors, its continued success will depend very much on decisions made to develop the inner city and especially the markets of Warwick and the Grey Street area. A higher frequency of literary heritage trail runs could potentially change the urban fabric into a tourist-dominated place, at the loss of its current character. At the time of writing, a certain degree of this might temporarily be beneficial for businesses currently relying on tourists visiting the currently regenerating area, but is something that needs to be monitored.

New impressions can be overwhelming and need to be processed. Especially in initial social contact situations on the trail, having time and space to retreat from the attention or direct engagement with people and place is crucial. The mode of transport used to approach Grey Street was attuned to the dominant sequence of transport use, beginning with a mini-bus (though private,
which is a different experience to the public taxi) and transitioning to pedestrian movement through the city. A potential of the literary trail open to discussion might lie in introducing trail participants to the use of the regular mini-bus taxis, a form of public transport, the experience of which was a topic of conversation between trail participants. However, according to the guide, the logistics of moving a tour group dictate a reliable mode of transport, insurance held by the driver to transport tourists and a set time. The trail run showed the potential of involving shopkeepers and vendors in the storytelling, as previously sceptical participants of the trail echoed shop owners by the end, who observed that the area is currently safer than generally thought. Augmenting interactive properties of the maps provided on the website, the accessibility of the site and authors works for people with visual impairment and auditory comprehension skills, and perhaps expanding the use of languages could increase the audiences reached.

The engagement of the context of the trail, in terms of shopkeepers and institutions along the trail, in the running of the trail might be a better way to perpetuate the trail’s existence. Informing about how the trade and service networks function in daily life creates a more critical understanding of the place perceived by trail participants during these phases of lowest mediacy. This is achieved to some extent through the guide’s decision to pause readings until Little Gujarat and instead picking up on what participants point out within the group and drawing attention to observable cultural symbols, such as the dress of traditional healers that demand extra information to be noticed and interpreted by a newcomer to the place. An experimental area of thought alludes to the implementation of the Grey Street Writers trail to augment law-focused induction programmes for stakeholders directly involved in changing the urban fabric.

Architect Jonathan Edkins aims to make the Grey Street Writers trail a fixture in an architecture course he runs at the Durban University of Technology dubbed ‘Happitecture’, expanding the influence of the trail to people who will influence the face of the city to a large extent. According to Edkins, the trail provides a combination of mediacy, exposure to the immediate surroundings of Grey Street and access to both history and literature suited to filling a gap in the programme. A most important feature of the literary trail is that functions of literature are imported into the trail experience. This sets the Grey Street Writers trail apart from other heritage trails. One might consider making use of other forms of art that might have similar effects, but for the
purposes of this trail, the fact that readings can take place in situ brings the place to life, not only in the present day but in the historic past as perceived with memories of the trail experience in the pages of the book. The course challenges architects to think past just the built structure of the city.

Altogether, the Grey Street Writers trail may foster a deeper understanding of the Casbah’s socio-economic and cultural urban fabric, thereby counter-balancing rumour and showing the effect of what Edward Relph describes as a balanced sense of place. The trail, when run, may contribute to better informed decisions regarding Durban’s literary and cultural heritage when considering economic and infrastructure projects, ideally creating an awareness for the palpable history and significance of the Grey Street area, beyond Durban.

Conclusion

The place-making capacity of the Grey Street Writers trail is an effective tool that can contribute to reconfiguring the Casbah’s reputation alongside ongoing regeneration projects and trails. The prerequisites are largely given. Success of regeneration efforts in connection with the guided group situation of the Grey Street Writers trail provides the parameters needed to create a basic sense of security required for such a process to be initiated. Research into the behaviour of the trail’s design demonstrated its potential for addressing fears of entering the place or meeting people working and living there, due largely to the reputation of the precinct. The mediated experience, provided in a guided group setting by car and on foot, allowed insights into places that may previously thought to be out of bounds, not entirely known, or purely imaginary. The dynamic of alternately increasing and decreasing the layers of mediacy is key to understanding the success of the trail in changing ingrained perceptions of an area by preventing the immediate dismissal of new, unfamiliar impressions or concepts. This leads to the conclusion that Grey Street Writers trail has the potential to balance and transform negatively preformed imaginaries associated with the area into a sense of familiarity, homeliness and safety in light of progress made to dynamically stabilize the literary trail’s context, that is the socio-economic ecology of the greater Warwick Junction Precinct.
References


**Interview References**


Interview Notes Rosenberg L. 2015. *Please Contact Bettina Pahlen (bpahlen[at]web.de).*

Interviews Madressa Arcade 2015. *Please Contact Bettina Pahlen (bpahlen[at]web.de).*

Bettina Pahlen  
University of Duisburg-Essen  
Germany  
bpahlen@web.de

Lindy Stiebel  
University of KwaZulu-Natal  
South Africa  
stiebell@ukzn.co.za
Women in Anti-Colonial and Nationalist Movements: A Comparative Study of India and South Africa

Kalpana Hiralal

Abstract
Women have been at the forefront of global nationalist movements. In Latin America, Asia and Africa colonialism and its subjugation of men and women inevitably led to the rise of nationalistic fervour. In both South Africa and India women were at the forefront of the struggle challenging gender roles and creating new spaces for their political activism. This paper adopts a gender lens and engages in a comparative approach to document the role and contributions of women in the nationalist and anti-apartheid movement in India and South Africa respectively. It highlights the similarities and differences in terms of their mode of resistance, political agency and mobilisation. More significantly, it documents the challenges and constraints they endured in different geographical settings, in the context of gender, class, race/ethnicity and religion and how it shaped and defined their political activism and consciousness. This article contributes to narratives on gender and nationalism and how regional and continental histories shape and define women’s participation and opportunities.

Keywords: Gender, resistance, Africa, India and nationalism

Introduction
In the late 19th and 20th centuries nationalistic fervour swept through most of Africa and Asia. Men and women challenged colonialist rule and questioned the colonial right to rule in the colonies. Women were an integral and significant part of that freedom movement. Women, both young and old, urban
and rural, the elite and working class joined forces to challenge decades and centuries of oppressive rule. In various parts of Africa, women were active in various nationalist movements. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO); the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA); the South West Africa People’s Organization in Namibia; the Zimbabwe African National Union and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, women’s political organisations were at the forefront of resistance (Giesler 2004: 40; White 2007). In east Africa, in Uganda, resistance to colonial rule saw women engaging in protest marches, drafting and submitting petitions and mobilising across race, ethnicity and class barriers (Tripp & Ntiro 2002:33-35). Presley notes that ‘Women’s massive participation in Mau Mau contributed to the rebellion’s initial psychological, if not military successes’ (Presley 1988: 504). In India, both urban and rural women challenged British colonial rule in places such as Gujarat in western India, Bengal, on the east and in Allahabad in the Uttar Pradesh. They were visible in key resistance campaigns such as the Swadeshi Movement of 1905; the Non-cooperation movement launched (1920); the Civil Disobedience campaign and the Dandi Salt March (1930) and the Quit India Movement (1942) (Thapar-Bjorkert 2006). Whilst women in South Africa and India were an integral part of the nationalist movements, their geo-political settings and socio-economic differentiation shaped and defined their resistance. These aspects of resistance and mobilisation across different regions and continents, in particular between India and South Africa, are examined in this paper.

Over the past few decades there has been an extensive scholarship on women’s roles in nationalist movements globally. Scholars have provided an analysis in the context of women’s status as citizens in post-nationalists’ struggles (Molyneux 1985; Beckwith 2001), the intersections of feminist issues and nationalist goals (Basu 1995) and the gendered nature of women’s activities (Unterhalter, Elaine, 2000; Cock 1991; Disney 2008; Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000; Walker 1991). Some scholars have also argued about the complex nature of women’s participation in nationalist struggles, in terms of gender roles and religion (Giesler 2004; Mlambo 2009). Patriarchy and the socially constructed roles of women, in many instances, hindered women’s political participation, thus limiting their access within the public sphere. In India it led to the politicization of the domestic sphere. According to Mlambo (2009), ‘Women also had to deal with patriarchy within their own societies and
handled that struggle in many subtle ways that defy easy classification and labelling between the women’s determination to assert their independence and the men’s desire to control women’s activities. Clearly there were unresolved tensions’ (Mlambo 2009:105). Giesler (2004) provides a comparative account of African women’s struggles for political representation in Africa in their varying political and historical contexts and argues that despite these differentiation, women had to contend with male chauvinism in the political arena. This paper draws on the above studies to highlight how both women in India and South Africa negotiated and accommodated their political identities in the context of race/ethnicity, class, gender and religion.

Comparative analysis on women’s movement in the context of feminism and nationalist struggles in different geographical settings provides interesting insights to the complexity of women’s experiences in the context race/ethnicity, class and gender (Kuumba 2001; Beckwith 2001; Weldon 2011; and Beckwith 2013). Studies by Kuumba (2001) highlight women’s motives for participation and their experiences as women activists in the context of different racial and ethnic institutional structures. In her study of women’s activism during the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and the Montgomery bus boycotts in the United States, Kuumba argues that women’s resistance stemmed from their particular positioning within oppressive political systems reinforced by race/ethnic, class and gender inequities. This had profound impact on women’s political opportunities (Kuumba 2001). Jones (2006) in her comparative study on the experiences and roles of women in the United States and Caribbean Black Power Movements highlights the twin challenges women experienced in the context of racial and gender oppression. The Movement sought to eliminate racial and economic discrimination but was ‘unresolved’ with regards to notions of patriarchy, ‘emasculating, black manhood, and the defeminization of black women’ (Jones 2006: 109). She adds, ‘the interlocking social forces of race, class, and gender impacted women participating in the Black Nationalist movement of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s’ (Jones 2006: v).

Both in India and South Africa there has been considerable literature on the role and participation of women in anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles respectively in the aftermath of a new political dispensation. In India, traditional narratives sought to portray the nationalist movement as homogenous thus overlooking gender perspectives (Thapar-Bjorkert 2006, 41). However, recent scholarly work have sought to rectify this gap. Bipan
Kalpana Hiralal

Chandra (2008) has examined women’s participation in trade union movements and their key role in the nationalist struggles. Thapar-Bjorker has shown how women challenged social and cultural norms such as purdah, illiteracy and patriarchy and made a significant contribution to the nationalist struggle (Tharpar 1993; Thapar-Bjorkert 2006). Taneja (2005) has examined women’s role in the context of Gandhi’s ideological construction of women within the public and private domains. Scholars such as Chaterjee (1989) and Thapar (1993) have highlighted how women became ‘symbols’ of the nationalist struggles within the confines of patriarchy. Chaterjee (1989) has argued that the women’s question was located in ‘the ideological framework’ of nationalist interests, between the ‘material’ and the ‘spiritual’/inner worlds. The ‘material’/outer worlds represented equality and liberalism of the West. The ‘spiritual’ inner world represented the true identity of the Indian peoples. Women represented the ‘spiritual’/inner worlds which embodied Indian femininity and ‘motherhood’. In this scenario motherhood was given a new political meaning.

In South Africa, since the dawn of democracy, there has been an increase in scholarship on the anti-apartheid movement. The advent of new kinds of sources such as sources like women’s writings (Govinden 2008), autobiographies (Cachalia 2013; Jaffer 2003; 2008), biographies letters and correspondences (Daymond 2014), interviews as well as the re-interpretation of historical documents: organizational and private papers, official reports and correspondences has certainly widened the scope of women’s history. Among the pioneering studies on women’s resistance in South Africa are notably the works of Walker (1991) and Wells. Walker provides interesting insights on the intersections of race, class and gender and how they shaped and defined women’s activism and political consciousness. Wells (1983) provides a comparative study of the 1913 and 1958 anti-pass campaigns in the Orange Free State and Pretoria. She raises pertinent issues of the significance and impact of the campaigns in terms of women’s political agency and consciousness. Scholars like Berger (2007) and Tshoaedi (2002) have written extensively on the impact of trade unions in politically conscientising women between the 1940s and 1970s. Trade unions provided grassroot women to articulate ‘bread and butter’ issues and a platform for political mobilisation. According to Berger,

Through union activities, women were politicised, introduced to the
pressing issues of the time and to a new world of debate, organising and protest. These experiences transformed the women involved, as well as the groups they helped to launch and sustain. Within these new political spaces, some women challenged racist practices and institutions, struggling to interact with one another on a basis of relative equality; they also acquired the skills to launch new groups with gender-specific objectives (Berger 2007: 204).

According to Tshoaedi, in the 1970s, African women in Durban such as June-Rose Nala and Joyce Gumede were appointed General Secretaries of the emerging independent unions (Tshoaedi 2002, 205-231). My own research has sought to incorporate race and ethnic perspectives in the nationalist narrative in South Africa (2009; 2010; 2013; 2014; 2015). These studies have examined women’s participation in the context of the 1913 and 1948 passive resistance movement, the role of Salisbury Island as a site of resistance and political mobilisation and women’s incarceration during the apartheid years thereby broadening the narrative of resistance, confrontation and negotiation in the telling of the liberation struggles. Whilst the above studies are significant there has been no comparative analysis of women’s role in the nationalist struggle in India and South Africa. Recently, studies by Van Der Spuy and Clowes (2012); Govinden (n.d.), Hiralal (2015) have made some inroads to examine and analyse the impact of Indian women nationalists on South African women and how women in both countries negotiated the political space within the realm of patriarchal politics.

This article adds to the above studies by examining the role of women in the nationalist struggle in South Africa and India within a comparative perspective. It locates the analyses in the context of how women were perceived in the nationalist struggle, notions of ‘motherhood’, their diverse political roles, the socio-economic conditions that shaped their activism and the challenges and constraints they faced in terms of religion, family obligations and cultural norms. This paper argues that women’s political participation in different geographical spaces was shaped and defined by class, gender, religion, ethnicity and race. Hence women’s experiences within nationalistic struggles cannot be homogenised but must be viewed through multiple lenses, such as gender, race/ethnicity, class and religion. A comparative study between India and South Africa is both significant and relevant. Firstly, it highlights the social and cultural fluidity and diversity of
Kalpana Hiralal

regions, and thus disengages one from making generalisations about women’s resistance globally in the context of gender relations, ethnicity, class and religion. Secondly, both South Africa and India were colonised (under British rule – South Africa up until 1910) and were subject to a racially oppressive system that located women to a secondary status in society. The nuances of women’s responses and resistance to their subjugated status politically, culturally and socially will broaden our understanding of feminist discourses and activities over different time, space and regions. Thirdly, Indian women activists such as Sarojini Naidu, Kalpana Dutta and Pandita Rama Bai were inspirational heroines for women in South Africa. Their courageous fight against British oppression and gender oppression drew parallels to South Africa’s own political trajectory. In addition, Indian nationalists such as Rabindranath Tagore and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, called upon Indians in South Africa to align with the African majority in their struggle against racism and reverently supported the anti-apartheid movement (Reddy 1995:3). Hence a comparison of women’s political participation will contribute to narratives on gender and nationalism and how regional and continental histories shape and define women’s participation in nationalist movements. This paper adopts a feminist lens, integrating race and gender as key theoretical concepts. It engages with these concepts not as separate entities, but ways in which they overlap, ‘ways in which each is implied in and experienced through the other …’ (Maynard 2001: 131). This study also incorporates the intersectionality theory which highlights varying levels of inequities, such as race, gender class, age and how they are interactive and intersect in shaping and defining women’s experiences (Ludvig 2006; Crenshaw 1991; McCall 2005; Yuval Davis 2006). Thus, this paper argues that race and gender, along with class and religion are central to understanding resistance strategies of women in South Africa and India’s road to democracy.

Research Methodology
This study is primarily based on archival and secondary sources. Secondary sources were useful in the documentation of the role and participation of women in India’s nationalist struggle. During the literature search several sources were consulted, consisting of primary unpublished and published sources, secondary sources (books, journal articles, unpublished thesis and papers, chapters in books), oral interviews, private collections, community
Women in Anti-Colonial and Nationalist Movements

pamphlets and leaflets. Information on women’s resistance in the anti-apartheid struggle was largely gleaned from several archives located in KwaZulu-Natal. Among them were the Killie Campbell African Library (KCAL), Gandhi Luthuli Documentation Centre (GLDC), the Natal Archives and the Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives (Pietermaritzburg), based at the University of Kwazulu-Natal, the Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (NAB), Durban Archives Repository (TBD) respectively. KCAL has a fantastic collection of documents on the Natal Organisation of Women (NOW) that provided information on their activities, policy and political activities in the 1980s. Newspapers such as Indian Opinion, provided valuable information on the 1913 Satyagraha campaign and 1913 anti-pass campaigns whilst The Leader, The Graphic, The Passive Resister, Flash, Drum, The Guardian and the New Age provided information on the 1946-1948 Passive Resistance campaign and the anti-pass campaign of the 1950s. They not only mapped the various stages in these political movements but also included the names of participants, leaders and organizations involved, and how they worked collectively in their defiance of discriminatory measures. Interviews with sisters and anti-apartheid activists such as Amina Cachalia and Zainub Asvat highlighted individual experiences and how socio-economic and political events shaped these women’s realities.

Notions of Motherhood and Women as Agents of Change
Both in Asia and Africa women were seen as an important catalyst for political and social change. Key political leaders, social reformers and revolutionaries believed that women’s roles as mothers and wives were significant in mobilising and canvassing support for nationalist movements and that without women the freedom movement could not be complete. For example, in Ghana in 1960, Kwame Nkrumah, leader of the Convention People’s Party relied heavily on women in the urban and rural areas during the struggle for independence and the post-colonial period (Azikiwe 2014). C.R.L. James in his book, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution noted that `in the struggle for independence, one market women … was worth any dozen Achimota (college) graduates …’ (Azikiwe 2014). Ghana’s nationalist leader, Se’kou Tour’e, stated women were `the most dynamic force because in them lies the total hope for progress’ (Geisler 2004:40). However, gender played a pivotal role in how women were perceived and articulated in political discourse. In both India and
South Africa patriarchy were firmly entrenched. Any deviation from women’s socially constructed roles were met with resistance. In India, Thapar has argued that ‘while, Gandhi encouraged women’s political participation, he was careful that their activities did not threaten men’s masculinity in any way’ (Thapar 1993: 87). Both rural and urban women were expected to full fill her traditional roles first and only after familial approval were expected to engage in non-violent nationalistic activities. Moreover, the symbolic representation of women in the nationalist struggle also justified their entry into the public sphere. In India, nationalism was evoked through mythical and religious figures such as ‘Sita’ and ‘Savitri’ who were the embodiment of suffering, self-sacrifice, courage and preservers of Hindu culture. They were seen as the ‘epitome of ideal Indian womanhood’ (Thapar 1993: 83-84). In South Africa, it was ‘bread and butter’ issues that propelled women into the political arena. This ‘motherist’ approach (Giesler 2004: 67) in South Africa also motivated women to participate in the freedom struggle as they wanted to ‘secure a better future for their children’. Winnie Mandela, former wife of Nelson Mandela, was viewed as the ‘Mother of the Nation’, appearing at public events ‘dressed in combat fatigues … creating powerful notions of a near mythical radical motherhood’ (Geisler 2004: 51). In both India and South Africa, the ‘motherist’ approach was successful because it not only reinforced traditional gender roles within a political context but also did little to challenge male patriarchal authority. Thus, notions of ‘motherhood’, served as an important mobilising tool for nationalist leaders, and thus limited women’s political opportunities and activism.

Role Models
Both India and South Africa had dynamic, brave women who were not afraid to challenge state authority and gender inequality. They showed commitment to the struggle, were bold in their decisions and took leadership roles when their male comrades were imprisoned or exiled. In India, during the first quarter of the twentieth century, among the notable women were Annie Besant, Sarojini Naidu and Kamala Devi Chattopadhyaya who encouraged women to challenge British colonial rule and support the Indian independence movement. They used multiple methods to inform and educate the public: they spoke at political meetings, addressed several public platforms and newspapers. Kamala Devi took part in the Salt March and was one of the founding members of the
All India Women’s Congress (AIWC). She founded the Vidhwa Ashram where women received political training (Bala 1986:99). Annie Besant, a fiery woman activist addressed several political platforms and urged the women of India to support the nationalist movement and end British rule. Sarojini Naidu, was a famed poet and orator and became the first woman President of the Indian National Congress in 1925. In 1930 she took leadership of the Salt March when Gandhi was arrested. She was jailed for 21 months in 1942 during the `Quit India’ protests and remained incarcerated for 21 months (Alexander 2000: 92).

Similar notable women activists could be found in South Africa during the anti-apartheid period. Women such as Lilian Ngoyi, Winnie Mandela, Bertha Mkize, Albertina Sizulu and Dora Tamana combined their multiple identities as African, women, mothers, wives and workers and mobilized women to support the anti-apartheid struggle between the 1950s and 1980s. They endured banning orders, imprisonment and censorship (New Age 22 March 1956). For example, Ngoyi was Secretary General of the ANC Women’s League (ANCWL), the National Chairman of FEDSAW and together with Rahima Moosa, Helen Suzman and Sophie Williams lead the march to the Union Buildings in Pretoria on the 9th of August 1956, to present petitions protesting the pass laws. She was among the 155 political activists arrested for high treason in 1956 (New Age 19 April 1956; Bernstein 1989). Tamana was an ardent political activist in the Western Cape and became actively involved in community struggles against forced removals, poverty, high rents, passes, and improving living conditions. She advocated many community upliftment programmes such as sewing groups, creches and schools. Her political activism subjected her to constant police harassment and repeated pass raids\(^1\) (Laber 1999: 28-36).

**Socio-Economic Conditions**

In both countries socio-economic conditions shaped and defined women’s political activism. In the late 19th century India was under British rule and

---

\(^1\) The issuing and carrying of passes by people classified as ‘black’ in South Africa, was one of the dominant features of the apartheid system. Pass laws were permits designed to segregate the population, manage urbanisation, and allocate migrant labour.
whilst there were murmurings for Home Rule women were not politically active. Prior to the 1930s there was no mass mobilization of women. Activism was confined to social reform, the formation of women’s clubs and associations. Men and women reformers, such as Raja Ram Mohan and Pandita Ramabhai sought to eradicate the social ‘evils’ of Indian society that were inflicted on women such as the caste system, purdah system (female seclusion), sati (Hindu practice of a widow throwing herself on to her husband’s funeral pyre), child marriages, and illiteracy (Sen 2000: 7). The Partition of Bengal in 1905 did provide an opportunity for women to participate in the political arena, however activism was largely confined to women from politically famed families (Chaterjee 2001:40). In the 1930s the failure of the British to heed to the freedom demands of the Indian people, led Gandhi spearheading the Civil Disobedience (also known as the Non-Co-operation) campaign. He called upon women to picket liquor shops selling foreign goods and take up spinning. Women immediately responded to the call. They included both urban and rural women, peasants, educated elite, housewives and labourers. Some women joined the revolutionary wing of the armed struggle (Chaterjee 2001:42).

In South Africa prior to the advent of the Nationalist Party in 1948 there was no ‘mass’ political mobilisation of women across racial groups. The black majority, comprising of Indians, Africans and Coloureds not only experienced differing forms of oppression but also socio-economic realities. African women - who comprised the largest racial group amongst women in South Africa, lived primarily in the reserves at the turn of the century. By 1921, only 7% of African women were living in urban areas (Walker 1991, 11). For African women, reserve life and the migrant labor system were twin evils of the state which wreaked havoc on their lives. The migrant labor system forced African males to live and work in the cities, only returning to the reserves after several months, sometimes never to return. It created women headed households thereby increasing the agricultural and domestic burdens of women in the reserves. Migrancy gave rise to the urbanization of African women. Some women challenged by the poor socio-economic conditions of the reserves began to move to the cities. However, the gradual influx of women in the cities forced the authorities to introduce passes for African women living and working there. In 1913, the introduction of pass laws on African females in the Orange Free State (OFS) led to widespread resistance by women in the province. Tis resistance was largely confined to African women as the passes affected them more than any other racial group (The Guardian 9 March 1950;

Whilst the pass laws mobilised African women to political resistance, their Indian counterparts did so under different socio-economic conditions. Indian women arrived as indentured labourers and free immigrants from 1860 onwards. They were heterogeneous in terms of their place of origin, religion, language and caste. As contractual labourers they were assigned mainly along the coastal regions of Natal in the tea and sugar plantations working as domestic servants and as agricultural labourers (DAR, II, Minute Paper, 1/8, 77/1881; Report of the Protector 1883:30; 1886:4). Their lives differed from Indian women who arrived as free or ‘passenger’ Indians. The latter, unlike indentured women, lived primarily in the cities and small towns and were mainly housewives. Given their differentiated migratory status the lives of indentured and ‘passenger’ Indians rarely intersected. However, by 1913 this situation was to change as both groups of women were affected by political legislation that not only restricted their mobility but was also an affront to their womanhood. For example, the introduction of the £3 tax on ex-indentured Indians in 1895 forced many women into poverty and prostitution and the non-recognition of Indian marriages in 1913 restricted the mobility of `passenger’ Indian women seeking to join their spouses in South Africa. These two pertinent issues provided an opportunity for both indentured and non-indentured women to collectively resist these discriminatory legislation passed by the Union Government. Thus Indian women, both urban and rural, indentured and ‘passenger’ origin, hawkers, domestic workers and labourers collectively and boldly participated in the 1913 Satyagraha campaign of 1913 (Indian Opinion 5 April 1913; Reddy & Hiralal 2017: 142-160).

In the 1940s rising food prices, poverty and unemployment forced working class women to mobilize around these issues. Factories and trade unions became an important platform that informed women’s political consciousness. African, Indian and Coloured women, mainly unskilled, worked alongside each other and this provided opportunities for women to strive towards non-racialism. For example, the Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU) in Cape Town, provided women of all racial groups with an opportunity to mobilize support on pertinent issues (wages, working and living conditions and high food prices), increased union membership and addressing

---

2 ‘Passenger’ Indians – also known as ‘Free’ Indians – arrived in Natal unencumbered by contractual labor but under normal immigration laws.
political platforms (Walker 1991:58; *Drum* August 1953). In the 1950s the Nationalist Party passed a series of laws that aimed at the political, economic and social segregation of the races. The state re-introduced the passes and this led to national protests against passes in Cape Town, Paarl, Stellenbosch, Port Elizabeth and Natal. In the 1960s the introduction of the state of Emergency and the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) led to thousands of political activists being detained, arrested and many fled the country. This political vacuum allowed women in some instances to seize leadership roles in trade unions and political organisations whilst their male comrades were imprisoned or exiled (KCAL Natal Organisation of Women (NOW) File no 98/61/18/19, Walker 1991: 58).

It also gave rise to the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in the 1970s which espoused Black solidarity and Black power. This period also witnessed an increase in youth activism and a series of labour strikes nationally. By the 1980s women were an integral part of the liberation struggle, participating in several campaigns such as rent boycotts, childcare, bread and bus fare increases and setting up civic organisation (Malibongwe 2007: 13-15).

**Modes of Resistance**

Women contributed both directly and indirectly to the anti-colonial and nationalistic struggles in Asia and Africa. Their activities and contributions were diverse and both direct and indirect forms of resistance were played out both within the public and private sphere. They engaged in intelligence work, raising soldiers’ morale, served as cooks, porters, nurses, combat trainers, recruiting agents, supported mass rallies and were disseminators of propaganda (Cock 1991; Curnow 2000:36-40; White 2007; Geiger 1987; Presley 1988; Kam Kah 2011). In Uganda resistance to colonial rule saw women engaging in protest marches, drafting and submitting petitions and mobilising across race, ethnicity and class barriers (Tripp & Ntiro 2002:33-35).

South Africa and India share similar trajectories in modes of resistance. During the 1950s, in South Africa, non-violent resistance took the form of national protest marches. Passes inhibited African women’s ability to lead normal lives and struck at the heart of their livelihood. In 1954 the Federation of South African Women was established (FEDSAW). FEDSAW was significant as it was the first serious attempt to establish a non-racial women’s political organisation. It’s members consisted of women of all race
Women in Anti-Colonial and Nationalist Movements

groups, rural and urban, domestic workers, trade unionists and factory workers. Under the leadership of FEDSAW the first national anti-pass protest took place in October 1955 when over 2000 women marched to the Union buildings in Pretoria (Drum March 1955; Drum January 1956; Bernstein 1989; Interview Amina Cachalia 2010; Zainub Asvat 2010). In 1956 FEDSAW launched another march on a much larger scale when over 20 000 women marched to the same venue and left petitions containing over 100 000 signatures outside Prime Minister’s Strijdom’s office door. This anti-pass campaign was significant because it not only highlighted women’s defiance of the passes but also their ability to mobilise on pertinent issues affecting them. According to Geisler (2004), the 1956 demonstration at the Union buildings was a show of ‘women’s political maturity and solidarity’ as women of all racial groups participated and it also highlighted that women were an important constituency within the liberation movement (Geisler 2004: 67).

In the 1960s the ANC and the PAC (Pan African Congress) and their military wings Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and Poqo respectively, went underground and were temporarily paralysed due to state repression. Many women joined the military wing of the ANC and received military training in exile. For example, Lindiwe Sisulu, current minister of Housing joined MK and underwent military training. She later specialised in Intelligence for MK. Women in exile, became fierce critics of the apartheid state and mobilised international support for the freedom movement. Ruth First whilst in exile in the United Kingdom in the 1960s and 1970s, gave lectures, held seminars and public discussions in support of the ANC and the South African Community Party (SACP). Women were also an integral part of the labour unrest of the 1970s and 1980s in the garment, textile and food-processing industries (Magubane 2006:1022). There were work stoppages, boycotts and stay-aways in Johannesburg, Natal, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town (Magubane 2006:1022-1023).

In India, women’s resistance was noticeable in regions such as Bengal, Maharashtra, Madras, Calcutta and Gujarat. Resistance took various forms: meetings and demonstrations, picketing liquor and foreign cloth shops, door to door campaigning, supported the Swadeshi movement (support of domestic goods and boycott of foreign goods) and courted imprisonment (Taneja 2005:215-220). Rural women in Nagar, East, West Khandesh, Nasik and Poona engaged in forest satyagraha, refusing to pay for grazing fees and chopping down grass and timber from reserved forests (Thapar-Bjorket 55).
Approximately 17000 women became involved in the Salt protest campaigns by engaging in the illegal manufacturing of salt during the Civil Disobedience campaign of the 1940s (Thapar 1993: 89). Salt, a daily commodity used by women in the home, became a symbol of defiance and gave them an opportunity to link the domestic sphere to the public political realm thereby supporting the independence movement (Thapar 1993:87-90).

Both in India and South Africa the domestic sphere acquired a new political meaning during the nationalistic struggles. Women governed by religious and cultural norms negotiated between the private and public sphere to participate and seek alternative forms of participating. Women sheltered and provided nursing care for escaped prisoners and refugees, inculcated nationalist ideas among their children and supported and encouraged the political activities of their menfolk in the movement (Thapar 1993:87-90). For example, in South Africa in the 1980s, Rabia Motala was involved in the United Democratic Front (UDF) and her home was the venue for many political meetings. According to Tripp and Ntiro they [women] used ‘domesticity as a rationale for entering into politics and to bring necessary female values into the public sphere’ (Tripp & Ntiro 2002:36).

**Political Organisations**

Political organisations, women’s clubs/groups and associations were important platforms for awakening women’s political consciousness, notions of sisterhood and shaping women’s political identity. Scholars like Cohen (2009) have rightfully argued that women’s clubs, associations or voluntary organisations served ‘as a training ground for participation in public life and nation-building’, they inculcated ‘the building blocks of democracy’ (Cohen 2009: 169-195.) In Uganda, Tanganyika, and Southern Rhodesia, ‘women’s clubs over time came to serve as political platforms for women’s participation in the process of colonial devolution and in the politics of the successor states’ (Higgs 2004:120.)

Both in India and South Africa political organisations during the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles were highly gendered. Politics was the domain of men and women were relegated to the domestic sphere. Collective organisation by women took the form of women’s clubs and associations. The latter mainly addressed social and cultural issues and rarely challenged traditional gender roles. In India in the late 19th century, male initiated
women’s organisations, clubs and associations such as the Bharat Ashram (Indian Hermitage) in Bengal; Arya Mahila Samaj (The Aryan Women’s Association) in Bombay, Bharat Mahila Parishad (Ladies’ Social Conference), whilst they sought to empower women through education did little to reverse gender roles. In the early 20th century the Women’s Indian Association (established 1917) the National Council of Indian Women (1925) and the All-India Women’s Conference (1927) were broad based organisations that promptly heeded the call for independence (Chaterjee 2001:43-44). In South Africa prior to 1948 existing political organisations were largely male centred providing no opportunity for women to become fully fledged members. The African National Congress (ANC) established in 1912, allowed women equal membership in 1943 and a women’s branch, the ANC Women’s League was established. However, their role confined women’s activities to traditional roles such as ‘fund-raising and catering’ (Geisler 2004: 66). Similarly, the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC), limited Indian women’s political participation within their structures during the early part of the twentieth century. It was only during the 1940s that both the NIC and the TIC, after making changes to its ‘archaic’ constitution that subsequently allowed female membership for the first time and provided women with an opportunity to be part of the political leadership. Thus in 1946 Dr Goonam was elected vice-president of the NIC and Zainub Asvat, Mrs P.K. Naidoo and Mrs Suryakala Patel occupied senior posts within the TIC executive committee (The Passive Resister 28 October 1946). In the 1950s the formation of the FEDSAW in 1954 was a multi-racial women’s organisation aimed at positioning women at the forefront of the struggle (Giesler 2004: 65-66). FEDSAW spearheaded both the 1955 and 1956 anti–pass campaigns. Moreover, FEDSAW adopted at its founding conference in April 1954 a Women’s Charter which sought full gender equality and firmly believed that national liberation could not be achieved without removing gender oppression. In the 1970s the Black Women’s Federation (BWF), a national umbrella body launched in 1975 under the auspices of BCM) was mainly concerned with racial subjugation rather than gender oppression (Giesler 2004:69).

By the 1980s collective organisation towards non-racialism became more firmly entrenched. Women in the Western Cape in the 1980s formed the United Women’s Congress (UWCO). They launched campaigns against high rents, housing, defended children against police brutality, childcare, bread prices and bus fare increases. In Natal women formed the Natal Organisation
Kalpana Hiralal

of Women (NOW) in December 1983 as one of the affiliates of the UDF. NOW campaigned for better housing, and the lack of maternity benefits and child-care. During the 1980s many political leaders were banned or detained. In their absence NOW provided the political leadership in Natal and spearheaded a number of UDF campaigns. The ‘Black Sash’ organisation (were nicknamed the ‘Black Sash’ which referred to the black sashes that members draped over their right shoulder during protest marches) was also vocal in its condemnation of passes and opposed the government’s policy of racial discrimination. They worked jointly with a number of organisations such as the UDF, FSAW and the End Conscription Campaign (called for the end of the compulsory military subscription for young white men and their deployment in the townships) (KCAL, NOW File no 98/61/18/19).

Challenges and Constraints Experienced by Women
In both countries gender, caste, religion, and ethnicity had an impact on women’s roles and participation. Firstly women had to deal with patriarchal attitudes and familial resistance. In India, some women were torn between family commitments and responding to the call of the nationalist struggle. Older women responded to the call of non-violence whilst the younger middleclass women, rejected non-violence and were ‘active in organizing underground activities’ (Thapar 1993: 89-90). Religion also shaped and defined women’s activities. Some Muslim men resented the idea of their womenfolk picketing liquor and cloth shops, thus contravening the principles of purdah tradition (Thapar 1993: 91). In South Africa in the 1940s some men were ‘unhappy ‘with their wives’ staying away from home and made it difficult for women to attend meetings’ (Giesler 2004:66). Zainub Asvat’s mother expressed concerns of her daughter’s participation in the 1946-1948 passive resistance struggle. However, an adamant Zainub, asked her late father’s political confidant, Dr Yusuf Dadoo to reassure her mother, ‘She’ll be following in the footsteps of her father’ he stated’ (Interview, Zainub Asvat 2010).

Conclusion
This article has demonstrated via a comparative study between India and South Africa that women’s experiences within global nationalistic struggles cannot
be homogenised but must be viewed through multiple lenses. Whilst the nationalist struggles both In India and South Africa gave women new spaces to develop their individual and political identities their activities were gendered to a very large extent. Firstly, gender played a pivotal role in shaping women’s political status in society. In both countries, during the struggles, political organisations and its associated structures were male dominated, providing no political opportunities for women. In South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s sexism was rife in many political circles. Political platforms were dominated by men; debates on feminist issues were ridicule. According to Seekings (cited in Giesler 2004: 69), leaders of the youth politics of the mid-eighties ‘scoffed at the idea of women participating in fighting or strategic planning and dismissively said that women’s role was to attend to food and look after the kids’. Secondly class and race played an important role in shaping resistance movement. In India, activism and social reform were initiated by the educated elite. Men and women such as Raja Ram Mohan and Pandita Ramabhai sought to eradicate social evils that were inflicted upon women. Moreover, women’s clubs and associations were largely urban based. In South Africa, African, Coloured and Indian women were racially oppressed but shared different trajectories of oppression. Passes, and reserve living plagued African women and not Indian women. Indian women, too, separated by their migration status (indentured and ‘passenger’) were subject to different forms of oppression. Indentured women were subject to the horrors of the £3 tax whilst ‘passenger’ Indian women were hindered entry to South Africa by stringent immigration laws. Thirdly, women were also subjugated to criticism for deviating from their roles as wives and mothers in their efforts to participate in the struggle. To some extent it restricted women’s activism and forced many to engage in covert operations. Collectively these factors shaped and defined women’s resistance and political consciousness. Whilst there may be divergent views on nationalism versus feminism, what is most notable are the opportunities created by women’s participation in these political struggles and how it transformed their identities as woman, wives and mothers.

**Funding:** This work is based on research supported by the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa. Any opinion, findings or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and the NRF does not accept any liability in this regard.
References


Women in Anti-Colonial and Nationalist Movements


Durban Archives Repository: (DAR), Report of the Protector of Indian Immigrants 1884 – 1895.


Hiralal, K. 2014. ‘Married to the Struggle – For Better or Worse’: Wives of
Kalpana Hiralal


Indian Immigration Papers, Minute Paper, 1/8, 77/1881. *Indian Opinion* 1913.

Interview, Amina Cachalia, Durban 2010.


Killlie Campbell Africana Library (KCAL), Natal Organization of Women (NOW), File no. 98/61/18/19.

Kuumba, M.B. 2001 *Gender and Social Movements*. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.


Women in Anti-Colonial and Nationalist Movements


New Age 1956.


Kalpana Hiralal


*The Passive Resister* 1946.


White, A.M. 2007. All the Men are Fighting for Freedom, All the Women are Mourning their Men, but Some of us Carried Guns: A Raced - Gendered Analysis of Fanon’s Psychological Perspectives on War. *Signs* 32,4: 857 – 884.


Kalpana Hiralal
School of Social Sciences
University of KwaZulu-Natal
hiralalk@ukzn.ac.za

254
Contributors

Dr. Kasturi Behari-Leak is a senior lecturer in the Centre for Innovation in Learning and Teaching in CHED at UCT. Her focus includes a range of professional and academic staff development work across a spectrum of new, emerging and established academics. Kasturi obtained her PhD at Rhodes University and was part of a NRF doctoral project on Social Inclusion in Higher Education. She currently convenes and teaches on the New Academics Practitioners’ Programme (NAPP) as well as The Short Course on Teaching (TSCOT), and the Learning and Teaching in Higher Education (LTHE) module of the PGDip/ Master’s coursework. Her work in these areas is focused on examining the interplay between structures (national, institutional, departmental and disciplinary), culture and lecturer agency. Her research interests include critical pedagogies, social justice, decolonisation of the curriculum, transformative staff development and inducting the next generation of academics into higher education, in a post-colonial context. She is currently the President of the Higher Education Learning and Teaching Association of Southern Africa (HELTASA). She is a council member of the International Consortium of Educational Development. She is a co- chair of the Curriculum Change Working Group, commissioned by the VC Dr Max Price to facilitate engagements on curriculum change and decolonisation across UCT faculties. Contact details: kasturi.behari-leak@uct.ac.za

Susan Julia Chand, PhD is the Director for Research and Innovation and a professor of Anthropology in the School of Social Sciences at the University of the Southern Caribbean (USC), Trinidad. She has been working at USC since 2005. Chand had completed her Bachelor of Liberal Arts (BLA) degree in Botany from Spicer Memorial College (1986, India), Master of Arts (MA) in Anthropology (1988) and PhD in Medical Anthropology, both from Pune University (1996, India). Her areas of specialization include online teaching and learning, addiction studies, medical anthropology, Ethnomedicine, communication studies, cross-cultural studies, qualitative research, race and
Contributors

ethnicity, gender studies and juvenile delinquency. She has presented papers at numerous national and international conferences and workshops and published in academic journals. Contact details: susan.chand@gmail.com

Professor Rajendra Chetty has published widely on commonwealth writings and postcoloniality. He is the author of South African Indian writings in English (2002) and The vintage book of South African Indian writings (2010), considered seminal texts in the sub-genre. His edited works include Indias abroad: the diaspora writes back (2005), Indian writers: transnationalisms and diasporas (2009) and Trauma, resistance and reconstruction in post-1994 South African writing (2010). Contact details: chettyr@cput.ac.za

Ashwin Desai is Professor of Sociology at the University of Johannesburg. His more recent books include The Race to Transform: Sport in Post-Apartheid South Africa (edited volume), Reading Revolution: Shakespeare on Robben Island and The South African Gandhi: Stretcher-Bearer of Empire (co-authored with Goolam Vahed). He is also the co-author of Blacks in Whites: A Century of Cricket Struggles in KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: ashdesai1@gmail.com

Nirmala Gopal is a criminologist in the Programme of Criminology and Forensic Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Among her foci of research is ‘hidden’ and vulnerable communities as victims of crime, social injustices, South African Indian Identity and discrimination with the aim of promoting justice and fairness for unequal groups in society. She has completed research in school based violence in disadvantaged communities in Durban and research on South African Indian Identity. Her current research study illicit drug users or ‘addicts’ and Indian identity. Contact details: Gopal@ukzn.ac.za

Kalpana Hiralal is an associate professor in the School of Social Sciences at Howard College at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. She teaches both undergraduate and graduate level modules on global history, women, gender and politics and culture and tourism. Her PhD dissertation focused on the South Asian Diaspora to Africa in the context of settlement, trade and identity formation. Her most recent book publications are: Satyagraha, Passive Resistance and its Legacy (Manohar 2015), Global
Contributors

Hindu Diaspora Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Manohar 2016) and Pioneers of Satyagraha Indian South African Defy Racist Laws 1907-1914 (Navajivan 2017). Contact details: hiralalk@ukzn.ac.za

Bobby Luthra Sinha is a PhD from University of Basel, Switzerland and a core member of the Scientific Commission of Migration at the IUAES. Her publications range from social movements and Indian Diaspora to international migration and substance abuse. She has been a lecturer in Political Science and Spanish (Delhi and Amity University), projects officer at the MRG (London) and has worked as a freelance translator and editor. Contact details: bobbyluthra@gmail.com

Bonita Marimuthu is a PhD candidate at the University of KwaZulu Natal, Department of Criminology and Forensic Studies. Main research areas focuses on juvenile delinquency, school violence and illicit drug use. Contact details: bonita.adele.16@gmail.com

Fatima Mukaddam, is currently a Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Luzern. Her work intends to research the South African case of legal pluralism and how it affects the lives of women living under Muslim laws. Mukaddam obtained her Master’s in Political Studies with Distinction from the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits University). She began reading for her Masters at Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po, Paris). Her Master’s research report researched the perceptions of domestic violence amongst select Muslims in Johannesburg. She completed her Bachelor of Arts Undergraduate Degree and Honours Degree at Wits University. Her research interests are in gender-based violence, feminism and women studies, and religion. Contact details: Fatima.mukaddam@gmail.com

Bettina Pahlen holds an MA in Urban Culture, Society and Space (Strategic Research Area ‘Urban Systems’), as well as a BA in Anglophone Studies and Applied Philosophy from the University of Duisburg-Essen. Contact details: bpahlen@web.de

Pragna Rugunanan is an associate professor at the University of Johannesburg. Her doctoral research focused on the construction of African
and South Asian migrant communities in South Africa. Her research interests include the sociology of migration, labour studies, changing patterns of work, social networks, and community studies. She has published on migration, gender, xenophobia, education and citizenship. Her current research examines “The South Asian Diaspora in South Africa”. Contact details: prugunan@uj.ac.za

**Lindy Stiebel** is Professor Emerita of English Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Her research interests are linked by a profound interest in the relationship between writers and place: these include the South African colonial and post-colonial novel; Indian Ocean studies particularly literary interconnections between South Africa, India and Mauritius; and literary tourism. Her latest books are Writing Home: Lewis Nkosi on South African Literature (with Michael Chapman, UKZNPress 2016) and A Literary Companion to KwaZulu-Natal (with Niall McNulty, UKZNPress 2017), a book which collects over 15 years of the KZN Literary Tourism project which she heads. Contact details: stiebell@ukzn.ac.za

**Goolam Vahed** is a Professor in the Department of History, University of KwaZulu Natal. His research interests include identity formation, citizenship, ethnicity, migration and transnationalism among Indian South Africans and the role of sport and culture in South African society. He has published widely in peer-reviewed journals and his recent co-authored book is *Schooling Muslims in Natal: Identity, State and the Orient Islamic Educational Institute*. Contact details: vahedg@ukzn.ac.za
Acknowledgement of Reviewers

We wish to acknowledge the participation of the following reviewers in the production of this issue of Alternation.

Current Trends in Postgraduate Research in the Social Sciences Reviewers

Kalpana Hiralal, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
Sultan Khan, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
Goolam Vahed, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
S. Narsiah, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
Zaheera Jinnah, Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg
Cherry Muslim, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
P. Rugunanan, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg
Simon Mapadimeng, University of Limpopo, Polokwane
Editorial: Current Trends in Postgraduate Research in the Social Sciences

Kalpana Hiralal
Sultan Khan

Post graduate research is basically a formal study that is carried out by a candidate at a tertiary institution. It is an extension of study from the undergraduate level. In essence, it may be dubbed as serving an ‘apprenticeship’ in a particular field in which a systematic investigation is conducted based on the work of peers that extends the present state of knowledge. Master’s and Doctorate degrees are common postgraduate programmes in which students engage in independent research. Research at a postgraduate level need not necessarily result in a major breakthrough. It can be an extension of knowledge or add to an existing body of knowledge.

Postgraduate research programmes varies globally. In developed countries, the availability of funds and research resources helps to promote a large cohort of postgraduate students. In developing and under-developed countries, one finds that postgraduate study opportunities are limited resulting in a knock on effect on the availability of scarce skills for these nation states. Developing and under-developed countries are denied an opportunity to produce a strong cohort of postgraduate candidates in diversified fields of study which indirectly leads to ‘brain drain’. Often in these countries one finds that postgraduate students migrate to developed countries on scholarship programmes to pursue their study. Some return to their home country to serve it, while others remain in the country of sponsorship or migrate to another country in search of jobs. Postgraduate students from developing and underdeveloped countries on completion of their studies abroad are often despondent to return to their home countries with the anxiety that they will not get the rewards for their educational qualification, or there might be no opportunity to find secure employment.
No matter where postgraduate students study they are expected to complete research projects as a requirement to obtain their academic qualifications. These research projects are resource intensive which demands large amounts of monies to be invested in them, requiring long hours of supervision and is time intensive. It is anticipated that on completion of the research projects it will create, inform knowledge or influence policy. If these objectives are not met, then it will be tantamount to wasting resources as the ordinary taxpayer does not benefit from it (Obuku et al. 2017a). Ideally, it is expected that postgraduate research should find itself in the public domain so that it can make a contribution to society. In order to find itself in the public domain it needs to be published either as academic papers, book chapters, technical reports or opinion pieces in the public media. Although this may be the ideal, in practice it is far from reality. Obuku et al. (2017b) observe in their study in Uganda found that the productivity and use of post graduate students research at Makerere University is considerably low in terms of peer-reviewed publications and citations in policy related documents. They located 1172 dissertations of Masters students over a 20 year period (1996-2010) and found that only 4% of policy related documents cited these dissertations. Obuku et al. (2017b) conclude that investing in research that is not accessible or used is a waste of resources and an injustice to human subject participants, collaborators, funders and the scientific community at large.

The nature and category of topics in postgraduate research are varied and diverse. Discipline specific are opening new pathways to topic and methodologies. For example, in history, in South Africa, there is a strong emphasis on revisionist history. Moreover, oral histories have become a valuable tool to unearth lost histories and marginalized voices. One of the key themes permeating in this collection is that of migration.

Migration of peoples and communities has occurred since time immemorial. In the contemporary period, globalization has led to the migration of peoples, ideas, goods and commodities. It has also had serious implications on peoples identity and citizenship in the migration process. Arjun Appadurai (1996) a socio-cultural anthropologist, alludes to the impact of global communications flows - electronic mass media and communication technologies- which has led to the fluidity, heterogeneity and mobility of communities, cultures and localities (Appadurai 1996:60). Other scholars such as Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Mohanty (1997) have highlighted the need to re-visit and reconceptualise terms such as ‘immigrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘guest-
workers’, and ‘citizens’ (1997: xix) in varying geo-political contexts, time and space. Migrants have plural and not singular identities and hence should not be zoned into compartments (Curti 2009; Govinden 2014:6-12).

Migration both internal from a country’s borders (rural to urban) and across national borders has undoubtedly created challenges for both immigrants and the inhabitants of the host country. It has raised issues of identity, borders, nation and state. These concepts have been problematized and deliberated by scholars such as Anzaldua (1999) and Butler and Spivak (2007). Anzaldua (1999) in *Borderlands/ La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (1999) problematizes the notion of borders as follows:

The US – Mexican border *es una herida abierta* [is an open wound] where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds. And before the scab forms it haemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two worlds merging to form a third country – a border culture. Borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish *us* from *them*. A border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants (Anzaldua 1999:24; cited in Govinden 2014).

She alludes to the psychological, physical and socio-economic challenges of immigrant life,

> The world is not a safe place to live in. We shiver in separate cells in enclosed cities, shoulders hunched, barely keeping the panic below the surface of the skin, daily drinking shock along with our morning coffee, fearing the torches being set to our buildings, the attacks in the streets… Alienated from her mother culture, ‘alien’ in the dominant culture, the woman of colour does not feel safe within the inner life of her Self (Anzaldua 1999:20; cited in Govinden 2014: 16).

Butler and Spivak (2007), in *Who Sings the Nation-State? – Language, Politics, Belonging* (2007), allude to the complexities of nation and state and argue that the state is a more provisional place and that the nation-states
produce ‘states of being’, such as ‘citizen’, ‘exile’, ‘refugee’, or ‘alien’ (Govinden 2014: 6-12).

The idea of nation has had serious implications for both immigrants and peoples of the host country. It has drawn lines between those that are considered alien and those who are perceived as native or indigenous. In South Africa, the outbreak of xenophobic violence against immigrants from across Africa and elsewhere has forced open debates on notions of citizenship, foreign, alien and nation-building. However, these challenges are not confined to South Africa only. In Europe the current wave of migration across the various European countries has not only created anti-immigration sentiments but also created new political alignments (The Sunday Tribune 26th October 2014). Anti-immigration sentiments have been countenanced by humanitarian voices seeking to provide a more humane solution to the current migration crisis. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, stated,

The language we use must reflect the value of the human being, and not treat immigration as just a deep menace that is somehow going to overwhelm a country that has coped with many waves of immigration successfully (The Mercury 28th October 2014).

The collection of articles in this volume reflects the complexities of migration as alluded in the above discussion. It showcases the diverse and varies topics of students across universities in South Africa dealing with migration and diaspora in the context of identity, politics, displacement and sexuality. The topics are not only popular but significant given the socio-economic and political challenges that currently exist in South Africa. These topics will certainly contribute to new perspectives and understanding to some of the problems facing South Africa and beyond. It is against this backdrop, that this volume of Alternation showcases the work of five post graduate students in the humanities and social sciences. All five papers focuses on the theme of migration in the context of identity, politics and history.

In the paper titled ‘The implications of forced relocation on perceptions of identity and belonging in the Post Apartheid State’, Karthigasen Gopalan provides a snapshot of forced removal, relocation and resettlement during the apartheid era. He makes reference to the Group Areas Act (1950) which was a notorious piece of legislation that aimed to separate races from
mixing by relocating settled communities into local residential areas known as townships. His paper looks at the minority immigrant Indian community in the city of Durban and how they have been victims of the Group Areas Act. In particular he looks at the settled community in the neighbourhood of Durban known as Magazine Barracks and how they have been uprooted and resettled in the all Indian township of Chatsworth, South of Durban. He reconstructs how residents despite their poor and crowded living conditions in Magazine Barracks took advantage to create a sense of community through religious and cultural institutions and produced a rich sporting and academic heritage. After sixty years of resettlement, the residents of Magazine Barracks now living in the township of Chatsworth continue to reflect in their identity their past history.

Divane Nzima’s article examines the role of remittances in shaping and defining immigrants lives. This study focuses on Zimbabwean migrants residing in South Africa who remit monies to the Tsholotsho District in Zimbabwe and some of the challenges and constraints they endure in the process. Her findings correlates with national and international studies that highlight that for many immigrants the preferred mode of remittances is through informal channels as opposed to the formal ones. This article not only provides insights into the complexity of remittances in the migration process, but the overall impact it has in family households and the economy in the home country.

Shabnam Shaik in her article ‘HIV/AIDS and Muslims in South Africa: The “Untouchable” Disease’ examines a very pertinent and significant topic in the context of religion, identity and culture in the migration process. The study is exploratory in nature, and seeks to examine and explore the social and cultural challenges that Muslims with HIV/AIDS experience. Shaik utilizes life histories, to extract personal experiences and to highlight how Muslims living with the disease negotiate and accommodate their status in the context of religious and social ostracism and myths relating to the disease. This study is valuable as it provides deep insights into how religion and ethnicity shape and define identity in the context of HIV/AIDS.

Yamkela Majikijela and Gabriel Tati’s article examines the structural changes in the participation of African migrants in the labour force of South Africa from 2001 to 2011. It locates the discussion in the context of the deployments of African immigrants in terms of occupation, employment sector and income groups. The authors conclude that male migrants still constitute a
higher proportion of the labour force compared to women. This gender inequity was most noticeable in the context of education, employment and labour.

Collectively the articles in this special edition provide some insights to the trends and patterns of postgraduate research in South Africa. A critical analysis of current postgraduate studies is essential, not only to increase postgraduate throughputs but also to promote engaging research which will be beneficial to the wider South African public.

Reference
Editorial


Kalpana Hiralal
Department of History
University of KwaZulu-Natal
hiralalk@ukzn.ac.za

Sultan Khan
Department of Sociology
University of KwaZulu-Natal
khans@ukzn.ac.za
Forced Relocations, Memory and Nostalgia amongst Indian South Africans in Post-Apartheid South Africa

K. Gopalan

Abstract
Relocations resulting from forced removals, during the implementation of the Group Areas Act (GAA) of 1950, have had profound implications on the ways in which South Africans see themselves today influencing both insular identities and broader notions of citizenship. This paper focuses specifically on Indian Municipal employees of the Durban Corporation (DC) who were removed from the Durban Municipal Magazine Barracks (henceforth Magazine Barracks) and resettled in Chatsworth, by examining the meaning of ‘Magazine Barracks’ on its former residents today, almost six decades after its destruction. Although the Magazine Barracks was established for the capitalist motives of the DC to house a cheap and manageable labour force, residents responded to circumstances imposed upon them by creating a unique lifestyle within the Magazine Barracks, which they revere today. They gave names to areas which comprised the Magazine Barracks and took advantage of their overcrowded living conditions to create notions of closeness through religious and cultural institutions, and produced a rich sporting and academic heritage. When the Magazine Barracks was destroyed by the GAA, residents similarly responded to structural forces imposed upon them in unique ways and examining this history provides valuable insight into how the past is negotiated in the present to shape identity.

Keywords: Magazine Barracks; memory; forced removals; Indian; and Chatsworth
Introduction
South Africa’s first democratic election in April 1994 was characterised by euphoria and optimism. The aim of creating a rainbow nation was seen as a means to unite a diverse nation. However, the long lasting impact of colonialism and nearly five decades of Apartheid were far reaching in dividing South Africans and entrenched massive inequalities. The so-called ‘miracle’ of South Africa’s transformation of 1994, which now appears to be unravelling two decades into the post-apartheid period, has had very different outcomes for South Africans and the country remains highly stratified. This makes it all the more important in the present juncture to critically engage with the past and analyse how various structural forces have come to influence people’s identities.

This paper examines the experiences and the memories of forced removals and relocation on former residents of the Magazine Barracks, to reflect on ways in which one group of South Africans are negotiating the past in the present and how the various laws imposed upon them affected their past lives and remain powerful in influencing their identities in the present. The Magazine Barracks were built in the 1880s on Somtseu Road just north of the Durban central business district (CBD), to house Indian municipal workers and their families. During the implementation of the GAA during the 1960s, approximately 10 000 people were removed from the Magazine Barracks and relocated to Chatsworth, 20 kilometres south west of the CBD. The Magazine Barracks was demolished thereafter and is currently the site of a police headquarters and magistrates’ courts.

Those that were forcibly removed from the Magazine Barracks faced many social and economic challenges as they made the transition to Chatsworth. This study explores how, over the long term, Group Areas relocations influenced the lives of these individuals and their families. It thus seeks to deepen our understanding of how broad structural changes in South Africa’s complex history during the middle decades of the twentieth century are reflected through the subjective experiences and agency of ordinary people. Equally important, the study brings into the equation the agency and subjectivity of the ‘victims’ of the GAA. In order to do this, the paper begins with a brief discussion on oral history and the challenges of using human memory as a historical source before a providing a very brief background of the Group Areas Act. Thereafter the paper focuses on the creation of the
Magazine Barracks to highlight how residents created an identity associated with the Magazine Barracks and finally examines what oral testimonies of particular residents today, can tell us about the meaning of that identity nearly five decades after the destruction of the Magazine Barracks.

**Memory, Nostalgia and Oral History**

A theme that emerged during the research process was that despite it being more than half a century since the destruction of the Magazine Barracks, some former residents continued to refer to it as their ‘home’ and many contended that a Magazine Barracks ‘community’ still exists today. Although the buildings that made up the Magazine Barracks have been destroyed, the name still has intrinsic value in the lives of its former residents and their identities. This is maintained through webs of friendships and social practices. Katja Uusihakala (2008: 2) who examined the memories of white former residents of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), who emigrated to South Africa after British colonial rule came to an end in 1980, wrote that “social practices connected with processes of remembering together are constitutive of how the community understands itself”.

Like many other communities who experienced displacement, commemorative memory, or the act of remembering together, features strongly amongst former residents of the Magazine Barracks (See Trotter 2009). This was evident during oral interviews with former residents and is illustrated in the efforts of bodies such as the Magazine Barracks Remembrance Association (MBRA) which holds meetings from time to time to find ways of preserving the memory of the Magazine Barracks, and the Durban Municipal Pensioners’ Club which organises weekly meetings where former residents socialise. At the Club’s weekly meetings and mass meetings organised by the MBRA, former residents often reminisce about their time in the Magazine Barracks. At the time of writing, the most recent mass meeting of former residents had taken place on 8 November 2014 at the Chatsworth Youth Centre and was attended by more than 700 former residents of the Magazine Barracks.

Kiru Naidoo (2012), one of the study respondents, believes that there is an important story to tell about Chatsworth as a journey of progression, but advocates an insider perspective.

I was born in Chatsworth so in terms of what I write and what I say
Forced Relocations, Memory and Nostalgia

and so on, I think that I am comfortable that there is an authenticity and a legitimacy about what I feel and say and so on. It sometimes upsets me that for people who do not have that experience to write as authoritatively as they do. Let me qualify that, I think that there is a lot of exceptional research that is happening by people who may not have a direct connection there. But there is something about a voice or a lived voice that I think that people like me or of my generation have that what we feel so deeply about.

This raised a broader philosophical debate about who has the right to write history. The Dalits in India claim that only they can write their history from an insider perspective; the Aboriginals in Australia and Canada make similar claims (See Kumar 2013 and Kumar 2010). The disputations and debates over representation are complex. While I respect this perspective, I also hold that one cannot put a hermeneutic seal around interpretation. There is no one authentic voice in any situation. As Sean Field (2012:19) points out, it is ‘not that the outsider cannot say anything about ‘the Other’ but rather that all researchers, outsiders, and insiders must try to understand how their identities and research strategies are shaping informants’ and interviewees’ responses’. Field (2012: 19) adds that ‘even when all the identities of the researcher and researched are identical, unequal power relations exist. There is no power-free research nirvana to be reached’.

While an ‘outsider,’ I tried to make up for this by attending the weekly meetings of the Durban Municipal Pensioners’ Club during 2013 and 2014. During these meetings I spoke to many former residents and listened to the way in which they told stories to me about what life was like in the Magazine Barracks. I also observed the ways in which they reminisced with one another, and the meanings that the barracks have for them today. I also conducted one-on-one qualitative interviews with those who volunteered.

The advantages and shortfalls of oral history methodology have been widely discussed.

As Ciraj Rassool (2010: 82) points out, some researchers are sceptical:

In spite of their commitment to the democratising power of oral history, for many South African social historians, it constituted only a ‘supplementary source’. Its purpose was to supplement more formal/written sources ‘which provide the larger context of public events, of
political and constitutional, economic and institutional developments’. Human memory in the form of oral testimony was ‘given to error, misconception, elision, distortion, elaboration and downright fabrication.

Field (2012: 4) puts it slightly differently but makes the same point, that historians in South Africa ‘still view oral history as a supplement to historical research, which draws primarily on written sources, but occasionally turns offstage to drag in interviews to provide vibrant colour to the serious business of history’. Historians who believe in the written word should remember that archival sources also represent particular viewpoints and that oral sources may represent different but equally important alternatives. Documentary sources are not necessarily more accurate in reconstructing the past. Oral history provides a different kind of historical knowledge, one that is not static but reveals how changing contexts are experienced.

While acknowledging the limitations of oral sources, archival and other documentary sources were also consulted. However, ordinary individuals’ perspectives are indispensable to understand the impact of the GAA from the viewpoint of those affected. During the 1980s, the emergence of so-called radical scholarship, inspired by Marxism, aimed to uncover the ‘submerged agency of ordinary people and give voice to the experience of marginal groups’. Since such voices were often excluded from official archival documents, social historians sought to write history ‘from below’ to create a counter narrative to the official history (Rassool 2010: 84).

Field (2012: 2) suggests that oral history interviews are less about events and more about the meaning behind these events for the narrator. Events become memories in the mind, an ever changing group of thoughts, images, and emotional responses. Oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing and how they think they did do it (see Portelli 1991). It is for this reason that oral history was such an essential tool for this study. Those who embrace oral history recognise that it is a subjective methodology and acknowledge that ‘memory stories are contingent and often fluid’ but believe that this ‘in no way detracts from their veracity and utility’. Rather, the stories add experiential and memory value to actual historical events and fill out such events with meaning and significance. By engaging these stories, oral historians have, in the words of Abrams (2010:6) become both intuitive and imaginative interpreters of their materials’.
The Group Areas Act

The aim of GAA was to achieve complete residential segregation by empowering the state to demarcate areas for exclusive occupation of specific racial groups and to enforce this through forced removals. The three largest, most famous, and well documented freestanding black townships destroyed by the GAA were District Six, Sophiatown, and Cato Manor. Iain Edwards (1991: 415) explains that these three areas have consequently ‘become political metaphors for urban dispossession and resistance’ in South Africa. However, as Saul Dubow (2014: 59) points out, ‘no urban area remained immune from the operation of the ‘Group’ as bureaucrats set to work to fillet out Coloureds, Indians, and Africans in the ‘non-white’ sections of town and created spatial buffer zones between them’. Given its impact, the GAA has been described as an ‘unparalleled example of state directed socio spatial structuring’ in shaping the ‘physical, social, cultural, political, and economic’ landscape in South Africa (Maharaj 1997: 135) and its consequences were far reaching and multifaceted. For around four decades South Africans lived in a landscape shaped by a policy which separated them, and promoted and entrenched inequality and unequal access to resources.

While the local state had long instituted segregation measures in Durban, Group Areas intensified this process. Thousands of mainly African and Indian residents were removed from long settled communities and resettled in townships such as KwaMashu and Umlazi for Africans (see Dlamini 2005), and Chatsworth and Phoenix for Indians (see Ariyan 1999; and Hansen 2012). The predicament of Indians in Durban and coloureds in Cape Town (see Western 1981) was different from that of Africans as, historically, Indians and coloureds had settled in larger numbers on the fringes of cities, which ultimately resulted in a larger percentage of these groups being displaced during the implementation of the GAA. In fact, Indians as a group were proportionally the most affected by forced removals with around 80 per cent of Indians in Durban being relocated. Some scholars have argued that the Durban City Council’s (DCC) desire to rid the city of Indians who were perceived as an economic threat to whites, played a crucial role in the development of legislation that culminated in the GAA and that the DCC utilised this Act for this very purpose (see Maharaj 1992; and Swanson, 1983). Given that force removals resulting from the GAA may have constituted the ‘greatest event in the post-war history of the Indian population of Durban’
(Freund 1995: 64) it is important to investigate how they have made the transition from areas which they made their home after indenture on the fringes of the city, to larger racially segregated townships such as Chatsworth and Phoenix.

Dubow (2007: 8) summarises the two trends which have dominated the historiography of the GAA:

For at least 25 years, from the end of the 1960s to the early 1990s, there were in South African historiography two fairly clear, mutually diverging viewpoints on the relationship between capitalism and apartheid, and their presence can still be sensed in new influential works of history. The radical revisionist viewpoint claimed that apartheid was created by and served capitalist interests that, because of the system, enjoyed access to great quantities of forced, cheap labour and state subsidies. In the view of the radical historians, the rapid growth in the South African economy during most of last century showed that segregation and apartheid were intentional and rational forms of government. The liberal viewpoint has assumed that apartheid was the result of the racist sentiments of Afrikaner nationalists, who dominated political power at least after the Pact government of 1924, and that, contrary to the opinion of revisionists, the system has slowed down economic growth.

While there is debate on the extent to which human agency applies, especially with regard to how South Africans responded to the laws imposed upon them by the state, this paper takes the approach suggested by Kata Uusihakala (2008: 4) that although ‘historical forces such as colonialism have shaped and continue to shape the lives of people globally, they are always reflected upon and given meanings in culturally specific ways’. Understanding the means in which South Africans affected by Group Areas responded to the structural forces imposed upon them is crucial to understanding the multifaceted impact of the GAA.

Etienne Nel (1990: 1) has pointed out that ‘geographic space in South Africa has been subsumed to the dictates of the prevailing political ideology of apartheid’ to such a great extent that ‘structure manifested by both the economy and the society reflects the ideals striven for by the architects of apartheid’. However many victims of forced removals, such as residents of the Magazine
Barracks have defined in their own ways what state created housing meant to them and created their own meaning of state laws. Although the Magazine Barracks was created to house a labour force to serve the labour requirements of the DCC, residents in their own way created a space which became crucial to their identity and which is revered today. Likewise, the move to Chatsworth did not create residents who functioned in coherence to the state’s aims of geopolitical engineering. In order to examine the impact of the GAA on former residents of the Magazine Barracks it is necessary to examine why the Magazine Barracks were constructed and what it came to mean to its residents over time.

**Durban’s Indian Municipal Employees**

Although indentured labourers who were brought to Natal from India between 1860 and 1911 are known primarily for their role on the sugar plantations, a significant number were employed by the municipality as well. With Durban and Pietermaritzburg establishing themselves as the major urban centres in Natal, they employed indentured workers to perform tasks such as street sweepers and night soil removers. Between January 1864 and July 1907, 1 437 indentured Indians were allocated to the Durban municipality.\(^1\) When the first Indians arrived in Durban to work for the municipality there was no housing and they consequently found accommodation in informal settlements such as Bamboo Square on the Point, a narrow strip of land next to the entrance of the Bay of Natal (Kearney 2002: 30). Located close to where they worked, this was an ideal location for the newly-employed Indian municipal workers.

By the 1870s the settlement included Tsonga, Indian, St Helenian, Chinese, Malay, Mauritian, and African workers (Kearney 2002: 30 - 31). From 1874, when the Secretary of Native Affairs, Theophilus Shepstone, introduced the togt or day labour system, Zulu workers who were employed by the municipality also found accommodation at Bamboo Square (Home 1998: 48). The rapid urbanisation of black people and their living in informal settlements was of concern to the DCC and the white electorate. In 1866, the Borough Police wrote to the DCC to express concern about Bamboo Square, and pointed to ‘at least seven other locations’ where Africans and Indians lived

\(^1\) This is according to the official Ship Lists. For a discussion on the construction of the Ship Lists, see Vahed and Waetjen (2014).
In 1870 Councillor Tyzack called for a separate location for Indians due to ‘evils’ arising out of overcrowding at Bamboo Square. He regarded this as ‘a serious matter with these Indians whose habits generally are not conductive to health’ (cited in Kearney 2002: 32). Although these concerns were expressed in language about health and sanitation, this period coincided with the arrival of Indian traders, known as passengers, which increased fears of a rapid increase in the urban population and made it more urgent to control Indian settlement in the city. The DCC’s solution to this perceived fear of urbanisation of blacks, was to create barracks-type accommodation for its employees.

In 1874, land was purchased just north of the Durban CBD on the Eastern Vlei. It was named the Magazine Barracks after a nearby military complex which stored magazine powder (ammunition). The Magazine Barracks was completed in 1884 and the original building comprised of 93 tiny ‘houses,’ with 26 allocated to married men and 67 to single men (Home 1998: 48). Each house comprised of a single room, roughly five metres by five metres in size, which had to be used as a kitchen, dining room, lounge and bedrooms. The entire complex was fenced, with two gates which were locked at night and guarded by Indian sirdars who were employed by the DCC to enforce law and order within the Magazine Barracks (Murugan 1998: 14). Two single men or one family lived in each house, regardless of the number of children per family. According to former resident Danny Pillay (2012), in later years, families were very large, with up to 15 children and it was not uncommon to find children sleeping on the kitchen floor or even outside on the balcony in summer. As the number of residents increased and children grew up, married couples had no option but to share rooms with other family members as their low income did not allow for private renting. They erected curtains across the rooms for privacy. The early wood and iron structures lacked electricity or running water and residents relied on communal taps and toilets. In 1928, the Indian Social Services Committee (ISSC), an organisation formed by educated and professional class Indians who were keen to ‘uplift’ the social condition of poorer Indians, reported that residents had to bathe in toilets with no doors (Vahed 1995: 83 -84), while Swaminathan Gounden (2002: 13) a former resident of the Magazine Barracks, recalled that as many as ‘twelve people could be using these toilets in full view of one another’ at a time.

The barracks were ideal for the DCC since they were cheap to build.
and maintain, and were ideal to teach and maintain discipline. This is reflected in a 1935 DCC report:

Apart from the economies obtained from the provision of communal sanitary washing and bathing blocks, there are undoubted advantages in having an adequate labour supply available at any hour for emergency work, and the possibility of following up all cases of absenteeism as they arise. A further advantage is the continuous supervision which is only possible in large barracks or compounds and we are further of the opinion that the training and control they receive under that system must be beneficial to the Indians themselves ... Would the provision of cottage type of house – the presumptive alternative – not constitute an unnecessary incentive to the increase of the size of families? (cited in Vahed 1995: 83).

Although the design of the barracks and its living conditions were dictated by the utilitarian purposes of the DCC, residents responded to these conditions in their own means and created a powerful identity associated with the Magazine Barracks. Every participant who lived in the Magazine Barracks that was interviewed for this study stated that they were ‘very happy’ when they lived in the Magazine Barracks and explained that they missed the rich cultural and community life. Many stated that if it was possible to go back, they would. For example at the end of her interview when asked if there was anything that she would like to add, Mrs Pillay (2013) stated, ‘if the place was big enough and if it was possible to go back, we would really want to go back’.

Rather than focus on poverty and overcrowding, interviewees described strong notions of sharing, family, and closeness, which they miss today. Siva Kugesan (2013) spoke of the strong culture of sharing as residents saw themselves as part of ‘one large family’. She added that neighbours would often eat together or exchange food. Many other former residents highlighted this that although most were poor, they rarely went hungry because people were willing to share food and it was common for children to visit neighbours’ houses to do so. John Kisten (2012), who lived at the Magazine Barracks for over 30 years, said that ‘we lived as one big loving community. There was so much of love, understanding and respect, we respected our elders. It was very, very nice’.

Most residents spoke about their ‘progressive nature’ which they deve-
K. Gopalan

loped to help cope with poverty by working together. Indian municipal employees established their own trade union called the Durban Indian Municipal Indian Employees Society (DIMES), and residents of the Magazine Barracks established many voluntary bodies such as the Friends of the Sick Association (FOSA), a Child Welfare Committee, St John Ambulance and the Red Cross First Aid, amongst others, to help one another. In addition they took advantage of their surroundings to find ways to supplement their income. For example, some men partook in fishing, and women found employment as domestic workers or sold fruit and vegetables.

Consequently, when former residents speak about the Magazine Barracks in the present their accounts are characterised by nostalgia. For example, Deena Muthen (2012) recalled …,

There was such tremendous love. Yes, but you still get the harmony, in Magazine Barracks the harmony was there, Oh yes, there was that harmony, I wish I could explain to you… there was such a tremendous love amongst our people, I wish I could see that now. Everything was available there for us, the beaches were nearby, the shopping centres were nearby, the Durban Market was nearby, the cinemas were nearby.

Relocation to Chatsworth

On 12 December 1958, the DCC purchased land in Umhlatuzana, 20 kilometres south west of the Durban CBD, for the construction of approximately 14 000 houses to accommodate Indians who would be displaced during the implementation of the GAA. Umhlatuzana included the farming districts of Chatsworth, Cavendish, Welbedacht, Witteklip, Buffelsbosch and Zeekoe Valley, as well as three private Indian townships, Silverglen, Kharwastan, and Umhlatuzana. Combined, this area would come to constitute the Chatsworth Indian Township which comprised of 89 acres, 61 acres of which was suitable for housing (see Subramony 1993; Vahed 2013). The bulk of the housing was low cost, utilising cheap materials and maximum space. By the early 1960s, after several unsuccessful court challenges, residents of the Magazine Barracks came to realise that they would have vacate what had been a home for thousands, for close to eight decades and be relocated to different areas in Chatsworth.
Whereas most regarded the barracks as their home and had a strong attachment to it, to their neighbours, and to the broader Magazine Barracks community, former residents pointed out during interviews that they always knew that they could not stay there permanently. Other than space problems which grew worse each year, residents did not own the land or their houses and faced eviction when they were no longer working for the municipality. Having said this, the respondents also pointed out that they anticipated leaving the Magazine Barracks gradually at some future date and of their own volition. The DCC’s decision to forcibly resettle them in the distant and unfamiliar Chatsworth was not something they had foreseen.

The move to Chatsworth also proved expensive for both residents who had to rebuild their lives in the new setting and the DCC which struggled to keep pace with service delivery demands. At the Magazine Barracks, residents had paid just 86 cents in rent, while their employer provided paraffin and wood rations and they lived within walking distance of work. In Chatsworth, residents had to pay more than double in rent, had to pay for electricity and water, had to buy electric stoves, and had to pay for transportation to and from the city to work, do shopping, and to visit relatives and friends. Pillay (2013) pointed out that, in contrast to the Magazine Barracks where residents had built a community over many decades, Chatsworth in the 1960s was a bare housing scheme ‘with no public amenities, no infrastructure such as roads, schools, shops, temples or mosques, sports fields or community centres’.

While the pay was low at the Durban Corporation, some found ways to improve their situation. The interviewees noted that while some workers chose to remain in low paying positions, for those who were determined, there were ways to climb the ladder to higher positions. Many respondents, who spoke about their climb up the ladder within the municipality, narrated their experiences as part of a ‘progressive nature’ that was developed when they lived in the Magazine Barracks. For example when narrating how he managed to work his way up in the Durban Corporation Naddie Perumal (2013) explained ‘once you are in the Corporation, a lot of people, found ways to improve themselves’.

Although the opportunities to supplement their incomes which existed in the CBD disappeared in Chatsworth, some residents found ways to do so in the new environment. Vassie Muthen said that this was because of the ‘progressive nature’ and ‘resourcefulness’ that was developed at the Magazine Barracks. He added that although residents lived as one big family and treated
one another as ‘brother and sister’ they were also ‘brought up to live independently’. For him, it was this ‘upbringing’ which led to some finding creative ways to become ‘small time entrepreneurs,’ when they arrived in Chatsworth. For example, due to the absence of retail stores, some residents of the township started tuck shops at their houses which provided daily essentials. V. Muthen and his wife sold milk, bread, sugar, tea, and other items, while others opened barbershops (hairdressing) or car repair workshops.

Speaking of how his grandmother adapted to conditions in Chatsworth after relocation from the Magazine Barracks, Kiru Naidoo (2012) recalled,

I think her strongest contribution in all of this was that she was a woman really ahead of her time, very entrepreneurial, entrepreneurial with really nothing. She had nothing to begin with but she really made a great deal with nothing. She set up a tuck shop at home, I mean now we call it a tuck shop but she was literally a woman with a box of eggs and cigarettes .... They [elder generation] spent very little, very frugal people but very, very high, exceptional rates of savings to be able to do this. So I think she had that matriarchal quality about her. If there were the right sort of political circumstances, I am more than certain that my granny would have been a millionaire. You know apartheid presented obstacles for her. If she had the slightest of opportunities, she would have been phenomenal. She just had a way and this is a woman who has never been in a classroom, who couldn’t even read or write Tamil but had, I think of it as a generosity of heart and spirit. She grew up [raised] so many people..... So there is that element of it. So if we talk about Chatsworth, as a story of triumph.

Whereas forced removals are often seen in the literature as creating ‘victims,’ many removed from the Magazine Barracks emphasised how they and their families overcame difficult odds. John Kisten explained that instead of facing the situation as powerless victims, most of the removees accepted the inevitable and tried to make the best of their predicament. Although it was difficult in the early years, the residents concentrated on making the best of it and this enabled them to improve their circumstances considerably. In this regard, moving to Chatsworth provided much-needed improvement to the situation that existed in the Magazine Barracks where the space problem would have been compounded. Kisten said that once residents got over their initial
‘shock’ and ‘sadness’ of being displaced from their homes and split from their neighbours, ‘instead of just sitting and moaning and groaning, we thought let’s see’. For Kisten it was this attitude and the progressive nature of former residents that enabled them to succeed. He added that had they remained in the Magazine Barracks it would have been difficult because families could not be accommodated in the overcrowded conditions for much longer. In his work as a priest, he was often called upon to offer prayers when a former resident of the Magazine Barracks made a purchase like a car or some other major investment and he said that it gives him great pride because at the barracks, only two people owned cars.

V. Muthen supported this:

In my voluntary work I do a lot of visits to these families, also because of my religious work at Magazine Barracks Shree Vishnu Temple, because of my religious work and social activities and being a chairman of the Durban Municipal Pension Fund and also being a secretary in the Magazine Barracks Remembrance Association, I use to go interview people on how they progressing, what their fathers and mothers use to do in Magazine Barracks and all that. Checking their past and checking their future and how they come up from and how they are moving up the ladder now, the progress is tremendous. I am not speaking bad about Magazine Barracks, I am one proud of the member of the Magazine Barracks. But I am sorry if they stayed in that same communal living they wouldn’t be where they are now. They would be very happy and would progress in a small way, but they wouldn’t progress to the extent that they progressed now.

This long quote captures an important theme that emerged during many of the interviews. The loss of communal living, although lamented by former residents of the Magazine Barracks, also meant economic progression and a ‘modern way’ of life. The initial hardships of Chatsworth were difficult but from a longer term perspective it allowed former residents to move out of a closely confined space and provided them with new opportunities.

When discussing the social and cultural impact of moving to Chatsworth former residents of the Magazine Barracks also exhibited notions ‘comparative memory,’ where they compared life before forced removals to life after forced removals. In this instance, they ignored or downplayed the
disadvantages of their settlements before forced removals, which they then contrasted with the settlements after relocation. For example, when asked about poverty or violence in the Magazine Barracks, former residents explained that although it existed, it was under control, unlike what happened in Chatsworth. In the Magazine Barracks, poverty was described fondly as something that promoted sharing and communal bonds. In Chatsworth, poverty in the initial years was described by something that was unfamiliar and created unbearable hardship. Violence too was depicted this way. Referring to gangsterism that existed in the Magazine Barracks, Perumal (2013) explained that,

The gangsters, big gangsters too, they don’t just fight for nothing unless there was a good reason. They were very helpful like, they help each other, you know I told you they were like a community like, like one family like. They never see somebody getting hurt or falling down or something, they take him home put him in bed. That is what they do, they help each other. But here in Chatsworth, all that is gone.

He added that when they came to Chatsworth and were split up, the discipline fell away. There was ‘no unity’, they started going their own way and there were fights between rival gangs.

**Remembering the Magazine Barracks**

An important component to examining Group Areas is to investigate how the forced removals are remembered and whether and how they are commemorated. Despite the vast body of literature on forced removals, until recently the perspectives of ordinary people were largely ignored, with most emphasis on government policy and an excessive focus on victimhood. Museums such as the District Six Museum in Cape Town and South End Museum in Port Elizabeth allow people to tell their own stories (see Kadi 2007). Much thought and planning has been put into these projects, and they try to capture memories of anti-apartheid activism and the effects of forced removals through interviews, photographs, and newspaper reports. In the South End Museum one gets the sense of a multi-racial, close-knit community destroyed by Group Areas.

What of Chatsworth? One cannot speak of ‘Chatsworth’ as a homo-
Forced Relocations, Memory and Nostalgia

genous unit but rather of attempts to institutionalise memories of the Magazine Barracks through the MBRA. The MBRA was established in 1997 in response to the new ANC land restitution programme. The act which aimed to ‘produce reconciliation and ‘healing’ of the country through the return of, or compensation for, lost land rights’ and was administered by the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) (Bohlin 2007: 118). As Anna Bohlin (2007: 127-128) argues, although the CRLR aimed to address the past suffering and injustice carried in living memory by those who were personally affected, the impact of the commission has been academically analysed almost exclusively in terms of its legal, administrative, and organisational dimensions. Missing from the literature are the ways in which land claims have led to people engaging with the past in new ways, and consequently the production of new memories.

In order to claim compensation for land lost, those who were forcibly displaced under apartheid were required to provide documentary evidence of their dispossession. Many people provided old photographs and oral testimonies situating their personal experience of displacement in a grander narrative of GAA removals. For Bohlin, one important ‘side effect’ of this process has been the production of a collective memory. Bohlin’s study of Kalk Bay, a small fishing community in the Western Cape, found that since only a small number of residents were forced to relocate (around 120 people, mainly Coloureds and Indians), many residents were not even aware that Kalk Bay was affected by Group Areas and the land claim process was important in producing a new collective memory.

In the case of the Magazine Barracks, as with other areas affected by the GAA, this was a lived experience for thousands. Even before the ANC government’s land restitution programme there were active attempts amongst former residents to preserve some form of Magazine Barracks memory despite, and because of obstacles such as the separation of neighbours. The recreation of places within and around the Magazine Barracks in Chatsworth such as the Chatsworth Magazine Barracks Shree Vishnu Temple and the naming of the Depot Road Memorial School are examples. Soccer clubs and other social ‘clubs’ such as school committees were ways in which residents attempted to maintain the bonds and linkages that had existed at the Magazine Barracks. The activities of the MBRA are different in several ways. In the first instance, these identities are being produced in a different context. For example, in the post-apartheid period, there are fears of marginalisation amongst Indians and
this process provides a means of communal identity. Also different is that over the decades many of the former residents of the Magazine Barracks acquired professional qualifications and other skills and this social capital was important in organising the community and preparing relevant documentation. The various mass meetings of residents over the past 15 years helped to forge a collective memory amongst former residents who were able to actively reminisce with one another about the ‘good old days’. Nostalgic recollections of the values and benefits of communal living at the Magazine Barracks and a narrative of progression and upliftment of community were promoted at such meetings.

Leaders in the MBRA who spoke of the origins of the association situate its existence in the collective drive to help one another in any way possible; a trait that they say existed at the Magazine Barracks. This is evident in V. Muthen’s (2012) recollection of the origins of the MBRA

Then when we came to Chatsworth, then we fought, we fought very hard, the Magazine Barracks Remembrance Society fought very hard. It was one day when I was sitting here at home, and then a call from the late Captain Marimuthu. He said, ‘Ah what are we doing, we are sitting back and not even thinking of collecting some sort of compensation for being forcibly removed from Magazine Barracks’. And he put me on to a female lawyer, Samba who was from Magazine Barracks. As a young girl she was there and then she qualified as a lawyer, and then I phoned Danny, and then a long conversation and then with our late secretary, and we said we have to help those who are in need and cannot do this on their own. Our late secretary [Nelson Veerasamy] and Danny together worked tooth and nail, they worked very hard, they worked very hard.

Although forced removals were effected in the early 1960s and the MBRA was only established in 1997, V. Muthen’s narrative, and those of others, point to the idea of continuity. V. Muthen added that after they started the organisation they had to interview families to get the details and documentary evidence from each of those that were resettled. This was a mammoth undertaking and members of the committee personally conducted interviews with those who were displaced. Kisten (2012) pointed out that it would have cost thousands of rand for each family if they had got outsiders to compile the documentation
and that is why they volunteered. For example, Deena provided his services as a commissioner of oaths and D. Pillay would leave his business early to help sort out documents. Kisten (2012) said that they did it ‘out of love for our community …. We got the documents, we went out of our way to make sure they were in order, and we never charged our people... You will go throughout the world and you will never find a community like that’.

In 1998 the association organised sessions at the New Bethesda Church Hall, the Chatsworth Youth Centre, and the Greenvale Primary School to conscientise former residents about the process and to help them prepare their applications. Representatives of around 2 000 displaced households from the Magazine Barracks came forward and these applications were submitted to the KwaZulu Natal Lands Claims Commission on 17 December 1998 with payments made from 2003. Not everyone was happy as some claims were rejected and successful claimants were paid R20 000 each as opposed to the R50 000 paid to other claimants because they did not own the land at the Magazine Barracks. The human suffering was not given appropriate weight.

Although initiated for the purpose of land claims, the process and the MBRA became a platform to promote the memory of the Magazine Barracks amongst a younger generation. Discussing the origins of the Association, Deena emphasised its importance in preserving bonds which once existed and the notion of one large Magazine Barracks ‘family,’ something that was lost because of their dispersal to various units in Chatsworth. While the idea of being a ‘family’ at the barracks is itself nostalgic, Deena believes that ‘we were no more that one family. Now to keep that thing going we started the Magazine Barracks Remembrance Association... to ‘get the people together, to come together to eat supper, keep that family unity’.

The Association has several ideas to ensure that these memories will not be lost. One is to compile a book to remind future generations of ‘where they came from,’ in Kisten’s (2012) words. During the land claims procedure, many families had to dig into their past and tracked their ancestors and the history of their families. They also charted the financial improvements made by families after they settled in Chatsworth, which was seen as a story of triumph. Unfortunately, this process was delayed by the death of their secretary Nelson Veerasamy in 2008 and they have not been able to locate all the information which was gathered from these interviews.

Another project that the founders of the MBRA have in mind is to build a hall and house a museum within it. D. Muthen (2009) said that,
Danny is looking for an area where we can purchase land – we want to bring back something in Chatsworth that would be a memory, a legacy, you know, that future generations will know where their grandparents and their parents came from – the Magazine Barracks – because that place where we lived, every person was very, very, very culturally, culturally orientated and it’s so unfortunate that we were put into this place – Chatsworth – we’ve lost our culture.

Respondents born at the Magazine Barracks and interviewed for this study, as well those who spoke during the many municipal pensioner meetings emphasised that the notion of a ‘Magazine Barracks identity’ was, and still is, important to them. This also applied to children of residents of the Magazine Barracks who were born in Chatsworth. For many of them, the Magazine Barracks remains a focal point of reference. For example, Naidoo (2012) said that his parents and grandparents saw the Magazine Barracks as an ‘exclusive club’. When they spoke to each other ‘they reminisced about the districts in which they used to live’. While Naidoo is open to people of all race, religious and class backgrounds, he too believes that there is that unidentifiable something that binds them together.

Most former residents believe that the GAA destroyed their rich and close-knit community even while facilitating material progress for many and providing a solution to the severe overcrowding at the Magazine Barracks. V. Muthen (2012) and others believe that unlike most others who were resettled in Chatsworth, the former residents of the Magazine Barracks are unique in that they did not lose their attachment completely and that this has strengthened in recent years.

Kisten (2012) supported the notion of a Magazine Barracks identity which helped residents to overcome some of their challenges in Chatsworth in the past and the present: ‘if I hear someone [from Chatsworth] has a problem, I run to assist because we came from that humble beginnings. We have not forgotten our roots,’ he said in reference to his voluntary civic work in Chatsworth. D. Muthen (2012) also said that the voluntary schools, medical clinic and feeding schemes which he runs today at no charge are the result of his upbringing at the Magazine Barracks and the ethos of community self-help that was ingrained in him by his father who always taught his children to serve others.
Conclusion

The story of Indian municipal workers since the 1870s shows how their living conditions were constantly shaped by the racist capitalist forces which so fundamentally determined the trajectory of South Africa’s social, economic, and political growth. The Magazine Barracks was primarily established to enable the DCC to have a cheap and manageable labour force at their disposal. However, residents made it into their home. Indian municipal employees were not passive victims, but took advantage of their situation and created a powerful identity associated to the Magazine Barracks.

Although many outsiders assign pejorative connotations to the term ‘barracks’ and its residents, for its former residents it is a term that is revered and holds special value because it is a reminder of their ‘humble beginnings,’ as some respondents put it, and how so many of them ‘progressed’ despite their difficult circumstances. This supposedly intrinsic quality of seeking to succeed against all odds helped the residents to cope with life at the Magazine Barracks and they felt that it also helped many to improve themselves materially in Chatsworth. However, it was not individual success but the community working together which helped uplift many in the process. Respondents describe their family histories as a kind of ‘rags to riches’ story. This ‘success’ and progress is crucial to the identities of interviewees.

The former residents of the Magazine Barracks were also keen to emphasize that it was impossible for an outsider to understand what the barracks meant to them, particularly the passion and camaraderie that existed there.

The Magazine Barracks produced a powerful shared experience, albeit a racially exclusive one in relation to Africans, but also one where the former residents of the barracks are keen to counter the stereotypes that other Indians have of them, associating them with ‘thuggery’ and ‘violence’ and the general negative qualities of being working class. They ignored and downplayed the disadvantages of their lives before forced removals and portrayed the barracks in a positive light as a place of prestige to have come from.

During the 1960s when the Group Areas proclamations were implemented in Durban, the Magazine Barracks was home to nearly 10 000 people. Apart from the practical benefits of living near to the city centre where municipal employees worked, residents resented vacating what had been their home for so many years. This they had in common with the millions of others affected by the GAA. Some former residents stated that what alarmed them
most was being split from their neighbours who they regarded as family. Houses with running water and electricity eventually appealed to some following their relocation to Chatsworth, even though most residents were unhappy about being forcibly evicted from their homes. The NIC’s ineffectiveness in challenging Group Areas, and the role played by those deemed to be ‘leaders’ at the Magazine Barracks in actually facilitating the move to Chatsworth minimised the anger and possible large-scale protests by residents, many of whom seemed to take the position that since they had ‘no choice’ they should make the best of their situation.

The physical violation of their community initially made residents of the Magazine Barracks angry and resulted in a sense of powerlessness as well as disorientation in the new township. Group Areas did not just mean that individuals were thrown out of their homes, but entire communities and a way of life which was created over decades were suddenly reduced to shreds. It is thus perfectly understandable that those were displaced spoke of their losses and described the GAA as a destructive force. Despite getting their own homes, Chatsworth was initially a bare housing scheme with no amenities. Houses were plagued with structural problems, roads were inadequate and dangerous gangs flourished. The extended family system was altered, the cost of living increased considerably, especially due to inadequate and higher transport costs, and many former residents were separated from neighbours that they had known for several generations. However, in the long term, residents were able to extend their homes and benefit from expanded educational and other opportunities, as well as running water and electricity.

Former residents speak nostalgically about the community that they created and have fond memories of growing up at the Magazine Barracks. The ‘unstable’ post-apartheid present seems to be producing this serene and thriving past. The move to Chatsworth was not just about material loss; underlying some of the narratives was the sense that the loss included loss of stability, friendships, family, culture, and religion, and a way of life; in other words, of self.

References
Ariyan, Luxien L 1999. The Impact of the Group Areas Act upon Indian South
Forced Relocations, Memory and Nostalgia


K. Gopalan


**Interviews**

Mrs. Pillay, former resident of the Magazine Barracks interviewed 15 April 2013.

Danny Pillay, former resident of the Magazine Barracks interviewed 28 November 2012.

Siva Kugesan, former resident of the Magazine Barracks interviewed 31 January 2013.
Forced Relocations, Memory and Nostalgia

John Kisten, former resident of the Magazine Barracks interviewed 12 December 2012.
Deena Muthen, former resident of the Magazine Barracks interviewed 1 December 2012.
Vassie Muthen, former resident of the Magazine Barracks interviewed 12 December 2012.
Naddie Perumal former resident of the Magazine Barracks interviewed 5 February 2013.

K. Gopalan
Department of History
University of Fort Hare
KGopalan@ufh.ac.za
Channelling Migrant Remittances from South Africa to Zimbabwe: Opportunities and Obstacles

Divane Nzima

Abstract
As migration-development interactions continue to expand, migrant remittances have taken a leading role in cementing these interactions. Given the centrality of remittances in the migration-development debates, this paper gives an outlook into the experiences and strategies of migrants and their households in the transfer of remittances to Tsholotsho district in Zimbabwe. This paper seeks to show how South Africa based Zimbabwean migrants from the Tsholotsho district in Zimbabwe channel their remittances to their remaining household members. In addition, the paper examines the opportunities and obstacles encountered by migrants in negotiating different channels of remittance transfer at their disposal. This study was conducted using a mixed methods approach and data was collected in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. 159 household principals in Tsholotsho responded to survey questionnaires while five key informants were interviewed as well as 15 migrants based in Johannesburg. This study found that the experiences and strategies of remittance transfer amongst migrants and their remaining household members in Tsholotsho were congruent with findings of previous studies conducted in other regions and countries. Migrants preferred the use of informal channels over the formal channels. Despite the risks associated with the use of informal channels various factors including the cost of transfer led migrants to use informal channels of sending remittances.

Keywords: migrant remittances, channels of transfer, Omalayitsha, South Africa, Tsholotsho
Introduction

Studies focusing on the role of migrant worker remittances in local development and improving household livelihoods are increasingly gaining interest on how these remittances reach their intended destination. Given that some migrant workers are documented while others are not, the migrant status has a bearing on the choice of the remittance channels used. While formal channels of money transfer exist, most undocumented migrant workers have no access to them hence the reason they come up with a plethora of creative ways to transfer remittances. Previous research has estimated that the majority of remittances are transferred via various informal channels such as carrying them in person, using a friend or relative, using a bus or taxi driver (Deshingkar et al. 2006; Savage & Harvey 2007; Orozco 2012; Chami 2012). Despite the dominance of informal channels, these studies also acknowledged that substantial amounts of remittances were also being sent through official channels such as Money Transfer Operators, Banks and Postal Unions. According to Orozco (2012), in most developed countries about 60% of migrants used formal channels whereas in Africa, migrants predominately if not exclusively used informal channels. Orozco (2012) attributed the aforementioned situation to repressive laws that prohibit outward international transfers by individuals except in extraordinary circumstances. These repressive laws are often justified as measures put in place to guard against money laundering and limiting access to terrorist funding. In cases where such an official transfer occurs, Orozco (2012) argued that the transfer was usually done only when one had a bank account, something that has never been common amongst undocumented migrant workers. While growing volumes of research on migrant remittances exist in Zimbabwe, studies focusing on the experiences of remittance transfer are sparse (Maphosa 2007; Mangunha, Bailey & Cliffe 2009; Bracking & Sachikonye 2010). In addition, the district of Tsholotsho has had a long and unique culture of migration to South Africa (see Nzima, Duma & Moyo 2016b) and yet very little is known on how migrant workers and their remaining households experience and negotiate various channels of remittance transfer. Given the centrality of remittances in the migration-development debates, this paper gives an outlook into the experiences and strategies of migrants and their households in the transfer of remittances to Tsholotsho. This paper seeks to show how South Africa based Zimbabwean migrant workers from the Tsholotsho area in Zimbabwe channel
their remittances to their remaining household members. In addition, the paper examines the opportunities and obstacles encountered by migrants in negotiating different channels of remittance transfer at their disposal. The following section will look closely at the research methodology used in this study.

Research Methodology
Paul Feyerabend, a renowned philosopher and anarchist once argued that plurality is the best medicine for epistemology. He held the view that,

… A scientist who wishes to maximize the empirical content of the views he holds and who wants to understand them as clearly as he possibly can, must therefore introduce other views; that is, he must adopt a pluralistic methodology … (Feyerabend 1975:30).

This study seeks to understand the complexities that migrants encounter in negotiating spaces and maintaining transnational lives though consistently remitting as clearly as possible. Given the differences between migrants’ situations and the need for making quantitative inferences, I adopted a pluralist methodology for this study. With reference to arguments made by Feyerabend, this research employs both quantitative and qualitative methods. Johnson and Onwnegbuzzie (2004) support a mixed methods approach, as it enables the researcher to holistically deal with the complex research problem such as understanding what comes into play when migrants have to decide on which remittance transfer methods to use and which ones best suit their unique situations. For the purpose of this study, 159 households out of the selected sample of 200 responded to self-administered questionnaires. 39 selected participants refused to participate for various reasons. These included lack of trust in the intentions of the research team as well as fear to be wrongfully mistaken to be entertaining political pressure groups. This research was conducted towards the 2013 elections and the environment was politically volatile. In line with research ethics their right to refuse participation was respected. In addition, 5 key informants in Tsholotsho were interviewed and a further 15 migrants took part in interviews in Johannesburg. Key informants were selected on the basis of their leadership influence in the community.
These included religious leader, ward councilors, senior police official and school teacher. Traditional leaders were invited to participate but they declined the offer. Migrant workers in South Africa were selected using snowballing. The key criterion was that they belong in a household in Tsholotsho. Some were selected through referral by their household members in Tsholotsho. The researcher mainly relied on interview notes as most of the participants refused to be recorded. The main reason for refusing to be recorded was the fear that they could be identified through voice recognition. Therefore, despite assurance for anonymity they were not willing to take chances. For migrant workers, their legal status in South Africa was the major driver of their skepticism towards recordings. In Zimbabwe, the political volatility at the time influenced refusal to be recorded.

Unobtrusive observation was also used as an essential resource in gathering data for this study. The researcher travelled extensively with informal cross border transporters to gain a deep ethnographic understanding of the street level politics governing the informal transfer of remittances. In addition the researcher also used documentary resources in the form of previous published research on the subject of remittances to further corroborate the findings of this study. This study, just like the others before it, which were conducted between the Zimbabwe-South Africa migration corridors, sought to gain insight from the use of plural methods (Maphosa 2007; Mangunha et al. 2009; Ncube & Gomez 2011). The common methodological objective between this study and the ones mentioned above was to maximize on the strengths of mixed methods. Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie (2002) concur that using mixed methods brings research synergy in that numbers can be given more meaning by narratives while narratives can have more precision if complimented by numbers.

**Formal Remittance Channels**

Formal remittance channels are predominately used by migrants with a legal status. Maphosa (2007) concurs with my assertion that undocumented migrants are less likely to use official channels when compared to documented migrants. Therefore, this implies that undocumented migrants often opt for informal channels despite the fact that they may be very unsafe. Researchers have argued that formal remittance channels are licensed and they are very safe
compared to the informal ones (Savage & Harvey 2007; Orozco 2012). There are several factors that determine the type of channel that migrants choose to use. Maphosa (2007:125) notes the availability of ‘… banking and other financial institutions, the speed, efficiency, security of the system and the educational status of the sender …’ as some of the most outstanding determinants.

There are several formal remittance channels that migrants can choose from. Sander (2003) identified three main formal channels that are used by migrants and these are the Banks, Post Offices and Money Transfer Operators (MTOs). According to Sander (2003), banks are often the cheapest formal option for larger remittance transactions. However, they generally have high costs for smaller transactions. He further noted that, though the bank is a more secure channel, it can be slow and the processes involved can be very cumbersome (Ibid.). Post Offices have been seen to be often cheaper in comparison to other formal channels and they have a high accessibility rate. Their main disadvantage is that they often have a poor service quality and have a lack of liquidity in many developing countries. These are attributes that contribute to an unnecessary delay of the process severely inconveniencing the recipients (Sander 2003). Money Transfer Operators have been identified by Sander (2003) as the speediest, being also reliable and accessible in major centers. Their problem though, is that they have high costs per transaction especially for smaller transactions. In addition they tend to have very unfavorable foreign currency exchange rates (Ibid.).

In the case of Zimbabwe, a study undertaken by Maphosa (2007) in Mangwe district revealed that very few people use official channels to remit. This was mainly because there were no banks and financial institutions in this rural district, and that most people who remitted were undocumented migrants (Ibid). Other studies in Zimbabwe indicate that, in 2004, the government, through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) once introduced a formal remittance transfer facility known as Homelink (Maphosa 2007; Chimhandamba 2009; Ncube and Hougaard 2010). This bid sought to encourage the formal transfer of remittances to Zimbabwe. However, the people of Zimbabwe had lost trust in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe given the fiscal and monetary challenges the country faced. Ncube (2010) agrees with this researcher, that migrants are reluctant to use the Homelink facility as it previously led to a dismal failure. She argues that the facility’s reputation was tainted from inception, due to the mere fact that it emanated from the Reserve
Channelling Migrant Remittances from South Africa to Zimbabwe

Bank of Zimbabwe, which had been discredited as a subsidiary of the political elite in the country (Ncube 2010). This general skepticism against government driven initiatives, and the general unavailability of Financial Institutions in the rural areas coupled with a high number of undocumented migrants has hindered many efforts to channel remittances into the mainstream economy in Zimbabwe. There have been recent reports (Karombo 2013) that the money transfer industry is growing between South Africa and Zimbabwe. This has mainly been an initiative of selected South African Banks in partnership with other private players in Zimbabwe such as retail supermarkets. These new developments might signify the beginning of a new dispensation where institutions are making it possible for remittances to enter the mainstream economy and this could ensure that more flows of remittances are recorded officially.

In other African countries, such as Senegal, a study conducted by Thiam (2012) reveals that Senegalese migrant workers remitted an estimated amount of 832 million Euros using formal remittance channels in 2007. The same study revealed that during the period 2005-2009 remittances transferred through formal remittance channels averaged 763 million Euros. Despite the high remittance flows through official channels, Thiam (2012) still raises concerns that an estimated 46% of remittances transferred to Senegal are sent via the informal channels. He suggests that perhaps a reduction in transaction costs and an introduction of incentives may influence more formal transfers. Tall (2008), as quoted in Thiam (2012) asserts that financial institutions in Senegal are interested in the opportunities presented by remittances. He argues that this is evidenced by financial institutions increasingly designing and offering products and services tailored to migrants’ needs. In addition, Thiam’s (2012) research found some Senegalese Banks have been opening branches and agencies in the Diaspora as a move to encourage the formal transfer of remittances to Senegal. This move by Banks presents opportunities for more remittances to be officially recorded, so as to ensure that their contribution to poverty reduction and use as venture capital is measured. In addition, this enables the economic circulation of legitimate money which undoubtedly creates the possible conditions for its growth.

Elsewhere in the world, Chowdhury (2012) conducted a study in Bangladesh, and discovers that government works closely with the Bangladesh Bank to encourage their migrants to send remittances through official channels. In the same spirit, Chowdhury (2012) also finds that other players in the
banking sector create networks abroad to ensure that Bangladesh nationals transfer their remittances through official channels with ease. Furthermore, Chowdhury’s (2012) study reveals that government initiatives such as tax exemptions and the creation of different savings products play a pivotal role in motivating remittance transfer through official channels. Chowdhury (2012) thus concludes that such joint measures taken by government and other stakeholders have seen increasing remittance transfers through official channels and which is increasing day by day in Bangladesh.

Informal Remittance Transfer Channels
The amount of informal remittances that are sent by migrants from host countries to countries of origin is virtually unknown since most of them are sent through informal channels. There are many forms of informal channels and they often tend to be private, posing challenges for the official recording of remittances. Studies have shown that migrants usually prefer to use bus drivers, taxi drivers, friends and family members and many other informal remittance sending methods (Kerzner 2009; Mohapatra et al. 2010). There are many reasons that prompt migrants to send remittances through informal channels. Studies have indicated that undocumented migrants have limited or no access to formal channels. Therefore, the implication is that their only option would be to make use of informal channels (Maphosa 2007; Chimhandamba 2009; Kerzner 2009). The nature of remittances is also an important factor, as Melde and Anich (2012) indicate, that in addition to money, migrants also send consumer goods and food items to their families. This study has revealed that informal channels have proven to be the most convenient in the transfer of such in-kind remittances. These in-kind remittances are usually omitted, both in official statistics and in most remittance surveys, as rightfully observed by Mede and Anich (2012).

Significantly, the point that stands out in many remittance studies is that high transaction costs associated with formal channels such as banks and money transfer operators prompts the majority of migrants to settle for informal channels (Kerzner 2009; Irving et al. 2010; Ratha et al. 2011). According to Melde and Anich (2012:91) ‘… sending remittances between Sub-Saharan countries can cost between 5% and 15% of the total money being remitted’. Given the fact that in most countries remittances are often taxed...
upon receipt as pointed out by Vasconcelos and Meins (2012), the use of informal channels proves to be an easy way out of this a situation.

In the case of Zimbabwe, previous studies have shown that the majority of remittances are sent through informal channels (Bloch 2006; Maphosa 2007; Mosala 2008; Chimhandamba 2009; Solidarity Peace Trust 2009; Ncube & Gomez 2011). In Bloch’s (2006) analysis of the ways through which Zimbabwean migrants transfer remittances, an estimated two thirds transferred their remittances through informal channels. Her study found 43% of Zimbabwean migrant workers transferred their remittances through friends and family, 38% used other parallel channels, and lastly 36% delivered their remittances in person while visiting Zimbabwe (Bloch 2006:82).

Maphosa’s (2007) study in the Mangwe district of Zimbabwe, found the bulk of remittances from South Africa reached their beneficiaries through unofficial channels. Moreover, the most prominent of these channels were found to be cross-border operators, (Maphosa 2007; Solidarity Peace Trust 2009; Ncube & Gomez 2011). Maphosa (2007) concurs with Bloch (2006) that other significant amounts of remittances in Mangwe were personally delivered by remitters, while also noting that some of the remittances were collected by beneficiaries in person. Meanwhile, in his study concerning the importance of remittances Mosala (2008) asserts that consensus existed amongst respondents on the importance of remittances to support remaining household members back in Zimbabwe. Mosala (2008:22) sums up his key findings by saying ‘… remittances are crucial, but circulate through informal channels’. Mosala (2008) also reports that most informal channels used by his respondents, to send their remittances included cross-border traders and public transport staff. It is clear from this exposition that difficulties exist in terms of measuring the real amount of remittances that are sent to Zimbabwe, since the bulk of them are being sent through informal channels.

**Channeling Remittances to Tsholotsho**

This study finds that the majority of households in the Tsholotsho district of Matabeleland North Province in Zimbabwe received the bulk of their remittances through informal channels. Previous studies that have been carried out on migrant remittances and development in other regions came to a similar finding. Most of these have identified that the majority of migrants, especially
in Sub-Saharan countries preferred to use informal and private methods of sending their remittances (Deshingkar et al. 2006; Savage & Harvey 2007; Orozco 2012; Chami 2012). The results of this study points one to the various informal channels through which remittances reach their beneficiaries in Tsholotsho. These include, a friend or relative, using a bus driver or a taxi driver. Given the foregoing, one could even argue that the choice of remittance channels used is carefully thought out as a means to avoid detection by authorities. This is most likely due partly to their immigration status that could lead to arrest and deportation. In addition, this research also notes that there are some households receiving remittances through official channels. However, the volume of official remittances reaching beneficiaries in Tsholotsho is very low. Either way, the choice of remittance channels is made against the need to maximise opportunities and minimise obstacles. The presence of remittances by itself presents opportunities to improve livelihoods, to raise venture capital and to maintain transnational lives. In choosing the method of transfer, migrants in Tsholotsho negotiate obstacles such as their legal status, loss of goods and transfer costs amongst others. While official channels are praised for their safety, there are various obstacles in using them such as high transfer costs which minimises opportunities such as raising venture capital and improving livelihoods. On the other hand, though informal channels are preferred because of their easy accessibility, they are unsafe and present obstacles such as loss of goods. Therefore, the choice of remittance channel is not an easy one. It is made after very careful considerations. Drawing from a sample of 159 households in Tsholotsho, the following (Figure 1) presents survey findings of this study regarding the choices of remittance channels to beneficiaries in Tsholotsho. Though the sample is relatively small, the data does give some kind of indication of the state of affairs in Tsholotsho.

According to the survey findings presented in the graph below, the Malayitsha system is the most popular means of remittance transfer in Tsholotsho, with 42.8% of households having reported to have used this facility. In Maphosa’s (2007) study the Malayitsha system is the most popular remittance transfer channel, with over 50% migrants using it in Mangwe district in Matabeleland South. While some households in Tsholotsho report

---

1 The term Malayitsha is used to refer to informal cross-border transport operators. ‘These cross-border operators carry people, goods and money’ (Maphosa 2007:129).
that they do use official channels, such as money transfer operators (9.4%) and banks (6.9%), this study reveals that informal channels are the most dominant, with a cumulative percentage of over 80%. According to Orozco (2012), the use of informal channels is a common feature in Africa. He argues that while in most developed countries, about 60% of migrants use formal channels, in Africa migrants predominantly, if not exclusively, use informal channels.

Figure 1. Channels of Remittance Transfer to Tsholotsho

There are various reasons that lead migrants to prefer the use of informal channels such as the explanation provided by JHB 02\(^2\) below:

\(^2\) JHB followed by a numerical figure represents the anonymous respondents who are migrants based in Johannesburg, South Africa.
... most of us don’t have papers so we cannot go to a bank because they can catch us and deport us or detain us at Lindela\(^3\). So Malayitsha is our best option even though they are expensive because we know them from home and they don’t require us to produce passport and work permit (Interview JHB 02, May 2013).

Most Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa are undocumented, and as a result they find it difficult to access formal channels such as banks and money transfer operators. As Orozco (2012) concurs, in most cases the use of formal channels may require one to be in possession of a bank account which is often not the case with many illegal migrants. In particular, Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) in South Africa are mostly, if not all, linked to a bank. When a person wants to send money even through a money transfer operator, they almost always are required to have an account with the bank through which the MTO (money transfer operator) operates. Therefore, such arrangements make it extremely difficult, and it deters undocumented migrants from sending their remittances through MTOs or even international bank transfers. Despite that, these are often praised for their safety as a means of transferring money internationally, but their strict monitoring makes the majority of migrants to shun them in favour of the less safe channels of the informal kind.

While Karombo (2013) in Business Day reports that cash transfer service fees are growing and an estimated R6.7 billion is remitted to Zimbabwe per year, there are still structural constraints for migrants and rural dwellers. There are some new MTOs on the rise in South Africa. Some of these operate jointly with popular stores and supermarket, while others operate within the bank, but in disguise. The following migrant’s account sheds some light:

\[
\text{It is not easy to send money from SA, it is worse if you don’t stay in Joburg. These days there is Mukuru you can send using your cellphone, the problem is you need papers to show that you get paid or where you get money. If you have no papers then you can’t register, sometimes you ask a friend to send with their account. There is this other one where you deposit to a certain account and use your cellphone to make sure your people have pin, but I don’t trust it (JHB 05, May 2013)}.\]

\(^3\) Lindela is an immigration detention centre in Johannesburg.
From the above account we can deduce that even with the rise of the new online based MTOs, migrants still face barriers with registration, if they are undocumented. The MTOs require identification documents as well as proof of income. In most cases, these migrants fear to even disclose their employers by submitting the proof of income, and in other cases they simply do not have such proof as they are involved in informal work. There is no doubt that some of these measures are put in place to guard against criminal elements such as money laundering. However, in this particular case, such measures push people to channel money through unsafe informal channels. Another system that is gaining momentum is the *hawala/hundi* system which is common between European and Asian countries. In this system people give their money to a dealer known as a hawalda in the host country and a partner in the origin country pays the recipients. In this system there is no movement of cash, the hawaldars in the host and origin country operate based on trust. They find creative ways of recovering the money owed between the two partners without the movement of cash. The researcher finds that the Zimbabwean migrants interviewed in this study are suspicious of this system, and hence they often steer clear of it. The system is common with migrants from Asian countries and it does not require any paperwork. Zimbabweans preferred to send money through private means such as through a friend, family member or a known Malayitsha, as they regarded this system as too good to be true.

There are also cases where documented migrants still insist on using informal channels to remit to their families. Based on empirical observations made in Tsholotsho, there was only one bank in the District. That bank is not easily accessible for many households, as they are located very far from the Tsholotsho business centre. Therefore, most people preferred to use the Malayitsha because they delivered remittances on the door step. A similar finding was made by Maphosa (2007) in his study conducted in the Mangwe District where he revealed that people preferred the use of the Malayitsha system owing to the unavailability of financial institutions in the rural areas. In the event that formal channels such as MTOs are used, recipients would be required to travel to Bulawayo (city nearest to Tsholotsho) and this would further reduce their remittance amount as some of it will be taken up by transport costs. In addition, some of the recipients are not literate enough as noted by the respondent below.

*.... Sometimes it is better to just buy the things and give Malayitsha or*
Divane Nzima

send money with someone when they are going home, our parents are old and these things can be too complicated for them and they don’t have to do the shopping ... (JHB 07, May 2013).

Another explanation that can be given for the extensive use of the informal migrant remittance transfer channels amongst 80 of the respondents could be the nature of remittances sent by migrant workers to Tsholotsho. While the most common form of remittances is financial in nature, in Tsholotsho remittances extend to in-kind remittances such as groceries, clothes, building materials and many others. Previous studies have also noted the commonality of in-kind remittances in some parts of the world and that they are often likely to be transferred via the informal channels (Maphosa 2005; Bradford et al. 2008; Guiliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009; Mohapatra and Ratha 2011). Using the informal channels such as the Malayitsha system enables people to by-pass the customs-duty as they would otherwise be required to pay in full at the border. In the case of Tsholotsho, the Malayitsha system is the most convenient channel, unless one carries the remittances in person when one is going back home for holidays. While there are concerns of a lack of reliability on the part of the Malayitsha, where there are delays and even cases of goods lost, there has not been other cheaper and much more accessible formal channels of transferring in-kind remittances. According to Maphosa (2007), the damage and loss of goods is problematic, given that there is no insurance against such unexpected developments. In this study, I have learnt that unforeseen occurrences where remittances are lost, delayed, damaged or put to use with the intention to pay back are very common within the Malayitsha system in Tsholotsho. These unfortunate occurrences often cause conflict between Omalayitsha and their clients. In other cases, the conflict becomes a communal matter and causes disharmony between community members. In this section, findings on the channels used to transfer remittances have been presented. The next section will take a closer look at the Malayitsha system and how it functions as it is the most preferred remittance transfer method.

The Malayitsha System
In this present study it has emerged that the Malayitsha remittance system is a very prominent means amongst Zimbabwean migrants to send remittances. In
Channelling Migrant Remittances from South Africa to Zimbabwe

this section, an attempt to zero into this system will be made. The term ‘Malayitsha’ is an Ndebele term meaning, ‘one who loads and carries goods’. This term is now very popular in the Zimbabwe-South Africa migration corridor. The term Malayitsha is used to refer to informal cross-border transport operators. ‘These cross-border operators carry people, goods and money’ (Maphosa 2007:129). In the researcher’s observations, while conducting this study, it is noted that these operators often carry people from Zimbabwe to South Africa without proper travelling documents. It is common belief among Zimbabweans that these operators have strong connections with immigration officials that enable them to smuggle undocumented migrants. Previous studies have also shown that the Malayitsha system has proven to be a very convenient channel for the millions of undocumented migrants in South Africa (Maphosa 2007; Chimhandamba 2009; SPT 2009; Ncube 2010). For undocumented migrants using a formal channel puts them at risk of being deported and besides without proper documents they have no access to the formal systems (Maphosa 2007; SPT 2009; Ncube 2010). The Malayitsha system does not require any documents from the clients. What is important is that clients provide the address where remittances, and sometimes people, have to be delivered. Solidarity Peace Trust (2009), also noted the Malayitsha system has made it easier to remit for families in Matebeleland as opposed to the periods between the 1980s and 1990s when the current Malayitsha system was not in place. This shows that the Malayitsha system has played a significant role in ensuring an improved transfer of remittances to the rural areas of Matabeleland and Tsholotsho in particular, even though their methods are unorthodox at times. Parallels can be drawn between the Malayitsha and the Hawala/Hundi system which is common in South Asia. Just like the Malayitsha system, the Hawala system is based on social networks and trust (Jost & Sandhu 2003; Rahman & Yeoh 2008). The only difference is that with the hawala system there is no movement of money, a person in the host country asks their connections in the origin country to settle the amount remitted on their behalf (Jost & Sandhu 2003; Rahman & Yeoh 2008). These transactions happen based on nothing but trust. In the case of the Malayitsha, money and goods move and again it is a system governed by trust as there often is no paperwork to trace the transactions. The remitter puts his or her trust on the Malayitsha to deliver. Both these systems are innovative and they are aimed at maximizing the opportunities of remittances by side stepping obstacles in the official channels.
The Malayitsha are usually seen carrying loads of goods heading towards Zimbabwe almost on a daily basis. Their business is however at peak during holidays, and the festive season sees many migrants sending money and groceries during these periods. One of the findings for this study was that, the Malayitsha are preferred as a means to transport remittances because they do not require any documentation from their clients. The Malayitsha can easily by pass barriers when crossing borders with goods by using their strong networks with authorities such as law enforcement, customs and immigration officials. The Malayitsha system just like the Hawala system derives its strength from maintaining these strong social connections and partnerships. During holidays most people are on leave and they want to travel. Given their undocumented immigration status, they put their faith on the Malayitsha to get them home. It often also would be the same Malayitsha that brings them back. In most cases, the Malayitsha will be from the same village as his clients and their trust runs deep, which explains why they trust the same Malayitsha to transfer their remittances despite the risk of loss, damage and fear that the Malayitsha will put goods to his personal use. In a similar note, the hawala system thrives on this trust, migrants send their money without any real guarantee that it will reach the beneficiaries but it does (Rahman & Yeoh 2008).

The Malayitsha system operates as a courier. They deliver goods at the doorstep. Given the unavailability of institutions to transfer money or alternative ways to transfer in-kind remittances in the rural areas such as Tsholotsho, beneficiaries prefer to receive their remittances from the Malayitsha. They trust the latter, and in some cases they grew up within the same village. Other earlier studies concur that delivering remittances at the door step sets the Malayistha apart, and hence people avoid unnecessary costs and inconveniences associated with using formal channels (Maphosa 2007; SPT 2009; Ncube 2010). By using the Malayitsha system, beneficiaries are not required to spend more money travelling to the cities to collect their remittances. Other researchers like Chimhandamba (2009) have argued that the Malayitsha system is not necessarily cheaper than formal channels as the cost of sending remittances from South Africa can be up to 20% of the total being transferred.

The findings of this study have also shown that the prices for transporting both in-kind and cash remittances are often negotiated as a result of kinship relations, friendships and social capital networks developed over a long term between the clients and the couriers. Most respondents lamented that
banks and other official channels have fixed prices and there is no room for negotiations. As a result, this reality justifies their choice to always opt for the Malayitsha system and other more flexible informal channels to remit. Respondents also strongly point out that given the economic situation prevailing in Zimbabwe; they often send in-kind remittances such as groceries, furniture, building materials among a host of things. What is peculiar with this is that these are very bulky items, leaving no other better channels that are most convenient for transporting the goods, other than through the Malayitsha. What is interesting is that the goods are not weighed to determine the transfer cost. However, the Malayitsha manually lifts them up, and provides a fee according to how heavy he feels the goods are. Though prices are negotiable, this arbitrary procedure of determining transfer costs for in-kind remittances is arguably one of the disadvantages of the system. Other notable disadvantages of using the Malayitsha system include the delay of delivery of remittances, failure to deliver, operators can be robbed, and goods can be damaged in transit. This is problematic given the background that there is no insurance against such unforeseen occurrences.

**Conclusion**

Migration-development interactions have continued to take centre stage in contemporary migration research. The glue to this nexus is the rising migrant remittance flows that are expected to result in a development dynamic in migrant’s land of origin (Nzima, Duma & Moyo 2016a). Given the centrality of remittances in the migration-development agenda, the need to understand how these remittances are transferred to their beneficiaries becomes necessary. This paper gave an outlook into the experiences and strategies of migrants and their households in the transfer of remittances to Tsholotsho. This paper sought to show how South Africa based Zimbabwean migrants from the Tsholotsho area in Zimbabwe channel their remittances to their remaining household members. In addition, the paper examined the opportunities and obstacles encountered by migrants in negotiating different channels of remittance transfer at their disposal. Different methods of channelling remittances have been discussed. These include formal and informal channels. This paper found that the choice of remittance channels is made against the need to maximise opportunities and minimise obstacles. The presence of remittances by itself
presents opportunities to improve livelihoods, to raise venture capital and to maintain transnational lives. In choosing the method of transfer, migrants from Tsholotsho negotiate obstacles such as their legal status in South Africa, loss of goods during transfer and transfer costs amongst others. While official channels are praised for their safety, there are various obstacles in using them such as high transfer costs which minimises opportunities such as raising venture capital and improving livelihoods for poor households in Tsholotsho. On the other hand, though informal channels are preferred because of their easy accessibility, they are unsafe and present obstacles such as loss of goods and damage. This is problematic given the inherent unavailability of insurance in unofficial channels. Therefore, the choice of remittance channel is not an easy one. It is made after very careful considerations. However, in this paper it merged that migrants from Tsholotsho derived more opportunities from using unofficial channels as evidenced by the prevalent use of the Malayitsha system. This system was found to be driven by trust and social partnerships in South Africa and in Zimbabwe. It presented opportunities to sidestep obstacles inherent in official systems such as bureaucratic processes and the high transfer costs. In addition, it was found to be easily accessible to undocumented migrants who had no access to banks and who needed to avert deportation. This system just like the hawala/hundi system in South Asia was found to be private and allowed personal interaction as remittances were delivered to the doorstep in person. This informal channel is nowhere near perfect. However, it remains the best alternative given the unique remittances sent to Tsholotsho such as bulky in kind-remittances. In addition, in the absence of financial institutions in rural areas like Tsholotsho, it remains the most convenient channel to maintain transnational lives through remittances and thus maximise on the opportunities of continual remittance flows.

References
Naypyidaw: Burma Economic Watch.
Divane Nzima


Channelling Migrant Remittances from South Africa to Zimbabwe


Divane Nzima
Department of Sociology & Anthropology
University of Fort Hare
Alice
dnzima@gmail.com
HIV/AIDS and Muslims in South Africa: The ‘Untouchable’ Disease

Shabnam Shaik

Abstract
UNAIDS (2015) reports that globally there are currently 36.9 million people living with HIV/AIDS. Despite the extensive biomedical, social and cultural research that has been conducted globally, Muslims have largely been absent in the discourse on HIV/AIDS. Worldwide, studies are few and statistical information about Muslims living with HIV/AIDS is lacking. The formulation of intervention programmes, amongst Muslims, is therefore challenging when information about the particular population group is scarce. This paper seeks to conceptualise HIV/AIDS amongst Muslims of Indian descent in Durban, South Africa, with an aim to uncover the social and cultural context of the disease. South African Indian Muslims are part of the worldwide Indian diasporic dialogue and as such certain cultural traditions are shared which influence the manner in which the disease is interpreted and experienced by this group. The study is exploratory in nature and seeks to understand the social and cultural challenges that HIV+ Muslims of Indian descent in Durban, face. Research findings are based on life histories that have been conducted with key participants in order to reveal the hidden nature of HIV/AIDS in the Indian Muslim community of Durban, South Africa.

Keywords: HIV/AIDS, Muslims, South Africa, Indian, Socio-cultural challenges

Introduction
Illife (2006) states that in 1959 the earliest and most substantial evidence of the existence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV,) that subsequently
causes the Acquired Immunodeficiency Virus (AIDS), was discovered in equatorial Africa. It was found, argues Abdool Karim (2008) that the disease is spread from person to person through contact with, and exchange of bodily fluids. According to Parker (2001) initially HIV/AIDS was believed to be a disease that affects primarily homosexuals, however, the groups affected by the spread of the disease has expanded to include heterosexuals. This means that the number of people who could possibly become infected would continue to grow at a rapid pace. AVERT (2015) reports that there are around 2.5 million people, worldwide, becoming infected with HIV each year while 1.7 million people die of AIDS related diseases. Currently, the most rapid spread of HIV is in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and AVERT (2015) states that the number of PLWHIV\(^1\) has, between the years 2001 and 2010, increased by 250%. UNAIDS (2015) reports that there are currently 36.9 million people living with HIV and from this sub-Saharan Africa has been the hardest hit region of the world. WHO (2014) points out that 1 in every 20 adults is living with HIV and from the worldwide total population of PLWHIV, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for roughly 71% of those infected.

Whilst biomedical research has been the focus of HIV research, social science research has become increasingly involved in the discourse on HIV/AIDS. Creating a social understanding of the disease has become necessary in order to implement effective preventative and treatment strategies in the absence\(^2\) of a cure. On a global scale and indeed in South Africa, studies tend to be confined within specific populations, or within what epidemiologists have classified as ‘risk groups’\(^3\). Research has been largely focused on the African indigenous population, with gender relations and power dynamics between men and women forming the focus of the research in Africa due to the largely heterosexual spread of the disease, (Abdool Karim and Abdool Karim, 2008). Reasons for the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, as stated by Illife (2006), have been attributed to social inequalities, migration and poverty experienced by the sub-Saharan region as a result of colonisation as well as economic and

---

\(^{1}\) People living with HIV.

\(^{2}\) Anti-retroviral therapy is the best form of treatment currently available and has recently been found to be successful in reducing infection when taken by HIV- risk populations.

\(^{3}\) Men who have sex with men, sex workers, injecting drug users, children and orphans and women.
political changes that have occurred in many countries. Parker (2001) asserts that anthropologists have carried out ground-breaking research that, since the 1980s, has raised concern around the significance of cultural systems in direct relation to shaping sexual practices which has related to the prevention and transmission of HIV. Despite such findings, however, research is heavily skewed in favour of biomedical, quantitative research.

In terms of studies concerning HIV and Muslims, Esack and Chiddy (2009) bring to our attention that the number of studies that have been conducted to ascertain HIV prevalence amongst Muslims as a religious group is relatively low. Even less has been done by the way of qualitative studies. Bocci (2013) substantiates this by pointing out that there are approximately 300 000 people living with HIV/AIDS across the Arab world yet detailed research in Islamic parts of the world is scant (Speakman 2012). In the past, as it has been noted by Bocci (2013), Muslim scholars often wrote about HIV/AIDS as though it was a disease that was experienced by European and American homosexuals only. In this way these scholars characterised HIV/AIDS as a non-Muslim disease which they regarded as being a result of the ‘modern sexual revolution’ (Bocci 2013). As such, the discourse on HIV/AIDS within the Muslim community has not been developed as extensively as possible.

This research, which is part of a larger Doctoral study on HIV and South African Muslims, has been conducted in Durban. A central aim of the study is to fill some of the gaps in the existing literature concerning Muslims and HIV/AIDS. The paper aims to provide an in-depth analysis and qualitative understanding about perceptions, attitudes and experiences of South African Muslims of Indian descent in Durban who are infected with HIV/AIDS.

**Literature Review**

According to Cochrane and Nawab (2012) there is an estimated 1, 5 billion Muslims worldwide, however, literature on HIV/AIDS amongst Muslims, or in predominantly Muslim countries, as indicated, is scant. Ahmed (2013) points out that there is as yet no complete data set that can aid in the study of incidence, spread or mortality of HIV/AIDS amongst Muslims. This, however, is changing as the AIDS2016 Conference, held in Durban, had an entire panel presentation dedicated to HIV/AIDS and Muslims. Cochrane and Nawab
HIV/AIDS and Muslims in South Africa

(2012) state that in most parts of the world the epidemic has stabilised with a decrease of incidence in some areas. Kamarulzaman (2013), on the other hand, brings our attention to countries that have seen an increase in incidence rates by 25% (since 2001), of which five countries have a predominantly Muslim population; namely Bangladesh, Indonesia, Guinea-Bissau, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In addition to this, Kamarulzaman (2013) states that there has been a 35% increase in the number of newly infected people in the Middle East and the North African region.

The lack of statistics and literature in the past was often due to the stigma that surrounds HIV/AIDS and the beliefs that a ‘good’ Muslim should not engage in premarital sex, extramarital affairs, homosexuality nor imbibe intoxicants of any form (Hasnain 2005; and Essack & Chiddy 2009). Hasnain (2005) states that the social stigma that is often closely linked to HIV/AIDS is far more deeply entrenched in Muslim societies where individuals are rejected by their family and community. According to Kamarulzaman (2013) and Ahmed (2013) ideas about the contraction of HIV are viewed as being associated with notions of promiscuity and drug usage and thus leads to the heavily stigmatised nature of HIV/AIDS in a Muslim context. Hasnain (2005) further points out that the response of policy makers to HIV/AIDS in Muslim countries has focused primarily on individuals abstaining from sexual practices prior to and outside of marriage as well as drug usage. It is due to this stigma that those who are at risk are prevented from seeking assistance in the form of counselling, testing as well as treatment because this would involve the individual having to disclose ‘risky’ or what Hasnain (2005), Cochrane and Nawab (2012) and Kamarulzaman (2013) refer to as ‘immoral’ behaviours.

Hasnain (2005) further states that changing the behaviour and lifestyles of individuals is necessary to break the chain of transmission and to contain the HIV/AIDS epidemic. According to Hasnain (2005) it is important to take into consideration the social and cultural variables in Muslim societies that affect ‘risky behaviour’ as these variables are crucial to an in-depth understanding of the epidemic in Muslim societies. The AEI Newsletter (2005) and Hasnain (2005) state that while the World Health Organisation’s Global Health Atlas does show the threat of an HIV/AIDS crisis in Muslim countries on the whole, data on incidence, prevalence and mortality for Muslims is still limited due to either under reporting or non-reporting of statistics which can have serious consequences for disease surveillance and may ultimately result in the continuous spread of the disease.
Research concerning Muslims and HIV has been almost exclusively limited to statistics and Hasnain (2005) reveals, there is noticeably no available numbers for people living with HIV/AIDS in predominantly Islamic countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen. Where statistics are available the numbers are low; for e.g. Oman and the Syrian Arab Republic have numbers less than 10 000. Africa has noticeably higher prevalence rates amongst Muslims than other regions of the world with numbers between 10 000 and 100 000 being presented for Egypt, Eritrea, Morocco and Somalia. Higher rates are found in Ethiopia and Nigeria where prevalence rates rise past 1 million Muslims living with HIV/AIDS. South Africa, however, does not feature on any of the broader statistical lists as South Africa has a Muslim population of only 2% of the country’s total population (Muslims In Africa (2011) and Cochrane and Nawab (2012)). Speakman (2012) points out that studies have found that there is a negative correlation between HIV prevalence and being Muslim in Africa as a whole, as well as in sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Gray’s (2004) study in sub-Saharan Africa, similarly showed the prevalence of HIV/AIDS to be lower amongst Muslims than non-Muslims. Gray’s (2004) study has also been the most significant qualitative study on HIV and Muslims to date, however, the study does not focus on a particular ethnicity but rather religious affiliation.

The lack of statistics and qualitative literature on Muslims and HIV, as it has been argued, is due to the stigma that surrounds HIV/AIDS and the beliefs that a ‘good’ Muslim should not engage in premarital sex or extramarital affairs. According to Hasnain (2005) the social stigma that is often closely linked to HIV/AIDS is far more deeply entrenched in Muslim societies. As pointed out by Kamarulzaman (2013) ideas about the contraction of HIV are associated with ideas of promiscuity and drug usage and this leads to the heavily stigmatised nature of HIV/AIDS in a Muslim context. Discussions of sex and sexuality are also considered to be off-limits both within a family setting and outside of the family, for example, in education settings. Hasnain (2005) further points out that the response of policy makers to HIV/AIDS in Muslim countries has focused primarily on individuals abstaining from sexual practices prior to and outside of marriage as well as drug usage.

Speculation about the spread of HIV/AIDS in Muslim countries according to Hasnain (2005: 4), is in terms of religious doctrine, ‘Islam places a high value on chaste behaviour and prohibits sexual intercourse outside of marriage’ and prior to marriage. In addition, the use of intoxicants, adultery
and homosexuality are prohibited. Hasnain (2005) states that although it is clear what Islam’s stance is on these issues, Muslims engage in so-called ‘risky behaviours’ that contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS and this is then accompanied by a great sense of denial by Muslim governments and religious scholars alike regarding the increasing threat of HIV/AIDS. Hasnain (2005) and Kamarulzaman (2013) further add that prevailing social, cultural and religious structures surrounding Muslims do not create an environment that is conducive to individuals at risk where they feel safe for disclosure. According to Hasnain (2005) religious scholars and leaders need to foster a safe environment for individuals at risk such as those seen in Uganda and Senegal involving Muslim religious leaders. In Senegal HIV/AIDS prevention is discussed regularly in masjids and during the important Friday prayer sermon.

Efforts have been implemented in some Islamic States to curb the prevailing stigma associated with HIV/AIDS. The AEI Newsletter (2005) states that in Iran, as recently as 2001 and 2002 respectively, an HIV-positive employee could be dismissed and that patients with the virus could be refused treatment. There has, however, been progress and although stigma is still rife, HIV education has been implemented in government schools and prior to marriage couples are encouraged to attend classes on how to prevent HIV/AIDS transmission.

In Bangladesh, the AEI Newsletter (2005) goes on to state that awareness programmes have been implemented in masjids drawing religious leaders into programmes. Ahmed (2013) refers to the first known case of HIV in Bangladesh in 1989 and points out that since then, the number has continued to steadily increase. Islam et al. (2010) point out that the Bangladeshi government responded by creating the National AIDS/STD Programme in the late 1980s which aimed to address a wide range of pressing concerns; namely testing, care, blood safety, sexually transmitted infections, prevention amongst women and migrant populations. Ahmed (2013) however, argues that there is still limited access to counselling and testing and this impacts on the ability to obtain accurate prevalence rates. This also makes it difficult to formulate prevention and intervention strategies.

Pakistan, similarly, had its first official diagnosis of HIV in 1986 and Maan et al. (2014) estimate the number of PLWHIV to be, at the lowest 46 000, and at its highest 210 000. Bhurgri (2006) and Maan et al. (2014) argue that although the prevalence rate in Pakistan is low, the risk of HIV is high and the spread of the disease, much like other parts of the world, is predominantly
heterosexual. Bhurgri (2006) considers that Pakistan’s vulnerability in terms of increasing levels of poverty, low levels of literacy low levels of HIV awareness and information has led to the high risk of transmission. In addition to these, Maan et al. (2014) point out that Pakistan has a booming commercial sex industry which also has low levels of condom usage. The Pakistani government, however, has not been slow to react. In 1993 the National AIDS Control Programme was created. This programme, argues Maan et al. (2014), has led to a focus on HIV in the national strategic framework and in major health development projects. Maan et al. (2014) furthers points out that the strategic plan has unfortunately not transformed into meaningful action.

South African Muslims of Indian descent, much like Muslims in the global HIV/AIDS context, have largely fallen outside of both biomedical and social science research and as a result not much is known about prevalence within this group. Esack and Chiddy (2009) state that entwined with cultural norms are religious viewpoints which impact on the openness of individuals about their behavioural actions and their HIV status. Accordingly, little is known about the drivers of HIV infection amongst Muslim South Africans of Indian descent. As a result there is a limited understanding of HIV prevention needs, opportunities, challenges and priorities faced by Muslims infected with HIV/AIDS and by those affected by the disease; such as family members, friends and care-givers. This does not, however, mean that the issue has been ignored in South African discourse as there are a number of groups which aim to provide support for Muslims living with HIV/AIDS; namely Positive Muslims, Islamic Careline (IC) and the Muslim AIDS Programme (MAP), yet research on Muslims in South Africa remains limited.

On the whole there remains a dearth of qualitative literature on Muslims infected with and affected by HIV/AIDS. Research that exists is predominantly quantitative and has sought, as a starting point, to establish incidence and prevalence rates through quantitative data gathering techniques. Rich qualitative analyses offering insights from the insider’s perspective, however, remains limited, and there is thus a dire need for such research if we are to move beyond a surface level understanding of HIV/AIDS in the Muslim population.

**Indian Diaspora, the Caste System and South African Muslims**

South African Muslims of Indian descent are part of the history and legacy of
Indian diaspora in relation to South Africa. A brief understanding of this diaspora is important to provide context to the discussion. IndianDiaspora (n.d.) states that the first Indians were brought to South Africa as slaves by Dutch settlers in 1653 and after the Act of Abolishment in 1833 and the banning of slavery in all parts of the British Empire, the system of indentured labour was created to deal with the crisis of labour. In November 1860, 342 men, women and children arrived at the port of Durban aboard the S.S. Truro, the first of many people of Indian origin who were brought to South Africa over a period of 50 years to work as indentured labourers on the sugar cane fields in Natal, IndianDiaspora (n.d.). Of the more than 150 000 people, fewer than 12% were Muslim and most were illiterate. However, they brought with them traditions, customs, rituals and language that they attempted to preserve as much as they possibly could. In addition to these indentured labourers, ‘free passenger Indians’ arrived in Natal. IndianDiaspora (n.d.) states that these were so called because they paid their own transport fare to South Africa and were in fact Hindu and Muslim merchants, originating from Gujarat. Mukherji (2011) states that Durban is the largest ‘Indian’ city outside of India. Indians in South Africa can be divided according to religion; the most prominent being Hindus, Tamils, Muslims and Christians. South Africans of Indian descent are considered to be a conservative group with a strong sense of community and the South African Muslim population is considered to be even more conservative than their fellow Indian South Africans (ISAs) and a strong reasoning for this, according to Amod (2004), is linked to religion.

Whilst numerous cultural and religious aspects of Indian origin remain amongst ISAs, the caste system, which operated in India for centuries, has not been strictly replicated. This was due mainly to the fact that, as Mukherji (2011) points out, those who made the decision to leave India were mainly from the poorest parts of Indian society and as a result of the indentured system were forced to interact with and co-exist with people of different castes and this resulted in new relationships being formed and a new identity that was not based on caste affiliation being established, IndianDiaspora (n.d.).

The findings of the study refer to the concepts of ‘untouchability’ and ‘ritual impurity’. These concepts are connected to South African Indian Muslims’ heritage and the Indian diaspora that brought them here. In order to understand these terms and their applicability, a brief understanding of India’s caste system will be provided. Jalali (2000) defines the Indian caste system as having divided Indian society into four varnas; the Brahman, Kshatriya,
Vaishya and Shudras\textsuperscript{4}. The ‘Untouchables’, Jalali (2000: 251) argues, are considered to be a fifth caste that resulted from the ‘polluting contact of Shudra males and Brahmana females’. As such, the Untouchables were heavily excluded from the caste division and were shunned and scorned by society because they were considered unclean and polluted and as such were involved in work which reflected that status; for example latrine and gutter cleaners and street sweepers (Jalali 2000). Zelliot (2005) further states that those marked as Untouchables were excluded from almost all parts of Indian society. They were not allowed to access any form of education and as such remained illiterate and so could not, and were not allowed, access to read religious texts, they were denied access to village water sources, (e.g. wells), were forced to live outside of the villages and were forbidden to enter the residential areas of upper castes. According to Roy and Kaye (2002), the ‘untouchables’ were considered to be ritually impure and were believed to be polluting to others and this pollution, Jalali (2000) states, was viewed as contagious and so other castes stayed well away from them.

Whilst the caste system has not been directly replicated, divisions still exist within South African Indian society and van den Berghe (1967:44) expressed that ‘the caste system as a whole subsists, for all practical purposes, only in a tendency towards endogamy which is now anything but strict’. Braziel (2008) states that the displacement of a population group results in the population group putting down roots in a new region, bringing with them cultural ideologies from their region of origin. Diasporic cultural development occurs along different lines from the population in the original homeland. Over time, Braziel (2008) argues, the new community becomes distinct from the community of origin and as a result changes in culture, tradition and language occurs. IndianDiaspora (n.d.) states that in order to ensure their survival and place in South African society, ISAs adopted a more western way of life. This ‘watering down’ of Indian culture has meant that certain aspects of Indian culture have been adapted to the host society. Whilst there is no Untouchable caste per say, this paper argues that the concept of untouchability and ritual impurity is being applied to those living with HIV/AIDS as a result of the stigma that is attached to the disease. It is with this in mind that this paper seeks to explore the concept of ritual impurity and the application of the concept of

---

\textsuperscript{4} ‘Varnas’ are ‘Castes’.
‘untouchable’ to the physical and psychological segregation of HIV+ Muslims from society as a result of the stigma associated with the disease.

**Principle Theories**

Grounded Theory has played a significant part in the analytical framework of this research due to the fact that qualitative research regarding the Muslim community is rare. Grounded Theory started out as the key theoretical framework for the study and has shaped the research, however, during the research process, other theoretical frameworks have emerged. Grounded theory, first proposed by Glaser and Strauss in the 1960s, was considered to be the best approach, at the outset, to this particular study as it provides a framework for understanding and analysing the data that is collected throughout the research process. Such a framework, which encourages the development of theory from research grounded in the information uncovered, is an excellent method of social analysis in the field of medical studies and it is indeed in the social studies of health that grounded theory was first conceptualised (Thomas & James 2006).

The use of Grounded Theory enabled the information uncovered during the research process to guide the choice of theoretical framework and as such Goffman’s theory of stigma has proven to be useful in analysing the data gleaned. The reason for this can be linked to what Cochrane and Nawab (2012) refer to as the ‘hidden’ statistics for HIV/AIDS and Muslims. Individuals who have been infected with HIV/AIDS have traditionally faced stigma from society although this has since changed somewhat due to awareness programmes and drives by governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to educate the public about HIV/AIDS. However, literature indicates that stigma remains surrounding HIV/AIDS in the Muslim population and the fact that little is known further reveals the hidden nature of the condition amongst Muslims. The isolation of the infected (in this case the HIV+ individual) from those who are non-infected can be linked to Goffman’s (1969) notion of the *spoilt identity*. Isolation does not necessarily refer to the physical isolation of stigma but can also refer to psychological isolation whereby the individual is cut off emotionally and psychologically from society as a result of his/her disease in the form of being unable to share status for fear of further rejection.
Society chooses how people are grouped according to personal and public attributes that are felt to be ‘ordinary and natural for members of those categories’ (Goffman 1969: 11). Within society individuals seek to be part of a group and if they do not share common characteristics and attitudes with the larger group then they often fall outside of the group dynamic and become an ‘outsider’ or ‘the other’. When a person becomes sick they are often cut off physically, in some way, from those around them because, if it is something contagious, others do not want to get sick as well. When a person is diagnosed with a life threatening disease it further separates the individual from those around him/her as well as from wider society through his/her experiences and through society’s understanding of that particular condition. With respect to HIV/AIDS and how society has traditionally responded to the disease, it can be seen that the response has been negative with individuals often being discriminated against due to the nature of the disease thus separating those who disclose their status from those around them. Jackson (2002) and UNAIDS (2008) argue that this is because HIV/AIDS has moral undertones and the disease has been associated with people placed in stigmatised ‘risk groups’ such as sex workers, unfaithfulness, men having sex with men and intravenous drug users. Within the Muslim community stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS is widespread and this leads to those who are infected not disclosing their status for fear of being ostracised from their families and communities.

Discussion of Findings
The findings of this study have been drawn from the life histories that have been conducted with five key respondents as well as supplementary information provided from semi-structured interviews with ten volunteers and care-givers of Muslims living with HIV/AIDS. The reason for the choice of life histories with key participants is due to the difficulty of obtaining participants who fit the demographic of the research sample. HIV/AIDS is a highly stigmatised disease and even more so amongst South African Muslims of Indian descent, as this study has found. Whilst there are numerous non-governmental organisations that work with HIV+ Muslims (of varying ethnicities) it has been extremely difficult to find individuals who are willing to talk openly about their experiences as HIV+ South African Muslims of Indian descent. Non-governmental organisations were contacted by the
researcher and interviews were arranged with willing participants. Life histories were chosen as the researcher believed this to be the best option in order to obtain detailed descriptive data concerning the research participant’s life and experiences as an HIV+ South African Muslim.

Due to the sensitive nature of the research study the approach to the research subject area has differed from the normative anthropological approach of participant observation. The aim of the study was to understand the lived experiences of research respondents and the best manner in which to do this, argues Bernard (1994) is with the use of qualitative research methodology. Qualitative methodology thus allows for a holistic investigation of the main issues such as experiences of individuals living with HIV/AIDS, effects on family, patterns of care-giving, coping strategies as well as community responses (Bernard 1994; and Akeroyd 1997).

According to Denscombe (2007) the qualitative method of the life history interview is a frequent tool of Anthropology and health sciences. Life histories provides insight into the research participants life and the interview schedule that was utilised covered a range of topics from the respondents early childhood years and experiences leading up to their current life situations. Denscombe (2007) argues that the use of life histories challenges the researcher to understand the current attitudes and behaviours of the respondent and how this has been influenced by decisions and experiences from the respondent’s past. Life history interviews also allows the respondent to reflect on their own experiences and this may allow for deeper insight into their past and present experiences and behaviours. Each interview was approximately 1 – 2 hours long, and was conducted in places suitable to the respondent’s privacy needs.

Research participants of this study have been living with HIV for long periods of time; ranging from 10 years to 23 years as HIV+. For this study, three women and two men were interviewed as key participants and ten female volunteers and care-givers. Pseudonyms were utilised in order to protect the identities of research respondents and each respondent was supplied with an informed consent document and their rights regarding the research, as respondents was clearly explained. In addition, respondents were allowed to end the interview if they wished or to not answer questions that made them feel uncomfortable. The ages of respondents at the time of the interviews were as follows: Maymoona (57), Rahman (43), Razak (35), Tasneem (31) and Shafieka (25). Maymoona and Shafieka are currently married, whilst Rahman and Razak are divorcees and Tasneem has never been married.
As stated above, the search for HIV+ Muslims has been slow as there are not many who are willing to speak openly about their disease and experience thereof and thus, at the outset of the research process, it has been clear the strong stigma that exists in this community. Therefore, the issues that will be highlighted in this section of the paper deal specifically with the stigma of HIV/AIDS and how this stigma leads to the ‘untouchability’ of South African Muslims of Indian descent living with HIV/AIDS. The study focused on HIV+ Muslims of Indian descent who were born and are living in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal.

Rizvi (1994) states that Islam recognises that human beings are sexual beings and as such have sexual urges and thus sex is viewed in a positive light. In fact, celibacy and monasticism are discouraged in Islam. Rizvi (1994) further states that Islamic guidance does not expect followers of the religion to suppress their sexual urges, however, the concept of ‘free sex’ is not accepted in Islam. Rather, Rizvi (1994) points to marriage as being a solution to the fulfilment of sexual urges experienced by individuals. Marriage, he goes on to state, is considered to be a responsible solution whereby two, or more, people commit to each other and satisfy their sexual needs. It can thus be found that Muslims are encouraged to marry young lest they are tempted to engage in ‘sinful acts of promiscuity’. Long term relationships between individuals of the opposite sex are discouraged and it can often be found that parents of such young people encourage the parties to marry, (Islamqa 2005). Thus, Rizvi (1994) explains that Islam makes provision for sex to occur in a safe environment which reduces the chances of the transmission of sexually transmitted infections between partners as they are in monogamous relationships. In addition to sexual intercourse, Islamic teachings specify that the consumption of drugs, alcohol and other intoxicants are forbidden. Islamqa (2005) states that the consumption of an intoxicant, renders the prayers of an individual to be invalid for forty days.

As a result of the above, those who engage in risky behaviours are stigmatised through their behaviour and are pushed to the margins of society. Behaviours that go against the teachings of Islam are considered to be immoral and HIV/AIDS is a disease that brands the individual with that immorality. These individuals are considered to be ‘bad Muslims’ and those who judge them so reduce their interactions with the individuals.

---

5 I.e. sex before marriage or out of marriage.
When referring to stigma, Goffman (1969) argues that originally, stigma referred to physical signs on the body that would bring to the fore that something was not ‘right’ regarding the moral status of the person. In this sense it meant a criminal or traitor who had been branded to reflect their status. If we look at HIV/AIDS, the disease is one that targets the immune system of the body and thus the body ‘breaks down’. In the early days of the epidemic and prior to the mass rollout of anti-retroviral medication, Illife (2006) states that within five years of contracting HIV, the body would show physical signs of the disease and this, for example, would be in the form of sores all over the body. With treatment of the disease having advanced in recent years a person living with HIV/AIDS can live a long and healthy life and as such the physical signs of HIV/AIDS are not as prominent as they were in the past. Stigma moves from a position of fixating on the physical branding to non-physical branding as people who are diagnosed with HIV continue to be stigmatised. Often times this stigma is reflected in how people interact with HIV+ individuals. The stigma then becomes associated with the notion that the individual is ‘blemished, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places’ (Goffman 1969: 11).

Research participants expressed that they felt ‘dirty’ and Tasneem stated that when she disclosed her status to her family, they avoided physical contact with her telling her that they did not want to ‘catch her disease and become dirty’. Maymoona said that ‘no matter what I did, I washed and scrubbed but I could not get rid of this feeling that I was filthy and my family, instead of helping me, told me that I was soiled and would not even pray with me in the same room’. Responses such as this bring to the fore the notion of ritual impurity, acts that are linked to unclean activities with no prospect of being able to wash away the impurity. This then renders the individual as needing to be separated from society. Research respondents explained that they were cut off from those around them both in a physical and psychological sense. Goffman’s (1969) spoilt identity then can be linked to this experience as individuals express that their sense of self is tainted by their own feelings of being ‘dirty’ and their families’ rejection as a result of their status.

When discussing their diagnosis, all respondents had stated that they had not been to the hospital for an HIV test but rather were diagnosed as a result of other medical conditions. Two female participants had been diagnosed when they had gone to the hospital when they were pregnant with their third and first child respectively. The third female participant had become ill and
when the cause of her illness could not be determined an HIV test was carried out without her permission. The male participants had been in hospital for surgery and had routine tests performed, which included an HIV test. None of the participants had anticipated the need for an HIV test and were not prepared for the results that would, as Maymoona put it ‘change my life forever’. Maymoona and the other participants responded similarly to their diagnosis, asking the questions ‘why me, what did I do?’ and ‘what will my family think of me?’ From the outset, these individuals had expressed that they were afraid to disclose their status to their families as they feared that they would be judged as having been immoral and having engaged in ‘sinful’ acts. Female participants in particular stated that their families had accused them of ‘sleeping around’ and Maymoona points out that she was called a ‘whore and other cruel names’ when she revealed her status to her family. Male participants had also expressed that their revelation was met with disappointment and scorn, however, not with the same severity their female counterparts experienced.

As stated earlier, the spread of HIV/AIDS has been attributed to what may be referred to, in Islam, as immoral acts or behaviours; i.e. individuals engaging in risky behaviours and Islam has strong beliefs around these concepts. Maymoona and Shafieka expressed fear and concern as both had been diagnosed during routine testing when they were pregnant. Shafieka had been a virgin when she got married and her husband was the only man she had had sexual relations with and thus believes she contracted the disease from him. She was afraid of what people would say about her and her child if her status was revealed, ‘what would people think of me? I was scared that I had gotten this disease from my husband and that people would say that it was my fault that he had slept with other women. What would become of my child who did not ask for this disease?’ Neither Maymoona nor Shafieka’s children were born with HIV.

When questioned about how long it took for participants to reveal the status to their immediate family, the responses ranged from six months to two years. The reason for this, participants stated, was due to the fact that they were afraid of what their family’s response would be. HIV/AIDS was already, at the time, highly stigmatised in society in general and even more so within the Muslim community.

Maymoona did not disclose her status to her then husband. She describes him as ‘abusive’ and stated that he also forced her to have sex with
other men in exchange for money. She is not sure whether she contracted the disease from her ex-husband or from a man she was forced to have sex with. Maymoona eventually found out, after her daughter was born, that he had contracted HIV several years before they were married and soon after the birth of her last child she divorced him and moved back to her mother’s house. It would be two years before she would disclose her status to anyone, (she had not told her ex-husband that she was HIV+ as she believed that he would blame her and tell everyone in her family and community and she was not ready for that). Maymoona disclosed her HIV+ status to her mother initially and she did so at the request of a nurse at the clinic that she attended who told her that it was important that her family know as they would be able to help and support her. The nurse encouraged Maymoona to at least tell her mother and Maymoona said that ‘I took the advice and I told my mother and my mother told my big sister in law … who made it like a joke and started telling each and every neighbour … my mother was not sympathetic, knowing what I went through in my marriage … she stood outside and told my neighbours that I am a whore, I am a bitch … she pulled my hair and she threw me outside and hit me and wanted me out of her house’.

Similar situations have been experienced by the remaining research participants, except for Rahman. Shafieka, Razak and Tasneem expressed that when they each disclosed to their immediate families that the response was negative and they were called names which had a severely negative impact on their dignity and self-esteem. Rahman explained that when he told his (now late) father and father’s wife (stepmother), whilst both expressed disappointment, they did not attack him in any way but rather, were extremely supportive, especially his stepmother (who he describes as being very over protective of him).

Thus, four of the five participants interviewed in this study experienced stigmatised responses by their immediate family upon revealing their HIV status. This, for the most part, translated into family, and even close friends, ‘cutting them off’ and stopping contact with the participant by actively avoiding any interaction with the individual. This was done in different ways; for example, Maymoona’s mother forced her to leave the family home and to stop contact with her family, Tasneem (who lived on her own) had been told by her family not to contact them as they ‘wanted nothing to do with me’. Even Rahman stated that although his parents accepted his diagnosis, his extended family and even colleagues at work had responded negatively and their inter-
actions towards him had changed.

From this it is evident that whilst not all participants experienced the same response from their immediate family, that the overwhelming response was negative. This correlated with responses from the interviews that were carried out with volunteers and professionals, (social workers and counsellors), as they recounted the experiences of other Muslim clients who had disclosed their HIV status to family members.

Participants expressed that their family, for the most part, have either cut them off completely or reduced their interaction with them. Shafieka explains that when she first told her family about her HIV+ status, they refused to touch her and she felt like a ‘pariah’. She was excluded from many family gatherings as her parents were afraid of what others would think of them still associating with her and were also concerned that they may contract the virus from her. As such, she, and other participants, stated that they felt cut off from others and unwanted by their own family and friends. They were viewed as being ‘dirty’ or polluted by those close to them and were avoided by their family. Research participants expressed that their families’ ignorance of the disease and wanting to distance themselves from a ‘morally’ questionable person by association lead to a highly stigmatised separation and ostracisation from the family.

From this it can be deduced that the HIV+ South African Muslims of Indian descent, in this study, experienced a form of ‘untouchability’. Whilst the notion of the ‘untouchable’ disappeared in South African Indian society, with the spread of HIV/AIDS and the growing spread of the disease amongst the population of Indian descent in South Africa, this concept can be applied in a different sense, one that is health related and ties into social stigma that is faced by South African Muslims living with HIV. HIV continues to be a stigmatised disease that is related to ‘morally questionable’ behaviour and this stigma leads to the HIV+ individual becoming a new type of ‘untouchable’ who is ritually polluted through their positive status and have become cut off from their families as a result. They are isolated from their families who, for the most part, want nothing to do with them for fear of being polluted through their association with the HIV+ individual who has ‘dishonoured them’ and is regarded as ‘impure’ or ‘dirty’; both ritually and physically.
Conclusion

HIV/AIDS is an epidemic that has rampantly spread throughout the world. With the introduction of ARVs death rates of HIV+ individuals have declined in recent years, however, the disease is far from being eradicated. HIV is not simply a biomedical disease. It has socio-economic components that affect its continued spread and the most recent data reveals that HIV is spreading faster than ever before in predominantly Muslim countries. Hasnain (2005) states that changing the behaviour and lifestyles of individuals is necessary to break the chain of transmission and to contain the HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, due to the complex and in some cases poorly understood forces that shape and influence human behaviour breaking the chain of transmission is, as the AEI Newsletter (2005) states, more challenging. The social and cultural variables in Muslim societies that affect ‘risky behaviour’ must be considered and understanding these variables are crucial to an in-depth understanding of the epidemic in Muslim societies. Although the statistics can be improved, it has significantly shown a rise in HIV rates in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Libya and Turkey, to name a few. Understanding the spread of the disease in Muslim populations is important if interventions are to be addressed and so qualitative studies are needed to provide an in-depth view into the world of HIV amongst Muslims in their various locations around the world.

Although there is widespread stigma relating to HIV/AIDS within the Muslim community there are groups who aim to assist Muslim individuals living with HIV/AIDS by using a de-stigmatising approach. According to Cochrane and Nawab (2012), in South Africa, Islamic Careline (IC) and the Muslim AIDS Programme (MAP) approach HIV/AIDS prevalence in the Muslim community as being indicative of wider social issues; namely violence against women and drug abuse and therefore choose not to limit their responses to promoting faithfulness in relationships and abstinence before marriage. The approaches utilised by these organisations replicate both Islamic principles as well as international good practice. Cochrane and Nawab (2012) state that the services provided by MAP, for example, include life skills training, education and development and are aimed mainly at the ‘high risk age group’ of 14 – 29. Cochrane and Nawab (2012) further elaborate that the life skills training offered by MAP addresses issues of information on disease, assertiveness, sex, sexuality, death and dying and the belief is that these discussions will enable youth to take more informed decisions in the future. Further initiatives have
also been taken to assist in areas of violence against women and children and other social issues that plague South Africa. In addition to this IC and MAP assist non-Muslim individuals infected with HIV/AIDS as well as providing assistance to the wider community. In South Africa, Muslims make up 2% of the total population, however, HIV has become an increased risk within this population group. The stigma that is associated with HIV is amplified within this group as a result of religious beliefs surrounding the moral character of the individual who has contracted the disease and as such has often resulted in the HIV+ individual experiencing isolation from family and friends. This isolation, as a result of their HIV status, has been conceptualised in the form of ritual impurity and as such this paper has aimed to prove the notion of these individuals being regarded as ‘untouchables’ in their society, those who are on the outskirts of society, who are left to themselves and others like them.

The best way to overcome stigma is through education and ensuring that information is disseminated throughout society to ensure that all the myths surrounding HIV are debunked which may result in a change in the attitude towards HIV+ individuals.

References
AVERT 2015. Global HIV Targets. Available at: http://www.avert.org/global-
hiv-targets. (Accessed on 08 October 2015.)


Shabnam Shaik
Anthropology Department - Selwyn Castle
Rhodes University
SShaik@ru.ac.za

Yamkela Majikijela
Gabriel Tati

Abstract
Migration is not a recent phenomenon; it is one of the three factors that contribute to the population changes. Cross-border migration between South Africa and its neighbouring countries started in the mid-19th century. The aim of this paper is to explore the structural changes in the participation of African migrants in the labour force of South Africa from 2001 to 2011. Furthermore, the specific objective is to demonstrate the structural changes between the two periods in the deployment of African immigrants in terms of occupation, employment sector, income groups just to name a few. 2001 and 2011 population census are used to evaluate the extent to which the situation has changed between the two periods. As far as African migration is concerned, to capture the structural changes during the ten-year period (2001 to 2011) this study focuses on variables such as demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. To profile the structural changes in the participation of African migrants, this study makes use of the 2001 and 2011 national population census data. Furthermore, statistical packages are used to test the relationship between variables. Policy document about migration are also used to provide the legislated framework with regards to the involvement of foreign labour in the South African labour force. The geographical scope of the study is national meaning it covers all nine provinces of South Africa.

Keywords: African migration; educational status; employment status; labour force; labour migrants
Introduction

Migration in general is a complex process and involves a number of challenges. However, despite this complex process and challenges, migrant workers have been on the rise. The number of migrant workers has been continuously increasing around the world due to income inequalities and working conditions between countries. According to International Labour Organization (2010) migrant workers contribute to economic growth and development to the country of destination through their supply of labour in the production of goods and service, and through job creation for those that are entrepreneurs and are able to create jobs.

Cross-border migration between South Africa and its neighbouring countries started in the mid-19th century when the South African diamond and gold mining industries were discovered. Africans came to South Africa as temporary contract labour migrants under bilateral agreements between the apartheid government and its neighbouring countries i.e. Lesotho, Mozambique and Malawi (Crush 2008). After the apartheid government, South Africa had comparatively strong economic and political stability as compared to its neighbouring countries. This strong economic and political stability made South Africa the leading destination for migrants from neighbouring countries and the African continent as a whole (Schachter 2009). As a consequence, South Africa experienced an increase in the number of African migrants coming into the country in search for employment opportunities and/or political freedom. Ever since South Africa gained independence and became a democratic country, the country also became a choice destination for many migrants. In other words, South Africa did not just become a destination only for African migrants who were in search for employment opportunities but the country also experienced different forms of migration and a rise in the number of migrants coming into the country for different reasons. Furthermore, the country experienced an increase in the number of illegal migrants coming from neighbouring countries. The post-apartheid government still struggles to formulate policies which reflect the country’s role in a changing regional, continental, and global migration regime (Crush 2008). This is evident from the continual amendments of immigration legislations in South Africa. Migration is a global problem therefore South Africa is not the only country facing difficulties in measuring and managing migration (Bhorat, Meyer, & Mlatsheni 2002).
Over the years the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 became insufficient to control and manage migration because the government failed to formulate a migration policy that was appropriate to address the needs of the country and its international obligations (Crush 2008). As a result the government introduced the 2011 Immigration Act which came into force in May of 2014 in order to try and manage migration.

The following sections of the paper covers the conceptual theory which guides this study. Followed by research methods, size and distribution of African immigrants, migration patterns in the labour force of South Africa, and concluding remarks.

Conceptual Framework
Generally, migration tends to be a selective process. As a result, this paper is guided by the migration selectivity theory since migrants are not homogenous, but differ in terms of demographic attributes such as sex, age, marital status and education.

**Age** is one of the central attributes in any study of migration because the propensity to migrate tends to vary with age. Migrants tend to be young. Often, a young person with or without education are more likely to migrate compared to people who are advanced in age. For instance, a young person who is unemployed and with little education in their home country is likely to migrate given that there is a great chance of finding employment in the receiving country (Bustamante, Jasso, Taylor & Legarreta 1998).

**Gender** is central in the migration process. Generally, migrants are predominantly males but recently females have started migrating more than they did in the past. Economic, social, political pressure and/or freedom within and between countries are some of the reasons that influence both men and women to migrate. According to Jolly and Reeves (2005) the migration process has some gender implications thus the impact of migrating for both men and women depends on many factors such as type of migration (temporary, permanent, labour, independent or as dependent spouse); and policies of sending and receiving countries. Jolly and Reeves (2005) further revealed that migrant women tend to dominate in unskilled sectors such as domestic workers.
and sex workers which may cause them to be at a greater risk of exploitation. On the other hand, migrant men often dominate in more regulated sectors such as construction, mines and agriculture.

**Human capital** (education) is another driving force causing people to migrate. Individuals with high level of education are likely to migrate more than those who are not educated or have lower levels of education because of economic returns at destination. According to Bustamante *et al.* (1998) this pattern occurs due to high economic returns and employment opportunities in the country facing in-migration. Educated people migrate from developing to developed countries in search of work, business opportunities and possible high earnings. If more educated people leave their countries of origin, it may eventually lead to brain drain. According to Kanbur and Rapoport (2003) brain drain may later induce positive feedback effects such as remittances and return migration after having obtained additional skills from abroad.

The movement of people within and between countries often happens as a result of connection between family and friends. As a result, the more people are connected the greater in-migration flow increases at destination. Therefore, migration selectivity on marital status may be a result of the migration network theory. A person’s marital status may have implications on many decisions. Migration is usually associated with married people as they need to support families. The married spouse tends to migrate more to join their partners at destination. A family usually plays a role or rather has an influence on who migrates, to where, and for how long (Bueker 2004). When migrating as a single person or independently, the process of finding a job, acquiring a visa and finding a decent location to reside in may be difficult and take longer. Thus, migrating as part of a family may encourage stronger incorporation at the country of destination (Bueker 2004).

**Research Methods**

This paper makes use of a cross-sectional design and correlational analysis which attempts to understand patterns of relationships between variables. In assessing the structural changes of African migrants in the labour force of South Africa, this paper makes use of the 2001 and 2011 population censuses conducted by Statistics South Africa. A 10% sample data was weighed to make
Yamkela Majikijela and Gabriel Tati

statistical inference for the population. Both census files were obtained in SPSS format. The accessibility of data in SPSS format made it possible to run necessary statistical analysis.

This study focuses on African migrants who migrated to South Africa in search for employment opportunities based on 2001 and 2011 census data. Since this study focuses on the participation of African migrants in the South African labour force, the participants under this study include all foreign African migrants both male and females who were living in South Africa. The study particularly focuses on African migrants who were economically active at the time of the censuses. The age group of interest for analytical purpose are those aged 15-64 years since these people make up the labour force. African migrants were selected by looking at their country of birth and citizenship status.

Size and Distribution of African Immigrants
Understanding the population structure for African migrants is important for policy planning purposes. From an economic point of view, the economically active population contributes to the productivity of the country through their provision of labour. Comparing the two periods, the results show that the active population of African migrants increased from 234 841 (2001) to 880 072 (2011) with an average annual growth rate of 13.2%. The statistics in the Table below presents the percentage distribution of males which decreased from 78.1% to 69.6% whilst females increased from 21.9% to 30.4%. Migration of women has always been an important factor in international migration. Even though, the percentage of females has increased over the period, it can be noted that the number of males remains higher than that of females. These results are in line with the migration selectivity theory which hypothesised that migrants are predominantly males. Migration patterns within and from Africa have recently became more feminised, i.e. females are migrating more in search for employment and to achieve their economic needs (UN 2004; Adepoju 2004).

Age Structure of African Migrants
Economic crises in countries often drives youth to make decisions to migrate with the purpose of finding better employment opportunities in foreign
countries. Young people often migrate in order to obtain higher education, finding work, getting married and family reunification (UN, 2011).

Table 1: Distribution of African Migrants Population by Gender in 2001 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>183 462</td>
<td>78,1</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>69,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51 379</td>
<td>21,9</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>30,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>234 841</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own computation using StatsSA 2001 and 2011 census data

Table 2 below tabulates the age distribution of African migrants for the year 2001 and 2011. Comparing the two periods, the table shows that most of the African migrants were relatively young, with a young population (15-34 years) of 59.8% in 2001 and 70.8% in 2011. The statistics in the Table reveal that the proportion of young African migrants who entered the South African labour force increased between the two periods. This shows that most of African migrants in the country were fairly young. It appears that the migrants in the
15-34 age category have been growing at a faster annual average growth rate than the rest of the African migrants. On the other hand, the findings show that the proportion of the 35-39 years age group remained fairly constant at about 13% between the two census periods. In sharp contrast to the increase in the youth migrants, the remaining population in the labour force (from ages of 35-64 years) show a decline from 40.2% in 2001 to 29.2% in 2011. The decrease in the proportion of older people in the labour force may be due to the high growth in youth participation. From the outcome of these results it is evident that migration is selective when it comes to age, that is, migration brings more migrants in the early working age than those in the advanced ages. The possible explanation is that young people migrate more than those in the older age groups in search for employment opportunities while others migrate to obtain education and possibly seek work upon completing their studies.

Table 2: Age Distribution of African Migrants in 2001 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>722</td>
<td></td>
<td>762</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16,7</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>18,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>312</td>
<td></td>
<td>842</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22,2</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>27,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>045</td>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16,3</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>20,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>221</td>
<td></td>
<td>479</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>13,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>283</td>
<td></td>
<td>777</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>568</td>
<td></td>
<td>142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>932</td>
<td></td>
<td>434</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5,0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>758</td>
<td></td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Structural Changes in the Participation of Migrants in the Labour Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>55-59</th>
<th>60-64</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 694</td>
<td>2 307</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4 969</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>164.5</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>274.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own computation using StatsSA 2001 and 2011 census data

Educational Status

Educational status is used to measure available skills and creativity in the active population in order to perform labour activities. Furthermore, educational status has an influence on job opportunities. In the census data, ‘no schooling’ refers to all persons who did not have any form of formal education. Therefore, from the economically active population those with no schooling are classified as uneducated.

The 2001 census data revealed that the majority of migrants completed secondary schooling (41.6%), followed by those with primary schooling (32.3%) and lastly only 6.1% with tertiary education. Furthermore, the data showed that 20% of the migrants had no formal education hence classified as uneducated. The Figure 1 below reveals that there was no huge difference in the proportion of male and female migrants who had no formal education. African male migrants who completed primary education were higher in number than their female counterparts. However, the proportion of female migrants who completed secondary or tertiary education was higher than male migrants.

In comparison to the 2001 findings, the 2011 census data suggests that migrants who were part of the labour force were more educated. The population is still dominated by people with secondary education. The results indicate that there has been a major decline in African migrants with no schooling (uneducated) between the two census periods, from 20% in 2001 to 6.8% in 2011. Initially, the decline in the proportion of those who had no formal education was positive because one of the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) was to make sure that individuals at least complete primary level of schooling. Secondly, it could be that migration attracted more persons with quality education during the ten-year period. Those with primary schooling also decreased from 32.3% in 2001 to 18.3% in 2011. The proportion
of those with secondary or tertiary education increased respectively. Inasmuch as the results show a positive change, only a few have completed tertiary education with an increase of about 3.6% between the two periods. Furthermore, the findings in Figure 1 show that in 2011 African male migrants who had no formal education or those who completed primary education were higher than females. Similar to 2001, the proportion of female migrants who completed secondary or tertiary education was higher than their male counterparts. In addition, the proportion of both males and females with no schooling or primary education decreased while those who completed secondary schooling or tertiary qualification showed an increase.

**Figure 1: Educational Status by Gender in 2001 and 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Male 2001</th>
<th>Female 2001</th>
<th>Male 2011</th>
<th>Female 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Schooling</td>
<td>20,1%</td>
<td>19,4%</td>
<td>7,3%</td>
<td>5,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>34,0%</td>
<td>26,1%</td>
<td>19,5%</td>
<td>15,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>40,4%</td>
<td>46,0%</td>
<td>63,8%</td>
<td>68,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>5,5%</td>
<td>8,5%</td>
<td>9,4%</td>
<td>10,6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Own computation using StatsSA 2001 and 2011 census data

In comparing the two periods, it seems evident that African migrants who were part of the labour force have become more educated between the two census periods. One of the MDG was to make sure that both males and females
complete primary schooling. The decrease in migrants with no schooling or with primary schooling suggest that there was an increase in the proportion of those who completed secondary level of schooling and tertiary education. On the other hand, the decline in the proportion of no schooling and primary schooling may be attributed to the better educated persons migrating to South Africa. The increase in the level of educational status between the two census periods illustrate that migration brought migrants of quality which is in line with the migration selectivity theory that individuals with high level of education are more likely to migrate. Moreover, the figure indicates the presence of gender disparities in education with females being more educated than their male counterparts.

The analysis of educational Status among African migrants by age assists in understanding the long-term trends in education especially through comparing the younger with the older age groups. Figure 2 below shows trends in education within the ten-year period.

**Figure 2: Educational Status by Age Group in 2001 and 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary 2001</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary 2001</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary 2001</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Schooling 2001</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary 2011</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary 2011</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary 2011</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Schooling 2011</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Own computation using StatsSA 2001 and 2011 census data
The data reveals that the majority of African migrants in the older age groups had no formal education as compared to those in the younger age groups. Most African migrants in the younger age groups completed primary or secondary level of education while the majority of migrants who completed tertiary education were found in the older age groups. However, the proportion of those who completed primary, secondary or tertiary education fluctuated with age. It is observed that the level of educational attainment increased with age among African migrants.

**Country of Birth**

The country of birth helped to identify the country from which the migrants have originated. Figure 3 below displays the top ten African countries from which migrants originated in 2001 and 2011. It will be observed that the main contributing countries between the two censuses were Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho. Mozambique contributed the largest proportion of immigrants in 2001 with 43.8%, while Zimbabwe contributed the largest in 2011 with 45.2%. The figures show a major increase of immigrants from Zimbabwe from 14.5% (2001) to 45.2% (2011).

**Figure 3: Top Ten African Countries Contributing Migrants to South Africa**
Migration Patterns in the Labour Force of South Africa
This section profiles the socioeconomic characteristics of African migrants who were part of the labour force in South Africa between 2001 and 2011. The analysis of the socioeconomic characteristics is in terms of employment status, monthly income, occupation, industry, and type of sector.

Employment Status
Table 3 below shows the results for the African migrants working age population and labour force in 2001 and 2011. The findings reveals an increase in the number of the working age population and for those in the labour force (both the employed and unemployed increased). There was a small decrease of 0.1% in the Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) from 78.9% in 2001 to 78.8% in 2011, while the share of the unemployed African migrants decreased only by 2.2% over the two census periods. Furthermore there was a decrease
in the unemployment rate from 23% to 20.1% while the employment rate increased from 77% (2001) to 79.9% (2011). The decrease in the unemployment rate complimented by an increase in employment rate suggests that the South African labour market was able to absorb new African migrants in the labour market between the two periods.

Table 3: Working Age Population and Labour Force Details, Census 2001 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working age</td>
<td>297 827</td>
<td>1 116 401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>180 924</td>
<td>702 763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>53 917</td>
<td>177 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Force</td>
<td>234 841</td>
<td>880 071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>77,0</td>
<td>79,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>23,0</td>
<td>20,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Force Participation Rate</td>
<td>78,9</td>
<td>78,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Absorption Rate</td>
<td>60,7</td>
<td>69,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own computation using StatsSA 2001 and 2011 census data

Employment Status by Gender and Educational Attainment

According to the 2001 population census, the proportion of employed males was higher than females regardless of educational attainment. The proportion of those employed increased with the level of education up to secondary education for both sexes. A large proportion of females with tertiary qualification were employed than those with no formal schooling. Moreover, the 2011 census reveal that the proportion of employed and unemployed migrants with no schooling decreased over the period.

Figure 4 below provides the results of the labour force participation rate by educational status. Between 2001 and 2011, the labour participation rate for African migrants who had no formal schooling or those who completed their primary education, decreased. However, there was an increase in the labour participation rate for African migrants who completed secondary or
Structural Changes in the Participation of Migrants in the Labour Force
tertiary level education. Labour participation for those who attained tertiary education increased by 14.5 points within the ten years from 67.2% (2001) to 81.7% (2011). The 2011 census data suggest that African migrants with higher educational status were likely to be in the labour force supplying their labour for economic activities. However, the 2001 census results revealed that a high proportion of migrants who supplied their labour in the labour market were those who were uneducated (no schooling) and those who had completed primary schooling. Thus, over the year’s education became an important criteria for African migrants to be in the labour force.

Figure 4: Labour Force Participation Rate by Educational Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Status</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>81,2</td>
<td>72,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>85,3</td>
<td>78,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>75,4</td>
<td>79,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>67,2</td>
<td>81,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own computation using StatsSA 2001 and 2011 census data

Monthly Income Category by Sex and Educational Status
Generally, in the labour market education is related to income, that is, individuals who completed the highest level of education have the probability
of earning higher incomes than those who have lower levels of education. According to Ghatak, Levine, & Price (1996) migrants who have completed higher levels of education have higher earnings and increased employment probabilities than other immigrant workers. Furthermore, the neoclassical economics of migration theory suggest that labour migration is driven by income differences between countries. Individuals migrate because of high expected income in the country of destination. However, upon arrival at destination countries, migrants might not earn what they expected. The monthly income category is in nominal terms meaning that the income is not adjusted in terms of inflation.

The results for 2001 census revealed that there were African migrants (both sexes) who did not earn any monetary income in all levels of education, with females initially being higher than their male counterparts. Regardless of educational status, migrants who reported to have no income were both employed and unemployed. This suggest that there was a proportion of migrants who were employed but did not receive any income in monetary value. About 26.3% migrants who have attained tertiary level of education reported to have no income. Female African migrants either with no schooling, primary and secondary level of education earning in the monthly income bracket of R1-R400 were higher than males, while the proportion of males with tertiary level qualification was higher.

The proportion of males who had no formal schooling and those who completed primary or secondary level of education earned in the monthly income bracket of R401 to R25600 was more than that for females. However, the proportion of females who attained tertiary level education was higher than their male counterparts. These results may suggest that for females to earn in the higher income bracket they need to be better educated. For the monthly income category of R51201 and more, both males and females with no schooling or with primary education were less represented than those with secondary or tertiary level. The proportion of males with secondary or tertiary education was higher than females even though there was a minimal difference. Nonetheless, males were more represented in higher earnings than their female counterparts.

A similar trend as above for the 2001 results has been observed where both males and females migrants with no income are represented in all levels of education. Between the two census periods the results indicate that there has been a decrease in the proportion of males with no schooling or primary
education and earning no income. Females who attained the tertiary level of education indicated a sharp increase. In the monthly income group of R1–R400 there were more males than females in 2011. However, the proportion of both males and females earning this income bracket decreased during the ten-year period. Males earning in the monthly income bracket of R401–R51200 were higher in proportion than their female counterparts. Furthermore, the results reveal that males were earning higher than females in the higher income category regardless of their educational attainment.

Overall, the results reveal that income earned by both males and females increases with level of education. This suggests that migrants who completed secondary schooling or tertiary education are more represented in the higher income brackets (from R3201 and above). Also, the results show that there are gender disparities in monthly earnings.

**Employment by Occupation**

The Table 4 below present’s findings for employed migrants by occupation in 2001 and 2011 census years. Comparing the two periods, the statistics in the Table below reveal that there has been an increase in African migrants who were employed in professional, high skilled occupation namely; managers, professionals, technicians, clerks, and service workers. Moreover, a proportion of those employed in the low skilled occupations have decreased. Therefore, this means that during the period there were more African migrants who joined the high skilled occupation. Looking at the 2001 results, the majority of African migrants were employed in elementary occupations (32.4%), followed by craft workers (26.7%) and machine operators (14.1%). Inasmuch as these results indicate a decrease in these occupations, a similar trend is observed in 2011 where majority of migrants were employed in elementary occupations (19.3%), craft workers (17.7%), service workers (17.8%) and domestic workers accounted for 11.5%. Nonetheless, a proportion of migrant workers who are employed as service workers and as craft workers in 2011 was equivalent.
Table 4: Employment by Occupation in 2001 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>4405</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>7893</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>4874</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>5407</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>15461</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural</td>
<td>7675</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft workers</td>
<td>45558</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine operators</td>
<td>23975</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>55152</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic works</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>170 402</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own computation using StatsSA 2001 and 2011 census data

To gain a better insight on the above section, Figure 5 below has been presented in terms of occupation and sex. Both sexes employed in high skilled professional occupations have increased during the period of 2001–2011 however females who were employed as professionals showed a decrease. Females who worked as managers, professionals, technicians, clerks and service workers were higher than males in 2001. Nonetheless, the 2011 results indicate that males employed as managers and service workers were higher in proportion than females. In contrast to the high skilled professional occupations, the results for low skilled occupations reveal that the proportion of both males and females decreased during the period. However, females in the elementary occupations show an increase. Furthermore, the 2011 results show that there were African migrants who worked as domestic workers (in 2001 the variable was not available). The proportion of females who worked as domestic workers was higher than that for males.
Occupation by Gender and Educational Status
The results reveal that the majority of migrants who were employed in skilled occupation such as managers, professionals, technicians and clerks had attained tertiary level education followed by those who completed a secondary education. Therefore, migrants with no formal education or with primary education accounted for a small share in the high skilled occupations. Regardless of the level of education, the proportion of African male migrants who were employed as managers and professionals was predominantly higher than that of females while majority of females were employed as technicians and clerks. Furthermore, majority of African migrants who were employed as craft workers, skilled agricultural, machine operators and in elementary occupations had no schooling, followed by those who completed primary and secondary education. In addition, migrants with tertiary education accounted
for a small proportion. A higher proportion of females worked in the elementary occupations except for those who completed tertiary level of education.

A similar trend with the 2001 results has been observed. The 2011 results revealed that Majority of African migrants who completed a tertiary level of education worked in the high skilled professional occupations while migrants with no schooling, primary and secondary education were employed in the remaining occupations. Moreover, the results reveal that more males than females were still employed in high skilled professional occupations while more females were employed in the low skilled occupations. There has been a decline in the proportion of those with a tertiary education (both male and female) who were employed as professionals and technicians during the period. Migrants who were employed as clerks have increased across all levels of education. Results also show that there has been a small increase in the proportion of African migrants who had primary, secondary and those with no education who entered high skilled occupations. Furthermore, migrants in the elementary occupations have decreased. The occupation ‘domestic workers’ was not available in 2001 however in 2011 this occupation was available. Henceforth, majority of migrants who were employed as domestic workers had no schooling, primary and those with secondary education; a small share had tertiary level education. This indicates that there were difficulties for migrants who attained tertiary level education to find better jobs as a result they ended up working as domestic workers in order to make a living.

**Employment by Industry**

Table 5 below presents findings for employed African migrants by industry between 2001 and 2011. The results reveal that in 2001 majority of African migrants were employed in mining (34.8%), agriculture (19.2%) and 13% were employed in wholesale businesses. In contrast to the 2001 results, there were variations in the employment of migrants within the industries. The 2011 census results reveal that majority of migrants were employed in wholesale businesses (20.6%), private household (14.6%), community service (14.1%), financial services (13%) and 12.7% were employed in the construction industry. Overall, there was a sharp decline in the proportion of African migrants who were employed in the agriculture and mining industries during the ten-year period.
Table 5: Employment by Industry in 2001 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>2001 Frequency</th>
<th>2001 Percent</th>
<th>2011 Frequency</th>
<th>2011 Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>32176</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>50932</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>58216</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>28008</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>10851</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>59346</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>4079</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>13010</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>88969</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale</td>
<td>21807</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>144932</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>3193</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>32785</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>7356</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>91614</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community services</td>
<td>9576</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>98913</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private household</td>
<td>10386</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>102672</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>167195</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>702592</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own computation using StatsSA 2001 and 2011 census data

In addition to the data in the Table above, Figure 6 below illustrate results for industries and gender. The 2001 results reveal that majority of males were employed in mining, manufacturing, electricity, construction and transport as compared to their female counterparts. The 2011 findings revealed that females who were employed in community services and private households industries were higher than males whilst the share of males was higher than females in the remaining industries. However, the proportion between males and females who were employed in the same industries were minimal. Inasmuch there has been an increase in the proportion of migrants who were employed in most of the industries except in agriculture and mining, females employed in manufacturing remained constant at 5.7% during the period. Furthermore, females in the mining industry increased in a small share from 1.1% to 1.3%.
Figure 6: Employment by Industry and Gender in 2001 and 2011

Source: Own computation using StatsSA 2001 and 2011 census data

Industry by Gender and Educational Status
The finding suggest that African female migrants who were employed in agriculture, community and private households industries were higher in proportion than males in all levels of education. Regardless of educational attainment a proportion of African male migrants employed in mining, manufacturing, electricity and construction industries were higher compared to females. The 2001 results also revealed that females who had no formal education and those with primary or secondary level of education were not employed in the electricity industry. However, only a small share of those who completed tertiary education was employed in this industry. These results suggest that females had little access to the electricity industry, which may be attributed to the nature of skills required to perform the job.

In comparison to the 2001 findings, the results suggest that there has been an increase in the proportion of African migrants (both sexes) who were
Structural Changes in the Participation of Migrants in the Labour Force

employed in construction, transport, financial, community and private household industries across all levels of education. Moreover, changes in the proportion of migrants who were employment in the following industries: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and electricity varied according to the level of educational achievement.

Employment by Type of Sector
The statistics in Figure 7 below indicate that African migrants were employed in all three sectors. The Table show that the majority (58.0%) of African migrants were employed in the formal sector, followed by 21.4% of migrants who were employed in the informal sector. On the other hand, 20.6% were employed in private households. Nonetheless, the difference between those in the informal sector and private household was minimal. In addition the share of males employed in the formal sector and informal sector was higher than that for females. On the other hand, females who worked in the private household sector were higher in proportion than males.

Figure 7: Employment by Type of Sector and Gender in 2011

Source: Own computation using StatsSA 2011 census data
Type of Sector by Gender and Educational Status

The statistics in Table 6 below depicts results for the type of sector by gender and educational achievement among African migrants in 2011. The results indicate that majority of African migrants who were employed in the formal sector completed tertiary education, followed by those who completed secondary levels of education. Furthermore, majority of migrants who were employed in the informal sector had no formal schooling, including who completed primary education. The proportion of males employed in the formal and informal sector was higher than females regardless of their level of education. Irrespective of the level of education, the majority of females were employed in the private household. The results show that a share of migrants employed in private households completed primary and secondary levels of education. Shown by the results, is that males (13.5%) and females (15.4%) who completed tertiary education were employed in private households.

Table 6: Type of Sector by Gender and Educational Status in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Sector</th>
<th>Educational Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Sector</td>
<td>17993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Sector</td>
<td>10713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private House-</td>
<td>6443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hold Do not</td>
<td>1521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>36670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own computation using StatsSA 2011 census data
Structural Changes in the Participation of Migrants in the Labour Force

Logistic Regression Analysis for African Migrants Employment Status

Table 7 below depicts multivariate analysis results for African migrant’s employment status for 2001 and 2011. The results show that age, sex and educational attainment are significantly associated (p-value<0.05) with employment status. With regards to the 2001 results, sex and age are strongly associated with employment status. The findings reveal that African female migrants were 0.202 less likely to be employed than their male counterparts.

Table 7: Binary Logistic Regression for African Migrants Employment Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Wald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.869</td>
<td>401.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male ®</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17535.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19 ®</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4786.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>621.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>751.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1858.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

359
Yamkela Majikijela and Gabriel Tati

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>50-54</th>
<th>55-59</th>
<th>60-64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1421.06</td>
<td>743.042</td>
<td>363.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3713.35</td>
<td>2335.14</td>
<td>1019.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>4.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Married ®</th>
<th>Cohabiting</th>
<th>Never married</th>
<th>Widowed</th>
<th>Separated</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>6 5 0 0 2 8 0 6</td>
<td>8 743.042 0 3 9 3 0 9</td>
<td>8 363.959 0 0 8 0 0 1</td>
<td>1 9 0 1 1 7 0 1</td>
<td>6 480.429 0 0 1 4 0 0</td>
<td>1 6.150 3 9 2 506.380 0 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2773.83</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6494.87</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational attainment</th>
<th>No Schooling ⊗</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>0 1 0 1 1 5 0 1</td>
<td>9 596.347 0 1 2 259.329 0 2</td>
<td>9 2 0 7 1 3 0 5</td>
<td>1.25 1717.98 0.00 3.48 1.11 5135.69 0.00 3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2073.26</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6494.87</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Province | Western Cape ⊗ | 1 4925.97 0.00 1 4925.97 0.00 | 1 6001.28 0.00 |
| Western Cape | 2 0 1 | 1 7 0 1 | 1 7 0 1 |
Structural Changes in the Participation of Migrants in the Labour Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>15-19</th>
<th>20-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-44</th>
<th>45-59</th>
<th>50-54</th>
<th>55-59</th>
<th>60-64</th>
<th>65-69</th>
<th>70+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>224.598</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.307</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>115.352</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.806</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1166.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>61.793</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.972</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>89.262</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74.182</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>801.349</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>804.729</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>71.604</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>252.342</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>286.528</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own computation using StatsSA 2001 and 2011 census data. ® = reference

As far as age is concerned, the probability of African migrants to be employed varied. African migrants aged 20-29 years were 1.154 times more likely to be employed than those who were 15-19 years old. Migrants who were 30-39 years were 2 times more likely to be employed. Furthermore, those who were in the ages 40-44 and 60-64 years were 3 times more likely to be employed than those who were 15-19 years. African migrants who were in the ages of 45-59 years were 4 times more likely to be employed compared to migrants who were 15-19 years old.

Marital status showed a significant relationship with the employment status. The results indicated that African migrants who were cohabiting
(OR=0.700), never married (OR=0.563), widows (OR=0.788), separated (OR=0.591) and divorced (OR=0.879) were less likely to be employed than those African migrants who were married. Changes in marital status variables have been observed between the two periods.

Educational attainment indicated a very strong significant relationship with employment status. The likelihood of being employed among the African migrants increased with educational attainment, implying that African migrants who are more educated had a greater chance to find work in South Africa. African migrants who have completed primary education were 1.461 more likely to be employed that those who were not educated. Furthermore, African migrants with secondary school attainment were 1.647 time more likely to be employed than those who had no schooling. Finally, African migrants who had completed tertiary level of education were 3.489 more likely to be employed compared to African migrants who had no formal schooling.

The results for the province of enumeration indicated that there were variations between provinces for African migrants to be employed. African migrants who were enumerated in Free State (OR=0.899), Gauteng (OR=0.752) and KwaZulu-Natal (OR=0.964) were less likely to be employed compared to African migrants who were enumerated in the Western Cape. Furthermore, those whose were enumerated in Northern Cape (OR=1.442), Limpopo (OR=1.808) and Mpumalanga (OR=3.053) were more likely to be employed compared to those who were enumerated in Western Cape. However, those who were enumerated in Mpumalanga had a greater likelihood of being employed compared to those who were enumerated in Northern Cape and Mpumalanga.

The multivariate results for 2011 were reported in the last column of Table 7. The outcome of binary regression revealed a strong significant relationship between sex, age, marital status, educational attainment and province of enumeration. In 2011 the odds ratio (OR=0.338) of African female migrants to be employed was still less compared to African male migrants. Contrary to 2001 results, in 2011 the probability of African migrants to be employed increased with age. African migrants who were at age 20-24 years were 1.642 more likely to be employed than those at age 15-19 years. Migrants at age 25-34 years were 2 times more likely to be employed. Furthermore, African migrants who were at age 35-49 years were 3 times more likely to be employed than African migrants who were at age 15-19 years. Lastly, the probability of African migrants who were 50-64 years old was 4 times more
likely to find employment compared to African migrants who were at age 15-19 years old.

The 2011 results for marital status revealed that the likelihood to be employed among African migrants who were never married (OR=1.061), widows (OR=1.631), separated (OR=1.162) and divorced (2.864) increased and were likely to be employed compared to their married counterparts. However, the divorced were 2.864 more likely to be employed than African migrants who were married. Finally, those who were cohabiting (0.770) were still less likely to find work compared to those that were married.

A similar trend was observed in educational attainment. African migrants who completed primary schooling were 1.212 more likely to be employed than African migrants who had no education. Whilst those who have completed secondary schooling were 1.585 more likely to be employed compared to those who did not go to school. To conclude, African migrants who completed tertiary level of education had a greater chance of being employed at 3.049 more compared to African migrants who had no formal schooling.

Results for the province of enumeration in 2011 revealed that there were variations between provinces for African migrants to be employed. Between the period of 2001 and 2011 there were some changes in the opportunity of African migrants to be employed within the provinces. African migrants enumerated in Free State (OR=0.544), North West (0.876) and Gauteng (0.744) were less likely to be employed compared those who were enumerated in the Western Cape Province. However, those who were enumerated in Eastern Cape (OR=1.401), Northern Cape (OR=1.848), KwaZulu-Natal (OR=1.137), Mpumalanga (OR=1.141) and Limpopo (OR=1.264) were more likely to be employed than African migrants who were enumerated in Western Cape.

**Concluding Comments**

The results revealed that the number of African migrants who were part of the labour force increased within the ten-year period as shown in Table 1 with an average annual growth rate of 13.2%. Inasmuch as there was an increase in the proportion of African migrants in the labour force over the period, the results further revealed that the proportion of males decreased while that of females
increased. However, African male migrants still constitute a higher proportion. The increase in females may be due to feminisation of migration in Africa as women have started migrating more to seek employment opportunities and for other various reasons.

Through the analysis of the statistical data, it can be concluded that from 2001 to 2011 there has been changes in the participation of African migrants in the labour force of South Africa. It can be noted from the findings in the analysis that the participation of African male and female migrants differs across the different socioeconomic variables. Furthermore, there were gender inequalities between sexes in relation to education, employment and income. Despite the increasing rate of females over the period, the results revealed that African male migrants still form a bigger proportion of those in the labour force. Given the apartheid history in this country, this outcome is no surprise as African male migrants migrated to South Africa to work in mines in order to provide for their families.

Even though there was an increase in the number of African migrants who entered the South African labour force, there were fluctuations and incidents that took place within the period. The period was marked by economic, social and political events. The South African government continued to amend the immigration policy in order to control the migration flows. Despite all this, South Africa still managed to attract many migrants within this period (2001 – 2011) as the number of African migrants increased in absolute numbers and in proportion.

References
Structural Changes in the Participation of Migrants in the Labour Force


Contributors

Kalpana Hiralal is an Associate Professor in the School of Social Sciences at Howard College at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. She teaches both undergraduate and graduate level modules on global history, women, gender and politics and culture and tourism. Her PhD dissertation focused on the South Asian Diaspora to Africa in the context of settlement, trade and identity formation. Her most recent book publications are: Satyagraha, Passive Resistance and its Legacy (Manohar 2015), Global Hindu Diaspora: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Manohar 2016) and Pioneers of Satyagraha: Indian South African Defy Racist Laws, 1907-1914 (Navajivan 2017). Contact details: hiralalk@ukzn.ac.za

Sultan Khan is an Associate Professor in Sociology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. His research interests are in the fields of urban sociology and social issues. He is the co-editor of the books (Un)Dressing Durban, Contemporary Social Issues in Africa and (De)Monopolising Paradise. He is a National Research Foundation rated scientist. His most recently internationally collaborated research project focused on ‘People, Places and Infrastructure: Countering Urban Violence and Promoting Justice in Mumbai, Rio, and Durban. Contact details: khans@ukzn.ac.za

Divane Nzima is a Doctoral student of sociology at the University of Fort Hare specialising in migration. He has a background in sociology of development, industrial sociology and industrial psychology. His research interests are in migration-development interactions, return migration as well as migration and family dynamics. Divane has written a number of articles on migration and parenting in low income countries, particularly Zimbabwe and South Africa. Contact details: dnzima@gmail.com

Shabnam Shaik is a lecturer in Anthropology at Rhodes University and a doctoral candidate in Anthropology (Medical). Her current work focuses on
Contributors

understanding the lives of HIV positive people amongst Muslims, in Durban, and their support networks. This area of research is also the focus of her PhD research. Contact details: S.Shaik@ru.ac.za

Karthigasen Gopalan is a lecturer in history at the University of Fort Hare having completed his undergraduate studies and PhD at the History Department of the University of KwaZulu- Natal. His research interests are on the Indian Diaspora, forced removals and identity. Contact details: KGopalan@ufh.ac.za

Gabriel Tati is Associate Professor at the University of the Western Cape (South Africa) where he teaches courses in demography, quantitative research methods and statistics. He has authored several articles in peer-reviewed journals, and book chapters. His publications have appeared in Development in Practice, Africa Spectrum, Espace Population Societies, African Population Studies, Geocarrefour, and AutrePart. Hommes and Migration to name but a few. From 2011 to 2015, he served as a member of the scientific committee on the Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Contact details: gtati@uwc.ac.za

Yamkela Majikijela holds a MPhil in Population Studies awarded by the University of the Western Cape. She graduated cum laude. Her research interests are in migration and labour market dynamics in South Africa. She had previously worked as a Population analyst intern at the Department of Social Development and as NRF research intern at Khenda marketing. Contact details: ymajikijela@gmail.com
Guidelines for Contributors

Manuscripts must be submitted in English (UK). If quotations from other languages appear in the manuscript, place the original in a footnote and a dynamic-equivalent translation in the body of the text or both in the text. Contributors must submit one computer-generated copy of the manuscript to the editor(s). The computer-generated copy must be in Word for Windows, and must have an Abstract and Keywords. It must also be submitted in the Alternation style.

Manuscripts should range between 5000-10000 and book reviews between 800-1200 words. However, longer articles may be considered for publication. Attach a cover page containing the following information: The corresponding author's full name, address, e-mail address, position, department, university/ institution, and telephone/ fax numbers. A brief summary of the biodate of all authors must be attached too.

Maps, diagrams and posters must be presented in print-ready form. Clear black and white or colour digitised photos (postcard size) or diagrams in pdf or jpeg may also be submitted. Use footnotes sparingly. In order to enhance the value of the interaction between notes and text, we use footnotes and not endnotes.

Authors may use their own numbering systems in the manuscript. Except for bibliographical references, abbreviations must include full stops. The abbreviations (e.a.) = 'emphasis added'; (e.i.o.) = 'emphasis in original'; (i.a.) or [...] = 'insertion added' may be used.

The full bibliographical details of sources are provided only once at the end of the manuscript under References. References in the body of the manuscript should follow the following convention: Mkhide (2017:14) argues ... or, at the end of a reference/quotation: .... (Ngwenya 2017:20).

The surname and initials of authors as these appear in the source must be used in the References section. Review articles and book reviews must include a title as well as the following information concerning the book reviewed: title, author, place of publication, publisher, date of publication, number of pages and the ISBN number.

In the text as well as the References, all book, journal, newspaper and magazine titles must be in italics.

The format for the References section is as follows:

Journal article by one author

Journal article by two authors

Book by one author

Book by one editor

Book by two editors

Chapter in an edited book

Translated book

Online resource